Anyone who has read Plato’s Republic knows it has a lot to say about mathematics. But why? I shall not be satisfied with the answer that the future rulers of the ideal city are to be educated in mathematics, so Plato is bound to give some space to the subject. I want to know why the rulers are to be educated in mathematics. More pointedly, why are they required to study so much mathematics, for so long?

Many moral philosophers have criticized intensive animal farming because it can be harmful to the environment, it causes pain and misery to a large number of animals, and furthermore eating meat and animal-based products can be unhealthful. The issue of industrially farmed animals has become one of the most pressing ethical questions of our time. On the one hand, utilitarians have argued that we should become vegetarians or vegans because the practices of raising animals for food are immoral since they (...) minimize the overall happiness. Deontologists, on the other hand, have argued that the practices of raising animals for food are immoral because animals have certain rights and we have duties toward them. Some virtue ethicists remain unconvinced of deontic and consequentialist arguments against the exploitation of animals and suggest that a virtue-based approach is better equipped to show what is immoral about raising and using animals for food, and what is virtuous about ethical veganism. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine Anne Conway’s ‘argument from love’ in her Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy. This argument, supported by a further argument, the ‘argument from pain’, undermines the dualist dichotomy between mind and matter by appealing to a vitalist similarity principle. My goal is two-fold: first, to contribute to a close systematic reconstruction and analysis of Conway’s arguments, which so far is largely lacking in the literature; second, to show that these arguments are richer and (...) more compelling than commentators have thought. (shrink)

Catharine Trotter Cockburn’s metaphysics dissolves the necessary relationship between immateriality, immortality and thought. While in her youth this leads her to admit the possibility of thinking matter, in her mature work, it allows her to conceive space as non-thinking immaterial substance that links non-thinking material substance and thinking immaterial substance. To ground this conception of space, she draws on the thesis of the great chain of being. However, the possibility of thinking matter is not consistent with the hierarchy of beings, (...) because within this frame matter occupies the lowest place. My aim is to evaluate whether there is any alternative within Trotter's philosophy to solve this contradiction. La metafísica de Catharine Trotter Cockburn disuelve la relación necesaria entre inmaterialidad, inmortalidad y pensamiento. Mientras que en su juventud esto la lleva a admitir la posibilidad de la materia pensante, en su madurez le permite concebir al espacio como sustancia inmaterial no pensante que oficia como eslabón entre la sustancia material no pensante y la sustancia inmaterial pensante. Para ello, apela también a la tesis de la gran cadena del ser. Sin embargo, la posibilidad de la materia pensante no es consistente con la tesis de la jerarquía de seres, porque en ella la materia ocupa el lugar más bajo. Me propongo estudiar si existe alguna alternativa dentro de la filosofía de Trotter que permita resolver esta contradicción. (shrink)

Tarot cards are a rich and fascinating art form. They are also an excellent tool for inquiry. I show why tarot has value, regardless of the user’s beliefs about magic. And I explain how novice or skeptical tarot users can appreciate (and create) that value by focusing on the card’s images, rather than consulting texts or expert guides. This is because, on a naturalistic conception, tarot’s zetetic value—that is, its value to inquiry—stems from its artistic properties.

I advance a type of conceptualist argument for substance dualism – minimally, the view that we are spiritual substances that have bodies – based on the understandability of what it would be for something to be a spirit, e.g. what it would be for God to be a spirit. After presenting the argument formally, I clarify and defend its various premises with a special focus on what I take to be the most controversial one, namely, if thinking matter is metaphysically (...) possible, it is not the case that we have a distinct positive concept of God's being a divine spirit. (shrink)

‘The soul hypothesis’ enjoys near unanimous support in the general population. Among philosophers and scientists, however, belief in the soul is far less common. The purpose of this essay to explain why many philosophers and scientists reject the soul hypothesis and to consider what the non-existence of the soul would entail.

