Disagreements that resist rational resolution, often termed “deep disagreements”, have been the focus of much work in epistemology and informal logic. In this paper, I argue that they also deserve the attention of philosophers of mathematics. I link the question of whether there can be deep disagreements in mathematics to a more familiar debate over whether there can be revolutions in mathematics. I propose an affirmative answer to both questions, using the controversy over Shinichi Mochizuki’s work on (...) the abc conjecture as a potential example of both phenomena. I conclude by investigating the prospects for the resolution of mathematical deep disagreements in virtue-theoretic approaches to informal logic and mathematical practice. (shrink)

In this work we argue that there is no strong demarcation between pure and applied mathematics. We show this first by stressing non-deductive components within pure mathematics, like axiomatization and theory-building in general. We also stress the “purer” components of applied mathematics, like the theory of the models that are concerned with practical purposes. We further show that some mathematical theories can be viewed through either a pure or applied lens. These different lenses are tied to different (...) communities, which endorse different evaluative standards for theories. We evaluate the distinction between pure and applied mathematics from a late Wittgensteinian perspective. We note that the classical exegesis of the later Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics, due to Maddy, leads to a clear-cut but misguided demarcation. We then turn our attention to a more niche interpretation of Wittgenstein by Dawson, which captures aspects of the aforementioned distinction more accurately. Building on this newer, maverick interpretation of the later Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics, and endorsing an extended notion of meaning as use which includes social, mundane uses, we elaborate a fuzzy, but more realistic, demarcation. This demarcation, relying on family resemblance, is based on how direct and intended technical applications are, the kind of evaluative standards featured, and the range of rhetorical purposes at stake. (shrink)

In his influential book, The Nature of Morality, Gilbert Harman writes: “In explaining the observations that support a physical theory, scientists typically appeal to mathematical principles. On the other hand, one never seems to need to appeal in this way to moral principles.” What is the epistemological relevance of this contrast, if genuine? This chapter argues that ethicists and philosophers of mathematics have misunderstood it. They have confused what the chapter calls the justificatory challenge for realism about an area, (...) D—the challenge to justify our D-beliefs—with the reliability challenge for D-realism—the challenge to explain the reliability of our D-beliefs. Harman’s contrast is relevant to the first, but not, evidently, to the second. One upshot of the discussion is that genealogical debunking arguments are fallacious. Another is that indispensability considerations cannot answer the Benacerraf–Field challenge for mathematical realism. (shrink)

Models are indispensable tools of scientific inquiry, and one of their main uses is to improve our understanding of the phenomena they represent. How do models accomplish this? And what does this tell us about the nature of understanding? While much recent work has aimed at answering these questions, philosophers' focus has been squarely on models in empirical science. I aim to show that pure mathematics also deserves a seat at the table. I begin by presenting two cases: Cramér’s (...) random model of the prime numbers and the function field model of the integers. These cases show that mathematicians, like empirical scientists, rely on unrealistic models to gain understanding of complex phenomena. They also have important implications for some much-discussed theses about scientific understanding. First, modeling practices in mathematics confirm that one can gain understanding without obtaining an explanation. Second, these cases undermine the popular thesis that unrealistic models confer understanding by imparting counterfactual knowledge. (shrink)

