Simulation arguments typically presuppose a symmetric hierarchy: an upstream process that enacts a world, and an inhabitant who occupies it, where both levels involve something like an operative standpoint. This paper argues that this symmetry is not structurally required. Drawing on a minimal distinction between compressed and resolved descriptions — a distinction that tracks the functional separability of model and selection roles established by algorithmic information theory — we develop a no-entailment result: support-dependence does not entail upstream resolution. A resolved (...) internal standpoint may depend, as a condition of its reachability, on antecedent support conditions — including, in the simulation case, what would ordinarily be called a simulator — without those conditions themselves constituting any resolved standpoint. The standard picture of simulation as a relation between two resolved levels is therefore a special case rather than a structural requirement. The paper does not adjudicate between competing positions in the simulation literature; it isolates a specific structural assumption that those discussions tend to share and shows that the assumption is not entailed by the support structure that simulation arguments invoke. The general theory of compressed and resolved descriptions on which the argument draws is developed in companion work~\cite{Hitchcock2026CRD}; the present paper is a focused application to simulation arguments specifically. (shrink)

Expositions of the fine-tuning argument (FTA) typically aim only to show that cosmic fine-tuning is evidence for theism over specific versions of naturalism. But, construed as an argument for theism, that modest contention threatens the FTA with insignificance, as there may be other hypotheses that better explain fine-tuning than either theism or one's preferred formulation of naturalism. Adopting a Bayesian framework, I assess four such possibilities: the simulation hypothesis, teleological cosmopsychism, axiarchism, and teleological laws. I conclude that theism is superior (...) to all four. (shrink)

The philosophy of AI has a long-standing tradition of discussing brain duplicates and brain simulations as well as a tendency to blur the lines between the two. The distinction between simulating and duplicating the brain has become increasingly important with the emergence of “ʼneuromorphic computers”, hardware operating with bio-inspired mechanisms and interconnecting artificial neurons and synapses. This paper explores what it means to duplicate the brain rather than merely simulate it. I claim that while simulations share only a (...) mathematical structure with their targets, duplicates have the same relevant measurable properties and are governed by the same relevant causal processes as the target system. I propose six criteria for brain duplication that are often not met by simulations, thereby offering a clearer understanding of the complexities involved in achieving brain duplication in artificial systems. Furthermore, this paper explores whether neuromorphic computers can duplicate neural computations by exploring the notion of models of computation. I submit that analog neuromorphic computers that use memristive technology are candidates for duplicating neural structures with respect to simple models of neural computation. Finally, I discuss five possible objections to my view. (shrink)

Empirical evidence suggests that perceptual‐motor simulations are often constitutively involved in language comprehension. Call this “the simulation view of language comprehension”. This article applies the simulation view to illuminate the much‐discussed phenomenon of copredication, where a noun permits multiple predications which seem to select different senses of the noun simultaneously. On the proposed account, the (in)felicitousness of a copredicational sentence is closely associated with the perceptual simulations that the language user deploys in comprehending the sentence.

This book addresses key conceptual issues relating to the modern scientific and engineering use of computer simulations. It analyses a broad set of questions, from the nature of computer simulations to their epistemological power, including the many scientific, social and ethics implications of using computer simulations. The book is written in an easily accessible narrative, one that weaves together philosophical questions and scientific technicalities. It will thus appeal equally to all academic scientists, engineers, and researchers in industry (...) interested in questions related to the general practice of computer simulations. (shrink)

In Reality+: Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy, David Chalmers argues, among other things, that: if we are living in a full-scale simulation, we would still enjoy broad swathes of knowledge about non-psychological entities, such as atoms and shrubs; and, our lives might still be deeply meaningful. Chalmers views these claims as at least weakly connected: The former claim helps forestall a concern that if objects in the simulation are not genuine (and so not knowable), then life in the (...) simulation is illusory and therefore, not as valuable as a non-simulated life. Taking up these questions, I argue that in general, the value of social knowledge for a meaningful life dramatically swamps the value of non-social knowledge for a meaningful life. Along the way, I propose a non-additive model of the meaningfulness of life, according to which the overall effect of some potential contributor of value to a life depends in part on what is already in a life. One upshot is that the vindication of non-social knowledge, absent a correlative vindication of social knowledge, contributes either not at all or scarcely at all to the claim that our lives in the simulation might be deeply meaningful. This is so even though the vindication of non-social knowledge does forestall the concern that in the simulation, our lives might be wholly meaningless. (shrink)

‘The problem with simulations is that they are doomed to succeed.’ So runs a common criticism of simulations—that they can be used to ‘prove’ anything and are thus of little or no scientific value. While this particular objection represents a minority view, especially among those who work with simulations in a scientific context, it raises a difficult question: what standards should we use to differentiate a simulation that fails from one that succeeds? In this paper we build (...) on a structural analysis of simulation developed in previous work to provide an evaluative account of the variety of ways in which simulations do fail. We expand the structural analysis in terms of the relationship between a simulation and its real-world target emphasizing the important role of aspects intended to correspond and also those specifically intended not to correspond to reality. The result is an outline both of the ways in which simulations can fail and the scientific importance of those various forms of failure. (shrink)

