This book is both an introduction to and a research work on Meinongianism. “Meinongianism” is taken here, in accordance with the common philosophical jargon, as a general label for a set of theories of existence – probably the most basic notion of ontology. As an introduction, the book provides the first comprehensive survey and guide to Meinongianism and non-standard theories of existence in all their main forms. As a research work, the book exposes and develops the most up-to-date (...) Meinongian theory (called modal Meinongianism), applies it to specific fields, and discusses its open problems. Part I of the book provides a historical introduction to, and critical discussion of, the dominant philosophical view of existence: the “Kantian-Fregean-Quinean” perspective. Part II is the full-fledged introduction to the Meinongian theories of existence as a real property of individuals: after starting with the so-called naïve Meinongian conception and its problems, it provides a self-contained presentation of the main neo-Meinongian proposals, and a detailed discussion of their strengths and weaknesses. Part III develops a specific neo-Meinongian theory of existence employing a model-theoretic semantic framework. It discusses its application to the ontology and semantics of fictional objects, and its open problems. The methodology of the book follows the most recent trends in analytic ontology. In particular, the meta-ontological point of view is largely privileged. (shrink)

According to many, necessary existence either is or follows from a perfection. There is something to this. Part of what makes or follows from something’s being impressive is its ontological durability: it has a strong grip on existence. But a necessarily existent being does not just have a strong grip on existence, but a grip that cannot be loosened! So it looks like necessary existence either is, or follows from, a perfection. In this paper, I argue (...) otherwise and so argue that necessary existence neither is, nor follows from, a perfection. And if this is so, then not only is the relationship between necessary existence and perfection not what many take it to be, but work on God (or a good deal of it) needs to be reconceived. (shrink)

Natural languages generally distinguishes among different existence predicates for different types of entities, such as English 'exist', 'occur', and 'obtain'. The paper gives an in-depth discussion and analysis of a range of existence predicates in natural language within the general project of descriptive metaphysics, or more specifically ‘natural language ontology’.

The Existence Threshold (v2.1) builds on a statistically significant framework for understanding pattern persistence in complexity science. -/- Using the corrected formula Φ = R·S + D, this work validates that disorder is a necessary component of existence. -/- Features comprehensive experimental success across ten cellular automata systems, establishing testable predictions for self-organization, emergence, and entropy in binary discrete environments. -/- Keywords: Existence Threshold, cellular automata, pattern persistence, binary discrete systems, self-organization, emergence, complexity science, information theory, system (...) integration, thermodynamic entropy, Conway's Game of Life, dynamical systems, state transitions, reproducibility, implementation details, experimental validation, statistical significance, domain boundaries, consciousness hypothesis, cosmological expansion, dark energy mechanism, recursive processing, integrated information theory. (shrink)

In both everyday language and philosophical discourse, the terms existence and reality are often used interchangeably. This conflation is especially evident in debates on the ontology of time. For example, an orthodox presentist will say that only present things truly exist, treating all non-present entities (past or future) as unreal in an absolute sense – “all such objects are unreal, according to Presentism,” as one defender neatly put it. This paper serves as a focused extension and clarification of the (...) metaphysical framework introduced in Existential Realism – A Distinct Ontological Framework Beyond Presentism. It addresses specific questions raised by readers and critics: Is it coherent to distinguish existence from reality? What philosophical work does that distinction do? How does it help with longstanding problems like truthmaking, the status of unobservable entities, and future ethics? In short, while the original paper laid out the core ontological structure, this follow-up revisits its foundations to deepen the theoretical implications, refine key definitions, and explore practical consequences. Our central thesis remains: existence and reality are not identical. But here, we argue more sharply that separating them yields a more nuanced, empirically grounded, and philosophically productive ontology of time. We defend this view against objections, offer clarified examples, and explore its implications for epistemology, phenomenology, and ethics. We proceed as follows. Section 2 defines existence narrowly, in terms of presentness and empirical accessibility, drawing on the spirit of van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism. Section 3 then defines reality more broadly, to include causal and structural aspects of the world inferable beyond the present—illustrated through examples such as dinosaurs, future climate events, and cognitive anticipations. Section 4 explores how this distinction addresses several philosophical issues: the truthmaker problem for past truths, the ontological status of unobservable scientific entities, the phenomenology of temporal experience (in the sense of Husserl and Metzinger ), and considerations of metaphysical parsimony. Section 5 argues why this two-tier ontology is not merely a restatement of presentism or eternalism, but a distinct metaphysical framework. Finally, Section 6 summarizes our contributions and highlights new directions this view opens—particularly in ethics (e.g., our duties to future persons), AI models of time, and decision theory under uncertainty. Throughout, we maintain an academic tone and use end-of-paragraph references in line with the original paper’s style. Our aim is for this article to stand on its own as a focused argument on the existence–reality distinction, while continuing and enriching the foundation laid by Existential Realism. (shrink)