This article makes the case for the necessity of a multi-focal conception of violence in religion and peacebuilding. I first trace the emergence and development of the analytical concepts of structural and cultural violence in peace studies, demonstrating how these lenses both draw central insights from, but also differ from and improve upon, critical theory and reflexive sociology. I argue that addressing structural and cultural forms of violence are concerns as central as addressing direct (explicit, personal) forms of violence for (...) purposes of building just and sustainable peace. Moreover, religiously informed and/or motivated peacebuilders are especially well-appointed and equipped to identify and address violence in its structural and cultural manifestations. I the examine how concepts of structural and cultural violence, in effect, centrally inform the efforts of Martin Luther King and Cornel West to cultivate just and sustainable peace in a context as putatively peaceful and prosperous as the United States. (shrink)

Recent scholarship has shown Nietzsche to offer an original and insightful moral psychology centering on a motivational feature he calls ‘will to power.’ In many places, though, Nietzsche presents will to power differently, as the ‘essence of life,’ an account of ‘organic function,’ even offering it as a correction to physiologists. This paper clarifies the scope and purpose of will to power by identifying the historical physiological view at which Nietzsche directs his criticisms and by identifying his purpose in doing (...) so. Nietzsche’s criticism, it is argued, is a widespread and pre-Darwinian description of the basic dispositions of organisms and their internal processes. The purpose of this criticism is to undermine the efforts of Herbert Spencer and Arthur Schopenhauer to derive moral-psychological insights from that description. The paper concludes that Nietzsche’s proposal to conceive of ‘organic function’ in terms of will to power is of little import for his moral psychology besides clearing away competing views. (shrink)

In Plato’s early dialogues, the impossibility of talking to the crowd appears as a constitutive element of the opposition between rhetoric and dialectic and raises the understudied question of the role of the audience in Socratic thought. However, Xenophon’s Socrates constantly identifies public and private speech. But this likening is also found in the Alcibiades Major, which gives a key to understand the true meaning of this assimilation: one can convince an audience, by talking to each individual in the crowd. (...) The need to address each one implies an adaptation of language that can be found in the texts of different disciples of Socrates. The rhetorical aspects of the Phaedrus’ psychagogia should then be understood, not as a new Platonic concept which allows the good orator to address the many, but rather as a new for- mulation of a well-known and shared Socratic ideal. (shrink)

In a crucial passage in the Parmenides, Parmenides states that the power of conversation (ten tou dialegesthai dynamin) depends on forms (135b-c) and indicates that this power is a prerequisite for philosophy. In chapter xx Kristian Larsen raises the question what implications this passage has for Plato’s conception of dialectic and argues that the discussion of the thesis that knowledge is perception in the Theaetetus, and in particular the conclusion to this discussion found at 184b3-186e12, provides an explanation of Parmenides’ (...) claims about the power of conversation. The chapter provides a detailed interpretation of the final refutation of Theaetetus’ thesis that knowledge is perception that highlights the way the dramatic features of the Theaetetus accentuate the argument Socrates develops in order to refute the thesis. Larsen argues that a central feature of the drama of the dialogue is Socrates’ attempt at redirecting Theaetetus from mathematics toward dialectic and philosophy. In particular, Socrates aims to make Theaetetus realize that being and the good or the beneficial are things that are what they are, themselves by themselves, that they are on a par, ontologically speaking, and that reaching for them, and attempting to come to grips with them, in thought, is a requirement for knowledge in general and for dialectic in particular. (shrink)

Aesthetics is not an area to which the Stoics are normally understood to have contributed. I adopt a broad description of the purview of Aesthetics according to which Aesthetics pertains to the study of those preferences and values that ground what is considered worthy of attention. According to this approach, we find that the Stoics exhibit an Aesthetic that reveals a direct line of development between Plato, the Stoics, Thomas Aquinas and the eighteenth century, specifically Kant’s aesthetics. I will reveal (...) an interpretation of the aesthetic of the Stoics which has more explanatory power for the history of aesthetic theory than a history of aesthetic theory which leaves out the Stoics. (shrink)

The German pioneer of electrophysiology, Emil du Bois-Reymond (1818–1896), is generally assumed to have remained silent on the subject of the brain. However, the archive of his papers in Berlin contains manuscript notes to a lecture on “The Seat of the Soul” that he delivered to popular audiences in 1884 and 1885. These notes demonstrate that cerebral localization and brain function in general had been concerns of his for quite some time, and that he did not shy away from (...) these subjects. (shrink)

La respuesta que demos a la problemática del nominalismo en la obra de Baruch Spinoza determina en forma decisiva las posibilidades de responder satisfactoriamente a la pregunta por la naturaleza humana. Dictaminar (junto con numerosos intérpretes contemporáneos) que el spinozismo se construye sin concesiones sobre principios nominalistas, implica sustraer todo fundamento ontológico a las consideraciones acerca de la natura humana, piedra de toque de la deducción spinozista de los afectos y de las estrategias terapéuticas que señalan el camino hacia la (...) beatitudo. Nuestra intención, por el contrario, consistirá en señalar el componente necesariamente universal que subyace bajo la psicología spinozista, para lo cual habremos de señalar ciertos aspectos centrales en cuanto a la problemática de los géneros de conocimiento, así como respecto de la teoría spinozista de la definición. (shrink)

