I show that in Epictetus’ view (1) the wise man genuinely loves (στέργειv) and is affectionate (φιλόστoργoς) to his family and friends; (2) only the Stoic wise man is, properly speaking, capable of loving—that is, he alone actually has the power to love; and (3) the Stoic wise man loves in a robustly rational way which excludes passionate, sexual, ‘erotic’ love (’έρως). In condemning all ’έρως as objectionable πάθoς Epictetus stands with Cicero and with the other Roman Stoics, (...) Seneca and Musonius Rufus, and against the Greeks of the early Stoa. Epictetus’ conception of love excludes erotic passion because of its intrinsic excessiveness and uncontrollableness, which inevitably endanger mental serenity, but includes and emphasizes the soberly rational, purely positive joy of interpersonal affiliation. Epictetus’ account of how the Stoic Sage loves is, I think, more consistent and less problematic than that of the Greek Stoics. (shrink)

Landefeld need not be faulted for not cobbling together a unified doctrine of prayer compatible with Stoic physics and logic where none exists in Epictetus. Perhaps this ex-slave fervently needed to unseat contempt for and defiance in the faces of his cruel, abusive human masters with praise of and obedient devotion to a maximally beneficent and providential divine master.

Michael Frede has argued that there is a minimum belief for a Stoic to have a notion of a will and that Epictetus and the late Stoics were the first to have this belief. Against Frede’s interpretation, I argue for a new understanding of what the Stoics believed. Epictetus did not believe, as Frede argues, that adult human beings choose to assent to impulsive impressions. This gets the object of choice wrong in the minimum belief. He believed that (...) the choice adult human beings make is to exercise their ability to use their impressions, and I argue that the early Stoics probably believed this too. (shrink)

For anyone approaching the Encheiridion of Epictetus for the first time, this book provides a comprehensive guide to understanding a complex philosophical text. Including a full translation and clear explanatory commentaries, Epictetus's 'Encheiridion' introduces readers to a hugely influential work of Stoic philosophy. Scott Aikin and William O. Stephens unravel the core themes of Stoic ethics found within this ancient handbook. Focusing on the core themes of self-control, seeing things as they are, living according to nature, owning one's (...) roles and fulfilling the responsibilities that those roles entail, the authors elucidate the extremely challenging ideas in Epictetus's brisk chapters. Divided into five distinct parts, this book provides readers with: - A new translation of the Encheiridion by William O. Stephens. - A new introduction to ancient Stoicism, its system of concepts, and the ancient figures who shaped it. - A fresh treatment of the notorious and counter-intuitive 'Stoic paradoxes'. - An accessible overview of the origin and historical context of the Encheiridion. - Detailed commentaries on each chapter of the Encheiridion that clarify its recurring themes and highlight their interconnections. - Careful attention to the presentation of the arguments embedded in Epictetus's aphoristic style. - A thoughtful discussion of serious criticisms of Epictetus's Stoicism and replies to these objections. Written with clarity and authority, Epictetus's 'Encheiridion' provides a foundation from which readers can understand this important text and engage with the fundamental questions of Stoic philosophy and ethics. This guide will aid teachers of Epictetus, students encountering Stoicism for the first time, and readers seeking a greater understanding of Stoic ethics. (shrink)

In this paper, I look at Epictetus' dichotomy of control, how it leads to freedom, and how these topics relate to modern life.

This paper argues that Epictetus’ ethics involves three features which are also present in Aristotle’s discussion of akrasia in the Nicomachean Ethics: 1) A major problem for agents is when they fail to render a universal premise effective at motivating a particular action in accordance with that premise. 2) There are two reasons this occurs: Precipitancy and Weakness. 3) Precipitancy and Weakness can be prevented by gaining a fuller understanding of our beliefs and commitments. This comparison should make clear (...) that akrasia is certainly not absent from Epictetus. Rather a very Aristotelian understanding of why we fail to act in accordance with what we take to be in our own best interests remains at the center of his ethics. (shrink)

My project examines the pedagogical approach of the Stoic Epictetus by focusing on seven vital lessons he imparts. This study will deepen our understanding of his vocation as a Stoic educator striving to free his students from the fears and foolishness that hold happiness hostage. These lessons are (1) how freedom, integrity, self-respect, and happiness interrelate; (2) real versus fake tragedy and real versus fake heroism; (3) the instructive roles that various animals play in Stoic education; (4) athleticism, sport, (...) and game-playing as analogies for striving to live virtuously; (5) place, time, and progress in the journey to self-realization; (6) how to live with death and exit life fearlessly; (7) how teaching wisdom is one of several ways the Stoic sage loves others. (shrink)

The Stoic Epictetus famously criticizeshis students for studying Stoicism as ‘mere theory’ and encouraged them to add training to their educational program. This is made all the more interesting by the fact that Epictetus, as a Stoic, was committed to notion that wisdom is sufficient to be virtuous, so theory should be all that’s required to achieve virtue. How are we then to make sense of Epictetus criticism of an overreliance on theory, and his insistence on adding (...) training? This paper argues that this tension can be resolved through an appeal to the metaphor of ‘digesting theory’. Epictetus discusses the digestion of theory in three parts of his existent work. While the use of digestion as a metaphor for moral progress in Epictetus has been noted, an explanation as to exactly what this process consists of has yet to be provided. This paper attempts to provide such an account. I argue that digestion consists of assimilating what we have learnt conceptually, at the level of general principles, into specific beliefs concerning existent objects. I argue further that this process of digestion can only be achieved through what Epictetus calls training (askesis). (shrink)