The currently standard philosophical conception of existence makes a connection between three things: certain ways of talking about existence and being in natural language; certain natural language idioms of quantification; and the formal representation of these in logical languages. Thus a claim like ‘Prime numbers exist’ is treated as equivalent to ‘There is at least one prime number’ and this is in turn equivalent to ‘Some thing is a prime number’. The verb ‘exist’, the verb phrase ‘there is’ (...) and the quantifier ‘some’ are treated as all playing similar roles, and these roles are made explicit in the standard common formalization of all three sentences by a single formula of first-order logic: ‘(∃ x )[P( x ) & N( x )]’, where ‘P( x )’ abbreviates ‘ x is prime’ and ‘N( x )’ abbreviates ‘ x is a number’. The logical quantifier ‘∃’ accordingly symbolizes in context the role played by the English words ‘exists’, ‘some’ and ‘there is’. (shrink)

This paper develops a phenomenological and biologically grounded account of human consciousness centered on structural interconnection and meta-awareness. It argues that no individual exists in isolation; biological, ecological, linguistic, and psychological processes form a relational field within which identity emerges. Psychological suffering arises not from thought itself but from identification with thought—mistaking transient cognitive activity for a stable self. -/- Building on phenomenological insights from Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, the paper reframes meta-cognition as a biologically grounded capacity for recursive (...) awareness: the mind’s ability to observe its own processes. This meta-awareness weakens narrative identification and reduces reactive cruelty, allowing compassion to emerge as a structural consequence of clear perception rather than moral prescription. -/- The study further diagnoses a defining tension of modern civilization: a structural asymmetry between rapidly expanding scientific capability and uneven development of reflective wisdom. Science systematically increases predictive power and technological control but does not inherently regulate ethical maturity. When capability expands without corresponding awareness, technological amplification intensifies unexamined psychological conditioning. -/- The paper proposes a reintegration of science and lived philosophy. Philosophy is redefined not as abstract theorization but as sustained self-observation—meditative awareness of thought and emotion within relational existence. The integration of empirical knowledge with meta-cognitive maturity is presented as essential for sustainable human development and civilizational stability. (shrink)

This essay considers Kant’s theory of modality in light of a debate in contemporary modal metaphysics and modal logic concerning the Barcan formulas. The comparison provides a new and fruitful perspective on Kant’s complex and sometimes confusing claims about possibility and necessity. Two central Kantian principles provide the starting point for the comparison: that the possible must be grounded in the actual and that existence is not a real predicate. Both are shown to be intimately connected to the Barcan (...) formulas, and Kant’s views on what he distinguishes as three different kinds of modality are then considered in light of this connection. (shrink)

Ted Sider has famously argued that existence, in the unrestricted sense of ontology, cannot be vague, as long as vagueness is modeled by means of precisifications. The first section of Chapter 9 exposes some controversial assumptions underlying Sider’s alleged reductio of vague existence. The upshot of the discussion is that, although existence cannot be vague, it can be super-vague, i.e. higher-order vague, for all orders. The second section develops and defends a novel framework, dubbed negative supervaluationary semantics, (...) which makes room for the possibility of super-vague existence. (shrink)

Considering whether existence, i.e., being, is a thing might seem like the height of aimless metaphysical chin stroking. However, the issue—specifically, whether existence is a quality—is significant, bearing on how reality, this all-encompassing totality, is. On one view, reality at large is ontologically fixed, the sum total of things does not (and cannot) vary; on another view, reality is ontologically transient, the sum total of things varies. I first show that if existence is a thing, that reality (...) is ontologically fixed follows. So I consider whether existence is indeed a thing. I demonstrate that “it” could not be: existence is no existent. I then discuss what it is to exist, given existence is nothing at all. I maintain there are no grounds for the view that reality is ontologically fixed. I argue, from the irrefragable basis of temporal differentiation—the world going from thus…to as so—that reality is ontologically transient. I consider some objections to ontological transience and conclude by considering the key to understanding the overall structure in reality and what it reveals about how very inconstant all this is. (shrink)

This thesis addresses the fundamental philosophical question of whether liminal existence can be defined and measured as an ontological category distinct from conventional binaries of being and non-being. Through the development of a novel theoretical framework termed Quantum-Phenomenological Liminal Ontology (QPLO), this research demonstrates that liminal states constitute a measurable third ontological category that transcends traditional binary classifications. The QPLO framework integrates insights from quantum measurement theory, phenomenological methodology, and consciousness studies to provide both theoretical foundation and empirical validation (...) for liminal existence as a fundamental aspect of reality. -/- The research introduces the Liminal Coherence Index (LCI) as a quantitative measure for assessing the degree of liminality in various entities, ranging from consciousness and quantum states to social phenomena and cultural constructs. Through comprehensive empirical validation involving intersubjective measurement protocols and quantum analogy testing, this thesis establishes that liminal existence exhibits measurable properties including superposition characteristics, observer dependence, phenomenological accessibility, temporal dynamics, and relational constitution. -/- Key findings demonstrate that entities traditionally considered paradoxical or ambiguous—such as consciousness, quantum superposition states, dreams, and social identities—exhibit high liminal coherence indices, suggesting they belong to a distinct ontological category that cannot be adequately captured by binary being/non-being frameworks. The research provides compelling evidence that liminal existence represents a fundamental aspect of reality that requires new ontological categories and measurement methodologies to be properly understood and studied. -/- This work contributes to multiple fields including philosophy of mind, quantum ontology, phenomenology, and consciousness studies by offering a unified framework for understanding and measuring states that exist "between" conventional ontological categories. The implications extend to practical applications in psychology, anthropology, quantum biology, and artificial intelligence research. (shrink)