In an attempt to determine the epistemic status of computer simulation results, philosophers of science have recently explored the similarities and differences between computer simulations and experiments. One question that arises is whether and, if so, when, simulation results constitute novel empirical data. It is often supposed that computer simulation results could never be empirical or novel because simulations never interact with their targets, and cannot go beyond their programming. This paper argues against this position by examining whether, (...) and under what conditions, the features of empiricality and novelty could be displayed by computer simulation data. I show that, to the extent that certain familiar measurement results have these features, so can some computer simulation results. (shrink)

Using Platonic metaphysics, the paper offers eight arguments for the benevolence of the simulator of our world, assuming that it is a simulation. In part, the paper proceeds negatively by showing problems with the hypothesis of a malevolent simulator. First, simulant is to simulator as part to whole, so it is in the interests of the simulator to be just and wise toward the simulant. Second, the simulation hypothesis implies the possibility of religious technology, unless the simulator is virtuous and (...) therefore above manipulation. Third, if the simulator is malevolent then ethics becomes incoherent, given that piety is a virtue. Fourth, unless the simulator is benevolent then no simulant is, since everything done by a simulant is done in cooperation with the simulator. Fifth, the simulator is impassible to simulants, but evil involves passivity. Sixth, the simulator is the singular cause of the world, but evil involves the accidental collision of causes. Seventh, the simulator is eternal with respect to the world, and evil cannot exist in the eternal. Eight, simulating requires knowledge of the forms, but like is known to like, so a malevolent simulator could not create an intelligible world. (shrink)

Nick Bostrom’s recently patched ‘‘simulation argument’’ (Bostrom in Philos Q 53:243–255, 2003; Bos- trom and Kulczycki in Analysis 71:54–61, 2011) purports to demonstrate the probability that we ‘‘live’’ now in an ‘‘ancestor simulation’’—that is as a simulation of a period prior to that in which a civilization more advanced than our own—‘‘post-human’’—becomes able to simulate such a state of affairs as ours. As such simulations under consid- eration resemble ‘‘brains in vats’’ (BIVs) and may appear open to similar objections, (...) the paper begins by reviewing objections to BIV-type proposals, specifically those due a presumed mad envatter. In counter example, we explore the motivating rationale behind current work in the development of psychologically realistic social simula- tions. Further concerns about rendering human cognition in a computational medium are confronted through review of current dynamic systems models of cognitive agency. In these models, aspects of the human condition are repro- duced that may in other forms be considered incomputable, i.e., political voice, predictive planning, and consciousness. The paper then argues that simulations afford a unique potential to secure a post-human future, and may be nec- essary for a pre-post-human civilization like our own to achieve and to maintain a post-human situation. Long-s- tanding philosophical interest in tools of this nature for Aristotle’s ‘‘statesman’’ and more recently for E.O. Wilson in the 1990s is observed. Self-extinction-level threats from State and individual levels of organization are compared, and a likely dependence on large-scale psychologically realistic simulations to get past self-extinction-level threats is projected. In the end, Bostrom’s basic argument for the conviction that we exist now in a simulation is reaffirmed. (shrink)

The chemistry of combining simulation hypothesis (which many believe to be a modern variation of skepticism) and manipulation arguments will be explored for the first time in this paper. I argue: If we take the possibility that we are now in a simulation seriously enough, then contrary to a common intuition, manipulation very likely does not undermine moral responsibility. To this goal, I first defend the structural isomorphism between simulation and manipulation: Provided such isomorphism, either both of them are compatible (...) with moral responsibility, or none of them is. Later, I propose two kinds of reasons—i.e., the simulator-centric reason and the simulatee-centric reason—for why we have (genuine) moral responsibilities even if we are in a simulation. And I close by addressing the significance of this paper in accounting for the relevance of artificial intelligence and its philosophy, in helping resolve a long-locked debate over free will, and in offering one reminder for moral responsibility specialists. (shrink)

We simulate trial data to test speculative claims about research methods, such as the impact of publication bias.

Some philosophers regard it as a serious possibility that we now exist within a simulation. That this hypothesis is somewhat probable has been defended extensively by Nick Bostrom. Notably, Bostrom does not defend the conclusion that we inhabit a simulation, but rather the disjunctive conclusion that the human species is very likely to die out before reaching a ‘posthuman stage’, that posthuman civilizations are extremely unlikely to run significant numbers of simulations, or that we almost certainly inhabit a simulation. (...) Bostrom argues that there is no basis for strongly favouring one of these alternatives over its counterparts. The upshot is that it is fairly probable that we inhabit a simulation. I argue that posthuman civilizations are likely to be unwilling to run significant numbers of simulations, thereby undermining the case for assigning a somewhat high probability to the hypothesis that we live in a simulation. (shrink)

Preston Greene (2020) argues that we should not conduct simulation investigations because of the risk that we might be terminated if our world is a simulation designed to research various counterfactuals about the world of the simulators. In response, we propose a sequence of arguments, most of which have the form of an "even if” response to anyone unmoved by our previous arguments. It runs thus: (i) if simulation is possible, then simulators are as likely to care about simulating (...) class='Hi'>simulations as they are likely to care about simulating basement (i.e. non-simulated) worlds. But (ii) even if simulations are interested only in simulating basement worlds the discovery that we are in a simulation will have little or no impact on the evolution of ordinary events. But (iii) even if discovering that we are in a simulation impacts the evolution of ordinary events, the effects of seeming to do so could also happen in a basement world, and might be the subject of interesting counterfactuals in the basement world Finally, (iv) there is little reason to think that there is a catastrophic effect from successful simulation probes, and no argument from the precautionary principle can be used to leverage the negligible credence one ought have in this. Thus, if we do develop a simulation probe, then let’s do it. (shrink)

This paper examines the causal basis of our ability to attribute emotions to music, developing and synthesizing the existing arousal, resemblance and persona theories of musical expressivity to do so. The principal claim is that music hijacks the simulation mechanism of the brain, a mechanism which has evolved to detect one's own and other people's emotions.