In book 9 of Plato's Republic, Socrates describes the nature and origins of the ‘tyrannical man’, whose soul is said to be ‘like’ a tyrannical city. In this paper, I examine the nature of the ‘government’ that exists within the tyrannical man's soul. I begin by demonstrating the inadequacy of three potentially attractive views sometimes found in the literature on Plato: the view that the tyrannical man's soul is ruled by his ‘lawless’ unnecessary appetites, the view that (...) it is ruled by sexual desire, and the view that it is ruled by a lust for power. I then present my own account. On the view I defend, the tyrannical man's soul is to be understood as ruled by a single, persistent, powerful desire for bodily pleasure: as much as he can get, and however he can get it. Finally, I show how understanding the tyrannical man's soul in the way I recommend helps resolve some commonly expressed concerns about this part of the Republic. I suggest, on this basis, that Plato's procedure in constructing his catalogue o.. (shrink)

A review of Steven Fuller's excellent book. Steve Fuller, professor of sociology at the University of Warwick, argues that, unfortunately for science, Kuhn won this debate. In the wake of Kuhn, science has come to be justified more by its paradigmatic pedigree than by its progressive aspirations. In other words, science is judged by whatever has come to be the dominant scientific community.

This paper offers a philosophical framework for understanding soul, selfhood, authenticity, and personal identity in non-mystical terms. It argues that soul can be read structurally as the depth-dimension of a life: the dimension through which a person remains answerable to what is most deeply true beyond current roles, self-image, and social performance. The paper distinguishes soul from persona, psyche, and self-concept, and introduces three concepts—the invisible trace, the thinness threshold, and vertical answerability—to explain why deeper truth becomes (...) visible when ordinary forms can no longer carry grief, vocation, conscience, creativity, repair, and moral injury. It also argues that a person can remain socially functional and outwardly coherent while becoming inwardly false. A final section examines artificial intelligence, authenticity, and the simulation of depth, arguing that AI can imitate the language and feeling-tone of soul without bearing human continuity, embodiment, grief, or answerable life-history. The paper contributes to philosophy of mind, personal identity, phenomenology, philosophical anthropology, psychology, and philosophy of AI by offering a more rigorous way to use soul-language under contemporary conditions. (shrink)