Timothy Williamson has argued for the radical conclusion that everything necessarily exists. In this paper, I assume that the conclusion of Williamson’s argument is more incredible than the denial of his premises. Under the assumption that Williamson is mistaken, I argue for the claim that there are some structured propositions which have constituents that might not have existed. If those constituents had not existed, then the propositions would have had an unfilled role; they would have been gappy. This gappy propositions (...) view allows for a plausible response to Williamson’s argument. Additionally, a slight variant of the gappy propositions view allows for plausible defense of Linguistic Ersatzism from the problem of contingent non-existents (also known as the problem of aliens). (shrink)

This essay examines the role of non-existent objects in "epistemological ontology" — the study of the entities that make thinking possible. An earlier revision of Meinong's Theory of Objects is reviewed, Meinong's notions of Quasisein and Außersein are discussed, and a theory of Meinongian objects as "combinatorially possible" entities is presented.

This article proposes a fundamental reversal in metaphysical orientation: instead of grounding existence in being, it interprets being as a local articulation within a more primary ontological condition. Drawing from phenomenology, process philosophy, and structural realism, the paper develops a non-substantialist ontology of configuration, wherein entities are not primitives but outcomes of differential stabilization. Existence is not treated as a genus, a property, or a quantifier, but as a transcendental operator of ontological effectuation, a pre-categorial regime that enables (...) the emergence, articulation, and intelligibility of being. This framework challenges classical ontologies and redefines the role of general philosophy as the epistemology of effectuation, rather than the doctrine of objects. The model introduces a stratified account of ontological configurations, to be further developed in subsequent work. (shrink)

This paper investigates the connection between two recent trends in philosophy: higher-orderism and conceptual engineering. Higher-orderists use higher-order quantifiers (in particular quantifiers binding variables that occupy the syntactic positions of predicates) to express certain key metaphysical doctrines, such as the claim that there are properties. I argue that, on a natural construal, the higher-orderist approach involves an engineering project concerning, among others, the concept of existence. I distinguish between a modest construal of this project, on which it aims at (...) engineering higher-order analogues of the familiar notion of first-order existence, and an ambitious construal, on which it additionally aims at engineering a broadened notion of existence that subsumes first-order and higher-order existence. After identifying a substantial problem for the ambitious project, I investigate a possible response which is based on adopting a cumulative type theory as the background higher-order logic. While effective against the problem at hand, this strategy turns out to undermine a major reason to embrace higher-orderism in the first place, namely the idea that higher-orderism dissolves a range of otherwise intractable debates in metaphysics. Higher-orderists are therefore best advised to pursue their engineering project on the modest variant and against the background of standard type theory. (shrink)

Semantic externalism in the style of McDowell and Evans faces a puzzle formulated by Pryor: to explain that a sentence such as ‘Jack exists’ is only a posteriori knowable, despite being logically entailed by the seemingly logical truth ‘Jack is self-identical’, and hence being itself a logical truth and therefore a priori knowable. Free logics can dissolve the puzzle. Moreover, Pryor has argued that the existentially hedged ‘If Jack exists, then Jack is self-identical’, when properly formalised, is a logical truth (...) in a system of neutral free logic and therefore a priori knowable, while it does not entail that Jack exists. The latter holds also for negative free logic. In response, Yeakel has argued that on any system of neutral free logic existence hedges will either entail some unwanted existence claims or they will not entail some wanted existence claims. The dilemma also holds for any non-positive free logic. It will be shown that the extension of one of the systems of neutral free logic with a truth operator escapes Yeakel's dilemma, whereas no other non-positive free logic when extended with the truth operator does the same (or it breaks quantifier exchangeability). (shrink)

This paper provides a logical proof of the non-existence of “infinity” within the hierarchy of physical reality, grounded in the laws of thermodynamics and information theory. Building upon the author’s previous definition of existence as difference (Saito, 2025), I demonstrate that the maintenance of any such difference requires a minimum thermodynamic energy cost, as dictated by Landauer’s Principle. Given that the total energy of the universe is finite, the number of definable differences is necessarily capped at a physical (...) upper bound. Consequently, infinity cannot manifest as an actual entity within the realm of physical existence. Furthermore, this proof is applied to resolve the Continuum Hypothesis (CH) by illustrating how the fundamental resolution of physical space (Planck scale) renders questions of infinite cardinality moot. I conclude by re-defining the universe as a dynamic computing system with finite resources, establishing the logical foundation for the Principle of Mutual Optimization to be detailed in subsequent works. (shrink)

This paper investigates the possibility of experiencing existence itself independently of psychological conditioning, conceptual interpretation, and self-referential identification. Human perception is ordinarily mediated through memory, belief, comparison, expectation, and the psychological structure commonly identified as the self. As a result, experience becomes an encounter with mental representations rather than with existence directly. Through a phenomenological analysis, this paper argues that existence can be encountered immediately when psychological mediation subsides. Such experiencing is neither mystical nor theoretical but constitutes (...) a direct awareness of being prior to conceptualization. The inquiry explores the relationship between consciousness, identity, perception, and presence, proposing that the direct experiencing of existence reveals a mode of awareness free from psychological division. (shrink)

