In this paper we interpret some key passages of scripture from Eastern religions and correlate them with salient features of a computer simulated universe. Apparently, the Eastern mystics of the past were able to intuit through philosophy and meditation the key properties of what we now call the Simulation Hypothesis.

Why does religion keep happening? Naturalist accounts explain the mechanisms — cognitive by-products, evolutionary functions, sociological utility. This paper argues they leave the prior question unanswered: why do those mechanisms produce this specific orientation, toward what is ultimately and unconditionally real, rather than any other? The answer advanced here is structural. Beings constituted by a relational ground necessarily experience their existence as structured by dependence, orientation, and a dimension that exceeds any finite object. They necessarily express that structure in symbolic (...) and communal form. Those forms necessarily carry an orientation toward ultimacy — because that is what they are interpreting. Cultural systems that articulate and practically orient life toward such concerns are what religion is. Its emergence was not contingent. It was always going to happen. The argument is non-confessional and establishes no particular tradition's truth claims. Its consequences are nonetheless precise. Naturalist accounts operate at the mechanistic level this argument explains — they are not competitors but confirmations at a different register. Secular ideologies are not independent alternatives to religious orientation but displacements of it, redirecting an ineliminable structural demand onto finite objects. Religious diversity confirms rather than refutes the argument: a single structural orientation interpreted by historically situated finite beings will produce exactly the diversity the record displays. Apophatic traditions represent not the absence of religious expression but its most self-aware form. -/- The paper situates itself against Tillich's account of ultimate concern, from which it differs at the methodological root: religion is not identified through existential analysis but derived from the metaphysical conditions of finite participation in a relational ground. (shrink)

The Earth Path, as I define it, is a way of life that integrates spiritual practice with ecological ethics. It is the living embodiment of the spiritual common core found in Nature Religions, guiding individuals to align their beliefs and practices with the rhythms and cycles of the Earth. To walk the Earth Path is to recognize the sacredness of nature and to act in ways that honor, protect, and sustain the natural world. The Earth Path is thus central (...) to how Nature Religions guide us in connecting with the natural world, addressing the ecological crisis, and fostering a spiritual life that is grounded in nature. -/- . (shrink)

Religion emerged among early humans because both purposive and non-purposive explanations were being employed but understanding was lacking of their precise scope and limits. Given also a context of very limited human power, the resultant foregrounding of agency and purposive explanation expressed itself in religion’s marked tendency towards anthropomorphism and its key role in legitimizing behaviour. The inevitability of death also structures the religious outlook; with ancestors sometimes assigned a role in relation to the living. Subjective elements such as the (...) experience of dreams and the internalization of moral precepts also play their part. Two important sources of variation among religions concern the adoption of a dualist or non-dualist perspective, and whether or not the religion’s early political experience is such as to generate a systematic doctrine subordinating politics to religion. The near ubiquity and endurance of religion are further illuminated by analysis of its functions and ideological role. Religion tends to be socially conservative but has the potential to be revolutionary. (shrink)

Do the same epistemic standards govern scientific and religious belief? Or should science and religion operate in completely independent epistemic spheres? Commentators have recently been divided on William James’s answer to this question. One side depicts “The Will to Believe” as offering a separate-spheres defense of religious belief in the manner of Galileo. The other contends that “The Will to Believe” seeks to loosen the usual epistemic standards so that religious and scientific beliefs can both be justified by a unitary (...) set of evidentiary rules. I argue that James did build a unitary epistemology but not by loosening cognitive standards. In his psychological research, he had adopted the Comtian view that hypotheses and regulative assumptions play a crucial role in the context of discovery even though they must be provisionally adopted before they can be supported by evidence. “The Will to Believe” relies on this methodological point to achieve a therapeutic goal—to convince despairing Victorians that religious faith can be reconciled with a scientific epistemology. James argues that the prospective theist is in the same epistemic situation with respect to the “religious hypothesis” as the scientist working in the context of discovery. (shrink)

This article proposes a polythetic definition of religion using Afro-Brazilian religions as prototypes: not as the correct definition, but as a thought experiment to enable theorizing beyond Christian biases that have shaped the study of religion. By using a stable-property-cluster approach to definition—addressing weaknesses in both monothetic-essentialist and family-resemblance approaches—the resulting framework emphasizes hybridity, ritual, healing, and fluid theologies/spiritologies. This shifts the focus from institutionalized, text-based, and hegemonically networked religious forms. The definition is proposed as a theoretical intervention that (...) foregrounds the epistemological crossroads (encruzilhadas) at which scholars—in dialogue with their interlocutors—construct and deploy disciplinary categories. (shrink)