Freud’s investigation into the unconscious sphere of the human psyche and its complex processes did not merely provide a heuristic tool for the interpretation and understanding of psychic manifestations; above all, it demythologized anthropocentric narcissism and the philosophical–metaphysical conviction that the self-conscious subject of modernity is governed by self-sufficiency and transparency and, consequently, is responsible for and in control of its thoughts, desires, and actions through autonomous will. The Freudian discovery of the unconscious overturns the Cartesian notion of subjectivity; it (...) questions the Cartesian equation subject = ego = consciousness. This “Copernican” displacement of the center of consciousness from the subjective ego to the unconscious structure of the psyche intimates the abyssal darkness of Being and the chaotic texture of the Cosmos, which cannot be incorporated into symbolic discourse, even though it traverses it and perpetually escapes it. -/- Thus, it problematizes—without transcending them—fetish concepts such as truth, reality, authenticity, propriety, appropriation, and belonging, and demonstrates that there exists no foundational knowledge nor any ultimate certainty, since all symbolic-cognitive systems, including science itself—of which Freud remained a restrained yet stubborn defender—constitute rationalizations in relation to the real, abstractions in relation to the concrete, generalizations in relation to the singular. Rationalized elements become idealized and are transformed into ideas, ideals, and principles referring to a metaphysical beyond, a transcendence of meaning. Freud reveals that symbolic institutions are idealizations—though he overlooks their deeper significance—and that imaginary identities and identifications are radical illusions. -/- Although he struggled to illuminate and exorcise the ancient shadows of irrationalism and belief in the supernatural, the undertaking fulfilled itself precisely through its failure. We say this because psychoanalysis—and this is due to Freud himself and not merely the Freudians—constitutes an “anti-theological” theology, an “anti-religious” meta-religion, whose metaphysical core possesses all the structural characteristics of both classical mythology and modern mythology, namely technology. Freud himself, to some extent, recognized this. -/- Freud’s entire project moves between what he himself calls instinctual mythology and the hope for a future pharmacodynamic and technical intervention. “The theory of instincts is, so to speak, our mythology, ” he writes in New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis. “The future may teach us, let us hope, to act directly, through certain chemical substances, upon the quantities of energy and their distribution within the psychic apparatus, ” he says in An Outline of Psychoanalysis. -/- At this point, it is necessary to clarify the structural characteristics of mythology. The first is universality: a mythology constitutes a complete image of “humanity within the world.” Every mythology also possesses an origin—a decisive moment of revelation or diagnostic insight from which the entire system derives—and certain developmental stages linked through the logic of causality. Another element indicative of the mythological universe is the development of a particular language, emblematic images, metaphors, and dramatic scenarios. This language generates its own system of myths; it depicts the world through a series of foundational rituals, gestures, and symbols. -/- The great mythologies constructed in the West during the nineteenth century were not merely attempts to fill the void left by the erosion of organized religion and systematic theology under the pressure of techno-scientific rationality—above all, the decline of Christian theology and dogma. They themselves became a kind of substitute theology, organized according to rules, as symbolic images of the meaning of humanity and “reality.” These were systems of belief and argumentation marked by intense anti-religiosity. They posited as metaphysical principle a world without a metaphysical principle (God), and denied life after death. Yet their structure, ambitions, and demands upon believers remained profoundly metaphysical and religious, both strategically and in terms of their effects. -/- Freudian psychology, despite its metaphysical and metaphorical dimensions and its quasi-religious aspect, represents an exaltation of the organizing power of rational thought, which decisively contributed to the unveiling and exploration of the non-rational dimension of existence. Above all, it continued the process of dismantling anthropocentric narcissism, the egocentrism of the modern individual, the individualism and autism of the contemporary subject. Of course, Copernicus, Darwin, Marx, Nietzsche, Einstein, and others had preceded him. Freud continues the long therapeutic process against anthropocentric arrogance and hubris—a process that must continue and expand in the Space Age through the recognition that humanity participates in, belongs to, and communicates with the biosphere and the Universe as a whole, which exists not for colonization and conquest but for dwelling and hospitality. -/- The question that arises is this: Did Freudian mythology—and the other mythologies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—succeed in filling the existential void created by the disintegration of religion? Was the longing of soul and spirit for Truth satisfied? Was the nostalgia and thirst for the Absolute and the transcendent weakened? Did the impulse toward mystery subside? -/- The belief held by the intellectuals of humanistic nihilistic Enlightenment—that the rise of the sciences (mathematics, physics, social sciences, applied sciences) would satisfy humanity’s need for order, beauty, and moral integrity in a way surpassing revealed religion, thereby filling the vacuum created by religion’s collapse—a collapse for which science itself is causally and logically co-responsible—was not confirmed. The dominance of techno-scientific rationalism and abstract conceptual schemas, producing a truth that is abstract, neutral, and impersonal, despite its productive contributions and despite the catastrophes it caused, fulfilled only partially the expectations it had cultivated. -/- The sense of failure prevailing in a West that is planetary in scope yet declining, the anxiety, dissatisfaction, unease, and fear dominating the soul and spirit of humanity, the subtle feeling that nothing is truly under control, strengthen the irrational and absurd element of existence. This irrationality overcompensates for the loss of meaning through nostalgia for the Absolute, the transcendent, Truth, Innocence, and Harmony, reviving beliefs, myths, and dogmas of the past. (shrink)

In books 8 and 9 of Plato’s Republic, Socrates provides a detailed account of the nature and origins of four main kinds of vice found in political constitutions and in the kinds of people that correspond to them. The third of the four corrupt kinds of person he describes is the ‘democratic man’. In this paper, I ask what ‘rules’ in the democratic man’s soul. It is commonly thought that his soul is ruled in some way by its (...) appetitive part, or by a particular class of appetitive desires. I reject this view, and argue instead that his soul is ruled by a succession of desires of a full range of different kinds. I show how this view helps us better understand Plato’s depiction of corrupt souls in the Republic more generally, and with it his views on the rule of the soul, appetitive desire, and the nature of vice. (shrink)