This paper develops a structural account of ideal existence based on the universal features of consciousness. Consciousness consists of awareness that produces desire, making non-imposition the only moral system consistent with universal desire fulfillment. From this foundation, ideal existence is defined as a state of perfect liberty and complete opportunity. Yet ideal existence contains an inherent limitation: knowledge is finite while time is infinite, causing novelty to eventually exhaust and existence to become burdensome. This is a (...) God’s Problem—one that any eternal being must face. The universe solves this problem by functioning as a random generator of complexity, producing new objects, experiences, and conscious beings that expand the total pool of knowledge and preserve novelty. Moral duality—creation versus control—further explains the divergence of conscious motion and the necessity of separate domains. An evaluation of atheistic, Eastern, and monotheistic explanations shows that only ideal existence is morally consistent, logically sufficient, and compatible with observed reality. The paper concludes that if existence is ideal, the structure described herein is what existence must be. (shrink)

Most metaphysicians take it for granted that existence comes first and constitutive character comes later. Something must exist before it can be anything. This paper argues that this assumption is not only false but structurally impossible. Three independent lines of argument—one from the ur‑fact that all being is determinate, one from the structure of creaturely gift, and one from the constitutive triadicity of the ground—converge on the same result: existence and constituency are one act. There is no bare (...) existence awaiting determination, no prior substrate beneath particularity, no non‑relational moment beneath relational actuality. The paper shows that both unity‑substance and constraint‑structure ontologies rely on a dogma that cannot be met, and that constitutive relational actuality is the only position that matches what existence itself requires. Readers interested in grounding, priority, or the structure of being will find that the argument forces a rethinking of what “to exist” can coherently mean. (shrink)

Metaphysicians who are aware of modern physics usually follow Putnam (1967) in arguing that Special Theory of Relativity is incompatible with the view that what exists is only what exists now or presently. Partisans of presentism (the motto ‘only present things exist’) had very difficult times since, and no presentist theory of time seems to have been able to satisfactorily counter the objection raised from Special Relativity. One of the strategies offered to the presentist consists in relativizing existence to (...) inertial frames. This unfashionable strategy has been accused of counterfeiting, since the meaning of the concept of existence would be incompatible with its relativization. Therefore, existence could only be relativistically invariant. In this paper, I shall examine whether such an accusation hits its target, and I will do this by examining whether the different criteria of existence that have been suggested by the Philosophical Tradition from Plato onwards imply that existence cannot be relativized. (shrink)

A central dispute in social ontology concerns the existence of group minds and actions. I argue that some authors in this dispute rely on rival views of existence without sufficiently acknowledging this divergence. I proceed in three steps in arguing for this claim. First, I define the phenomenon as an implicit higher-order disagreement by drawing on an analysis of verbal disputes. Second, I distinguish two theories of existence—the theory-commitments view and the truthmaker view—in both their eliminativist and (...) their constructivist variants. Third, I examine individual contributions to the dispute about the existence of group minds and actions to argue that these contributions have an implicit higher-order disagreement. This paper serves two purposes. First, it is a study to apply recent advances in meta-ontology. Second, it contributes to the debate on social ontology by illustrating how meta-ontology matters for social ontology. (shrink)

Existence and coexistence of and by means of speech, and its consequences. – The text is concerned with several questions that are interrelated with what was termed “logos” by the ancient Greeks. The questions are as follows: If, according to Aristotle, man is the only spiritual being in the world to be endowed with speech, what does this mean for the (self)education of man? If, according to Augustine, understanding another person’s speech is decisive for whether we want to be (...) in his/her presence, or rather that of our dog, what does it imply as regards the essence of relationship with the other person? If, according to Heidegger, human expression is interrelated with what is real or unreal, what does it mean with respect to our existence through speech? If, according to Heraclitus, it is impossible to determine the limits of the soul, because its logos is too deep, what, then, is the purpose of man? Or where is he/she headed? What does this imply when it comes to the relation of a human being to logos? (shrink)

Philosophical discussions of existence, logic, and truth have typically proceeded within separate domains. Ontology investigates what exists, logic studies valid reasoning, and theories of truth analyze the conditions under which propositions are true. Despite their central importance, the structural relations among these concepts remain unclear. This paper argues that their relation is hierarchical rather than symmetrical. Existence provides the fundamental domain within which propositions can arise. Structure organizes this domain into stable relational patterns. Logic articulates the constraints governing (...) these relations, and truth emerges as the evaluative status of propositions that successfully represent them. By developing this hierarchical model—existence, structure, logic, and truth—the paper clarifies how logical articulation and truth evaluation ultimately presuppose an ontological foundation. (shrink)

Kant said that existence is not a predicate and Russell agreed, arguing that a sentence such as ‘The king of France exists’, which seems to attribute existence to the king of France, really has a logical form that is not reflected in the surface structure of the sentence at all. While the surface form of the sentence consists of a subject and a predicate, the underlying logical form, according to Russell, is the formula given in. This formula obviously (...) has no subjectpredicate form and in fact has no single constituent that corresponds to the verb phrase ‘exists’ in the surface sentence. ∃x∀y The importance of Russell’s analysis becomes clear when we consider ‘The king of France does not exist’. If this sentence would attribute non-existence to the king it should entail that there is someone who does not exist, just as ‘Mary doesn’t like bananas’ entails that there is someone who doesn’t like bananas. Thus the idea that all sentences have subject-predicate form has led some philosophers to the view that there are objects that lack existence. This embarrassing position can be avoided once Russell’s analysis is accepted: if ‘The king of France does not exist’ is formalised as the negation of formula, no unwanted consequences follow. (shrink)