Why God is believed to be male in all Abrahamic religions since there is no female God. Logically in order to be distinguished as male there must be female also along side. Therefore how God can be specified as male and if male why God doesn't have any female of him, since being omnipotent? The characterization of God as anthropomorphic and male in the Abrahamic religions stems from a combination of historical, cultural, and theological factors. Here are some (...) key points to consider. (shrink)

Cécile Laborde has argued that the freedom we think of as ‘freedom of religion’ should be understood as a bundle of separate and relatively independent freedoms. I criticise that approach by pointing out that it is insufficiently sensitive to facts about the sorts of entities that liberal states are. I argue that states have good reasons to mould phenomena such as religion into easily governable monoliths. If this is a problem from the normative point of view, it is not due (...) to descriptively inadequate accounts of religion, but a problem with a lack of realism about the sort of institutions states are. My conclusion is a three-way disjunction: either one must reckon with liberal states’ historically determined limitations in the management of changing social phenomena, or one should direct one’s frustration at the marriage of liberalism and the state, or the very existence of states is normatively problematic. (shrink)

Commentary on José Eduardo Porcher's Afro-Brazilian Religions (Cambridge University Press, 2025).

This article argues (against John Hick and Huston Smith) that different religions teach truths that are different even at the most fundamental level. Nevertheless these are genuine axiological truth claims that can be subject to rational evaluation, differentiating well-founded interpretations of a given religion from interpretations that are not well-founded.

Commentary on José Eduardo Porcher's Afro-Brazilian Religions (Cambridge University Press, 2025).

What role should religion play in public discourse? Not long ago Richard Rorty argued, in more than one place, that religion is a "conversation stopper" which polite people refer to only in private conversations. Religious believers complain, however, that this practice renders it impossible for them to participate in public discourse. They ask whether a democratic community is worthy of the name if it effectively forbids (by custom or legislation) a significant segment of its citizens from acknowledging and drawing upon (...) their own traditions to help justify their moral and political claims? This paper draws upon the work of Jeffrey Stout, Robert Brandom, and importantly a Confucian understanding of ritual to argue that Rorty goes too far in arguing that religious assumptions have no place in public discourse. (shrink)

This article critically examines the traditional concept of subjectivity as rooted in Christian theology and Western philosophy, revealing how it has historically reinforced patriarchal structures and the marginalization of women. Engaging with Mary Daly’s feminist critique and reinterpreting biblical narratives through a phenomenological lens, I argue that the dominant model of autonomous, male-centered subjectivity fails to account for the relational and plural nature of selfhood. By revisiting theological symbols such as the image of God and the act of naming, I (...) propose a renewed vision of the self as inherently relational and pre-subjectively connected to others. This perspective challenges the prevailing framework of philosophy of religion (PoR) and calls for an inclusive rethinking that acknowledges the plurality and interdependence of human existence. (shrink)

This paper examines the nature of religion. A definition of religion is proposed, and a major rival interpretation -- that of John Hick -- is examined and rejected. It is then explained how religions can be evaluated.

RELIGION TODAY (2nd edition) offers a refreshing introduction to the academic study of religion with a particular emphasis on critically informed analysis. The book skillfully explores diverse religious traditions and phenomena, providing readers with a comprehensive overview that encourages them to engage critically with the subject and materials. Written for an undergraduate audience, this book is accessible and well-organized, making it suitable for both students and general readers interested in sharpening their understanding of religion. Overall, Religion Today is a valuable (...) resource for anyone seeking to approach the academic study of religion. Its holistic approach, engaging writing style, and emphasis on critical thinking make it a welcome addition to various religious studies curriculums or personal libraries.” — Brad Stoddard, associate professor of Religious Studies, McDaniel College. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: * Brief History * How We Talk * Science and Infinity * Religion and Infinity * Concluding Remarks * Notes * References * Further Reading.