For over two thousand years, the philosophy of mathematics has been trapped in the ontological dilemma of "whether mathematics is invented or discovered", while long plagued by core problems such as Wigner’s puzzle of unreasonable effectiveness, Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, infinity paradoxes, and the legitimacy of mathematical axioms. Existing schools of mathematical philosophy can only explain partial phenomena, failing to achieve the underlying logical closed loop between mathematics, authentic physical reality, and conscious cognition, let alone touch the ultimate (...) ontological root of mathematics. Based on the author’s original Cognitive Succession Ontology system, starting from the unfalsifiable first principle that "the essence of cognition (faculty) is succession", this paper derives the ultimate ontological definition of mathematics: mathematics is an unambiguous abstract expression of the universal meta-rule of succession governing all domains, made by humans with self-created symbolic systems. Taking geometrized construction, which is strictly 1:1 aligned with existential ontology, as the intermediary, this paper opens up the full-chain logic of "ontological meta-rule → authentic physical causality → conscious cognition → symbolic abstraction", thoroughly resolves all millennial and centennial problems in the philosophy of mathematics, proves the underlying homology between mathematics, the authentic physical world, and conscious cognition, and finally completes the cross-domain logical closed loop of ontology, physics, consciousness science, and mathematics. This theory provides the ultimate ontological support for the absolute truth of mathematics, lays a legitimate foundation for the cross-domain application of mathematics, and offers a brand-new paradigm-level path for the development of the philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)

Mathematicians often speak of conjectures as being confirmed by evidence that falls short of proof. For their own conjectures, evidence justifies further work in looking for a proof. Those conjectures of mathematics that have long resisted proof, such as Fermat's Last Theorem and the Riemann Hypothesis, have had to be considered in terms of the evidence for and against them. It is argued here that it is not adequate to describe the relation of evidence to hypothesis as `subjective', `heuristic' (...) or `pragmatic', but that there must be an element of what it is rational to believe on the evidence, that is, of non-deductive logic. (shrink)

The human attempts to access, measure and organize physical phenomena have led to a manifold construction of mathematical and physical spaces. We will survey the evolution of geometries from Euclid to the Algebraic Geometry of the 20th century. The role of Persian/Arabic Algebra in this transition and its Western symbolic development is emphasized. In this relation, we will also discuss changes in the ontological attitudes toward mathematics and its applications. Historically, the encounter of geometric and algebraic perspectives enriched the (...) mathematical practices and their foundations. Yet, the collapse of Euclidean certitudes, of over 2300 years, and the crisis in the mathematical analysis of the 19th century, led to the exclusion of “geometric judgments” from the foundations of Mathematics. After the success and the limits of the logico-formal analysis, it is necessary to broaden our foundational tools and re-examine the interactions with natural sciences. In particular, the way the geometric and algebraic approaches organize knowledge is analyzed as a cross-disciplinary and cross-cultural issue and will be examined in Mathematical Physics and Biology. We finally discuss how the current notions of mathematical (phase) “space” should be revisited for the purposes of life sciences. (shrink)

The present first part about the eventual completeness of mathematics (called “Hilbert mathematics”) is concentrated on the Gödel incompleteness (1931) statement: if it is an axiom rather than a theorem inferable from the axioms of (Peano) arithmetic, (ZFC) set theory, and propositional logic, this would pioneer the pathway to Hilbert mathematics. One of the main arguments that it is an axiom consists in the direct contradiction of the axiom of induction in arithmetic and the axiom of infinity (...) in set theory. Thus, the pair of arithmetic and set are to be similar to Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries distinguishably only by the Fifth postulate now, i.e. after replacing it and its negation correspondingly by the axiom of finiteness (induction) versus that of finiteness being idempotent negations to each other. Indeed, the axiom of choice, as far as it is equivalent to the well-ordering “theorem”, transforms any set in a well-ordering either necessarily finite according to the axiom of induction or also optionally infinite according to the axiom of infinity. So, the Gödel incompleteness statement relies on the logical contradiction of the axiom of induction and the axiom of infinity in the final analysis. Nonetheless, both can be considered as two idempotent versions of the same axiom (analogically to the Fifth postulate) and then unified after logicism and its inherent intensionality since the opposition of finiteness and infinity can be only extensional (i.e., relevant to the elements of any set rather than to the set by itself or its characteristic property being a proposition). So, the pathway for interpreting the Gödel incompleteness statement as an axiom and the originating from that assumption for “Hilbert mathematics” accepting its negation is pioneered. A much wider context relevant to realizing the Gödel incompleteness statement as a metamathematical axiom is consistently built step by step. The horizon of Hilbert mathematics is the proper subject in the third part of the paper, and a reinterpretation of Gödel’s papers (1930; 1931) as an apology of logicism as the only consistent foundations of mathematics is the topic of the next second part. (shrink)

This article will consider imagination in mathematics from a historical point of view, noting the key moments in its conception during the ancient, modern and contemporary eras.