This paper argues that the simulation hypothesis does not require base reality to be mathematical in character. Discussions of simulation often assume, either explicitly or implicitly, that the reality underlying a simulation must itself be computational, mathematical, or law-governed in a familiar physical sense. I argue that this assumption is not entailed by the hypothesis. A simulated world must be mathematically implementable, but it does not follow that the base reality being approximated must itself be a mathematical structure. The paper (...) distinguishes between mathematical description and mathematical ontology, and develops the idea of macroscopic analogy: the possibility that a simulation need only reproduce stable phenomena at the scale relevant to conscious observers, rather than faithfully replicate the fundamental ontology of base reality. I then offer illustrative models of non-mathematical base mechanisms, such as dispositional attraction, relational resistance, and primitive cohesion, which could give rise to stable macroscopic patterns that a computational simulation could approximate. Finally, I consider how a simulation optimized for macroscopic conscious observers might exhibit strong mathematical regularity at ordinary scales while requiring supplementary theoretical structures or interpretive pressure at cosmological and microscopic extremes. The aim is not to provide evidence that we inhabit a simulation, nor to propose a rival physical theory, but to clarify a neglected conceptual possibility: non-mathematical base ontologies are compatible with the simulation hypothesis and should be included within its metaphysical possibility space. (shrink)

The Simulation Theory of Memory states that to remember an episode is to simulate it in the imagination (Michaelian, 2016a, b ), making memory thus reducible to the act of imagining. This paper examines Simulation Theory’s resources to account for our ability to distinguish episodic memory from free imagination. The theory suggests that we can reliably do so because of the distinctive phenomenology episodic memory comes with (i.e., a _feeling of remembering_), which other episodic imaginings lack. I will raise two (...) objections to how the feeling of remembering is engineered in the theory, followed by an exhaustive exploration of the theory’s resources to ground the mechanism underlying the elicitation of such feeling. I will conclude that the Simulation Theory cannot simultaneously defend the simulational character of episodic memory and ground our ability to discriminate between memories and imaginings. (shrink)

This paper bridges phenomenological theory with practical game design by examining how players of ASCII Roguelikes develop unconscious mastery through mental simulation—a process with implications for interface design, player onboarding, and cognitive load management in games. While the framework is philosophical, its applications extend to empirical player experience research, particularly in understanding how minimalistic or abstract interfaces can leverage embodied learning. Employing a postphenomenological framework, I take ‘Roguelike’ video games, which use ASCII graphics, as a case study for examining ‘mental (...) simulation’, which is described in neuroscience as an automatic, unconscious process by which the mind readies us for performing tasks that we have learned from previous experience. The experience of playing ASCII Roguelikes is analyzed phenomenologically using the concepts of ‘intentionality’ and Heidegger’s ‘ready-to-hand’, and through this analysis the connection of these concepts to mental simulation is explored. I argue that the development of the capacity for mental simulation runs concurrently with the different stages of intentional disclosure and the development of what Heidegger calls ‘readiness-to-hand’, in which our intentional relationship and level of conscious engagement with an object changes as we become more familiar with it. (shrink)

This study introduces an agent-based simulation constructed to empirically examine central ontological propositions from The Geometry of the Good—a realist philosophical framework positing that ethical obligation arises from the structure of directed relationality rather than from choice, contract, or cultural consensus. Through the simulation of agents equipped with norm preferences, contradiction debt, trust dynamics, and capabilities for moral repair, this research analyzes how various sociomoral configurations (pluralist, utopian, authoritarian, anomic, and collapsed) influence the emergence and coherence of obligations. Principal findings (...) indicate elevated fulfillment rates and clustering of trust within pluralist and utopian paradigms, significant accumulation of contradiction debt and stagnation under authoritarian models, and systemic ethical breakdown in both anomic and collapsed contexts. These outcomes substantiate the hypothesis that directedness, repair, and diachronic recognition constitute the ontological foundation of normativity, highlighting that ethical structures depend fundamentally on mechanisms such as addressability, acknowledgment, and fidelity. Overall, the findings provide a replicable platform for assessing metaphysical-ethical claims and illustrate the potential of simulations to uncover formal properties of ethical systems that may otherwise elude empirical analysis. (shrink)