Epictetus, a former slave who lived in Rome during Nero’s reign but was exiled (along with all those who practiced philosophy in Rome) to Greece by Domitian’s decree in 93 CE, espoused an austere ethical philosophy which aimed at happiness (eudaimonia), or tranquility (ataraxia), through the delimitation of valuation to things within one’s control. Although Epictetus never set to writing his beliefs, his disciple Arrian recorded eight books of his sayings (entitled Discourses [ διατριβαί ] of which only (...) four books survive) and edited a compendium entitled the Handbook ( Ἐγχειρίδιον). In his preface to the volume under review, editor Theodore Scaltsas writes that “there is no message that would be of greater value in the face of today’s threats to society than Epictetus’ ‘bear and forbear.'” (1) Although Epictetus’ “forbearance” is not exactly the philosophy of hope much in vogue in contemporary politics, there is no doubt that Epictetus offers a perennial source of strength and self-reliance. (shrink)

Epictetus' thought is defined by an antithesis of mine and not-mine, which is an antithesis of externals and self. From this arise a number of questions for Epictetus‘ theology, which are addressed in this paper: How is the self delimited from God, given that God is all-pervading? Is God inside or outside the self? In which way is God the cause, creator and shaper of the self? And how does human agency and self-shaping through prohairesis spell out within (...) this determinst framework? If, as will become apparent in the discussion of the previous questions, the shape and activities of human selves originate from God and should be perfectly aligned with God, in which sense is there still a separate, individual human self? (shrink)

After decades of attempts, comparisons between classical Chinese and Greco-Roman philosophy have had limited success. While there have been some productive lines of inquiry (for example, comparing early Confucian ethics to virtue ethics as represented by Aristotle), the overall record is disappointing because concepts such as Plato’s theory of forms or Aristotle’s emphasis on syllogism have proved incommensurable with most classical Chinese ways of thinking. But much of the problem can be attributed to the habit of comparing Chinese thinkers to (...) Plato and Aristotle without asking whether they are the most suitable philosophers for this purpose. For most of the twentieth century, Hellenistic philosophy was scarcely considered. Yet very recently, provocative similarities have been identified between Chinese philosophy and Stoicism, especially Epictetus. I shall argue that these parallels are even more significant than previous scholarship has recognized (I hope to convince the reader that some of them are indeed staggering), and conclude by asking why we find such parallels in the first place. My claim will not be direct or even indirect transmission; this is a case, to borrow a distinction from evolutionary biology, of analogous rather than homologous development. -/- . (shrink)

“Everyone has a price at which he sells himself”: Immanuel Kant quotes this remark in the 1793 _Religion within the Bounds of Reason Alone_, attributing it to “a member of English Parliament”. I argue, however, that the context of the quotation in the _Religion_ alludes to the arresting pedagogical practices of the Stoic philosopher Epictetus, who famously said that “different people sell themselves at different prices” (Discourses 1.2). I argue that there are two sides of Epictetus’s pedagogical strategies: (...) a jolting side meant to expose self-deception and practical inconsistency; and an uplifting side meant to arouse the resources by which it is possible to progress towards virtue — specifically, our sense of kinship with the divine insofar as we are rational. I argue that Kant develops a conception of self-respect in later practical works that plausibly draws on Epictetus, and his distinctive version of the traditional Stoic account of rational agency. (shrink)

A. A. Long, one of the world's leading writers on ancient philosophy, presents eighteen essays on the philosophers and schools of the Hellenistic and Roman periods--Epicureans, Stoics, and Sceptics. The discussion ranges over four centuries of innovative and challenging thought in ethics and politics, psychology, epistemology, and cosmology.

Stoic philosophers had to face the accusation of incoherence, self-contradiction and Paradoxes since ancient times. Plutarch in his Moralia writes against them; Cicero devotes a separate work on stoic paradoxes. Even in contemporary Literature there are still discussions on the possibility of such an incoherence and existence of paradoxes in the stoic theory. At first glance, stoic Cosmology gives the impression to both accept a kind of Determinism, and at the same time it undoubtedly argues for the moral agent’s freedom (...) of the Will. In pre-stoic or even other contemporary to Stoicism Philosophical Traditions, the definitions that these two terms/concepts are given, fairly accuse as incoherent any Theory that does not set them as “contraries”. Under these types of accusations, the stoic Cosmology and Theory of the Freedom of the Will is often to be included. This phenomenal self-contradiction inside the Principles of Stoicism becomes even more obvious in Epictetus, a philosopher of the Late Stoa. He is interested in practical ethics, thus the phenomenal contradiction gets more lucid. This would have augmented the criticism of the Stoic philosophy for incoherence, if Epictetus had not made his main philosophical aim/target : the clarification of how an agent’s Will can be Free inside a Universe ruled by Fate/Destiny ; namely, a Universe merely Determined by Nature’s/God’s Will. Epictetus’ originality appears in the way he interrelates the concept of Freedom of the Will with the concept of Destiny and Determinism, in order to accomplish their simultaneous co-existence. This approach guards him against being easily accused for incoherence and self-contradiction. Through the unique way he understands and defines the Moral Agency, which is the agent’s internal state/condition/disposition, he steers towards an integrated, accomplished, strong and coherent line of argument. This sturdy declaration is able to support the weight of the Consent to a Free Will, and thus a certain kind Freedom of the moral agent. The excellence of this line of argument is that it can bear also the burden of the Consent to the phenomenally contrary concept of Determinism and Destiny. The elements used to the construction of this argument, which is stretched throughout the whole epictetean corpus can be summarised to a few key concepts, which are: the things which are in our power and the things which are not in our power, the concept of Freedom. These concepts work towards his philosophical targeting, because of the special definition he gives them. Axiomatically Epictetus states that in order for man to be free, it is necessary to be liberated from what the body forces him to do. Desires, passions and beliefs are considered as elements which are external to the moral agent. The moral agent “shrinks” into the Will. Thus man has the capability to free himself from anything external to his Will and therefore to harmonise his own Will to the Will of Nature/God; namely, to will what Nature/God wills and thus never conflict to the external facts. Consequently, Epictetus’ solution, is to include in the category of τά οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν anything that he defines as external to the prohairesis: the desires, beliefs, passions and in general anything the body entails, the external facts. Thus the prohairesis, remains unhindered and it is completely depended on man’s power ; as characteristically Epictetus writes, “not even Zeus himself can overpower” the prohairesis. Dissertation for the MSc Ancient Philosophy (2008-2009) at The University of Edinburgh, supervised by Inna Kupreeva. (shrink)