Carnap introduced his notion of explication to arrive at concepts that are precise enough for scientific purposes. As Carnap wants to precisify concepts, his notion of explication targets less precise concepts so that explications within mature mathematics are not possible. We argue that explications of mature mathematical concepts are both possible and widespread. We focus on foundational work, especially as done in the context of interactive theorem proving. Taking foundational work seriously necessitates explicit decisions which are generally ignored in (...) mathematical practice - and such developments are not captured by our usual notions of explication. To see this, we introduce Carnapian and Quinean explication and argue that they are not capable of accounting for intra-mathematical conceptual changes. We argue that these changes are best understood as explications and so need a different notion of explication. We suggest one candidate, called tolerant explication, and sketch how it handles the intra-mathematical cases. (shrink)

The focus of this chapter is on efforts to create a new mathematics, with my prime interest being the role of mathematics in comprehending a world consisting first and foremost of processes, and examining what developments in mathematics are required for this. I am particularly interested in developments in mathematics able to do justice to the reality of life. Such mathematics could provide the basis for advancing ecology, human ecology and ecological economics and thereby assist (...) in the transformation of society and civilization so that we augment life rather than undermining the conditions for our existence. It was in the process of grappling with these problems that I was drawn to investigate the tradition of intuitionism in mathematics and the role of intuition in mathematics, science and philosophy, and then to consider Whitehead’s work on mathematics and its philosophy in relation to these. (shrink)

Analytical philosophy defines mathematics as an extension of logic. This research will restructure the progress in mathematical philosophy made by analytical thinkers like Wittgenstein, Russell, and Frege. We are setting up a new theory of mathematics and arithmetic’s familiar to Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language. The analytical theory proposed here proves that mathematics can be defined with non-logical terms, like numbers, theorems, and operators. We’ll explain the role of the arithmetical operators and geometrical theorems to be foundational in (...) mathematics. Our position states that mathematical operators and theorems are tautologies. Here numbers are arbitrary signs of magnitudes whose meaning is arbitrated by the mathematical operator. We will prove that set theory in mathematics doesn’t form a branch of logic and operators arbitrarily form sets into units. Herein are the foundations of numbers. (shrink)

In this article, we survey intuitionism as a philosophy of mathematics, with emphasis on the philosophical views endorsed by Brouwer, Heyting, and Dummett. Before we proceed, however, a few general remark are in order. We must stress that intuitionism is not to be regarded as synonymous with constructivism, an umbrella term that roughly refers to any particular form of mathematics that adopts "we can construct" as the appropriate interpretation of the phrase "there exists". However, intuitionism remains one of (...) the most prominent varieties of constructive mathematics in existence. The curious reader can see our related entry constructive mathematics for complementary background. For more on the intuitionistic rejection of actual infinities, see also the entry on the infinite. Finally, because intuitionism advocates a revision of classical mathematics, a certain amount of mathematical knowledge is required to fully appreciate some parts of this article, most importantly Section 1.2 on intuitionistic analysis. Readers can check any introductory textbook on classical real analysis or topology if they are not familiar with our terminology. Some familiarity with basic set theory will also be presupposed in Section 1.1, in particular regarding transfinite ordinals and uncountable cardinalities. Since our focus is intuitionistic mathematics, intuitionistic logic is not presented in this article. But we include a list of notable theorems and non-theorems of intuitionistic logic in the appendix for reference. (shrink)

