Psychology's foundational crisis stems from its systematic failure to define the "Sound Mind" while obsessively cataloging dysfunction through instruments like the DSM. This philosophical treatise employs the methodology of Ockham's War—systematic intellectual self-destruction—to demolish psychology's current first principles and reconstruct them through the consilience of psychological and philosophical functions. Through aggressive skepticism and methodical deconstruction, we expose six fundamental failures in psychology's foundations: the pathology bias, the abandonment of philosophical inquiry, the reductionist fallacy, the measurement obsession, the context blindness, (...) and the meaning deficit. The reconstruction proposes seven new first principles that integrate philosophical function (meaning-making, value determination, existential inquiry) with psychological function (cognitive processing, emotional regulation, behavioral adaptation). These principles establish: (1) The Sound Mind as primary object of study, defined as the capacity for integrated philosophical-psychological functioning; (2) The irreducible duality of human consciousness requiring both domains; (3) The multiplicative rather than additive relationship between philosophical and psychological functions; (4) The pyramid structure of personality development; (5) The necessity of existential engagement; (6) The contextual-universal dialectic; and (7) The authenticity imperative. This reconstruction has profound implications for research methodology, clinical practice, and education, demanding fundamental restructuring of psychology as a discipline. The framework demonstrates that psychology cannot achieve scientific maturity without reintegrating philosophical inquiry, and that understanding human consciousness requires treating philosophical and psychological functions as complementary aspects of a unified system. (shrink)

Whilst arguing for sounds as repeatable objects does not seem suitable to our auditory experience, considering them as events can then help us understand some of their main features. In this sense, sounds are events happening to material objects; they have a beginning and an end; they are ephemeral entities that we cannot grasp as ordinary objects. Nevertheless, supporters of event theory usually focus on the autonomous status that sounds manifest from the things in the world. Conversely, when we hear (...) sounds, we hear what and where they are sounding even in those theories that I will call detached-sound theories; in hearing them we hear how different materials create different sounds. Within the different positions of the event theory to pure-event or acousmatic proposal, the importance and role that the material has in the creation of diverse sounds does not always seem to be recognized. In this paper, I therefore aim to show how the materiality of resonating bodies and objects is given in all forms of auditory experience, not until analyzed the differences between object and event accounts in the philosophy of sound. (shrink)

Both Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl addressed sound while trying to explain the inner consciousness of time and gave to it the status of a supporting example. Although their inquiries were not aimed at clarifying in detail the nature of the auditory experience or sounds themselves, they made some interesting observations that can contribute to the current philosophical discussion on sounds. On the other hand, in analytic philosophy, while inquiring the nature of sounds, their location, auditory experience or the (...) audible qualities and so on, the representatives of that trend of thought have remained silent about the depiction of sound and the auditory phenomena in the phenomenological tradition. The paper’s intention is to relate both endeavours, yet the perspective carried out is that of analytic philosophy and, thus, I pay special attention to conceptual analysis as a methodological framework. In this sense, I first explain what sound ontology is in the context of analytic philosophy and the views that it encompasses— namely, the Property View (PV), the Wave View (WV) and the Event View (EV)—. Secondly, I address the problems it entails, emphasising that of sound individuation. In a third section, I propose the possibly controversial conjunction of a “Brentano-Husserl Analysis of the Consciousness of Time” (for short “Brentano-Husserl analysis”) and outline the commonalities of both authors, without ignoring its discrepancies. My main focus is Husserl’s 1905 Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des Inneren Zeitbewusstseins. While addressing the Brentano-Husserl analysis, I elaborate on the problem of temporal and spatial extension (Raumlichkeit and Zeitlichkeit, respectively) of both consciousness and sound. Such comparison is a key one, since after these two developments, one can notice some theoretical movements concerning the shift of attention from sounds to the unity of consciousness, and how they mirror each other. After examining the controversial claims concerning the temporal and spatial extension of both consciousness and sound, I argue in the concluding paragraphs that while considering the accounts of sound ontology, the Brentano-Husserl analysis would probably endorse a Property View and that this could have interesting consequences for the issue of Sound Individuation. (shrink)

Contemporary physics defines sound as mechanical vibrations within the audible range (20 Hz - 20 kHz) and light as electromagnetic radiation in the visible spectrum (~4-7 × 10¹⁴ Hz), treating them as fundamentally different phenomena. This paper demonstrates that they are expressions of a continuous vibrational spectrum. Through mathematical analysis, we establish that 40 octaves map audible sound frequencies directly into the visible-light range, revealing a previously unrecognized quantitative relationship in standard physics pedagogy. Empirical evidence from multiple domains (...) converges on this conclusion: cymatics demonstrates that frequency determines form across all scales; sonoluminescence directly converts acoustic energy into electromagnetic radiation; string theory posits that matter itself is a vibrational pattern at the Planck scale. Technological applications validate this framework in practice—phototherapy and ultrasound therapy operate on identical resonance principles at different frequencies, while acoustic and optical levitation exploit the same radiation pressure mechanisms. The apparent categorical distinction between sound and light arises from propagation mechanism (mechanical vs. electromagnetic) and human sensory limitations, not from any fundamental discontinuity in the nature of oscillation itself. We propose adopting the term "soundlight" to reflect this vibrational unity and reforming physics education to present unified wave mechanics organized by frequency rather than sensory-based categories. This conceptual integration aligns terminology and pedagogy with empirical evidence across the full vibrational spectrum. (shrink)