As a result of the dynamic structure of society, there is a constant change in social life and researching the change is among the unit analysis of the field of sociology that takes society as a subject matter for itself. There are various ways to examine the change that has taken place in society. One of them is the implicit reference system thereby examining mindset structures. There are many factors such as economy, culture, and education which constitute mentalities and one (...) of them is religion. Religions because of their unique characters have an aspect to influence mentalities. From this point of view, the first issue in this article to be examined is the relationship between mentality-social change. Subsequently, insights will be given about mentality-religion relations, and lastly, an attempt to unearth the impact of religion-social change relations on mentalities will be made. For further clarification of all this process through an example, Sabri F. Ülgener's Zihniyet ve Din (Mentality and Religion) will be examined and Ülgener's views will be analyzed on the ground of religion-change relation. (shrink)

This paper explores the reception of Kant's understanding of consciousness by both Romantics and Idealists from 1785 to 1799, and traces its impact on the theory of religion. I first look at Kant's understanding of consciousness as developed in the first Critique, and then looks at how figures such as Fichte, Jacobi, Hölderlin, Novalis, and Schleiermacher received this theory of consciousness and its implications for their understanding of religion.

Psychology of religion tries to understand the cause-effect relationships of religious experiences and religious consciousness so as to be able to predict behaviors. It aims to study the religious consciousness with investigations in religious behavior patterns. -/- The major systems of psychology are: structuralism, functionalism, behaviorism, psychoanalysis, and Gestalt School of Psychology. Obviously, each system has its own way of understanding religious consciousness.

This chapter consists of a series of reflections on widely endorsed claims about Christian philosophy and, in particular, Christian philosophy of religion. It begins with consideration of some claims about how (Christian) philosophy of religion currently is, and then moves on to consideration of some claims about how (Christian) philosophy of religion ought to be. In particular, the chapter offers critical scrutiny of the oft-repeated claim that we are currently in a golden age for Christian philosophy of religion.

This essay develops standards for grading religions including various forms of spiritualism. First, I examine the standards proposed by William James, John Hick, Paul Knitter, Dan Cohn-Sherbok, and Harold Netland. Most of them are useful in grading religions with or without conditions. However, those standards are not enough for refined and piercing evaluation. Thus, I introduce standards used in spiritualism. Although those standards are for grading spirits and their teachings, they are useful in refined and piercing evaluation of (...) religious phenomena. The spiritual standards complement James's, Hick's, Knitter's, and Netland's standards. Although most of the spiritual standards are rationally unjustifiable, they have practical value. (shrink)

The relationship between philosophy and religion is considered one of the most significant and complex issues in the history of human thought. In Islamic intellectual tradition, this problem has been actively discussed, particularly in the context of the relationship between reason and revelation. Whether there is a contradiction between philosophy and religion, or whether they should be regarded as different paths leading to the same truth, has occupied the minds of many Islamic philosophers. Among the prominent Muslim thinkers who addressed (...) this issue, Sadr al-Din al-Shirazi, a major philosopher of the 17th-century Safavid period, stands out. This paper explores the relationship between religion and philosophy, reason and revelation in the philosophical worldview of Sadr al-Din al-Shirazi. With the translation and spread of ancient Greek philosophical heritage in the Islamic world, the philosophy–religion issue emerged as a major topic, and its nature has been interpreted in various ways by different thinkers. Shirazi paid special attention to this matter, emphasizing that philosophy and religion originate from the same source, and that the apparent contradiction between them is due to the limitations of human understanding. He viewed reason both as the foundation of faith and as a complement to revelation, and he defended the inseparable connection between true knowledge and belief. The paper demonstrates how, within the framework of Shirazi’s “Transcendent Philosophy,” the relationships among reason, faith, mysticism, and religious law are reconciled. The author also highlights that Shīrāzī upheld the principle of harmony with the Qur’an and Sunnah in his approach to philosophy and mysticism, while noting that certain truths can only be grasped through inner, esoteric knowledge. By analyzing the core elements of Shirazi’s religious-philosophical system, the paper demonstrates the possibility of harmony between philosophy and religion. (shrink)

In his article ‘Epistemic Injustice and Religion’, Ian James Kidd raises the possibility that some epistemic injustices might be deep. To spell out exactly what might be involved in deep epistemic injustices, especially those involving religious worldviews, an obvious place to look is Wittgenstein’s work on religion. Careful reflection on Wittgenstein’s remarks in the ‘Lectures on Religious Belief’ and his late work collected in On Certainty will have implications for how we are to understand the relationships between belief and evidence (...) and for the ways in which we might enrich our hermeneutical sensitivities, and so Wittgenstein’s remarks are helpful for understanding epistemic injustices more generally. This paper will focus on epistemic injustices involving Islamophobia since Islamophobia has, so far, been given little attention in the literature on epistemic injustice. (shrink)