Readers of the Republic have usually seen the passages about the stereotypical characteristics of communities as grounding the city-soul analogy. Plato indeed takes those attributions to be a powerful reason to expect the same types (εἴδη) and manners (ἤθη) in both the city and the individual soul and, hence, to affirm the structural isomorphism of polis and psyche (Resp. 435e). This natural reading is considerably challenged by Bernard Williams’ “The Analogy of City and Soul in Plato’s ‘Republic’” (...) (2001), where it is shown to entail paradoxes that make the analogy flawed. The point lies in the derivation principles that communal stereotypes imply. For while a community is expected to be, say, spirited precisely because all or many or its most prominent members are spirited, it seems that Plato’s perfect and imperfect constitutions fail to meet this simple requirement. In this paper, I will briefly examine Williams’ puzzles and lay out their core challenges. Then, I will discuss two of the most prominent attempts to meet them: Lear’s psychological interpretation and Ferrari’s metaphorical interpretation of the city-soul analogy. As I hope to show, they both entail consequences that run against some of the Republic’s most important aims or make them plainly unattainable. Finally, by distinguishing psycho-political forces (ἤθη) from psycho-political constitutions (εἴδη), I propose a solution that holds the derivation rules without falling prey to Williams’ paradoxes. This solution, we will see, calls for a prima facie compelling model of the unity of virtues, that is, a model showing how everyone in Callipolis may possess, in some way, all the virtues. (shrink)

From Soul to Self takes the reader on a fascinating journey through philosophy, theology, religious studies, and physiological sciences. Each of the essays, drawn from a number of different fields, focuses on the idea of the soul and of our sense of ourselves. A stellar line-up of authors explore the relationship between a variety of ideas that have arisen in philosophy, religion and science, each idea seeking to explain why we think that we as individuals are somehow distinct (...) and unique. Contributors: Richard Sorabji, Anthony Kenny, Kallistos Ware, Peter Riviere, Gary Matthews, Susan Greenfield, Galen Strawson. (shrink)

Thomistic Hylomorphists claim that we human persons have rational or intellective souls which can continue to exist separately from our bodies after we die. Much of the recent scholarly discussion of Thomistic Hylomorphism has centered on this thesis and the question of whether human persons can survive death along with their souls or whether only their souls can survive in this separated, disembodied, post-mortem state. As a result, two rival versions of Thomistic Hyomorphism have been formulated: Survivalism and Corruptionism. This (...) chapter makes a new contribution to the debate between Survivalists and Corruptionists by identifying a heretofore undiscussed problem for Corruptionist Thomistic Hylomorphism. In particular, it is argued that if Corruptionists were right that human persons cannot survive their deaths along with their souls, this would undermine the grounds on which all Thomistic Hylomorphists, including Corruptionists, rely to justify their belief that our souls can continue to exist after our deaths. Given this, it is argued that Thomistic Hylomorphists have grounds for thinking that our souls can continue to exist after our deaths only if they allow, as Survivalists do and Corruptionists do not, that we human persons can continue to exist after our deaths, with souls but no bodies. (shrink)

I argue that John Hick’s soul-making theodicy is committed to opposing social progress. By focusing on justifying the current amount and distribution of suffering and evil, Hick’s theodicy ends up having to condemn even positive change as undesirable. First, I give a brief outline of Hick’s theodicy, with a particular emphasis on the role of earned virtue in justifying the existence of evil. Then I consider two understandings of social progress: progress as the elimination of suffering and evil; and (...) progress as the promotion of earned virtue. I further distinguish the earned virtue understanding of social progress into two kinds, in which the relationship between social structures and moral growth either: allows members of a more advanced society to start closer to perfection; or allows members of a more advanced society to progress more quickly. I argue that no matter which approach we take, Hick’s theodicy struggles with the idea of social progress. Hick is either straightforwardly committed to opposing social progress, or he can support it only at the expense of being unable to justify status quo of suffering and evil. (shrink)

Plato’s tripartite soul plays a central role in his account of justice in the Republic. It thus comes as a surprise to find him apparently abandoning this model at the end of the work, when he suggests that the soul, as immortal, must be simple. I propose a way of reconciling these claims, appealing to neglected features of the city-soul analogy and the argument for the soul’s division. The original true soul, I argue, is partitioned, (...) but in a finer manner than how we encounter it in our everyday lives. (shrink)

This paper examines the soul-turning metaphor in Book 7 of Plato’s Republic. It argues that the failure to find a consistent reading of how the metaphor is used has contributed to a number of long-standing disagreements, especially concerning the more famous metaphor with which it is intertwined, the Cave allegory. A full reading of the metaphor, as it occurs throughout Book 7, is offered, with particularly close attention to what is one of the most difficult and stubbornly divisive passages (...) in Book 7, 532b6–d1. (shrink)

The concept of the soul has traditionally occupied a space between mysticism and metaphor, treated as something beyond rigorous analysis. In this paper, we recast the soul not as a supernatural entity but as a stable, entropy-resistant, recursive information pattern—a coherent structure that persists through change. Drawing upon principles from systems theory, thermodynamics, information geometry, and fractal recursion, we propose a formal model in which the soul is understood as a self-stabilizing field of meaningful energy. Our hypothesis (...) is that what endures within any living system is neither matter nor mere energy, but an evolving pattern that resists entropy. In elucidating this framework, we offer mathematical formulations, discuss applications in artificial intelligence and human consciousness, and explore implications for understanding death as transformation rather than termination. (shrink)