A traditional conception of ontology takes existence to be its proprietary subject matter—ontology is the study of what exists (§ 1). Recently, Jonathan Schaffer has argued that ontology is better thought of rather as the study of what is basic or fundamental in reality (§ 2). My goal here is twofold. First, I want to argue that while Schaffer’s characterization is quite plausible for some ontological questions, for others it is not (§ 3). More importantly, I want to offer (...) a unified characterization of ontology that covers both existence and fundamentality questions (§§ 4-5). (shrink)

We initially characterize what we’ll call existence problems as problems where there is evidence that a putative entity exists and this evidence is not easily dismissed; however, the evidence is not adequate to justify the claim that the entity exists, and in particular the entity hasn’t been detected. The putative entity is elusive. We then offer a strategy for determining whether an existence problem is philosophical or scientific. According to this strategy (1) existence problems are characterized in (...) terms of causal roles, and (2) these problems are categorized as scientific or philosophical on the basis of the epistemic context of putative realizers. We argue that the first step of the strategy is necessary to avoid begging the question with regard to categorization of existence problems, and the second step categorizes existence problems on the basis of a distinction between two ways in which an entity can be elusive. This distinction between kinds of elusiveness takes as background a standard account of inference to the best explanation. Applying this strategy, we argue that the existence of a multiverse is a scientific problem. (shrink)

The human experience moves continuously between personal success and philosophical hopelessness which philosophers including Arthur Schopenhauer along with Albert Camus, David Benatar, John Gray and Thomas Ligotti have emphasized upon in their writings. The analysis in this paper will be about their evaluations of optimistic beliefs as well as the concepts of human advancement and search for values in life. According to Schopenhauer suffering dominates life but Camus explains that defiance or revolt allows people to discover meaning beyond absurdism. Benatar (...) and Ligotti present contrary arguments because they choose anti-natalism alongside their belief that consciousness is a horror. For Ligotti and Benatar, Consciousness is something which should not have been as it causes more harm than good. Research has not yet explored how pessimists build their psychological strength and why seemingly pleasant art, and intellectual activities might reduce existential fear. The systematic study of psychology enables this paper to demonstrate that understanding life’s absurd nature enables a thoughtful approach to existence, instead into making an individual to into a cycle of misery. (shrink)

Existence value refers to the value humans ascribe to the existence of something, regard­less of whether it is or will be of any particular use to them. This existence value based on preference satisfaction should be taken into account in evaluating activities that come with a risk of species extinction. There are two main objections. The first is that on the preference satisfaction interpretation, the concept lacks moral importance because satisfying people’s preferences may involve no good or (...) well-being for them. However, existence value can be based on a restricted version of the preference satisfaction theory, which is not vulnerable to the skeptical arguments about the link between preference satisfaction and well-being. The second objection is that even if preference satisfaction can be linked to well-being, understanding existence value in terms of individual preference satisfaction is incoherent, because existence value reflects disinterested preferences that involve no benefits to the individual. However, the fact that existence value may involve disinterested preferences does not threaten the coherence of the concept, but suggests that it does not fit smoothly into the “utilitarian” or “welfarist” framework it is commonly considered within. A pluralistic normative approach based on prima facie duties can be an alternative to standard utilitarian-style approaches for considering existence value in concrete cases involving a risk of species extinction, such as through deep sea mining. (shrink)

What grounds the facts about what is identical to/distinct from what? A natural answer is: the facts about what exists. Despite its prima facie appeal, this view has received surprisingly little attention in the literature. Moreover, those who have discussed it have been inclined to reject it because of the following important challenge: why should the existence of some individuals ground their identity in some cases and their distinctness in others? (Burgess 2012, Shumener 2020b). This paper offers a sustained (...) defense of the view. The first half provides some positive motivations in terms of other natural principles involving ground. The second half considers various ways of distilling the challenge into a precise objection to the view, and argues that none of the resulting objections proves persuasive. (shrink)

The question of whether parallel universes exist represents one of the most profound challenges in modern physics and philosophy. This thesis presents a comprehensive examination of existing methodologies for proving parallel universe existence and introduces a revolutionary theoretical framework called the Quantum Information Coherence Detection (QICD) paradigm. Through systematic analysis of current approaches—including Many-Worlds Interpretation testing, cosmological multiverse theories, and string theory landscapes—this work identifies fundamental limitations that have prevented definitive proof of parallel universes. -/- The QICD paradigm addresses (...) these limitations by proposing that parallel universe branching events leave persistent information signatures in the quantum vacuum structure of our universe, manifested as specific coherence patterns in large-scale quantum entanglement networks. Unlike previous approaches that attempt direct observation or interaction with parallel universes, the QICD framework detects their existence through indirect but definitive evidence encoded in our universe's fundamental structure. -/- This thesis develops the mathematical formulation of the Quantum Information Coherence Principle (QICP), presents three complementary experimental methodologies—Macroscopic Entanglement Network Analysis (MENA), Vacuum Fluctuation Spectroscopy (VFS), and Cosmological Coherence Mapping (CCM)—and provides a detailed empirical validation strategy spanning fifteen years of technological development. The framework generates specific, testable predictions that can be validated with achievable extensions of current quantum technology and astronomical observation capabilities. -/- The implications of this work extend beyond physics to fundamental questions about the nature of reality, information, and consciousness. If validated, the QICD paradigm would not only provide definitive proof of parallel universes but also revolutionize our understanding of quantum mechanics, cosmology, and the relationship between information and physical reality. (shrink)