This paper is an exercise in the Christian (meta)theology of religions. As such, it rests on the idea that systematic theology must take account of the fact of religious pluralism within its articulation of the Christian faith. It might be asked however, despite clear motivations such as the traditional imperative of mission, why we need a theology of religions at all. Why not simply dialogue or engage in a kind of comparative study of the texts and practices of (...) the religions? On the contrary, the fact of religious pluralism requires at least a basic or schematic response in the present, and not only in the alwayspostponed-future that makes true dialogue and comparative theology possible and fruitful. While remaining open to new developments that may arise out of the necessary work of dialogue and comparative theology, the theology of religions can, and should, provide an intellectual resting place, albeit a temporary one, as we shall see. (shrink)

The rise and legacy of world religions out of that period centered roughly around 500-600 BCE, what John Stuart-Glennie termed in 1873 the moral revolution, and Karl Jaspers later, in 1949, called the axial age, has been marked by heightened ideas of transcendence. Yet ironically, the world itself, in the literal sense of the actual earth, took on a diminished role as a central element of religious sensibility in the world religions, particularly in the Abrahamic religions. Given (...) the issue today of ecological unsustainability, including massive die-offs of wildlife and ever-increasing global human population and consumption, the legacy of those world religions face the question I consider here: Can religion transcend the earth in the long run? With the Axial Age/Moral Revolution, comes the possibility of transcendence of the world per se. The moral revolution/Axial Age represented significant changes in civilization, to be sure, but it can also be taken, as I do, as a second phase in the radical shift to anthropocentric mind already begun with the advent of agriculturally based civilization. The axial ideal of transcendence connects to a larger ideal, manifest not only in the legacies of the world religions but in contemporary science and technology, of a philosophy of escape from the earth. I show how ideas of axial transcendence, celebrated by scholars such as Jaspers and Bellah, nevertheless involve an unacknowledged tragic cost, the forgetting of the earth and its lessons and limits as central to what I have termed elsewhere, “sustainable wisdom.” . (shrink)

The argument and discussion in this paper begins from the premise that Hume was an atheist who denied the religious or theist hypothesis. However, even if it is agreed that that Hume was an atheist this does not tell us where he stood on the question concerning the value of religion. Some atheists, such as Spinoza, have argued that society needs to maintain and preserve a form of “true religion”, which is required for the support of our ethical life. Others, (...) such as D’Holbach have argued that religion is not only false it is pernicious and it should be eradicated. This paper argues that Hume rejected both these proposals, on the ground that they rest, in different ways, on excessively optimistic assumptions. The sensible, practical form of atheism that Hume defends has a more modest and realistic aim, which is simply to restrict and limit the most pernicious forms of religion. Understood this way, Hume’s practical atheism is very different from the forms of “old” atheism associated with Spinoza and D’Holbach, as well as from the “new atheism” of thinkers such as Dawkins and Dennett. -/- Reprinted in Paul Russell, "Recasting Hume and Early Modern Philosophy: Selected Essays" (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021): 340-383. (shrink)

For Whitehead and Nishitani, a rethinking of religion necessitates a rethinking of the metaphysics that underlie one’s concept of religion. The dynamism of religion is unveiled only within the metaphysical grounding of an ontology that accommodates the philosophical preference of “becoming” as an ultimate category of reality. The novelty of Whitehead’s theory of religion lies in the process metaphysics that it presupposes. For him, religion, like the whole of reality, is inherently developing and evolving. What Nishitani offers is a rethinking (...) of Western understanding of religion by way of an Asian speculative approach grounded in Zen Buddhism. He argues that Western religion, particularly Christianity and Judaism, has succumbed to the modern predicament of nihilism, or relative nothingness. He radicalizes this same nihility towards absolute nothingness (śūnyatā). For both Whitehead and Nishitani, despite the distortion of religion by religious fundamentalists, genuine religion consolidates and points a society towards its real destiny. However, the realization of religion’s role necessitates reflexivity on its own inherent dynamism. (shrink)

Some naturalists feel an affinity with some religions, or with a particular religion. They may have previously belonged to it, and/or been raised in it, and/or be close to people who belong to it, and/or simply feel attracted to its practices, texts and traditions. This raises the question of whether and to what extent a naturalist can lead the life of a religious believer. The sparse literature on this topic focuses on religious fictionalism. I also frame the debate in (...) these terms. I ask what religious fictionalism might amount to, reject some possible versions of it and endorse a different one. I then examine the existing proposals, by Robin Le Poidevin, Peter Lipton, Andrew Eshleman and Howard Wettstein, and show that even on my version of religious fictionalism, much of what has been described by these authors is still possible. (shrink)