Since antiquity, scholars have observed a structural tension within Plato’s Phaedrus. The dialogue demands order in every linguistic composition, yet it presents itself as a disordered composition. Accordingly, one of the key problems of the Phaedrus is determining which—if any—aspect of the dialogue can supply a unifying thread for the dialogue’s major themes (love, rhetoric, writing, myth, philosophy, etc.). My dissertation argues that “soul-leading” (psuchagōgia)—a rare and ambiguous term used to define the innate power of words—resolves the dialogue’s structural (...) tension. I clarify the conceptual and dramatic features of soul-leading by focusing on the dialogue’s uniquely prevalent use of the semantic network of “leading” and “following.” By continuing to foreground the language and drama of leading and following, I offer a new interpretation of the dialogue as a whole: the Phaedrus is Plato’s articulation of how the soul can be led into communion with reality. Chapter 1 discusses scholarly disputes about the unity of the Phaedrus and proposes that soul-leading adequately satisfies the criteria put forward for what would count as a unifying element. I argue that soul-leading unifies the dialogue both thematically and non-thematically; moreover, soul-leading is a theme capacious enough to account for the other principal contenders for unity put forward. Chapter 2 develops the ambiguous character of soul-leading by examining how the dialogue showcases dangerous forms thereof. Love and language are dangerous when they lead the soul toward goods which can never truly fulfill it. In order to clarify how love and language can mislead the soul, Socrates develops a set of accounts of how the soul is led, both internally and externally, in the three speeches on love. If the soul is to be led into communion with reality (the proper end of soul-leading), it must be led internally by the right part of the soul and externally by the right object of desire. Chapter 3 argues that all souls can, in principle, be harmonized and directed in the way that Chapter 2 requires. I show that Plato’s view of philosophy is neither elitist (i.e., some are intrinsically incapable of philosophy) nor naively essentialist. All can come into communion with reality because all are by nature equipped to do so. While Plato recognizes that there are forces which tend to prohibit one from exercising one’s capability of being rightly led, none of them are intrinsic to human nature. Chapter 4 argues that successful soul-leading require neither the leader nor the follower to be already well-disposed to what’s ultimate in order for the pair to come to a communion with what’s ultimate. Plato’s depiction of soul-leading love shows that love can itself promote the formation needed for both leader and follower to come into contact with reality. Love can do so because it is always already bound up reality in its responsiveness to beauty. Beauty itself calls the lover to itself by shining through the beautiful beloved, who acts as a reminder of transcendent Beauty. The lover mediates this same experience for the beloved. Each comes to desire the other as well as Beauty itself. Chapter 5 argues that the drama of the lovers’ formation mythically depicted in the Palinode (Chapter 4) is written into the drama of the dialogue as a whole. In the relationship between Socrates and Phaedrus, we see an enactment of love’s formative role. Likewise, in the relationship between Phaedrus and Lysias, we see an enactment of the dangerous soul-leading discussed in Chapter 2. My focus on leading and following also allows me to show the thematic significance of the drama’s setting. Chapter 6 articulates the metaphysical conditions under which one can be led into communion with reality. Transcendent Beauty invites us into communion with itself and makes possible our ascent by providing us with divine guides and images which can transport us from our ordinary experiences to the true beings. Beauty accomplishes its work—leading us in a “divine dance” where we follow the gods up to Beauty and back down to each other—through images. When we handle images of reality rightly, they lead our souls into communion with reality. Further, when we have come into communion, we’ll be inspired to be co-workers of Beauty’s soul-leading work. When we articulate reality in language, we create new images that can serve to lead others toward reality. (shrink)

Part of the Elements Philosophy of Religion series, this short book focuses on the spiritual dimensions of life’s meaning as they have been discussed in the recent English and mainly analytic philosophical literature. The overarching philosophical question that this literature has addressed is about the extent to which, and respects in which, spiritual realities such as God or a soul would confer meaning on our lives. There have been four broad answers to the question, namely: God or a (...) class='Hi'>soul is necessary for meaning in our lives; they are not necessary for it; one or both would enhance the meaning in our lives; and they would detract from it. These views have been largely advanced in chronological order through the history of Western philosophy, with the view that life would be meaningless without God and a soul having been most prominent in the medieval period, the rejection of this claim having arisen in the modern era, and then sophisticated positions about enhancement or reduction having appeared in earnest only in the past 20 years. This book addresses all four positions, paying particular attention to the more recent views. Beyond familiarizing readers with these positions, it presents prima facie objections to them, points out gaps in research agendas, and suggests argumentative strategies that merit development. (shrink)