The current literature on norms of inquiry features two families of norms: norms that focus on an inquirer’s ignorance and norms that focus on the question’s soundness. I argue that, given a factive conception of ignorance, it’s possible to derive a soundness-style norm from a version of the ignorance norm. A crucial lemma in the argument is that just as one can only be ignorant of a proposition if the proposition is true, so one can only be ignorant with respect (...) to a question if the question is sound. (shrink)

Thousands of years before modern physics measured vibrational frequencies, Vedic cosmology described reality as Nada (vibration) Brahman (universe), the universe as vibration. The ancient texts articulated a sophisticated framework: the four stages of sound (para, pashyanti, madhyama, vaikhari) mapping progressively from subtle to gross, from high-frequency to low-frequency manifestation. Most significantly, pashyanti-vak is explicitly described as the stage where "sound possesses color and visual qualities"... a precise phenomenological description of the frequency range (~10¹⁴ Hz) where mechanical vibrations transition (...) into electromagnetic radiation. -/- This paper demonstrates that contemporary physics now validates what the Vedic seers perceived millennia ago. Three converging lines of evidence confirm the ancient understanding: First, cymatics reveals that frequency determines form, visually demonstrating the creative power of sound described in Vedic texts. String theory describes matter as vibrating patterns at quantum scales, confirming the assertion that reality is fundamentally vibrational. Mathematical analysis shows that transposing audible sound upward by 40 octaves places it directly within the visible light spectrum… exactly where the ancient texts located pashyanti, the stage at which sound becomes visible. -/- Second, the Vedic framework provides a complete phenomenological map of the vibrational spectrum. Para-vak (transcendent sound) corresponds to the unified field. Pashyanti-vak (visionary sound) corresponds to visible light frequencies. Madhyama-vak (mental sound) corresponds to brainwave and bio-electromagnetic oscillations. Vaikhari-vak (physical sound) corresponds to audible mechanical vibrations. Ancient wisdom mapped the territory; modern science provides measurement tools. Both describe the same reality. -/- Third, the human energy system embodies this understanding. The chakra system maps the visible light spectrum with remarkable precision, each chakra corresponding to a specific color frequency and associated beej mantra (seed sound). The seven chakras span from red (Muladhara, ~4.3 × 10¹⁴ Hz) through violet (Sahasrara, ~7.0 × 10¹⁴ Hz), demonstrating that ancient practitioners understood humans as multi-frequency receivers accessing different octaves of the vibrational continuum through different faculties: eyes perceive light, ears perceive sound, mind accesses thought-frequencies… all manifestations of the same oscillating energy at different scales. -/- This convergence between ancient phenomenology and modern empiricism reveals a profound epistemological insight: traditional wisdom systems, developed through contemplative practice and refined perception, accessed truths about reality's vibrational nature that Western science is only now confirming through instrumentation. The Vedic understanding was not metaphor; it was precise knowledge of how frequency organizes consciousness and matter across dimensions. -/- The implications extend beyond validating ancient texts. If consciousness operates through vibrational frequencies, if matter is condensed vibration, if reality is fundamentally sound-light unity, then recognizing what the Vedas always knew provides pathways for understanding quantum mechanics, therapeutic applications, and the nature of awareness itself. The wisdom was always there. Science is finally catching up. (shrink)

The notion of hyle seems problematic for a phenomenological foundation of experience. For this very reason, its completed invalidity was generally postulated. At the same time, there are many reflections in Husserlian writings that help us understand it better. This paper attempts to show how hyletic experience, by existing in the lived body, triggers in parallel rhythmic, vibrating, and sonorous experiences as bodily experiences. Sounds are experienced by the body before any reflections or conscious experiences of them. In this way, (...) the aporetical instance of hyletic data founds a proposal of resolution in the fundamental corporeal experience of sound. (shrink)

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in natural language understanding and generation, but they exhibit problems with logical consistency in the output they generate. How can we harness LLMs' broad-coverage parametric knowledge in formal reasoning despite their inconsistency? We present a method for directly integrating an LLM into the interpretation function of the formal semantics for a paraconsistent logic. We provide experimental evidence for the feasibility of the method by evaluating the function using datasets created from several short-form (...) factuality benchmarks. Unlike prior work, our method offers a theoretical framework for neuro-symbolic reasoning that leverages an LLM's knowledge while preserving the underlying logic's soundness and completeness properties. (shrink)