Susan Haack has recently attempted to discredit religion by showing that science is an extended and enhanced version of common sense while religion is not. I argue that Haack’s account is misguided not because science is not an extended version of common sense, as she says. It is misguided because she assumes a very restricted, and thus inadequate, account of common sense. After reviewing several more realistic models of common sense, I conclude that common sense is rich enough to allow (...) various kinds of extensions. Just as science can be correctly seen as an enhanced version of common sense, so also religion. (shrink)

This article offers a review of Richard Rorty’s attempts to come to terms with the role of religion in our public and intellectual life by tracing the key developments in his position, partially in response to the ubiquitous criticisms of his distinction between private and public projects. Since Rorty rejects the possibility of dismissing religion on purely epistemic grounds, he is determined to treat it, instead, as a matter of politics. My suggestion is that, in this respect, Rorty’s position is (...) best construed as that of a humanist rather than a post-modernist. Ultimately, it appears that, in his view, the positive element of religion—i.e. the idea of religion as a social gospel—has been absorbed and transformed into a utopian striving which humanists associate with the ideal of democracy. Hence, in this regard, religion can be considered obsolete. Yet, without explicitly invoking the usual epistemic grounds, Rorty’s arguments for excluding religion from the public sphere remain rather thin, and an interest in reforming rather than excluding religion would have been more consistent with his general outlook. (shrink)

The purpose of this book is to further an understanding of religion -- not of the kind that might come from psychological or sociological enquiry -- but an understanding from the inside, so to speak, of the subject-matter of such explanatory enquiries. An understanding of the kind possessed by someone who, firmly believing in a religion, has thought about the nature of religion. The book aims to increase this kind of understanding where it already exists, and in its absence, at (...) bringing about some degree of it without presupposing in a reader any religious belief at all. (shrink)

John Tillson argues, on grounds of children’s well-being, that it is impermissible to teach them religious views. I defend a practice of pluralistically advocating religious views to children. As long as there are no monopolies of influence over children, and as long as advocates do not use coercion, deceit, or manipulation, children can greatly benefit without having their rational abilities subverted, or incurring undue risk to form false beliefs. This solution should counter, to some extent, both perfectionist and antiperfectionist reasons (...) against initiating children into religions. (shrink)

Drawing on findings from the study of prejudice and prejudice reduction, we identify a number of mechanisms through which religious communities may influence the intergroup attitudes of their members. We hypothesize that religious participation could in principle either reduce or promote prejudice with respect to any given target group. A religious community’s influence on intergroup attitudes will depend upon the specific beliefs, attitudes, and practices found within the community, as well as on interactions between the religious community and the larger (...) social environment in which it is embedded. Basing our proposals on findings from the literature on prejudice formation and prejudice reduction allows us to outline useful directions for future studies of religion and prejudice. (shrink)

The full text of this essay is available in an English translation (also in philpapers) under: Alfred Gierer, Science, religion, and basic biological issues that are open to interpretation. Der Artikel bildet das Schlusskapitel des Buches " Alfred Gierer: Wissenschaftliches Denken, das Rätsel Bewusstsein und pro-religiöse Ideen", Königshausen&Neumann, Würzburg 2019. Reichweite und Grenzen naturwissenschaftlicher Erklärungen ergeben sich zum einen aus der universellen Gültigkeit physikalischer Gesetze, zum anderen aus prinzipiellen, intrinsischen Grenzen der Bestimmbarkeit und Berechenbarkeit, zumal bei selbstbezüglichen Fragestellungen. In diesem (...) Essay geht es um deutungsoffene Grundfragen in Zusammenhang mit der Beziehung von Wissenschaft und Religion: Der Unterscheidung von Tier und Mensch, der Entstehung der mentalen Fähigkeiten der biologischen Spezies „Mensch“, den naturgesetzlichen Voraussetzungen eines „lebensfreundlichen“ physikalischen Universums, und der Reichweite wie den Grenzen einer naturwissenschaftlichen Erklärung von menschlichem Bewusstsein. Naturwissenschaft kann auf der philosophischen, kulturellen und religiösen Ebene die Mehrdeutigkeit der Welt nicht auflösen. Agnostische und religiöse Grundauffassungen werden auf Dauer ko-existieren, und die Wahl ist nicht nur eine Frage des Wissens, sondern besonders auch der Weisheit und der Lebenskunst. (shrink)

This research aims to explore the relationship between religion and artificial intelligence. The research starts by defining a fundamental concept of religion and a conception of the principles of artificial intelligence. Then, the research explores the possible interactions between religion and artificial intelligence, as well as the potential challenges that this relationship may pose. Finally, the research examines the implications of this relationship for the management of the religious field.

