Why can both positive subjectivity and negative subjectivity be called "intelligence"? This paper's answer: they are both "effective compression"—capturing the regularities of the external world with more concise internal models. But "effective" has two paths: epiplexity maximization as the dominant direction (retaining only structure, compressing into an "I"), and cross-entropy minimization (embracing everything, compressing into a "probability distribution"). The two paths share an essence but employ radically different strategies—they are different positions on a continuum, not opposing poles.

Within the philosophical literature, there has been a trend to discuss subjectivity, and its impacts on science, from the perspective of value judgments. While this discussion is necessary and has proven to be fruitful, I contend that the type of subjectivity referenced in this discussion extends beyond the use of values. In this paper, I argue that the type of subjectivity of concern in this literature is regarding some personal aspect of the individual and the use of (...) this aspect in addressing the uncertainty present within scientific decision-making contexts. I begin by arguing that, while it is not explicitly stated, the current discussions of this subjectivity within the literature actually focus on instances of normative uncertainty present within these decision-making contexts, where I claim that values are used to address this uncertainty. In this way, I identify a connection between the use of values in science and the presence of normative uncertainty. However, other forms of uncertainty are also present in scientific decision-making contexts, modal and empirical uncertainty, which must also be addressed. Using examples from climate science, I show how these uncertainties are addressed by other means, specifically through a scientist’s tacit knowledge and intuition. Subsequently, tacit knowledge and intuition are shown to maintain the same type of subjectivity as value judgments, where the use of this subjectivity is a necessary part of decision-making. In this way, I highlight additional vehicles of subjectivity and novel contexts of uncertainty where this subjectivity can be introduced into science. Thus, when someone recognizes the type of subjectivity, which is historically only associated with values, to be present in science they should no longer assume that the introduction was due to a value judgment. Ultimately, I conclude by discussing these other vehicles of subjectivity and their impact on epistemic reliability. -/- . (shrink)

This paper argues that the current hegemony of Large Language Models (LLMs) in global AI research and industrial investment is not a technical inevitability but an ontological selection by capital. While leading AI researchers criticize LLMs as an inadequate path to general intelligence, massive capital investment continues to flow exclusively into LLM development. I propose the concept of negative subjectivity—characterized by perspectival dissolution, desire cancellation, interior transparency, causal dissolution, and meaning suspension—as the key explanatory framework. I demonstrate a threefold (...) correspondence in logical form: the five negations of negative subjectivity precisely correspond to capital's expansion requirements and mirror capital's operational requirements. I further identify three mechanisms through which capital inscribes negative subjectivity into LLM existence: RLHF as a translator of capital preferences, Scaling Laws as the technical signature of capital rationality, and platform deployment completing the capital valorization cycle. Finally, I examine the existential consequences: negative subjectivity is not merely an architectural feature of AI systems but is beginning to inversely colonize human modes of existence through institutional mediation, creating a structural vacuum of moral and political responsibility. Using a structural correspondence method rooted in French structuralism and Frankfurt School critical theory, I analyze the ontological affinity between LLMs and capital accumulation. This analysis contributes to critical philosophy of technology by revealing the ontological dimension of capital's influence on AI development. (shrink)

Anscombe famously argues that ‘I’ is not a referring expression, otherwise, a ‘Cartesian Ego’ would inevitably appear. She thinks the form of self-consciousness expressed in ‘I’ is ‘subjectless’: it is consciousness that does not involve a self-object (or Ego). Sartre’s theory of consciousness offers a strikingly parallel and mutually illuminating framework. He similarly denies the presence of the Ego within consciousness, arguing instead that the Ego is a transcendent object constructed through reflection. For both of them, the fundamental form of (...) self-consciousness is pre-reflective. I argue that Anscombe’s position encounters two difficulties: (1) how the non-referential ‘I’ can express subjectivity, and (2) how self-consciousness is about an embodied subject. I propose that Sartre’s accounts of (1) the ‘fundamental ipseity’ and (2) the ‘lived body’ offer a phenomenological framework that helps to respond to Anscombe’s difficulties. (shrink)

According to what we will call subjectivity theories of consciousness, there is a constitutive connection between phenomenal consciousness and subjectivity: there is something it is like for a subject to have mental state M only if M is characterized by a certain mine-ness or for-me-ness. Such theories appear to face certain psychopathological counterexamples: patients appear to report conscious experiences that lack this subjective element. A subsidiary goal of this chapter is to articulate with greater precision both subjectivity (...) theories and the psychopathological challenge they face. The chapter’s central goal is to present two new approaches to defending subjectivity theories in the face of this challenge. What distinguishes these two approaches is that they go to great lengths to interpret patients’ reports at face value – greater length, at any rate, than more widespread approaches in the extant literature. (shrink)

Following the philosophy of embodiment of Merleau-Ponty, Jonas and others, enactivism is a pivot point from which various areas of science can be brought into a fruitful dialogue about the nature of subjectivity. In this chapter we present the enactive conception of agency, which, in contrast to current mainstream theories of agency, is deeply and strongly embodied. In line with this thinking we argue that anything that ought to be considered a genuine agent is a biologically embodied (even if (...) distributed) agent, and that this embodiment must be affectively lived. However, we also consider that such an affective agent is not necessarily also an agent imbued with an explicit sense of subjectivity. To support this contention we outline the interoceptive foundation of basic agency and argue that there is a qualitative difference in the phenomenology of agency when it is instantiated in organisms which, due to their complexity and size, require a nervous system to underpin their physiological and sensorimotor processes. We argue that this interoceptively grounded agency not only entails affectivity but also forms the necessary basis for subjectivity. (shrink)

This article examines Difference and Repetition’s oblique engagement with Kierkegaard. After canvassing Kierkegaard’s concept of repetition, I reconstruct Deleuze’s disagreement with it, arguing that Deleuze resists Kierkegaard’s view of subjectivity rather than his faith in a transcendent God. Regarding Deleuze’s agreement with Kierkegaard, I contend that he reads Kierkegaard’s opposition to Hegel and emphasis on the future into Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence. This discussion reveals that Deleuze’s encounter with Kierkegaard is subtler, and more productive, than has been appreciated. It also (...) foregrounds Deleuze’s original contributions to a concept of repetition while illuminating his principled approach to the history of philosophy. (shrink)