We hear sounds, and their sources, and their audible qualities. Sounds and their sources are essentially dynamic entities, not wholly present at any given moment, but unfolding through their temporal interval. Sounds and their sources, essentially dynamic entities, are the bearers or susbtrata of audible qualities. Audible qualities are qualities essentially sustained by activity. The only bearers of audible qualities present in auditory experience are essentially dynamic entities. Bodies are not, in this sense, essentially dynamic entities and so are not (...) present in our auditory experience. Though absent in auditory experience, we may, nonetheless, attend to bodies in audition, when an audible sound-generating event in which they participate presents a dynamic aural image of them. (shrink)

In the realm of the philosophy of sounds and auditory experience there is an ongoing discussion concerned with the nature of sounds. One of the contestant views within this ontology of sound is that of the Property View, which holds that sounds are properties of the sounding objects. A way of developing this view is through the idea of dispositionalism, namely, by sustaining the theory according to which sounds are dispositional properties (Pasnau 1999; Kulvicki 2008; Roberts 2017). That portrayal, (...) however, is not sufficient, as it has not inquired the metaphysical debates about dispositions beyond the conditional analysis. In this paper, I try to advance this view by including recent developments (for instance Bird 2007; Vetter 2015) in the field of dispositionalism and I analyse whether this new version can sort out known and new objections to Property View. (shrink)

An analysis of a valenced corpus of English words revealed that words that rhyme with slurs are rated more poorly than their synonyms. What at first might seem like a bizarre coincidence turns out to be a robust feature of slurs, one arising from their phonetic structure. We report novel data on phonaesthetic preferences, showing that a particular class of phonemes are both particularly disliked, and overrepresented in slurs. We argue that phonaesthetic associations have been an overlooked source of some (...) of the more peculiar, arational aspects of slurs. We conclude by drawing broader morals about the evolution of the lexicon. (shrink)

In the philosophy of auditory experience, it is commonly accepted that hearing sounds and their sources are related perceptual occurrences. The paper evaluates three widespread accounts of such a relationship, according to which sounds are respectively auditorily experienced as properties of their sources, parts of their sources, or caused by their sources. These approaches are found inadequate, insofar as they are unable to capture the specific perceptual dependencies that characterize our auditory experiences of sounds and their sources. It is argued (...) that we can accommodate these dependencies by accepting that sources are perceived in virtue of an operation of perceptual categorization applied to the sounds we hear. Finally, this proposal is defended from the common objection that it cannot accommodate the cognitive role played by our auditory experience of sound sources. (shrink)

This article studies cymatics as a disciplined problem in visible sound. It argues that cymatic forms are best understood not as mystical proof, but as visible consequences of vibration, medium, geometry, boundary, frequency, amplitude, material behavior, particle motion, fluid motion, observation, and interpretation. The scientific core of the article moves through Chladni figures, Faraday’s acoustical figures, standing waves, acoustic radiation force, acoustic streaming, Faraday waves, pattern formation, and boundary conditions. The cultural core asks why visible sound so quickly (...) becomes symbolic, spiritual, architectural, aesthetic, pedagogical, and public. The article’s central claim is that sound becomes visible when motion passes through a medium under constraint, while meaning begins when human beings interpret that visible order. This distinction protects both sides of the phenomenon. It refuses to reduce cymatic images to mere spectacle, but it also refuses to inflate them into proof of healing, sacred geometry, universal consciousness, or undiscovered natural law. The article introduces Boundary-Condition Hermeneutics as a controlled interpretive method: in physics, visible pattern depends on material and spatial limits; in culture, pattern depends on ritual frame, architectural setting, image convention, memory, platform, and symbolic reading. The method follows a mechanism-first sequence: physical mechanism, mathematical structure, visible or perceptual form, symbolic interpretation, cultural memory, speculative extension, and testable proposal. The result is a source- controlled account of visible sound that can speak to acoustics, fluid dynamics, sound studies, history of physics, aesthetics, philosophy of science, and cultural theory without collapsing them into one another. Cymatics remains powerful precisely because it sits at the threshold between event and image. The task is not to make that threshold vague. The task is to name it clearly. (shrink)

Sound is one of the types of waves that can be felt by the sense of hearing (ears). In physics, the definition of sound is something that is produced from objects that vibrate. Objects that produce sound are called sound sources. The sound source that vibrates will vibrate the molecules into the air around it. Sound is mechanical compression or longitudinal waves that propagate through the medium. This medium or intermediate agent can be liquid, (...) solid, gas. So, sound waves can propagate for example in water, coal, or air. Most sounds are a combination of various vibratory signals composed of harmonic waves, but pure sound can theoretically be explained by oscillating vibrational speed or frequency measured in Hertz (Hz) vibration units and amplitude or loudness of sound with measurements in decibels (dB). The effect sounds can have on us humans is simply astounding. While everyday life becomes stressful, overcrowded and increasingly hectic, we seek ways for inner peace and balance. The power of music, felt through overtone-rich sound therapy and sound massage, can be a solution. No matter how much scientific explanation is behind it, healing through music remains fascinating, even magical. This paper introduces a new field called cymatics and sound healing with their plausible impact to spirituality and consciousness research. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that composer John Cage’s so-called ‘silent piece’, 4’33”, is music. I first defend it against the charge that it does not involve the organization of sound, which has been taken to be a necessary feature of music. I then argue that 4’33” satisfies the only other condition that must be met for it to be music: it bears the right socio-historical connections to its predecessors within its tradition (Western art music). I argue further that (...) one cannot understand the organized sound condition and the socio-historical condition separately and that understanding their interaction has theoretical benefits—not least of which is providing a groundwork for a more culturally inclusive philosophy of music. Finally, I consider a number of outstanding questions concerning the content of the organized sound condition for Western art music in the wake of 4’33”. (shrink)