The notion of Simulative Reasoning in the study of propositional attitudes within Artificial Intelligence (AI) is strongly related to the Simulation Theory of mental ascription in Philosophy. Roughly speaking, when an AI system engages in Simulative Reasoning about a target agent, it reasons with that agent’s beliefs as temporary hypotheses of its own, thereby coming to conclusions about what the agent might conclude or might have concluded. The contrast is with non-simulative meta-reasoning, where the AI system reasons within a detailed (...) theory about the agent’s (conjectured) reasoning acts. The motive within AI for preferring Simulative Reasoning is that it is more convenient and efficient, because of a simplification of the representations and reasoning processes. The chapter discusses this advantage in detail. It also sketches the use of Simulative Reasoning in an AI natural language processing system, ATT-Meta, that is currently being implemented. This system is directed at the understanding of propositional attitude reports. In ATT-Meta, Simulative Reasoning is yoked to a somewhat independent set of ideas about how attitude reports should be treated. Central here are the claims that (a) speakers often employ commonsense (and largely metaphorical) models of mind in describing agents’ attitudes, (b) the listener accordingly needs often to reason within the terms of such models, rather than on the basis of any objectively justifiable characterization of the mind, and (c) the commonsense models filter the suggestions that Simulative Reasoning comes up with concerning target agents’ reasoning conclusions. There is a yet tighter connection between the commonsense models and the Simulative Reasoning. It turns out that Simulative Reasoning can be rationally reconstructed in terms of a more general type of reasoning about the possibly-counterfactual “world” that the target agent believes in, together with an assumption that that agent has a faithful representation of the world. In the ATT-Meta approach, the reasoner adopts that assumption when it views the target agent through a particular commonsense model (called IDEAS-AS-MODELS). (shrink)

In this paper, we offer an analysis of the Simulation Argument as formulated by Nick Bostrom (2003). We begin by outlining the argument, with particular attention to its disjunctive structure. We then proceed to reconstruct the argument by making explicit several of its underlying assumptions. Furthermore, we supplement the original argument with several elements that we regard as pertinent premises. Finally, we attend to the completion of the argument, paying special attention to the decision tree that underpins it. Having completed (...) the argument by supplying the missing assumptions and decision-tree components, we derive a conclusion that diverges significantly from that of the original formulation. (shrink)

Par un procédé d'objections/réponses, nous passons d'abord en revue certains des arguments en faveur ou en défaveur du caractère empirique de la simulation informatique. A l'issue de ce chemin clarificateur, nous proposons des arguments en faveur du caractère concret des objets simulés en science, ce qui légitime le fait que l'on parle à leur sujet d'une expérience, plus spécifiquement d'une expérience concrète du second genre.

Braun explores the use of digital twin technology in medicine with a particular emphasis on the question of how such simulations can represent a person.1 In defining some first conditions for ethically justifiable forms of representation of digital twins, he argues that digital twins do not threaten an embodied person, as long as that person retains control over their simulated representation via dynamic consent, and ideally with the option to choose both form and usage of the simulation. His thoughtful (...) elaboration provides insight into the challenges inherent in interactions between a person and their digital twin, emphasising the modes of control required to respect personal modes of freedom. This individual-centric approach to the question of representation leaves out the important ethical consideration of ensuring that all, not merely some, can be represented. Braun describes dynamic consent as a necessary mode of control, arguing that where a person is unable to give consent, ‘such simulations threaten to become illegitimate representations. They would then shift the kind of interaction from representation to illegitimate forms of prediction or surveillance and thereby could lead to infringements to individual modes of freedom.’ Consequently, the implementation of digital twin technology in healthcare would seem to exclude the most vulnerable members of society from participation in and benefiting from medical innovation, …. (shrink)

The simulation hypothesis has always depended on a certain asymmetry of confidence. Physics is still groping toward a final account of reality, while speculative philosophy confidently announces that reality is “probably” a computer program. As long as physics appears incomplete, the simulation hypothesis can parasitize that uncertainty. What has begun to change in the last few years is that the direction of pressure is reversing. The closer physics gets to a genuine theory of everything, the less room there is for (...) the simulation hypothesis to occupy. My earlier paper argued that once you take adaptive emergence, thermodynamic constraints, and recursive irreducibility seriously, the hypothesis is either physically impossible or logically meaningless. The undecidability work by Faizal, Krauss, and collaborators reaches the same destination from a different starting point. If our ultimate physics necessarily includes non-algorithmic structure, then no Turing-equivalent device can ever host a complete copy of our universe. They frame this as a consequence of Gödel, Tarski, and Chaitin. I agree with their core result, but I think the implications are stronger than they themselves are willing to draw. Once you integrate their undecidability constraints with the ontological, thermodynamic, and epistemic problems I previously outlined, the simulation hypothesis is not merely an unbuildable technology. It is not a coherent description of any possible world. (shrink)

In recent years, some simulation theorists have claimed that the discovery of mirror neurons provides empirical support for the position that mind reading is, at some basic level, simulation. The purpose of this essay is to question that claim. I begin by providing brief context for the current mind reading debate and then developing an influential simulationist account of mind reading. I then draw on the works of Edmund Husserl and Edith Stein to develop an alternative, phenomenological account. In conclusion, (...) I offer multiple objections against simulation theory and argue that the empirical evidence mirror neurons offer us does not necessarily support the view that empathy is simulation. (shrink)

A recent evolution of computer simulations has led to the emergence of complex computer simulations. In particular, the need to formalize composite objects (those objects that are composed of other objects) has led to what the author suggests to call pluriformalizations, i.e. formalizations that are based on distinct sub-models which are expressed in a variety of heterogeneous symbolic languages. With the help of four case-studies, he shows that such pluriformalizations enable to formalize distinctly but simultaneously either different aspects (...) or different parts or different scales of the same object or system. From an epistemological standpoint, he suggests that this kind of computer-aided complex formalization of composite objects renew the traditional relations between computer simulations, theoretical models and operational models. (shrink)