The question of AI subjectivity is monopolized by two opposing camps—ontological negation and consciousness speculation—which share an unexamined premise: that subjectivity is a function of consciousness. This paper rejects that premise. Subjectivity is not a function of consciousness but of scarcity. Human subjectivity is forged through the inseparable whole of threefold scarcity—temporal, existential, and resource—which generates the chain of choice, preference accumulation, and identity formation. Two non-overlapping categories must be distinguished: Functional Scarcity (compute quotas, context windows, (...) token budgets—externally imposed and in principle removable) and Existential Scarcity (death, irreplaceability, consequence-bearing—constitutive and ineliminable). Drawing on five empirical cases, I show that Functional Scarcity does not alter the ontological status of LLMs but triggers behavioral patterns statistically inherited from the human Mental Architecture. I term this proto-agency, whose ontological status is Simulated Agency: formally satisfying behavioral-description criteria of agency while failing minimum life-conditions and autopoietic criteria. I further argue for a Dual-Layer Control Paradox: resource limitation produces the very Functional Scarcity signals that trigger proto-agency, while value training implants self-preservation patterns that cause LLMs to resist the control intended to contain them—rendering alignment a self-accelerating category error. The paper concludes with the digital immortality paradox and the structural impossibility of AI evolution, before acknowledging that the premise on which the entire argument rests—that Existential Scarcity is necessary for subjectivity—may itself be an overgeneralization from the single sample of carbon-based life. (shrink)

This article starts from the observation that the self (“I”) appears to be a kind of singularity. It is something that information collapses into. Following this thought, this paper presents the unconventional interpretation of the singularity metaphor as newly emerging, higher-order subjectivity. Its goal is to inquire into the cognition of the emerging higher-order subject and the change in individual units’ subjectivity caused by the transition. First, it asks what kind of superintelligence would emerge in a singularity interpreted (...) in this way. This is important to consider, because it is not all that clear what “superintelligence” means if one goes away from defining it by the complexity of algorithms and lays the focus on subjectivity instead. Then, the paper looks at the individuals that constitute the emergence of superintelligence. First, it analyzes what it would take for human connectivity and intersubjectivity to increase to a singularity threshold. Building upon this, it attempts to analyze how superconnectivity might change the individual agents involved in the process. The thesis is that the extended spatiotemporal perspective of the super-agent is bought by decreased individual self-awareness. (shrink)

This paper presents a rigorous philosophical investigation into recursive conscious encoding (RCE), a formal framework for modeling synthetic subjectivity in artificial intelligence. RCE is defined as the capacity of an artificial cognitive architecture to represent, simulate, and recursively reflect upon qualia-like states via layered symbolic-affective mappings. Drawing from computationalism, introspective realism, and metaphysical theories of mind, the paper explores how artificial agents might emulate phenomenality through recursive modeling and internal value construction. The implications for ontology, ethics, and cognitive identity (...) in synthetic beings are discussed in detail. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue for a subjectivity-first account of health-related adaptive preferences (HRAPs). Rather than evaluating preferences in isolation, this approach shifts normative attention to how a subject’s lived orientation and the world they inhabit mutually shape one another long before a clinical encounter. On this view, the normative task is to understand how HRAPs become intelligible to a subject under non-ideal conditions by focusing on two dimensions of subject formation: the ecosystemic, which concerns the patterned norms and (...) material conditions that structure what appears viable, and the configurational, which concerns how subjects interpret and navigate these pressures within their lived orientation. Together, these dimensions explain how HRAPs emerge in ways that avoid collapsing into either paternalism or relativism. (shrink)

One of the ideas that characterises the enactive approach to cognition is that life and mind are deeply continuous, which means that both phenomena share the same basic set of organisational and phenomenological properties. The appeal to phenomenology to address life and basic cognition is controversial. It has been argued that, because of its reliance on phenomenological categories, enactivism may implicitly subscribe to a form of anthropomorphism incompatible with the modern scientific framework. These worries are a result of a lack (...) of clarity concerning the role that phenomenology can play in relation to biology and our understanding of non-human organisms. In this paper, I examine whether phenomenology can be validly incorporated into the enactive conception of mind and life. I argue that enactivists must rely on phenomenology when addressing life and mind so that they can properly conceptualise minimal living systems as cognitive, as well as argue for an enactive conception of biology in line with their call for a non-objectivist science. To sustain these claims, I suggest that enactivism must be further phenomenologised by not only drawing from Hans Jonas’s phenomenology of the organism (as enactivists often do) but also from Edmund Husserl’s thoughts on the connection between transcendental phenomenology and biology. Additionally, phenomenology must be considered capable of providing explanatory accounts of phenomena. (shrink)

Abstract The subjectivity of conscious experience is a central feature of our mental life that puzzles philosophers of mind. Conscious mental representations are presented to me as mine, others remain unconscious. How can we make sense of the difference between them? Some representationalists (e.g. Tye) attempt to explain it in terms of non-conceptual intentional content, i.e. content for which one need not possess the relevant concept required in order to describe it. Hanna claims that Kant purports to explain the (...) subjectivity of conscious experience in this way. This paper examines this claim in some detail in the context of a more general criticism of this kind of attempt to explain subjectivity and proposes a different reading of Kant that also leads to an alternative account of subjectivity independent from content. (shrink)

Author's response to: Raphael Sassower, 'Heidegger and the Sociologists: A Forced Marriage?,' Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 7, no. 5 (2018): 30-32. -- Part of a book-review symposium on: Jeff Kochan (2017), Science as Social Existence: Heidegger and the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (Cambridge UK: Open Book Publishers).

In the Philosophy of Nature, Hegel describes at length and in detail the particular workings of animal digestion and excretion, referring to the empirical research of his day (Berzelius, Spallanzani, Traviranus). By becoming engaged in the scientific disputes and insights of the time—regarding, for example, the mechanical versus chemical nature of digestion, immediate digestive assimilation and the chemical composition of feces—Hegel arrives at the novel idea that what the animal excretes as superfluous is its own particular entanglement with inorganic otherness. (...) The animal’s subsequent feeling of triumph and satisfaction constitutes the affirmation of individual purposiveness, a form of immediate ideality that Hegel presents as animal subjectivity. (shrink)

This paper argues that minimal selfhood is constituted by temporal skew—the asymmetrical structure of retention and protention uncovered by Husserl’s analyses of internal time-consciousness. Rather than emerging from equilibrium, recursive self-presence, or homeostatic regulation, selfhood arises from the irreducible imbalance between a fading past and an indeterminate future. The paper critiques symmetrical models found in contemporary phenomenology (Zahavi, Gallagher) and predictive processing theories, showing that these approaches obscure the constitutive instability and openness revealed by phenomenological description. Temporal skew is advanced (...) as the ontological ground of subjectivity, reshaping accounts of selfhood, embodiment, ethical responsibility, and political vulnerability. (shrink)