Building on the notational principles of C. S. Peirce’s graphical logic, Pietarinen has tried to develop a propositional logic unfolding in the medium of sound. Apart from its intrinsic interest, this project serves as a concrete test of logic’s range. However, I argue that Pietarinen’s inaugural proposal, while promising, has an important shortcoming, since it cannot portray double-negation without thereby portraying a contradiction.

The adoption of web-based telecare services has raised multifarious ethical concerns, but a traditional principle-based approach provides limited insight into how these concerns might be addressed and what, if anything, makes them problematic. We take an alternative approach, diagnosing some of the main concerns as arising from a core phenomenon of shifting trust relations that come about when the physician plays a less central role in the delivery of care, and new actors and entities are introduced. Correspondingly, we propose an (...) applied ethics of trust based on the idea that patients should be provided with good reasons to trust telecare services, which we call sound trust. On the basis of this approach, we propose several concrete strategies for safeguarding sound trust in telecare. (shrink)

This paper establishes Adagana as a pre-textual sound-technology rather than a symbolic or descriptive language system. Drawing from Afrikan ancestral knowledge frameworks, it argues that sound, tone, rhythm, breath, and silence were engineered as functional tools affecting physiological, psychological, and environmental states. The paper rejects the modern assumption of linguistic neutrality and situates Adagana within disciplined, embodied, and ethically constrained transmission systems. It further explains why written reconstruction alone is insufficient and outlines contemporary implications for responsible speech and (...) linguistic realignment. This work forms the second paper in the Adagana series, contributing to decolonial linguistics, ancestral technology studies, and sound-based knowledge systems. (shrink)

Sounds are motions, vibrations, affordances, and key tools for intra- and interspecies exchanges. This paper explores how emotions from sounds constitute embodied pathways to push the limits of perspectival anthropocentrism towards interspecies understanding. It suggests that sounds can serve as empathic bridges that connect our emotions to other species’, such as bees. Sound combinations (harmonies, rhythms, melodies) are tied to specific emotions in patterns that can be explained by the physics, ecology and biology of sounds. As we share these (...) tools with bees and other species, by learning to listen, we could grasp echoes from their buzzing inner worlds. (shrink)

When beginning to think about the relation between experimental music and the thought of Gilles Deleuze, this quotation seems to be a natural starting point. In Deleuze and Guattari’s affirmation of this phrase from John Cage they suggest a resonance between music and philosophy: in both fields the experimental approach entails a dismantling of predetermining codes and hierarchies, and with this arises the opportunity for an open-endedness that accommodates singular events and encounters. This understanding of experimentation, however, is not as (...) transparent as it seems. In the context of the uptake and critique of Deleuzian ideas in the theorisation of music and sound, as well as recent re-evaluations of the milieu of “experimental music,” critics have argued that a range of normative demands, ideological assumptions, and metaphysical reductions undermine the purported freedoms of both Cagean and Deleuzian experimentalism. Here I can only deal with a small aspect of the wide historical and theoretical problem this involves; but in short my aim is to begin to construct a means through which Deleuze and Guattari’s thought can be used to help us examine some strategies that composers and performers in post-Cagean musical experimentalism developed to navigate around the demands, assumptions, and reductions of Cage’s thought. (shrink)

I argue against the Primary Sound Account of Echoes (PSAE) – the view that an echo of a sound just is that sound. I then argue that if my case against PSAE is successful, distal theories of sound are false. The upshot of my arguments, if they succeed, is that distal theories are false. Towards the end, I show how some distal theories can be modified to avoid this conclusion and note some open questions to which (...) the modified theories give rise. (shrink)

We respond to some of the points made by Bennet and Blanck (2022) concerning a previous publication of ours (2021).

In Interstitial Soundings, Cynthia R. Nielsen brings music and philosophy into a fruitful and mutually illuminating dialogue. Topics discussed include the following: music's dynamic ontology, performers and improvisers as co-composers, the communal character of music, jazz as hybrid and socially constructed, the sociopolitical import of bebop, Afro-modernism and its strategic deployments, jazz and racialized practices, continuities between Michel Foucault's discussion of self-making and creating one's musical voice, Alasdair MacIntyre on practice, and how one might harmonize MacIntyre's notion of virtue development (...) with Foucauldian resistance strategies. (shrink)

In this paper I consider two related issues raised by Aristotle 's treatment of hearing and sounds. The first concerns the kinds of changes Aristotle takes to occur, in both perceptual medium and sense organs, when a perceiver hears a sounding object. The second issue concerns Aristotle 's views on the nature and location of the proper objects of auditory perception. I argue that Aristotle 's views on these topics are not what they have sometimes been taken to be, and (...) that when rightly understood they compare favourably in many respects with leading contemporary accounts. (shrink)