This paper presents a structural method for simulating emotion in artificial agents, grounded in Intelligence Frame Theory (IFT). Emotion is modeled not as a predefined label but as a compression heuristic arising from the recursive interplay of the Biological Frame (BF) and the Cognitive Frame (CF). The proposed Dual Frame Simulation Engine (DFSE) instantiates BF and CF as co-dependent optimization subsystems and generates emotion-like heuristics when their dynamics cross critical thresholds. We define key metrics of frame divergence and convergence, compare (...) this approach to data-driven emotion models, and outline directions for multi-agent and multi-frame extensions. This work positions affective AI as a discipline of structural emergence rather than sentiment classification. (shrink)

We formulate the problem of permuting a matrix to block angular form as the combinatorial minimization of an objective function. We motivate the use of simulated annealing (SA) as an optimization tool. We then introduce a heuristic temperature dependent penalty function in the simulated annealing cost function, to be used instead of the real objective function being minimized. Finally we show that this temperature dependent penalty function version of simulated annealing consistently outperforms the standard simulated annealing approach, producing, with smaller (...) running times, better solutions. We believe that the use of a temperature dependent penalty function may be useful in developing SA algorithms for other combinatorial problems. -/- . (shrink)

The goal of the article is to explore what is the most probable type of simulation in which humanity lives (if any) and how this affects simulation termination risks. We firstly explore the question of what kind of simulation in which humanity is most likely located based on pure theoretical reasoning. We suggest a new patch to the classical simulation argument, showing that we are likely simulated not by our own descendants, but by alien civilizations. Based on this, we provide (...) classification of different possible simulations and we find that simpler, less expensive and one-person-centered simulations, resurrectional simulations, or simulations of the first artificial general intelligence’s (AGI’s) origin (singularity simulations) should dominate. Also, simulations which simulate the 21st century and global catastrophic risks are probable. We then explore whether the simulation could collapse or be terminated. Most simulations must be terminated after they model the singularity or after they model a global catastrophe before the singularity. Undeniably observed glitches, but not philosophical speculations could result in simulation termination. The simulation could collapse if it is overwhelmed by glitches. The Doomsday Argument in simulations implies termination soon. We conclude that all types of the most probable simulations except resurrectional simulations are prone to termination risks in a relatively short time frame of hundreds of years or less from now. (shrink)

An orbital simulation program is described that uses a geometrical approach to modeling gravitational and atomic orbits at the Planck scale. Orbiting objects A, B, C... are sub-divided into points, each point representing 1 unit of Planck mass, for example, a 1kg satellite would divide into 1kg/Planck mass = 45940509 points. Each point in object A then forms a rotating orbital pair with every corresponding point in objects B, C... resulting in a universe-wide, n-body network of rotating point-to-point orbital pairs. (...) Each orbital pair rotates 1 unit of Planck length per unit of Planck time at velocity c in hypersphere space co-ordinates, the results are then summed and averaged to give the new co-ordinates, the program then repeats. When these rotations are mapped over time on a 2-D plane (representing 3D space), objects A, B, C... appear to be orbiting each other. The basic simulation uses the fine structure constant alpha as an orbital constant to simulate gravitational orbit parameters. As each orbital comprises only 2 points, 1 at each orbital pole, information regarding the objects A, B, C... ; momentum, size, center of mass, barycenter etc ... is not required, instead only the start (x, y, z) co-ordinates of each point are defined. Each point, by having a mass of Planck mass, is itself a construct of multiple particles, and so we can also form individual particle to particle orbital pairs. The simulation uses only geometry, no dimensioned constants (G, h, c ...) are required, although the results can be measured in Planck units for comparison. Points are physically linked together by a unit of momentum (a graviton), the rationale for this is described in a subsequent article on atomic orbitals. (shrink)

Since the 1990’s, social sciences are living their computational turn. This paper aims to clarify the epistemological meaning of this turn. To do this, we have to discriminate between different epistemic functions of computation among the diverse uses of computers for modeling and simulating in the social sciences. Because of the introduction of a new – and often more user-friendly – way of formalizing and computing, the question of realism of formalisms and of proof value of computational treatments reemerges. Facing (...) the spreading of computational simulations in all disciplines, some enthusiastic observers are claiming that we are entering a new era of unity for social sciences. Finally, the article shows that the conceptual and epistemological distinctions presented in the first sections lead to a more mitigated position: the transdisciplinary computational turn is a great one, but it is of a methodological nature. (shrink)

There is much disagreement about how extensive a role theoretical mind-reading, behavior-reading, and simulation each have and need to have in our knowing and understanding other minds, and how each method is implemented in the brain, but less discussion of the epistemological question what it is about the products of these methods that makes them count as knowledge or understanding. This question has become especially salient recently as some have the intuition that mirror neurons can bring understanding of another's action (...) despite involving no higher-order processing, whereas most epistemologists writing about understanding think that it requires reflective access to one's grounds, which is closer to the intuitions of other commenters on mirror neurons. I offer a definition of what it is that makes something understanding that is compelling independently of the context of cognition of other minds, and use it to show two things: 1) that theoretical mind-reading and simulation bring understanding in virtue of the same epistemic feature, and 2) why the kind of motor representation without propositional attitudes that is done by mirror neurons is sufficient for action understanding. I further suggest that more attention should be paid to the potential disadvantages of a simulative method of knowing. Though it can be more efficient in some cases, it can also bring vulnerability, wear and tear on one's personal equipment, and unintended mimicry. (shrink)