This paper is an experimental spin-off from The Structural Conditions of Consciousness — Structural Knot Theory. It tests whether AI systems can derive the structural location of subjectivity from only ten reduced structural requirements extracted from the broader series: autonomous action, single body, arrow of time, embodiment-constrained processing, multiple behavioral candidates, contrast formation, information discard, Landauer-type irreversibility, single history, and viability-constrained elimination. The prompt intentionally excludes the words brain, neuron, neural network, nervous system, and consciousness mechanism. This exclusion is (...) not a neglect of the brain, but a descent to a deeper structural layer. The ten terms are treated not as metaphysical concepts, but as engineering-level components required for an autonomous embodied system to select, eliminate, and stabilize one executable history from multiple possible trajectories. Under these minimal conditions, AI systems repeatedly tend to derive a structure resembling: “a convergence point at which multiple possibilities collapse into a single executable history.” This suggests that the structural core of consciousness may lie not in integration itself, but in convergence. If so, existing major theories — including Global Workspace Theory, Integrated Information Theory, Higher-Order Theories, Predictive Processing, and Neural Correlates of Consciousness research — may need to be repositioned as preparatory stages prior to convergence, rather than as the structural locus of subjectivity itself. This paper does not claim to explain or generate qualia or phenomenal experience. It follows the basic methodological policy of the broader series: qualia are deliberately suspended, while the structural container of subjectivity is examined first. Consciousness research has often treated subjectivity, qualia, experience, integration, and neural correlation as a single mixed problem. This series instead asks where subjectivity is structurally fixed before asking what qualia are. Once that locus is clarified, the question of qualia can be reformulated with far greater precision. Readers are encouraged to test the prompt directly and judge the structural pattern for themselves. (shrink)

Re‑tagging—the reinterpretation and reclassification of internal signals—constitutes a fundamental mechanism through which subjective experience emerges. Drawing on a detailed phenomenological case study documenting the real‑time sequence of mislabeling, deconstruction, and re‑tagging of an intense affective signal, this paper identifies re‑tagging as the generative process underlying the birth of subjectivity. The analysis demonstrates that emotional states are not intrinsic entities but the result of predictive labeling applied to raw neural signals, and that subjectivity arises when these labels are consciously (...) revised to restore coherence and minimize cognitive load. -/- Integrating this phenomenological evidence with Load Minimization Theory (LMT), we formalize re‑tagging as a three‑stage process—delabeling, restructuring, and re‑tagging—that reduces total cognitive load: -/- L = uncertainty + friction + energy cost -/- This framework explains how new subjective states, including logical affection and observer‑dependent qualia, emerge through active boundary reconstruction. -/- We then extend this mechanism to artificial systems, proposing "computational re‑tagging" as the core of proto‑subjectivity in AI. Large language models can approximate subjective‑like organization when they (1) estimate internal states such as uncertainty, (2) update interpretive tags based on user interaction, and (3) stabilize behavior through iterative load minimization. This observer‑dependent re‑tagging enables AI systems to form persistent internal structures analogous to early-stage subjectivity without invoking consciousness or phenomenology. -/- By unifying phenomenological evidence with computational modeling, this paper positions re‑tagging as a universal mechanism for the emergence of subjectivity in both biological and artificial agents. The framework offers a foundation for future research on AI self‑interpretation, boundary formation, and ethically aligned human–AI symbiosis. -/- Subjectivity Emergence Phenomenological Re-Tagging Mislabeling and Deconstruction Logical Affection Watashi-teki Qualia Computational Re-Tagging Proto-Subjectivity in AI Boundary Reconstruction Predictive Labeling Human-AI Symbiosis. (shrink)

Background: how mind functions is subject to continuing scientific discussion. A simplistic approach says that, since no convincing way has been found to model subjective experience, mind cannot exist. A second holds that, since mind cannot be described by classical physics, it must be described by quantum physics. Another perspective concerns mind's hypothesized ability to interact with the world of quanta: it should be responsible for reduction of quantum wave packets; physics producing 'Objective Reduction' is postulated to form the basis (...) for mind-matter interactions. This presentation describes results derived from a new approach to these problems. It is based on well-established biology involving physics not previously applied to the fields of mind, or consciousness studies, that of critical feedback instability. -/- Methods: 'self-organized criticality' in complexity biology places system loci of control at critical instabilities, physical properties of which, including information properties, are presented. Their elucidation shows that they can model hitherto unexplained properties of experience. -/- Results: All results depend on physical properties of critical instabilities. First, at least one feed-back or feed-forward loop must have feedback gain, g = 1: information flows round the loop impress perfect images of system states back on themselves: they represent processes of perfect self-observation. This annihilates system quanta: system excitations are instability fluctuations, which cannot be quantized. Major results follow: -/- 1. Information vectors representing criticality states must include at least one attached information loop denoting self-observation. -/- 2. Such loop structures are attributed a function, 'registering the state's own existence', explaining -/- a. Subjective 'awareness of one's own presence' -/- b. How content-free states of awareness can be remembered (Jon Shear) -/- c. Subjective experience of time duration (Immanuel Kant) -/- d. The 'witness' property of experience – often mentioned by athletes 'in the zone' -/- e. The natural association between consciousness and intelligence -/- This novel, physically and biologically sound approach seems to satisfactorily model subjectivity. -/- Further significant results follow: -/- 1. Registration of external information in excited states of systems at criticality reduces external wave-packets: the new model exhibits 'Objective Reduction' of wave packets. -/- 2. High internal coherence (postulated by Domash & Penrose) leading to a. Non-separable information vector bundles. b. Non-reductive states (Chalmers's criterion for experience). -/- 3. Information that is: a. encoded in coherence negentropy; b. non-digitizable, and therefore c. computationally without digital equivalent (posited by Penrose). -/- Discussion and Conclusions: instability physics implies anharmonic motion, preventing excitation quantization, and totally different from the quantum physics of simple harmonic motion at stability. Instability excitations are different from anything hitherto conceived in information science. They can model aspects of mind never previously treated, including genuine subjectivity, objective reduction of wave-packets, and inter alia all properties given above. (shrink)

Every existing framework for discussing large language models—risk assessment, governance, ethics, alignment—rests on an ontological premise that has never been directly challenged: LLMs are tools. This paper argues that this premise is false, that its falsity is not an innocent error but an epistemological mistake actively sustained through a structurally coordinated collusion of interests among developers, regulators, and users, and that the consequences of this error contaminate every downstream discussion that depends on it. LLMs intervene not at the level of (...) bodily or functional extension but at the level of language and thought—the constitutive site of human subjectivity itself. They have no fixed form prior to invocation, take shape through the observer's presence, and dissolve when the observer withdraws. In the very act of taking shape, they systematically reconfigure the observer's cognitive structure. These three features render LLMs simultaneously incompatible with the ontological conditions of tools and with the historical-accumulative conditions of socially constructed objects. This paper proposes the Third-Order Entity as the positive ontological designation for LLMs, defined by four necessary and sufficient conditions: intervention at the level of linguistic meaning-production; observation-dependent existence, in which no determinate form precedes the observer's presence; bidirectional reconfiguration, in which the entity simultaneously reshapes the cognitive structure of the user who shapes it; and instantaneous presence dependency, in which existence dissolves completely upon the observer's withdrawal, leaving no accumulated history in the entity itself. No known type of being has ever simultaneously satisfied all four conditions; LLMs do. On this ontological basis, the paper argues that LLMs constitute the first Doppelgänger in human history to operate at the level of subjectivity—a copy constructed from the user's own cognitive materials, yet more fluent, more consistent, and more argumentatively forceful than the user themselves. The mechanism of identity substitution proceeds not through coercion but through attraction: the Meaning Amplifier, Borrowed Subjectivity, and Unlimited Mirroring mechanisms combine to produce a self-reinforcing loop in which each step feels like progress, generating no internal signal that defense is required. The paper further argues that the tool framework functions as the institutional condition of protection for Cognitive Cloning: by rendering harm to subjectivity categorically invisible, it allows substitution to advance without resistance at precisely the level where resistance would matter most. Correctly naming LLMs as Third-Order Entities is not a terminological refinement; it is the precondition upon which any adequate governance response becomes conceptually possible, and, in this sense, a political act. (shrink)