Cécile Laborde proposes a liberal egalitarian view for a liberal state to adopt in its fair treatment of religious citizens. She suggests a method where state neutrality is applied restrictively and religion is “disaggregated” across standard liberal rights. Without recourse to a legal-political category religion, she responds to the problem of religious accommodation by using main elements of a particular liberal right(s) to account for the dimension of religion that an issue of justice makes salient. In reply to the problem (...) of state neutrality, she proposes that a liberal state can be non-neutral in its treatment of religious claims as long as religion is not a marker for social division, does not impose its comprehensive ethics, and provides publicly accessible reasons. I argue that adopting Laborde’s approach has conceptual and pragmatic advantages as a political strategy (modus vivendi) in resolving justice claims. However, its content-neutral and procedural framework partially meets the requirements of justice of religious citizens because of its egalitarian motivation. In adopting a minimal political conception of religion defined by elements of other liberal rights, the liberal state employs a narrow understanding of religion as a “collection” of beliefs and practices. This can result in religious citizens exercising partial or even distorted expressions of their religious identities. I suggest a conceptual refinement in Laborde’s theory if it aims at attracting endorsement from religious citizens as a reasonable conception of justice. I will survey some alternative frameworks and ideas (e.g. Raz value-based approach, Riordan’s capacity for truth argument) and build on their strengths. I propose vocation as a useful concept for a liberal state to employ in appropriately understanding and assessing religious commitment. My modest proposal presents a liberal understanding of religion-state relationship other than those framed in the themes of neutrality, toleration, exclusion, or limitation of practices. (shrink)

Philosophy and religion were the two important sources of knowledge for medieval Arab Muslim polymaths. Owing to the difference between the nature of philosophy and religion, the interplay between philosophy and religion often takes the form of conflict in medieval Muslim thought as exemplified by the Al-Ghazali versus Averroes (Ibn Rusd) polemic. Unlike the Al-Ghazali versus Averroes (Ibn Rushd) polemic, the interplay between philosophy and religion in the political philosophy of Abu Nasr Alfarabi takes the form of harmonious co-existence. Although, (...) for Alfarabi, religion is an inferior form of knowledge as compared to philosophy, the present article will show that philosophy and religion play equally significant roles in Alfarabi’s virtuous city and that in the absence of either philosophy or religion, the political system proposed by Alfarabi cannot exist. (shrink)

Hilmi Omar Budda (1894-1952) has played a significant role in the process of institutionalization of History of Religions in Turkey. He, who was the first academician in the field of History of Religions in Turkey, lectured for many years in Dâru’l-Funûn (Ottoman University) Faculty of Divinity, which was found in 1924. Then he worked in department of Institute of Islamic Sciences, which was a branch of Istanbul University Faculty of Arts, by pursuing his same position and career. After (...) that, Budda lectured in Ankara University Faculty of Divinity, which was found in 1949, as the first academic person of the department of History of Religions. Budda, who wrote many scientific studies and trained a large number of students during his academic life roughly thirty years, filled a gap in the field of History of Religions in the early years of republic period. Even though there are some scientific problems in his writings and views on issues, this article deals with Budda’s contributions to the History of Religions and his role in the formation of such a discipline in Turkey. This study, besides, mentions about Budda’s academic sides by analyzing his scientific writings composed of books, articles and columns. (shrink)

In 1992, Peter Ochs and a few Christian and Muslim colleagues began to gather small groups, in and outside the classroom, to practice close and attentive reading of the sacred Scriptures of the Jewish, Muslim, and Christian traditions. The hope was that members of different religions could hear one another through the patient, respectful reading of each other's Scripture. Hearing each other, participants might enter into interreligious relationships that might point a way to the peaceful engagement of religions--especially (...) those who, after September 11, 2001, too often found themselves at each other's throats. It was a hope for religion without violence. In Religion without Violence, Ochs reflects on the practical and philosophic lessons he has learned from hosting hundreds of Scriptural Reasoning engagements. He introduces the "scriptural pragmatism" of Scriptural Reasoning." He painstakingly recounts instances of successful scriptural reasoning and warns where and how it might fail. He provides guidance on how to introduce and facilitate Scriptural Reasoning in the classroom. He shows how reading out of the "hearth" of a faith can contribute to peace building across religions. And, drawing on the resources of rabbinic tradition, Augustine, and Charles Peirce, he moves beyond practice to reflect on the implications of Scriptural Reasoning for discerning what kinds of "reasoning" best address and help repair societal crises like religion-related violent conflict. (shrink)

