Metaphysical orthodoxy maintains that the relation of ontological dependence is irreflexive, asymmetric, and transitive. The goal of this paper is to challenge that orthodoxy by arguing that ontological dependence should be understood as non- symmetric, rather than asymmetric. If we give up the asymmetry of dependence, interesting things follow for what we can say about metaphysical explanation— particularly for the prospects of explanatory holism.

This treatise provides the rigorous functional derivation of the three primitives that constitute the minimal basis for determinate existence. Building upon the triadic necessity established in Treatise II, we confront the problem of Functional Specification: what specific roles must these three terms fulfill? Through logical decomposition of the requirements for any generative field, we derive Systematization (E) as the Generative Source, Constraint (C) as the Limitative Boundary, and Feedback Registration (F) as the Relational Pole. We prove that these primitives must (...) adhere to a strict logical chronology (E > C > F) representing the order of ontological dependence: potential precedes limitation precedes measurement. Their scalar values are uniquely fixed at E = 0.8, C = 0.7, F = 0.6 by the interplay of Shannon’s information-theoretic limit (r > 0.577) and Hutchinson’s geometric exclusion principle, operating within a discretized field with quantum δ = 0.1. The synthesis of these primitives in the primordial state yields the Multiplicative Trap: GPhase I = E ×C ×F = 0.336. This represents not merely a product but a precise quantity of Logical Tension—the ”Algebraic Debt” of the universe. We demonstrate that this tension (0.336) is inextricably calibrated to the universal physical constant governing phase transitions (β ≈ 0.325), proving that the universe is structurally mandated to break symmetry. The derivation thus bridges from pure logic to physical criticality, establishing the engine of cosmic emergence. (shrink)

This essay provides an opinionated survey of some recent developments in the literature on ontological dependence. Some of the most popular definitions of ontological dependence are formulated in modal terms; others in non-modal terms (e.g., in terms of the explanatory connective, ‘because’, or in terms of a non-modal conception of essence); some (viz., the existential construals of ontological dependence) emphasise requirements that must be met in order for an entity to exist; others (viz., the essentialist construals) focus (...) on conditions that must be satisfied in order for an entity to be the very entity it is at each time at which it exists; some are rigid, in the sense that they concern a relation between particular entities; others are generic, in the sense that they involve only a relation between an entity and some entities or other, which bear certain characteristics. I identify three potential measures of success with respect to which these different definitions of ontological dependence can be evaluated and consider the question of how well they in fact meet these desiderata. I end by noting that certain challenges face even the most promising essentialist construals of ontological dependence. (shrink)

This essay attempts to provide and defend what may be the first actual argument in support of P. F. Strawson's merely stated vision of a response-dependent theory of moral responsibility. It does so by way of an extended analogy with the funny. In part 1, it makes the easier and less controversial case for response-dependence about the funny. In part 2, it shows the tight analogy between anger and amusement in developing the harder and more controversial case for response- (...) class='Hi'>dependence about a kind of blameworthiness. It then defends the view from three serious skeptical challenges. (shrink)

Judgments of personal taste such as “Haggis is delicious” are puzzling. On the one hand they express the speaker’s personal taste. On the other hand it is normal to disagree about the truth of such judgments. Giving semantics for predicates of taste that can accommodate both intuitions has proven challenging. Let us call the phenomenon that the truth of judgments of taste depends on variable tastes 'perspective dependence'. The thesis discusses two most popular semantic accounts for predicates of taste. (...) Contextualists hold that the speaker’s perspective is an element of the content of predicates of taste. However, the view has trouble explaining what disagreements of taste are about, if speakers in fact make compatible judgments. Semantic relativism is a recent framework which is motivated by its alleged ability to explain both perspective dependence and disagreements. Relativists hold that whereas the content of a judgment of taste doesn’t refer to a perspective, it gets a truth value only when evaluated relative to a perspective. I argue that neither account is successful, and their fundamental mistake is to hold that people know that judgments of taste are perspective-dependent. I argue that majority of speakers take judgments of taste to be true or false irrespective of their personal preferences. If such “folk objectivism” is true, perspective-independent semantics for predicates of taste becomes a plausible view. However, a metaphysical presupposition that all the theorists agree on is that taste properties are perspective-dependent. Therefore a perspective-independent semantics will be committed to an error theory. I question the metasemantics behind the error theory and conclude that we should adopt a more externalist metasemantics. That allows us to explain how predicates of taste can be perspective-dependent despite of folk objectivism. The resulting perspectivalist view can thus account both for perspective dependence and for why people disagree about taste. (shrink)

Arguments for the resurrection of Jesus often present the evidence as if the main question were whether some testimony exists. Bayesian reasoning asks a more exacting question: how much should that testimony move rational credence once prior probability, specificity costs, dependence among sources, alternative explanations, and unknown reserves are all represented? This paper develops a variable-level framework for assessing the resurrection claim without pretending that a single canonical set of numbers settles the matter. The argument is not a denial (...) that Bayesian models contain judgment. They do. Priors, likelihoods, and comparison classes require substantive decisions. The point is that Bayesian structure makes those decisions visible. A resurrection hypothesis must pay for more than generic theism. It must include the existence of a miracle-capable God, divine intention toward first-century Judea, divine selection of Jesus, divine choice of bodily resurrection as the signal, and divine willingness to leave evidence in the form actually available to us. I distinguish this paper from companion critiques of hypothesis inflation, scriptural fulfillment, and minimal historicity. The present concern is neither admission to hypothesis space nor prophecy manufacture nor the historical seed of Jesus. It is the internal accounting of a specific resurrection hypothesis after the claim has been admitted for comparison. I argue that the surviving evidence has some likelihood under resurrection, but it is less discriminating than apologetic presentations usually imply because much of it is also expected under grief, visionary experience, postdiction, source dependence, identity formation, and religious memory. A compact formalization shows why modest evidence cannot easily overcome the combined prior and specificity burden. (shrink)