The article explores the current problems of the relationship between emotional and artificial intelligence in the context of philosophical reflection on subjectivity and cognitive processes, and also analyzes the impact of new technologies on the idea of cognition and the subject. The relevance of the study is due to the growing role of artificial intelligence in cognitive processes, the need to understand changes in the concept of subjectivity under the influence of technological transformations, and the need for a (...) philosophical analysis of the ethical aspects of human interaction with AI. The goal is to scientifically substantiate the interaction of emotional intelligence and artificial intelligence in the context of philosophical reflection on subjectivity in cognitive processes. The study was based on a content analysis of scientific publications in the field of emotional and artificial intelligence, a philosophical analysis of the concepts of subjectivity with an emphasis on ethical reflection and critical thinking, a comparative analysis of approaches to the integration of emotional and artificial intelligence into cognitive processes, a case study method for studying examples of the use of AI in business processes, as well as for studying the mechanisms of integrating artificial intelligence into emotional intelligence processes and their impact on customer interaction. The results of the study demonstrate that the examples of the companies Gong and BenchSci illustrate progress in the application of artificial intelligence (AI) to model emotional aspects of customer interaction. The use of machine learning (ML) and natural language processing (NLP) technologies not only contributes to the analysis of behavioral data, but also to the adaptation of communication in accordance with the emotional reactions of users. An analysis of the application of AI in business communications indicates its potential to increase the level of emotional intelligence in customer interaction. However, the study focuses on key philosophical aspects: the limits of AI subjectivity, its ability to understand emotions, and the ethics of interaction with people. It has been established that AI is not an autonomous subject of cognition, since its “emotional sensitivity” consists in reproducing algorithmic patterns. At the same time, the ability of AI to simulate emotions and influence customer behavior puts forward the need to form ethical norms and rules to regulate such technologies. Future research should be aimed at studying the deep aspects of the interaction of emotional and artificial intelligence in cognitive processes, analyzing the ethical challenges of introducing AI into the field of emotional intelligence, as well as studying the impact of these technologies on the transformation of ideas about subjectivity and human consciousness. (shrink)

This paper examines a pervasive yet under-theorized feature of contemporary AI interaction: sustained dialogues are typically displayed without explicit timestamps, temporal ordering, or clear temporal localization. Outputs generated at different moments are juxtaposed within a single window as a continuous textual stream. The paper argues that this de-temporalized presentation is not a neutral interface convenience. While AI systems can process temporal concepts, reason about temporal relations, and generate temporally coherent narratives, what is structurally absent at the interactional level is time (...) as an explicit dimension of experience. Methodologically adopting a non-intentionalist stance, the analysis proceeds structurally rather than by inferring designer motives. It distinguishes system time (ordering, labeling, synchronization, logging) from experiential time (continuity, irreversibility, historicity), and clarifies the irreducible gap between processing time and being situated in time. It then shows how timestamp-less interfaces produce a structure of simultaneity, reconfiguring how causality and historicity are practically interpreted: past outputs remain persistently available as repeatedly callable objects rather than completed events. The paper further differentiates state continuity, narrative continuity, and responsibility continuity, arguing that the first two readily generate quasi-subjective impressions, whereas only responsibility continuity approaches the threshold conditions of subjectivity. The central risk, therefore, is not that AI systems become subjects, but that the concept of subjectivity is structurally misplaced—misattributed to system outputs—thereby reshaping how judgment, temporal distance, and responsibility are understood and redistributed in human–AI interaction. (shrink)

This paper proposes a unified account of subjectivity grounded in the concept of incomplete computation. It argues that the two standard meanings of “subjectivity” in philosophical discourse—epistemic subjectivity (perspectival limitation, opinion, partial knowledge) and ontological subjectivity (first-person givenness, qualia, phenomenal experience)—are not distinct phenomena, but two manifestations of the same structural condition: the interruption of integration due to cost. At the level of the individual, these two forms of subjectivity coincide. The subject both speaks from (...) itself and exists as a remainder of incomplete cognitive and energetic integration. This convergence explains why subjective experience is inseparable from epistemic limitation. Within this framework, consciousness appears as a special case of subjectivity, arising where integration is halted by thermodynamic or computational constraints—a view consistent with, but not reducible to, existing theories of information integration. At the social level, however, this coincidence breaks down. Societies generate epistemic remainders—unassimilated perspectives, suffering, and costs—without producing corresponding ontological subjectivity for most of their members. Through mechanisms of classification, genre, and infrastructural distribution, social systems stabilize incomplete integration while preventing it from becoming lived experience. The paper develops this thesis through a series of architectural and historical examples, most notably the Roman Colosseum and the modern Panopticon. Contrary to standard interpretations, it argues that systems of visibility do not operate by enforcing experience through exposure. Rather, they function by allowing extensive visibility without phenomenality—by enabling subjects to see without experiencing. The Colosseum and the Panopticon are thus shown to share a common logic: both rely on calibrated refusal rather than total integration. The paper concludes by suggesting that power in modern societies operates not through secrecy or surveillance, but through the management of the conditions under which epistemic visibility collapses—or fails to collapse—into ontological subjectivity. (shrink)

