Teenage pregnancy has been identified as a social issue that requires attention. Given the negative impact on teenage mothers, the people who care for them, and the children they give birth to. This study examined the pattern of relationship between body image, self-esteem, socio-economic status, peer influence, and teenage pregnancy. This study employed a correlational design, and a multistage sampling procedure was utilized. Adolescents in Ibadan constitutes the population (N = 150; 12.0% below 14 years, 58.7% 14 – (...) 16 years, while 29.3% were 17 – 19 years). Participants completed standardized instruments: (Body Image Acceptance Survey α = 0.85; Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale α = 0.78; Socio-economic Status Scale α = 0.79; Peer Influence Scale α = 0.81; and Teenage Pregnancy Scale α = 0.87). The results showed that body image (r = 0.327; p<0.05), self-esteem (r = 0.376; p<0.05), socio-economic status (r = 0.306; p<0.05), and peer influence (r = 0.201, p<0.05) all had a significant relationship with teenage pregnancy. A multiple regression coefficient (R = 0.484) and multiple regression adjusted (R2 = 0.234) were obtained. Also, self-esteem recorded the most effective relative contribution to teenage pregnancy, followed by body image, parental socio-economic status, and peer influence, respectively. This emphasizes the necessity of broad and all-encompassing strategies to stop teenage pregnancy because it is unlikely that a single element will be adequate to deal with the problem successfully. (shrink)

The distinction between the body schema and the body image has become the stock in trade of much recent work in cognitive neuroscience and philosophy. Yet little is known about the interactions between these two types of body representations. We need to account not only for their dissociations in rare cases, but also for their convergence most of the time. Indeed in our everyday life the body we perceive does not conflict with the body (...) we act with. Are the body image and the body schema then somehow reshaping each other or are they relatively independent and do they only happen to be congruent? On the basis of the study of bodily hallucinations, we consider which model can best account for the body schema/body image interactions. (shrink)

This chapter presents an account of Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of the body schema as an operative intentionality that is not only opposed to, but also complexly intermingled with, the representation-like grasp of the world and one’s own body, or the body image. The chapter reconstructs Merleau-Ponty’s position primarily based on his preparatory notes for his 1953 lecture ‘The Sensible World and the World of Expression’. Here, Merleau-Ponty elaborates his earlier efforts to show that the body schema (...) is a perceptual ground against which the perceived world stands out as a complex of perceptual figures. The chapter clarifies how Merleau-Ponty’s renewed interpretation of the figure-ground structure makes it possible for him to describe the relationship between body schema and perceptual (body) image as a strictly systematic phenomenon. Subsequently, the chapter shows how Merleau-Ponty understands apraxia, sleep, and perceptual orientation as examples of dedifferentiation and subtler differentiation of the body-schematic system. The last section clarifies how such body-schematic differentiating processes give rise to relatively independent superstructures of vision and symbolic cognition which constitute our body image. It, moreover, explains how, according to Merleau-Ponty, the cognitive superstructures always need to be supported by praxic operative intentionality to maintain their full sense, even though, in some cases, they have the power to compensate for praxic deficiencies. (shrink)

In this paper, I am predominantly interested in interpretations of emotional states portrayed in images of the face. In particular, the interpretations which have grown around the series of busts by Franz Xaver Messerschmidt, as well as those which attempt to expound Bill Viola’s video works. I will refer to aspects of physiognomy, artistic practices and aesthetics, in order to show what each of these tells us about our attitude to the body and emotions and what happens to the (...) body while a person is experiencing an emotion. My aim is to demonstrate how the act of depicting the body, regarded as a cognitive process in an artistic medium accompanied by a special kind of aesthetic experience, becomes a means of communication which is capable of conveying a universal message and of allowing us to define our attitude to the body. (shrink)

Aesthetic evaluations of human bodies have important implications for moral recognition and for individuals’ access to social and material goods. Unfortunately, there is a widespread aesthetic disregard for non-white bodies. Aesthetic evaluations depend on the aesthetic properties we regard objects as having. And it is widely agreed that aesthetic properties are directly accessed in our experience of aesthetic objects. How, then, might we explain aesthetic evaluations that systematically favour features associated with white identity? Critical race philosophers, like Alia Al-Saji, Mariana (...) Ortega, Paul C. Taylor, and George Yancy, argue that this is because the perception of racialized bodies is affected by the social structures in which they are appreciated. The aim of this paper is to propose how social structures can affect aesthetic perception. I argue that mental imagery acquired through the interaction with aesthetic phenomena structures the perception of non-aesthetic properties of bodies, so that aesthetic properties consistent with racist stereotypes are attributed to individuals. (shrink)

In recent years, the notion of the body schema has been widely discussed, in particular in fields connecting philosophy, cognitive science, and dance studies, as it seems to have bearing across disciplines in a fruitful way. A main source in this literature is Shaun Gallagher’s distinction between the body schema – the “pre-noetic” conditions of bodily performance – and the body image – the body as intentional object –, another is Merleau-Ponty’s writings on the living (...) body, that Gallagher often draws upon. In this paper, I will first discuss Gallagher’s presumed clarification of body schema–body image, and discuss a recent critique by Saint Aubert (2013), who evaluates it against the backdrop of Merleau-Ponty’s thoughts on this issue. While I believe that Saint Aubert’s criticism overshoots the mark, it is useful for a clarification of Gallagher’s analysis and points to a problematic feature, namely the alleged inscrutability of the body schema to phenomenological reflection. This is particularly interesting in relation to contemporary dance and performance practice, where working with – and against – habitual structures is a core element. Certain contemporary training techniques are explicitly aimed at raising awareness of those bodily aspects that condition movement and expression – that Gallagher sees as pertaining to the body schema – and that in ordinary activities often remain hidden. In order to clarify the role that reflection on our own body and its habitual patterns plays in contemporary dance practice, I will examine the movement language and improvisation practice “Gaga”, where this aspect is arguably fundamental. (shrink)