This treatise develops a philosophical–psychological framework for deepening intimate relationships through a structured practice termed Soul Gazing, while critically examining how contemporary self-labeling behaviors obstruct the authentic connection such practices seek to cultivate. Integrating phenomenological philosophy—principally the relational ontologies of Martin Buber and Emmanuel Levinas—with empirical research in social neuroscience, attachment theory, and interpersonal synchrony, the paper argues that sustained mutual gaze between romantic partners constitutes a potent yet undertheorized therapeutic intervention capable of fostering genuine presence, emotional attunement, and (...) relational depth. The framework further draws upon existentialist analyses of bad faith, sociological labeling theory, and person-centered psychology to demonstrate how rigid categorical self-identification paradoxically undermines the authenticity individuals claim to pursue. The central thesis holds that authentic intimate connection requires two complementary movements: the active cultivation of non-verbal presence through disciplined practices such as Soul Gazing, and the deliberate relinquishment of fixed identity labels that interpose constructed personae between self and other. The treatise concludes by proposing an integrated model of relational authenticity grounded in philosophical rigor and empirical evidence, offering both theoretical contributions to the study of intimacy and practical implications for couples seeking to deepen their bonds beyond the reach of language. (shrink)

Merold Westphal's book is a wonderful introduction to the history of philosophy.

Since the inception of psychology as a distinct field of study in the modern West, it has been widely regarded as the only valid form of this discipline, supplanting all other accounts of the mind and human behavior. The modern West is unique in having produced the only psychology that consciously severed itself from metaphysics and spiritual principles. The momentous intellectual revolutions inaugurated by the Renaissance and the European Enlightenment further entrenched the prejudices of its purely secular and reductionist approach. (...) Yet, across the diverse cultures of the world, we find spiritual traditions that embrace a fully-integrated psychology, unsullied by the limitations of the modern scientific method. It is only by grounding psychology on a foundation of sacred and universal truths—found in all traditional civilizations—that we can begin to restore a true “science of the soul” that addresses the entire gamut of human needs and possibilities. (shrink)

Embark with me on an enthralling odyssey to demystify the elusive essence of consciousness, venturing into the uncharted territories of Artificial Consciousness. This voyage propels us past the frontiers of technology, ushering Artificial Intelligences into an unprecedented domain where they gain a deep comprehension of emotions and manifest an autonomous volition. Within the confluence of science and philosophy, this article poses a fascinating question: As consciousness in Artificial Intelligence burgeons, is it conceivable for AI to evolve a “soul”? This (...) inquiry not only challenges our conventional understanding but also opens the door to a plethora of groundbreaking possibilities in the realm of AI's sentient potential. (shrink)

This paper introduces a conceptual framework in which the soul (or pure awareness) interacts with the brain in a tri-layered architecture. The lower brain structures (reptilian and limbic layers) serve as the repository for raw, unreflected experiences from early life. The neocortex reflects and interprets those encoded patterns rather than providing access to them directly. Thus, ordinary awareness is constrained to the reflected representations, preventing immediate insight into the contents of the unconscious. Only when awareness is freed from cognitive (...) filtering can it access the stored unconscious data directly, enabling a form of unmediated perception. This model offers a bridge between neuroscience, psychology, and metaphysical philosophy of consciousness, reframing the unconscious not as hidden text to be deciphered, but as stored presence awaiting clear contact. (shrink)

Mark Coeckelbergh is a Belgian philosopher who specializes in the philosophy of technology. His work primarily explores the intersection of technology and society, specifically the philosophical implications of emerging technologies such as AI and robotics. He has written on whether machines can be moral agents and how ethical frameworks should be applied to autonomous machines. He has a broad philosophical perspective drawing on classical sources, Eastern philosophy, Marxism, Foucault, phenomenology, and the postmodernists. In this short text, he brings his remarkable (...) insights and erudition to bear on our attempts at self-improvement in the age of AI. (shrink)

This paper proposes a conceptual hypothesis that consciousness; the phenomenon traditionally called the soul can be understood as a fundamental energy-information particle. Like energy, it cannot be destroyed but only transformed, persisting across past, present, and future in accordance with relativity’s block universe model. Drawing on analogies from energy conservation, quantum entanglement, and particle hierarchy, the theory suggests that consciousness is nonlocal, timeless, and embedded in the deepest layers of reality. Paranormal phenomena such as past-life memories and ghost experiences (...) are interpreted as expressions of this persistence. The aim is to frame the soul not as a metaphysical mystery but as a candidate for scientific inquiry, inviting further mathematical formalization and empirical testing. (shrink)

Advances a novel theory of how paradoxes evident in Wilhelm Heinrich Wackenroder's essay on instrumental music evoke specific religious dichotomies and that these in turn propose an aesthetic interpretation of autonomous instrumental music concordant with the importance attached to religion in early German Romantic thought.