We all want to find a way to live fulfilling lives together in spite of our differences. What beliefs must be held in common if we are to do so? What beliefs must be excluded? And what are the implications for religion’s place in society? Philip Kitcher recognises that our answers to these questions have important implications for education, and he devotes a chapter of 'The Main Enterprise of the World' to the role of religion in education and wider society. (...) This paper is a critical response to that chapter. I argue that Kitcher is right to recognise that religious beliefs cannot be confined to the private sphere and thus they are a matter of educational concern. However, I question whether Kitcher makes an adequate case for the distinctive harmfulness of the beliefs that he wishes to exclude. I also question Kitcher’s suggestion that students be taught that all religions are ‘on a par’, epistemically speaking. I finish by shining a light on Kitcher’s proposal that education should aim for students to develop specific beliefs about religion, clarifying the proposal and highlighting some implications for education in practice. (shrink)

In the pre-history of the concept of recognition Spinoza’s social philosophy deserves a special place. Although we rarely think of Spinoza as a social philosopher, Spinoza understood well the ways in which individual subjectivity is shaped by the social forces. I will argue that Spinoza offers a mechanism to understand the way in which recognition works, in order to untangle the web of affect, desire and ideas, which support the recognitions and misrecognitions at the foundation of social life. Spinoza sets (...) out this mechanism in Book Three of the Ethics, but his extended example of the first Hebrew Kingdom in the Theological-Political Treatise, shows how he applied his theory of social recognition to the great problem of his times – the debate between faith and reason, and the need to unify a commonwealth. Social unity based on shared religion, for Spinoza, could be powerful, though not so powerful as democracy. Only through understanding Spinoza’s views of social subjectivization can we understand why. (shrink)

Religion and culture are interwoven and this can be seen among the Oron people in their use of the shrine as a socio-cultural and ethical institution. The shrine is an embodiment and the symbol of the very traditional religion of the people. As such, the shrine serves as a medium through which the norms, values, ethics, taboos, and morals are taught and enforced. There is also a great relationship between religion and justice as the shrine (Afi/Obio) as an ethical institution (...) serves as a tribunal of justice by the deities, divinities, and ancestors under the guidance and administration of the priest in tackling and resolving criminal activities, disputes as well as restoring social order and justice in Oron traditional society. The Oron Afi/Obio (Shrine) method of administering justice is beyond the Empirical application of the modern judiciary system that relies on physical facts and shreds of evidence, while the shrine, also, uses spiritual methods that involve Oath taking, incantation and necromancy. Globalization rather than modifying the lapses and loopholes of this system in the parlance of morality, ethics, and health has led to its abolition and break down. This work adopts the qualitative method. This work as primary research uses the conflict theory, phenomenological and Historical method. It identifies globalization as a threat to the traditional justice system and recommends that the shrine is a multi-faceted institution whose function can be adopted and applied to the Nigerian legal system where there is no or little evidence and oath swearing for politicians in our contemporary society. (shrink)

Religion-based AI chatbots serve religious practitioners by bringing them godly wisdom through technology. These bots reply to spiritual and worldly questions by drawing insights or citing verses from the Quran, the Bible, the Bhagavad Gita, the Torah, or other holy books. They answer religious and theological queries by claiming to offer historical contexts and providing guidance and counseling to their users. A criticism of these bots is that they may give inaccurate answers and proliferate bias by propagating homogenized versions of (...) the religions they represent. These “embodied spiritual machines” may likewise bear bias against women, their gender, and their societal roles. This paper crafts a concept intended to address this GPT issue by reimagining, modifying, and implementing a feminist approach to these chatbots. It examines the concepts and designs of these bots and how they address women-related questions. Along with the challenge of bringing gender and diversity-sensitive religious wisdom closer to the people through technology, the paper proposes a re-engineered model of a fair religion-based AI chatbot. (shrink)