This chapter is focused on the philosophy of film sound in the analytic tradition and its limitations; drawing from current literature in other fields, it aims to complement some philosophical discussions typically centered on the image with their aural counterparts. Firstly, it provides an overview of early skeptical views on the contribution of sound to the artistic status of films and critically questions the status of sound in contemporary philosophical conceptions of film suggesting a revision that takes (...) seriously the idea of film as an audio-visual medium. Secondly, it discusses a central topic in the philosophy of film, the idea of film realism, showing how the discussion of sound may open new directions along three different dimensions: illusion, likeness, and transparency. (shrink)

"Twilight of the Idols" plays an important role in Nietzsche’s work, since it represents the opening writing of the philosophical project called "Transvaluation of all values". In that text, Nietzsche aims to sound out the "eternal idols", which means to disclose the inconsistency of the principles of traditional metaphysics. The way Nietzsche addresses the "old truths" in Twilight of the Idols leads back to his early writings, when his theory of knowledge is first outlined, inspired by Schopenhauer as much (...) as neo- and post-Kantian thinkers such as F. Lange and A. Spir. As I shall show, these observations can be compared with Ernst Mach's anti-metaphisical attitude to the ordinary world-conception, insofar as Mach as much as Nietzsche stressed the importance of a historical approach as instrument to enlighten the "prejudices" of traditional scientists or philosophers. (shrink)

This paper addresses the problem of sound individuation (SI) and its connection to sound ontology (SO). It is argued that the problems of SI, such as aspatiality, extreme individuation, indexical perplexity and duration puzzles are due to SO’s uncertainties. Besides, I describe the views in SO, including the wave view (WV), the property view (PV), and the event view (EV), as Casey O’Callaghan defends it. According to O’Callaghan, EV offers clear standards to individuate sounds. However, this claim is (...) countered by the consideration that any view could also defend the standards in SO, and thus, EV does not solve any of the problems mentioned above. As a way of showing the difficulties inherited by sound’s inner ontology, the problem of its linguistic representation is also addressed. The problem of SI can be developed within the frame of the philosophy of language and, specifically, regarding the discussion about mass vs count-­sortal terms. Is the term sound a mass or a count­-sortal? It is shown that, for reasons pertaining SO, the decision regarding the case of sound as a mass or count-­sortal term remains open. SI is, thus, covered from the SO to the philosophy of language. (shrink)

We take ourselves to have an inner life of thought, and we take ourselves to be capable of linguistically expressing our thoughts to others. But what is the nature of this “inner life” of thought? Is conscious thought necessarily carried out in language? This paper takes up these questions by examining Merleau-Ponty’s theory of expression. For Merleau-Ponty, language expresses thought. Thus it would seem that thought must be independent of, and in some sense prior to, the speech that expresses it. (...) He also claims, however, that thinking just is linguistic expression, and thus that language constitutes thought. The primary aim of this paper is to make sense of this constitutive claim while maintaining that, for Merleau-Ponty, there is an inner life of thought that exists independently of linguistic expression, and that this inner life rightly deserves the label “thought”. The upshot of this account is twofold. First, it explains why the mainstream view of Merleau-Ponty’s theory of expression seems plausible, but is ultimately inadequate. Second, it functions as a corrective to contemporary debates about the nature and scope of phenomenal consciousness and the sense in which conscious experience has content. (shrink)

Philosophical exploration of individualism and externalism in the cognitive sciences most recently has been focused on general evaluations of these two views (Adams & Aizawa 2008, Rupert 2008, Wilson 2004, Clark 2008). Here we return to broaden an earlier phase of the debate between individualists and externalists about cognition, one that considered in detail particular theories, such as those in developmental psychology (Patterson 1991) and the computational theory of vision (Burge 1986, Segal 1989). Music cognition is an area in the (...) cognitive sciences that has received little attention from philosophers, though it has relatively recently been thrown into the externalist spotlight (Cochrane 2008, Kruger 2014, Kersten forthcoming). Given that individualism can be thought of as a kind of paradigm for research on cognition, we provide a brief overview of the field of music cognition and individualistic tendencies within the field (sections 2 and 3) before turning to consider externalist alternatives to individualistic paradigms (section 4-5) and then arguing for a qualified form of externalism about music cognition (section 6). (shrink)

Music has a strong effect on human emotions, and it has been extensively explored. Music evokes memories, heightens emotions, and, in certain situations, serves as treatment for patients. As artificial intelligence grows more widespread in all areas of the economy, the music industry is on the cusp of one of the most significant technological revolutions. In this paper, we describe the "Sentiment Sounds" system, a deep learning-based system that can detect human emotions from facial expressions and produce music based on (...) the observed mood. Based on the ReLU as the foundation, this system intends to provide next-generation individualized music experiences. Beyond personal amusement, "Sentiment Sounds" has the potential to solve difficulties in mental health and productivity through therapeutic and adaptive soundscapes in real time. The parts that follow discuss the inspiration for this innovation, a detailed examination of existing literature, the suggested approach, prospective applications, obstacles, and the transformative system's broad future possibilities. Through "Sentiment Sounds," we hope to demonstrate how technology may enhance the relationship between music and human emotions, opening up new avenues for participation and well-being. (shrink)