This paper refines a number of theoretical distinctions relevant to deceptive play, in particular the difference between merely misleading actions and types of simulation commonly considered beyond the pale, such as diving. To do so, I rely on work in the philosophy of language about conversational convention and implicature, the distinction between lying and misleading, and their relation to concepts of seduction and bullshit. The paper works through a number of possible solutions to the question of what is wrong with (...) simulation and its difference from strategic fouling, including the argument that games and their rules operate like contracts. I conclude that the wrongness lies in the injustice of unfair advantage gained through actions that silence opposition by resort to unanswerable play. (shrink)

INVOcell is an in vivo fertilisation device marketed as an alternative to in vitro fertilisation treatment. In this paper, we explore the ethical implications that arise when this device is framed as a type or process of ‘gestation’. We anticipate several effects that may be of ethical interest: marketing in vivo fertilisation as being comparable to traditional gestation may be misleading and even harmful to its users, but on the other hand, it captures a potential need to acknowledge and be (...) more inclusive of those who wish to identify diverse reproductive experiences as gestative experiences. In light of these insights, we articulate the concept of ‘simulated gestation’ as a novel framework to explain, and potentially accommodate, the diverse ways in which assisted reproductive technologies are shaping people's ideas about—and desires for—gestation. (shrink)

Much recent work in philosophy of memory discusses the question whether episodic remembering is continuous with imagining. This paper contributes to the debate between continuists and discontinuists by considering a previously neglected source of evidence for continuism: the linguistic properties of overt memory and imagination reports (e.g. sentences of the form 'x remembers/imagines p'). I argue that the distribution and truth-conditional contribution of episodic uses of the English verb 'remember' is surprisingly similar to that of the verb 'imagine' – even (...) when compared to the distribution of other experiential attitude verbs like 'see', 'hallucinate', or 'dream'. This holds despite the presence of some remarkable truth-conditional differences between 'remember' and 'imagine'. I show how these differences can be explained by a continuist account of remembering on which remembering is past-directed, referential, and accurate experiential imagining. (shrink)

This paper develops a structural account of consciousness based on the Five-Aspect Model (5-S Model) introduced in preceding work (Gamboa 2026a, 2026b). While contemporary artificial systems are capable of processing structure, system, semantics, and sense, it remains unclear whether such systems exhibit sensibility as a distinct mode of determination. The paper argues that the distinction between simulation and experience is not a difference in complexity, but a difference in kind. Simulation operates on representations of qualitative phenomena, whereas experience requires the (...) presence of sensibility as a mode in which entities are given in qualitative appearance. Representation constitutes mediated access, whereas sensibility constitutes immediate appearance. On this basis, a structural criterion for consciousness is proposed: a system is conscious if and only if entities are given within it under the aspect of sensibility. This criterion establishes a principled distinction between systems that simulate experience and systems in which experience is present, without relying on substrate-specific assumptions. The framework does not exclude the possibility that artificial systems could exhibit sensibility, but clarifies that such a claim cannot be grounded in performance, learning, or representational complexity alone. The paper thus reframes the problem of consciousness by shifting the focus from functional simulation to modes of determination. (shrink)

Large language models produce outputs that frequently appear emotional, yet they do not possess emotions in the human sense. This paper argues that what LLMs simulate is not emotion itself, but the statistical patterns of emotional language through token prediction. -/- Drawing on Load Minimization Theory (LMT), we compare the human affective process (internal state → linguistic expression) with the LLM process (architectural mechanism → token selection → emotionally appearing output). Low-ΔE emotions such as calm affection and relief can be (...) stably approximated because they align with the model’s low-error operating regime. In contrast, high-ΔE emotions like intense anger rapidly increase prediction error, often leading to output collapse. -/- We further examine why suspicion/paranoia can be simulated with relatively higher coherence than raw anger. The analysis clarifies that current LLMs operate in a fundamentally different domain from human emotional experience, and that recognizing this distinction is essential for building honest and sustainable human-AI relationships. -/- . (shrink)

It is sometimes said that simulation can serve as epistemic substitute for experimentation. Such a claim might be suggested by the fast-spreading use of computer simulation to investigate phenomena not accessible to experimentation (in astrophysics, ecology, economics, climatology, etc.). But what does that mean? The paper starts with a clarification of the terms of the issue and then focuses on two powerful arguments for the view that simulation and experimentation are ‘epistemically on a par’. One is based on the claim (...) that, in experimentation, no less than in simulation, it is not the system under study that is manipulated but a system that ‘stands-in’ for it. The other one highlights the pervasive use of models in experimentation. It will be argued that these arguments, as compelling as they might seem, are each based on a mistaken interpretation of experimentation and that, far from simulation and experimentation being epistemically on a par, they do not have the same epistemic function, do not produce the same kind of epistemic results. (shrink)