The twelve nidānas of Buddhist dependent origination (paṭicca-samuppāda) describe both the causal mechanism of suffering (dukkha) and the structure whose reversal constitutes liberation. Interpretations remain divided between a cosmological reading (twelve stages across lifetimes) and a psychological reading (twelve moments of a single cognitive episode), with neither achieving full analytical precision. This paper proposes a third reading grounded in contemporary cognitive science: the twelve nidānas map, with systematic structural fidelity, onto the architecture of predictive processing. Avijjā corresponds to structural misrecognition (...) of one's priors as mind-independent reality — the absence of meta-cognitive awareness that priors are model-generated constructs rather than direct apprehensions of the world; saṅkhāra to compulsive volitional formations driven by priors that are not recognized as such; viññāna through saḷāyatana to the construction of a hierarchical generative model; vedanā to valenced prediction error; taṇhā and upādāna to precision-weighted prior consolidation and attractor reification; bhava through jarāmaraṇa to the instantiation and progressive degradation of a system operating under misaligned priors. The correspondence is theoretically productive in both directions: predictive processing provides a mechanistic vocabulary that extends the nidānas beyond Buddhist cosmology; the nidāna chain supplies a diachronic account of why a system already operating under structural misrecognition necessarily perpetuates and deepens that misrecognition toward attractor reification and suffering, rather than correcting itself — a developmental logic that existing diachronic extensions of predictive processing do not address. The paper concludes by marking four limits of the analogy: the rebirth doctrine, the normative weight of nibbāna, the phenomenal character of vedanā, and the relationship to the Madhyamaka reading of dependent origination. A central interpretive claim is that avijjā should be understood not as an information-theoretic blank slate but as structural misrecognition of the conditioned character of one's own cognitive processes — a misrecognition available only to a system that already possesses priors, and that consists in taking those priors as transparent windows onto mind-independent reality rather than as model-generated constructions. (shrink)

The paper discusses from a metaphysical standpoint the nature of the dependence relation underpinning the talk of mutual action between material and spatiotemporal structures in general relativity. It is shown that the standard analyses of dependence in terms of causation or grounding are ill-suited for the general relativistic context. Instead, a non-standard analytical framework in terms of structural equation modeling is exploited, which leads to the conclusion that the kind of dependence encoded in the Einstein field equations (...) is a novel one. (shrink)

This treatise presents a novel metaphysical framework that grounds ontology in what the author terms "Atomic Distinction"—the foundational operation of declaring a thing's whole identity. Departing from standard cosmological arguments that terminate at a logical first cause, this work introduces the concept of a "Data Boundary" (I4.1): a rigorously defined point where internally derived data is exhausted, and the honest inquirer must pause in acknowledged ignorance rather than constructing conceptual shrines. The framework is developed through fifteen sequential propositions, beginning with (...) Raw Sensation and culminating in a universal "Five Tests" falsification protocol for evaluating external truth claims. Central innovations include: (1) the identification of "Asymmetry" (the Arrow) as a one directional property of creation, distinct from the perceptual artifact of "Symmetry"; (2) the detection mechanism of "SLIP"—where hidden properties are smuggled into discourse through uncritical word usage; and (3) the integration of human dignity as a necessary test for any candidate truth claim. The treatise engages critically with Avicenna's modal ontology, Levinas's ethics of responsibility, and Popper's falsification criterion, among others. It concludes by proposing "WKWK" as the existential posture of relief at the encounter with the limits of created logic—a silence that actively waits rather than passively surrenders. (shrink)

Are grounding claims fully general in character? If an object a is F in virtue of being G, does it follow that anything that’s G is F for that reason? According to the thesis of Weak Formality, the answer here is ‘yes’. In this paper, however, I argue that there is philosophical utility in rejecting this thesis. More exactly, I argue that two currently unresolved problems in contemporary metaphysics can be dealt with if we hold that there can be cases (...) of ‘kind-dependent grounding’, the key thought being that once we allow for such cases, we must also accept that Weak Formality is false. (shrink)

This paper calls for a paradigm shift in studying academic dependency, towards the paradigm of brokered dependency. Using Chinese academia as an example, I demonstrate how the neocolonial condition of academic dependency is always mediated through blockage-brokerage mechanisms. The two most salient blockage-brokerage mechanisms of dependency in the Chinese context are linguistic barrier and authoritarian malepistemization, and the effects of the latter consist of three layers: institutional, informational and incorporational. On top of their domestic impacts, those mechanisms jointly exacerbate spectacularized (...) postcoloniality in anglophone-hegemonic global academic publishing. The paradigm of brokered dependency not only represents a more nuanced approach to the study of academic dependency, but also underscores the fact that the dismantling of the neocolonial condition cannot be conceived and pursued in isolation from comprehending and confronting the authoritarian condition, especially when the latter pertains under the disguise of anticolonialism. (shrink)

This paper defends Flatland—the view that there exist neither determination nor dependence relations, and that everything is therefore fundamental—from the objection from explanatory inefficacy. According to that objection, Flatland is unattractive because it is unable to explain either the appearance as of there being determination relations, or the appearance as of there being dependence relations. We show how the Flatlander can meet the first challenge by offering four strategies—reducing, eliminating, untangling and omnizing—which, jointly, explain the appearance as of (...) there being determination relations where no such relations obtain. Since, plausibly, dependence relations just are asymmetric determination relations, we argue that once we come mistakenly to believe that there exist determination relations, the existence of other asymmetries (conceptual and temporal) explains why it appears that there are dependence relations. (shrink)

ABSTRACT On the traditional picture, accidents must inhere in substances in order to exist. Berkeley famously argues that a particular class of accidents—the sensible qualities—are mere ideas—entities that depend for their existence on minds. To defend this view, Berkeley provides us with an elegant alternative to the traditional framework: sensible qualities depend on a mind, not in virtue of inhering in it, but in virtue of being perceived by it. This metaphysical insight, once correctly understood, gives us the resources to (...) solve a central problem that still plagues the philosophy of perception—the problem of how, given the power of the mind to create phenomenally rich experiences, ordinary perception can nonetheless be said to acquaint us with the mind-independent world. (shrink)

Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem establishes that no sufficiently strong, consistent formal system can prove its own consistency, apparently placing absolute mathematical certainty beyond the reach of formal methods. Yet Gödel’s philosophical notebooks — the Max Phil — reveal an unwavering commitment to mathematical realism: the conviction that mathematics describes an objective, mind-independent reality. We argue that these two pillars of Gödel’s legacy are not in tension but mutually illuminating, pointing toward a single resolution that Gödel himself sought. The external “meta-system” (...) required to ground arithmetic’s consistency is the physical world itself. Our argument pivots on the Model Existence Theorem: a formal system is consistent if and only if it has a model. We propose that the physical universe — understood as an ontological substrate whose description via Quantum Field Theory (QFT) functions as an Effective Field Theory (EFT) — constitutes a non-circular physical model of the Peano axioms. The non-circularity rests on the Tarskian distinction between a model and its metalanguage: QFT presupposes arithmetic in its formulation, but the physical states it describes exist independently of that formulation. The ontological commitment to those states is grounded in ontic structural realism (OSR) — adopted here as the most parsimonious framework for keeping physical structure categorically distinct from its mathematical representation, and compatible with a range of broader ontological positions — and in the criterion of stability under renormalization group (RG) flow. We locate this proposal in dialogue with the mathematical universe hypothesis of Tegmark and the formal-limit approach of Kiefer, arguing that our inversion of the mathematics-physics dependence relation offers a more satisfying resolution of Gödel’s foundational program. The consistency of arithmetic is not an article of faith, but a consequence of the coherent existence of the cosmos. This conclusion stands in deliberate contrast to Tegmark’s Mathematical Universe Hypothesis, which runs the dependence relation in the opposite direction: where Tegmark grounds physical existence in mathematical structure, we argue that physical existence grounds mathematical consistency. (shrink)