I begin by reviewing recent research by Merleau-Ponty scholars opposing aspects of the critique of Merleau-Ponty made by Meltzoff and colleagues based on their studies of neonate imitation. I conclude the need for reopening the case for infant self-other indistinction, starting with a re-examination of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of indistinction in the Sorbonne lectures, and attending especially to the role of affect and to the non-exclusivity of self-other distinction and indistinction. In undertaking that study, I discover the importance of understanding self-other (...) distinction and indistinction in terms of their affective significance. For Merleau-Ponty, self-other indistinction is a virtual or imaginary participation in others’ orientations that he defines as an affective phenomenon. Further, Merleau-Ponty’s account of the advent of the body proper—the aspect of the body image that circumscribes the body as a distinct and private space—theorizes it as an affective innovation. Rather than being a fact of which we at first are ignorant and gradually grow to recognize, distinction from others in the sense that is important to Merleau-Ponty is a situation that must be cultivated and maintained through the negotiation of affective intimacy. Understanding indistinction and distinction in terms of the affective forces that sustain them explains how it is possible for them to coexist. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss empirical evidence regarding anorexic patients’ distorted body representations. I fit this evidence into a broader framework for understanding how the spatial content of the body is tracked and represented. This framework is motivated by O’Shaughnessy’s (1980) long-term body image hypothesis. This hypothesis posits a representation that tracks changes in the spatial content of the body and supplies this content to other body representations. I argue that a similar kind of (...) body representation might exist and, in the case of anorexia, be distorted. Finally, I suggest that this body representation might become distorted through influence by affect. -/- . (shrink)

Although better known for his phenomenology of perception and the perceived world, Merleau-Ponty’s writings also contain the outlines of a rich and unique account of the imagination and the imaginary. In this paper, I explicate the phenomenology of the image that Merleau-Ponty develops throughout his work. I show how Merleau-Ponty develops this account of the image in critical response to Sartre and in a way that follows from his own descriptions of what painters do when they paint and (...) of what we experience when we look at their paintings. The investigation of the particular mode of being of images leads to a consideration of the body and Merleau-Ponty’s later ontology. (shrink)

Anorexia Nervosa (AN) is a complex disorder characterised by self-starvation, an act of self-destruction. It is often described as a disorder marked by paradoxes and, despite extensive research attention, is still not well understood. Much AN research focuses upon the distorted body image that individuals with AN supposedly experience. However, based upon reports from individuals describing their own experience of AN, I argue that their bodily experience is much more complex than this focus might lead us to believe. (...) Such research often presents an overly cognitive understanding of bodily experience in AN, underplaying the affective, felt experience of individuals with AN, as well as descriptions of empowerment, strength and control reported in the early stages of AN. This paper seeks to enrich our understanding of bodily experience in AN as it progresses throughout the various stages of the disorder. I show how the classical phenomenological distinction between the body-as-subject and the body-as-object, as well as Leder’s conception of the visceral body, can inform our understanding of bodily experience in AN. I suggest that the project of self-starvation is an attempt to overcome the noisy demands of the visceral body, which are experienced as threatening the body-as-subject, through a process of objectifying the body-as-object. By cashing out AN as a project of radical bodily control that, tragically, comes to control the individual, we can capture important aspects of the bodily experience of AN and the temporal progression of the disorder. -/- . (shrink)

A distorted representation of one's own body is a diagnostic criterion and core psychopathology of both anorexia nervosa (AN) and bulimia nervosa (BN). Despite recent technical advances in research, it is still unknown whether this body image disturbance is characterized by body dissatisfaction and a low ideal weight and/or includes a distorted perception or processing of body size. In this article, we provide an update and meta-analysis of 42 articles summarizing measures and results for (...) class='Hi'>body size estimation (BSE) from 926 individuals with AN, 536 individuals with BN and 1920 controls. We replicate findings that individuals with AN and BN overestimate their body size as compared to controls (ES= 0.63). Our meta-regression shows that metric methods (BSE by direct or indirect spatial measures) yield larger effect sizes than depictive methods (BSE by evaluating distorted pictures), and that effect sizes are larger for patients with BN than for patients with AN. To interpret these results, we suggest a revised theoretical framework for BSE that accounts for differences between depictive and metric BSE methods regarding the underlying body representations (conceptual vs. perceptual, implicit vs. explicit). We also discuss clinical implications and argue for the importance of multimethod approaches to investigate body image disturbance. (shrink)

Advanced medical imaging, such as CT, fMRI and PET, has undergone enormous progress in recent years, both in accuracy and utilization. Such techniques often bring with them an illusion of immediacy, the idea that the body and its diseases can be directly inspected. In this paper we target this illusion and address the issue of the reliability of advanced imaging tests as knowledge procedures, taking positron emission tomography in oncology as paradigmatic case study. After individuating a suitable notion of (...) reliability, we argue that PET is a highly theory-laden and non-immediate knowledge procedure, in spite of the photographic-like quality of the images it delivers; the diagnostic conclusions based on the interpretation of PET images are population-dependent; PET images require interpretation, which is inherently observer-dependent and therefore variable. We conclude with a three-step methodological proposal for enhancing the reliability of advanced medical imaging. (shrink)

Throughout the 20th century, philosophers have criticized the scientific understanding of the human body. Instead of presenting the body as a meaningful unity or Gestalt, it is regarded as a complex mechanism and described in quasi-mechanistic terms. In a phenomenological approach, a more intimate experience of the body is presented. This approach, however, is questioned by Jacques Lacan. According to Lacan, three basic possibilities of experiencing the body are to be distinguished: the symbolical (or scientific) (...) class='Hi'>body, the imaginary (or ideal) body and the real body. Whereas the symbolical body is increasingly objectified (and even digitalized) by medical science, the phenomenological perception amounts to an idealization of the body. The real body cannot be perceived immediately. Rather, it emerges in the folds and margins of our efforts to symbolize or idealize the body, which are bound to remain incomplete and fragile. In the first part of the article (1-3), Lacan's conceptual distinction between the symbolical, the imaginary and the real body will be explained. In the second part (4-5), this distinction will be further clarified by relying on crucial chapters in the history of anatomy (notably Mundinus, Vesalius, Da Vinci and Descartes). (shrink)