The genetic modification of pigs as a source of transplantable organs is one of several possible solutions to the chronic organ shortage. This paper describes existing ethical tensions in xenotransplantation (XTx) that argue against pursuing it. Recommendations for lifelong infectious disease surveillance and notification of close contacts of recipients are in tension with the rights of human research subjects. Parental/guardian consent for pediatric xenograft recipients is in tension with a child’s right to an open future. Individual consent to transplant is (...) in tension with public health threats that include zoonotic diseases. XTx amplifies concerns about justice in organ transplantation and could exacerbate existing inequities. The prevention of infectious disease in source animals is in tension with the best practices of animal care and animal welfare, requiring isolation, ethologically inappropriate housing, and invasive reproductive procedures that would severely impact the well-being of intelligent social creatures like pigs. (shrink)

Philosophers often appeal to Bayesian confirmation theory to render speculative metaphysical arguments more rigorous. But can a probabilistic framework designed for empirical data decide questions of metaphysics? This paper argues that Huemer’s Bayesian “existence → immortality” inference fails on two independent grounds. First, the comparison tacitly shifts the content of the evidence across the competing identity theories: treating “I exist now” as a different event under a restrictive view than under a permissive view. So, the Bayesian evidence is ill-defined. (...) Second, if we hold the evidence fixed as the single indexical proposition E = “I exist now”, the key question is the relative likelihoods of E under each hypothesis. Once standard constraints on background verses evidence and on self-locating information are respected, there is no non-question-begging route to a Bayes factor that favors the permissive view of personal identity. Thus, mere existence does not confirm reincarnation. I remain agnostic on the correct theory of personal identity. (shrink)

This paper presents a synthesis of four interconnected research programs that together establish a quantum-native interpretation of Chaitin's halting probability Omega and Teilhard de Chardin's Omega Point. We begin with the Unified Omega Hypothesis, which proposed that existence itself might be understood as a computation whose completion corresponds to the determination of Omega. However, Minimal Axioms for Quantum Structure demonstrated that classical computation cannot derive quantum structure (Axiom A1: superposition), establishing a no-go theorem formally verified in Coq. This negative (...) result necessitated a fundamental revision. Two independent lines of evidence support the conclusion that a quantum substrate is overwhelmingly favored: (1) Algorithmic Naturalness shows that quantum mechanics has minimal description length on a quantum substrate (K_UQ << K_UC), and (2) Artificial Physics demonstrates through evolutionary simulation that matrix operations (quantum-like structures) dominate scalar operations under selection pressure, achieving >90% dominance within 3.8 ± 1.7 generations, while spontaneous emergence of matrix operations from scalar primitives never occurred (0/5 runs over 500 generations). We therefore propose the Quantum Omega Hypothesis: if the universe is computational and the principle of algorithmic naturalness holds, then a quantum-native substrate is the most parsimonious explanation. Under this interpretation, Chaitin's Omega becomes a quantum state vector |Omega_Q> = Σ_p α_p |p| — the wavefunction of the algorithmic multiverse. This synthesis provides a coherent framework connecting algorithmic information theory, quantum foundations, and evolutionary dynamics, while clearly distinguishing between established facts and interpretive proposals. (shrink)

The notion of existence is a very puzzling one philosophically. Often philosophers have appealed to linguistic properties of sentences stating existence. However, the appeal to linguistic intuitions has generally not been systematic and without serious regard of relevant issues in linguistic semantics. This paper has two aims. On the one hand, it will look at statements of existence from a systematic linguistic point of view, in order to try to clarify what the actual semantics of such statements (...) in fact is. On the other hand, it will explore what sort of ontology such statements reflect. The first aim is one of linguistic semantics; the second aim is one of descriptive metaphysics. Philosophically, existence statements appear to reflect the distinction between endurance and perdurance as well as particular notions of abstract states and of kinds. Linguistically, statements of existence involve a particular way of drawing the distinction between eventive and stative verbs and between individual-level and stage-level predicates as well as a particular approach to the semantics of bare plurals and mass nouns. (shrink)

In this paper I aim to defend a first‐order non‐discriminating property view concerning existence. The version of this view that I prefer is based on negative (or a specific neutral) free logic that treats the existence predicate as first‐order logical predicate. I will provide reasons why such a view is more plausible than a second‐order discriminating property view concerning existence and I will also discuss four challenges for the proposed view and provide solutions to them.