It’s sometimes suggested that we can (in a sense) settle the truth-value of some statements in the language of number theory by stipulation, adopting either φ or ¬φ as an additional axiom. For example, in Clarke-Doane (2020b) and a series of recent APA presentations, Clarke-Doane suggests that any Σ01 sound expansion of our current arithmetical practice would express a truth. In this paper, I’ll argue that (given a certain popular assumption about the model-theoretic representability of languages like ours) we (...) can’t know ourselves to have any such freedom. (shrink)

The ear is one of our sensory organs that allow us to perceive our surroundings. We perceive with it the voices that the objects possess by means of the waves within the mass of air surrounding us. In this sense, the ear has an important value for being. In the Qur'an, besides being an ear or a sensory organ, it reveals a person who reflects his level of consciousness and perception, revealing his awareness. It is not just the voices heard; (...) the ear is special importance in understanding what is being said and what is said. Other sense organs and mold are mentioned together because of the feature. Of course, the word "voice" is also on the agenda when the ear is concerned. The verses found at the base of the basic qualities that man should possess present important dynamics about sound. Beyond being a symptom of voice being an inherent symptom, the latest discovery is pointing to the dimension of telling the apocalypse. This study tries to show in what context the hearing aid ear is expressed in the verses and its distinctive features, and its associated value, as well as its inherent value. (shrink)

This article seeks to define and characterize artistic autonomy in Eduard Hanslick and Luigi Russolo theoretical works: (1) based on an analysis of sound in the context of musical autonomy and (2) based on an analysis of noise in the context of sound autonomy. In both cases, the role of the technical listener, concerned with the creation of instruments, and the applications of sound in artistic works, was the main subject. In both cases we identified listening attitudes (...) focused on sound as sound, but large differences in the listening parameters listed. We conclude by characterizing Luigi Russolo's The Art of Noise as an exemplary case of autonomization in art, defined through the election of new parameters candidates for emancipation in discontinuity with other autonomous arts. (shrink)

Could the intersection of [formal proofs of mathematical logic] and [sound deductive inference] specify formal systems having [deductively sound formal proofs of mathematical logic]? All that we have to do to provide [deductively sound formal proofs of mathematical logic] is select the subset of conventional [formal proofs of mathematical logic] having true premises and now we have [deductively sound formal proofs of mathematical logic].

Reasons internalism holds that reasons for action contain an essential connection with motivation. I defend an account of reasons internalism based on the advisor model. The advisor model provides an account of reasons for action in terms of the advice of a more rational version of the agent. Contrary to Pettit and Smith's proposal and responding to Sobel's and Johnson's objections, I argue that the advisor model can provide an account of internal reasons and that it is too caught up (...) in the psychology of the actual agent to be able to account for anything other than internal reasons. (shrink)

The ancient Greeks already used to give ethnic names to their different scales, and observations on differences in music of the various nations always raised the interest of musicians and philosophers. Yet, it was only in the late nineteenth century that “comparative musicology” became an institutional science. An important role in this process was played by Carl Stumpf, a former pupil of Brentano’s who pioneered these researches in Berlin. Stumpf founded the Phonogrammarchiv to collect recordings of folk and extra-European music (...) and a dedicated journal, the Sammelbände für vergleichende Musikwissenschaft. Gifted in the field of science no less than in that of musicology, Stumpf developed an empirically-oriented approach to phenomenology, deeply divergent from Husserl’s and highly influential over the Berlin school of Gestalt psychology. A self-declared “outsider” among armchair philosophers, Stumpf experimentally investigated the perception of sounds and the origins of musical consonance. Developing the physiological studies of Ernst Weber on the sense of touch, Stumpf discovered that two sensations of tone, given at the same time, tend to mix in a certain degree. Musical consonance – he claimed – lays in this level of “tonal fusion”, not in the allegedly “natural” series of the harmonic partials of a vibrating chord, as suggested by the naturalists of all times from Pythagoras to Stumpf’s great contemporary Hermann Helmholtz. Accordingly, no musical system can claim for preponderance over the others: Stumpf’s researches in comparative musicology served to corroborate his theses on “tonal fusion” and the psychological foundations of consonance. Although Stumpf later revised and finally abandoned this theory, its permanent value lays in its opposition to dominant naturalistic approaches. The commitment for comparative musicology at the Berlin School is then no concession to a positivistic fashion for exoticism. The fundamentally Eurocentric stance of naturalistic theories of music is also fiercely contrasted by Stumpf’s pupil Erich Hornbostel, who suggests that music ought to be considered as culture, rather than as nature, and focuses attention on the eventually melting human cultures. The Berlin school flourished until the Nazis forced most of its exponents to emigration and, for tragically obvious reasons, heavily discouraged researches on these topics. (shrink)

