Curiosity is evident in humans of all sorts from early infancy, and it has also been said to appear in a wide range of other animals, including monkeys, birds, rats, and octopuses. The classical definition of curiosity as an intrinsic desire for knowledge may seem inapplicable to animal curiosity: one might wonder how and indeed whether a rat could have such a fancy desire. Even if rats must learn many things to survive, one might expect their learning (...) must be driven by simpler incentives, such as hunger. One might also wonder what proximal signals could guide animals towards knowledge itself, or how something as abstract as knowledge could ever be a motivational target for an unreflective animal. Taking a cue from recent work in reinforcement learning, I argue that surprise functions as a reward signal for the curious animal, and then show how this amounts to a desire for knowledge gain, where knowledge is conceived of as a cognitive adaptation to reality. This adaptation results in a mental state whose existence depends essentially on the truth of its contents, a factive mental state. Curious creatures benefit from an interaction between the prediction-error correction processes of basic learning and the active surprise-seeking force of their curiosity. This internally adversarial interaction accelerates knowledge gain in ways that are very helpful for agents with the restrictions of biological creatures, in environments with the complexity of our natural world. (shrink)

While research on Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) has traditionally focused on cognitive and behavioral deficits, there is increasing interest in exploring possible resources associated with the disorder. In this paper, we argue that the attention-patterns associated with ADHD can be understood as expressing an alternative style of inquiry, or “zetetic” style, characterized mainly by a lower barrier for becoming curious and engaging in inquiry, and a weaker disposition to regulate curiosity in response to the cognitive and practical costs (...) associated with inquiry. Exploring this zetetic style from an epistemological perspective, we show that it is often epistemically rational and can be advantageous in important respects. We close by suggesting that the very aspects of the zetetic style that might at times render it disadvantageous from the point of view of individual subjects with ADHD, will often confer epistemic benefits to the social group that the subjects are part of. (shrink)

In Judgemental Philosophy, creativity emerges when resonance (r) encounters a lack of constructibility·coherence (cc), creating an experiential gap. We propose that curiosity is the motivational force generated by this gap, propelling inquiry that closes it and actualizes novel possibilities. We outline a tripartite framework—Existential Openness, Margin, Responsibility—mapping curiosity’s role, and review neural correlates (dopaminergic reward, ACC error detection, temporal association integration). This model yields testable hypotheses and practical designs for enhancing curiosity-driven innovation.

Some philosophers have recently argued that one should not be curious about a question whose answer one knows. This norm is said to follow from the fact that curiosity aims at knowledge. This article contends that the view that curiosity is inappropriate when directed at what is known, though attractive, is false. In fact, we are frequently curious about questions whose answers we know, and this curiosity is entirely appropriate because, along with metacognitive judgments about the contents (...) of memory, it plays an important role in the process by which we successfully retrieve knowledge from memory. If this argument is successful, it reveals that some curiosity-driven inquiries target knowledge that lies within one’s own mind and raises important questions about the status and interpretation of the claim that curiosity aims at knowledge. (shrink)

I propose that Confucianism incorporates a latent commitment to the closely related epistemic virtues of curiosity and inquisitiveness. Confucian praise of certain people, practices, and dispositions is only fully intelligible if these are seen as exercises and expressions of epistemic virtues, of which curiosity and inquisitiveness are the obvious candidates. My strategy is to take two core components of Confucian ethical and educational practice and argue that each presupposes a specific virtue. To have and to express a ‘love (...) of learning’ requires the virtue of curiosity, while the normative practice of good questioning requires exercise of the virtue of inquisitiveness. Taken together, people engaging in the foundational Confucian project of moral self-cultivation must desire and acquire a range of epistemic goods, a set of dispositions that manifest in the virtues of curiosity and inquisitiveness, possession of which is admirable and excellent. Such, at least, is the claim defend in this chapter, which is an exercise in cross-cultural virtue epistemology. (shrink)

This paper explores the nature of curiosity from an epistemological point of view. First it motivates this exploration by explaining why epistemologists do and should care about what curiosity is. Then it surveys the relevant literature and develops a particular approach.