This thesis addresses the enduring philosophical paradox of a state of being that lies between conventional existence and non-existence—a state whose existence is defined by its non-existence, and whose non-existence constitutes a form of existence. Traditional metaphysical frameworks, often constrained by binary logic, struggle to adequately conceptualize such liminal states. This work proposes a novel theoretical framework, Ontological Liminality Theory (OLT), to address this challenge. OLT integrates insights from contemporary metaphysics, analytic philosophy, philosophy of (...) mind, Eastern philosophical traditions, and empirical findings from quantum physics, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence research. The framework is built upon five core concepts: Modal Oscillation, Perspectival Ontology, Ontological Gradience, Relational Manifestation, and Emergent Phenomenality. These concepts are synthesized within a multidimensional Liminal Ontology Matrix, providing a nuanced apparatus for mapping and analyzing entities that defy binary classification. The thesis presents rigorous logical arguments supporting OLT, grounded in recent peer-reviewed literature and empirical evidence, particularly concerning the ontological status of AI systems and virtual entities. Visual diagrams illustrate the core concepts and their integration. OLT offers a new paradigm for understanding existence, moving beyond binary constraints to accommodate the complexities of quantum phenomena, consciousness, social constructs, and the burgeoning realm of digital being, thereby providing a more robust and empirically relevant approach to contemporary ontological challenges. (shrink)

In this article, we intend to see if the emergence of basic existence, or nothingness, from nothingness has occurred. So a contact boundary between existence and nothingness finds an existential necessity. Which we are trying to understand. This boundary between being and nothingness must have the characteristics of being composed of its before and after to the extent that it is compatible with both sides. That is, it must not be so much, that is, it must be accepted (...) as being, that it cannot be placed on the boundary of nothingness and be in conflict with it. Nor must it be so much included as not being that it is unstable on the side of being, cannot last, and in fact cannot be. So it needs a balance between being and nothingness that can be maintained in a state of flux between the two. (shrink)

This paper introduces Relational Existence, a structural approach to human connection grounded in the fundamental inaccessibility of other minds. It argues that what we interact with in others is not their true internal state, but a cognitive construct—a projection filtered through our own interpretive lens. This construct, denoted as {B}@{A}, is not a mirror of B’s inner self, but a relational entity that exists independently within A’s mind. The paper contends that intersubjective understanding is structurally asymmetrical and that most (...) human relationships operate through these non-synchronous, self-generated relational existences. Consequently, ethical responsibility must shift away from the unknowable “true other” to the autonomous image we create of them. This has broad implications for epistemology, phenomenology, and existential ethics. (shrink)

It is widely held that there is a problem of talking about or otherwise representing things that not exist. But what exactly is this problem? This paper presents a formulation of the problem in terms of the conflict between the fact that there are truths about non-existent things and the fact that truths must be answerable to reality, how things are. Given this, the problem of singular negative existential statements is no longer the central or most difficult aspect of the (...) problem of non-existence, despite what some philosophers say. (shrink)

The distinction between essence (essentia) and existence (existentia) plays a major role in Spinoza’s metaphysics. Although the distinction did not originate with Avicenna, it is primarily through Avicenna’s influence that it became widespread, if not ubiquitous, in both Jewish and Christian medieval philosophy (e.g., Ogden 2021). Spinoza was clearly familiar with this important distinction through his study of Maimonides, Crescas, and Descartes, and it is particularly useful to examine Spinoza’s employment of the distinction in contrast to Descartes’. In the (...) Meditations, Descartes relies on the distinction in a proof of God’s existence, and in his exploration of the essence of material things (both in Meditation Five). (shrink)

The question of why humans act remains a central issue in philosophy and psychology. This paper proposes a novel theoretical framework, Existence Confirmationism, positing that the fundamental driving force of human behavior is the continuous confirmation of one’s own existence through psychological feedback. Individuals obtain this confirmation through three primary pathways: Self-Confirmation, Social Confirmation, and Meaning Confirmation. Unlike traditional hierarchical models of needs, these pathways represent parallel and functionally equivalent sources of existential experience. Furthermore, this paper introduces the (...) concept of "Existential Fixation"—driven by either over-gratification (path dependence) or over-frustration (compensatory seeking)—to explain why individuals may persistently remain within a single mode of confirmation, such as the indefinite pursuit of wealth, power, or validation. Existence Confirmationism seeks to establish an integrative explanatory framework bridging existential philosophy, humanistic psychology, and motivation theory, offering a reinterpretation of human behavior through the lens of psychological confirmation mechanisms. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with the experience of suddenly becoming aware of the existence of things, understood as a shift from our ordinary concern with how things stand in the world to the recognition of the bare fact that there is something at all. I argue that the experience of existence is grounded in the adoption of a peculiar stance that withdraws from any particular object or determinate content of experience and turns instead towards experience as such. I (...) designate this stance as the perspective of witness-consciousness. I begin by outlining the principal features of witness-consciousness and offer a prima facie case for its reality based on phenomenological considerations, drawing primarily on Miri Albahari’s analysis of the concept. I then turn to examining a number of passages from authors across historical epochs and cultural traditions who claimed to have directly experienced and settled in the standpoint of a pure consciousness akin to what I designate as witness-consciousness. These testimonies are placed in dialogue with the work of authors who either reflected on or reported the experience of sheer existence. This comparative exercise is meant to highlight a number of “family resemblances” between the experience of existence and that of witness-consciousness, thus supporting the central intuition that the two may be phenomenologically coincident, or at least share a common phenomenal ground. (shrink)