This thesis explores the concept of timbre through the lens of analytic philosophical aesthetics and philosophy of music. I argue that timbre should be thought of as providing the grounds for artistic and aesthetic values in music. To this end and firstly, I critique the physical sense of timbre in favour of two anti-realist senses of timbre. These two are the qualitative and the semantic senses which are developed from two of Siedenburg and McAdams’ four senses of timbre. I argue (...) that the qualitative sense of timbre is the experience of the unique qualities of sounds. The semantic sense is that which associates timbres to objects and concepts. Within the semantic sense, I argue for what I call a genealogical sense of timbre which relates timbres to sources and concepts through a history of built up associations. Secondly, these two senses are situated within the artform of music by demonstrating the functions they may fulfil there and how these ground artistic and aesthetic values. Regarding these values, I employ Robert Stecker’s definitions of artistic and aesthetic value. Finally, I summarise the two arguments for why we should think that timbre can provide grounds for aesthetic and artistic value in music. (shrink)

This review covers experimental approaches to sound-symbolism—from infants to adults, and from Sapir’s foundational studies to twenty-first century product naming. It synthesizes recent behavioral, developmental, and neuroimaging work into a systematic overview of the cross-modal correspondences that underpin iconic links between form and meaning. It also identifies open questions and opportunities, showing how the future course of experimental iconicity research can benefit from an integrated interdisciplinary perspective. Combining insights from psychology and neuroscience with evidence from natural languages provides us (...) with opportunities for the experimental investigation of the role of sound-symbolism in language learning, language processing, and communication. The review finishes by describing how hypothesis-testing and model-building will help contribute to a cumulative science of sound-symbolism in human language. (shrink)

I put forward a version of the Cartesian Argument from Doubt for mind–body dualism. My version utilizes de re statements, which means that it is not vulnerable to the usual charge of intensional fallacy. The key de re statement is, ‘Body is such that its existence is entailed by Mind’s believing that Body does not exist’, which is false, whereas the respective ‘Mind is such that its existence is entailed by Mind’s believing that Body does not exist’ is true.

In the present article, I show that sounds are properties that are not physical in a narrow sense. First, I argue that sounds are properties using Moorean style arguments and defend this property view from various arguments against it that make use of salient disanalogies between sounds and colors. The first disanalogy is that we talk of objects making sounds but not of objects making colors. The second is that we count and quantify over sounds but not colors. The third (...) is that sounds can survive qualitative change in their auditory properties, but colors cannot survive change in their chromatic properties. Next, I provide a taxonomy of property views of sound. As the property view of sound has been so rarely discussed, many of the views available have never been articulated. My taxonomy will articulate these views and how they are related to one another. I taxonomize sounds according to three characteristics: dispositional/non-dispositional, relational/non-relational, and reductive/non-reductive. Finally, mirroring a popular argument in the color literature, I argue that physical views in the narrow sense are unable to accommodate the similarity and difference relations in which sounds essentially stand. I end replying to three objections. (shrink)

I demonstrate that there are two distinct senses of practical truth at work in Anscombe’s philosophical writings, and that she characterizes the distinction as between truth in agreement with desire and truth in agreement with right desire. I explore her strategy of articulating these distinct senses and their interrelationship via her account of practical soundness, as distinguished both from practical validity and from merely purported practical soundness. Only her thin sense of practical truth in agreement with desire, invoking merely purported (...) practical soundness, is directly relevant to Anscombe’s accounts of intention and action. But I argue that when she turns from the theory of action to ethics, her robust sense of practical truth in agreement with right desire, invoking practical soundness, takes centered stage. These distinctions in turn shed light upon Anscombe’s grounds for holding that her account of sound practical inference exorcises the moral ought of her contemporaries. (shrink)

Punjabi language is most widely spoken language of Pakistan (Abbas, Chohan, Ahmed, & Kaleem, 2016). Punjabi is under developed language because of which, upcoming generations are shifting to other technically and digitally developed languages such as Urdu and English. In result of which, the sound shift is being observed in Punjabi language. Sounds which used to be present in the past in Punjabi language are found missing now. This leads to a problematic situation that this sound shift may (...) result in language extinction and sound loss. This study is about the sound change and it has been studied in Punjabi language. On the basis of observation of speech in surrounding, researcher made a hypothesis that those speakers of Punjabi language who acquired Punjabi as L1 are able to produce few distinctive sounds that are not produced by the speakers who acquired Urdu as a mother tongue. For this purpose, a corpus of 2 million words was collected and the words including the sounds |n|ن and |l| ل were particularly shortlisted from the corpus. The speakers from both origins were asked to pronounce these words, the hypothesis was proved and, in result, variations in the pronunciation of sounds were observed. Sociolinguists and Phonologists need to heed on this issue to save Punjabi language from extinction. (shrink)