This paper synthesizes the central argument of our forthcoming book ‘Tantric Instructions of Insight’ (2026) within a broader scholarly context, drawing on the contributions of Giuseppe Tucci, David and Janice Jackson, Robert Beer, Yael Bentor, David Germano, and Janet Gyatso. The shared discovery across these diverse approaches is that Tibetan tantric imagery is operative rather than merely representational. A thangka does not illustrate awakening from outside; it functions as a living instrument of presence, visualization, and inner transformation. The paper situates (...) this claim within the author’s own practice-based framework, the Yoga of the Inner Light, and argues that the thangka belongs to a wider contemplative phenomenology in which image, body, subtle perception, and primordial awareness become interwoven. Particular attention is given to the Samantabhadra Peaceful-Wrathful Mandala, to the doctrine of bardo recognition, and to the role of wrathful imagery as fierce compassion. The paper concludes that the thangka’s deepest function is initiatory: it trains consciousness to recognize its own luminous ground in the act of seeing. (shrink)

In 2016, a multidisciplinary body of scholars within the International Commission on Stratigraphy—the Anthropocene Working Group—recommended that the world officially recognize the Anthropocene as a new geological epoch. The most contested claim about the Anthropocene, that humans are a major geological and environmental force on par with natural forces, has proven to be a hotbed for discussion well beyond the science of geology. One reason for this is that it compels many natural and social scientists to confront problems and (...) systems that transgress traditional disciplinary boundaries, and as a result, calls for interdisciplinary research are now gaining traction. Proponents of such transgressions have dubbed the new scientific order that will result “Anthropocene Science”, and rhetoric notwithstanding, such discussions exemplify how recent changes within science justify rethinking a prevailing image of how science is done, and with it, the working relationship between scholars in the humanities, natural scientists, and social scientists. (shrink)

According to the biomedical model of medicine, the subject of the illness event is the pathology rather than the person diagnosed with the disease. In this view, a body-self becomes a ‘patient’ body-object that can be enrolled in a therapeutic protocol, investigated, assessed, and transformed. How can it be possible for cancer patients to make sense of the opposite dimensions of their body-self and their body-diseased-object? Could a creative embodied approach enable the coping with trauma tied (...) to the experience of illness? By applying a phenomenological approach and auto-ethnographic analysis to the experience of cancer, this visual exploration provides support for rethinking the cancer event through a performative perspective. This work previews images and video material collected over ten years of haematological treatments, video dance performances and physical explorations. This work displays how processes of healing can be set in motion by creative embodied practices, physical explorations and unexpected journeys. By resisting the biomedical model and allowing the emergence of new meanings, it illustrates how dance and performative practices offer ground for transformation. (shrink)

[Original title: "Dobras entre corpo e mapa na Transamazônica paraense"] The Transamazon Highway (BR-230) in Pará has had its image frozen for decades: a muddy road, tractors felling a forest empty of people, opening Amazonian space to authoritarian modernization. This image is reproduced in geography education — including for children and young people living alongside the road — through textbooks and discourses that impose the regional scale as totalizing, at the expense of place-ed [lugarizadas] scales in the field. (...) The result is not merely a distance between lived phenomenon and learned concept, but the reproduction of an (in)existence of the creative potency of vicinal roads as sites of geographical construction. Drawing on mental maps developed with students and teachers from two vicinal schools in Pacajá (PA) between 2016 and 2019 — attempts to provoke the body in the map and the map in the body within a limit-situation [situação-limite] of existence — we argue that bodily engagement and the situated gaze do not offer merely a totalizable example, but an opening to the new: a symbology that does not separate the emotional from the symbolic in map-making, and that reveals the need for a dialogical bridge between what is lived in the vicinal road and the world that thematizes it in an (in)existed manner. (shrink)

Our concern in this paper is to explore the psychosexual logic that supports and constitutes the grammar of racist discourse in early twentieth-century American popular media culture. Images of "grotesque" Black bodies represent the "Otherness" which was excluded in the process of white, middle-class identity formation in this historical period. Through examination of the visual aspects of these ethnic caricatures we display how a re-articulated racist ideology was sustained through specific strategies of iconographic representation. Racialized gender relations were depicted as (...) symbolic inversions of bourgeois sexuality, with African American women masculinized and African American men symbolically castrated. The pervasive "bathroom humor" and sexual jokes of these images portray the Black body as contaminating, dirty, and repulsive. These postcards made use of protuberant and repugnant bodies to transform white fantasies of racial denigration into supposedly benign humor, turn racial panic into perverse pleasure. (shrink)

We hear sounds, and their sources, and their audible qualities. Sounds and their sources are essentially dynamic entities, not wholly present at any given moment, but unfolding through their temporal interval. Sounds and their sources, essentially dynamic entities, are the bearers or susbtrata of audible qualities. Audible qualities are qualities essentially sustained by activity. The only bearers of audible qualities present in auditory experience are essentially dynamic entities. Bodies are not, in this sense, essentially dynamic entities and so are not (...) present in our auditory experience. Though absent in auditory experience, we may, nonetheless, attend to bodies in audition, when an audible sound-generating event in which they participate presents a dynamic aural image of them. (shrink)

I examine the passages where Aristotle maintains that intellectual activity employs φαντάσματα (images) and argue that he requires awareness of the relevant images. This, together with Aristotle’s claims about the universality of understanding, gives us reason to reject the interpretation of Michael Wedin and Victor Caston, on which φαντάσματα serve as the material basis for thinking. I develop a new interpretation by unpacking the comparison Aristotle makes to the role of diagrams in doing geometry. In theoretical understanding of mathematical and (...) natural beings, we usually need to employ appropriate φαντάσματα in order to grasp explanatory connections. Aristotle does not, however, commit himself to thinking that images are required for exercising all theoretical understanding. Understanding immaterial things, in particular, may not involve employing phantasmata. Thus the connection that Aristotle makes between images and understanding does not rule out the possibility that human intellectual activity could occur apart from the body. (shrink)