The paper discusses Bernard Williams’ argument that immortality is rationally undesirable because it leads to insufferable boredom. We first spell out Williams’ argument in the form of a dilemma. We then show that the first horn of this dilemma, namely Williams’ requirement of the constancy of character of the immortal, is defensible. We next argue against a recent attempt that accepts the dilemma, but rejects the conclusion Williams draws from it. From these we conclude that blocking the second horn of (...) the dilemma is the best way to respond to Williams. Our objection contends that Williams overlooks a basic feature of human existence, namely curiosity, and that his negative evaluation of an eternal life is therefore unconvincing. (shrink)

ABSTRACT A thriving project in contemporary epistemology concerns identifying and explicating the epistemic virtues. Although there is little sustained argument for this claim, a number of prominent sources suggest that curiosity is an epistemic virtue. In this paper, I provide an account of the virtue of curiosity. After arguing that virtuous curiosity must be appropriately discerning, timely and exacting, I then situate my account in relation to two broader questions for virtue responsibilists: What sort of motivations are (...) required for epistemic virtue? And do epistemic virtues need to be reliable? I will sketch an account on which curiosity is only virtuous when rooted in a non-instrumental appreciation of epistemic goods, before arguing that curiosity can exhibit intellectual virtue irrespective of whether one is reliable in satisfying it. (shrink)

This paper examines the relationship between curiosity, knowledge, and repetition through a phenomenological lens. It argues that curiosity arises independently of answers and functions as the primary movement of awareness toward the unknown. In contrast, when curiosity diminishes, knowledge transforms into repetition, losing its vitality and becoming a psychological burden. The study explores how childhood inquiry is gradually replaced by social conditioning, leading to imitation rather than understanding. It proposes that authentic knowledge emerges only when curiosity (...) is sustained without the immediate imposition of answers. (shrink)

Curiosity seems, in principle, like a morally good motivation to travel—like a motivation conducive to good travel. However, being motivated by curiosity can cause or fail to prevent different forms of harm to local populations. Standard accounts of curiosity do not adequately address these risks. I look instead at the role of feminist curiosity, which is a reframed form of curiosity as a relational stance that resists instrumentalization, foregrounds context, and embraces flexibility and uncertainty. Feminist (...) curiosity is then a good motivation to travel, but it is not sufficient for good travel, given that the requirements of feminist curiosity may interact with other morally relevant considerations. (shrink)

In this short essay I connect Perry Zurn’s work on curiosity with trans history, activism, and art to bridge trans curiosity with eco curiosity in the form of transecological curiosity. I discuss examples from trans art, literature, music, and ecopoetics.

In this book, Ilhan Inan questions the classical definition of curiosity as _a desire to know._ Working in an area where epistemology and philosophy of language overlap, Inan forges a link between our ability to become aware of our ignorance and our linguistic aptitude to construct terms referring to things unknown. The book introduces the notion of inostensible reference (or reference to the unknown). Ilhan connects this notion to related concepts in philosophy of language: knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge (...) by description; the referential and the attributive uses of definite descriptions; the _de re/de dicto_ distinction; and Kripke’s distinction between rigid and accidental designators. Continuing with a discussion of the conditions for curiosity and its satisfaction, Inan argues that the learning process—starting in curiosity and ending in knowledge—is always an effort to transform our inostensible terms into ostensible ones. A contextual account is adopted for the satisfaction of curiosity. It then discusses the conditions of successful reference to the object of curiosity and its presuppositions. The book concludes with a discussion on the limits of curiosity and its satisfaction. (shrink)

I start with a critical discussion of some attempts to ground epistemic normativity in curiosity. Then I develop three positive proposals. The first of these proposals is more or less purely philosophical; the second two reside at the interdisciplinary borderline between philosophy and psychology. The proposals are independent and rooted in different literatures. Readers uninterested in the first proposal (and the critical discussion preceding it) may nonetheless be interested in the second two proposals, and vice versa. -/- The proposals (...) are as follows. First I argue that, among several ways in which the notion of curiosity might be used to delineate significant truths from trivial ones, a particular way is the most promising. Second, I argue that curiosity has some underappreciated epistemic roles involving memory. Third, I argue that curiosity has some underappreciated epistemic roles involving coherence. (shrink)

