Raciocínio com Falsidades: Um Ensaio sobre Conhecimento Inferencial

Dissertation, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande Do Sul (2021)
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Abstract

The goal of this essay is to evaluate the claim that it is possible to acquire inferential knowledge from false belief. In order to do so, we explain the main problem and some preliminaries notions in the first chapter. In the second chapter, we evaluate the reasons against the possibility of knowledge from falsehood. In the final chapter, we examine the reasons for the possibility of knowledge from falsehood.

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Eduardo Alves
Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul

Citations of this work

Introdução ao infinitismo na epistemologia : uma resposta ao Trilema de Agripa.Samuel Cibils - 2023 - Dissertation, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande Do Sul
Em defesa das intuições: uma resposta a Rolla.G. Gaboardi - 2023 - Revista Opinião Filosófica 14 (2):1-25.

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References found in this work

Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.
A Theory of Conditionals.Robert Stalnaker - 1968 - In Nicholas Rescher, Studies in Logical Theory. Oxford,: Blackwell. pp. 98-112.
Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (3):247-279.

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