The paper aims to clarify some features of Epictetus ' specific usage of the concept of proairesis throughout his Discourses. This will be done by suggesting that a number of problematic expressions concerning proairesis and its freedom should be understood as rhetorical-pedagogical expressions of Epictetus ' intellec-tualism. I will mainly focus on a series of problematic passages that have been discussed by several commentators concerning the concept of proairesis, and I will suggest that those passages are best interpreted (...) as rhetorical or, better, pedagogical expressions of Epictetus ' strictly intellectualist approach to the psychology of action. The interpretation I will propose does away with the need to resort to certain interpretations of those passages that threaten to obscure the otherwise clear picture of human action offered by Epictetus ' intellectualism concerning the psychology of action. El articulo tiene por objetivo clarificar algunos aspectos del uso especifico que realiza Epicteto a lo largo de las Dissertationes del concepto de proairesis. Esto se realizara sugiriendo que ciertas expresiones problematicas referidas a la proairesis y su libertad deben ser entendidas como expresiones retorico-pedagogicas del intelectualismo de Epicteto. Me concentrare fundamentalmente en una serie de pasajes problematicos que han sido discutidos por varios comentadores en relacion con el concepto de proairesis, y sugerire que esos pasajes deben ser interpretados como expresiones retoricas o, mejor, pedagogicas de enfoque estrictamente inte-lectualista de la psicologia humana que propone Epicteto. La interpretacion que propondre hace innecesario el recurso a ciertas interpretaciones de esos parajes que amenazan con oscurecer el panorama claro de la accion humana ofrecido por la concepcion intelectualista de la psicologia humana defendida por Epicteto. (shrink)

This paper shows that the medieval concept synderesis comes from Origen’s endorsement of the Stoic theory of rational “self-affiliation” (oikeiōsis). Synderesis is a term that medieval authors inherited from Jerome, who was reporting Origen. Most famously, Aquinas made synderesis central to his moral epistemology, claiming that it is a natural mental habit whereby all humans have an implicit and vague understanding of axiomatic norms of morality. However, the identity of the original Greek word and its conceptual content have been debated (...) since the ninth century. I show that the word must have been suntērēsis (“safeguarding”), employing as evidence recently (2012) discovered texts by Origen. I compare Origen to Chrysippus, Hierocles, and Epictetus. I also compare Aquinas to Origen. I point out three implications. First, the latest critical edition of Jerome (CCL) is incorrect, because it prints suneidēsis (“conscience”) instead of suntērēsis. Second, some of Aquinas’ core assertions about the characteristics of synderesis and its “place” within the mind are consistent with Origen’s account. Third, Stoic suntērēsis and Aquinas’ synderesis share certain metaethical associations. (shrink)

I review a tentative list of the examples of ethical (or spiritual) exercises that have been proposed as Epictetan by contemporary commentators. Based on a minimal definition of the notion of ethical exercises, I suggest that some practices have been misidentified and propose some revisions to that repertoire.

This chapter reconstructs Epictetus’ account of Stoic love and asks whether the Stoic sage can genuinely love. Against the common suspicion that Stoic apatheia makes love impossible, the chapter argues that Epictetus allows, and indeed requires, a rational form of love grounded in natural affection, social roles, and the proper use of prohairesis. The Stoic sage is not unfeeling. He is affectionate toward family, friends, and fellow human beings, but his love does not become an irrational passion that (...) destroys serenity or enslaves his will. Epictetus therefore rejects erotic love when it becomes emotional servitude, while preserving a free, giving, and joyful form of affection compatible with virtue. The chapter distinguishes Stoic love from grief, dependency, and the desire to possess loved ones permanently, since all persons and relationships outside one’s prohairesis remain externals. It also analyzes Epictetus’ claim that only the wise person truly has the power to love, because only the wise person knows what is genuinely good, evil, and indifferent. The chapter concludes that Stoic love is practical and pedagogical. The sage loves others chiefly by sharing his wisdom, helping them overcome spiritual poverty, and encouraging them toward virtue and mental freedom. (shrink)

This article introduces Stoicism for a general readership by arguing that ancient Stoic thought, especially the philosophy of Epictetus, had found renewed cultural visibility at the turn of the twenty-first century through Tom Wolfe’s A Man in Full and Ridley Scott’s Gladiator. The article explains Epictetus’ life as a former slave, his teaching career at Nicopolis, and his influence on Marcus Aurelius. It presents Stoicism as a practical philosophy of living in accordance with nature, cultivating rational judgment, and (...) distinguishing what is up to us from what lies beyond our control. On this view, happiness depends not on wealth, status, bodily condition, reputation, or external success, but on virtue, moral integrity, disciplined judgment, and peace of mind. The article connects this Stoic outlook to Admiral James Stockdale’s use of Epictetus during captivity in Vietnam, then examines Stoic themes in Wolfe’s novel, especially Conrad Hensley’s discovery of Epictetus and Charlie Croker’s need to learn that wealth and status are not the measure of a human being. It also interprets Gladiator as dramatizing Stoic virtues through Maximus, whose courage, honor, endurance, and resistance to tyranny make him the cinematic heir of Marcus Aurelius. The article concludes by asking whether contemporary America, despite its fascination with power, possessions, fame, and money, may be ready for Stoicism’s renewed emphasis on virtue and justice. A concluding sidebar situates the article within Stephens’s own scholarly work on Epictetus and Stoic ethics. (shrink)