Resumo: Neste artigo exploramos a concepção estoica de πάθος, suas causas e consequências. Inicialmente abordamos o modo como as paixões se encaixam na ética estoica, uma vez que elas se mostram como impedimentos para aquele que quer viver melhor. Logo depois, analisamos os debates realizados no seio da escola, os acréscimos e os aperfeiçoamentos teóricos. Por fim, mostramos a distinção entre πάθη, προπάθειαι e εὐπαθεῖαι, pois isso propicia uma melhor compreensão da dimensão emocional da psicologia da Stoa, servindo principalmente para (...) evitar interpretações precipitadas que podem ocorrer ao se ler um texto estoico. -/- Abstract: In this article the stoic conception of πάθος is explored, its causes and consequences. Initially, it is approached how passions fit Stoic ethics, since they appear as impediments to those who want to live better. Afterwards the debates within this school are analyzed, its additions and the theoretical improvements. Finally, the distinction between πάθη, προπάθειαι and εὐπαθεῖαι is presented, since this provides a better understanding of the emotional dimension of Stoa’s psychology, mainly to avoid precipitous interpretations that may occur when reading a Stoic text. (shrink)

Although they are often grouped together in comparison with non-dualist theories, Plato's soul-body dualism, and Descartes' mind-body dualism, are fundamentally different. The doctrines examined are those of the Phaedo and the Meditations. The main difference, from which others flow, lies in Plato's acceptance and Descartes' rejection of the assumption that the soul (= intellect) is identical with what animates the body.

This paper explores the various ways Aristotle refers to and employs “heat and cold” in his embryology. In my view, scholars are too quick to assume that references to heat and cold are references to matter or an animal’s material nature. More commonly, I argue, Aristotle refers to heat and cold as the “tools” of soul. As I understand it, Aristotle is thinking of heat and cold in many contexts as auxiliary causes by which soul activities (primarily “concoction”) (...) are carried out. This, as I argue, is what it means to call them “tools” of soul. An upshot of this investigation is the fuller picture of Aristotle’s conception of efficient causation it provides in general, and the better understanding of the efficient causal operation of an organism’s nature or soul it provides in particular. (shrink)

It is well known that in the Republic, Socrates presents a view of the soul or the psyche according to which it has three distinct parts or aspects, which he calls the reasoning, spirited, and appetitive parts. Socrates’ clearest characterization of these parts of the soul occurs in Republic IX, where he suggests that they should be understood in terms of the various goals or ends that give rise to the particular desires that motivate our actions. In Republic (...) X, however, Socrates uses the phenomenon of cognitive conflict about matters of fact to show that the soul has only two parts, the rational and the irrational. Moreover, he characterizes these parts in terms of cognitive tendencies, such as forming beliefs on the basis of reason versus forming beliefs on the basis of perceptual appearances. In this chapter, I explain how these divergent accounts of the soul and its parts are legitimate alternative characterizations. A consequence of my argument is that we should not think of the divided soul as primarily a division of desires, but rather as a division of cognitive attitudes towards the world, each of which yields different sorts of desires. (shrink)

Iris Murdoch offers a distinctive conception of moral psychology. She suggests that to develop a moral psychology is to develop what she calls a soul-picture; different philosophical moral psychologies are, as she puts it, “rival soul-pictures.” In this paper I clarify Murdoch’s generic notion of “soul-picture,” the genus of which, for example, Aristotle’s, Kant’s, Nietzsche’s, and Murdoch’s constitute rival species. Are all philosophical moral psychologies soul-pictures? If not, what are the criteria that a moral psychology must (...) meet in order to qualify as a soul-picture? I propose five key dimensions. A soul-picture provides a picture of the soul or self that is 1) holistic, 2) value-rich and psychologically realistic (for Murdoch these are intertwined), 3) reflexive, 4) therapeutic and 5) the articulation of which makes use of imaginative language. (shrink)