Abstract

The paper discusses Schlick's Fragen der Ethik. It comprises of two parts. The first part analyses Schlick's metaethical views, his arguments against objective values and absolute norms, and his analysis of the meaning of "good" in general and "morally good" in particular. Further, it also tests these views against some plausible objections. The second part addresses an apparent tension in Schlick's conception. The underlying general thesis of the Fragen der Ethik is that philosophical ethics is an exclusively descriptive, non-normative endeavor: philosophy ought not to aim at proving what the good is, and which norms are objectively valid. Justification of values or norms may only consist in determining whether they are endorsed, judged as values or norms by a particular society. This is, however, the task of scientific ethics, i.e. empirical scientific research. In contrast with this proclaimed view, Schlick in the last chapter of the book also puts forth his own normative ethical views, i.e. his Principle of Happiness-apparently leaving the role of the moral philosopher and moral scientist behind and acting as a moralist. Moreover, it seems, that he relies on this normative principle to ground his analysis of the meaning of "morally good".