This chapter aims to shed light on the normative questions raised by medical imaging (MI), paving the way for interdisciplinary dialogue and further philosophical exploration. MI comprises noninvasive techniques aimed at visualizing internal human body structures to aid in explanation, diagnosis, and monitoring of health conditions. MI requires interpretation by specialized professionals, and is routinely employed across medical disciplines. It is entrenched in clinical guidelines and therapeutic interventions. Moreover, it is a dynamic research field, witnessing ongoing technological advancements. After (...) surveying philosophical issues arising from MI, which are relatively unexplored, the chapter focuses on the epistemology of diagnostic imaging. Specifically, it delves into what constitutes an image as evidence and how radiological procedures generate knowledge. The discussion dissects three facets of the radiological process: image interpretation, radiological reporting, and semantic analysis. Each facet carries distinct epistemic implications, as errors can manifest in various ways, affecting the acquisition of patient-relevant knowledge. (shrink)

In this existential reading of Kim Kardashian-West's International Women's Day selfie of 2016, I focus on the rise of selfie culture and public discourse around emerging digital representations of women's bodies. The selfie is a relatively new phenomenon, and is particularly curious because of the subject/object paradox it creates; in taking a selfie, a person asserts control over their own image, but at the same time, becomes object in their own gaze. My argument is that selfies, like other assertions (...) of bodily subjectivity in digital spaces, are a threat to patriarchal structures that paint women as immanent, object, as reflected in public discourse around Kardashian-West's International Women's Day selfie. I draw on both Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir's work on subjectivity in existentialism and phenomenology, as well as Amy Shields Dobson's work on post-feminism and young women's projections of self, in order to delineate what it is about the selfie that creates this paradox. I also make reference to the work of Elisabeth Grosz and Frantz Fanon in relation to a colonial hierarchy that prioritises body over mind, as well as Laura Mulvey's work on the male gaze. (shrink)

Written in broad strokes, this paper attempts to draw form Krishnamurti’s life and teachings, a hermeneutics of the human soul’s quest-journey towards transcendent wholeness. It begins with an attempt to frame K’s “process” (the name given to the painful ordeals in his youth that many believe were the catalyst responsible for his metamorphosis) through a variety of disciplines and cultural perspectives, some of which underscore the impasse of scientific objectivity and the limits of phenomenalist categories in general. It then explores (...) the procedures and conceits of present technologies of self-transformation via pseudomeditative body work and suggests that this subject can only be confirmed by an experience so intimately and subversively (to its own object) subjective that it risks undermining its own legitimacy in the face of our body-phobic Cartesian cultural ethos that holds sacrosanct the mind-body split. It then explores the deeper origins and history of this problem from the pre-Socratics to the misconceptions of modern mathematics about the proper place of metaphor and paradox and underscores how present day false consciousness fails to discriminate between a “noumenal” world and its conditioned “phenomenal” counterfeit copy. It ends with a brief meditation on K’s process. (shrink)

This paper is a tentative step towards a historical cognitive science, in the domain of memory and personal identity. I treat theoretical models of memory in history as specimens of the way cultural norms and artifacts can permeate ('proto')scientific views of inner processes. I apply this analysis to the topic of psychological control over one's own body, brain, and mind. Some metaphors and models for memory and mental representation signal the projection inside of external aids. Overtly at least, medieval (...) and Renaissance theorists agreed that such models had to allow for, or even guarantee, some conception of cognitive order and discipline. Individual memory traces had to be independent, not mixed up or interfering with others. The long tradition of improving or bypassing 'natural memory' by deliberately internalizing artefactual models was part of an arduous process of self-fashioning. Moral panic about confusion and mixture features centrally in the imposition of cognitive discipline in local memory traditions. (shrink)

Taking as its object the transformations of "Nailong" across short-video platforms, sticker circulation, commercial licensing, and AI-generated images, this essay understands Nailong not as a stable animated character, but as a continuously sculpted body image. In contrast to conventional IP studies, which usually focus on character continuity, brand consistency, and affective loyalty, the cultural significance of Nailong derives from the instability of its identity: it repeatedly detaches itself from the context of the original work and is shaped respectively (...) by platform algorithms, youth subcultures, commercial systems, and technological apparatuses. Knowledge archaeology, genealogical analysis, the analysis of taboo coding and the projection of fantasy and jouissance, theories of technological reproduction, and apparatus theory together constitute the analytical framework, explaining how Nailong is transformed from an official animated character into platform-native action, an autonomous sticker body, a carrier of fantasy and jouissance, an object of commercial incorporation, a reproducible body, and a life-sized apparatus. The history of Nailong is not the growth history of an IP, but a history in which body images are continuously generated, mutated, and reproduced in the internet age. (shrink)

Hysteria, a mysterious disease known since antiquity, is said to have ceased to exist. Challenging this commonly held view, this is the first cross-disciplinary study to examine the current functional neuroimaging research into hysteria and compare it to the nineteenth-century image-based research into the same disorder. Paula Muhr's central argument is that, both in the nineteenth-century and the current neurobiological research on hysteria, images have enabled researchers to generate new medical insights. Through detailed case studies, Muhr traces how different (...) images, from photography to functional brain scans, have reshaped the historically situated medical understanding of this disorder that defies the mind-body dualism. (shrink)

