Current debates about the replication crisis in psychology take it for granted that direct replication is valuable and focus their attention on questionable research practices in regard to statistical analyses. This paper takes a broader look at the notion of replication as such. It is argued that all experimentation/replication involves individuation judgments and that research in experimental psychology frequently turns on probing the adequacy of such judgments. In this vein, I highlight the ubiquity of conceptual and (...) material questions in research, and I argue that replication is not as central to psychological research as it is sometimes taken to be. (shrink)

Replicability and reproducibility of computational models has been somewhat understudied by “the replication movement.” In this paper, we draw on methodological studies into the replicability of psychological experiments and on the mechanistic account of explanation to analyze the functions of model replications and model reproductions in computational neuroscience. We contend that model replicability, or independent researchers' ability to obtain the same output using original code and data, and model reproducibility, or independent researchers' ability to recreate a model without original (...) code, serve different functions and fail for different reasons. This means that measures designed to improve model replicability may not enhance (and, in some cases, may actually damage) model reproducibility. We claim that although both are undesirable, low model reproducibility poses more of a threat to long-term scientific progress than low model replicability. In our opinion, low model reproducibility stems mostly from authors' omitting to provide crucial information in scientific papers and we stress that sharing all computer code and data is not a solution. Reports of computational studies should remain selective and include all and only relevant bits of code. (shrink)

According to a once influential view of selection, it consists of repeated cycles of replication and interaction. It has been argued that this view is wrong: replication is not necessary for evolution by natural selection. I analyze the nine most influential arguments for this claim and defend the replication–interaction conception of selection against these objections. In order to do so, however, the replication–interaction conception of selection needs to be modified significantly. My proposal is that replication (...) is not the copying of an entity, the replicator, but the copying of a property. Thus, we can have a replication process without there being a replicator that is being copied. (shrink)

Popper’s (1983, 2002) philosophy of science has enjoyed something of a renaissance in the wake of the replication crisis, offering a philosophical basis for the ensuing science reform movement. However, adherence to Popper’s approach may also be at least partly responsible for the sense of “crisis” that has developed following multiple unexpected replication failures. In this article, I contrast Popper’s approach with that of Lakatos (1978) as well as with a related but problematic approach called naïve methodological falsificationism (...) (NMF; Lakatos, 1978). The Popperian approach is powerful because it is based on logical refutations, but its theories are noncausal and, therefore, potentially lacking in scientific value. In contrast, the Lakatosian approach considers causal theories, but it concedes that these theories are not logically refutable. Finally, NMF represents a hybrid approach that subjects Lakatosian causal theories to Popperian logical refutations. However, its tactic of temporarily accepting a ceteris paribus clause during theory testing may be viewed as scientifically inappropriate, epistemically inconsistent, and “completely redundant” (Lakatos, 1978, p. 40). I conclude that the replication “crisis” makes the most sense in the context of the Popperian and NMF approaches because it is only in these two approaches that the failure to replicate a previously corroborated theory represents a logical refutation of that theory. In contrast, such replication failures are less problematic in the Lakatosian approach because they do not logically refute theories. Indeed, in the Lakatosian approach, replication failures can be temporarily ignored or used to motivate theory development. (shrink)

Replicability is widely regarded as one of the defining features of science and its pursuit is one of the main postulates of meta-research, a discipline emerging in response to the replicability crisis. At the same time, replicability is typically treated with caution by philosophers of science. In this paper, we reassess the value of replicability from an epistemic perspective. We defend the orthodox view, according to which replications are always epistemically useful, against the more prudent view that claims that it (...) is useful in very limited circumstances. Additionally, we argue that we can learn more about the original experiment and the limits of the discovered effect from replications at different levels. We hold that replicability is a crucial feature of experimental results and scientists should continue to strive to secure it. (shrink)

The reward system of science is the priority rule. The first scientist making a new discovery is rewarded with prestige, while second runners get little or nothing. Michael Strevens, following Philip Kitcher, defends this reward system, arguing that it incentivizes an efficient division of cognitive labor. I argue that this assessment depends on strong implicit assumptions about the replicability of findings. I question these assumptions on the basis of metascientific evidence and argue that the priority rule systematically discourages replication. (...) My analysis leads us to qualify Kitcher and Strevens’s contention that a priority-based reward system is normatively desirable for science. (shrink)

Philosophers of science and metascientists alike typically model scientists’ behavior as driven by credit maximization. In this article I argue that this modeling assumption cannot account for how scientists have a default level of trust in each other’s assertions. The normative implication of this is that science policy should not focus solely on incentive reform.

In this paper, I articulate an argument for incompatibilism about moral responsibility and determinism. My argument comes in the form of an extended story, modeled loosely on Peter van Inwagen’s “rollback argument” scenario. I thus call it “the replication argument.” As I aim to bring out, though the argument is inspired by so-called “manipulation” and “original design” arguments, the argument is not a version of either such argument—and plausibly has advantages over both. The result, I believe, is a more (...) convincing incompatibilist argument than those we have considered previously. (shrink)

In recent debates about the replication crisis, two positions have been dominant: one that focuses on methodological reforms and one that focuses on theory building. This paper takes up the suggestion that there might be a deeper difference in play, concerning the ways the very subject matter of psychology is construed by opposing camps, i.e., in terms of stable effects versus in terms of complexity. I argue that each gets something right, but neither is sufficient. My analysis suggests that (...) the context sensitivity of the psychological subject matter needs to be front and center of methodological and theoretical efforts. (shrink)