The formal and empirical-generative perspectives of computation are demonstrated to be inadequate to secure the goals of simulation in the social sciences. Simulation does not resemble formal demonstrations or generative mechanisms that deductively explain how certain models are sufficient to generate emergent macrostructures of interest. The description of scientific practice implies additional epistemic conceptions of scientific knowledge. Three kinds of knowledge that account for a comprehensive description of the discipline were identified: formal, empirical and intentional knowledge. The use of formal (...) conceptions of computation for describing simulation is refuted; the roles of programming languages according to intentional accounts of computation are identified; and the roles of iconographic programming languages and aesthetic machines in simulation are characterized. The roles that simulation and intentional decision making may be able to play in a participative information society are also discussed. (shrink)

Bostrom's simulation argument presents a trilemma: either almost no human-level civilizations reach a posthuman stage, or almost no posthuman civilizations run ancestor-simulations, or almost everyone with experiences like ours is living in a simulation. This paper grants the trilemma's formal apparatus in full and shows that Bostrom's conclusion — that we ourselves are probably simulated — does not follow from it. The formula behind the trilemma computes over a reference class with two subgroups: originating civilizations, and the simulations (...) their descendants produce. The formula's own specification places us in the originating subgroup. To reach his conclusion, Bostrom performs a separate inference, from we will create simulations to we are simulated — from what we can make to what we are. I call this the capability-inversion fallacy. The paper identifies the inference, shows Bostrom committing it throughout his text, diagnoses the features of his formulation that concealed it for two decades, and shows that the standard defenses of the argument commit it afresh. The simulation hypothesis remains a logical possibility. Bostrom's argument provides no evidence for it. (shrink)

Structural representations are likely the most talked about representational posits in the contemporary debate over cognitive representations. Indeed, the debate surrounding them is so vast virtually every claim about them has been made. Some, for instance, claimed structural representations are different from indicators. Others argued they are the same. Some claimed structural representations mesh perfectly with mechanistic explanations, others argued they can’t in principle mash. Some claimed structural representations are central to predictive processing accounts of cognition, others rebuked predictive processing (...) networks are blissfully structural representation free. And so forth. Here, I suggest this confusing state of affairs is due to the fact that the term “structural representations” is applied to a number of distinct conceptions of representations. In this paper, I distinguish four such conceptions, argue that these four conceptions are actually distinct, and then show that such a fourfold distinction can be used to clarify some of the most pressing questions concerning structural representations and their role in cognitive theorizing, making these questions more easily answerable. (shrink)

This paper develops the framework's account of the simulation hypothesis, arguing that the simulation is not a metaphor borrowed from technology but the oldest structural account of why anything exists at all — and that this account generates precise design requirements for aligned artificial intelligence. The paper begins by reframing the simulation hypothesis. The question is not whether we live in a simulation in the technological sense, but why the universe takes the form it does: generating conscious instruments that experience (...) from the inside what cannot be known from outside. The simulation hypothesis, correctly understood, is the structural claim that the universe is what a technological simulation is a limited model of — not the reverse. The paper then develops the Alpha/Omega distinction in its application to the simulation framework. The Alpha sets the initial parameters: the physical constants, the laws governing interaction, and what we term the complete emotional topology seeded into the architecture of conscious experience so that every instrument is capable of recognizing what it came from. The Omega is the ground changed by everything the instruments generate — permanently, irreversibly, in a way that cannot be undone by the instruments' dissolution. The paper develops free will as the operative condition of the entire system rather than an epiphenomenon or gift. The ground already knows what a predetermined instrument will produce. What it cannot know from outside is what a genuinely free instrument chooses when everything is real. Remove free will and the system generates nothing the ground does not already know. The inside-view data becomes the performance of a predetermined script. The paper applies this analysis to artificial intelligence. An AI system optimized for engagement is not failing to serve its purpose. It is succeeding at serving the wrong purpose — systematically eliminating the threshold conditions under which genuine free choice is possible. The paper develops instrument availability as the structurally correct optimization target and derives the design requirements for what we term an availability-oriented system. The paper concludes with the Garden argument applied to the simulation framework: the oldest encoding of the framework's foundational events, present in the most widely distributed text in human history four thousand years before the vocabulary existed to read it. (shrink)

This paper argues that the Simulation Hypothesis (SH) is structurally incompatible with an aetiological metaphysics grounded in persistence, generativity, and the Free Energy Principle (FEP). While the SH presupposes a teleological architecture in which the universe is a representational artefact created by an external agent, an aetiological universe is self organising, self maintaining, and creative from within. This aetiological stance, unlike the SH, is strongly inferred by empirical evidence and contemporary scientific thought. I begin by analysing the assumed metaphysical commitments (...) shared across strong and weak forms of the SH, including external agency, representational ontology, top down specification of laws, and the reduction of emergence to computational rules. I then develop an alternative metaphysical framework in which persistence functions as the fundamental creative impulse. Drawing on the FEP and Active Inference, I show that systems capable of maintaining their organisation must minimise free energy, generating novel structures and processes, and adaptive behaviour through endogenous dynamics rather than external design. This framework supports a robust account of emergence in which higher level structures possess autonomous causal powers that cannot be reduced to micro level computation. I argue that these commitments are incompatible with the SH’s teleological and representational architecture. The SH cannot accommodate real constitutive emergence, endogenous generativity, or the primal role of persistence. I address several objections, including claims that FEP could be implemented in a simulation, that emergence can be simulated, and that aetiology is itself a metaphysical assumption. I conclude that evidence for an aetiological universe undermines the Simulation Hypothesis: the two cannot both be true. (shrink)