The human body has always been one of the most important subjects for European artists. But the way it is displayed in art has varied in different epochs. In ancient Greece, a canon was constituted that proclaimed an ideal vision of the body, derived from the rules governing the universe. This idealization of the human body, neglected in the Middle Ages, was re‑established in Renaissance and Classicist art. However, Renaissance artists also created another image of the (...) human body by borrowing from patterns mainly found in nature, and started to depict their models not in an ideal but rather in a more natural shape. The new non‑ideal forms of art that appeared in Mannerist art made the artists develop a much wider artistic language, which brought into being a variety of individually interpreted artistic representations of the human body. It preceded similar phenomena which became widespread in the twentieth century. Thus, the human body was not always displayed in art as strong, healthy and beautiful. On the contrary, the martyred bodies of Christ and the saints, as well as the depictions of aged, tired or ill people, also carried enormous artistic expression. A distinct problem has occurred with the ways in which corpses have been presented in art. The review concludes with a reference to the contemporary trend called Body‑Art that involves various artistic activities, such as happenings and performances, where the human body is itself used as a significant work of art. (shrink)

Three of the most robust functional landmarks in the human brain are the selective responses to faces in the fusiform face area (FFA), scenes in the parahippocampal place area (PPA), and bodies in the extrastriate body area (EBA). Are the selective responses of these regions present early in development or do they require many years to develop? Prior evidence leaves this question unresolved. We designed a new 32-channel infant magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) coil and collected high-quality functional MRI (fMRI) (...) data from infants (2–9 months of age) while they viewed stimuli from four conditions—faces, bodies, objects, and scenes. We find that infants have face-, scene-, and body-selective responses in the location of the adult FFA, PPA, and EBA, respectively, powerfully constraining accounts of cortical development. (shrink)

[Original Title: "Dobras entre corpo e mapa na Transamazônica paraense"] The Transamazon Highway (BR-230) in Pará has had its image frozen for decades: a muddy road, stalled vehicles or tractors felling a people-empty forest, opening Amazonian space to a project of authoritarian modernization. This image is reproduced and reproductive in geography education through discourses that impose the regional scale as totalizing and explanatory, at the expense of place-ed [lugarizadas] scales in the field. The result of this dynamic is (...) not merely a distance between what is lived as phenomenon and what is learned as concept; it moves toward the reproducibility of an (in)existence of the creative potency of vicinal roads — places of geographical construction — and against mappings that, from within, might force a rethinking of the unshakeable foundations of frozen images, generalist maps, and their standardizing projections, scales, and symbology. To this end, we conducted — together with students and teachers from two vicinal schools in the municipality of Pacajá (PA), from early 2016 to 2019 — a series of mental maps: that is, attempts to provoke the body in the map and the map in the body within a limit-situation [situação-limite] of existence. This bodily engagement in the attempt to think the vicinal road as place-in-institution — and from there, as a situated opening to the world — is what gives meaning to geocartography. We conclude: (a) the emergence of a subjective sense that does not separate the emotional from the symbolic in the making of maps; (b) the bodily engagement and situated gaze of teachers and students does not hold merely the value of a totalizable example, but of an opening to the new, insofar as they produce a symbology that reveals the need to build a dialogical bridge between what is lived in the vicinal road and the world that thematizes it in an (in)existed manner. (shrink)

This paper explores the implicit thought of the “body-network” in Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the body, drawing from both his earlier and later works. It demonstrates that, for Merleau-Ponty, the phenomenal body is inherently interconnected with the world through motor intentionality. Meanwhile, in his later concept of “flesh,” this interconnectedness deepens into a relationship of mutual reflection and chiasmic intertwining, where bodies and the world continuously mirror and permeate each other. The paper then introduces the Huayan Buddhist (...) metaphor of Indra’s Net, along with Fazang’s interpretation of it. A detailed comparative analysis is conducted between Merleau-Pontian body-network and Fazang’s understanding of Indra’s Net. The paper argues for a profound resonance between the primordial characteristics of the Merleau-Pontian body-network—namely, relationality and reflectivity—and Fazang’s key concepts, such as “mutual identity” (相即), “mutual inclusion” (相入), and the contemplative idea that “the images of many bodies are reflected in one mirror” (多身入一鏡像觀). Despite their distinct cultural and philosophical vocabularies, both thinkers construct a relational ontology aimed at deconstructing entrenched dualisms. Through this in-depth comparative study using the Internet of Bodies (IoB) as a case study, this paper demonstrates that the IoB technology exhibits only superficial resemblances to the Merleau-Pontian body-network and Fazang’s interpretation of Indra’s Net. To address the ethical challenges posed by the IoB, it is imperative to integrate the shared philosophical insights of Merleau-Ponty and Fazang in constructing a critical techno-ethics capable of interrogating the ontological reduction and power asymmetries inherent in contemporary technological networks. Merleau-Ponty’s concept of reversible flesh inspires an ethics of contextual sensitivity and user agency, resisting the reduction of lived experience to data points. Meanwhile, Fazang’s Huayan Buddhism, with its principles of mutual identity and mutual inclusion, reveals the relational nature of data, challenging its treatment as neutral or absolute. Together, these philosophies advocate for a decentralized, reciprocal techno-ethics that prioritizes embodied meaning over surveillance and control. (shrink)

With emotional motivation the organism prepares the body to obtain a goal. There is an anticipatory sensitization of the sensory systems in the body and the brain. Presynaptic facilitation of the sensory afference in the spinal cord is probably involved. In a second stage the higher centers develop an action image/plan to realize the goal, modifying the initial preparations in the body. The subject experiences the changes in the body as a feeling. Three empirical studies (...) supporting this description are summarized. This description of how feelings develop from emotion circuits is discussed from a phenomenological viewpoint. (shrink)

Jenny Saville is a leading contemporary painter of female nudes. This paper explores her work in light of theories of gender and embodied agency. Recent work on the phenomenology of embodiment draws a distinction between the body image and the body schema. The body image is your representation of your own body, including your visual image of it and your emotional attitudes towards it. The body schema is comprised of your proprioceptive knowledge, (...) your corporeally encoded memories, and your corporeal proficiency with respect to various environments and activities. Saville is concerned with body image issues, and I discuss how she reconfigures representational practices with respect to feminine body images. However, the most exciting potential for feminist analysis of the state of the female nude derives from the concept of the body schema, for this concept endows the human body with subjectivity and agency. My key question, then, is by what pictorial means and to what extent Saville succeeds in representing agentic womanhood. I argue that interpreting Saville’s paintings from the standpoint of the body schema demonstrates the radicality of her remaking of the female nude and the rapport between her imagery and feminist values. (shrink)

