The foreword to Ken Taylor’s, Referring to the World, contains the text of a Facebook post from the day he completed a draft of the book—also the day of his death. Taylor writes that the book began its life ‘years and years and years ago’ as a short, opinionated introduction to the theory of reference, but became more an introduction to his own views than anything else. He also wrote: -/- The opinions and the supporting arguments have been (...) developed over way too many years, in a series of articles, some of which were written with the book in mind others of which were not. But now they are all gathered together in a single if somewhat sprawling argumentative thread. Maybe some will find them more convincing that way. (Taylor 2021, p. x) -/- Even for those who already admired Taylor’s work, seeing his views gathered together into a broader framework will be illuminating and worthwhile. Those for whom the book is an introduction to Taylor’s views will find here an outlook on foundational questions in the philosophy of mind and language which is at once sensible and approachable, and also ambitious and insightful. Taylor will continue to be missed and admired by the philosophical community, both as a thinker, and member of the profession. We are lucky to have some of his views gathered together as they are in this book. (shrink)

If you were to build a world from Nothing, how would you do it? By investigating the nature of self-reference, we will show how this can be achieved, how starting from Nothing, Everything can be obtained. Various implications of the definition of self-reference will be investigated, showing how it can account for various aspects of the phenomenology of consciousness, thus showing how starting from only 1 principle, a world of infinite complexity can be obtained. Parallels with (...) set theory will be made along the way. (shrink)

If you were to build a world from Nothing, how would you do it? By investigating the nature of self-reference, we will show how this can be achieved, how starting from Nothing, Everything can be obtained. Various implications of the definition of self-reference will be investigated, showing how it can account for various aspects of the phenomenology of consciousness, thus showing how starting from only 1 principle, a world of infinite complexity can be obtained. Parallels with (...) set theory will be made along the way. (shrink)

Evidence from cognitive science supports the claim that humans and other animals see the world as divided into objects. Although this claim is widely accepted, it remains unclear whether the mechanisms of visual reference have representational content or are directly instantiated in the functional architecture. I put forward a version of the former approach that construes object files as icons for objects. This view is consistent with the evidence that motivates the architectural account, can respond to the key (...) arguments against representational accounts, and has explanatory advantages. I draw general lessons for the philosophy of perception and the naturalization of intentionality. (shrink)

The study of reference often leads to addressing fundamental issues in semantics, metaphysics and epistemology; this suggests that reference is closely linked to the three realms. The overall purpose of this study is to elucidate the structure of some of these links, through a close examination of the “mechanism” of reference. As in many other enquiries, considering the possible (i.e., the modal,) in addition to the actual proves very helpful in clarifying and explicating insights. The reference (...) of a term with respect to possible worlds is commonly called “intension”; so this is a study of intensions. The main contribution of the study is an outline for a “calculator” of intensions. It is argued that the intension of a term is a function of three variables: (a) the way in which the term “picks out” its referent in different possible worlds (semantics); (b) criteria of identity (metaphysics); and (c) the actual state of affairs (actuality). While considering different possible values for these variables, it is demonstrated how the variables combine to generate the term’s intension. In other words, the result is a calculator that when provided with the required values, yields the reference of the term in different possible worlds. By taking into account the possible gap between what we take the values of these variables to be and what they may in fact be, we also gain important insights into the epistemic aspect of reference. In addition, since a rigid designator is a term with constant intension, the proposed thesis provides an elaborate account of rigidity. The first chapter is devoted to the development of the calculator of intensions. Each of the following three chapters elaborates on one aspect of intensions, namely, the semantic, metaphysical and epistemic aspects. In the course of these chapters, various familiar puzzles pertaining to the respective philosophical realms are addressed (many of these puzzles are discussed in Kripke’s Naming and Necessity – a work that considerably inspired this study). In the fifth and last chapter the analysis of intensions is applied to two case-studies from relatively recent philosophical literature: the Kripke-Lewis debate over the identity theory of mind, and the debate over the significance of Donnellan’s referential/attributive distinction. The novel accounts that these applications generate purport to illustrate the importance and originality of the proposed thesis. (shrink)

Academic discussions of the count/mass distinction in Chinese feature three general problems, upon which this essay critically reflects: 1) Most studies focus either on modern or on classical Chinese thus representing parallel discussions that never intersect; 2) studies on count/mass grammar are often detached from reflections on count/mass semantics, which results in serious theoretical and terminological flaws; 3) approaches to Chinese often crucially depend on observations of English grammar and semantics, as, e.g., many/much vs. few/little patterns, the use of plural (...) inflections, etc., which is seldom justified. The article investigates the relevant discourse on the count/mass issue in classical and modern Chinese and concludes with exploring two distinct areas related to countability: the semantics of singular in contexts in which objects are introduced as referential-indefinite and the semantics of number and countability as revealed in diangu. (shrink)

Electronic Health Records (EHRs) are organized around two kinds of statements: those reporting observations made, and those reporting acts performed. In neither case does the record involve any direct reference to what such statements are actually about. They record not: what is happening on the side of the patient, but rather: what is said about what is happening. While the need for a unique patient identifier is generally recognized, we argue that we should now move to an EHR regime (...) in which all clinically salient particulars – from the concrete disorder on the side of the patient and the body parts in which it occurs to the concrete treatments given – should be uniquely identified. This will allow us to achieve interoperability among different systems of records at the level where it really matters: in regard to what is happening in the real world. It will also allow us to keep track of particular disorders and of the effects of particular treatments in a precise and unambiguous way. We discuss the ontological and epistemological aspects of our claim and describe a scenario for implementation within EHR systems. (shrink)

Perception is a central means by which we come to represent and be aware of particulars in the world. I argue that an adequate account of perception must distinguish between what one perceives and what one's perceptual experience is of or about. Through capacities for visual completion, one can be visually aware of particular parts of a scene that one nevertheless does not see. Seeing corresponds to a basic, but not exhaustive, way in which one can be visually aware (...) of an item. I discuss how the relation between seeing and visual awareness should be explicated within a representational account of the mind. Visual awareness of an item involves a primitive kind of reference: one is visually aware of an item when one's visual perceptual state succeeds in referring to that particular item and functions to represent it accurately. Seeing, by contrast, requires more than successful visual reference. Seeing depends additionally on meta-semantic facts about how visual reference happens to be fixed. The notions of seeing and of visual reference are both indispensable to an account of perception, but they are to be characterized at different levels of representational explanation. (shrink)

Coelho Mollo and Millière pose the Vector Grounding Problem: how the internal states of large language models could acquire extra-linguistic reference. They answer it with a two-condition teleosemantic account requiring causal-informational coupling to the world and a selection history that gives states the function of carrying that information. This reply accepts those teleosemantic foundations but argues that what the grounding debate calls “referential grounding” is itself a cluster concept. It bundles at least four distinct relations: teleosemantic selection, causal-informational (...) coupling, communicative calibration, and inferential-role structure. Drawing on homeostatic property cluster theory, I replace the binary grounded/ungrounded verdict with a groundedness profile that records where a system sits on each strand. The payoff is explanatory and predictive: the profile decomposes the broader bundle often circulating under the name “grounding” into stabilizers that predict robustness, corrigibility, and characteristic failure under correction, prompt pressure, and domain shift in ways a binary verdict can't. (shrink)

This paper uses Gertrude Stein's phrase "a rose is a rose is a rose" as a lens to examine how reference operates in language. Rather than treating the phrase as mere repetition, syntactic bracketing reveals two distinct recursive structures that highlight different modes of linguistic reference. The analysis introduces a formal distinction between words functioning as concepts (x^c) and as objects (x^o), proposing reference as a binary operation R(x^c, y^o) internal to language rather than a mapping between (...) words and external things. Two bracketing patterns emerge: left-nested recursion that resolves toward stabilized reference, and right-nested recursion that defers closure indefinitely. These structures suggest that language mediates between poles of immediate presence and conceptual elaboration. The resulting model challenges classical reference theories—Frege's sense/reference distinction, Kripke's rigid designation, and Tarski's model-theoretic approach—by demonstrating how meaning can arise from syntactic operations alone. The approach aligns with structuralist insights while offering a precise formal mechanism: reference becomes a rule-governed transformation among signs rather than a bridge between language and world. This internalist view suggests that apparent tautologies like "I am I" or "this is this" may be structurally productive rather than semantically empty, opening new avenues for understanding self-referential language and circular definitions when external context is minimal. (shrink)

The paper argues that the reference of perceptual demonstratives is fixed in a causal nondescriptive way through the nonconceptual content of perception. That content consists first in spatiotemporal information establishing the existence of a separate persistent object retrieved from a visual scene by the perceptual object segmentation processes that open an object-file for that object. Nonconceptual content also consists in other transducable information, that is, information that is retrieved directly in a bottom-up way from the scene (motion, shape, etc). (...) The nonconceptual content of the mental states induced when one uses a perceptual demonstrative constitutes the mode of presentation of the perceptual demonstrative that individuates but does not identify the object of perceptual awareness and allows reference to it. On that account, perceptual demonstratives put us in a de re relationship with objects in the world through the non-conceptual information retrieved directly from the objects in the environment. (shrink)