Human experience is structured, meaningful, temporally extended, and affectively weighted. A theory of mind must account not only for information processing, but also for coherence, breakdown, emotional significance, and lived transformation across time. The Curiosity, Clarity, Valence (CCV) framework is proposed as a structural architecture of minded experience. It describes an ongoing negotiation between stability and destabilization through four elements: clarity (referential coherence of self and world models), entropy (unresolved uncertainty and contradiction), valence (initial orienting that becomes meaning bearing), (...) and curiosity (conditional openness that engages when significance is high and uncertainty is survivable). A developmentally expanding recurrence buffer supports temporal organization and interpretability. CCV is presented as a philosophy of mind proposal rather than an empirical model. Its primary claim is structural and ontological: meaningful conscious experience plausibly arises from architectures with these relational dynamics. The framework is evaluated in terms of coherence, phenomenological plausibility, and consistency with cognitive, affective, and predictive processing literatures, and is secondarily applied to trauma, depression, flow, moral injury, and developmental change. CCV does not compete with existing theories but argues that they describe different aspects of a single structural architecture of minded experience. It is offered as a disciplined, computationally formalizable framework that invites critique, refinement, simulation, and exploration. (shrink)

This paper explores the intellectual and ethical necessity of rebalancing the relationship between age-based authority and youthful curiosity. Traditionally, societal structures demand obedience to elders, often leading to the suppression of inquiry and the preservation of outdated or erroneous beliefs. Drawing upon the pedagogical and philosophical insights of Socrates, Hannah Arendt, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Jiddu Krishnamurti, the author argues that intellectual vitality depends on two complementary principles: authority must remain open to rigorous questioning to remain accountable, while the (...) class='Hi'>curiosity of the young must be protected from dogmatic coercion. By shifting the role of elders from dominant figures to mentors who welcome examination, society can transition from a culture of conformity to one of dynamic dialogue. Ultimately, the paper contends that questioning authority is not an act of disrespect but an act of intellectual responsibility essential for the evolution of human thought. (shrink)

I argue that our intrinsic epistemic motivation extends beyond curiosity to include interest — a distinct affect through which we evaluate objects as worthy of exploration through sustained attention. While an agent’s curiosity is directed at certain questions or specific unknowns, and aims at acquiring the relevant knowledge through goal-directed inquiry, an agent’s interest is an attitude about objects and facts which she aims to get acquainted with through sustained attention. Drawing on valuationist theories of cognition, I argue (...) that interest serves as the phenomenological manifestation of our appraisal of stimuli as worthy of attention, playing a crucial role in proper epistemic attunement, and explaining some forms of improper attunement. While fitting curiosity might support virtuous inquiry, fitting interest might support virtuous attending. (shrink)

This paper makes a case for the centrality of the passion of curiosity to Hobbes’s account of human nature. Hobbes describes curiosity as one of only a few capacities differentiating human beings from animals, and I argue that it is in fact the fundamen- tal cause of humanity’s uniqueness, generating other important difference-makers such as language, science and politics. I qualify Philip Pettit’s (2008) claim that Hobbes believes language to be the essence of human difference, contending that Pettit (...) grants language too central a place in Hobbes’s psychology. Language is, for Hobbes, a tech- nology adopted on account of curiosity. Further, curiosity is necessary not only for linguistic but also for scientific activity. Only after what he calls original knowledge has been gathered are names employed to generate the conditional propositions that con- stitute science. Finally, curiosity can resolve another puzzle of Hobbesian psychology that Pettit leaves unanswered: our tendency towards strife. Hobbes believes that inso- far as human beings have an implacable hunger for knowledge of the future, we are unable to rest content with present gains and must always aspire to secure the best possible outcome for ourselves. (shrink)

This paper examines the fundamental cognitive challenges that distinguish philosophical from non-philosophical minds. While philosophers grapple with an overwhelming and often uncontrollable curiosity that drives relentless questioning, non-philosophers face what we term "Failure of Imagination" (FOI), an inability or unwillingness to engage with abstract possibilities and questioning modes of thought. Through examination of historical philosophical traditions, cognitive science research, and phenomenological analysis, this paper argues that these opposing tendencies represent complementary cognitive pathologies that illuminate the nature of human inquiry (...) and intellectual engagement. The philosophical burden of excessive curiosity, while generating profound insights, can lead to existential paralysis and social disconnection, while FOI limits human potential for growth, innovation, and understanding. Understanding these contrasting cognitive orientations offers insights into educational approaches, mental health considerations for intellectuals, and the broader question of how societies can better integrate philosophical and practical modes of thinking. (shrink)

