Abstract

Structuralism, as I will use the term, is the view that phenomenal character is fully determined by the similarity relations between experiences, that is, that the way an experience of orange feels is entirely a matter of its relational profile within the space of color experiences. This theory has been criticized because it seems to leave out what is often referred to as the intrinsic character of experience. However, these critiques have failed to convince numerous scholars, largely due to their reliance on intuition, a tool that many consider unreliable. Here, I present two objections to structuralism that rest on firmer ground. The starting point is certain structural claims about color experience that are widely accepted in the science and philosophy of color. Then, playing the structuralist game through and through, I argue that the structure of color experience is incompatible with structuralism. I formulate two arguments to show this incompatibility: one focusing on unique hues (red, green, yellow, and blue), and a second focusing on the rule regulating how pure colors (red, green, yellow, blue, black, and white) combine to form composite colors. I consider some possible counterarguments, provide rebuttals, and conclude that structuralism should be rejected.