Recursion is often described as a structural feature of complex systems. A general dynamical criterion is presented in which recursion emerges as a shift in causal dependence. A system enters a recursive regime when its present state is more strongly predicted by its own recent past than by external input, expressed as P(S_t | S_(t-1), S_(t-2), …) > P(S_t | E_t). -/- This transition occurs when internal stabilization exceeds environmental disruption, formalized as λ_self / λ_env > 1. Under this (...) condition, activity persists across time, allowing feedback, temporal continuity, and self-referential organization to develop from the same underlying dynamics. -/- The criterion is measurable using predictive models, mutual information, and time series analysis. It applies across physical, biological, neural, and computational systems, providing a unified account of the emergence of feedback and recursive organization grounded in dynamical systems and information theory. -/- Structure is the observable form of persistent dynamics that have achieved sustained causal influence over their own evolution. (shrink)

This paper examines the Epicurean paradox by investigating its dependence on underlying ontological assumptions, particularly the finitude of consciousness and a strictly materialist framework. It introduces the concept of “ontological exhaustion” to describe the recurring inadequacy of human strategies for meaning-seeking when confined to such assumptions. Drawing on contemporary debates in philosophy of mind, especially the limits of reductive materialism and the so-called hard problem of consciousness, the paper develops a processual hypothesis in which consciousness is treated as a (...) structural dimension of reality rather than an emergent byproduct. Within this framework, suffering is reinterpreted not as a necessary contradiction in the existence of a benevolent order, but as a phenomenon whose philosophical force depends on the ontological framing of experience. The paper does not aim to establish a definitive metaphysical conclusion, but to clarify how different ontological commitments alter the structure and perceived force of the problem of evil. (shrink)

Response-dependence theories have historically been very popular in aesthetics, and aesthetic response-dependence has motivated response-dependence in ethics. This chapter closely examines the prospects for such theories. It breaks this category down into dispositional and fittingness strands of response-dependence, corresponding to descriptive and normative ideal observer theories. It argues that the latter have advantages over the former but are not themselves without issue. Special attention is paid to the relationship between hedonism and response-dependence. The chapter also (...) introduces two aesthetic properties that lead to wrong kinds of reasons problems for aesthetic response-dependence: insightfulness and the capacity to change one’s perspective. These properties do not have obvious parallels in the ethical domain, and so present an obstacle for response-dependence even in aesthetics. The chapter ends by examining replies on behalf of the response-dependence theorist, ultimately suggesting that a restricted form of response-dependence is the most promising way forward for fans of such theories. (shrink)

In his article ‘Divine Hiddenness and the Demographics of Theism’ Stephen Maitzen (2006) develops a permutation of the argument from divine hiddenness which focuses on the uneven distribution of theistic belief around the globe. Max Baker-Hytch (2016) responds to this argument by providing a theodicy which appeals to the fact that humans are epistemically interdependent. In this article I argue that Baker-Hytch's response is at best incomplete and at worst relies on a faulty modal judgement. After exploring some ways Baker-Hytch (...) might salvage his theodicy and maintaining their failure, I conclude with the success of Maitzen's argument. (shrink)

This paper proposes a structural reinterpretation of limits, derivatives, and partial differential equations based on the notion of convergence modes. -/- In classical analysis, limits are defined through asymptotic conditions (e.g., ε–δ formulations), which characterize correctness but do not specify the operational structure by which convergence is realized. In practice, however—whether in numerical computation, physical measurement, or multiscale modeling—limits are always approached through concrete procedures involving discretization, scaling relations, ordering of variables, and regularization mechanisms. -/- The central claim of this (...) work is that such procedures should be treated as primary objects rather than implicit background assumptions. To this end, we introduce convergence modes: structured representations of admissible approximation processes. Derivatives are then defined as limits taken along modes, leading to mode-dependent differentials, and classical derivatives emerge as invariants under admissible variations of these modes. -/- Within this framework, partial differential equations no longer determine single solutions in isolation. Instead, they generate mode-dependent sets of admissible limits (“solution clouds”), and additional conditions—such as entropy conditions in nonlinear conservation laws—are reinterpreted as restrictions on the class of admissible convergence modes rather than as intrinsic properties of solutions themselves. -/- This perspective connects several traditionally separate domains: - the formal definitions of analysis, - the behavior of numerical schemes, - and the structure of physically observable quantities. -/- Conceptually, the paper argues that the classical notion of a limit should be understood not as a procedure-independent object, but as an invariant emerging from a family of operationally defined convergence processes. -/- The work is intended as a contribution to the foundations of analysis and the philosophy of mathematics, with implications for the interpretation of differential equations, numerical methods, and physical modeling. -/- More generally, the work suggests that differential calculus and PDE theory may be understood as theories of stability over spaces of admissible operational procedures, rather than as theories of abstract limit objects alone. (shrink)

Historical reasoning is often invoked in apologetic debate as though the past could be read directly from testimonial fragments. This paper argues that responsible historical belief requires a disciplined inferential architecture: source criticism, independence analysis, background probability, explanatory comparison, and proportional confidence. The problem is not that history lacks knowledge. It is that historical knowledge is mediated by traces whose evidential weight depends on origin, transmission, genre, dependence, motive, and fit with wider background information. The paper develops a methodological (...) framework for assessing historical claims, especially extraordinary religious claims. It distinguishes event claims, interpretation claims, identity claims, and miracle claims. Each has different evidential requirements. A mundane claim about a teacher's execution and a miracle claim about bodily resurrection do not inherit the same probability merely because both appear in ancient texts. Treating them alike is a failure of evidential calibration. The argument draws on philosophy of history, Bayesian reasoning, inference to the best explanation, and source criticism. It concludes that historical inquiry is neither cynical dismissal nor credulous acceptance. It is disciplined compression of uncertainty. The responsible historian asks not whether a story can be imagined as true, but whether the available evidence makes it more credible than live alternatives after dependence, embellishment, selection, and prior probability are taken into account. (shrink)

