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Philosophy of Science 79 (3):386-395 (2012)
Abstract
Opponents of Causal Decision Theory (CDT) sometimes claim (i) that it gives the wrong advice in Egan-style cases, where the CDT-endorsed act brings news that it causes a bad outcome; (ii) that CDT gives the right advice in Newcomb cases, where it is known in advance that the CDT-act causes you to be richer than the alternative. This paper argues that (i) and (ii) cannot both be true if rational preference over acts is transitive.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Will AI avoid exploitation? Artificial general intelligence and expected utility theory.Adam Bales - 2025 - Philosophical Studies 182 (7):1519-1538.
Rational monism and rational pluralism.Jack Spencer - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):1769-1800.
Causal Decision Theory is Safe from Psychopaths.Timothy Luke Williamson - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (3):665-685.
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References found in this work
Newcomb’s problem and two principles of choice.Robert Nozick - 1970 - In Carl G. Hempel, Donald Davidson & Nicholas Rescher, Essays in honor of Carl G. Hempel. Dordrecht,: D. Reidel. pp. 114–46.
Counterfactuals and Two Kinds of Expected Utility.Allan Gibbard & William L. Harper - 1978 - In A. Hooker, J. J. Leach & E. F. McClennen, Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory: Vol.II: Epistemic and Social Applications. D. Reidel. pp. 125-162.
No regrets, or: Edith piaf revamps decision theory.Frank Arntzenius - 2008 - Erkenntnis 68 (2):277-297.
Some counterexamples to causal decision theory.Andy Egan - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (1):93-114.
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