This paper explores the concept of empathy in the philosophy of Epictetus. Although Stoicism is often misunderstood as a philosophy of emotional suppression, Epictetus, in the Enchiridion, demonstrates the possibility of empathy by encouraging comforting words and shared lamentation in response to others’ suffering. Concurrently, he emphasizes the importance of not being inwardly overwhelmed by such emotions. This paper interprets Epictetus’ unique approach as ‘controlled empathy,’ a form of emotional regulation that does not simply suppress emotion but (...) recognizes the suffering of others and responds to it through rational judgment. First, this paper examines the key passages in which empathy is mentioned in Epictetus’ writings, analyzes the reasons for its restrained nature, and explores its meaning. Next, viewing controlled empathy as closely tied to prohairesis, this paper argues that it can be interpreted as Epictetus’ philosophical attempt to address emotions within the domain of moral responsibility. Finally, this paper examines the reasons for practicing controlled empathy and seeks to reveal its philosophical implications within Epictetus’ ethics of practice. Controlled empathy, uniting relational morality and emotional self-discipline, provides a meaningful ethical guideline for contemporary reflections on empathy. 본 논문은 에픽테토스의 공감 개념에 주목한다. 흔히 스토아는 감정 억제의 철학으로 오해되나, 『엥케이리디온』에서 에픽테토스는 타인에게 말을 건네고 함께 탄식하는 등 공감의 가능성을 보여준다. 그런데 동시에 에픽테토스는 공감에 있어 내면까지 휘둘리지 말 것을 강조한다. 본 논문은 이러한 에픽테토스의 독특한 공감 방식을 ‘절제된 공감’이라 칭한다. 절제된 공감은 단순한 감정 억제가 아니라 타인의 고통을 인식하되 이성적으로 판단하고 대응하는 감정 통제의 기술이다. 먼저, 에픽테토스의 저작에서 공감이 언급되는 주요 지점을 검토하며 에픽테토스의 공감이 절제된 이유를 분석한다. 이후 절제된 공감의 방식이 프로하이레시스에 기반한다는 점에서, 절제된 공감이 감정을 도덕적 책임의 영역에서 다루려는 에픽테토스의 철학적 시도로 해석될 수 있음을 주장한다. 마지막으로 절제된 공감의 실천 근거를 분석하여, 그것이 에픽테토스의 실천 철학에서 갖는 철학적 함의를 밝힌다. 절제된 공감은 타인을 향한 관계적 도덕성과 자기의 감정에 대한 훈련의 결합으로서 오늘날 우리에게 유의미한 공감 윤리의 지침이 된다. (shrink)

O presente artigo trata do pensamento de Epicteto pelo viés do exercício (áskēsis), ou seja, por meio de práticas que conduzem ao aperfeiçoamento de quem elege para si o ofício de filósofo. Para tal, inicialmente esclarecemos o que significam os exercícios na filosofia antiga, tendo como subsídio as teses de Pierre Hadot. Logo depois, exploramos seis exercícios que consideramos centrais para o filósofo de Nicópolis, contextualizando com os ensinamentos que estão envolvidos e descrevendo as principais características de seu método. Por (...) fim, defendemos que a importância deste artigo está em esclarecer a áskēsis em Epicteto de maneira a evitar possíveis anacronismos. -/- This article deals with Epictetus' thought through the exercise bias (áskēsis), that is, through the perfectioning practices of those who choose the office of philosophy. In order to do so, we first clarified what exercises in ancient philosophy mean, based on the theses of Pierre Hadot. Continuing, we explore six exercises considered central to the philosopher of Nicopolis, contextualizing with the teachings involved and describing the main characteristics of his method. Finally, we argue that the importance of this article lies in clarifying the áskēsis in Epictetus in order to avoid possible anachronisms. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo propongo una interpretación de las Dissertationes de Epicteto estructurada sobre dos argumentos centrales: el Argumento Eudaimonista y el Argumento Teleológico. Sugeriré que a pesar de las estrategias que el autor presenta para evitar la acusación de solipsismo, Epicteto no puede escapar a la misma, y que la figura de la divinidad adquiere, por esa misma razón, una dimensión que ha sido desestimada por los comentaristas contemporáneos. In the present paper I put forward an interpretation of (...) class='Hi'>Epictetus Discourses which is based on two main arguments: the Eudaimonistic Argument and the Teleological Argument. I suggest that despite the author's strategies to avoid the accusation of solipsism, Epictetus cannot escape it, and that the figure of the divinity acquires, for this very reason, a dimension that has been overlooked by contemporary critics. (shrink)