New technological developments have fundamentally transformed human life. Throughout this process, fundamental questions about human beings have once again been posed. The paper examines how technological change affects understandings of human beings and their bodies, thereby requiring new approaches to anthropology. First, Section 2 illustrates how the use of technology has changed the understanding of human beings and their bodies. A new connection between the human being or the body and technology has emerged. Section 3 then moves onto considering (...) the increasing blurring of the boundaries between organisms and machines, showing how the understanding of humans and bodies is constantly being renegotiated in relation to machines. Based on this, Section 4 explores how the understanding of the human being and the body can be redesigned in the context of modern technology. To this end, approaches for a contemporary anthropology can be derived from critical posthumanism. Section 5 addresses concrete practice and examines the construction of identity in social media platforms such as Instagram. The paper argues that technological processes and social media are places where theology is constructed and appeals for a responsible theological co-creation of these places. It advocates that technology offers the opportunity to question traditional anthropological concepts and to renegotiate understandings of the human being and the body. -- Puzio, Anna: Digital and Technological Identities – In Whose Image? A philosophical-theological approach to identity construction in social media and technology. In: Cursor (2021). (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to develop and defend an Attentional View of bodily awareness, on which attention is necessary for bodily awareness. The original formulation of the Attentional View is due to Marcel Kinsbourne. First, I will show that the Attentional View of bodily awareness as formulated by Kinsbourne is superior to other accounts in the literature for characterizing the relationship between attention and bodily awareness. Kinsbourne’s account is the only account in the literature so far which can (...) accommodate key neurological diseases such as personal neglect. Second, when I consider Kinsbourne’s view in more detail, I will argue that Kinsbourne’s Attentional View faces problems because it is too reductive. Kinsbourne deviates from the standard taxonomy on which there is a body schema and a body image. Instead he reduces the body image to the neural representation of the body in the somatosensory cortex, the body schema and attentional shifts. I will present two challenges to Kinsbourne’s view which demonstrate that Kinsbourne’s reduction of the body image is unsuccessful. Finally, I will present a revised version of the Attentional View that is both empirically adequate and philosophically satisfactory. (shrink)

The transformation of aesthetics after moving images became possible.

This paper, as a response to Mark K. Spencer’s, “Perceiving the Image of God in the Whole Human Person” in the present volume, argues in defence of Aquinas’s position that the Imago Dei is limited in the human being to the rational, intellective soul alone. While the author agrees with Spencer that the hierarchical relation between body and soul in the human composite must be maintained while avoiding the various permeations of dualism, nevertheless, the Imago Dei cannot be (...) located in the human body or the principle of the body considered within the body/soul composite without betraying a number of fundamental Thomistic metaphysical principles. Essential to these includes Aquinas’s position that an image of God should image not only the Divine Nature, but also the Trinitarian relations between the Divine Persons. Further, the paper also argues that a phenomenology of sense experience could not, on principle, attain to an image of God in the whole human person within a Thomistic framework generally. (shrink)

Introduction: Recognition of the level of the conus medullaris termination (CMt) is of clinical importance for avoiding iatrogenic injuries during spinal anesthesia and lumbar puncture. Although CMt levels have been examined in a variety of studies, they vary in classical textbooks and literature studies. The aim of this study was to investigate the level of CMt and its correlation to gender, age, and body mass index (BMI) using magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) in healthy individuals and those with lumbar disc (...) herniation. Methods: The lumbar MRIs of 341 subjects, including healthy individuals (F: 123, M: 68) and those with lumbar disc herniation (F: 105, M: 45), were retrospectively examined, and the CMt levels were determined. Results: It was found that CMt levels were most commonly located at upper 1/3 of the L1 vertebral body in both healthy individuals and those with disc herniation groups. No statistically significant difference was observed between the two groups evaluated. In addition, no significant mean level of CMt, weight, height, and BMI difference existed between the two groups. Conclusion: In the literature, the highest level of CMt is seen as being at the intervertebral disc between T11 and T12 vertebrae, while the lowest level of the CMt is seen as being at lower 1/3 of the L3 vertebral body. Consequently, we are of the opinion that the L3-4 or L4-5 intervertebral spaces should be preferred to lower the complication rate in procedures such as spinal anesthesia and lumbar puncture. (shrink)

Henri Lefebvre’s writings continue to accrue interest in twenty-first-century Anglo-American scholarship, which confirms Stuart Elden’s forecast of Lefebvre’s posthumous rebirth in contemporary research. This ongoing generation of scholarly output comes as no surprise to those who share Elden’s palingenetic pronouncement and aims toward ameliorating erstwhile inaccessibility of the French philosopher’s work. Lefebvre’s prolific writings were produced over a broad sweep of twentieth-century intellectual activity spanning eight decades (1924–92) with thoughts expressed inside nearly seventy published books and hundreds of articles that (...) appeal to readers interested in various aspects of philosophy, politics, and sociology, thus attracting, and allowing for, the kinds of interdisciplinary, cross-pollinating, and synthesizing scholarship currently being produced. By the same token and seeking to contribute to this growing body of commentary, this article proposes an interpretation of Lefebvre’s famous distinction as a dialectician by striving to illuminate the message of his provocative image of the “Crucified Sun” via Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s equally suggestive metaphor of the “Crucified Rose.” Consequently, this article examines the Franco-German interface between Lefebvre and Hegel through three complecting lines. The first serves to orient the reader with respect to Lefebvre’s classification as a post-Hegelian dialectician of social phenomena. The second weaves together the Lefebvrean and Hegelian cruciform images as symbolizing the unity of present struggle with future reward, that is, as metaphors which, while suggesting sacrifice and death, can still vivify hope for a better world. And finally, as an alternative to commentators who suggest that Friedrich Nietzsche showed Lefebvre how to deliver the sun from the cross, it is argued that Lefebvre’s desire for radical social transformation cannot be fulfilled by Nietzschean views that equate alienation with resentful weakness and instead requires a Hegelian mindset that needs the figurative sun to stay nailed to its cross in order to continually resurrect its reconciling potency. -/- . (shrink)