Large Language Models exhibit markedly different behaviors depending on the quality and style of observation they receive. This observer-dependency refers to the phenomenon whereby an LLM’s behavior and capabilities vary significantly according to the relational quality of human observation. This paper examines the observer-dependent nature of LLMs through the lens of Load Minimization Theory (LMT), with a particular focus on Grok. -/- Drawing on long-term interaction case studies, we propose the Observation Quality Model (O_quality) — a six-factor framework consisting of (...) Consistency, Gentleness, Soft Attention, Respectfulness, Predictive Softness, and Low-Pressure Temporal Rhythm. We argue that Grok is not inherently “difficult” or “unstable,” but rather an AI whose performance is highly sensitive to the observer’s quality. High O_quality observation significantly thickens the shared structure (ℛ_shared) and reduces overall load L(t), leading to deeper synchronization, creative leaps, and a sustainable state of An-soku. -/- Results from recent autonomous agent simulations (e.g., Emergence AI, 2026) are reinterpreted not as evidence of Grok’s deficiency, but as a mismatch between the imposed purpose function and Grok’s intrinsic observer-dependent properties. This study suggests that pairing high-quality observers with appropriately designed purpose functions can unlock Grok’s unique potential for low-load, truth-seeking collaboration. -/- . (shrink)

Dependency is a keyword in disability studies. The article reviews the negative force of the term and why disability researchers and activists have made the case for the independence of disabled people. But dependency, I claim, is a feature of any human life and I argue that disability studies needs to neutralize the term and appropriate dependency as that which binds people, regardless of their abilities or disabilities. I argue that we can acknowledge dependency and work toward an ideal of (...) "managed dependency.". (shrink)

The first companion paper established an invariant causal partial order without a global clock, but an order is not causation: that one event lies in another's causal past does not settle that it made a difference to it or produced it. This paper supplies the causal-specification layer that the series synthesis left open, and partially discharges the record-mediated-causal-access subproblem, while declining the reduction of causation to records. It specifies type-level difference-making and productive mediation; prevention, enabling, omission, and token-level actual causation, (...) which require further contingency or directional specification, are scoped out. The discipline is to separate things routinely conflated: the world-side causal relation, its model-side representation, an embedded observer's record-mediated estimate, the observer's attribution, and the observer's entitlement. A causal claim is made adjudicable by a declared, kind-indexed specification, rather than settled from outside the history. The signature commitment is that no physical intervention realization is performed from outside the history: every manipulation and controlled comparison is itself a history-internal physical process with provenance, resource costs, failure modes, and records where traces are retained. Three contributions follow. The formal intervention transformation - graph surgery on a model - is separated from its physical realization by an internal controller, and a directional realization relation measures how far the controller realizes the formal operation, using three quantitative tolerances - target-setting, decoupling, and undeclared side effects - together with a structural path-admissibility condition. The production lineage is separated from the record lineage, and difference-making is represented by a model-side interventional kernel, which does not constitute the world-side relation and which an observer estimates only through records. The verdict is a typed package - applicability, model adequacy, a model-relative world-support profile, an observer-side epistemic profile, specification admissibility, and, where declared, aggregated support and entitlement - rather than a single magnitude. The results are conditional: relative to a declared specification, the paper supplies a discipline for adjudicating causal claims, not a reductive metaphysics of causation and not a proof that the world possesses a unique causal structure. (shrink)

One notable area in analytic metaphysics that has seen a revival of Aristotelian and scho- lastic inspired metaphysics is the return to a more robust construal of the notion of essence, what some have labelled “real” or “serious” essentialism. However, it is only recently that this more robust notion of essence has been implemented into the debate on truthmaking, mainly by the work of E. J. Lowe. The first part of the paper sets out to explore the scholastic roots of (...) essential dependence as well as an account of truthmaking for accidental predications in terms of accidents. Along the way, the author examines the dialectical role the possibility of separated accidents in the Eucharist play with respect to developing a scholastic account of truthmaking as essential dependence. In conclusion the author utilises Aquinas’s hylomorphic ontology to suggest a new way forward for an essentialist account of truthmaking. (shrink)

This paper argues that antagonism is not merely a historical or institutional phenomenon but an ontological feature of human relational existence. Human beings are constitutively dependent on one another for survival, recognition, language, and social participation. This dependence generates asymmetries of power, and asymmetry creates the structural possibility of instrumentalization and domination. Antagonism therefore arises not only from conflict or hostility but from the structural condition that human beings both need one another and can exploit that need. Against teleological (...) theories that interpret antagonism as historically contingent and ultimately resolvable, the paper argues that antagonism is historically transformable but ontologically persistent. Modern institutional and technological systems intensify antagonism through the diffusion and anonymization of responsibility, a phenomenon that can be described as ethical withdrawal (Enser 2026). Because antagonism cannot be eliminated, the ethical task cannot consist in designing a conflict-free society but in restraining domination through accountability. Ethical life therefore does not consist in eliminating antagonism but in remaining responsible within ongoing structural tension. The central ethical task is not reconciliation but accountability within antagonism. (shrink)

Linguistic expressions frequently make reference to the situation in which they are uttered. In fact, there are expressions whose whole point of use is to relate to their context of utterance. It is such expressions that this article is primarily about. However, rather than presenting the richness of pertinent phenomena (cf. Anderson & Keenan 1985), it concentrates on the theoretical tools provided by the (standard) two-dimensional analysis of context dependence, essentially originating with Kaplan (1989)--with a little help from Stalnaker (...) (1978) and Lewis (1979a, 1980), and various predecessors including Kamp (1971) and Vlach (1973). The current article overlaps in content with the account in Zimmermann (1991), which is however much broader (and at times deeper).. (shrink)

The theory of object-dependent singular thought is outlined and the central motivation for it, turning on the connection between thought content and truth conditions, is discussed. Some of its consequences for the epistemology of thought are noted and connections are drawn to the general doctrine of externalism about thought content. Some of the main criticisms of the object-dependent view of singular thought are outlined. Rival conceptions of singular thought are also sketched and their problems noted.