Franz Brentano is not usually associated with mathematics. Generally, only Brentano’s discussion of the continuum and his critique of the mathematical accounts of it is treated in the literature. It is this detailed critique which suggests that Brentano had more than a superficial familiarity with mathematics. Indeed, considering the authors and works quoted in his lectures, Brentano appears well-informed and quite interested in the mathematical research of his time. I specifically address his lectures here as there is much (...) less to be found about mathematics in his published works. Besides Brentano’s own work, it is quite remarkable to see that practically all of his better-known students sooner or later produced a work on the philosophy of mathematics. This also encourages the supposition not just of a common interest in the matter, but of a common theoretical core. All this prompts the question: Can we speak of a Brentanist philosophy of mathematics? (shrink)

In this paper I discuss Mark Steiner’s view of the contribution of mathematics to physics and take up some of the questions it raises. In particular, I take up the question of discovery and explore two aspects of this question – a metaphysical aspect and a related epistemic aspect. The metaphysical aspect concerns the formal structure of the physical world. Does the physical world have mathematical or formal features or constituents, and what is the nature of these constituents? The (...) related epistemic question concerns humans’ cognitive ability to reach the formal structure of the physical world. Among other things, I explore the interaction of mathematical and non-mathematical cognition in physical discovery. (shrink)

We make some remarks on the mathematics and metaphysics of the hole argument, in response to a recent article in this journal by Weatherall ([2018]). Broadly speaking, we defend the mainstream philosophical literature from the claim that correct usage of the mathematics of general relativity `blocks' the argument.

Mathematics is often taken to play one of two roles in the empirical sciences: either it represents empirical phenomena or it explains these phenomena by imposing constraints on them. This article identifies a third and distinct role that has not been fully appreciated in the literature on applicability of mathematics and may be pervasive in scientific practice. I call this the “bridging” role of mathematics, according to which mathematics acts as a connecting scheme in our explanatory (...) reasoning about why and how two different descriptions of an empirical phenomenon relate to each other. I discuss two bridging roles appearing in biological and physical explanations. (shrink)

While there are satisfactory answers to the question “How should we teach children mathematics?”, there are no satisfactory answers to the question “What mathematics should we teach children?”. This paper provides an answer to the last question for preschool children (early childhood), although the answer is also applicable to older children. This answer, together with an appropriate methodology on how to teach mathematics, gives a clear conception of the place of mathematics in the children’s world and (...) our role in helping children develop their mathematical abilities. Briefly, children’s mathematics consists of the world of children’s internal activities that they eventually purposefully organize in order to understand and control the outside world and organize their overall activities in it. We need to support a child in mathematical activities that she does spontaneously and in which she shows interest, and we need to teach her mathematics that she is interested in developing through these activities. In doing so, we must be fully aware that the child’s mathematics is part of the child’s world of internal activities and is not outside of it. We help the child develop mathematical abilities by developing them in the context of her world and not outside of it. From the point of view of this conception, the standards established today are limiting and too focused on numbers and geometric figures: these topics are too prominent and elaborated, and other mathematical contents are subordinated to them. Adhering to the standards, we drastically limit the mathematics of the child’s world, hamper the correct mathematical development of a child, and we can turn her away from mathematics. (shrink)

An Aristotelian Philosophy of Mathematics breaks the impasse between Platonist and nominalist views of mathematics. Neither a study of abstract objects nor a mere language or logic, mathematics is a science of real aspects of the world as much as biology is. For the first time, a philosophy of mathematics puts applied mathematics at the centre. Quantitative aspects of the world such as ratios of heights, and structural ones such as symmetry and continuity, are parts (...) of the physical world and are objects of mathematics. Though some mathematical structures such as infinities may be too big to be realized in fact, all of them are capable of being realized. Informed by the author's background in both philosophy and mathematics, but keeping to simple examples, the book shows how infant perception of patterns is extended by visualization and proof to the vast edifice of modern pure and applied mathematical knowledge. (shrink)

Anyone who has read Plato’s Republic knows it has a lot to say about mathematics. But why? I shall not be satisfied with the answer that the future rulers of the ideal city are to be educated in mathematics, so Plato is bound to give some space to the subject. I want to know why the rulers are to be educated in mathematics. More pointedly, why are they required to study so much mathematics, for so long?