Self destruction, inapprehensible an option as it might be, has been a challenging issue for philosophers and scholars since the dawn of time, forcing meditation into a vigorous and everlasting debate. The core question is: could suicide ever be deemed rational a choice? And if so, could it count as a moral alternative, if the circumstances call for it? The Stoics from Zeno up to Epictetus and Seneca regarded suicide as the ultimate resort, as the utmost opportunity for a (...) rational being to maintain his virtue, when all other bridges are burnt. For an act to be moral, it has to be deliberate, as well as the manifestation of an established evaluative hierarchy, however spontaneous and instantaneous might the latter be. In other words, a moral act is one that agents rationally opt for over other possible alternatives, on the subjective basis of their alleged best interests. Modern philosophers as Tom Beauchamp, Margaret Battin and Jacques Choron stress the criterion of rationality as a key issue regarding the ethics of suicide. Utilizing Rorty’s second definition of rationality, the article examines whether self destruction can be the outcome of proper evaluative assessment and deliberation, given that, as T. N. Pelegrinis suggests, such an evaluation seems to rest on a symmetry case, which might hardly be based on sound foundation. (shrink)

Contrary to what has been assumed by several of Epictetus' commentators, I will argue in the present paper that the concept of aidōs in Epictetus cannot be reduced to the modern notion of moral conscience, given that the mental phenomenon of aidōs (which is closer to the idea of shame than has been assumed by some authors) involves the presence of a transcendent other. The consequences concerning the ethical and theological foundations of Epictetus' thought which derive from (...) this impossibility cannot be neglected if we aim to comprehend the singularity of the author's place in Stoicism. (shrink)

This paper offers a rigorous examination of the concept of prosochē—the attentive mindfulness or vigilant focus on oneself—within Hellenistic Stoicism and its later transformations in Late Antiquity, and compares it to the modern psychological notion of the “flow state.” We analyze prosochē as a Stoic spiritual exercise (askēsis) essential to ethical development and life in accordance with cosmic reason (logos). Drawing on Pierre Hadot’s work and other scholarship, we detail how Stoic thinkers (especially Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius) conceived prosochē (...) as continuous self-awareness and moral vigilance, and how this practice was adapted by Neoplatonist philosophers and early Christian ascetics. We then develop a comparative analysis between prosochē and Mihály Csíkszentmihályi’s concept of flow from contemporary psychology. Notable similarities include focused immersion, a harmonious affective state, and a sense of mastery or control during the experience. Key differences are also highlighted: prosochē is grounded in a teleological and moral framework oriented by cosmic nature and virtue, whereas flow is a content-neutral psychological state defined by optimal experience and lacking inherent ethical orientation. In sum, the paper situates prosochē as both an ancient practice of attentive presence and a precursor, with crucial differences, to modern ideas about absorbed states of consciousness. Footnotes provide references to primary sources (Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, Plotinus) and modern analyses (Hadot, Csíkszentmihályi, cognitive science research), and the conclusion reflects on the enduring relevance of prosochē for philosophy and psychology. (shrink)

This paper investigates the philosophical convergence between Stoicism, as articulated by Epictetus, and Solipsism, as exemplified in the work of René Descartes. While traditionally treated as distinct—one grounded in ethical resilience and the other in epistemological doubt—this study argues that both philosophies center on the primacy of the internal self in relation to an uncertain or indifferent external world. By examining Stoicism’s dismissal of externals and Solipsism’s radical skepticism of external reality, I propose a conceptual synthesis wherein the Stoic (...) sage and the Cartesian subject share a common foundation: the retreat into the self as the only stable ground for meaning, truth, and freedom. This synthesis, which I term “Stoic Solipsism,” reframes personal agency not as dependent on an objective world, but as rooted in conscious mastery over one’s own judgments. Ultimately, the paper suggests that this convergence offers a compelling philosophical framework for navigating existential insecurity, emotional disillusionment, and the modern crisis of meaning. (shrink)

Ancient philosophical traditions agree that human beings possess divine potential, yet they diverge fundamentally on how such transcendence is realized. This paper argues that the contrast between Stoic and Daoist accounts of meaningful existence reflects deeper cultural-philosophical assumptions about whether wisdom requires perfecting discriminating judgment or dissolving it entirely. -/- For the Stoic thinker Epictetus, humans are "offshoots of God" whose divine nature manifests through rational capacity. The meaningful life consists in perfecting prohairesis, a term that literally means "to (...) choose one thing before another." Through years of examining impressions and ranking them hierarchically according to rational criteria, practitioners achieve transcendence by becoming increasingly skilled at making correct distinctions, separating true impressions from false ones, good from bad, what lies within our control from what does not. The sage embodies perfected discrimination. -/- For Zhuangzi, humans possess innate attunement to Dao that becomes obscured through discriminating judgment itself. The meaningful life consists in suspending the compulsive imposition of binary categories—this versus that, right versus wrong, useful versus useless—that fragment continuous reality. Transcendence is achieved not by refining discrimination but by dissolving the need to discriminate, enabling spontaneous responsiveness that flows with natural patterns without conceptual mediation. The sage embodies impartial receptivity. -/- The paper demonstrates that this divergence reflects distinct cultural-philosophical orientations. Greek philosophical method, rooted in Socratic dialectic and Aristotelian categorization, treats language as capable of capturing stable universal truths through precise definition. Wisdom emerges through argumentative refinement and systematic judgment. Chinese philosophical method, emphasizing practical knowing over theoretical reasoning, treats fixed principles as inadequate for navigating particular circumstances. Wisdom emerges through embodied responsiveness below linguistic levels. -/- The analysis reveals that disagreement about the meaningful life extends beyond surface-level differences in practice to fundamental assumptions about whether human flourishing requires making better distinctions or transcending distinction-making itself. Contemporary practitioners seeking spiritual cultivation must consider whether wisdom lies in perfecting judgment or releasing its grip—a choice reflecting not merely personal preference but deeper commitments about language, reason, and truth's accessibility. (shrink)