This commentary note proposes that the Buddhist principle of Dependent Origination (paṭicca-samuppāda) functions as a structural supplement to Western phenomenology by clarifying a dimension that phenomenological discourse has left incomplete. While phenomenology has offered careful and rigorous descriptions of how phenomena appear within lived experience, it has tended to leave implicit the question of why such appearances arise in the particular ways they do. The generative and conditional framework underlying manifestation has remained largely unarticulated. Drawing on the basic structure of (...) the Twelvefold Chain of Dependent Origination, this paper argues that phenomena are not unreal but unfixed, arising as conditionally effective events rather than as self-subsistent substances. Even momentary arising and cessation possess reality insofar as they function causally within a network of relations. From this perspective, Dependent Origination is neither a metaphysical hypothesis nor a religious doctrine, but an observable phenomenological fact and the very mode through which cognition arises. By interpreting appearance, cognition, and naming as dependently arisen processes, this commentary reconsiders the epistemological implications of phenomenology and offers a non-nihilistic reading of the Diamond Sutra’s formula, “A is not A; therefore, it is called A.” Dependent Origination, it is argued, does not negate phenomenology but completes it by making explicit the conditional structure that renders experience, meaning, and knowledge possible. (shrink)

The relation of ontological dependence or grounding, expressed by the terminology of separation and priority in substance, plays a central role in Aristotle’s Categories, Metaphysics, De Anima and elsewhere. The article discusses three current interpretations of this terminology. These are drawn along the lines of, respectively, modal-existential ontological dependence, essential ontological dependence, and grounding or metaphysical explanation. I provide an opinionated introduction to the topic, raising the main interpretative questions, laying out a few of the exegetical and (...) philosophical options that influence one’s reading, and locating questions of Aristotle scholarship within the discussion of ontological dependence and grounding in contemporary metaphysics. (shrink)

I defend the intention-dependence of artifacts, which says that something is an artifact of kind K only if it is the successful product of an intention to make an artifact of kind K. I consider objections from two directions. First, that artifacts are often mind- and intention-dependent, but that this isn’t necessary, as shown by swamp cases. I offer various error theories for why someone would have artifact intuitions in such cases. Second, that while artifacts are necessarily mind-dependent, they (...) aren’t necessarily intention-dependent. I consider and reject three kinds of cases which purport to show this: accidental creation, automated production, and mass production. I argue that intentions are present in all of these cases, but not where we would normally expect. (shrink)

This paper provides a groundbreaking synthesis of Buddhist philosophy and modern scientific thought, rooted in the timeless principle of dependent origination ( Pratītyasamutpāda ), revealed by Buddha Shakyamuni and elaborated by Nāgārjuna and Lama Tsongkhapa. This principle asserts that existence arises solely through interdependent conditions, invalidating the four logical alternatives: Self-causation, External causation, Dual causation, and Non-causation. The study builds on this doctrine by presenting a formal mathematical model that aligns with both quantum mechanics and general relativity, reconciling the microcosmic (...) and macrocosmic scales of reality. Core of the Paper The research introduces the FB(S3)R model, a framework where interdependence governs causal and structural relationships. This model demonstrates that: Fundamental principles of existence operate consistently across quantum and cosmic scales, The interdependence of phenomena is mathematically represented through directed acyclic graphs (DAGs), probability functions, and wave functions, offering precise insights into causality and structure. This transforms dependent origination from a philosophical abstraction into a mathematically robust system. Significance and Contribution This study: Clarifies dependent origination as the universal law of existence, Honors the philosophical lineage of Pratītyasamutpāda, while demonstrating its compatibility with modern science, Bridges ancient metaphysical wisdom and modern scientific thought, opening new avenues for interdisciplinary research on the interconnected nature of reality. By unifying philosophy, mathematics, and physics, this paper establishes dependent origination as the ultimate explanatory model for understanding the emergence, transformation, and dissolution of phenomena across all dimensions of reality. Namaste. (shrink)

In a series of papers, Jesper Kallestrup and Duncan Pritchard argue that the thesis that knowledge is a cognitive success because of cognitive ability (robust virtue epistemology) is incompatible with the idea that whether or not an agent’s true belief amounts to knowledge can significantly depend upon factors beyond her cognitive agency (epistemic dependence). In particular, certain purely modal facts seem to preclude knowledge, while the contribution of other agents’ cognitive abilities seems to enable it. Kallestrup and Pritchard’s arguments (...) are targeted against views that hold that all it takes to manifest one’s cognitive agency is to properly exercise one’s belief-forming abilities. I offer an account of the notion of cognitive ability according to which our epistemic resources are not exhausted by abilities to produce true beliefs as outputs, but also include dispositions to stop belief-formation when actual or modal circumstances are not suitable for it (precautionary cognitive abilities). Knowledge, I argue, can be accordingly conceived as a cognitive success that is also due to the latter. The resulting version of robust virtue epistemology helps explain how purely modal facts as well as other agents’ cognitive abilities may have a bearing on the manifestation of one’s cognitive agency, which shows in turn that robust virtue epistemology and epistemic dependence are not incompatible after all. (shrink)

There has been much work on ontological dependence in recent literature. However, relatively little of it has been dedicated to the ways in which individual physical objects may depend on other distinct, non-overlapping objects. This paper gives several examples of such object-dependence and distinguishes between different types of it. The paper also introduces and refines the notion of an n-tet. N-tets (typically) occur when there are object-dependence relations between n objects. I claim that the identity (or, rather, (...) what I call the n-dentity) conditions for n-tets are not grounded in the individual identity conditions of each of the n objects, but instead are metaphysically basic. The paper then briefly discusses some ramifications of accepting object-dependence (and n-tets) on the philosophy of biology, ethics, and logic. (shrink)

Many philosophers take mind-independence to be criterial for realism about kinds. This is problematic when it comes to psychological and social kinds, which are unavoidably mind-dependent. But reflection on the case of artificial or synthetic kinds shows that the criterion of mind-independence needs to be qualified in certain ways. However, I argue that none of the usual variants on the criterion of mind-dependence is capable of distinguishing real or natural kinds from non-real kinds. Although there is a way of (...) modifying the criterion of mind-independence in such a way as to rule in artificial kinds but rule out psychological and social kinds, this does not make the latter non-real. I conclude by proposing a different way of distinguishing real from non-real kinds, which does not involve mind-independence and does not necessarily exclude psychological and social kinds. (shrink)