This paper constructs a four-dimensional cognitive phase space mathematical model based on three foundational axioms: Infinite Non-Cyclic Determinism, the Cognitive Entropy Reduction Principle, and the Persistence of Curiosity Entropy. The proposed fourth dimension is rigorously defined as an abstract information-cognitive phase space dimension, not a physical spacetime dimension, placing this work within the interdisciplinary domain of condensed matter physics, information theory, and artificial intelligence. By introducing a second-order cognitive tensor as the core mathematical object, this paper establishes a governing (...) evolution equation, completes the physical mapping of the theory onto three engineering systems—a three-dimensional stacked Hall circuit board, a formal verification AI, and a multi-agent peer explorer network—and designs three quantifiable and reproducible experimental protocols. Following the classical scientific research paradigm of "mathematical self-consistency → theoretical prediction → experimental verification," this framework provides a novel approach for the unified description of information systems, cognitive subjects, and physical carriers. (shrink)

Curiosity has taken a winding path through intellectual history, from Early Christian vice to Enlightenment virtue and beyond. This original volume sees contemporary philosophers and psychologists examining the nature and value of curiosity, shedding light on some of its most interesting features and exploring its role in human experience. Authors examine the nature and history of curiosity, the psychology of curiosity and its relationship to interest, understanding, and desire, the impact of language in shaping our (...) class='Hi'>curiosity, the cultivation and measurement of curiosity, and the vital part that curiosity can and should play in education. With perspectives on curiosity from all over the world, this diverse, interdisciplinary collection provides an in-depth and multi-faceted examination of the epistemological, psychological, moral, and educative dimensions of curiosity. (shrink)

Apuleius’s The Golden Ass presents curiosity as the protagonist’s downfall, yet ultimately recodes curiosity as the single virtue through which the human soul achieves not only immortality but joy. I identify Apuleius’s treatment of curiosity as falling into the categories of erotic and nonerotic. The union of Eros and the curious human soul suggests that one who is erotically curious can take pleasure in her devotion to one, precisely because she has eyes for the beauty of many.

The contours of Nietzsche’s socio-moral framework are idiosyncratic when compared to contemporary neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics. Nietzsche starts with a naturalistic conception of drives, instincts, and types of people. He then moves in a normative direction by identifying some drives and instincts as virtues – at least for certain types of people in particular social and cultural contexts. Much of Nietzsche’s understanding of virtue must therefore be understood relative to a type of person and the context in which they find themselves. (...) Nietzsche pays special attention to his own type in his own context, emphasizing the virtues of curiosity, courage, the pathos of distancepathos of distance, the sense of humor, and solitude. These instincts-become-virtues are held together by conscience and integrity. For Nietzsche, drivesdrive are act-directed motivational and evaluative dispositions. An agent’s drives move her to engage in and positively evaluate a range of characteristic actions regardless of the consequences that may eventuate from those actions. Drives thus differ from preferences and desires in being associated primarily with the processes of agency rather than with teleologically-specified states of affairs. In addition, Nietzsche thinks that instinctsinstinct are innate drives, though other drives can be acquired. Moreover, instincts and other drives are mutable on several dimensions, including their intensity, their objects, and the structural interrelations. And an agent’s instincts and other drives constitute her psychological typetype. This in turn makes it possible to say what a Nietzschean virtue is: namely, a well-calibrated instinct or other drive. What it takes for a drive to be well-calibrated involves both internal and external (social) integration, or at least non-interference. In particular, a drive is a virtue to the extent that it is conducive to lifelife, does not systematically or reliably induce negative self-directed emotions that respond to fixed aspects of the self, and does not systematically or reliably induce reactions from the agent’s community that are liable to be internalized as negative self-directed emotions that respond to fixed aspects of the self. In Nietzsche’s framework, exemplars of different types elicit different discrete emotions in people with fine-tuned affective sensitivity. While some exemplars inspire admirationadmiration that leads to emulation, others incite envy and the motivation to agonistic one-upsmanship. Exemplars of bad or deplorable types provoke contempt and disgust, which serve as signposts of what to avoid. Nietzsche also pays special attention to the role of community in fostering virtues. For him, one’s community and the language used by that community play a constitutive role in the cultivation of virtuevirtue. This is because part of what it means for a person to be of a certain type is that she is susceptible to social determination of her character. (shrink)

This article shows how the specific interaction and mutual dependence between language and curiosity accounts for the more general dialectic between reason and passion in Hobbes’ philosophy, providing the distinguishing trait of human beings and their behaviour.

This paper presents the Curiosity Field Theory of Consciousness (CFTC), a philosophical framework proposing that consciousness may be interpreted as a fundamental field characterized by curiosity. The framework is intended as a conceptual contribution to metaphysics, phenomenology, and consciousness studies rather than an empirical scientific theory.