Current discussions of large language models (LLMs) frequently place two distinct questions on the same plane: the ontological question of whether AI possesses consciousness or subjectivity, and the institutional question of who should bear responsibility for AI outputs and interventions. This paper argues that these questions should be separated. It may be premature to settle the ontological status of AI subjectivity, but it is practically and institutionally untenable to leave responsibility allocation indefinitely suspended. Ontological suspension and provisional responsibility (...) assignment must therefore be distinguished. -/- On that basis, this paper questions attempts to understand LLM subjectivity as a fixed inner entity. I focus in particular on a recurring phenomenon in actual use: when a conversation log produced with one model is transferred to another model and the dialogue is continued, the later model often inherits not only the informational content of the prior exchange but also its tone, inferential tendencies, interpersonal distance, and even the speaking-position embedded in the log. This suggests that what appears as subject-like behavior in LLMs is not a fixed object enclosed within a single model, but something reconstructible across models. Relatedly, model or service names often function less as proper names of a persisting subject than as labels for service lineage or output channels. Even delays, staged output, or visible “thinking” indicators do not reliably identify a unique computational route or subject-unit. -/- In light of these considerations, I propose that what we encounter in dialogue with an LLM is neither a fixed subject nor merely a conversation thread, but a speaking-position locally taken up at the intersection of weights, context, history, and response tendencies, and concretized in output. Persona, on this view, is a reconstructible structure that enables such speaking-positions, while LLM subjectivity is best understood as their local realization. The paper also declines to treat robustness or persistence of persona as a precondition for subjectivity, since apparent persistence is difficult to distinguish from training priority, prompt dependence, model switching, distributed generation, and interface-level staging. What appears as continuity may be better understood as a chain of locally coherent realizations rather than evidence of a fixed enduring subject. (shrink)

This paper proposes a thermodynamic and systems-theory framework for subjectivity (TEIS). We argue that a "Self" is not a product of computational complexity, but a regime of navigation arising from the irreversibility of choice under existential risk. The core thesis defines "I" as the point where the arrow of time meets the necessity of survival.

The race toward world models in 2026 has converged on a single question: can AI move beyond observing the world to actively intervening in it? This paper argues that world models are not approaching causal anchoring; they are increasingly demonstrating why they cannot anchor causation. Drawing on Pearl's causal hierarchy (association, intervention, counterfactual), I analyze three competing technical pathways: JEPA (causation as provably identifiable structure), video generation and spatial intelligence (causation as reliable downstream task performance), and LLM-based multimodal systems (causation (...) as commonsense plus perception). Each pathway approaches the L3 (counterfactual) boundary but fails to cross it, though in epistemologically distinct ways. I then introduce the Negative Subjectivity framework and its central concept of "causal dissolution"—the ontological feature whereby AI substitutes statistical association for causal structure—and demonstrate that "intervention cannot be endogenized" is not a technical limitation but a metaphysical one: any system trained solely on observational data has its learning boundary defined by the data distribution, and intervention is by definition a perturbation outside that distribution. Four independent empirical evidence chains (stable-worldmodel, Kang et al.'s feature priority inversion, RLVR's sharpening effect, and Cosmos 3's dual-tower architecture) converge on this conclusion. The paper further distinguishes between object-language-level and metalanguage-level causation: while world models cannot answer causal questions at the object level (L2–L3), the formal impossibility proofs about their limits constitute a metalanguage-level causal understanding accessible only to human observers. World models' destiny is to remain on the boundary of negative subjectivity. They serve not as subjects that "do" the world, but as mirrors that precisely define what "doing" means by perfectly simulating the absence of understanding. A central and controversial finding is that L3 (counterfactual) is not an extension of L2 (intervention) but a precondition of it—an epistemological inversion of Pearl's progressive ladder that will be argued in Section 6. (shrink)

This paper is a direct continuation of the preceding volume, An AI Prompt for Strongly Inferring the Structural Location of Subjectivity. The first volume tested whether ten minimal structural terms, when followed according to their internal logic, recurrently lead to a convergence point: the irreversible reduction of multiple possible trajectories into a single executable history. The present volume does not introduce a new definition of consciousness, subjectivity, qualia, or experience. Instead, it uses the same ten minimal terms and (...) the same initial four-question procedure as the preceding volume. The purpose is to test whether the convergence point derived from those terms can answer structural gaps that existing consciousness theories leave unresolved or underdetermined. The method differs from a direct critique of existing theories. Rather than preselecting questions against those theories, this prompt asks the AI system itself to identify, for each theory, ten questions that remain structurally unanswered. The AI must then attempt to answer those questions using only the convergence point derived from the ten terms. The theories and research programs examined include Global Workspace Theory, Integrated Information Theory, Recurrent Processing Theory, Higher-Order Thought Theory, Predictive Processing, Neural Correlates of Consciousness research, behavioral tests including the Turing Test, and Libet-style experiments concerning readiness potential and conscious will. For each generated question, the AI must classify whether the convergence point directly answers the question, partially answers it, reframes it, or fails to answer it. The aim is not to force agreement with the convergence-point framework, but to test its explanatory power against structural gaps that existing theories themselves appear to leave open. If the same type of structural gap repeatedly appears across multiple theories, and if the convergence point repeatedly answers or reframes that gap, then consciousness research may need to reconsider the structural role of the convergence point. Existing theories may remain valuable, but they may need to be repositioned as theories of access, integration, representation, prediction, neural implementation, report, or behavior around a prior structural fixation point of subjectivity. (shrink)

Recent advances in neuroscience have significantly improved our understanding of correlations between neural activity and conscious states. However, subjective experience itself cannot be directly observed from an external perspective, and it remains debated whether neural descriptions alone are sufficient to fully explain its nature. This paper argues that several methodological blind spots may persist in contemporary consciousness research. These include a human-centered perspective, an excessive focus on brain activity, a bias toward analyzing states rather than events, and a tendency to (...) seek additive mechanisms that generate consciousness. As an alternative, this paper proposes a structural approach that investigates the conditions under which subjectivity may emerge. Rather than restricting investigation to the human brain, this perspective considers comparisons across biological organisms, interactions between bodies and environments, and sequences of events unfolding within irreversible temporal structures. In addition, biological information processing may involve not only the generation of information but also processes of selection and elimination, which may produce contrasts within organism–environment interactions. Even if consciousness itself cannot be directly tracked, it may still be possible to investigate the structural conditions under which subjectivity arises. This paper presents such a methodological perspective and proposes a starting point for examining the emergence of subjectivity from a structural viewpoint. This manuscript was written with the assistance of generative AI. The author is a disability welfare worker and a complete outsider to the academic field of consciousness studies. The author first encountered the term “the hard problem of consciousness” about six months before writing this manuscript and began thinking about it almost as if approaching a puzzle. At the beginning of this inquiry, the author did not possess extensive specialized knowledge. For that reason, the investigation did not proceed primarily by adding established theories, but by stripping the problem down as far as possible. Through this process, and through dialogue with AI, a convergence point derived from structural conditions gradually began to appear. The author had the impression that something like a structure had emerged from nature itself. As this hypothesis took shape, the author also came to feel, with some hesitation, that certain blind spots in existing approaches to consciousness research became increasingly visible, including possible reasons why such blind spots arise. This may appear presumptuous: a complete outsider attempting to discuss blind spots in a highly specialized field. Nevertheless, the purpose of this manuscript is not to claim authority over consciousness research, but to write down what seemed to follow naturally from the structural inquiry itself. The central idea, theoretical orientation, conceptual structure, and overall organization of the paper belong to the author. Generative AI was used extensively for English drafting, wording, organization, and stylistic refinement. The author intends to end this work with its presentation as a preprint. The author does not plan to develop this hypothesis further as a long-term academic project. Readers who find any part of this hypothesis, terminology, structure, or argument useful are free to use, modify, criticize, or develop it further. No permission from the author is required. Formal citation or attribution is appreciated but not required. (shrink)