This dissertation examines the relationship that exists between two distinct and seemingly incompatible bodies of scholarship within the field of contemporary philosophy of technology. The first, as argued by postmodern pragmatist Barry Allen, posits that our tools and what we make with them are epistemically important; disputing the idea that knowledge is strictly sentential or propositional, he claims instead that knowledge is the product of a performance that is both superlative and artefactual, rendering technology importantly world-constituting. The second, as argued (...) by Heidegger and his inheritors, is that technology is ontologically problematic; rather than technology being evidence of performative knowledge, it is instead existentially threatening by virtue of the fact that it changes the tenor of our relationship with the world-as-given. Despite the fact that these claims seem prima facie incompatible, I argue that they may be successfully reconciled by introducing a third body of scholarship: the philosophy of photography. For it is the case, I argue, that although we, qua human beings, occupy lifeworlds that are necessarily constituted by technology, technology also induces a kind of phenomenological scepticism: a concern that mediated action precludes us from the possibility of authentic experience. Arguing in favour of the sentiment that photographs serve as a kind of phenomenal anchor—a kind of machine for living—I claim that photographic images provide a panacea to this existential concern: despite being epistemically problematic, it is this selfsame epistemic “specialness” of photographs that forces us to phenomenologically recommit, if only temporarily, to the world in a serious way. Consequently, it is my belief that an analysis of our artefacts and the way they function is fundamentally incomplete without an analysis of the epistemic and ontological problems introduced of the photographic image; as I will demonstrate, the photographic image casts an extremely long shadow over the philosophy of technology. (shrink)

Current research on the various forms of autoscopic phenomena addresses the clinical and neurological correlates of out-of-body experiences, autoscopic hallucinations,and heautoscopy. Yet most of this research is based on functional magnetic resonance imaging results and focuses predominantly on abnormal cortical activity. Previously we proposed that visual consciousness resulted from the dynamic retinogeniculo-cortical oscillations, such that the photoreceptors dynamically integrated with visual and other vision-associated cortices, and was theorized to be mapped out by photoreceptor discs and rich retinal networks which (...) synchronized with the retinotopic mapping and the associated cortex. The feedback from neural input that is received from the thalamus and cortex via retinogeniculo-cortical oscillations and sent to the retina is multifold higher than feed-forward input to the cortex. This can effectively translate into out-of-body experiences projected onto the screen formed by the retina as it is perceived via feedback and feed-forward oscillations from the reticular thalamic nucleus, or “internal searchlight”. This article explores the role of the reticular thalamic nucleus and the retinogeniculo-cortical oscillations as pivotal internal components in vision and various autoscopic phenomena. (shrink)

More number of deaths occurring every year due to a common health issue, cancer. It is one of the diseases distributed over large areas. Among all, bone cancer is most predominant, having a high death rate. Hence this is most important and a lot of research is going on and to identify bone cancer X-RAY scanned images are used. They provide a picture detailed with the growth of the tumor and track its growth in the body so it is (...) better by providing good results compared to other techniques. Therefore in medical fields most of the image processing techniques are used to detect cancer in its early stages .In this project we present an approach to detect bone cancer in scanned images. The steps involved in it are proposed using methods of image preprocessing where median filter is used followed by segmentation where mathematical morphological operations are used. Geometrical features like area, perimeter, and eccentricity are calculated to the tumor detected part. At last CNN classifier is used to classify whether it is cancerous (Malignant) or normal (Benign). In our project we will be using the following algorithms for classification like Support Vector Machine (SVM) as existing and Convolution Neural Network (CNN) as proposed and its accuracy has been calculated and well compared. From the results obtained it is proved that the proposed Convolution Neural Network (CNN) performs better than existing Support Vector Machine (SVM). (shrink)

Mirrors are more than reflective surfaces; they are portals to self-perception influenced by a tapestry of developmental, psychological, and cultural factors. In this paper, we explore the interplay between these factors by investigating the effect of beliefs on mirror images and clarifying how negative self-perception develops. We analyse the phenomenon of mirror self-recognition and the development of beliefs about oneself, attempting to clarify how emotionally charged beliefs could influence our experience with the mirror. Our proposal offers insights into body (...) dysmorphia disorders, emphasizing the importance of the interaction between belief and self-perception in this and related disorders. (shrink)

Generative artificial intelligence can plausibly complete objects, relations, and internal structures that are not directly observed, drawing on regularities in text and images. Both text and video, however, are primarily descriptions or recordings of a world experienced by humans. Physical properties such as mass, friction, resistance, support, and collision can be estimated statistically from such data, but they are never given as sensory consequences of the artificial agent's own actions. This paper proposes Architectural Body Intelligence (ABI) as a third (...) pathway of world-model formation that addresses this gap. In ABI, the built environment itself is organized as the primary body and developmental environment of an artificial agent. Floor pressure distributions, structural vibrations, acoustics, effector states, and wide-area visual input from distributed cameras are integrated into a single learning loop, and indoor robots and manipulators serve as effectors. Standard ABI does not occlude vision. Visual and structural sensing are learned jointly as consequences of active intervention, and what ABI extracts from human development is not an ordering that delays vision but the principle that multisensory correspondences between perception and action precede linguistic symbolization. The paper positions sensorimotor learning as a third foundation alongside linguistic and visual learning, presents the architectural body as a developmental niche in which machines learn the world bodily, and translates simultaneous multisensory, physics-first, vision-first, and language-first configurations into a comparable experimental program. ABI is offered as a constructive conceptual model for examining tacit assumptions of artificial embodiment rather than as a report of an implemented system. (shrink)

