Abstract

Hilary Putnam, who was once one of the representatives and proponents of scientific and metaphysical realism, became an unrelenting opponent of metaphysical realism during the mid-70s. Having argued against alethic and ontological dimensions of metaphysical realism, he proposed “internal realism” as an alternative to it. Putnam's major objection to the alethic dimension of metaphysical realism was that this philosophy brings about an unbridgeable gap between the truth of a proposition and our epistemic justifications for it. As to the ontological dimension of metaphysical realism, he proposed the criticism to the effect that according to this philosophical position the world consists of “ready-made” objects. Putnam poses these criticisms because, as he argues, firstly, truth cannot be considered anything but the ideal justification and secondly, the world is not made of ready-made objects, but rather it is we that cut up the world into different objects when we take a conceptual scheme. Indeed, according to Putnam assuming any "external perspective", whether about truth or about ontology, is meaningless. Having introduced and reviewed Putnam's arguments in rejecting metaphysical realism, this article explains and examines the basic elements of internal realism. The results of this article show that Putnam's objections against metaphysical realism lack the necessary credibility and strength and at the same time his proposed alternative has serious problems that made to be addressed. By his chosen conception of truth, internal realism, cannot touch its stated purpose i.e. the removal of a huge gap between the truth of a statement and our knowledge of it. The ontological claims of internal realism are not, indeed, the reliable and true consequences of the thesis of conceptual relativity, which is considered as Putnam’s main base in this regard, but rather it is more a consequence of mistaking the linguistic issues with ontological ones.