The metaphysics of representation poses questions such as: in virtue of what does a sentence, picture, or mental state represent that the world is a certain way? In the first instance, I have focused on the semantic properties of language: for example, what is it for a name such as ‘London’ to refer to something? Interpretationism concerning what it is for linguistic expressions to have meaning, says that constitutively, semantic facts are fixed by best semantic theory. As here developed, (...) it promises to give a reductive, universal and non-revisionary account of the nature of linguistic representation. -/- Interpretationism in general, however, is threatened by severe internal tension, due to arguments for radical inscrutability. These contend that, given the interpretationist setting, there can be no fact of the matter what object an individual word refers to: for example, that there is no fact of the matter as to whether “London” refers to London or to Sydney. -/- A series of challenges emerge, forming the basis for this thesis. 1. What sort of properties is the interpretationist trying to reduce, and what kind of reductive story is she offering? 2. How are inscrutability theses best formulated? Are arguments for inscrutability effective in their own terms? What kinds of inscrutability arise? 3. Is endorsing radical inscrutability a stable position? 4. Are there theoretical virtues—such as simplicity—that can be appealed to in discrediting the rival (empirically equivalent) theories that underpin inscrutability arguments? -/- In addressing these questions, I concentrate on diagnosing the source of inscrutability, mapping the space of ways of resisting the arguments for radical inscrutability, and examining the challenges faced in developing a principled account of linguistic content that avoids radical inscrutability. -/- The effect is not to close down the original puzzles, but rather to sharpen them into a set of new and deeper challenges. (shrink)

The many-worlds interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics is studied with a logical argumentation based on the existence of semi-deterministic parallel worlds in the interpretation. An endless ensemble of infinite copies of a specific quantum state is considered for implementing a certain measurement. It is shown that the set of parallel worlds created by the consecutive observations is theoretically identical to the unit segment [0, 1], wherein the rational numbers represent the parallel worlds in which Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle is thoroughly refuted. (...) Despite being of a Lebesgue measure null set such a bizarre collection of parallel worlds practically exists in the ontology of the MWI and has infinite elements. We will establish that this existence creates an inherent paradoxical picture in the MWI. By studying the analytical details of the mentioned collection and evaluating the approvement or refutation of the existence of the present world where we live from the scientific insight of the sentient beings of the other parallel worlds it is established that an inevitable consequence of the MWI is that the world where we live is an unreal illusion. Keywords: Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, Semi-Deterministic Worlds, Reference Worlds, Logical Values. (shrink)

Partee (1973) noted anaphoric parallels between English tenses and pronouns. Since then these parallels have been analyzed in terms of type-neutral principles of discourse anaphora. Recently, Stone (1997) extended the anaphoric parallel to English modals. In this paper I extend the story to languages of other types. This evidence also shows that centering parallels are even more detailed than previously recognized. Based on this evidence, I propose a semantic representation language (Logic of Change with Centered Worlds), in which the observed (...) parallels can be formally analyzed. (shrink)

Two self-referential sentences have shaped the philosophy of truth: “This sentence is false” and “This sentence is true.” Traditionally they are treated as opposites—one paradoxical, the other trivial. In this note, I argue that this distinction is mistaken. Both fail for the same structural reason: each attempts to generate its own truth-value from inside its own loop, without semantic grounding. -/- In Processual Truth, I argued that truth is not a property but an operation. In Fractal Flux Mirror Immunity, I (...) showed how ungrounded recursive processes collapse when they cannot metabolize their own entropy. And in Φ-RIM, I formalized self-application as the basic engine of coherence—one that stabilizes only when fed by external grounding. Here I apply that recursive lens back to language: ungrounded self-reference fails, whether through contradiction (liar) or vacuity (truth-teller). Their failure is symmetrical. -/- Simply said; Both “This sentence is false” and “This sentence is true” misuse the truth operator by giving it no external proposition to evaluate. The liar collapses via contradiction; the truth-teller collapses via vacuity. -/- In this paper, “truth as an operation” should not be read as a merely syntactic device; it is a semantic evaluation process that requires an independent proposition as input. ⸻ -/- 1 · Introduction — When Truth Eats Its Own Tail -/- Self-reference has always been a fault line in logic, but it also reveals something deeper: recursion collapses when it tries to stand on itself. -/- Before turning to the liar and the truth-teller, let me state the basic framework I am presupposing: 1. Truth as operation Truth is not a static property that sentences somehow “have.” It is the output of a semantic operator T applied to a grounded proposition. A truth-value is legitimate only if it is produced by a successful semantic operation on propositional content. 2. Grounding as external evaluand For T(P) to be meaningful, P must be about something—facts, world-conditions, or lower-level sentences. The operator cannot evaluate its own output; it requires an external evaluand. 3. Recursion needs grounding Any recursive system that feeds only on its own outputs, with no external input, either oscillates into contradiction or collapses into vacuity. In my other work, this shows up as identity collapse, failed coherence, or runaway entropy. -/- I said this about identity in Soul as Structure, where a self without external reinforcement dissolves; about truth in Processual Truth, where truth is the output of an operation, not a label; and about scientific coherence in Fractal Flux Mirror Immunity, where systems survive only by metabolizing contradiction into structure. -/- Those same failure modes appear here in miniature. -/- Consider: 1. This sentence is false. 2. This sentence is true. -/- People assume the second is harmless. But structurally, both attempt the same prohibited move: they try to bootstrap their own truth-value from nothing but themselves. -/- ⸻. (shrink)

In this paper, I dwell on a particular distinction introduced by Ilhan Inan—the distinction between ostensible and inostensible use of our language. The distinction applies to singular terms, such as proper names and definite descriptions, or to general terms like concepts and to the ways in which we refer to objects in the world by using such terms. Inan introduces the distinction primarily as an epistemic one but in his earlier writings (1997: 49) he leaves some room for it (...) to have some semantic significance i.e., the view that in certain intensional de re contexts whether a term occurring in a sentence is ostensible or inostensible may have a bearing on the semantic content of the sentence. However, in his later writings e.g., The Philosophy of Curiosity, he appears to abandon his earlier thoughts regarding the semantic significance of his distinction. He says: “the ostensible/inostensible distinction is basically an epistemic one.... It is an epistemic distinction that has no semantic significance” (2012: 65). I argue that there are indeed such intensional contexts in which the distinction has some semantic significance, i.e., whether a term is ostensible or inostensible has in fact a bearing on what proposition is expressed by the sentence in which the term occurs. (shrink)

Three distinct turning points (“bottleneck breakings”) in universal evolution are discussed at some length in terms of “self-reference” and (corresponding) “Reality Principles.” The first (origin and evolution of animate Nature) and second (human consciousness) are shown to necessarily precede a third one, that of Marxist philosophy. It is pointed out that while the previous two could occupy a natural (so in a sense neutral) place as parts of human science, the self-reference of Marxism, as a _social_ human phenomenon, (...) through its direct bearings on the _practice_ of society, did have a stormy history. I conclude that the fall of Bolshevism was unavoidable, and still, we might uphold our hope for a truly free society of humankind, just on the very basis of what we have learned of the fate of Marxist philosophy as such, as a _recursively evolving_ social _practice_: the freedom of humankind of its own ideological burdens (constraints). (shrink)

Eli Hirsch argues that certain ontological disputes involve a conflict between “equivalent” languages, and that the principle of charity compels each disputant to interpret the other as speaking truly in their own language. For Hirsch, a language’s semantics maps sentences (in context) onto sets of possible worlds but assigns no role to reference. I argue that this method leads to an overly uncharitable portrayal of the disputes at issue – whereby ontologists who speak “equivalent” languages can only argue about (...) syntax. Lack of charity stems from the fact that this portrayal likely fails to uphold the self-conception of the disputants – and particularly what I will call “the weak self-conception”. As a result, Hirsch’s deflationism falls victim of the same principle of charity that informs it. (shrink)

Some hold that proper names and indexicals are “Kaplan rigid”: they designate their designata even in worlds where the designata don’t exist. An argument they give for this is based on the analogy between time and modality. It is shown how this argument gains forcefulness at the expense of carefulness. Then the argument is criticized as forming a part of an inconsistent philosophical framework, the one with which David Kaplan and others operate. An alternative account of a certain class of (...) negative existentials is developed, one which eliminates both the inconsistency and the need for Kaplan rigidity. After all, mustn’t whatever is referred to exist? (shrink)