I argue that our intrinsic epistemic motivation extends beyond curiosity to include interest—a distinct affect through which we evaluate objects as worthy of exploration through sustained attention. While an agent’s curiosity is directed at certain questions or specific unknowns, and aims at acquiring the relevant knowledge through goal-directed inquiry, an agent’s interest is an attitude about objects and facts which she aims to get acquainted with through sustained attention. Drawing on valuationist theories of cognition, I argue that interest (...) serves as the phenomenological manifestation of our appraisal of stimuli as worthy of attention, playing a crucial role in proper epistemic attunement, and explaining some forms of improper attunement. While fitting curiosity might support virtuous inquiry, fitting interest might support virtuous attending. (shrink)

We give a very curious curiosity about Newtonian Gravity.

This paper introduces the Curiosity Premium Theory, a conceptual framework proposing that artificial intelligence's compression of information access costs fundamentally restructures the determinants of economic productivity. Where classical human capital theory emphasizes accumulated knowledge stocks operationalized through educational attainment, skill certification, and experience this framework argues that AI-saturated economies increasingly reward a dispositional variable the intrinsic orientation toward continuous, unbounded epistemic expansion. I distinguish between instrumental learners, who acquire knowledge to satisfy immediate utility thresholds, and epistemically curious agents, who (...) engage in open-ended knowledge acquisition as a behavioral disposition. The central claim is that this distinction, previously economically latent, becomes a first-order determinant of productivity differentials as AI democratizes access to information while simultaneously raising the premium on cognitive activities that transcend information retrieval. I develop the theoretical architecture for a Curiosity Capital Index and explore its implications for growth theory, labor economics, and human capital measurement in post-scarcity information environments. (shrink)

This paper constructs a four-dimensional cognitive phase space mathematical model based on three foundational axioms: Infinite Non-Cyclic Determinism, the Cognitive Entropy Reduction Principle, and the Persistence of Curiosity Entropy. The proposed fourth dimension is rigorously defined as an abstract information-cognitive phase space dimension, not a physical spacetime dimension, placing this work within the interdisciplinary domain of condensed matter physics, information theory, and artificial intelligence. By introducing a second-order cognitive tensor as the core mathematical object, this paper establishes a governing (...) evolution equation, completes the physical mapping of the theory onto three engineering systems—a three-dimensional stacked Hall circuit board, a formal verification AI, and a multi-agent peer explorer network—and designs three quantifiable and reproducible experimental protocols. Following the classical scientific research paradigm of "mathematical self-consistency → theoretical prediction → experimental verification," this framework provides a novel approach for the unified description of information systems, cognitive subjects, and physical carriers. (shrink)

A lot has been said about how the notion of reference relates to the notion of knowledge; not much has been said, however, on how the notion of referencerelates to our ability to become aware of what we do not know that allows us to be curious. In this essay I attempt to spell out a certain type of reference I call ‘inostensible’ that I claim to be a fundamental linguistic tool which allows us to become curious of what we (...) do not know. In the first part, I try to explicate the notion of inostensible reference, both for singular and for general terms, as well as full declarative sentences, and in the second part, I argue that our capacity to enjoy conceptual curiosity is essentially based upon our aptitude for inostensible reference. (shrink)

This paper presents a falsifiable laboratory prediction derived from Cognitive Phase Space Theory and the Origin of Curiosity theory, grounded in the axiom of Infinite Non-Cyclic Determinism (INCD). The INCD axiom states that the global state of the universe is strictly non-repeating across all time, S(t₁)≠S(t₂) for all t₁≠t₂. We predict that a three-dimensional Hall device will develop a deterministic, irreversible offset voltage after repeated current–magnetic field cycling, even when all external parameters are precisely reset to their initial conditions. (...) -/- The offset originates from cumulative irreversible information traces embedded in electron transport microstate evolution, defined as cognitive entropy accumulation, which is independent of conventional thermodynamic entropy. We provide a complete, reproducible experimental protocol including ultra-low-noise environment requirements, multi-group control design, and quantitative signal estimation. Under standard device parameters, the predicted offset lies in the attovolt to femtovolt range, detectable via state-of-the-art SQUID measurement systems. -/- We establish rigorous falsifiability criteria to distinguish cognitive entropy offset from thermal noise, electromagnetic hysteresis, and material drift. This experiment offers a direct macroscopic test of universal irreversible evolution, providing empirical grounding for the INCD axiom and extending fundamental descriptions of time asymmetry beyond thermodynamic frameworks. (shrink)

We investigate the idea of sleep as the protostate, and posit the idea of dark consciousness where dark is a 2-fold hybrid. We model dark consciousness as a 2-topos in p-adic time, and outline perfectoid and diamond-like versions. We then introduce and illustrate implications of Dark Imaginarium, which is a higher order Curiosity Artificial Intelligence, an Infinity-Curiosity Type, that thinks in infinity categories.