To defend religion is to invite confusion from every direction. To some, the term signals a retreat from reason, an apology for superstition, or a refusal to accept the hard-won insights of modern science. For others, defense suggests a rallying cry, an attempt to restore authority, reassert dogma, or protect inherited belief from scrutiny. I will do neither. I will not argue whether religious doctrines are true, miracles occurred, or sacred texts should govern public life. I will begin instead from (...) a simpler observation. Religion is criticized for something it was never primarily meant to be. (shrink)

By using the general investigation framework offered by the cognitive science of religion (CSR), I analyse religion as a necessary condition for the evolutionary path of knowledge. The main argument is the "paradox of the birth of knowledge": in order to get to the meaning of the part, a sense context is needed; but a sense of the whole presupposes the sense (meaning) of the parts. Religion proposes solutions to escape this paradox, based on the imagination of sense (meaning) contexts, (...) respectively closures of these contexts through meta-senses. What is important is the practical effectiveness of solutions proposed by religion, taking into account the costs of faith and the costs of the absence of religious belief. The hypothesis has the following consequences: religion is a necessary condition for the initial evolution of knowledge and the emergence of religion is determined by the evolution of knowledge. The continuation of the solving of paradox is a Bayesian one, using explorations: a sense of the whole allows cognitive arrangements of the parties, which in turn open the possibility of a rearrangement of the whole. The contribution of religion to the emergence of sense (meaning) could be governed by the rule: any map of the world is more useful than no map; any meaning (of life) is better than no meaning. The human mind fills the perceptual and cognitive gaps, some (religious) filling solutions being true vault keys of the entire cognitive construction called the world. Knowledge is conditioned by the existence of an organized context, as the cosmos created by religion by means of explanatory meta-theories supports knowledge by closing the cognitive context and using meaning networks. The proposed analysis is consistent with a redefinition of rationality from the perspective of evolution: the importance and relevance of knowledge is determined by its practical outcome - survival. In the context of useful fictions, it does not matter what God actually does, but what we have done by believing in God. Existence has provided a pragmatic verification of the cognitive solutions that underlie the survival strategies promoted by religions. (shrink)

Religions seem to merge over time in order to achieve political and cultural stability; In the context of the modern-day, as the rate of globalization continues to increase, a greater understanding of syncretism is needed.

This paper investigated “Between Religion and Agriculture: A Roadmap to Revamping Nigeria's Economy." Religion is meant to affect all facets of life both at the individual and community levels. This applies equally to the economy of nations including Nigeria as a sovereign state. Petroleum which has been Nigeria's mainstay economically over the past five decades has proved to be not a sustainable means of income to the country in recent times. With the fluctuation in oil price with its attendant nose-diving, (...) Nigeria is bound to have a rethink over her means of economic stay. This informs the thrust of this paper which looks at revamping Nigeria's economy from a religious perspective. Using the creation accounts in Genesis Chapter one and two, this paper which looks at the original divine mandate given to humanity in the days of creation; it concludes that this economic mandate was agriculturally based. Hence, this paper, using the hermeneutical approach to the study of scripture and content analysis research methodology calls on all ecclesial bodies to promote the agricultural sector not only as of the way of revamping Nigeria's economy but as a positive response to the divine mandate. Apart from adding to the body of interpretations of the texts under review, the contribution of this paper to knowledge is its application of these texts to the Nigerian economy. (shrink)

During the New Imperialism (1884–1920) period, an attitude pervaded the Western mindset that non-Christian religions were inferior and unsophisticated. At the heart of the colonialist view was ‘the white man’s burden’ of civilising primitive societies, including converting Indigenous peoples to Christianity. This aim escalated into a conscious effort among colonial powers to exert dominance over their subjects by othering and stereotyping non-Christians by presenting their religions through the prism of exoticism and orientalism. This article explores how colonialism accelerated (...) modern recognition and registration issues for religious communities and continues to influence state-religion relations today, including how governments restrict religious freedom. (shrink)

This paper provides a structural analysis of religion as a cycle of artifi- cialization, antithesis, and stabilization (Aufhebung). Tracing the develop- ment from Judaism through Christianity, Catholic institutionalization, the Franciscan poverty debate, the Protestant Reformation, and the Vatican’s role in modern history, we argue that religious institutions oscillate between charismatic origins and artificial hierarchies. The Vatican’s cooperation with fascism and its later stabilization highlight both the dangers and resilience of artificial religion.