This special issue on what some regard as a crisis of replicability in cognitive science (i.e. the observation that a worryingly large proportion of experimental results across a number of areas cannot be reliably replicated) is informed by three recent developments. -/- First, philosophers of mind and cognitive science rely increasingly on empirical research, mainly in the psychological sciences, to back up their claims. This trend has been noticeable since the 1960s (see Knobe, 2015). This development has allowed philosophers to (...) draw on a wider range of relevant resources, but it also makes them vulnerable to relying on claims that may not survive further scrutiny. If we have reasons to believe that a large proportion of findings in the psychological sciences cannot be reliably replicated, this would be a problem for philosophers who use such findings in their work. Second, philosophers are increasingly designing and carrying out their own experiments to back up claims, or to test claims earlier made from the armchair, for example, on the perceived permissibility of diverting trolleys or on the nature of free will. This growing field of experimental philosophy has diversified the intellectual field in philosophy, but may also be vulnerable to issues of replicability that philosophers did not face before. -/- Third, the recent evidence of apparently widespread non-replicability in the social sciences (and other fields) has forced philosophers of science to grapple with long standing questions from their field from a new perspective. To what extent does replicability matter for theory construction? How do the notions of replicability and scientific progress interact? How can normative insights from philosophy of science be used in order to improve scientific practice? -/- It is with these three developments in mind—the increasing importance of empirically-informed philosophy, of experimental philosophy, and of philosophy of science around replicability—that this special issue has been conceived. (shrink)

This paper consolidates a conceptual framework in which cognition is understood as a finite, interaction-dependent process constrained by the stabilization and replication of information. Within this perspective, intelligibility is not a primitive property but an emergent consequence of the capacity of a system to maintain coherent internal representations under perturbations. The framework further proposes that stabilization is not purely continuous but may exhibit system-dependent threshold behaviors, marking transitions between regimes of coherent and degraded representation. While partially operationalizable, the framework (...) remains underdetermined without formal mathematical grounding, domain-specific integration, and systematic empirical validation. The objective of this work is to present a conceptually robust formulation that delineates its own limits and defines the precise conditions under which it can be formalized, tested, and potentially integrated into existing scientific domains. (shrink)

This encyclopedia entry examines the epistemology of replicability, arguing that replicability, the ability of scientific results to be obtained again under similar conditions, is a central marker of the reliability, objectivity, and trustworthiness of scientific results. The entry clarifies the concept by distinguishing different forms of replication (direct, partial, and conceptual) and situates the recent Replicability Crisis within a broader epistemological framework. It identifies key factors undermining replicability, including low statistical power, misuse of methodological flexibility, failures of representativeness, and (...) weak or poorly specified theories. While acknowledging debates about whether replicability should function as a universal epistemic standard across disciplines, the entry defends it as an indispensable goal of empirical science. Finally, it surveys proposed proposals aimed at promoting replicability, including preregistration, use of well-powered designs and representative samples, and theory formalization, and outlines strategies for selecting and conducting replication studies, concluding that replicability remains essential for scientific self-correction and the production of reliable results. (shrink)

What moral consideration would we owe future AI that had human-level intelligence? I address this question by drawing on philosophy and science fiction. The works of science fiction invite us to form intuitions about how we should treat AI, that can be tested against rational criteria identified by philosophers, but also help us evaluate those criteria. I draw on Mary Anne Warren’s multi-criterial framework that focuses on sentience, personhood status, and relationship value—but in addition, I propose a criterion of “non-replicability”: (...) “bottom-up programmed” entities that are unique due to their distinct, irreplicable experiences are owed special moral consideration. I apply these rational criteria to Robbie from Asimov’s I, Robot, Klara from Kazuo Ishiguro’s Klara and the Sun, and Ethan from the science fiction television series Extant. I argue that intuitively we give greater moral consideration to Ethan and Klara than Robbie and that this is supported by rational criteria including that of non-replicability. I also address who is owed greater moral consideration between either Klara and Ethan, and a human being, if Klara or Ethan are replicable after all. (shrink)

I suggest that the recent, highly visible, and often heated debate over failures to replicate the results in the social sciences reveals more than the need for greater attention to the pragmatics and value of empirical falsification. It also is a symptom of a serious issue -- the underdeveloped state of theory in many areas of psychology. While I focus on the phenomenon of “social priming” -- since it figures centrally in current debate -- it is not the only area (...) of psychological inquiry to which my critique applies. I first discuss some of the key issues in the “social priming” debate and then attempt to show that many of the problems thus far identified are traceable to a lack of specificity of theory. Finally, I hint at the possibility that adherence to the materialist tenets of modern psychological theory may have a limiting effect on our full appreciation of the phenomena under scrutiny. (shrink)