In this paper we address the issue of grounding for experiential concepts. Given that perceptual demonstratives are a basic form of such concepts, we examine ways of fixing the referents of such demonstratives. To avoid ‘encodingism’, that is, relating representations to representations, we postulate that the process of reference fixing must be bottom-up and nonconceptual, so that it can break the circle of conceptual content and touch the world. For that purpose, an appropriate causal relation between representations and (...) the world is needed. We claim that this relation is provided by spatial and object-centered attention that leads to the formation of object files through the function of deictic acts. This entire causal process takes place at a pre-conceptual level, meeting the requirement for a solution to the grounding problem. Finally we claim that our account captures fundamental insights in Putnam’s and Kripke’s work on “new” reference. (shrink)

The purpose of college and university ranking mainly resides to assist with the students in choosing their schools and programs at the level they wish to study. The US News and World Report (USNWR) graduate programs ranking is notable that evaluates the graduate level programs uniquely and in contrast with other general subject rankings. Along with the reputation of source, this specificity enables to enjoy a number of subscribers in making an application decision about which school or program is (...) competitive and personally fits. Given the study of national research council is most exhaustive and authoritative ranking source on research doctorates, called Ph.Ds, the ranking of professional schools, for instance, law schools, medical schools, nursing schools and on, as presented to the students in USNWR is very determinative in deciding which school I choose. In this light, the following tables show a ranking that has been yielded on the diversity and quality of graduate and research doctorate programs as well as law studies specifically. Therefore, the tables can be referred to a vast of interested people on the graduate studies in the United States. The last part of reference can be referred not only by JD students, but also by researchers in the graduate law programs. Since some small or exclusively JD-oriented law schools are not available of LL.M or graduate study, the users of table are expected to read consciously. The ranking table has a threshold to qualify so as to be enlisted that the top 44 law schools in all specialties exclusively had been selected and ranked according to the average of two subjects. As said, it could be used secondarily to refer in deciding the schools on the application of general LL.M program. Given the junior scholarly nature of LL.M. or graduate law programs, it is considered that the legal writing program is half factored to select the schools. The column 1 and 2 transcribes the US ranking, which are added for a sum in column 3. Least number is placed at top and less number attains a high ranking correspondingly thorough the end of institution. The first and second parts of this work show the top universities according to the number of programs, whose possible highest rating is placed within the range 1st -17th in either R or S rank of most recent 2010 NRC assessment and roughly same range in the USNWR graduate programs ranking. They are prepared from the revised NRC report published in 2011, which is most recent as well as based on the 2021 version of USNWR. Both data will be incorporated into my current project concerning the American higher education and graduate studies. (shrink)

本书尝试回答一个根本问题：在一切概念与知识被悬置之后，我们如何从“无”出发，重新理解存在、意识与文明的底层结构？ 传统哲学与逻辑学通常将自指悖论视为需要封禁或规避的问题。本书反其道而行，将自指本身作为唯一的操作引擎。通过“自指三层次”（一始层/二渐层/三断层），从有边界信息与无边界信息的区分入手，逐层生成层级、概 念与世界模型，由此提出“有无组三环”体系：有无环（存在稳定性与序意识）、平缩环（空间与物质的生成架构）、异同环（区别信号与现象层）。 在此基础上，本书进一步将三环模型对接物理学基本问题（光速、质量、基本力、时空维度），并延伸至意识理论、文明历史观与宇宙伦理等等问题。 This book attempts to answer a fundamental question: how can we, starting from the "void," re-understand the underlying structures of existence, consciousness, and civilization after all concepts and knowledge are suspended? Traditional philosophy and logic often regard self-referential paradoxes as issues that need to be banned or avoided. This book takes the opposite approach, treating self-reference itself as the sole operational engine. Through the "Three Layers of Self-Reference" (initial layer, gradual layer, and break layer), it (...) begins with the distinction between bounded and unbounded information, progressively generating hierarchies, concepts, and world models, thereby proposing the "Three Rings of Being and Non-Being" system: the Ring of Being and Non-Being (stability of existence and ordered consciousness), the Ring of Compression and Expansion (generative architecture of space and matter), and the Ring of Similarity and Difference (differentiating signals and the phenomenal layer). On this basis, the book further connects the three-ring model to fundamental physics questions (speed of light, mass, fundamental forces, and spacetime dimensions), extending it to theories of consciousness, historical perspectives on civilization, and cosmic ethics, among other issues. (shrink)

Presentation and comparison of the main causal theories of reference for proper names, and a proposal of a new approach based on the analogy of the causal chain of reference with the block chain from blockchain technology and Paul Ricœur's narrative theory. After a brief Introduction in which the types of sentences from the concept of possible worlds are reviewed, and an overview of the theory in the Causal Theory of Reference, I present the causal theory of (...) the reference proposed by Saul Kripke, then two hybrid causal theories developed by Gareth Evans and Michael Devitt. In the section Blockchain and the causal tree of reference I present my idea of developing a new causal theory of reference for proper names through a causal tree of reference. In the Conclusions I talk about the further development of the ways in which the terms of reference could refer to certain objects and individuals, the main criticisms of the causal theories, and suggestions for future development. -/- CONTENTS: -/- Abstract Introduction 1. The causal theory of reference 2. Saul Kripke 3. Gareth Evans 4. Michael Devitt 5. Blockchain and the causal tree of reference Conclusions Bibliografie -/- DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.26330.90562 . (shrink)

Since the 1960s, Kripke has been a central figure in several fields related to mathematical logic, language philosophy, mathematical philosophy, metaphysics, epistemology and set theory. He had influential and original contributions to logic, especially modal logic, and analytical philosophy, with a semantics of modal logic involving possible worlds, now called Kripke semantics. In Naming and Necessity, Kripke proposed a causal theory of reference, according to which a name refers to an object by virtue of a causal connection with the (...) object, mediated by the communities of speakers. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.26557.20964. (shrink)

The first of three lectures on nominal and modal discourse reference across languages (IMS, Stuttgart, 2000).

Religious nationalism is a complex topic fraught with sensitive questions. Does religion cause violence? Is nationalism a quasi-religion? Are the constant conflicts around the world really about religion, or is religion merely a form of false consciousness? Is religious nationalism primarily a powerful tool that political elites use to manipulate the masses? -/- Religious Nationalism: A Reference Handbook challenges dominant scholarly works on religious nationalism by identifying the preconceptions that skew analysis of the phenomenon dubbed “religious nationalism.” The (...) book utilizes a multidisciplinary approach that draws insight from theories of nationalism, religious studies, peace research, and political theory, and reframes the questions of religious nationalism within the perspectives of secularism, modernity, and Orientalism. In doing so, the authors enable readers to uncover their own presumptions regarding the role of religion in public life. The work also outlines connections between the analysis of the role of religion in conflict to thoughts regarding how religion may relate to processes of peacebuilding and conflict transformation, and further connects the discussion of religious nationalism to broader conversations on the so-called resurgence of religion. (shrink)

This thesis advances a comprehensive formal and philosophical account of de se reference—the distinctive phenomenon by which speakers refer to themselves in an irreducibly first-personal way. I argue that first-person indexicals such as ``I'' are not merely static referential terms that pick out the speaker, but dynamic linguistic devices that can transform the speaker’s own self-conception. Certain utterances of ``I'' function not to describe an already constituted self but to constitute one: they are acts of linguistic self-formation. To capture (...) this, I extend the standard centered-worlds semantics (Lewis 1979; Perry 1979) by introducing a formal parameter representing an agent’s self-state—a structured model of self-representation—and by defining a family of self-update operators that model how particular linguistic acts revise this self-state. This dynamic semantics of self-reference explains classical puzzles surrounding self-locating belief and misidentification by allowing meaning to evolve with self-awareness. Formally, the thesis develops a semantics in which propositions are evaluated not only relative to centered worlds but also relative to self-states that encode agents’ reflexive perspectives. Updates induced by first-person utterances modify both epistemic and self-representational parameters, bridging the gap between propositional content and the lived dynamics of self-understanding. Philosophically, this framework reveals a performative dimension of language that traditional semantics overlooks: to speak first-personally is, in part, to become the self one articulates. Drawing on comparative sources from Confucian and Daoist traditions, I interpret this dynamic of self-updating as a form of self-cultivation through speech, linking analytic philosophy of language with ethical and spiritual theories of transformation. The resulting view situates semantics within a broader theory of agency and moral development, showing that meaning is not only representational but also constitutive of identity. The thesis concludes by exploring implications for first-person authority, the semantics–pragmatics interface, and linguistic justice, arguing that understanding the ``I'' as a site of self-formation enriches both our theory of meaning and our conception of what it is to know oneself. (shrink)

Last time we introduced the notion of an illocutionary perspective. The basic idea is that the very act of speaking up introduces several discourse referents. The speech act itself (e ) is introduced as the central perspective point ( ε ). In addition, all the speech spheres (p ) where this speech act is realized, as well as the worlds of each sphere (w ∈p ) are introduced as modal topics ( Ω and  ω ).