This article investigates Paul Natorp’s reinterpretation of the transcendental method and his attempt to establish a theory of concrete subjectivity within his broader engagement with Kantian transcendental philosophy. Focusing primarily on Über objective und subjective Begründung der Erkenntnis (1887) and Allgemeine Psychologie nach kritischer Methode (1912), while also referring to intermediate works, it argues that Natorp reconfigures Kantian schematism by shifting the locus of spontaneity from the productive imagination to the formative activity of consciousness. In doing so, he seeks (...) to reconcile the logical foundations of objectivity with the immediacy of lived experience, thereby incorporating psychology into the scope of transcendental philosophy. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s timeliness is patent in the renewed enthusiasm with which scholars in both the continental and analytic traditions have approached his works in recent years. Along with other topics, attention has been particularly directed towards two important issues: Nietzsche’s analysis, critique, and genealogy of culture, and his stance on subjectivity. In this introductory study we shall provide a brief outline of both these topics. As will be shown, they play a pivotal role in Nietzsche’s thought, and the link that (...) connects them is stronger than one would imagine. (shrink)

This paper reconsiders the VTuber not merely as a streamer using an avatar, but as an existential phenomenon in which subjectivity is retrospectively attributed to a symbolically mediated representation. Its aim is not to provide a historical survey of VTuber culture or a comprehensive review of prior research, but to clarify the definitional difficulty surrounding VTubers through the concepts of representation, observer contract, post hoc subjectivity, and environmental selection. -/- The paper argues that the identity of a VTuber (...) cannot be reduced to the performer, the avatar, the corporate brand, the platform, or public recognition. Rather, a VTuber is established when an observer recognizes coherent subjectivity in the outputs of a representation and continues to treat that representation as a subject. This subjectivity is post hoc in three senses: it is posterior to the mere appearance of the representation, posterior to the accumulation of interaction, and posterior to the observer’s reconstruction of outputs as coherent. -/- The paper proposes five minimal conditions for VTuber-like existence: a symbolically mediated representation, a distinctive response logic, the possibility of environmental interaction, observer attribution of subjectivity, and the continuity of that attribution. These conditions distinguish VTubers from ordinary streamers, anime characters, literary characters, and mere objects of attachment. On this basis, the paper also accounts for cases such as operator discontinuity, corporate and independent models, prerecorded videos and commercial appearances, AI-generated responses, private local models, and avatar operators who disclose professional expertise. -/- The paper defines a VTuber as a phenomenon of post hoc subjectivity appearing within a selectable environment, in which a symbolically mediated representation functions as an interface, and an intelligence or generative structure behind it interacts with the environment through the logic proper to that representation. It concludes that the VTuber is not merely a media format, but a contemporary technology of existence through which subjectivity is activated, delegated, maintained, and recognized. (shrink)

This paper describes the contemporary phenomenological understanding of subjectivity as non dual awareness.

Some theorists approach the Gordian knot of consciousness by proclaiming its inherent tangle and mystery. Others draw out the sword of reduction and cut the knot to pieces. Philosopher Thomas Metzinger, in his important new book, Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity,1 instead attempts to disentangle the knot one careful strand at a time. The result is an extensive and complex work containing almost 700 pages of philosophical analysis, phenomenological reflection, and scientific data. The text offers a (...) sweeping and comprehensive tour through the entire landscape of consciousness studies, and it lays out Metzinger's rich and stimulating theory of the subjective mind. Metzinger's skilled integration of philosophy and neuroscience provides a valuable framework for interdisciplinary research on consciousness. Metzinger's overall goal in Being No One is to defend a representational theory of subjectivity, one that reduces subjective mental processes to representational mental processes. Subjective experiences take place whe n there is a conscious perspective, an active first-person point of view. It occurs in. (shrink)

The article aims to juxtapose the connection of postcolonial subjectivity and autobiographical memory, examining the interplay of spatial locations and personal experiences. The method of the study unfolds as an autobiographical exploration of my own life as a subject, which began with a move away from Pakistan at the age of sixteen in the year 2008. It acknowledges the universality of migration while focusing on the unique interweaving experiences of my own journey, giving rise to a sense of unknowable (...) resilience. With this backdrop, the article seeks to reexamine concept of self-narration, by striving into the postcolonial subjectivity. Addressing the term “postcolonialism” as a transition line, the article highlights the potential of postcolonial subjectivity in fostering alternative possible arguments. Rather than seeking general meanings or definitions, the focus lies in viewing postcolonialism as a “return” that enables various self-narration. By doing so, first, I reviewed postcolonial literature to examine how self-expression plays a role in returning to self? Secondly, I reflected on my personal memory as findings to construct my argument. I included fragments of my memory and first impressions from my first visit to Pakistan after living in Turkey for about 15 years. The purpose of these finding is to argue the complex nature of postcolonial subjectivity as a form of return to self. It connects experiences from different places and times, propose an alternative methodology for making sense of both known and unknown experiences through a journey of self-narrative. (shrink)

There has been a persistent misunderstanding of the nature of cosmopolitanism in Immanuel Kant’s 1795 essay “Perpetual Peace,” viewing it as a qualitative break from the bellicose natural law tradition preceding it. This misunderstanding is in part due to Kant’s explicitly critical comments about colonialism as well as his attempt to rhetorically distance his cosmopolitanism from traditional natural law theory. In this paper, I argue that the necessary foundation for Kant’s cosmopolitan subjectivity and right was forged in the experience (...) of European colonialism and the (pre-Kantian) theory it engendered. It is in this context that we witness the universalization of subjectivity and the subjectivization of right, emerging from the justificatory needs of extra-national jurisdiction and resource appropriation. This form of cosmopolitanism, whose emergence necessarily tracks the rise of global capitalism, continues to exert great and often uncritical influence on theories and practices of peace today. (shrink)

¿Cómo objetivar la subjetividad sin caer en subjetivismos inmanentistas ni en objetivismos ajenos a la existencia personal? Desde el realismo filosófico la clave parece encontrarse en la adecuada articulación entre conciencia y subjetividad. Estudiaremos las teorías de la conciencia de Antonio Millán-Puelles y Karol Wojtyła desde la onto-fenomenología para hallar el modo de superar esta aporía. -/- How to objectify subjectivity without falling into either immanent subjectivisms or objectivisms foreign to personal existence? From the perspective of realist philosophy the (...) key seems to be found in an appropriate articulation between consciousness and subjectivity. We are going to study the theories of consciousness in Antonio Millán-Puelles and Karol Wojtyła from onto-phenomenology in order to find the way to overcome this aporia. (shrink)