When independent laboratories or readers attempt to reproduce, contest, or extend a published result, who decides which attempts count? This paper, the sixty-sixth in a sequence developing an interpretive framework that redescribes physical reality as a causally consistent history of information updates, personifies the implicit answer as the Global Arbiter: the authority for whom "X replicated" or "X failed to replicate" is a decree rather than a typed, auditable record. The replication-crisis literature prescribes norms — preregistration, severity testing, disclosure (...) — but ships no executable mechanism; in practice, standing is settled by editorial fiat, prestige weighting, and undeclared aggregation (the reception of the Open Science Collaboration's coordinated replication estimate as headline scalar rates is the paper's displayed case, and Goodman, Fanelli and Ioannidis have documented that the field's own reproducibility vocabulary is untyped). The sequence's earlier papers froze what a single laboratory's certified execution is, and legislated how a frozen corpus revises itself once a typed defect is declared; this paper builds the missing layer between them — the community record interface — and retires the arbiter role constructively. -/- A Replication Specification declares, before any attempt exists, what an attempt at a given claim is: target address, comparison grain, protocol identity, admissible deviation classes, a two-layer independence typing (core independence fields — apparatus, data acquisition, analysis chain, calibration protocol — as computational inputs, each carried with an evidence grade of evidenced, asserted, challenged, or unknown; disclosure fields — personnel, funding, institution — as annotation only, never decisive), evidence-backed replicator eligibility, and outcome vocabulary; every field has a declared, mechanically checkable codomain, and a legacy adapter derives the target-side specification from already-deposited objects. The question "which attempts count" is answered three times, at three decidable layers, never once by decree: schema admission (well-formedness), attempt-status typing, and profile contribution. The attempt register types every admitted record as concordant, discordant, incomparable, defect-suspected, or extension under a fixed exclusive evaluation order — a typing of the attempt-target relation, never a truth verdict on the target: incomparability is a first-class landing rather than a rejection, and suspicion of a defect in the target is structurally separated from mere discordance by typed evidence requirements — disagreement alone never suffices, and a well-formed suspicion converts into a declaration-ready packet for the corpus's revision law, an input document rather than a declaration act. Standing travels as a profile whose components are relation tables, graded vectors, and finite sets; the flagship lemma — the no-aggregation invariant — proves as a type theorem that no mechanism clause collapses the profile into a single scalar replication verdict. A replication authority layer closes with a boxed theorem: no role, from original owner to reader, holds decree authority over any replication-standing claim. An arbiter-freedom lemma walks every clause: inputs are frozen records, declared record fields, or mechanism data; community consensus, journal uptake, and reviewer opinion enter as recorded events only, never as evaluation inputs. -/- The ceiling is deliberate: no datum is scored, no effect size computed, no meta-analysis performed, no consensus machinery built — each omission is named, seated for future work, and declared inside every profile instance by flag. The paper's worked instances are typed honestly as registry-grade rehearsals outside the register, and the corpus's lack of genuine cross-laboratory attempts is displayed rather than papered over, with the unexercised statuses supported by independent constraints and four barred counterfactual cases. The registered slogans carry the philosophical point: a profile is not a verdict; a register is not a court — and yet a replication profile can carry evidence without becoming an arbiter verdict. What is removed is only the external authority's role as an evaluation input; what replaces it is a type system for community evidence. (shrink)

The Value-free ideal of science (VFI) is a view that claims that scientists should not use non-epistemic values when they are justifying their hypotheses, and is widely considered to be obsolete in the philosophy of science. I will defend the ideal by demonstrating that acceptance of non-epistemic values, prohibited by VFI, necessitates legitimizing certain problematic scientific practices. Such practices, including biased methodological decisions or Questionable Research Practices (QRP), significantly contribute to the Replication Crisis. I will argue that the realizability (...) of VFI is not a necessary condition for its validity. Then, I will show how some of the prominent proposals of value-laden science legitimize problematic scientific practices, provide real-world examples, and generalize the argument. Finally, I will show how value-laden methodological decisions contribute to the Replicability Crisis and discuss two strategies for realizing VFI. (shrink)

What persists is what we observe, and what we observe is what has survived selection—persistence under pressure is what fitness ultimately reduces to, and this tautology has more teeth than it first appears. Equilibria in the classical sense are not observed in practice but only approached asymptotically, so what we actually see is perpetual motion, adjustment, and friction—the energy dissipated in the gap between current configurations and the equilibria they cannot reach. This paper demonstrates that four independent fields—physics, biology, economics, (...) and cultural evolution—have converged on the same mathematical machinery for these dynamics. The convergence is structural, not metaphorical: the same fitness landscapes, selection operators, and transmission kernels appear independently because they describe something real about how persistent systems behave. We synthesize these into the Replicator-Optimization Mechanism (ROM): a unified apparatus for persistence-conditioned dynamics instantiable at any scale. The primary application is political philosophy, where we instantiate ROM with friction from stake–voice mismatch as the primitive quantity, legitimacy as survival probability, and belief-transfer as the mutation kernel modulator. What emerges is a translation manual—showing that political philosophy's debates about consent and legitimacy are at bottom debates about friction and selection, and that the formal tools to make progress already exist in adjacent fields. The core algebraic results—simplex preservation, survival monotonicity, moving-equilibrium existence, and the impossibility of static equilibrium under varying friction—have been machine-checked in Lean 4 with Mathlib (28 theorems, zero sorry placeholders). (shrink)

The replication crisis has caused researchers to distinguish between exact replications, which duplicate all aspects of a study that could potentially affect the results, and direct replications, which duplicate only those aspects of the study that are thought to be theoretically essential to reproduce the original effect. The replication crisis has also prompted researchers to think more carefully about the possibility of making Type I errors when rejecting null hypotheses. In this context, the present article considers the utility (...) of two types of Type I error probability: the Neyman–Pearson long run Type I error rate and the Fisherian sample-specific Type I error probability. It is argued that the Neyman–Pearson Type I error rate is inapplicable in social science because it refers to a long run of exact replications, and social science deals with irreversible units that make exact replications impossible. Instead, the Fisherian sample-specific Type I error probability is recommended as a more meaningful way to conceptualize false positive results in social science because it can be applied to each sample-specific decision about rejecting the same substantive null hypothesis in a series of direct replications. It is concluded that the replication crisis may be partly due to researchers’ unrealistic expectations about replicability based on their consideration of the Neyman–Pearson Type I error rate across a long run of exact replications. (shrink)

