Depicting second-order isomorphism and “depictive” representations

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):182-183 (2002)
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Abstract

According to Pylyshyn, depictive representations can be explanatory only if a certain kind of first-order isomorphism exists between the mental representations and real-world displays. What about a system with second-order isomorphism (similarities between different mental representations corresponding with similarities between different real-world displays)? Such a system may help to address whether “depictive” representations contribute to the visual nature of imagery.

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