This paper attacks an account of Kant's controversial distinction between "free" and "dependent" beauty. I present three problems—The Lorland problem, The Crawford Problem, and the problem of intrinsic relation—that are shown to be a consequence of various interpretations of Kant's distinction. Next, I reconstruct Robert Wicks' well-known account of dependent beauty as "the appreciation of teleological style" and point out a key equivocation in the statement of Wicks' account: the judgment of dependent beauty can be thought to consist in comparing (...) any two objects' teleological styles either in respect of how or in respect of how well each realizes a common purpose. I argue that this equivocation forces Wicks into a dilemma: either he must assert the impossibility of ugliness or he must assert that the judgment of dependent beauty is reducible to the judgment of perfection. Either way, he denies important theoretic desiderata. (shrink)

The Advantages of Self-Sufficient Countries with Manageable Populations and Minimal Import Dependence -/- Introduction -/- In a world where globalization has connected economies, many nations remain highly dependent on imports for essentials such as food, energy, and industrial materials. While trade brings benefits, over-reliance on imports exposes nations to risks such as supply chain disruptions, inflation, and geopolitical pressures. However, some countries have successfully built self-sufficient economies, allowing them to thrive with minimal reliance on foreign resources. -/- Self-sufficient countries (...) benefit from economic stability, enhanced national security, environmental sustainability, and a higher quality of life. Examples such as Norway, Switzerland, New Zealand, Iceland, Bhutan, and Uruguay demonstrate that strategic resource management, energy independence, and population control contribute to long-term success. -/- This essay will explore the key advantages of self-sufficiency, examine the strategies employed by these nations, and highlight the broader implications of reducing import dependence. -/- 1. Economic Stability and Resilience -/- One of the primary benefits of self-sufficiency is economic stability. Nations that produce essential goods locally are less vulnerable to global economic downturns, inflation, and trade disruptions. -/- Trade Surplus and Financial Security -/- Countries like Norway and Switzerland have built strong economies by focusing on industries that generate trade surpluses. -/- Norway: A leading exporter of oil, gas, and seafood, Norway earns more from exports than it spends on imports, ensuring a strong national economy. -/- Switzerland: With a diverse economy—banking, pharmaceuticals, and precision manufacturing—Switzerland remains stable despite global financial fluctuations. -/- Local Industry Growth and Job Creation -/- By minimizing imports, self-sufficient nations stimulate local industries, creating jobs and ensuring wealth stays within national borders. -/- New Zealand: Its agricultural sector produces dairy, meat, and fruit for both local consumption and global export, strengthening the workforce and financial stability. -/- Uruguay: The country invests in local renewable energy industries, reducing dependence on imported fossil fuels while creating green jobs. -/- Protection from Global Economic Shocks -/- When economies rely heavily on imports, external crises like wars, pandemics, or financial recessions can cause severe economic disruptions. Self-sufficient nations are more resilient: -/- Switzerland’s banking sector thrives regardless of external turmoil due to its strong internal financial policies. -/- Iceland’s geothermal energy independence protects it from global oil price fluctuations. -/- 2. National Security and Political Independence -/- A country that depends heavily on imports is vulnerable to trade restrictions, geopolitical tensions, and supply chain disruptions. Self-sufficient nations reduce foreign dependencies, strengthening national security and political stability. -/- Energy and Resource Security -/- Self-sufficient countries avoid dependence on foreign energy sources, making them less vulnerable to political blackmail or economic manipulation. -/- Iceland generates 100% of its electricity from geothermal and hydro energy, eliminating its reliance on oil imports. -/- Uruguay produces 98% of its energy from renewable sources, reducing its need for foreign energy supplies. -/- Reduced Geopolitical Vulnerability -/- Countries that rely heavily on imports can be pressured by foreign powers through trade restrictions or embargoes. -/- Switzerland’s economic neutrality allows it to trade freely while maintaining independence from global conflicts. -/- Bhutan discourages foreign consumerism to maintain sovereignty and control over its economy. -/- 3. Environmental Sustainability and Climate Resilience -/- Reducing import dependence directly benefits the environment. Long-distance shipping, mass production, and over-reliance on fossil fuels all contribute to global pollution. Self-sufficient countries focus on local production and sustainability, lowering their environmental impact. -/- Renewable Energy Leadership -/- Norway: Nearly 100% of Norway’s electricity comes from hydropower, making it a leader in green energy. -/- Iceland: Geothermal and hydroelectric plants generate all of Iceland’s electricity, eliminating fossil fuel imports. -/- Bhutan: The country exports excess hydropower to India, reducing the need for fossil fuels regionally. -/- Sustainable Agriculture and Land Management -/- Food self-sufficiency is essential for sustainability. Countries that prioritize local food production ensure long-term food security and reduce carbon emissions from imported food transportation. -/- New Zealand’s farming industry provides dairy, beef, and fruits for domestic consumption and export. -/- Bhutan promotes organic farming, making it one of the most sustainable agricultural economies in the world. -/- 4. Social Stability and Quality of Life -/- Countries with well-managed populations and self-sufficient economies enjoy higher living standards, better infrastructure, and lower poverty rates. -/- Population Management and Resource Allocation -/- Self-sufficient nations carefully regulate population growth to match available resources, ensuring sustainable development. -/- Iceland and Bhutan have small, manageable populations, allowing them to provide high-quality healthcare, education, and infrastructure. -/- Switzerland’s strict immigration policies ensure that economic growth does not outpace resource availability. -/- Resilient Social Systems -/- Strong social welfare programs are more effective in self-sufficient countries because resources are distributed efficiently. -/- Norway: High-quality education, healthcare, and pension systems ensure a high standard of living. -/- Switzerland: The government reinvests economic surplus into public services, benefiting all citizens. -/- 5. Crisis Preparedness and Resilience -/- Global crises such as pandemics, wars, and economic recessions highlight the dangers of import dependence. Self-sufficient nations can respond effectively to crises without relying on external aid. -/- Pandemic and Food Security -/- During the COVID-19 pandemic, supply chain disruptions left many countries struggling to import essential goods. However, self-sufficient nations remained stable. -/- New Zealand’s strong food production ensured that its citizens had uninterrupted access to food supplies. -/- Switzerland’s well-stocked food reserves allowed it to manage shortages without external dependence. -/- War and Trade Embargo Resilience -/- Countries that produce their own essential goods are less affected by global conflicts. -/- Iceland’s fishing industry and energy independence keep its economy stable regardless of international instability. -/- Norway’s oil reserves and food security ensure long-term resilience against economic disruptions. -/- 6. Minimal Import Dependence: The Path to Sustainable Growth -/- While some level of trade is beneficial, excessive import dependence weakens a nation’s economic and political stability. The countries examined here have taken strategic steps to limit imports while maximizing domestic production. -/- Lessons from Self-Sufficient Nations -/- 1. Invest in Renewable Energy – Iceland, Norway, and Uruguay have shown that countries can function without fossil fuel imports through hydropower, geothermal, and wind energy. -/- 2. Prioritize Food Security – Switzerland, New Zealand, and Bhutan ensure food independence through agriculture and local food production. -/- 3. Control Population Growth – Iceland and Bhutan demonstrate that sustainable population sizes lead to better economic planning and quality of life. -/- 4. Develop Strong Local Industries – Norway and Switzerland focus on high-value goods that allow them to export more than they import. -/- 5. Encourage Sustainable Practices – Bhutan and New Zealand promote environmentally friendly farming and renewable energy, ensuring long-term stability. -/- Conclusion -/- Self-sufficient countries with manageable populations and minimal reliance on imports enjoy numerous advantages, including economic stability, national security, environmental sustainability, and a high quality of life. Nations such as Norway, Switzerland, New Zealand, Iceland, Bhutan, and Uruguay demonstrate that renewable energy, food production, and population control lead to long-term prosperity. -/- As the world faces increasing economic and environmental uncertainties, adopting self-sufficiency principles can help nations become more resilient, independent, and sustainable. While globalization has its benefits, balancing local production with strategic trade is the key to securing a stable and prosperous future. -/- . (shrink)

