Are the preference axioms really rational?

Theory and Decision 23 (2):189-214 (1987)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.1007/bf00126305

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Must rational intentions maximize utility?Ralph Wedgwood - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup2):73-92.
Decision theoretic foundations for axioms of rational preference.Sven Ove Hansson - 1996 - Synthese 109 (3):401 - 412.
A representation theorem for a decision theory with conditionals.Richard Bradley - 1998 - Synthese 116 (2):187-229.
Pure time preference.Rosemary Lowry & Martin Peterson - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (4):490-508.
In defense of adaptive preferences.Donald W. Bruckner - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (3):307-324.
A preference for selfish preferences: The problem of motivations in rational choice political science.Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca - 2008 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 38 (3):361-378.
In defense of a constructive, information-based approach to decision theory.M. R. Yilmaz - 1997 - Theory and Decision 43 (1):21-44.
On Preference and Freedom.Prasanta K. Pattanaik & Yongsheng Xu - 1998 - Theory and Decision 44 (2):173-198.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-01-04

Downloads
179 (#227,353)

6 months
25 (#386,890)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

Money-Pump Arguments.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2022 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Optimization and Beyond.Akshath Jitendranath - 2024 - Journal of Philosophy 121 (3):121-146.
Bounded Rationality.Gregory Wheeler - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Does optimization imply rationality?Philippe Mongin - 2000 - Synthese 124 (1):73 - 111.
Defining "good" and "bad" in terms of "better".Sven Ove Hansson - 1989 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 31 (1):136-149.

View all 18 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.
Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality.Jon Elster - 1983 - New York: Editions de la Maison des sciences de l'homme.
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk.D. Kahneman & A. Tversky - 1979 - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society:263--291.
Risk, ambiguity, and the Savage axioms.Daniel Ellsberg - 1961 - Quarterly Journal of Economics:643–69.

View all 12 references / Add more references