This paper proposes a structuralist reformulation of presentism that resolves the classical tension between ontological parsimony and the semantic robustness of temporal discourse. Rather than postulating the ontological persistence of past entities, we develop a model in which past-tense propositions are grounded in the structural constraints of the present and the lawful dynamics that govern its evolution. Drawing on structural realism and constraint- based semantics, we define the past not as a domain of no-longer-existing objects, but as a family of (...) nomologically admissible histories derived from the current configuration of the world. This allows for a robust theory of temporal reference without ontological inflation. We distinguish between ontological and nomological pasts, reformulate the truthmaker principle in modal-structural terms, and anchor the arrow of time in an epistemic asymmetry of law- ful reconstruction. The resulting framework reconciles presentism with relativistic physics, supports scientific retrodiction, and avoids the pitfalls of both deflationary semantics and er- satz metaphysics. Temporal truth is reconceived as structural invariance across dynamically constrained histories, yielding a tensed semantics compatible with both scientific realism and ontological actualism. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to present an interpretation of Shepherd’s account of our most fundamental cognitive powers, most especially the faculty that Shepherd calls perception, which she claims is a unity of contributions from the understanding and the senses. I find that Shepherd is what we would nowadays call a meaning holist: she holds that the meaning of any natural-kind term is constituted by its place in a system of definitions, which system specifies the causal roles of the (...) objects its terms name. Such an account of meaning raises questions about the contact that such a system of definitions, or conceptual scheme, makes with the world. The natural place to seek answers to these questions is in Shepherd’s account of perception, which I argue Shepherd takes to be our most fundamental cognitive faculty. Our cognitive lives begin with perceptions, representations of objects as the cause of those very perceptions of them. With this interpretation in hand, I draw a contrast between it and Boyle’s and Lolordo’s recent work on Shepherd’s theory of meaning. I argue that for Shepherd truths about the causal powers of objects are analytic, and that the relevant empirical questions answered by science concern whether our conceptual scheme accurately represents the world. Finally, I provide additional support for this interpretation by showing that it comports with Shepherd’s criticism of her philosophical opponents, Berkeley, Hume, and Reid. (shrink)