The widespread assumption that logical coherence implies truth is increasingly challenged in the context of contemporary artificial intelligence systems. This paper examines the philosophical claim that what is logically consistent is not necessarily true, and investigates its implications for the behavior and evaluation of Large Language Models (LLMs). Unlike traditional reasoning systems grounded in formal logic or empirical verification, LLMs generate outputs based on probabilistic pattern recognition, optimizing for linguistic coherence rather than factual accuracy. As a result, these models can (...) produce arguments that are internally consistent and highly persuasive, yet fundamentally detached from reality. This work argues that LLMs do not fail at truth-seeking; rather, they are not inherently designed for it. Instead, they simulate reasoning by reproducing patterns of logical structure present in their training data, creating an "illusion of reasoning" that can obscure the distinction between valid argumentation and true claims. The paper further explores how this distinction affects the evaluation of knowledge, particularly in contexts where coherence, clarity, and rhetorical strength are mistakenly treated as indicators of correctness. By analyzing the epistemic limitations of coherence-based systems, this paper highlights a critical gap between logical form and factual grounding in AI-generated content. It concludes by proposing a conceptual framework for separating coherence from truth in the design and assessment of intelligent systems, emphasizing the need for hybrid approaches that integrate logical consistency with mechanisms of external validation. (shrink)

The paper discusses some changes in Bolzano's definition of mathematics attested in several quotations from the Beyträge, Wissenschaftslehre and Grössenlehre: is mathematics a theory of forms or a theory of quantities? Several issues that are maintained throughout Bolzano's works are distinguished from others that were accepted in the Beyträge and abandoned in the Grössenlehre. Changes are interpreted as a consequence of the new logical theory of truth introduced in the Wissenschaftslehre, but also as a consequence of the overcome (...) of Kant's terminology, and of the radicalization of Bolzano's anti‐Kantianism. Bolzano's evolution is understood as a coherent move, once the criticism expressed in the Beyträge on the notion of quantity is compared with a different and larger notion of quantity that Bolzano developed already in 1816. This discussion is enriched by the discovery that two unknown texts mentioned by Bolzano in the Beyträge can be identified with works by von Spaun and Vieth respectively. Bolzano's evolution is interpreted as a radicalization of the criticism of the Kantian definition of mathematics and as an effect of Bolzano's unaltered interest in the Leibnizian notion of mathesis universalis. As a conclusion, the author claims that Bolzano never abandoned his original idea of considering mathematics as a scientia universalis, i.e. as the science of quantities in general, and suggests that the question of ideal elements in mathematics, apart from being a main reason for the development of a new logical theory, can also be considered as a main reason for developing a different definition of quantity. (shrink)

In the last decades two different and apparently unrelated lines of research have increasingly connected mathematics and evolutionism. Indeed, on the one hand different attempts to formalize darwinism have been made, while, on the other hand, different attempts to naturalize logic and mathematics have been put forward. Those researches may appear either to be completely distinct or at least in some way convergent. They may in fact both be seen as supporting a naturalistic stance. Evolutionism is indeed crucial (...) for a naturalistic perspective, and formalizing it seems to be a way to strengthen its scientificity. The paper shows that, on the contrary, those directions of research may be seen as conflicting, since the conception of knowledge on which they rest may be undermined by the consequences of accepting an evolutionary perspective. (shrink)

In this article, modern standards of early years mathematics education are criticized and a proposal for change is presented. Today's early years mathematics education standards rest on a view of mathematics that became obsolete already at the end of the 19th century while the spirit of children's mathematics is precisely the spirit of modern mathematics. The proposal for change is not a return to the “new mathematics” movement, but something different.

