Abstract

The concept of constitution is at the heart and the task of Husserlian phenomenology. The same notion of constitution that has also appeared in the field of law from its origins. The same? We are interested in asking ourselves here about the conceptual archaeology of constitution, and more precisely about the possibility of establishing a problematic link common to the double tradition that seems to make up this concept: on the one hand, the tradition of legal thought; on the other, that of the phenomenological philosophy. Our hypothesis in this regard is staged in four parts: first of all, we will make explicit the meaning of constitution within Husserlian phenomenology so as to analyze, on that basis, the semantic shift that Merleau-Ponty proposes from the gnoseological to the legal register of constitution. Then, we will seek to establish the legitimacy of this procedure. Finally, we will seek to determine the relevance, not only of a post-Husserlian, but also of a post-Merleau-Pontian phenomenological perspective on institution and its possibilities.