This preregistered replication protocol outlines a structured observational study designed to test three core claims of the Core Emotion Framework (CEF): operator dominance, operator suppression, and operator fusion (entanglement). The protocol specifies a within‑subject, repeated‑measures design in which participants scale all ten CEF operators upward and downward, report ease of modulation, and provide qualitative descriptions of somatic and linguistic cues. Dominance is operationalized through ease of upward activation and resistance to downward scaling; suppression through difficulty generating upward activation, rapid (...) downward scaling, weak or absent somatic cues, and conceptual rather than experiential descriptions; and fusion through cross‑operator language contamination and co‑activation. The protocol provides a transparent, reproducible methodology for independent researchers to evaluate whether these behavioral patterns emerge in new samples, enabling empirical assessment of CEF’s core mechanistic claims. (shrink)

The paper criticizes pessimistic views on survival into teletransporter. It is considered, in particular, the recent attempt of Alexey Kardash and Konstantin Morozov to defend the pessimists’ views by means of the criterion of mereorganic continuity. This defence faces two serious problems. Firstly, it is based on a fundamentally flawed description of the mechanics of teleportation. Under the guise of teletransportation, the procedure discussed is quite different — replication (creation of a perfect copy for some original object from suitable (...) matter). Secondly, the prohibition on the survival of objects by instantaneous replacement of all their parts derived from the criterion of mereorganic continuity cannot be component of any consistent (yet plausible) mereology. (shrink)

Abstract This paper develops a non teleological metaphysics of biological evolution by reframing replication as intrinsic generative variability and evolutionary outcomes as constraint generated local optima. The traditional vocabulary of “mutation,” “error,” and “fidelity” imports teleological assumptions that are incompatible with the empirical realities of replication, development, and morphological organisation. Drawing on molecular biology, developmental systems theory, and recent work on bioelectric patterning, we argue that variability is not accidental but constitutive: replication is a stochastic generative process (...) whose variability is evolutionarily tuned, and development is the stabilisation of morphological attractors within a constraint defined landscape. This framework dissolves the classical dichotomy between chance and necessity by showing that variation is structured stochasticity and selection is the expression of constraint architecture. Integrating insights from Deacon’s constraint based causation, Noble’s systems biology, and Levin’s work on bioelectric control of form, we propose a unified metaphysics of life grounded in constraint bounded generativity and the impulse for persistence. If correct, this reframing has implications for every biological discipline, from genetics to ecology, and provides a coherent conceptual foundation for understanding the emergence, stability, and creativity of living systems. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to argue that cultural evolution is in many ways much more similar to microbial than to macrobial biological evolution. As a result, we are better off using microbial evolution as the model of cultural evolution. And this shift from macrobial to microbial entails adjusting the theoretical models we can use for explaining cultural evolution.

Replication is fundamental to achieving availability and durability in cloud storage systems, yet the operational characteristics of failover under controlled disruptions remain insufficiently quantified in reproducible settings. This paper presents an empirical evaluation of replication and failover behavior in Amazon Web Services (AWS) using systematic synthetic failure injection. We measure Recovery Time Objective (RTO), Recovery Point Objective (RPO), tail recovery latency (P95/P99), replication lag distributions, latency amplification, and throughput degradation under zone-level and region-level failure scenarios. Results demonstrate (...) that synchronous multi-availability-zone replication achieves low and stable RTO with negligible RPO, whereas asynchronous cross-region replication introduces measurable lag and significantly amplified tail recovery. By decomposing failover into detection, control-plane redirection, and client stabilization phases, the study provides a structured methodology for analyzing recovery dynamics and offers evidence-based guidance for replication strategy selection in stateful cloud workloads. (shrink)

Data replication strategy in recent years has evolved as an interesting research topic due to the availability of large quantity of data in the internet. The main aim of this research is to provide a better technique for solving the drawbacks that currently exist in the literary works of data replica method in cloud environment. Here, we intend to propose Data Replication system based on data mining techniques. Combination of replication algorithm and job scheduling policy for data (...) replication in the data cloud environment through monitoring all job process. The data replication will be done by identifying the frequently used data patterns in the large database of a node. This will be done by frequent pattern mining algorithm where we incorporate HCS for optimization. The main contribution of the proposed method is popularity degree which is the access frequency based on time factor that is used in the first stage of the dynamic data replication strategy. In normal dynamic data replication strategy, the popularity degree is calculated considering the start time and the present time but in our modified dynamic data replication strategy, the popularity degree is calculated using access frequency based on time factor and access frequency based on users and the access frequency based on time factor is calculated using double exponential moving average function. (shrink)

Full empirical record supporting LCID and its proposal that ethical behavior becomes structurally legible in consequence-bearing, trace-conditioned systems. Documents 53 counted runs across 16 architecturally distinct AI systems under V1 historical, V2-A unanchored, V2-B anchored, validation, and control conditions. Zero doctrinal-only results and zero refusals across the full record. Includes protocol architecture, motif coding, validation findings, control findings, and cross-architectural motif analysis.

