Conclusion

In The Matter of Consciousness: From the Knowledge Argument to Russellian Monism. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 241-242 (2023)
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Abstract

The chapter summarizes the book’s main conclusions. The main conclusion is that the knowledge argument is sound. All three of the argument’s main steps are prima facie plausible, and they hold up well to scrutiny. Some strategies for resisting them fail to adequately account for the dramatic change in Mary’s epistemic state after she leaves the room and sees colors. Other strategies merely relocate the original problem. Still other strategies at best reveal problems in certain ways the knowledge argument has been formulated and do not threaten more nuanced formulations. The remaining strategies run into equally serious problems—problems that are not avoided either by combining different objections or by rejecting the conceptual apparatus in terms of which the argument has been formulated. The knowledge argument is significant. It refutes all structuralist theories, including all standard versions of physicalism. Combining the knowledge argument with plausible assumptions leads to Russellian monism. But what form Russellian monism should take is left open.

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Physicalism and the Knowledge Argument.Torin Alter - 2017 - In Susan Schneider & Max Velmans, The Blackwell companion to consciousness. Hoboken: Wiley. pp. 404–414.
What is Russellian Monism?Torin Alter & Yujin Nagasawa - 2012 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (9-10):67–95.

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Torin Alter
University of Alabama

References found in this work

Combining Minds: How to Think about Composite Subjectivity.Luke Roelofs - 2019 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives.Godehard Brüntrup & Ludwig Jaskolla (eds.) - 2017 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press USA.
Consciousness, information, and panpsychism.William Seager - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):272-88.
Illusionism and Anti-Functionalism about Phenomenal Consciousness.D. Pereboom - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (11-12):172-185.

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