In this article we identify that the philosophers Marcus Tullius Cicero, Lucius Annaeus Seneca and Epictetus conceive a “freedom” that is characteristic of the wise and happy, and a “slavery” that is characteristic of the unwise and unhappy, nevertheless they did not use a special word for them. We name such conceptions “metaphysical freedom” and “metaphysical slavery” respectively. And we demonstrate that, in divergent intensities and objectives and in many places, the three thinkers differentiated this freedom/slavery principally from the (...) juridical-political-social freedom/slavery. En este artículo identificamos que los filósofos Marco Tulio Cicerón, Lucio Anneo Séneca y Epicteto conciben una “libertad” que es característica del sabio y feliz, y una “esclavitud” que es característica del no-sabio e infeliz, aunque no les otorgaron un vocablo especial. A tales concepciones, según proponemos, las denominamos “libertad metafísica” y “esclavitud metafísica” respectivamente. Demostramos que los tres pensadores diferenciaron a éstas, con distintas intensidades y propósitos y en reiteradas ocasiones, principalmente de la libertad/esclavitud jurídico-político-social. (shrink)

Much of chapters 2 to 6 of this book is in agreement with publications from the last twenty years (including those of the reviewer); so for example Frede’s points that neither Aristotle nor the Stoics had a notion of free-will; that in Epictetus (for the first time) the notions of freedom and will were combined; that an indeterminist notion of free-will occurs first in Alexander. The achievement of these chapters lies in the way Frede carefully joins them together and (...) uses them as a basis for some substantive criticism and rewriting of the history of free-will regarding late antique Pagan and Christian authors, in particular Plotinus, Origen and Augustine. (shrink)

The author’s aim in this quirky monograph is not to reconstruct all that can be surmised about Stoic logic in the first two centuries A.D. of the Roman empire, but rather to concentrate on the three Stoic authors whose extant texts contain remarks on logic. These imperial Stoics, Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius, are known for their emphasis on ethics and not for their contributions in either logic or physics. So it comes as some surprise that Barnes can find (...) much to say about what these philosophers thought about logic. As Barnes presents it (defying chronology), “Marcus introduces the comedy; Seneca features in the second act; and Epictetus is the hero” (ix). (shrink)

After his airplane was shot down over North Vietnam, Admiral James Stockdale underwent seven years of isolation and torture. Stockdale, however, was trained as much in Western philosophy as military strategy. Once freed, Stockdale explained that he survived and kept his sanity because he gave up on the idea of ever being rescued. He instead accepted his conditions as the new normal. As Stockdale saw it, he was essentially testing Epictetus‘s Stoic doctrines in a laboratory of human behavior, which (...) is the subtitle of his book. Yet, look up Stockdale online and you‘ll find that almost everyone now denatures what he had to say. Stockdale explicitly says that he thrived by letting go of hope. Few people, however, are prepared to hear/accept this. They instead hold that he thrived by never letting go of hope. This certainly sounds good. However, what if one of the brutal facts requiring confrontation is that you won’t prevail in the end, regardless of what you do? This is the possibility I want to explore. (shrink)

The ancient Stoics believed that virtue is the only true good and as such both necessary and sufficient for happiness. Accordingly, they classified food as among the things that are neither good nor bad but "indifferent." These "indifferents" included health, illness, wealth, poverty, good and bad reputation, life, death, pleasure, and pain. How one deals with having or lacking these things reflects one’s virtue or vice and thus determines one’s happiness or misery. So, while the Stoics held that food in (...) itself contributes nothing to a person’s happiness, how one obtains, prepares, and serves it, and both what and how one eats, all reveal a person’s character as good or bad. Thus, understanding the purpose of food, the necessity of frugality, and the virtue of temperance are all important in Stoicism. This paper traces the ethical views on food from Zeno of Citium and Chrysippus to Seneca, Musonius Rufus, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius. They agree that the wise and temperate know that simple, inexpensive foods in moderate amounts produced locally are easy to get and prepare, healthy for the body, and good for the mind. Thus, Stoicism dictates frugality of diet and the rejection of ambitious eating, gluttony, luxuries, delicacies, and gustatory extravagance. Some Stoics favor vegetarianism. All Stoics think it wise to limit eating and drinking to strict bodily need and to eradicate all food anxieties. (shrink)