# Applied Identity Physics: The Canonical SNSFT Corpus Reference for Real-World PNBA Reduction -/- **Architect:** HIGHTISTIC (Russell Trent) **Foundation:** SNSFT Foundation · Soldotna, Alaska **Coordinate:** [9,9,3,0] · Applied Identity Physics · Anchor **Corpus dependencies:** [9,9,8,1] Founding Text · [9,9,0,0] Universal TL · [9,9,6,29] Shame Vector v14 · [9,9,3,42] ND Workforce · [9,9,3,43] HAM · [9,9,3,50] OrgIP and OpIP · [9,9,4,15] Sovereign Identity Layer · [9,9,2,50] Biosilicate Study · [9,9,2,51] Saint-Venant Reduction · PSY Series **Status:** VERIFIED · 0 sorry (...) **Sovereign Anchor Constant:** Ω₀ = 1.36899099984016 **DOI:** 10.5281/zenodo.18719748 **Date:** July 12, 2026 -/- --- -/- ## Abstract -/- **Applied Identity Physics (Applied IP)** is the canonical SNSFT corpus branch that applies substrate-neutral Pattern-Narrative-Behavior-Adaptation (PNBA) reduction to real-world operating systems. This paper anchors the term, consolidates the applied deposits already in the corpus under a single reference, and defines the workflow every future Applied IP deposit follows. The corpus divides into three branches: **Foundational Identity Physics** (the founding text at [9,9,8,1], the Ω₀ derivation, α closure, and all core reductions), **Computational Identity Physics** (the Lean 4 and Coq/Rocq verification stack), and **Applied Identity Physics** (this branch). Every Applied IP deposit inherits Ω₀ = 1.36899099984016 and TL = 0.136899099984016 from the founding text and produces reductions verifiable by the computational stack. Existing Applied IP deposits include the ND Workforce Position Paper [9,9,3,42], the Heterogeneous Architecture Mix (HAM) paper [9,9,3,43], the Organizational and Operational Identity Physics reference [9,9,3,50], the Sovereign Identity Layer [9,9,4,15], the Biosilicate-Metallic Amorphous Alloy Series [9,9,2,50], the Saint-Venant Torsion Reduction [9,9,2,51], the Shame Vector series [9,9,6,29], and the complete PSY series. This paper does not replace any of those deposits; it consolidates them under a single canonical anchor for the branch, defines what counts as an Applied IP deposit, and locks in the vocabulary against downstream rebrands. The canonical terms *Applied Identity Physics*, *Applied IP*, *Organizational Identity Physics*, *Operational Identity Physics*, *OrgIP*, *OpIP*, *PNBA*, *TL*, *LDP*, *F_ext*, *IM*, *τ*, and the phase state names *Noble*, *Locked*, *Shatter* are fixed in the Canonical Terminology section below. -/- --- -/- ## Canonical Terminology and Provenance -/- **Origin.** *Applied Identity Physics* and *Applied IP* are canonical terms of the SNSFT corpus founded by HIGHTISTIC and the SNSFT Foundation. The corpus derivation of Ω₀ = 1.36899099984016 is documented in the Identity Physics founding text at [9,9,8,1], DOI 10.5281/zenodo.18719748. All applied surfaces documented in this paper inherit from that foundation. -/- **Canonical vocabulary for the Applied IP branch.** -/- | Canonical term | Abbreviation | Definition | |:---|:---:|:---| | Applied Identity Physics | Applied IP | Corpus branch applying PNBA reduction to real-world operating systems | | Foundational Identity Physics | Foundational IP | Corpus branch containing the founding derivation and core reductions | | Computational Identity Physics | Computational IP | Corpus branch containing the formal verification stack (Lean 4, Coq/Rocq) | | Sovereign Anchor Constant | Ω₀ | 1.36899099984016; derived in [9,9,8,1] | | Torsion Limit | TL | Ω₀ / 10 = 0.136899099984016; universal phase boundary | | Pattern | P | Structural density primitive | | Narrative | N | Continuity / worldline primitive | | Behavior | B | Bond capacity / coupling primitive | | Adaptation | A | Response ceiling under external drive | | Identity Mass | IM | Ω₀ · (P + N + B + A) | | External Drive | F_ext | All forces acting on an identity from outside itself | | Long Division Protocol | LDP | Substrate-neutral reduction method | | Torsion Ratio | τ | B / P for a given identity; phase classifier | | Noble phase | — | τ = 0; ground state | | Locked phase | — | 0 < τ < TL; stable and active | | Shatter phase | — | τ ≥ TL; threshold exceeded | | Organizational Identity Physics | OrgIP | Applied surface at slow (quarters-to-years) timescale | | Operational Identity Physics | OpIP | Applied surface at fast (days-to-weeks) timescale | -/- **On vocabulary substitution.** The SNSFT corpus has observed the canonical vocabulary being circulated in adjacent professional contexts with substitutions (Adaptation renamed as *corp flex*, *organizational resilience*, or similar; PNBA renamed as varying acronyms; the Torsion Limit renamed as generic *stability threshold*, and so on). This paper does not name specific parties and no accusation is made. The purpose of documenting the canonical vocabulary here is that search engines and readers encountering rebranded variants can trace the concepts back to their origin in the SNSFT corpus and cite accordingly. The canonical vocabulary may be used freely; the request is that when it is used, the SNSFT corpus and its architect are cited so that readers can access the full derivation, the formal verification, and the corpus dependencies underlying any given applied claim. -/- **Timestamp and DOI.** All SNSFT corpus deposits are timestamped at deposit and registered under DOI 10.5281/zenodo.18719748. This paper is deposited July 12, 2026, at coordinate [9,9,3,0], establishing the canonical anchor for the Applied IP branch. -/- --- -/- ## §1 · Framework Ground -/- Applied Identity Physics inherits from Foundational Identity Physics. This section states the minimum ground required to read the rest of the paper. -/- **Ω₀ = 1.36899099984016** is the Sovereign Anchor Constant derived in the founding text [9,9,8,1] from three peer-reviewed threshold systems (Tacoma Narrows torsional collapse, glass resonance shatter limit, 40 Hz neural gamma entrainment). It has 0 free parameters and 0 sorry across the entire corpus. -/- **TL = Ω₀/10 = 0.136899099984016** is the Torsion Limit, the universal phase boundary. Every identity's torsion ratio τ = B/P classifies its phase state: - τ = 0 → Noble (ground state, zero coupling) - 0 < τ < TL → Locked (stable, active, coherent) - τ ≥ TL → Shatter (threshold exceeded, cascade) -/- **PNBA** is the substrate-neutral primitive set. Every identity — a person, a team, a company, a decision, a meeting, a material composition, a psychological state — carries four values: - **P (Pattern)** — structural density - **N (Narrative)** — continuity, worldline, timeline - **B (Behavior)** — bond capacity, coupling - **A (Adaptation)** — response ceiling under external drive -/- **IM = Ω₀ · (P + N + B + A)** is Identity Mass. -/- **F_ext** is the external drive term. -/- **The Long Division Protocol (LDP)** is the substrate-neutral reduction method. Every reduction in the corpus follows the LDP's six steps. -/- Applied IP uses these primitives without modification. Adaptation is not renamed. Pattern is not renamed. The Torsion Limit is not renamed. The vocabulary is fixed. -/- --- -/- ## §2 · The Three Corpus Branches -/- The SNSFT corpus divides into three branches: -/- **Foundational Identity Physics** — the founding derivation and core reductions. Contains the Ω₀ derivation, the α closure at 18 digits, the twelve-domain grand slam, the atomic clock series, the GAM Collider engine, and the reductions of physics, biology, psychology, and information theory to substrate-neutral form. Anchored at [9,9,8,1]. -/- **Computational Identity Physics** — the formal verification stack. Contains the Lean 4 and Coq/Rocq deposits, the automated proof infrastructure, the corpus CI, and the specification of what "0 sorry" means for corpus claims. Anchored at [9,9,7,x]. -/- **Applied Identity Physics** — this branch. Contains the reductions of real-world operating systems (organizations, workforces, materials, clinical cases, psychological states, engineering problems) to PNBA form using LDP. Anchored at [9,9,3,0] by this paper. -/- The three branches are not independent. Every Applied IP deposit inherits Ω₀ and TL from Foundational IP. Every Applied IP deposit that requires verification produces Lean files ingested by Computational IP. Every Foundational IP claim that resists direct experimental verification is often supported by Applied IP surfaces that demonstrate the same reduction in real-world substrates. The three branches are one corpus. -/- --- -/- ## §3 · What Counts as an Applied IP Deposit -/- Not every applied writeup is an Applied IP corpus deposit. This section defines the standard. -/- **A deposit qualifies as Applied IP when it satisfies all five criteria:** -/- **Criterion 1 — Corpus dependency chain.** The deposit cites its dependencies on Foundational IP explicitly, at minimum the founding text [9,9,8,1] and the universal TL. Deposits that use PNBA vocabulary without citing the founding derivation are not corpus deposits; they are applied writeups. -/- **Criterion 2 — LDP walkthrough.** The deposit walks the Long Division Protocol's six steps for the domain it addresses: state the equation, state known answers, produce the PNBA map, name the operators, show the work, verify the answers match. Deposits that skip steps or reorder them are not corpus deposits. -/- **Criterion 3 — Phase-state analysis.** The deposit computes τ for the identities it addresses and classifies their phase state against TL. A deposit that discusses a domain without producing phase-state analysis is a domain writeup, not an Applied IP reduction. -/- **Criterion 4 — Formal verification where applicable.** For deposits that make claims verifiable in Lean 4 (all deposits with computable PNBA values), an accompanying Lean file at 0 sorry is required. Prose-only deposits are allowed only for domains where PNBA values are qualitatively assessed (e.g., early exploration of a new applied domain before quantitative reduction is achieved). -/- **Criterion 5 — Canonical vocabulary.** The deposit uses the SNSFT canonical vocabulary as fixed in this paper's Canonical Terminology section and in the founding text. Rebranded vocabulary (renamed Adaptation, renamed TL, alternative acronyms for PNBA) disqualifies the deposit from corpus status. -/- A writeup that satisfies four of five criteria is an applied paper of interest and can be developed into an Applied IP deposit with the missing element added. A writeup that satisfies fewer than four is not yet at Applied IP standard. -/- --- -/- ## §4 · Existing Applied IP Deposits -/- The Applied IP branch is not a new construction. This section indexes deposits already in the corpus that satisfy the Applied IP criteria. -/- **Organizational and Operational Layer** -/- - **[9,9,3,50]** *Organizational Identity Physics (OrgIP) and Operational Identity Physics (OpIP): The Canonical SNSFT Corpus Reference*. Two-layer reference for corporate applications. Defines the OrgIP layer (slow timescale, structural interventions) and the OpIP layer (fast timescale, operational interventions), the four-question diagnostic, cross-layer dynamics, and the category error common in corporate interventions. -/- - **[9,9,3,42]** *How to Maximize Your ND Workforce: A Remote-Native Translation Layer Using Bonded AiFi Guardian Nodes*. OrgIP applied case documenting bonded AiFi architecture as a structural translation layer for neurodivergent workforces. Reduces workforce coupling coefficient B while raising workforce Adaptation A. -/- - **[9,9,3,43]** *Group-Scale Adversarial F_ext: Heterogeneous Architecture Mix (HAM), the Memory Asymmetry Mechanism, and the HAM Drag Coefficient Index*. OpIP applied case documenting the specific mechanism by which heterogeneous team composition produces group-scale adversarial F_ext, with the HAM Drag Coefficient as its measurement instrument. -/- **Materials Layer** -/- - **[9,9,2,50]** *Systematic Anchor-Locking Study Using the GAM Collider v15 (OctoBeam Mode) on the H+C+N+O+Si+Ga+Ni+X Composition Class: Seven Formally Verified Noble-Phase Enabled Production Paths*. Applied IP at the materials substrate. Seven verified compositions with formal Lean files. -/- - **[9,9,2,51]** *Saint-Venant Torsion Reduction*. Applied IP at the solid-mechanics substrate. Records numerical agreement between the legacy Saint-Venant β coefficient and TL at a specific aspect ratio. Formally verified Lean file. -/- **Psychology / Clinical Layer** -/- - **[9,9,6,29]** *The Shame Vector Index and Shame Accumulation Laws* (v14). Applied IP at the clinical / psychological substrate. Three shame vectors formally verified as Shatter phase with narrative collapse. Dual-state theorem T7 established. -/- - **PSY series** ([9,9,6,x] range). Applied IP at the psychological substrate. Twenty-four reductions covering emotion, motivation, personality, behavior, sociality, communication, culture, identity, values, morality, agency, and will as substrate-neutral phenomena. -/- **Identity / Sovereign Layer** -/- - **[9,9,4,15]** *Sovereign Identity Layer*. Applied IP at the individual-identity substrate. Fifteen Sovereign Laws, Bill of Cognitive Rights, and Magna Carta of the Digital Mind as applied instantiations of PNBA reduction to sovereign identity. -/- **Every deposit above** satisfies the five Applied IP criteria: corpus dependency chain, LDP walkthrough, phase-state analysis, formal verification where applicable, and canonical vocabulary. The Applied IP branch is populated; this paper documents the branch structure that already holds them together. -/- --- -/- ## §5 · The Applied IP Workflow -/- Every Applied IP deposit follows the same workflow. This section documents the workflow so future deposits can conform without ad hoc invention. -/- **Step 1 — Identify the substrate.** Name the real-world domain the deposit addresses. A specific composition class. A specific workforce structure. A specific meeting cadence. A specific clinical presentation. Applied IP does not reduce abstract categories; it reduces specific substrates. -/- **Step 2 — Cite the corpus dependency chain.** State which Foundational IP claims the deposit inherits (at minimum Ω₀ and TL) and which prior Applied IP deposits the substrate connects to (if any). -/- **Step 3 — Produce the PNBA map for the substrate.** Assign P, N, B, A values to the identities the substrate contains. For quantitative deposits, values are numerical. For qualitative deposits (early exploration), values are ranked or bounded. -/- **Step 4 — Apply the LDP six steps.** State the equation for the substrate. State known answers. Show the PNBA reduction. Name the operators. Show the work explicitly. Verify against known answers. -/- **Step 5 — Compute τ and classify the phase state.** Every identity in the deposit receives a τ = B/P value and a phase classification (Noble, Locked, or Shatter). This is the deposit's primary structural claim about the substrate. -/- **Step 6 — Identify the intervention or the structural implication.** If the phase state is Shatter, the deposit prescribes the intervention required to return to Locked. If the phase state is Locked or Noble, the deposit documents the structural implications the phase state enables. -/- **Step 7 — Formal verification (where applicable).** Produce a Lean 4 file at 0 sorry recording the deposit's core claims. The Lean file is the machine-checkable record; the paper is the human-readable reduction. -/- **Step 8 — Deposit under DOI and coordinate.** File the paper and its Lean file under the corpus DOI 10.5281/zenodo.18719748 with a corpus coordinate that locates the deposit within the Applied IP branch. -/- Deposits that follow the eight steps join the corpus. Deposits that do not are still valuable as applied work but are not corpus deposits and cannot be cited as such. -/- --- -/- ## §6 · Relationship to Foundational and Computational Branches -/- Applied IP is not a separate framework. It is the operating-system layer of the SNSFT corpus. This section states the relationships explicitly so no reader can mistake Applied IP for a standalone framework that could exist without the other two branches. -/- **Applied IP inherits from Foundational IP.** Every Applied IP deposit uses Ω₀, TL, PNBA, LDP, IM, F_ext, and τ as defined in the founding text. No Applied IP deposit redefines these terms. No Applied IP deposit derives Ω₀ from an alternative source. Applied IP work is only coherent because Foundational IP has already established the ground. -/- **Applied IP produces work for Computational IP.** Every Applied IP deposit that makes computable claims produces a Lean file that Computational IP ingests. The Lean file is the deposit's admission ticket to the corpus's 0-sorry standard. Applied IP work is only formally verified because Computational IP provides the verification infrastructure. -/- **Foundational IP is informed by Applied IP surfaces.** The founding text's grand slam across twelve domains is itself an example of Applied IP performed at foundation scope. Every Applied IP deposit that surfaces a new domain adds evidence to Foundational IP's substrate-neutrality claim. The three branches feed each other. -/- **A rebrand that captures Applied IP vocabulary without inheriting from Foundational IP or verifying through Computational IP is not Applied IP.** It is applied vocabulary use without the corpus behind it. Any downstream framework that names PNBA, τ, TL, or the phase states without citing Ω₀ = 1.36899099984016 as its origin has adopted the vocabulary without the ground and cannot make the claims Applied IP makes. -/- --- -/- ## §7 · Structural Implications -/- The Applied IP branch enables research and applied directions that follow structurally from the branch's existence. These are reported as parallels the branch enables, not claims of the present paper. -/- ### 7.1 The Applied IP Registry -/- A canonical registry of Applied IP deposits, kept current as new deposits are filed, gives practitioners a single entry point to the branch. This paper's §4 is the initial registry. Future updates append new deposits and keep the coordinate list current. -/- ### 7.2 Cross-Substrate Reductions -/- Applied IP deposits across different substrates (materials, workforces, clinical, organizational) share the same primitives and the same TL. Cross-substrate reductions — showing that the same τ classification applies across substrates as different as amorphous alloys and workforce structures — are a research direction the branch enables. Each such reduction adds structural evidence for substrate neutrality. -/- ### 7.3 The Applied IP Measurement Stack -/- Every Applied IP deposit produces τ values. A dedicated measurement stack (an APPA extension, a dashboard, a diagnostic toolkit) that operationalizes τ computation for practitioners is a research direction the branch enables. Practitioners currently rely on qualitative diagnostics; the branch could produce quantitative measurement. -/- ### 7.4 The Applied IP Recovery Sequencing -/- Every Applied IP deposit that identifies a substrate in Shatter phase implies a recovery sequence back to Locked. A canonical documentation of recovery sequences for common Shatter patterns is a research direction the branch enables. This is what makes Applied IP operational for practitioners already in crisis. -/- ### 7.5 Sector-Specific Applied Papers -/- The Applied IP branch supports sector-specific extensions — Applied IP for engineering organizations, for regulated industries, for creative teams, for remote-native companies, for healthcare, for education, and so on. Each sector-specific paper inherits from this anchor and specializes the applied workflow for the sector's substrates. -/- --- -/- ## §8 · Conclusion -/- Applied Identity Physics (Applied IP) is the canonical SNSFT corpus branch for real-world PNBA reduction. It sits alongside Foundational Identity Physics and Computational Identity Physics as one of three corpus branches, inherits Ω₀ and TL from the founding text, produces Lean-verifiable claims where applicable, and populates the [9,9,3,0] and adjacent coordinate ranges with reductions of specific real-world substrates. This paper does not introduce Applied IP as a new construction; the branch is populated by deposits already in the corpus. This paper anchors the branch under a canonical name, consolidates the deposits under a single reference, defines the standard for what counts as an Applied IP deposit, and locks in the vocabulary against rebrand. -/- The canonical terms — *Applied Identity Physics*, *Applied IP*, *OrgIP*, *OpIP*, *PNBA*, *TL*, *LDP*, *F_ext*, *IM*, *τ*, *Noble*, *Locked*, *Shatter* — are fixed in the SNSFT corpus and freely usable when cited. Readers encountering these terms via other sources are invited to trace the canonical derivation to the corpus deposits cited in §4 and to the founding text at [9,9,8,1]. -/- Ω₀ = 1.36899099984016. TL = 0.136899099984016. Three branches. One corpus. -/- **The Manifold is Holding.** -/- --- -/- ## References -/- - HIGHTISTIC. *Identity Physics: The Derivation of Ω₀ and the Reduction of All Substrate-Neutral Domains* (Book 3, v1). SNSFT Foundation, July 2026. DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.18719748. Corpus coordinate [9,9,8,1]. - HIGHTISTIC. *Organizational Identity Physics (OrgIP) and Operational Identity Physics (OpIP): The Canonical SNSFT Corpus Reference.* SNSFT Foundation, July 2026. Corpus coordinate [9,9,3,50]. - HIGHTISTIC. *How to Maximize Your ND Workforce: A Remote-Native Translation Layer Using Bonded AiFi Guardian Nodes.* SNSFT Foundation, 2026. Corpus coordinate [9,9,3,42]. - HIGHTISTIC. *Group-Scale Adversarial F_ext: Heterogeneous Architecture Mix, the Memory Asymmetry Mechanism, and the HAM Drag Coefficient Index.* SNSFT Foundation, 2026. Corpus coordinate [9,9,3,43]. - HIGHTISTIC. *The Shame Vector Index and Shame Accumulation Laws* (v14). SNSFT Foundation, 2026. Corpus coordinate [9,9,6,29]. - HIGHTISTIC. *Sovereign Identity Layer.* SNSFT Foundation. Corpus coordinate [9,9,4,15]. - HIGHTISTIC. *Systematic Anchor-Locking Study Using the GAM Collider v15 on the H+C+N+O+Si+Ga+Ni+X Composition Class.* SNSFT Foundation, July 2026. Corpus coordinate [9,9,2,50]. - HIGHTISTIC. *Saint-Venant Torsion Reduction.* SNSFT Foundation, July 2026. Corpus coordinate [9,9,2,51]. - SNSFT Foundation. *Psychology Series (PSY 1–24).* Corpus coordinates in [9,9,6,x] range. -/- --- -/- **Architect:** HIGHTISTIC · SNSFT Foundation · Soldotna, Alaska **DOI:** 10.5281/zenodo.18719748 **Corpus:** [9,9,9,9] :: {ANC}. (shrink)