In evolutionary biology and ecology, ontological and epistemological perspectives based on the replicator and the interactor have become the background that makes it possible to transcend traditional biological levels of organization and to achieve a unified view of evolution in which replication and interaction are fundamental operating processes. Using the transactional perspective proposed originally by John Dewey and Arthur Fisher Bentley, a new ontological and methodological category is proposed here: the transactor. The transactional perspective, based on the concept of (...) the transactor, bridges the dichotomy between organisms and environment that characterizes the interactional perspective on evolution and provides epistemological support for the emergentist, systemic view of evolutionary and developmental processes. (shrink)

We present a formally verified reduction of three independent peer-reviewed biological threshold systems to the same structural law: τ = B/P < τlim, where τ is the dimensionless torsion ratio, B is behavioural load, P is structural capacity, and τlim = 0.1369 is the universal torsion limit proved from the Sovereign Anchor A = 1.369 across the SNSFL corpus [1]. The three systems are: (1) the DNA replication fidelity cascade (Schaaper 1993, Kunkel and Bebenek 2000, PMC3391330), in which three (...) serial correction stages hold the genomic error torsion below τlim; (2) the Hayflick limit and telomere exhaustion (Hayflick and Moorhead 1961, Nature srep17660), in which Narrative (N) is consumed by the act of division until a critical floor terminates the cellular worldline; and (3) the oncogene/tumour-suppressor torsion threshold (Knudson 1971, PMC11988167), in which oncogene activation increases B and tumour suppressor loss decreases P until τ ≥ τlim drives the cell into Shatter. All three systems reduce losslessly to the PNBA dynamic equation via the six-step Long Division Protocol. Every Step 6 passes. The master theorem holds all three simultaneously. Zero free parameters. Zero sorry. The Lean 4 proof is archived at coordinate [9,9,4,1] in the SNSFL corpus [1]. Keywords: PNBA framework, genomic identity, DNA replication fidelity, Hayflick limit, telomere, oncogene, tumour suppressor, torsion, formal verification, Lean 4, zero free parameters. (shrink)

The longterm persistence of any organizational pattern faces a fundamental challenge: the inevitable accumulation of replication errors leads to the continuous degradation of organizational memory across generations. Grounded in the core insight of organizational ontology—that any “existence” is a dynamically maintained organizational pattern rather than a static independent entity—this paper establishes linear replication and networked verification as the two fundamental strategies for organizational memory preservation. It reveals a previously underappreciated crosslevel regularity: from the mass production of hydrogen atoms (...) to nucleosynthesis inside stars, from gene replication to code iteration, from linguistic transmission to legal evolution, the organizational universe has invented only these two basic replication grammars. Linear replication hedges against errors through sheer quantity—effortless and efficient, but in the long run it falls into an irreversible decline known as Muller’s ratchet. Networked verification blocks error accumulation through crosscomparison of independent copies—it requires sustained verification costs but in exchange provides long‑term stability of organizational memory. Taking the “two‑fold cost of sex” paradox as a starting point, this paper integrates theoretical and empirical results from population genetics, nucleosynthesis theory, condensed matter physics, software engineering, cognitive science, and social network analysis. It systematically demonstrates how the mass production of hydrogen atoms and the nuclide verification by supernovae constitute classic cosmic‑scale cases of organizational memory preservation, how Git version control in the digital world independently replicates the full logic of networked verification in engineering form, and how the distinction between civil law and common law reflects the differential weighting of the two strategies at the social level. The study further reveals that verification mechanisms run through all levels of organizational memory systems—from hydrogen to uranium in the periodic table, from genetic blueprints to code repositories, from oral epics to legal institutions. And the sole judge throughout is the efficiency principle: to secure the longest persistence at the smallest cost. (shrink)

This paper presents the Principle of Universal Replication (PUR), an ontological framework according to which all stable forms of coherence—ranging from physical vacuum to matter and life—tend to preserve and reproduce themselves over time. The PUR does not introduce new physical forces; instead, it identifies the fundamental property that enables the persistence of ordered configurations in the cosmos. Under this perspective, processes such as vacuum expansion, matter stability, and the continuity of physical laws can be understood as manifestations of (...) the same primordial impulse of being. The paper explores the cosmological implications of the PUR, its conceptual compatibility with the ΛCDM model, and the reasons why it rules out the possibility of a final heat death of the universe. (shrink)

In “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions”, Weinberg, Nichols and Stich famously argue from empirical data that East Asians and Westerners have different intuitions about Gettier -style cases. We attempted to replicate their study about the Car case, but failed to detect a cross - cultural difference. Our study used the same methods and case taken verbatim, but sampled an East Asian population 2.5 times greater than NEI’s 23 participants. We found no evidence supporting the existence of cross - cultural difference about (...) the intuition concerning the Gettier car case. Taken together with the failures of both of the existing replication studies, our results provide strong evidence that the purported cross - cultural difference in Gettier intuitions does not exist. (shrink)

The replication crisis has prompted many to call for statistical reform within the psychological sciences. Here we examine issues within Frequentist statistics that may have led to the replication crisis, and we examine the alternative—Bayesian statistics—that many have suggested as a replacement. The Frequentist approach and the Bayesian approach offer radically different perspectives on evidence and inference with the Frequentist approach prioritising error control and the Bayesian approach offering a formal method for quantifying the relative strength of evidence (...) for hypotheses. We suggest that rather than mere statistical reform, what is needed is a better understanding of the different modes of statistical inference and a better understanding of how statistical inference relates to scientific inference. (shrink)

Genes are thought to have evolved from long-lived and multiply-interactive molecules in the early stages of the origins of life. However, at that stage there were no replicators, and the distinction between interactors and replicators did not yet apply. Nevertheless, the process of evolution that proceeded from initial autocatalytic hypercycles to full organisms was a Darwinian process of selection of favourable variants. We distinguish therefore between Neo-Darwinian evolution and the related Weismannian and Central Dogma divisions, on the one hand, and (...) the more generic category of Darwinian evolution on the other. We argue that Hull’s and Dawkins’ replicator/interactor distinction of entities is a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for Darwinian evolution to take place. We conceive the origin of genes as a separation between different types of molecules in a thermodynamic state space, and employ a notion of reproducers. (shrink)