This paper presents a novel axiomatic framework for the definition of existence to address the fundamental Leibnizian question: ``Why is there something rather than nothing?'' Within the broader context of {Universal Ontology, I define existence ($E$) as being synonymous with information-theoretic difference ($D$). By establishing the semantic equivalence between ``Nothingness'' ($N$) and ``Totality'' ($A$) as states of zero-difference, this framework positions existence as an emergent structure arising from the breaking of this symmetry. Furthermore, by defining the boundary (...) conditions of the logical system itself through the $N \equiv A$ postulate, this paper provides a meta-logical path to transcend the limitations of self-reference inherent in Gödel'sIncompleteness Theorems. (shrink)

What do market crashes, geomagnetic storms, and the loss of consciousness have in common? They are all moments when a system's organizational identity dissolves. This paper introduces a framework that makes that dissolution measurable, predictable, and universal. The Dynamic Existence Threshold (DET) provides a single coordinate system — the integration-differentiation balance zone — in which conscious brains, stable markets, and quiet magnetospheres all occupy the same region. Departure from this zone is organizational dissolution: the system persists physically but loses (...) the coordinated structure that made it more than the sum of its parts. -/- The decisive result: a simple sum of neural power anti-predicts brain state (AUC 0.416 — worse than a coin flip), while the structural coupling metric achieves 91% accuracy across 136,394 EEG epochs. Deep sleep has more total power than wakefulness. What it lacks is coordination. This is the cleanest dissociation between organizational structure and mere magnitude in the critical transitions literature — and it raises the obvious question about AI: is a large neural network's activation organized, or just loud? The DET framework can test this. -/- Six tests, three domains (financial markets, space weather, EEG), zero parameter tuning. Early warning signals 5–30 days before events. Total organizational information is conserved during every tested transition while its components undergo massive inverse exchange — the system redistributes information rather than losing it. Dimensional embedding destroys it irreversibly. Two distinct failure modes: reversible organizational shift versus irreversible information destruction. -/- The framework that detects when a brain loses consciousness is the same one that detects when a market loses coherence — and potentially the same one that could measure whether an AI system has organizational structure at all. -/- Provisionally patented. -/- __________ -/- Keywords: consciousness, artificial intelligence, complex systems, critical transitions, early warning signals, integrated information theory, AI consciousness, EEG, financial crashes, space weather, nonlinear dynamics, tipping points, information conservation, organizational dissolution, cross-domain analysis. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with neo-Fregean accounts of reference to abstract objects. It develops an objection to the most familiar such accounts, due to Bob Hale and Crispin Wright, based upon what I call the 'proliferation problem': Hale and Wright's account makes reference to abstract objects seem too easy, as is shown by the fact that any equivalence relation seems as good as any other. The paper then develops a response to this objection, and offers an account of what it (...) is for abstracta to exist that is Fregean in spirit but more robust than familiar views. (shrink)

The chapters of the book are seemingly short, but deep explorations on the various fields and possibilities of human being and existence. Such explorations of course reorder and reformulate the timely and essential possibilities of philosophy and philosophizing. These together convey the true weight and stakes of things. For it is indeed so that: „Philosophy is destined to deal with the Deepest and most disturbing questions. It would hardly survive, if they were definitively solved.”.

According to hardcore actualism (HA), all modal truths are grounded in the concrete constituents of the actual world. In this paper, I discuss some problems faced by HA when it comes to accounting for certain alleged possibilities of non‐existence. I focus particular attention on Leech (2017)'s dilemma for HA, according to which HA must either sacrifice extensional correctness or admit mere possibilia. I propose a solution to Leech's dilemma, which relies on a distinction between weak and strong possibility. It (...) remains the case, however, that HA cannot capture certain iterated de re possibilities of non‐existence and that it is committed to a stock of necessary existents. But I still think that the virtues of the view outweigh these costs. (shrink)

If I see, hear, or touch a sparrow, the sparrow seems real to me. Unlike Bigfoot or Santa Claus, it seems to exist; I will therefore judge that it does indeed exist. The “sense of existence” refers to the kind of awareness that typically grounds such ordinary judgments of existence or “reality.” The sense of existence has been invoked by Humeans, Kantians, Ideologists, and the phenomenological tradition to make substantial philosophical claims. However, it is extremely controversial; its (...) very existence has been called into question. This paper aims to clarify the nature and reality of the sense of existence by studying a psychiatric condition in which the sense appears to be disrupted: depersonalization disorder (DPD). (shrink)

This paper develops Generative Continuum Ontology (GCO) as an ontological framework for understanding emergence, laws of nature, organized complexity, and the conditions of physical reality. The framework begins from the proposition that existence is ontologically fundamental and characterized by an intrinsic generative capacity (Φ). Rather than treating substances, objects, structures, processes, or relations as the fundamental constituents of reality, GCO interprets them as organizational expressions and regime-dependent forms of organization arising within a generative continuum of existence. Φ denotes (...) the intrinsic generative capacity of existence. Organizational expressions are understood as organizational manifestations of this generative capacity. Organizational regimes are coherent and relatively stable organizational disclosures of such manifestations. Within and through these regimes, relations, organizations, structures, laws, and forms of spatial and temporal order become identifiable. Persistence and change are therefore interpreted as complementary expressions of ongoing generative activity rather than as opposing ontological categories. A minimal formal schema is introduced to clarify the relationships among existence, intrinsic generative capacity, organizational expressions, organizational regimes, emergence, stabilization, and law formation. The framework proposes a unified ontological perspective through which emergence across physical, biological, and complex systems may be interpreted with greater explanatory coherence and ontological economy. (shrink)