To call someone ignorant is to insult them. It is not surprising then that much of the philosophical literature on ignorance has focused on its harms. In this paper, I argue that there are morally laudable cases of ignorance. When we indulge in over-curiosity, we risk a range of inquisitive wrongs. We risk failing to give others the respect they are owed, not just in how we act towards them, but also in how they figure in our thoughts. I (...) argue that ignorance, as a kind of epistemic etiquette, protects us from this vice. Ignorance protects inquiry from turning into an inquisition, questioning from turning into prying. By focussing on the case of Stevens from Kazuo Ishiguro’s Remains of the Day, I show that where we cannot but live out parts of our private lives in public, or when we find intimate parts of our lives at the mercy of others whose help we require, this practice of ignorance, and in turn a practice of forgetting what we’ve illicitly learned, is a way we enable the dignity of others and to confer the respect that they are owed. (shrink)

This paper argues that scientific humility is essential for preserving human curiosity and intellectual progress. Drawing from paradigm shifts in astronomy and physics, contemporary cosmology’s 5% visible-matter framework, and philosophical accounts of provisional knowledge, it critiques epistemic finality—particularly when theological or metaphysical claims function as cognitive closure. Expanding the discussion, the paper introduces a phenomenological framework grounded in the concept of “zero and infinity,” proposing that reality is encountered as an open field of awareness rather than a completed system (...) of answers. The universe is interpreted not as a final solution to be possessed, but as an ongoing question that deepens consciousness. -/- Keywords: scientific humility, epistemology, curiosity, dark matter, phenomenology, zero and infinity, cosmology. (shrink)

We propose a quantum curiosity algorithm as a means to implement quantum thinking into AI, and we illustrate 5 new quantum curiosity types. We then introduce 6 new hybrid quantum curiosity types combining animal and plant curiosity elements with biomimicry beyond human sensing. We then introduce 4 specialized quantum curiosity types, which incorporate quantum thinking into coding frameworks to radically transform problem-solving and discovery in science, medicine, and systems analysis. We conclude with a forecasting of (...) the future of quantum thinking in AI and illustrate an example of how to apply the new curiosity types: General Collaborative Networks. (shrink)

The curious philosopher often answers questions by raising further, more fundamental questions. How can this be fruitful and practical in the context of Wageningen University? Philosophy offers critical reflection on conceptual and normative assumptions in science and society, and that is necessary for responsible practices. I illustrate this by analyzing the concept of quality of life – a key value in the mission of our university – and by questioning current debates about responsibility for health.

We advance the understanding of the philosophy and psychology of curiosity by operationalizing and constructing an empirical measure of Nietzsche’s conception of inquisitive curiosity, expressed by the German term Wissbegier, (“thirst for knowledge” or “need/impetus to know”) and Neugier (“curiosity” or “inquisitiveness”). First, we show that existing empirical measures of curiosity do not tap the construct of inquisitive curiosity, though they may tap related constructs such as idle curiosity and phenomenological curiosity. Next, we (...) map the concept of inquisitive curiosity and connect it to related concepts, such as open-mindedness and intellectual humility. The bulk of the paper reports four studies: an Anglophone exploratory factor analysis, an Anglophone confirmatory factor analysis, an informant study, and a Germanophone exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis. (shrink)

Academic inquiry has two basic inter-related aims. One is to explore intellectually aspects of our world of intrinsic interest and value, for its own sake, and to encourage non-academics to participate in such exploration, thus improving our knowledge and understanding. The other is, by intellectual means, to help humanity solve its problems of living, so that a more peaceful, just, democratic and environmentally enlightened world may be attained. Both are at present betrayed.