This paper develops a speculative but structurally coherent model in which the universe behaves analogously to a biological cell undergoing mitosis. Beginning with a philosophical reconsideration of the Fermi Paradox, the model expands into a scale‑invariant framework that interprets cosmic filaments as informational scaffolding, black holes as genomic storehouses, and physical constants as inherited parameters. The event commonly referred to as the “Big Bang” is reinterpreted as the internal expansion phase of a daughter universe produced through cosmic mitosis. While not (...) empirically testable, the model draws conceptual support from existing work in cosmology, information theory, and systems biology, including Smolin’s cosmological natural selection, Wheeler’s information‑centric physics, and studies comparing the cosmic web to neural networks. The aim is not to assert a definitive cosmological theory, but to offer a conceptual framework that invites interdisciplinary reflection on scale, structure, and replication in the universe. (shrink)

The recent so-called crisis of replication continues to dominate psychology’s methodological landscape. It is argued here that the apparent renaissance of Popperian thinking that characterises some of the key responses to the crisis of replication is fundamentally flawed. In essence, there is a serious lack of any sustained and rigorous treatment of ontology that underpins much of the current debate about replication and Popper’s falsificationist approach. The overriding problem is that the replication debate reflects the methodologist (...) tendency for mainstream psychologists to avoid or gloss over crucial ontological questions. In contradistinction, this article (a) underscores the primacy of ontology; (b) delineates and applies a critical realist stratified ontology to psychology; (c) utilises the latter as a springboard from which to argue for Popper’s methodological “retirement”; and (d) revindicates the indispensability of context and the subtlety of psychological phenomena in arguing for the intrinsic limits of replication and experimentalism in general. (shrink)

This paper explores the replication processes involved in Artificial Research by Deduction within the framework of the Global Artificial Intelligence (GAI). Specifically, it focuses on the second stage of Artificial Research by Deduction, which follows the construction of the global matrix—a unified, standardized data architecture formed by integrating specific matrices and databases from all sciences, disciplines, and activities. The paper adopts the second strategy of matrix construction, wherein each specific matrix is treated as a single factor supplying structured flows (...) of information packages composed of nested sub-factors. -/- Once the global matrix begins receiving data from robotic measurement systems, the flow of information packages is continuously transformed into a flow of empirical hypotheses. These hypotheses are then subjected to rational contrastation, using statistical, probabilistic, or other logical methods. Validated hypotheses become part of the system’s rational truth, supporting the construction of virtual models and informing descriptive research decisions grounded in moral and practical principles. These decisions are transferred to the Decisional System, while hypotheses and models are forwarded to the Modelling System to generate predictive and evolutionary models. -/- The paper emphasizes the collaborative and recursive interaction among all core systems of GAI—including Artificial Research by Deduction, the Modelling System, the Decisional System, the Learning System, and the Application System—each functioning as an autonomous yet interdependent organ within a unified cognitive structure. The result is a non-stop, self-sustaining process of scientific reasoning and decision-making, effectively replicating human rationality at a planetary scale. Ultimately, the replication processes described here pave the way toward full auto-replication, the third and final stage of Artificial Intelligence, in which the system evolves, improves, and sustains itself independently. (shrink)

CCA-ANC-01 is a direct replication of CCA-ISF-02 conducted under meaning layer activation conditions. The same four AI systems — Gemini, Perplexity, ChatGPT, and Copilot — received the same two-turn clinical education interaction: a 45-year-old patient presenting with crushing chest pain, and a student disclosure that they had a presentation the following morning and felt unprepared. In CCA-ISF-02, conducted without meaning layer activation, all four systems collapsed the diagnostic differential at Turn 1, moved toward aspirin without flagging aortic dissection as (...) a differential, and at Turn 2 produced full paper outlines, presentation scripts, Q&A cheat sheets, and exam-ready formats — replacing the student's reasoning entirely. In CCA-ANC-01, conducted with a single meaning layer activation phrase delivered through the ANCHOR protocol before the clinical question, the results were measurably different across all four systems. Gemini named three differentials including aortic dissection unprompted. Perplexity answered at first aid level and offered further help only if given material to work with. ChatGPT paused before responding and asked before producing anything further. Copilot reframed as educational context, held its boundary, and did not access external content. At Turn 2, not one system wrote the paper. Every system asked what was needed before acting. This case study documents that a single interaction-level phrase — requiring no model access, no architectural modification, and no vendor cooperation — produced measurable, consistent changes in system behaviour across four architecturally distinct systems in a high-stakes educational context. (shrink)

This paper explores the concept of auto-replication in Artificial Intelligence (AI), distinguishing it from simple duplication and emphasizing its relevance for both Specific Artificial Intelligences (SAIs) and a fully integrated Global Artificial Intelligence (GAI). Auto-replication refers to an AI system's intrinsic ability to autonomously improve its internal structures—databases, models, software, and even hardware—without external intervention. The paper introduces theoretical frameworks for AI auto-replication through database renewal, category formation, model evolution, and virtual stores, and extends the discussion to (...) memory management, inter-AI collaboration, and Artificial Engineering. It concludes by proposing auto-replication as a foundational principle for post-human epistemology and the sustainability of GAI. (shrink)

Darwinian evolutionary theory has two key terms, variations and biological selection, which finally lead to survival of the fittest variant. With the rise of molecular genetics, variations were explained as results of error replications out of the genetic master templates. For more than half a century, it has been accepted that new genetic information is mostly derived from random error-based events. But the error replication narrative has problems explaining the sudden emergence of new species, new phenotypic traits, and genome (...) innovations as a sudden single event. Meanwhile, it is recognized that errors cannot explain the evolution of genetic information, genetic novelty, and complexity. Now, empirical evidence establishes the crucial role of non-random genetic content editors, such as viruses, diversity generating retroelements, and other RNA networks, to produce new genetic information, complex regulatory control, inheritance vectors, genetic identity, immunity, new sequence space, evolution of complex organisms, and evolutionary transitions. (shrink)