Stoicism, an ancient Greco-Roman philosophy, has experienced a modern resurgence owing to its practical tools for managing emotion and navigating adversity. Founded in Athens by Zeno of Citium in the 3rd century BCE and later developed by philosophers like Epictetus, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius, Stoicism taught that philosophy should function as a “medicine for the psyche,” treating the emotional and existential ailments of life. In Stoic teachings, disturbances of the mind are seen as arising not from external events but (...) from within—specifically, from our judgments about events. This cognitive framework — famously captured by Epictetus (“Men are disturbed not by things, but by the views which they take of them”) — positions Stoicism as a philosophical ancestor of many principles in modern psychotherapy. Indeed, contemporary therapeutic approaches such as cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) have explicitly acknowledged Stoic philosophy as an influence on their development. The convergence between Stoic practices and psychotherapy has given rise to Stoic-based therapies, which integrate exercises and insights from Stoicism into clinical and self-help contexts. This paper provides a comprehensive examination of therapies grounded in Stoic practices. We begin by outlining the theoretical foundations of Stoicism relevant to psychology, including Stoic views on emotions and virtue. Next, we explore the historical and conceptual links between Stoicism and modern psychotherapy, detailing how Stoic ideas underpin techniques in cognitive-behavioral therapy, rational-emotive behavior therapy, and mindfulness-based interventions. We then introduce core Stoic therapeutic techniques – such as cognitive reframing through the dichotomy of control, negative visualization (premeditatio malorum), and mindful self-awareness (prosochē) – and discuss their applications in promoting emotional resilience and rational living. The integration of Stoic practices into treatment will be illustrated with real-world clinical examples and case vignettes, showing how Stoic-based strategies can aid in managing anxiety, anger, depression, trauma, and personality disorders. Throughout, we reference both classical wisdom and current empirical studies that have begun testing Stoic interventions in clinical and educational settings. Finally, we address challenges and critiques of Stoic-based therapy, including potential misunderstandings of Stoicism and its limitations as a stand-alone treatment, emphasizing the importance of an empirically grounded and ethically informed approach. By bridging ancient philosophy and contemporary psychology, this interdisciplinary inquiry aims to demonstrate that Stoic practices – far from being mere historical curiosities – continue to offer valuable tools for psychological wellbeing. The enduring Stoic emphasis on reason, virtue, and mindfulness provides a rich conceptual framework that can complement modern therapeutic techniques. At the same time, empirical scrutiny and clinical experience are vital to adapt these age-old practices to individual needs in the present day. In sum, Stoic-based therapy offers a compelling synthesis of classical wisdom and evidence-based methods — warranting further exploration by practitioners and scholars across psychology, mental health, and philosophy. This paper argues that Stoic thought provides a coherent and practical therapeutic framework—one that prefigures and complements modern psychological practices such as cognitive-behavioral therapy. By examining its theoretical foundations, psychological insights, and practical exercises, we explore how Stoicism offers an enduring model of cognitive-affective regulation. (shrink)

The norms of simplicity, convenience, unfussiness, and self-control guide Diogenes the Cynic, Zeno of Citium, Chrysippus, Seneca, Musonius Rufus, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius in approaching food. These norms generate the precept that meat and dainties are luxuries, so Stoics should eschew them. Considerations of justice, environmental harm, anthropogenic global climate change, sustainability, food security, feminism, harm to animals, personal health, and public health lead contemporary Stoics to condemn the meat industrial complex, debunk carnism, and select low input, plant-based foods.

ABSTRACT: In this paper I argue (i) that the hypothetical arguments about which the Stoic Chrysippus wrote numerous books (DL 7.196) are not to be confused with the so-called hypothetical syllogisms" but are the same hypothetical arguments as those mentioned five times in Epictetus (e.g. Diss. 1.25.11-12); and (ii) that these hypothetical arguments are formed by replacing in a non-hypothetical argument one (or more) of the premisses by a Stoic "hypothesis" or supposition. Such "hypotheses" or suppositions differ from propositions (...) in that they have a specific logical form and no truth-value. The reason for the introduction of a distinct class of hypothetical arguments can be found in the context of dialectical argumentation. The paper concludes with the discussion of some evidence for the use of Stoic hypothetical arguments in ancient texts. (shrink)

Writing to the young emperor Nero, Seneca elaborates a sophisticated distinction between compassion and mercy for use in forensic contexts, agreeing with earlier Stoics that compassion is a vice, but adding that there is a virtue called mercy or 'clemency.' This Stoic repudiation of compassion has won the attention of Nussbaum, who argues that it was motivated by a respect for persons as dignified agents, and was of a piece with the Stoics' cosmopolitanism. This chapter engages Nussbaum's presentation of the (...) Stoics, examining Seneca’s On Clemency and Epictetus' use of the term prohairesis, showing that while there is some truth in her characterization, it needs to be qualified in important ways. It also analyzes Augustine's engagement with Seneca's On Clemency in the City of God 9.5, and in his letters concerning punishment for vandalism, theft, and human trafficking. It argues that Augustine has a nuanced mercy ethic that is deeply informed by Seneca's position, but that he intentionally improves upon it. (shrink)

The ancient Stoics had an uneven track record with regard to women’s standing. On the one hand, they recognized women as fully capable of rationality and virtue. On the other hand, they continued to hold that women’s roles were in the home. These views are consistent, given Stoic value theory, but are unacceptable on liberal feminist grounds. Stoic value theory, given different emphasis on the ethical role of choice, is shown to be capable of satisfying the liberal feminist requirement that (...) autonomy must be respected. In turn, a model for Stoic feminism is proposed. (shrink)

A sloppy, smug, conceptually muddled, and tendentious Christian apologist's comparison of narrowly selected texts from Seneca, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, Paul, Luke, and Justin Martyr. Following Alasdair MacIntyre, Rowe defends the traditionist view according to which Spirit-enhanced ‘supernatural’ discourse is intelligible only to those on the inside of Christian faith. Rowe argues that morality and religion are abstractions. Rowe presents his translations of Seneca, Epictetus, Marcus, Paul, Luke, and Justin into modern English while also being committed to the traditionist (...) view that such translations are doomed to inaccuracy and distortion. His views invite relativism and skepticism about all kinds of inquiry, including MacIntyre’s traditioned approach. (shrink)

El objetivo de este trabajo consiste en analizar dos alternativas presentes en las Disertaciones de Epicteto como posibles vías de acceso a la libertad y la eudaimonía: a) identificar nuestro querer con el querer de la divinidad; b) concentrarnos exclusivamente en aquello de "depende de nosotros". Dado que ambos caminos parecen conducir al solipsismo y la pasividad, ofreceremos una alternativa de interpretación que permite conciliar ambas estrategias con la impronta práctica que caracteriza a la ética del autor. The aim of (...) this paper is to analyse two alternatives which are present in Epictetus' Dissertations as possible ways to reach freedom and happiness: a) to identify our will with the will of the divinity; b) to focus exclusively on "what depends on us". Since both paths seem to lead to solipsism and passiveness, we shall offer an alternative interpretation that can reconcile both strategies with the practical approach of the Epictetus's ethics. (shrink)