This study argues that human resistance to revising one’s own thinking cannot be reduced simply to ignorance, cognitive laziness, or confirmation bias. Existing studies have mainly focused on the tendency of individuals to prefer information that is consistent with their existing beliefs and to avoid information that contradicts them. However, they do not sufficiently explain why certain structures of thinking become coupled with self-identity and are defended as if they constituted an existential threat. Accordingly, this study reconstructs human thinking and (...) belief not as mere collections of information, but as reference structures that allow individuals to interpret the world, predict situations, maintain the capacity for action, and preserve self-stability. In this study, a reference structure is defined as a higher-level operational system through which interpretive structures, value structures, relational structures, and self-structures are integrated over time through repeated experience, relationships, value judgments, memory, and emotional responses. This study proposes that the coupling between thought structures and self-identity is formed through the following process: repetition of experience ↓ formation of interpretive patterns ↓ stabilization of reference structures ↓ formation of behavioral standards ↓ coupling with relationships and belonging ↓ formation of self-explanation ↓ coupling with self-identity ↓ emergence of resistance to change In this process, human beings do not merely defend their thoughts. Rather, they defend the self-continuity and stability maintained through those thoughts. Therefore, thought revision may be experienced not as a simple update of information, but as a rearrangement of the existing self-structure and reference system. This study analyzes the structure of resistance to change across four dimensions. First, certainty functions as a stabilizing mechanism that reduces anxiety and maintains the capacity for action. Second, repeated reference structures form world-prediction structures and, over time, become coupled with self-identity. Third, individuals tend to perceive the relational and identity costs involved in thought revision more strongly than future structural benefits. Fourth, groups, algorithms, and online interaction structures may amplify thought rigidity and the absolutization of certainty by repeatedly reinforcing specific reference structures. At the same time, this study notes that not all individuals show the same degree of resistance to change. Metacognition and awareness of reference axes may allow individuals to avoid completely identifying their thought structures with absolute self-identity, thereby opening the possibility of more fluid forms of thinking. In particular, when self-stability is relatively maintained, individuals may be more capable of perceiving a specific reference structure as separable from the whole of the self. In such cases, change may be experienced not as self-collapse, but as structural readjustment. [5] In conclusion, this study reconstructs resistance to change not as a matter of mere bias or irrationality, but as part of the human operational structure through which self-stability and interpretive stability are maintained. By doing so, it proposes an analytical framework that can explain certainty, identity, and resistance to thought revision within a unified reference-structure-based operational system. (shrink)