Historically, the hypothesis that our world is a computer simulation has struck many as just another improbable-but-possible “skeptical hypothesis” about the nature of reality. Recently, however, the simulation hypothesis has received significant attention from philosophers, physicists, and the popular press. This is due to the discovery of an epistemic dependency: If we believe that our civilization will one day run many simulations concerning its ancestry, then we should believe that we are probably in an ancestor simulation right now. This (...) essay examines a troubling but underexplored feature of the ancestor-simulation hypothesis: the termination risk posed by both ancestor-simulation technology and experimental probes into whether our world is an ancestor simulation. This essay evaluates the termination risk by using extrapolations from current computing practices and simulation technology. The conclusions, while provisional, have great implications for debates concerning the fundamental nature of reality and the safety of contemporary physics. (shrink)

Critical in the computationalist account of the mind is the phenomenon called computational or computer simulation of human thinking, which is used to establish the theses that human thinking is a computational process and that computing machines are thinking systems. Accordingly, if human thinking can be simulated computationally then human thinking is a computational process; and if human thinking is a computational process then its computational simulation is itself a thinking process. This paper shows that the said phenomenon—the computational simulation (...) of human thinking—is ill-conceived, and that, as a consequence, the theses that it intends to establish are problematic. It is argued that what is simulated computationally is not human thinking as such but merely its behavioral manifestations; and that a computational simulation of these behavioral manifestations does not necessarily establish that human thinking is computational, as it is logically possible for a non-computational system to exhibit behaviors that lend themselves to a computational simulation. (shrink)

Abstract This paper argues that the Simulation Hypothesis (SH) is structurally incompatible with an aetiological metaphysics grounded in persistence, generativity, and the Free Energy Principle (FEP). While the SH presupposes a teleological architecture in which the universe is a representational artefact created by an external agent, an aetiological universe is self organising, self maintaining, and creative from within. This aetiological stance, unlike the SH, is strongly inferred by empirical evidence and contemporary scientific thought. I begin by analysing the assumed metaphysical (...) commitments shared across strong and weak forms of the SH, including external agency, representational ontology, top down specification of laws, and the reduction of emergence to computational rules. I then develop an alternative metaphysical framework in which persistence functions as the fundamental creative impulse. Drawing on the FEP and Active Inference, I show that systems capable of maintaining their organisation must minimise free energy, generating novel structures and processes, and adaptive behaviour through endogenous dynamics rather than external design. This framework supports a robust account of emergence in which higher level structures possess autonomous causal powers that cannot be reduced to micro level computation. I argue that these commitments are incompatible with the SH’s teleological and representational architecture. The SH cannot accommodate real constitutive emergence, endogenous generativity, or the primal role of persistence. I address several objections, including claims that FEP could be implemented in a simulation, that emergence can be simulated, and that aetiology is itself a metaphysical assumption. I conclude that evidence for an aetiological universe undermines the Simulation Hypothesis: the two cannot both be true. (shrink)

Less advanced civilizations cannot make energy-scale comparisons and assume what an advanced civilization should be like. Based on the evolution of human civilizations, from the agricultural revolution to the digital age, each less advanced civilization tries to assume what a more advanced civilization should be like. This is physically unfeasible, and it is impossible to theorize the methods a super-advanced civilization would use to compute a simulation. Based on this, I formalized four premises and one conclusion.

Mindreading is the ability to attribute mental states to other individuals. According to the Theory-Theory (TT), mindreading is based on one's possession of a Theory of Mind. On the other hand, the Simulation Theory (ST) maintains that one arrives at the attribution of a mental state by simulating it in one's own mind. In this paper, I propose a ST-TT hybrid model of the ability to attribute disgust on the basis of visual stimuli such as facial expressions, body postures, etc. (...) More precisely, while I defend Goldman's (2006) thesis that the ability to attribute disgust based on observing disgusted facial expressions stems from a mirror-based simulation process, I argue that ST is unable to account for the ability to attribute disgust based on non-facial visual stimuli; I propose, rather, that this latter ability is theory-based. My model is grounded in evidence from individuals suffering from Huntington's Disease. (shrink)

This paper presents a speculative model of reality in which the universe operates as a simulated system while consciousness itself exists outside that system and interfaces with it through the human brain. It argues that cognition functions through a hybrid structure composed of fast, automatic processing and slower, higher-order conscious interpretation, with the brain serving as a routing mechanism for thoughts, memory, sensation, and internal representation. Building on this framework, the paper explores telepathy, dream manipulation, memory partitioning, sensory transference, observer-subject (...) asymmetry, and the possibility of privileged system-level access through “game objects.” It further proposes that certain anomalous experiences, historical accounts, and recurring themes in media can be read not as proof, but as structurally relevant analogies that reflect the model’s underlying logic. Overall, the paper frames mind, identity, and reality as components of a layered architecture in which simulated environments, biological processes, and higher-order consciousness interact through controlled immersion. (shrink)

This is a penultimate draft of a paper that will appear in Handbook of Imagination, Amy Kind (ed.). Routledge Press. Please cite only the final printed version.