This study proposes the HEVANAH Framework, a universal systems model for conscious evolution that integrates the moral aspiration of Heaven, the liberating insight of Nirvana, the harmonious abundance of Jannah, and the disciplined wisdom of the Stoic principles of Epictetus. By interpreting these traditions as archetypes of ultimate human fulfillment rather than exclusive doctrines, the framework identifies shared philosophical and psychological foundations that transcend cultural and religious boundaries. Through this synthesis, spiritual ideals are reframed as practical pathways for cultivating (...) inner freedom, ethical resilience, and harmonious coexistence. The model affirms a timeless human truth: that enduring fulfillment is achieved through virtue, self-mastery, and the shared flourishing of all, a principle that can be embraced by people of all faiths and worldviews as a common foundation for humanity’s conscious evolution. (shrink)

Use of the word “worry” is on the rise. Does that reflect our anxious time — or make it worse?

This article aims to analyze some aspects of the work Manual para a Vida Feliz, the result of classes given by Epictetus, and recorded by his student Ariano. We will consider the situations that, according to Epictetus, depend on the individual and those that do not depend on their action. In particular, this analysis will focus on fragments 1 to 6 of the manual, given the length to be analyzed in an article. To account for the proposed object, (...) this analysis will be carried out, based on Hadot's (2015) perspective on the subject. The research method used will be bibliographic review. As for the methodology, it will be deductive in nature. Our studies show that his teachings are based on the essential principles of Stoic philosophy. Therefore, the only good that exists, for him, is the moral good. Furthermore, all human action is based on judgment and nature is coherent with itself. From this perspective, what depends on the individual, in this life, is what is under their control and everything that is beyond their control does not depend on them. Therefore, worrying about what is not under your control is considered useless and a waste of time. (shrink)

Experiencing tragedy may broaden our ability to understand the suffering of others, and further our ability to endure future suffering. In the work of stoic philosopher Epictetus, he proports one should practice premeditatio malorum, preparing for the tragedies to come so that when they do occur one will be less disturbed. Through the stories of those that have survived tragedy and great suffering though, we can grow to understand the choices people make that lead to suffering are often the (...) lesser of two evils. When man sees a reason to suffer, he will choose to suffer, it is possible to understand and explain what experiencing suffering causes. The writings of philosophical professor Michael Brady, Susan Feagin, and others explain that the virtues of suffering are enough so we should not avoid the experience of it. We study history so that we may avoid repeating it, and just the same we experience the suffering that comes naturally throughout life so that we may avoid repeating it. (shrink)

This monograph offers a rigorous and application-focused synthesis of classical Stoic texts, drawing extensively from the primary sources of Seneca, Marcus Aurelius, Epictetus, Musonius Rufus, and Cicero. It engages critically with modern scholarship, notably the work of Pierre Hadot, to re-frame philosophy as an indispensable practical discipline for achieving human flourishing (Eudaimonia). The text is fundamentally a guide to Stoic applied ethics, employing an intentional focus on the ancient practices of Hypomnemata (personal records) and the cognitive discipline of Prosochē (...) (attentive awareness). The methodology illustrates how the cultivation of the four cardinal excellences—wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice—provides a robust framework for self-mastery and rational discernment. By systematically examining the core Stoic claim that distress arises from subjective judgments rather than external circumstances, this work establishes a comprehensive approach to cultivating inner tranquility (Ataraxia) and intentional living in a contemporary context. -/- Availability and Acquisition The work is distributed globally through major commercial channels and is available in multiple formats: -/- Paperback Edition: Lulu Hardcover Edition: Lulu E-book Edition: Lulu -/- Audiobook (Google Play): Google Play Audiobook (Apple Books): Apple Books Audiobook (Spotify): Spotify -/- Further Distribution: Available through major academic and commercial retailers, including Amazon, Barnes & Noble, Booktopia, Bookshop, and Gardners. (shrink)

This is a study of Roman adaptations of Stoic doctrine that seeks to portray a model of the self functioning as a mediator between philosophical and traditional values (1). The author’s aim is ‘to let the Roman Stoics’ self arise out of a comprehensive analysis of their extant philosophical work and to conduct that analysis from the vantage point of the specific question of social embeddedness. Such an approach yields a Stoic self that is constituted by the encounter between challenges (...) and normative expectations’ (2). Overall, this aim is met. The Roman Stoics referred to are Seneca, Musonius Rufus, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, and to a lesser extent Hierocles, who ‘all had to come to terms with the sociopolitical challenges of imperial Rome’ (3). The tame thesis advanced is that the doctrine of these Roman Stoics ‘shows a distinctive pattern of emphasizing social responsibility’ (3). This social responsibility includes commitments to the political community, marriage, and parenthood. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: In contemporary discussions of freedom in Stoic philosophy we often encounter the following assumptions: (i) the Stoics discussed the problem of free will and determinis; (ii) since in Stoic philosophy freedom of the will is in the end just an illusion, the Stoics took the freedom of the sage as a substitute for it and as the only true freedom; (iii) in the c. 500 years of live Stoic philosophical debate, the Stoics were largely concerned with the same philosophical (...) problems of freedom. In this paper I argue that (i) can be upheld only in a very restricted way; (ii) is altogether untenable; and regarding (iii), that, although there may have occurred little change in the Stoic philosophical position on freedom over the centuries, we can detect more than one transformation of the philosophical problems that were at the forefront of the discussion. Moreover, that all the conceptions and problems of freedom were linked to Stoic ethics, and that the differences between them become transparent when one considers their various roles in this context. (shrink)