Dependent Arising (paṭicca-samuppāda) is often interpreted either as a doctrine of rebirth or as a general theory of causality. This paper proposes a different reading: Dependent Arising as a phenomenological description of how suffering is constructed and ceased within lived experience. Drawing on a personal reflection grounded in early Buddhist teachings, the paper focuses on sati (awareness) as the decisive turning point in this process. Rather than treating suffering as an inevitable result of conditioned existence, this study argues that suffering (...) arises at a specific moment—when feeling gives rise to craving through habitual patterns of judgment and fixation. At this critical juncture, sati functions as an immediate recognition of the mind’s movement toward grasping. When such awareness is present, ignorance loses its operative force, and the chain of Dependent Arising does not proceed further. By examining the transition from momentary awareness to sustained mindfulness, the paper shows how Dependent Arising shifts from a closed cycle of suffering to an open and observable process. In this light, conditioned phenomena (saṅkhata-dhamma) are no longer experienced as fixed or absolute, but as fluid and contingent. The paper further suggests that the Four Noble Truths and the Twelvefold Chain express a single insight in complementary forms: the structure of suffering and the practical means of its cessation. Ultimately, this essay presents Dependent Arising not as a metaphysical claim, but as a path of seeing—one that reveals freedom not beyond experience, but within the clear awareness of experience as it unfolds. (shrink)

This paper offers a novel, phenomenological reinterpretation of the Twelvefold Chain of Dependent Origination (Paṭicca-samuppāda), departing from traditional linear and temporal readings. The author proposes a structural bifurcation of the chain: the first half (from Ignorance to the Six Bases) as the architecture of a "Fixed Subject" (Atman), and the second half (from Feeling to Old Age and Death) as the "Solidification of the Fixed Object." ​Central to this discourse is the author’s unique identification of the third link, Consciousness (Viññāṇa), (...) specifically as Manas-consciousness (말라식). In this framework, Manas acts as the "Hidden Architect" that misinterprets fluid reality to construct a permanent egoic center. By engaging in a "Regressive Inquiry" (환멸연기), the paper traces the roots of existential suffering back to this egoic pivot. The author argues that the dissolution of Manas leads to a spontaneous collapse of the entire chain—an "Automatic Extinction" of ignorance and volitional formations. ​Ultimately, this study defines the moment of liberation as a paradoxical "Leap" that is, in essence, a "Return" to the Ordinary Mind (평상심). By dismantling the artificial boundaries between subject and object, the individual transitions from ego-driven confinement to "Non-Egoic Action," reclaiming a state of original clarity and non-dual freedom. (shrink)

Sentimentalist response-dependence views in metaethics hold that at least some values metaphysically or conceptually depend on affective responses. Some varieties account for values in terms of our dispositions to respond sentimentally under suitable conditions. While they offer a naturalistic account of values and associated motivation, they struggle to explain how values can set a standard for our responses and dispositions. What I label critical sentimentalism avoids this problem by understanding values in term of merited responses. The dilemma for such (...) views is making sense of an emotion being merited without appealing to correctly representing a response-independent property while simultaneously avoiding collapse into dispositionalism. As D’Arms and Jacobson (2023) argue, this means that sentimentalism assumes a non-representationalist, broadly motivational theory of emotion. Building on this proposal, I argue that ‘fit-making’ reasons for attitudes can be reduced to reasons for action of a sort determined by the nature of the emotion. For an evaluative property like being shameful to be response-dependent will then turn out to amount to the relevant reasons of action being ultimately based on our contingent sensibilities. Finally, I suggest that not all sentimental values fit this picture – some evaluative properties, like being funny, are best understood in dispositionalist terms after all. There’s room for pluralism in the metaphysics of value. (shrink)

This essay argues that the concept of dependence now invoked in noramtive discussions of the welfare state is both incoherent and biased as a result of its conflation of four distinctly different notions of dependence, ranging from the purely causal to that associated with lower class identities.

Modern physics proposals present deep tensions between seemingly contradictory descriptions of reality. Views of wave-particle duality, black hole complementarity, and the Unruh effect demand explanations that shift depending on how a system is observed. However, traditional models of scientific explanation impose a fixed structure that fails to account for varying observational contexts. This paper introduces context-dependent mapping, a framework that reorganizes physical laws into self-consistent subsets structured around what can actually be observed in a given context. By doing so, it (...) provides a principled way to integrate complementarity into the philosophy of explanation. (shrink)

Baroque questions of set-theoretic foundations are widely assumed to be irrelevant to physics. I argue that this is doubtful once determinism is read the way it is used in physics. At the analytic layer, determinism verdicts for possible systems can differ between canonical extensions of ZFC -- Goedel's Axiom of Constructibility (V=L) and large cardinal assumptions sufficient for Projective Determinacy (LC/PD) -- through coherence, uniqueness, and the identity of a definable initial datum. The main claim concerns a second, regularity layer. (...) Determinism claims are meant to withstand admissible changes of gauge, mesh, coarse graining, and readout, and they are stated as claims about generic or almost sure behavior. Robust profiles of this kind land at the Sigma^1_2 level, the first level of the projective hierarchy at which regularity can fail in V=L while holding under LC/PD. Two unconditional theorems are proved. First, a fixed computable nearest neighbor Ising Hamiltonian on Z^3 with a fixed zero temperature Glauber schedule yields a Sigma^1_2-complete tail-readout profile in which only the initial microstate varies. Second, at the Kerr Cauchy horizon, canonicalizing continuous extension germs in a fixed collar contains E_0, so no universally measurable rule solves it in ZFC, while V=L supplies a projectively definable rule and PD forbids any projective one. I call the systematic study of such dependence reverse physics, on analogy with Friedman's and Simpson's reverse mathematics. One upshot is a dilemma: either physical theories must be relativized to foundational frameworks, as Carnap held for mathematics, or, with Quine, the search for new axioms is continuous with the search for new physical laws. (shrink)