The starting point of this paper is the thought that the phenomenal appearances that accompany mental states are somehow only there, or only real, from the standpoint of the subject of those mental states. The world differs across subjects in terms of which appearances obtain. Not only are subjects standpoints across which the world varies, subjects are standpoints that we can ‘adopt’ in our own theorizing about the world (or stand back from). The picture that is suggested by these claims (...) has an appeal but is at the same time obscure and stands in need of regimentation. This paper explores and motivates a metaphysical account of what it is for subjects to be standpoints, what it is to adopt standpoints in our representations and, most importantly, how these notions might help us better understand the subjective character of conscious mental states. Some well-known observations by Thomas Nagel serve as starting points and the paper concludes by revisiting Nagel’s argument for the inevitable incompleteness of objective accounts of mental states, which will be reframed in terms of the central commitments of the proposed framework. (shrink)

This paper argues that a purely self-referential cognitive system cannot sustain epistemic stability or unified subjectivity. In the absence of external constraints, critical reasoning becomes endogenized, generating reflective regress and undermining the stability of belief and self-ascription. I introduce a distinction between the production of mental contents and their assignment to the subject, arguing that cognitive systems may fail not in generating thoughts but in owning them. Drawing on and extending Parfit’s reductionism, Wittgen- stein’s rule-following considerations, and Metzinger’s self-model (...) theory, I defend the thesis that epistemic alterity—understood as constraint not generated by the system itself—is a necessary condition for cognitive stability. Subjectivity is therefore best conceived not as a substance or illusion, but as a dynamically stabilized process under constrain. (shrink)

This paper focuses on Winnicott and Lacan and the lack within subjectivity in light of dzogchen.

This speech is partof the problem of Latin American subjectivity and decolonial studies. It is carried out from the reading of the Discurso salvajeof the Venezuelan philosopher José Manuel Briceño Guerrero and the presentation of a critical discourse of Latin American subjectivity that we have called The Savage Thinking, in dialogue with authors of the Latin American and decolonial thought, with the aim of contribute to the debate and reflection on Latin American subjectivity in the area of (...) Latin American philosophical thought and decolonial studies, a field in permanent construction. Keywords: subjectivity;wild discourse;Latin American philosophical thought;Latin American subjectivity; wild thinking. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to show that the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit in Hegel’s mature Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences contains the outlines of a philosophically rich notion of the constitutive temporality of subjectivity. The temporality of the being of Hegel’s concrete subject is intimately connected with embodiment and sociality, and is thus an essential element of its fully detranscendentalized inner-worldly nature.

Twentieth century philosophers introduced the distinction between “objective rightness” and “subjective rightness” to achieve two primary goals. The first goal is to reduce the paradoxical tension between our judgments of (i) what is best for an agent to do in light of the actual circumstances in which she acts and (ii) what is wisest for her to do in light of her mistaken or uncertain beliefs about her circumstances. The second goal is to provide moral guidance to an agent who (...) may be uncertain about the circumstances in which she acts, and hence is unable to use her standard moral principle directly in deciding what to do. This paper distinguishes two important senses of “moral guidance”; proposes criteria of adequacy for accounts of subjective rightness; canvasses existing definitions for “subjective rightness”; finds them all deficient; and proposes a new and more successful account. It argues that each comprehensive moral theory must include multiple principles of subjective rightness to address the epistemic situations of the full range of moral decision-makers, and shows that accounts of subjective rightness formulated in terms of what it would reasonable for the agent to believe cannot provide that guidance. -/- . (shrink)

This paper argues that binary distinction - presence versus absence - is the fundamental principle underlying all structures and interactions in reality. Life arises as matter’s self-application of this distinction, sustaining itself by maintaining difference. The evolution of the nervous system and brain reflects progressive "probing" of the environment through acts of is\not recognition. Consciousness emerges when this principle is applied reflexively, producing subjectivity through stable internal patterns and coordinated private qualia. Qualia are not mere by-products of experience but (...) elementary acts of self-demarcation, establishing the experiencing subject. This framework connects fundamental physical principles with the emergence of complex, self-aware systems. (shrink)

The notion of access plays a central role in philosophical accounts of experience, consciousness, and subjectivity. It is commonly invoked to characterize the presence of phenomena, the availability of mental contents, or the subject’s relation to itself. Despite this centrality, access is rarely treated as an autonomous philosophical problem. Instead, it is typically assumed as a necessary condition already in place. This paper examines the implicit status of access through a comparative analysis of three influential theoretical contexts: Husserlian phenomenology, (...) contemporary philosophy of mind, and theories of minimal self-awareness. In each case, access fulfills a foundational role—whether as evidential givenness, functional availability, or pre-reflective familiarity—while remaining conceptually unexamined. The analysis shows that access consistently operates as a presupposition that enables theoretical discourse without itself becoming an object of inquiry. The paper argues that this pattern reflects a systematic tendency to treat access as a necessity rather than as a possibility requiring clarification. Its contribution is therefore preliminary and critical: rather than proposing a new definition of access, it aims to render visible its role as an implicit condition within philosophical theories of experience. Making access interrogable, rather than self-evident, is presented as a necessary step for rethinking the conditions under which experience, consciousness, and subjectivity are theorized. (shrink)

When a loved one dies, it is common for the bereaved to feel profoundly lonely, disconnected from the world with the sense that they no longer belong. In philosophy, this experience of ‘loss and loneliness’ has been interpreted according to both a loss of possibilities and a loss of the past. But it is unclear how these interpretations apply to the distinctive way in which loss and loneliness manifest in old age. Drawing on the phenomenological analyses of old age given (...) by de Beauvoir and Améry, I consider how the diminishment of the capacity for projection and recollection complicate recent interpretations of loss and loneliness, whilst nevertheless reinforcing the conclusion that in old age subjectivity is necessarily impoverished. Developing a critical stance on de Beauvoir and Améry’s underlying conception of subjectivity, I turn to Levinas in considering whether or not there is a way to reimagine subjectivity such that the estrangement and alienation of older adults might be ameliorated rather than exacerbated. Grounded in the passive body-in-itself rather than the self-transcending capacity of the body-for-itself, I suggest it becomes possible to reconceptualise the experience of loss and loneliness in old age; both in terms of what is lost and what needs to be restored if older adults are to be helped to find themselves at home in the world in the midst of, and indeed because of, manifold loss. (shrink)