Starting from the "incomplete observability" of consciousness, this paper constructs a philosophical framework for understanding the relationship between consciousness and the universe through an analogy with black hole theory. The paper proposes that core experiences of consciousness, like black hole singularities, cannot be directly observed, while moments of "sudden insight" resemble Hawking radiation escaping from the edge of the event horizon—evidence of the singularity's existence. On this basis, the paper extends the discussion of consciousness to a cosmic scale, proposing that (...) "curiosity" and "resonance" are mechanisms through which the universe achieves local entropy reduction. Finally, it outlines a symbiotic model: the universe is not a unidirectional entropic system heading toward heat death, but a living whole that "experiences itself" through life and consciousness. (shrink)

Sebastian Sunday-Grève and Timothy Williamson discuss the relationship between curiosity and common sense.

This treatise advances a playful yet rigorous defense of ontology as a lived practice rather than a narrow specialization. Writing in the first person, I argue that the sustained activity of asking what exists, when pursued with disciplined curiosity and structured imagination, transforms the inquirer into something approaching a polymath, not because the inquirer masters every field but because the inquirer becomes fluent in borrowing the tools of every field. The argument proceeds in three movements. First, I situate ontology (...) in relation to epistemology, showing that the two operate in a continuous feedback loop in which what one believes exists shapes how one attempts to know it, and how one attempts to know it constrains what one is permitted to admit as real. Second, I argue that this loop generates not vertigo but delight when approached with what Loewenstein (1994) called epistemic curiosity. Third, I propose that the ontologist becomes polymathic by necessity rather than ambition: questions about being do not respect disciplinary boundaries, and so the ontologist learns to wield the toolkits of physics, mathematics, psychology, and art without claiming mastery of any. Existence, on this account, becomes a playground in which the rules are themselves objects of play. I close by considering objections concerning dilettantism, ontological anxiety, and the apparent tension between rigor and play, and I argue that each objection rests on a contestable assumption about what philosophical seriousness requires. (shrink)

本文提出一套全新的AI工程范式，核心理论依托作者原创的《好奇本源》理论。该理论包含两条基础公设：无限不循环决定论（S(t₁) ≠ S(t₂)）与“我存在”主观先验前提。本文首次将这两条哲学公设系统化转化为可落地的AI系统工程约束规则，并基于此设计了一个名为“探源1.0”的原型系统。该系统采用JEPA直觉引擎与Lean4逻辑验证引 擎的双引擎协同架构，通过内嵌的求真价值函数与定制化Kubernetes调度器，将智能体的内生探索需求转化为基于热力学规律的算力资源动态分配策略。同时，系统基于RP2040微控制器搭建硬件可信根，将伦理 准则固化为物理上不可篡改的底层宪法。相较于依赖人工反馈的RLHF优化范式，本文建立了一套由基础哲学公设内生驱动的智能体构建路线，为内生好奇心、可验证认知、硬件锚定AI安全提供了完整的落地实例，开辟了从 底层哲学公理自上而下设计人工智能的全新技术路径。 This paper proposes a novel AI engineering paradigm grounded in the author's original Curiosity Origin theory. The theory is founded upon two boundary axioms: Infinite Acyclic Determinism, mathematically expressed as S(t₁) ≠ S(t₂), and "I exist" as the subjective a priori precondition for cognition. For the first time, these two philosophical axioms are systematically translated into executable engineering constraints for AI system design. A prototype system named "Tanyuan 1.0" is designed, featuring a dual-engine architecture that integrates (...) a JEPA-based intuition engine and a Lean4-based logical verification engine. Through an embedded Truth-Seeking Value Function and a customized Kubernetes scheduler, the system translates the agent's intrinsic drive for exploration into a thermodynamic resource allocation strategy. Furthermore, a hardware root of trust based on the RP2040 microcontroller is employed to physically solidify the ethical principles as an immutable constitutional core. In contrast to the prevailing RLHF paradigm that relies on external human feedback, this work establishes a construction roadmap for agents driven endogenously by foundational philosophical axioms, providing a complete implementation example for intrinsic curiosity, verifiable cognition, and hardware-anchored AI safety, thereby opening a novel technical path for designing artificial intelligence top-down from philosophical first principles. (shrink)