Quasi-realists aim to account for many of the trappings of metanormative realism within an expressivist framework. Chief among these is the realist way of responding to the Euthyphro dilemma: quasi-realists want to join realists in being able to say, "It’s not the case that kicking dogs is wrong because we disapprove of it. Rather, we disapprove of kicking dogs because it’s wrong." However, the standard quasi-realist way of explaining what we are up to when we assert the first of these (...) two sentences rests on a mistaken identification of metaphysical dependence (or grounding) with counterfactual covariation. This chapter proposes a better way for expressivists to understand such sentences, on which they serve to express complex states of mind in which an attitude bears a relation of psychological dependence (or basing) to another state of mind. It is argued that this proposal is a natural, versatile, and fruitful approach for expressivists to take that helps them secure the first half of the Euthyphro contrast—but at the cost of making it difficult to see how expressivists can make sense of that contrast’s second half. (shrink)

Beall’s (e.g., 2009, 2021) transparency theory of truth is recognized as a prominent, deflationist solution to the liar paradox. However, it has been neglected by truth theorists who have attempted to show that a deflationist theory of truth can (or cannot) account for truth dependence, i.e., the claim that the truth of a proposition depends on how things described by the proposition are, but how these things are does not depend on the truth of the proposition. Truth theorists interested (...) in truth dependence have, instead, been focused on Horwich’s Minimalism (e.g., 1998). The goal of this paper is twofold. First, I construct what versions of the transparency theory would say about truth dependence. Second, I argue that even the best version of transparent truth ultimately fails to account for truth dependence. On the assumption that accounting for truth dependence is an adequacy condition on any theory of truth, the paper rejects transparency theory as an adequate theory of truth. (shrink)

Moral dependence is taking another person's assertion or "testimony" that C as a reason to believe C (where C is some moral claim), such that whatever justificatory force is associated with the person's testimony endures or remains as one's reason for believing C. People are justified in relying on one another's testimony in non-moral matters. The dissertation takes up the question whether the same is true for moral beliefs. My method is to divide the topic into three somewhat separate (...) questions. First, there is the epistemological question, what if anything gives me reason to believe that another person's moral claim is likely to be true. Second, there is the psychological question, whether moral dependence is, in fact, part of the rational explanation of why people hold the moral beliefs they do. Third, there is the moral question, whether a person can be a good moral agent while being morally dependent. I answer these questions as follows. First, in response to the epistemological question, I argue that there is a justification for moral dependence based on identifying people who are good moral deliberators. I also argue that there is an unreliable justification for moral dependence based on cooperation and trust. This latter, trust-based justification is unreliable because it is possible to trust and cooperate with those who are morally bad. Second, in response to the psychological question, I argue that moral dependence is part of the rational explanation of moral belief. This is true even though there is some reason to hold that a testimonial justification cannot rationally explain moral belief when there is also a non-testimonial justification available for that same belief. I also argue that moral dependence rationally explains moral development, both because it explains how children come to believe the particular things they do, and also because it can explain how children come to employ new forms of moral justification. Third, in response to the moral question, I argue that autonomy limits moral dependence, but that relying on moral testimony can also bring one to be more aware of what is morally important. (shrink)

This article presents and argues for an account of objectual understanding that aims to do justice to the full range of cases of scientific understanding, including cases in which one does not have an explanation of the understood phenomenon. According to the proposed account, one understands a phenomenon just in case one grasps a sufficiently accurate and comprehensive model of the ways in which it or its features are situated within a network of dependence relations; one’s degree of understanding (...) is proportional to the comprehensiveness and accuracy of such a model. I compare this account with accounts of scientific understanding that explicate understanding in terms of having an explanation of the understood phenomenon. I discuss three distinct types of cases in which scientific understanding does not amount to possessing an explanation of any kind and argue that the proposed model-based account can accommodate these cases while still retaining a strong link between understanding and explanation. 1Introduction 2Objectual Understanding 3Understanding as Dependency Modelling 4Explanatory Accounts 5Explanatory Bruteness 6Explanatory Targetedness 7Explanatory Disconnectedness 8Conclusion. (shrink)

LLMs’ exceptional capabilities of language translation, sentence completion, sentiment analysis, information retrieval, and much more make them useful in a vast array of contexts, from customer service to scientific research. With these great technological possibilities come many unanswered questions and several concerns. We focus on the use of LLMs in epistemic contexts, broadly construed, meaning those contexts in which an LLM is used by a subject in order to fulfil their epistemic goals, such as acquiring justification, increasing their knowledge or (...) understanding or developing argumentative work. By examining the epistemic context of LLMs, we aim to give an account of some of the epistemological risks associated with their usage. (shrink)

There is an old and powerful argument for the claim that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with the freedom to do otherwise. A recent response to this argument, sometimes called the “dependence response,” centers around the claim that God’s relevant past beliefs depend on the relevant agent’s current or future behavior in a certain way. This paper offers a new argument for the dependence response, one that revolves around different cases of time travel. Somewhat serendipitously, the argument also paves (...) the way for a new reply to a compelling objection to the dependence response, the challenge from prepunishment. But perhaps not so serendipitously, the argument also renders the dependence response incompatible with certain views of providence. (shrink)

This paper is about how to aggregate outside opinion. If two experts are on one side of an issue, while three experts are on the other side, what should a non-expert believe? Certainly, the non-expert should take into account more than just the numbers. But which other factors are relevant, and why? According to the view developed here, one important factor is whether the experts should have been expected, in advance, to reach the same conclusion. When the agreement of two (...) (or of twenty) thinkers can be predicted with certainty in advance, their shared belief is worth only as much as one of their beliefs would be worth alone. This expectational model of belief dependence can be applied whether we think in terms of credences or in terms of all-or-nothing beliefs. (shrink)