In this paper I challenge the widely held assumption that loudness is the perceptual correlate of sound intensity. Drawing on psychological and neuroscientific evidence, I argue that loudness is best understood not as a representation of any feature of a sound wave, but rather as a reflection of the salience of a sound wave representation; loudness is determined by how much attention a sound receives. Loudness is what I call a quantitative character, a species of phenomenal (...) character that is determined by the amount of attention that an underlying perceptual representation commands. I distinguish quantitative from qualitative character; even qualitative characters that represent degrees of sensible magnitudes are phenomenally and functionally distinct from quantitative characters. A bifurcated account of phenomenal character emerges; the phenomenal is not exhausted by the qualitative. (shrink)

In recent years, some eminent scientists have argued that free will, as commonly understood, is an illusion. Given that questions such as ‘do we have free will?’ were once pursued solely by philosophers, how should science and philosophy coalesce here? Do philosophy and science simply represent different phases of a particular investigation—the philosopher concerned with formulating a specific question and the scientist with empirically testing it? Or should the interactions between the two be more involved? Contemporary responses to such questions (...) have occasionally given rise to conflict amongst members of different disciplines. Some individual scientists have dismissed philosophical objections to their scientific theories on the grounds that the philosopher lacks experience in their respective field. And some individual philosophers have rejected scientific theories on a priori grounds, without giving due consideration to the empirical evidence. In this paper, I argue that such dismissiveness, on both sides, is mistaken. I will do so by putting forward a view that is inspired by the American philosopher and psychologist William James, who has been characterised by recent commentators as having performed ‘boundary work’. Boundary work involves transgressing the dividing lines between such disciplines, and attempting to solve certain problems without being restricted to the methodology of a single discipline. To help support this position, I will examine a series of contemporary problems that are pursued in both philosophy and science that relate to moral responsibility and free will. I will argue that in order to solve such problems we need to perform boundary work. (shrink)

I argue that an analogy between pains and sounds suggests a way to give an objective account of pain which fits well with a naïve perceptualist account of feeling pain. According to the proposed metaphysical account, pains are relational physical events with shared qualitative nature, each of which is constituted by tissue damage and the activation of nociceptors. I proceed to show that the metaphysical proposal is compatible with platitudes about pains being animate, private, and self-intimating states.

Difficulty in producing natural English sounds by Indonesian learners of English is due to the divergence in manner of producing the sounds in English and Indonesia and resulted in unnatural pronunciation of the English sounds. This research addresses the issue of English sound production with special attention to segmental sounds produced by Indonesian learners of English. Descriptive method was used to explain the data collected from picture description task and interview. The study was divided into two: 1) an in-depth (...) phonetic analysis of the students’ sounds production in terms of place of articulation, manner of articulation and distinctive features for the production of English consonant sounds, and openness of mouth, tongue elevation, position of tongue elevation, lips’ shapes, and length of vocalization for the production of the English vowel sounds and 2) detailed explanation about the contributory factors to the production of segmental sounds quality in terms of unnatural performance and unnatural competence. The findings of this research denoted that the most to least frequent problematic sounds produced by the student occur in [ð] voiced dental fricative (38.15%) for consonant sound and [ӕ] Lax Low Front Unrounded (38.46%) for vowel sound. The most potential influential factors to the problematic English sounds production are the learners’ mother language interference and the less practice of speaking English. Both are indicators of unnatural performance. (shrink)

This manuscript extends the Adagana framework beyond biological sound production into the domain of temporal and cosmological alignment. Building upon the neuro-vibrational architecture established in earlier Paper IV, this paper introduces rhythmic timing as a governing variable in structured phonation. -/- The central position advanced is that sound, when produced through controlled breath, resonance placement, and phonetic structure, is further conditioned by environmental cycles including solar phases, transitional thresholds, and broader rhythmic patterns inherent in natural systems. Adagana is (...) therefore formalized not only as a system of vibrational regulation, but as a timing-sensitive discipline operating through alignment between internal biological rhythms and external environmental cycles. -/- The manuscript defines the Law of Rhythmic Alignment, establishes three operational gates (Solar, Lunar, and Terrestrial), and introduces transitional amplification windows as high-sensitivity phases for precise vibrational application. It further develops the concept of cosmological encoding, describing how cyclical patterns are translated into structured sound sequences through repetition, directionality, and timing. -/- Adagana is presented as an independent indigenous doctrine grounded in embodied practice, structural coherence, and reproducible outcomes. This work establishes the temporal and cosmological layer of the system while maintaining a disciplined, non-symbolic approach to sound and rhythm. (shrink)

This article critically examines the structure and implications of the argument in ST 1, Q2, A3, associated with Aquinas’ First Way. Our central endeavor is to discern whether a certain disambiguation of point 6 (“There is something that is not moving/changing that moves/changes other things”) can be logically inferred from points 1-5. Through a three-part proof, the article establishes that under specific conditions, it can indeed be inferred. However, this interpretation notably diverges from Aquinas’ intended conclusion and subsequent stronger interpretations (...) of the claim. The paper also engages in discussions surrounding the soundness of the argument, assessing the plausibility of its premises in light of physics and logical analysis. The contribution does not seek to speculate on Aquinas’ understanding or to dismiss his perspective but rather to delineate what follows from his First Way premises, highlighting discrepancies with contemporary views on the nature of existence, particularly the notion of God. (shrink)