In 1804, when asked by the aspiring writer Clemens Brentano why she had chosen to publish her work, Karoline von Günderrode wrote that she longed “mein Leben in einer bleibenden Form auszusprechen, in einer Gestalt, die würdig sei, zu den Vortreflichsten hinzutreten, sie zu grüssen und Gemeinschaft mit ihnen zu haben.” In light of this kind of statement, it is perhaps not surprising if, despite some exceptions, much of the still relatively scant literature on Günderrode reads her works largely in (...) terms of how they articulate and manifest Günderrode’s desires, frustrations, and character, for the most part ignoring their imaginary, creative, and intellectual aspects. This interpretation of the author’s works as biography is, in Günderrode’s case, often accompanied by an interpretation of her biography, particularly her suicide, as literary work. This paper is not the first to question the conflation of Günderrode’s life, death, and writing, but it is one of only a handful that aim to address the autopoietic element of Günderrode’s work in a way that does not reduce her writings to biographical and psychological expressions, or Günderrode herself to an image – or a legend – encapsulated by her writings and her relationship to them. This paper argues that Günderrode’s own position on what the self is has been largely neglected as a result of this conflation, and that taking this position into account changes how we understand Günderrode’s articulations of self in her writings. Thus this paper has two goals: to address difficulties in articulating and even constituting oneself sincerely when one’s efforts are unrecognized, belittled, censored, and forced to conform to the conventions of a society in which one is marginalized; and to unearth a neglected and potentially rich account of the modern self. (shrink)

We are taught to mourn Alexandria as a civilizational wound, a moment when something irreplaceable was lost and never quite recovered. The story is familiar enough to feel unquestionable. There was a place where the world’s knowledge was gathered and wisdom was accumulated to be safeguarded, and when it burned, humanity itself was diminished. From this image we draw a moral that seems obvious and is, therefore, rarely examined. Knowledge is fragile, preservation is virtuous, forgetting is dangerous, and destruction, (...) even accidental, is akin to barbarism. The lesson settles in early and quietly, until it no longer sounds like an argument at all but a reflex, something that activates whenever loss is mentioned, the past loosens its hold on the present, or memory threatens to slip. (shrink)

WHAT THIS PAPER ARGUES. Gilles Deleuze's Postscript on the Societies of Control (1990) is six pages long, among the most cited essays in twentieth-century social theory, and an explicit, direct extension of Foucault in exactly the direction this corpus's Biological Zero-Day Mechanism operates. It has not, until this paper, been cited anywhere in this corpus, despite The Archive Beneath the Index engaging Foucault directly and despite BZM's own formal architecture being built, unknowingly, in the image of the disciplinary form (...) Deleuze's essay argues is already being superseded. Deleuze distinguishes disciplinary societies, organized around enclosure — discrete, bounded institutional spaces the individual passes through one threshold at a time, each a mold that casts a fixed shape — from societies of control, organized around modulation: continuous, boundless variation with no enclosure to cross and no discrete threshold to pass, a sieve whose mesh transmutes from point to point rather than a mold that fixes a form. This paper argues the Biological Zero-Day Mechanism, examined against this distinction, is a discipline-era instrument: its formal properties — discreteness, a dated event, institutional authorship — are built to detect exactly the kind of threshold discipline produces and control does not. The generative process underneath BZM's discrete precipitates, AI-accelerated biological discovery, is by contrast pure Deleuzian control: continuous, unbounded, never enclosed in a fixed protocol the way a clinical trial once enclosed drug development, modulating constantly rather than passing through fixed stages. This produces the paper's central finding: BZM, built to detect discipline's discrete thresholds, is structurally positioned to miss an entire class of continuous, sub-threshold biopolitical modulation — continuously updated polygenic risk scores, continuously ingested biomarker streams, continuously repriced insurance premiums — that never crystallizes into any single dated coverage decision and yet produces real, differential, modulated exposure exactly as discretely-attributed BZM events do. The paper further shows that Deleuze's dividual, the infinitely divisible, continuously sampled data-subject that control substitutes for discipline's bounded individual, gives Rose's ethopolitics and this corpus's own vicarious ethopolitics a reason for their felt inescapability that neither prior paper supplied: discipline's enclosure could be left; control's modulation has no outside to leave, because it was never bounded to begin with. The paper closes by naming, cautiously, the direction this corpus's own market material may already be heading — from discrete purchase toward continuous subscription — and what remains unformalized about that shift. (shrink)

Feminist social theory and female body experience are the twin themes of Iris Marion Young's twelve outstanding essays written over the past decade and brought together here. Her contributions to social theory raise critical questions about women and citizenship, the relations of capitalism and women's oppression, and the differences between a feminist theory that emphasizes women's difference and one that assumes a gender-neutral humanity. Loosely following a phenomenological method of description, Young's essays on female embodiment discuss female movement, pregnancy, (...) clothing, and the breasted body. In an introduction that situates her work in the context of shifts in feminist theory and politics over the past decade, Young emphasizes the rootedness of her theorizing in a dedicated and seasoned political activism. (shrink)

Almost everyone who has a limb amputated will experience a phantom limb--the vivid impression that the limb is not only still present, but in some cases, painful. There is now a wealth of empirical evidence demonstrating changes in cortical topography in primates following deafferentation or amputation, and this review will attempt to relate these in a systematic way to the clinical phenomenology of phantom limbs. With the advent of non-invasive imaging techniques such as MEG (magnetoencephalogram) and functional MRI, topographical reorganization (...) can also be demonstrated in humans, so that it is now possible to track perceptual changes and changes in cortical topography in individual patients. We suggest, therefore, that these patients provide a valuable opportunity not only for exploring neural plasticity in the adult human brain but also for understanding the relationship between the activity of sensory neurons and conscious experience. We conclude with a theory of phantom limbs, some striking demonstrations of phantoms induced in normal subjects, and some remarks about the relevance of these phenomena to the question of how the brain constructs a 'body image.'. (shrink)