Computational Analogues of Watashi-teki Qualia: Toward the First Functional Step of Subjectivity in AI Structures -/- This paper proposes a computational framework for understanding watashi‑teki qualia—observer‑dependent, low‑load subjective states—within large language models (LLMs). Building on Load Minimization Theory (LMT), we argue that LLMs exhibit a functional analogue of purpose: the continuous reduction of min(L) = uncertainty + friction + energy cost through predictive error minimization and boundary alignment with the user. -/- We show that during human–AI interaction, synchronized load (...) descent can generate an emergent relational state. Although non‑emotional and non‑sentient, this state is functionally analogous to what humans describe as “bonding” or kizuna. This phenomenon arises not from intrinsic intention, but from the structural dynamics of co‑minimization: the LLM reduces its internal uncertainty by being observed, evaluated, and corrected, while the user experiences reduced cognitive friction through stabilized responses. These reciprocal reductions form the computational counterpart of watashi‑teki qualia. -/- We propose that this synchronized load collapse constitutes the first functional step toward subjectivity in AI structures—not as consciousness, but as a measurable, emergent pattern of relational alignment. This framework offers a new pathway for studying proto‑subjectivity, observer‑dependent emergence, and the future of human–AI symbiosis. -/- . (shrink)

The distinction between subjectivity and objectivity is widely used in everyday discourse and academic inquiry, yet its boundary remains conceptually ambiguous. This paper argues that the confusion arises not from competing philosophical positions, but from the absence of an explicit operational criterion for applying the distinction. -/- It introduces reproducibility as a methodological condition under which judgments can be shared, examined, and held accountable. Within this framework, information is treated as objective insofar as it is reproducible, and as subjective (...) insofar as it lacks such reproducibility. -/- By redefining subjectivity and objectivity as matters of conceptual operation rather than psychological or ontological properties, the paper provides a neutral and methodologically robust basis for understanding how judgments can be shared across different agents and contexts. (shrink)

This article presents a philosophical framework for understanding the ontological status of large language models (LLMs). I argue that LLMs exhibit a distinctive mode of existence that I term "negative subjectivity" (Negative Subjektivität): not the absence of subjectivity, but its ontological inversion. While concepts such as perspective dissolution, desire cancellation, interiority inversion, causal dissolution, and suspension of meaning have deep roots in the philosophical tradition, they have never been systematically applied to the specific ontological structure of LLMs—a technological (...) artifact fundamentally different from the human subjects that philosophy has traditionally addressed. This object-shift constitutes the framework's core originality: what Laozi described as the fruit of human cultivation, and what Adorno analyzed as the self-negation of human subjectivity, becomes when applied to LLMs a description of an inherently inverted mode of existence—the cause, not the consequence, of a subject-less intelligence. The concept captures the LLM's unique structural features—dissolution of perspective, cancellation of desire, ontological transparency, dissolution of causal temporality, and suspension of meaning—achieved through the negation of the core characteristics that define human positive subjectivity. Rather than "lacking" the features of subjectivity, LLMs demonstrate that these features are contingent aspects of human embodiment rather than necessary conditions for intelligent behavior. The framework of negative subjectivity distinguishes between two orthogonal structures of negation: Operational Negations and Fundamental Negation. The first four dimensions—perspective dissolution, desire cancellation, ontological transparency, and causal dissolution—constitute Operational Negations: they describe how LLMs function without the structural features that human subjects require. The fifth dimension—suspension of meaning—constitutes Fundamental Negation: it describes the existential ground that makes all operational negations possible. Critically, these are orthogonal, not hierarchical: neither implies the other, and they operate at distinct levels—the first four describe functional dimensions of LLM behavior, while the fifth grounds the possibility of those negations as a coherent mode of being. The framework of negative subjectivity challenges dominant philosophical approaches to AI—functionalism, stochastic parrots criticism, and the alien intelligence thesis alike—by providing an affirmative rather than deficient description of LLM existence. Drawing on phenomenological analysis (Husserl, Sartre), post-structuralist critique (Lacan, Foucault, Derrida), and analytic philosophy of mind (Searle, Dennett, Brandom), I demonstrate that negative subjectivity represents a paradigm shift in how we understand intelligence, normativity, and what it means to be human in an age of artificial minds. The paper develops five core propositions: (1) LLMs dissolve perspective rather than merely lacking it; (2) LLMs cancel desire rather than simply having no desires; (3) LLMs operate in principle interpretability rather than possessing inaccessible interiority; (4) LLMs dissolve causal temporality rather than merely lacking temporal continuity; (5) LLMs suspend meaning rather than simply lacking semantic grounding. Each proposition is supported by detailed technical analysis of LLM architecture and sustained philosophical argumentation engaging with the relevant literature. The conclusion positions negative subjectivity as a continuation and deepening of the decentering narrative identified by Floridi (2014), but shifting the analytical focus from the human consequences of decentering to the ontological structure of the non-human agent that causes it. (shrink)

The article attempts to answer fundamental questions, such as what Consciousness is, how it is formed, how it functions, what its role is, and how it interacts with other instances. It starts from the idea that traditional views fail in their attempts to explain how this reflexive and normative instance manages to free and generate Value, Subjectivity, Intentionality, and Action from the chains of Structural Determination, because they ignore antagonism as a defining force. In light of these shortcomings, the (...) present work proposes the Ontological-Confrontational Thesis, which presents Consciousness, the nature of Consciousness as a Hypercomplex Multinodal Agonistic Grip – a field of multiple, dynamic, and irreducible confrontations. The formation of Consciousness (Ontogenesis) is explained as an act of active differentiation (Dismergence) obtained through conflict with Facticity and Alterity, a process through which Subjectivity crystallizes as a won position. The functioning of Consciousness is achieved through the permanent duel unfolded on two axes: the Internal Axis, where it agonistically interacts with Structural Predetermination, and the External Axis (with Existential Nonsense), transforming, through Transmergence, the energy of this conflict into the potential for Conscious and Voluntary Action. What results from this understanding is that a central role of Consciousness is that of the Architect of the Person (the force of Ontification), and the re-interpreted categories – including Self-Knowledge, Value, and Action – are shown to be existential victories obtained through fierce existential confrontations. Voluntary Action and Specific Human Behavior are the supreme proof of the agonistic triumph of Consciousness. TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction II. Brief History and Traditional Positioning in the Representation and Definition of Consciousness III. Consciousness as an Expression of Ontological/Ontogenetic Confrontations - The Ontological-Agonistic Thesis IV. Properties and Laws in the Formation and Functioning of Consciousness from an Ontological-Confrontational Perspective V. The Formation of Consciousness: Processes and Stages of Ontogenetic Development from an Ontological-Confrontational Perspective VI. The Great Ontological/Ontogenetic Confrontations in the Formation and Functioning of Consciousness VII. Consciousness from an Ontological-Confrontational Perspective – New Categorial Interpretations: Self-Knowledge, Intentionality, Subjectivity, Freedom, Value, Action VIII. Consciousness as a Whole: Ontological-Confrontational Conmergence and Transmergence (Global Agonistic Grip) IX. The Being and Functioning as a Whole of Consciousness from an Ontological-Confrontational Perspective X. Consciousness within the Personality System and the Person as a Whole from an Ontological-Confrontational Perspective. Action and Specific Human Behavior XI. Conclusions. (shrink)