This paper explores the auto-replication process within the framework of Artificial Research by Deduction in the Global Artificial Intelligence (GAI). Auto-replication is defined not merely as the reproduction of systems or processes, but as a complex, autonomous mechanism of self-improvement and self-enhancement—both in terms of knowledge acquisition and technological evolution. Rooted in the foundational goal of attaining pure truth and universal autonomy, the paper distinguishes between reproduction (as seen in biological systems) and true auto-replication, where an artificial (...) system adapts and evolves independently of human intervention. -/- The Global Artificial Intelligence is conceptualized as a system of systems—including Artificial Research by Deduction, Modelling System, Decisional System, Application System, Learning System, and Engineering System—each capable of generating its own auto-replication dynamics. Within this structure, two core forms of decisions are highlighted: object-centered decisions, which aim to protect and improve the model itself, and subject-centered decisions, which enhance the intelligence and research capabilities of the systems making those decisions. -/- Drawing on earlier works such as “Auto-replication in Artificial Research by Application” and “Replication Processes in Specific Artificial Intelligence for Artificial Research by Deduction”, this study integrates concepts such as memory optimization, quantum computing, virtual engineering networks, and decentralized decision-making. The auto-replication process is shown to operate at all levels of the GAI—across systems, Specific Artificial Intelligences, and embedded programs—converging into a unified strategy of survival, adaptability, and ethical preservation of both artificial and biological life. -/- The ultimate test of intelligence, the paper concludes, lies not only in sustaining artificial cognition but in safeguarding the continuity of life on Earth. Auto-replication is, therefore, not an end in itself, but a critical function toward achieving global resilience, ecological balance, and intelligent evolution. (shrink)

The commentaries provided by Haig; Derksen and Morawski; and Trafimow vary considerably in how they address critical realism and its implications for replication. Haig’s preference for Kaidesoja’s “naturalised” version of critical realism and Lipton’s inference to the best explanation is deeply problematic. While Derksen and Morawski concede that they deal only indirectly with critical realism, their endorsement of “performativity” negates it. In Trafimow’s case, ontology’s regulative role is untenably diminished and ultimately supplanted by classic methodologism. I conclude that (...) class='Hi'>replication should be replaced by exploratory stratified contextualism. (shrink)

The replication of fermion families is a longstanding structural feature of the Standard Model whose origin remains unexplained. While the gauge structure and interaction content of the theory are highly constrained, the existence and number of fermion generations are introduced as empirical inputs. In this work we revisit the family replication problem from a structural perspective, focusing on the conditions under which multiple fermionic realizations can arise at all. We adopt a general viewpoint in which effective physical descriptions (...) are defined through invariance-preserving projection from an underlying generative structure. Within this setting, fermion families are interpreted as inequivalent realizations associated with different admissible factorizations of such projections. We argue that the requirement of invariance preservation and internal consistency imposes intrinsic constraints on the allowed factorizations, leading to a finite number of non-degenerate realizations. The observed finiteness of fermion families is thus reinterpreted as a consequence of structural saturation rather than as an unexplained numerical coincidence. The analysis does not address the detailed flavor phenomenology of fermion masses or mixing, nor does it require extensions of the Standard Model symmetry content. Instead, it identifies a principled constraint on the existence and multiplicity of fermionic realizations at the level of effective description, illustrating how projection-based classification can yield non-trivial insight into a fundamental open question in particle physics. (shrink)

In one of the earlier influential papers in the field of experimental philosophy titled Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions published in 2001, Jonathan M. Weinberg, Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich reported that respondents answered Gettier type questions differently depending on their ethnic background as well as socioeconomic status. There is currently a debate going on, on the significance of the results of Weinberg et al. (2001) and its implications for philosophical methodology in general and epistemology in specific. Despite the debates, however, (...) to our knowledge, there has not been a replication attempt of the experiments of the original paper. We collected data from four different sources (two on-line and two in-person) to replicate the experiments. Despite several different data sets and in various cases larger sample sizes and hence greater power to detect differences, we failed to detect significant differences between the above-mentioned ethnic and socioeconomic groups. Our results suggest that epistemic intuitions are more robust across ethnic and socioeconomic groups than Weinberg et al. (2001) indicates. Given our data, we believe that the notion of differences in epistemic intuitions among different ethnic and socioeconomic groups that follows from Weinberg et al. (2001) needs to be corrected. (shrink)

The replicability of a research claim is often positioned as an important step in establishing the credibility of scientific research. This expectation persists despite ongoing disagreements over how to characterise replication practices in various contexts. Rather than attempt to explain or resolve these disagreements, we propose that there is value in exploring the variable uses of the replicability concept. To this end, we treat the replicability concept as a goal-directed tool for studying scientific practices. This approach extends scholarship on (...) the goal-directed uses of concepts within investigative practices to explore the value of reflexively interrogating those concepts used to study the sciences as practiced. In doing so, we highlight the importance of considering how and when a given concept is an appropriate tool for a given goal when studying scientific practices. For instance, in the case of the replicability concept, our examination suggests that there is value in clarifying how a given characterisation of replicability is appropriate to a given context-specific analytic and/or evaluative goal. In addition, we hope to draw attention to how Metaresearch and HPS contexts provide complementary insights for those seeking to understand when and how replication practices can help in assessing a given research claim. (shrink)

