Abstract

Tis paper reconsiders John Stuart Mill's liberal-democratic synthesis, with particular focus on the internal tension between liberal individualism and democratic solidarity. While Mill seeks to harmonize the principles of personal liberty with the demands of democratic governance, his synthesis reveals deep contradictions, such as the issues of common good, negative liberty, moral neutrality and selfhood that negate the sustainability of liberal democratic discourse that acknowledges the rights of both the individuals and the community. By interrogating the latent tyranny embedded within his liberal individualism, the paper argues that Mill's approach, though foundational, remains inadequate for addressing the challenges of pluralistic democratic societies. Using critical and complementarity methods, the paper proposes a new theoretical approach — Dialogical Liberal-Communitarianism — which integrates Afisi's normative emphasis on relational autonomy with Habermas's procedural vision of discursive legitimacy. This reconstructed framework affirms the social constitution of individual identity while grounding democratic legitimacy in reason-giving and mutual recognition. Dialogical Liberal Communitarianism thus offers a more coherent and inclusive path for rethinking liberalism and democracy in ways that respond to the normative and institutional demands of pluralistic societies.