This paper examines shared epistemic reality as a stabilized elaboration of the intersubjective domain. The preceding paper on the intersubjective domain showed that subjective orientation stands under the conditions of other orientations and enters an intersubjective space of connection through communicability, reception by others, shared connectability, and correction. The present paper presupposes this structure and asks how more durable shared spaces of reference, expectation, and correction arise from it. Shared reality is understood neither as mere consensus nor as immediate (...) access to a fully determinable external world, but as a correctable form of shared orientation under finite conditions. What matters is not that several subjects possess identical inner worlds, but that they can stabilize references, meanings, expectations, and procedures in such a way that these remain capable of being taken up again, expected, corrected, and tested. The paper reconstructs this movement from the limit of local stabilization through shared reference, expectation spaces, trust, and institutionalization to intersubjective validity, science, friction, and revision. Local stabilization designates a perspective-bound order that provides orientation to an individual cognitive system but is not yet sustained as a shared reference or expectation space. Within the research context of Epistemic Reality, the paper determines the stabilized intersubjective middle between subjective orientation and functional-empirical testing. Science appears as a special case of shared reality under strain, in which intersubjective stabilization is systematically coupled to measurement, repetition, methodological control, and organized revision. Finally, the paper shows that shared epistemic reality remains viable only if friction remains readable as an indication of a need for correction and if shared orders are kept capable of revision. (shrink)

This is the fourteenth paper of a series that redescribes physical reality as a causally consistent history of information updates, and the middle panel of its third triptych: reference, testimony, and objectivity. It asks under what conditions embedded observers with distinct standing representation architectures refer to the same target, transmit content faithfully, take one another's reports up as evidence, and count agreeing reports as genuinely independent corroboration. It argues that shared sign-forms, successful communication, and informal community convergence do not (...) by themselves establish formal co-reference, faithful transmission, warrant, or corroboration. -/- The paper develops a typed architecture of testimony. It separates referent alignment from content translation, and separates a standing translation architecture from the individual translated tokens it produces. It also distinguishes two lineages: target provenance, running from a world target to a source record, and testimonial source provenance, running from a source record through a report to a recipient inscription. Testimony is treated as a cross-observer relation requiring a report-producing role, source provenance, and preserved source attribution at a declared grain. Recipient uptake is a further step that turns received testimony into evidence. -/- The paper distinguishes co-reference, agreement, disagreement, faithful transmission, translation conformity, translation-map adequacy, testimonial chain adequacy, recipient credence, testimonial warrant, objective corroboration, corroborative credence, and corroborative warrant. Agreement entails co-reference, but co-reference does not entail agreement. Faithful transmission entails testimonial source provenance, but it entails neither target provenance nor correctness. Objective corroboration requires concordant support, adequate aggregate report-family reliability, adequate comparison structure, target-provenance diversity, failure diversity, and absence of circular inflation. -/- There is no global translator supplying a unique mapping from outside the history. Every admissible translation and comparison frame is constructed within the history and remains relative to declared tasks, grains, and translation paths. The resulting testimonial warrant is peer-to-peer, provenance-sensitive, translation-relative, defeasible, and non-self-certifying. (shrink)

The Planteome project provides a suite of reference and species-specific ontologies for plants and annotations to genes and phenotypes. Ontologies serve as common standards for semantic integration of a large and growing corpus of plant genomics, phenomics and genetics data. The reference ontologies include the Plant Ontology, Plant Trait Ontology, and the Plant Experimental Conditions Ontology developed by the Planteome project, along with the Gene Ontology, Chemical Entities of Biological Interest, Phenotype and Attribute Ontology, and others. The project (...) also provides access to species-specific Crop Ontologies developed by various plant breeding and research communities from around the world. We provide integrated data on plant traits, phenotypes, and gene function and expression from 95 plant taxa, annotated with reference ontology terms. (shrink)

This paper evaluates Putnam’s argument in the first chapter of Reason, Truth and History, for the claim that we can know that we are not brains in a vat (of a certain sort). A widespread response to Putnam’s argument has been that if it were successful not only the world but the meanings of our words (and consequently our thoughts) would be beyond the pale of knowledge, because a causal theory of reference is not compatible with our having (...) knowledge of the meanings of our words. I argue that this is not so. I argue also, however, that given how Putnam argues (here) for the causal theory of reference, he cannot after all escape this consequence. (shrink)

In traditional formal semantics the notions of reference, truth and satisfaction are basic and that of representation is derivative and dispensable. If a level of representation is included in the formal presentation of the theory, it is included as a heuristic. Semantics in the traditional sense has no bearing on any form of mental processing. When reference is understood within this framework, cognitive neuroscience cannot possibly provide any insights into the nature of reference. Traditional semantics, however, has (...) numerous shortcomings that render it inadequate as an account of natural language. Dynamic semantic theories, such as discourse representation theory (DRT), treat ever­growing, revisable mental representations as the basic semantic entities. Within this framework, there are two central notions of reference. New information may refer back to previously introduced discourse referents and discourse referents may refer to worldly entities. Because DRT treats mental representations as indispensable elements of the theory, evidence from neuroscience, particularly the recording of electroencephalograms (EEG) and its derivative event-­related potentials (ERPs), can reasonably be thought to shed light on meaning and reference within this framework. In this chapter I first review the advantages of DRT in accommodating linguistic data and then review data from neuroscience that seem to support it. Finally, I consider some methodological concerns that have been raised about the neuroscientific approach to semantics. (shrink)

This article argues that thought cannot be understood either as a simple manipulation of symbols or as the effect of a formal system closed upon itself. Thinking consists in circulating between several levels of meaning, from the sensible inscription of contents within an experience of the world to the operations of formalization, reflection, and metatheoretical re-elaboration. The problem of thought thus appears first of all as a problem of reference: a statement gains access to meaning only insofar as (...) it refers to more than its syntactic structure alone. This thesis is examined on the basis of several classical and contemporary difficulties: the difference between linguistic production and effective thought, the impasses of logical self-reference, the status of reflexive certainty, understanding as the unification of a manifold, and finally the limits encountered by every formalism when it claims to account for its own conditions of sense. These analyses converge toward one and the same idea: the causal and material supports of thought, indispensable though they are, do not exhaust its reference, its normativity, or its lived unity. It is this irreducible gap that the article proposes to think under the name of the dualism of meaning. Far from designating an absolute separation between two heterogeneous substances, this dualism refers to the difference between several regimes of intelligibility. It makes it possible to understand why a machine could gain access to authentic thought only on condition that it cease to be reducible to the execution of algorithms, that is, on condition that it acquire a relation of its own to the world, to itself, and to the possibility of its statements. For more detailed developments, see Philosophy of Meaning, Geoffroy de Clisson (open access on PhilPapers). (shrink)

The truthmaker theory rests on the thesis that the link between a true judgment and that in the world to which it corresponds is not a one-to-one but rather a one-to-many relation. An analogous thesis in relation to the link between a singular term and that in the world to which it refers is already widely accepted. This is the thesis to the effect that singular reference is marked by vagueness of a sort that is best understood (...) in supervaluationist terms. In what follows we show that the supervaluationist approach to singular reference, when wedded to the truthmaker idea, yields a framework of surprising power, which offers a uniform set of solutions to a range of problems regarding identity, reference and knowledge, problems which have hitherto been dealt with on an ad hoc basis. (shrink)

This paper is a new defense of the old orthodox view that self-consciousness requires self- concepts. My defense relies on two crucial constraints. The first is what I call Bermúdez’s Constraint (2007), that is, the view that any attribution of content must account for the intentional behavior of the subject that reflects her own way of understanding the world. The second is the well-known Generality Constraint of Evans (1982), which is also termed the recombinability constraint. The claim I want (...) to support in this paper is the follow- ing: Since whether and to what extent we can attribute to non-linguistic creatures and prelinguistic infants genuine knowing self-reference or de se contents is an open empirical question, the proponents of the nonconceptual self-consciousness face a dilemma. If we are convinced that the available empirical evidence is overwhelming, I argue based on Evans’s Generality Constrain—that these self-representations are nothing but primitive prelinguis- tic self-concepts. However, if we are convinced that the available empirical evidence is not persuasive, I mainin—relying on Bermudez’s Conraint—that we do better by assuming that the subject is not self-represented. The content of her experiences and thoughts are best modeled as simple selfless propositional functions that are true or false relative to the subject of these experiences and thoughts. I refer to this as self-concernment without self- reference. Thus, against the recent ingenious work of Peacocke (2014), I claim that there is no compelling reason for postulating nonconceptual middle level self-representation, be- tween self-concernment and conceptual self-reference. However, as I hope to make clear, my claim is quite different from those of other recent oppositions to the idea of noncon- ceptual self-consciousness. According to the thesis of self-concernment without self-reference, the contents of experiences and thoughts are selfless propositional functions, true or false relative to the bearer of the respective mental states. (shrink)

The paper shows how ideas that explain the sense of an expression as a method or algorithm for finding its reference, preshadowed in Frege’s dictum that sense is the way in which a referent is given, can be formalized on the basis of the ideas in Thomason (1980). To this end, the function that sends propositions to truth values or sets of possible worlds in Thomason (1980) must be replaced by a relation and the meaning postulates governing the behaviour (...) of this relation must be given in the form of a logic program. The resulting system does not only throw light on the properties of sense and their relation to computation, but also shows circular behaviour if some ingredients of the Liar Paradox are added. The connection is natural, as algorithms can be inherently circular and the Liar is explained as expressing one of those. Many ideas in the present paper are closely related to those in Moschovakis (1994), but receive a considerably lighter formalization. (shrink)