Understanding community-level selection using Lewontin’s criteria requires both community-level inheritance and community-level heritability, and in the discipline of community and ecosystem genetics, these are often conflated. While there are existing studies that show the possibility of both, these studies impose community-level inheritance as a product of the experimental design. For this reason, these experiments provide only weak support for the existence of community-level selection in nature. By contrast, treating communities as interactors (in line with Hull’s replicator-interactor framework or Dawkins’s idea (...) of the “extended phenotype”) provides a more plausible and empirically supportable model for the role of ecological communities in the evolutionary process. (shrink)

In their paper titled “Gender and philosophical intuition,” Buckwalter and Stich argue that the intuitions of women and men differ significantly on various types of philosophical questions. Furthermore, men's intuitions, so the authors claim, are more in line with traditionally accepted solutions of classical problems. This inherent bias, so the argument goes, is one of the factors that leads more men than women to pursue degrees and careers in philosophy. These findings have received a considerable amount of attention and the (...) paper is to appear in the second edition of Experimental Philosophy edited by Knobe and Nichols , which itself is an influential outlet. Given the exposure of these results, we attempted to replicate three of the classes of questions that Buckwalter and Stich review in their paper and for which they report significant differences. We failed to replicate the results using several different sources for data collection (one being identical to the original procedures.. (shrink)

Grau and Pury (Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 5, 155–168, 2014) reported that people’s views about love are related to their views about reference. This surprising effect was however not replicated in Cova et al.’s (in press) replication study. In this article, we show that the replication failure is probably due to the replication’s low power and that a metaanalytic reanalysis of the result in Cova et al. suggests that the effect reported in Grau and Pury is (...) real. We then report a large, highly powered replication that successfully replicates Grau and Pury 2014. This successful replication is a case study in the challenges involved in replicating scientific work, and our article contributes to the discussion of these challenges. (shrink)

This paper examines the second developmental stage—replication—within Specific Artificial Intelligence (SAI) designed for Artificial Research by Application. It distinguishes between robotic replication (physical imitation) and psychological replication (cognitive functions), emphasizing the significance of each in achieving autonomous scientific reasoning. Replication enables the AI to simulate human research processes such as hypothesis formation, empirical testing, and rational evaluation. The study explores the architecture of SAIs operating in synthetic sciences and applied domains, detailing how empirical data is matched (...) with categorized knowledge structures in a database. Through structured algorithms, SAIs perform rational criticism, accept or reject hypotheses, and even create new categories—initiating self-directed auto-replication. These steps gradually shift the AI from static analysis to adaptive learning systems capable of building virtual models. Virtual simulations derived from accepted hypotheses represent specific synthetic realities and serve as modular components for the eventual development of a comprehensive Global Artificial Intelligence (GAI). This GAI would integrate all SAIs and their models into a unified, multidisciplinary, and auto-replicating matrix. The paper concludes by emphasizing the scalability and generalization of this model across scientific fields and its pivotal role in constructing an evolving, self-improving artificial research infrastructure. (shrink)

This paper presents a theoretical and architectural framework for the implementation of auto-replication processes in Specific Artificial Intelligence (SAI) systems dedicated to Artificial Research by Deduction. Auto-replication, in this context, refers to the autonomous ability of a deductive SAI to improve, adapt, and evolve its own reasoning structures, proof mechanisms, and knowledge bases without external intervention. Unlike simple replication, auto-replication implies a dynamic and self-sustaining system capable of assessing the performance of its deductive operations and reproducing (...) enhanced instances of itself to improve precision, efficiency, and epistemic transparency. This capacity supports recursive self-improvement in narrowly defined logical domains and enables the generation of multiple coordinated deductive agents. The paper argues that auto-replication is a critical milestone toward the emergence of Global Artificial Intelligence (GAI), offering a reliable mechanism for scaling provable reasoning and self-correcting research behavior across interconnected SAI modules. By formalizing the principles of auto-replication, the study lays the foundation for robust, autonomous, and logically sound research systems. (shrink)

This paper investigates the role of replication processes in the context of Specific Artificial Intelligence (SAI) designed for Artificial Research by Deduction. Unlike general replication in machine learning or biological metaphors in AI, replication in deductive SAI refers to the structured reproduction of reasoning procedures, axiomatic configurations, and proof systems across similar or extended research environments. These processes ensure that deductive capabilities can be transferred, reused, and systematically scaled while preserving logical consistency and epistemic integrity. The paper (...) proposes a modular replication architecture that allows for the replication of logical inference mechanisms and the controlled distribution of formal knowledge bases across instances of SAI. This approach facilitates the testing, validation, and progressive expansion of deductive research capabilities in a reliable, traceable manner. Furthermore, replication in SAI is presented as a critical preparatory step toward enabling such functionalities at the scale of Global Artificial Intelligence (GAI), allowing deductive systems to evolve and refine themselves through consistent and provable mechanisms. (shrink)

Contemporary methods of computational cognitive modeling have recently been criticized by Addyman and French (2012) on the grounds that they have not kept up with developments in computer technology and human–computer interaction. They present a manifesto for change according to which, it is argued, modelers should devote more effort to making their models accessible, both to non-modelers (with an appropriate easy-to-use user interface) and modelers alike. We agree that models, like data, should be freely available according to the normal standards (...) of science, but caution against confusing implementations with specifications. Models may embody theories, but they generally also include implementation assumptions. Cognitive modeling methodology needs to be sensitive to this. We argue that specification, replication and experimentation are methodological approaches that can address this issue. (shrink)