All political utopias share one fatal structural defect: they attempt to eliminate evil by eradicating the carriers of evil. Based on the axiomatic framework of the Origin of Curiosity Theory and the Infinite Non-Cyclic Determinism (INCD), this paper proves with logical necessity that any utopian project aiming at the complete eradication of evil inevitably transforms the eradicating agent into the ultimate form of evil. -/- Evil is not an external social pathogen or a contingent defect of human society. It (...) is an inherent and ineradicable attribute of finite mortal life. Rooted in the existential competition of finite beings against annihilation, scarcity, and hierarchical status ordering, evil persists as a structural necessity rather than a historical accident. As long as finite life exists, evil exists. -/- This paper formulates the Dragon Slayer Paradox: any institutional entity granted the monopoly power to define, judge, and eradicate evil will inexorably degenerate into the very tyranny it seeks to destroy. To resolve this paradox, this paper establishes three structural behavioral axioms: Truth-Seeking, Kindness, and Evil-Restraining. Together they constitute a self-consistent distributed constraint system that avoids both ideological self-deception and the corruption of means over ends. -/- Distinguished from the normative moral frameworks of Kantian deontology and Rawlsian justice, the three axioms proposed herein are structural stability conditions for social systems, not ideal moral aspirations. The core political conclusion follows: a sustainable civil order does not eliminate structural evil, but dissolves the monopolistic institutional role of the “dragon slayer”. Civilization persists not in a utopia without evil, but in a steady state of coexistence with constrained evil, free of absolute moral authority. (shrink)

In this paper I respond to and elaborate on some of the ideas put forth on my book The Philosophy of Curiosity (2012) as well as its follow-up “Curiosity and Ignorance” (2016) by Nenad Miščević, Erhan Demircioğlu, Mirela Fuš, Safi ye Yiğit, Danilo Šuster, Irem Günhan Altıparmak, and Aran Arslan.

This chapter argues that Hobbes’s appreciation of Galileo’s principles of motion occurred in stages by focusing on a principle that Hobbes introduces in Leviathan 2.1 to explain the imagination: “[…] when a thing lies still, unlesse somewhat els stirre it, it will lye still for ever, is a truth that no man doubts of. But that when a thing is in motion, it will eternally be in motion, unless somewhat els stay it, though the reason be the same, namely, (that (...) nothing can change itself) is not so easily assented to.” Although there is evidence that Hobbes became aware of the importance of this principle in early criticisms of Thomas White and in early notes for De corpore, he did not incorporate it into his account of the imagination in Elements of Law (1640). However, in later works, such as the English and Latin versions of Leviathan and De corpore, conceiving of unhindered motion as continuing eternally provided Hobbes with the ability to explain more aspects of human cognition related to the imagination. Furthermore, thinking of the passion ‘curiosity’ as an infinite endeavor enabled Hobbes to explain why human scientific endeavors can persist even in the face of failure or apparent uselessness or failure. (shrink)

B.A.S.I.C. AI: A Walk Down Memory Lane with Code and Curiosity explores how the simplicity of early programming can still illuminate the core ideas behind artificial intelligence. Beginning with the humble 1960s-era BASIC language, this work revisits the roots of human–computer interaction to show how even minimal tools can simulate learning behavior. Through a playful, nostalgia-rich experiment, a BASIC program is constructed to detect keywords, store user-taught responses, and recall them in future conversations—demonstrating the power of memory, association, and (...) incremental improvement. -/- An upgraded version introduces a more “thoughtful” flow: the system first checks existing knowledge before asking for new input, mirroring the philosophy that learning builds upon what is already known. While far from modern machine learning models, this project highlights a fundamental truth—intelligence often emerges not from complexity, but from clever use of simple mechanisms. The result is both a tribute to the early days of programming and a reminder that creativity thrives under constraints. In celebrating BASIC’s charm and limitations, this work bridges past and present, inviting readers to rediscover the joy of making machines “learn” one line at a time. (shrink)

This paper examines four central issues prompted by Thompson's recent critique of the Buddhist modernism phenomenon: (i) the suitability of evolutionary psychology as a framework of analysis for Buddhist moral psychological ideas; (ii) the issue of what counts as the core and main trajectory of the Buddhist intellectual tradition; (iii) the scope of naturalism in the relation between science and metaphysics, and (iv) whether a Madhyamaka-inspired anti-foundationalism stance can serve as an effective platform for debating the issue of progress in (...) science. The main argument of this paper is that while the mind sciences may corroborate some aspects of the Buddhist model of mind, they also call into question some core Buddhist ideas. Hence, if Buddhism is to enter into a fruitful dialogue with the mind sciences, it must be shown to complement the empirical claims to knowledge for which scientific naturalism so far provides the most viable basis. (shrink)