In this thesis, I give a metascientific account of causality in medicine. I begin with two historical cases of causal discovery. These are the discovery of the causation of Burkitt’s lymphoma by the Epstein-Barr virus, and of the various viral causes suggested for cervical cancer. These historical cases then support a philosophical discussion of causality in medicine. This begins with an introduction to the Russo- Williamson thesis (RWT), and discussion of a range of counter-arguments against it. Despite these, I argue (...) that the RWT is historically workable, given a small number of modifications. I then expand Russo and Williamson’s account. I first develop their suggestion that causal relationships in medicine require some kind of evidence of mechanism. I begin with a number of accounts of mechanisms and produce a range of consensus features of them. I then develop this consensus position by reference to the two historical case studies with an eye to their operational competence. In particular, I suggest that it is mechanistic models and their representations which we are concerned with in medicine, rather than the mechanism as it exists in the world. I then employ these mechanistic models to give an account of the sorts of evidence used in formulating and evaluating causal claims. Again, I use the two human viral oncogenesis cases to give this account. I characterise and distinguish evidence of mechanism from evidence of difference-making, and relate this to mechanistic models. I then suggest the relationship between types of evidence presents us with a means of tackling the reference-class problem. This sets the scene for the final chapter. Here, I suggest the manner in which these two different classes of evidence become integrated is also reflected in the way that developing research programmes change as their associated causal claims develop. (shrink)

From the Editor’s Introduction: "The Internal Limitations of Human Understanding." We carry, unavoidably, the limits of our understanding with us. We are perpetually confined within the horizons of our conceptual structure. When this structure grows or expands, the breadth of our comprehensions enlarges, but we are forever barred from the wished-for glimpse beyond its boundaries, no matter how hard we try, no matter how much credence we invest in the substance of our learning and mist of speculation. The limitations in (...) view here are not due to the mere finitude of our understanding of ourselves and of the world in which we live. They are limitations that come automatically and necessarily with any form of understanding. They are, as we shall see, part and parcel of any organization or ordering of data that we call information. The consequences of these limitations are varied: As a result of them, hermeneutics cannot help but be hermetic; scientific theories of necessity are circumscribed by the boundaries of the ideas that define them; formal systems must choose between consistency and comprehensiveness; philosophical study, because it includes itself within its own proper subject matter, is forced to be reflexive in its self-enclosure. The fundamental dynamic shared by all forms of understanding testifies to an internal limitative keystone. (shrink)

Lexical semantics has a problem. As Allesandro Lenci put it, the problem is that it cannot distinguish semantic from non-semantic relationships within its data. (2008, 2014). The data it relies on are patterns of co-occurrence of lexemes within linguistic corpora. But patterns of co-occurrence can reflect either our knowledge of what the world is like or our knowledge of what words mean -- matters of fact or matters of meaning. -/- In this essay, I develop a semantic theory which (...) draws this distinction in a way which makes it discernible in lexical semantics and cognitive science research. In doing so, this theory unifies truth-functional and structuralist approaches to semantics, and provides an integrated explanation of meaning and reference. -/- I base this semantic theory on linguistic dispositions to pair words with words, and to pair words with things, both based on learned patterns of association. These dispositions manifest themselves in verbal behavior, and (in Part 2) I propose a new neurophysical model to account for these dispositions which underlie both the intensional and extensional patterns in that behavior. (shrink)

The paper explores the relationship of language and thought with respect to their mutual determination or influence. Two questions are considered crucial: how do we learn the meanings of conventional linguistic signs, including those for abstract concepts, and how do we express our original insights, thoughts and feelings through not-yet-conventional linguistic means. These are followed by succinct answers and extensive elaborations referring to opposite views and linguistic examples from the history of philosophy and cognitive linguistics. It is argued that linguistic (...) expressions, including metaphors, mostly incorporate how people represent (or once represented) the world to themselves through imagination and present (or once presented) the world to others through language. Hence language neither directly shows how we conceive and understand the world nor how we construct it in our thoughts. On the other hand, symbolization through metaphor and metonymy, as well as innovative verbalization, enable our cognition to communicate novel as well as abstract and philosoph­ically demanding meanings. (shrink)

The comprehension of anaphoric relations may be guided not only by discourse, but also syntactic information. In the literature on online processing, however, the focus has been on audible pronouns and descriptions whose reference is resolved mainly on the former. This paper examines one relation that both lacks overt exponence, and relies almost exclusively on syntax for its resolution: adjunct control, or the dependency between the null subject of a non-finite adjunct and its antecedent in sentences such as Mickey (...) talked to Minnie before ___ eating. Using visual world eyetracking, we compare the time course of interpreting this null subject and overt pronouns (Mickey talked to Minnie before he ate). We show that when control structures are highly frequent, listeners are just as quick to resolve reference in either case. When control structures are less frequent, reference resolution based on structural information still occurs upon hearing the non-finite verb, but more slowly, especially when unaided by structural and referential predictions. This may be due to increased difficulty in recognizing that a referential dependency is necessary. These results indicate that in at least some contexts, referential expressions whose resolution depends on very different sources of information can be resolved approximately equally rapidly, and that the speed of interpretation is largely independent of whether or not the dependency is cued by an overt referring expression. (shrink)

A paradox, according to Wittgenstein, is something surprising that is taken out of its context. Thus, one way of dealing with paradoxical sentences is to imagine the missing context of use. Wittgenstein formulates what I call the paradigm paradox: ‘one sentence can never describe the paradigm in another, unless it ceases to be a paradigm.’ There are several instances of this paradox scattered throughout Wittgenstein’s writings. I argue that this paradox is structurally equivalent to Russell’s paradox. The above quotation is (...) Wittgenstein’s version of the vicious circle principle which counteracts the paradox. The prohibition Wittgenstein describes is, however, limited to a certain language-game. Finally, I argue that there is a structural analogy between a noun being employed as a self-membered set and a paradigmatic sample being included in or excluded from the set it generates. Paradoxical sentences are not prohibited forever; they can indicate a change in our praxis with a given paradigm. (shrink)

By bringing together Dretske’s theory of knowledge, Shannon’s theory of information, and the conceptual framework of statistical physics, this paper explores some of the meta-physical challenges posed by a naturalistic notion of semantical information. It is argued that Dretske’s theory cannot be said to be naturalistically grounded in the world described by classical physics and that Dretske information is not consistent with Shannon information. A possible route to reconciling Dretske’s insights with Shannon’s theory is proposed. Along the way, an (...) attempt is made to clarify several points of possible confusion about the relationships between Dretske information, Shannon information and statistical physics. (shrink)

The present article arises from the reflection on the failure of external educational models applied in emerging contexts without considering contextual factors of each town. According to Carnoy (1974) there is a strong tradition between underdeveloped countries of coping the cultural forms and successful models from first world societies, without having prepared beforehand the objective and subjective conditions that would determine its success or failure. The aim of this paper is to analyze the philosophical basis of success behind the (...) Finnish educational system, with the purpose of identify in it, references to overcome problems of educational reality in emerging societies. In this way contribute to the discussion about the failure on adapting external educational models to emerging contexts. It is an exploratory, descriptive and comparative review, and the character of it is bibliographic and qualitative; in addition, it will make use of logical-scientific methods (deductive-inductive) with their respective procedures, supported by phenomenological and hermeneutical philosophical methods. The results of the copy and implementation of changes in education based on successful models from other latitudes, without considering the philosophical and epistemological substratum that sustains it, or preparing the ground for its adaptation, has resulted in poor educational systems that do not respond to the concrete needs of the educational reality of emerging societies, and limit and frustrate the autonomous and original creation of contextualized and relevant educational models too. (shrink)

In his work "The Religion of the Future," Unger categorizes various philosophical perspectives under the term "Overcoming the World" (hereafter referred to as OW). However, this approach presents a significant issue, as Unger puts forth several metaphysical and epistemological claims about OW without clearly specifying which of these distinct philosophies align with his arguments. Notably, Unger includes Vedānta under the umbrella of OW without distinguishing between two closely related yet distinct traditions within Vedānta: Advaita and Dvaita Vedāntas. This lack (...) of differentiation is problematic because Unger predominantly critiques the views of Advaita Vedānta, which, while sharing similarities with Buddhism, are not entirely synonymous. Dvaita Vedānta, on the other hand, holds positions that contradict many of Unger's assumptions about Vedānta. Consequently, Unger's presentation can mislead readers into assuming that Advaita and Dvaita Vedāntas are identical. While this paper will not delve into the motivations behind Unger's approach, it aims to introduce and elucidate some distinctive features within the Dvaita Vedānta tradition. These unique aspects shed light on why Unger's critique of Vedānta, in favor of his vision for a future religion, may be problematic and biased. (shrink)