This study explores the application of the philosophy of social constructivism and the principles of democracy in mathematics education among students as pre-service mathematics teachers. Involving 134 third-year students from Universitas Negeri Makassar, the research employs both quantitative and qualitative methods to analyze the understanding and implementation of these principles. The results reveal that 89.55% of students comprehend the concept of social constructivism, although its application remains limited, particularly in theoretical courses. A moderate correlation was found between gender (...) and teaching experience with the understanding of social constructivism, while its implementation was not significantly influenced by demographic factors. The main barriers identified include student inactivity, resource limitations, and classroom management challenges. Indepth interviews with 15 students revealed that teaching experience enhances the ability to lead discussions and apply democratic principles in the classroom. This study highlights the importance of classroom management training and collaborative strategies to improve the effectiveness of social constructivism- and democracy-based learning. (shrink)

Sand drawings are introduced in relation to the fieldwork of British anthropologists John Layard and Bernard Deacon early in the twentieth century, and the status of sand drawings as mathematics is discussed in the light of Wittgenstein’s idea that “in mathematics process and result are equivalent”. Included are photographs of the illustrations in Layard’s own copy of Deacon’s “Geometrical Drawings from Malekula and other Islands of the New Hebrides” (1934). This is a brief companion to my article “Wittgenstein (...) on string figures as mathematics” (2022), published in the journal Philosophical Investigations. (shrink)

Mathematical Thinking in Modern Life: Epistemology, Cognition, and Practical Application is a research-based interdisciplinary essay that explains mathematics not merely as a school subject, but as a framework for disciplined reasoning in modern life. The paper connects philosophy of mathematics, theology, cognitive reasoning, and practical numeracy by examining whether mathematics is discovered or invented, how humans use estimation and proportional reasoning, and why innumeracy creates vulnerability in finance, policy, and daily decision-making. It also applies these ideas to (...) concrete examples such as percentage asymmetry, scale distortion, tax planning, and the historical “20 percent rule” associated with Joseph in Egypt. Overall, the report presents mathematics as both an intellectual discipline and a form of practical self-defense against confusion, manipulation, and poor judgment. (shrink)

If there is an area of discourse in which disagreement is virtually absent, it is mathematics. After all, mathematicians justify their claims with deductive proofs: arguments that entail their conclusions. But is mathematics really exceptional in this respect? Looking at the history and practice of mathematics, we soon realize that it is not. First, deductive arguments must start somewhere. How should we choose the starting points (i.e., the axioms)? Second, mathematicians, like the rest of us, are fallible. (...) Their ability to recognize whether a putative proof is correct is not infallible. In most cases, disagreement over the correctness of a putative proof is, however, evanescent. Once an error is spotted and communicated, the disagreement disappears. But this is not always the case. Sometimes it is recalcitrant; that is, it persists over time. In order to zoom in on this type of disagreement and explain its very possibility, we focus on a single case study: a decades-long (1921-1949) controversy between Federigo Enriques and Francesco Severi, two prominent exponents of the Italian school of algebraic geometry. We suggest that the instability of the mathematical community to which they belonged can be explained by the gap between an abstract criterion of rigor and local criteria of acceptability. It is this instability that made the existence of recalcitrant disagreement over putative proofs possible. We do not condemn speculative mathematics but rather its pretense of being rigorous mathematics. In this respect, we show that the overly self-confident Severi and the more intuitive, visionary Enriques had a completely different attitude. (shrink)

Pluralist mathematical realism, the view that there exists more than one mathematical universe, has become an influential position in the philosophy of mathematics. I argue that, if mathematical pluralism is true (and we have good reason to believe that it is), then mathematical realism cannot (easily) be justified by arguments from the indispensability of mathematics to science. This is because any justificatory chain of inferences from mathematical applications in science to the total body of mathematical theorems can cover (...) at most one mathematical universe. Indispensability arguments may thus lose their central role in the debate about mathematical ontology. (shrink)

Mathematics forms graph theory as its fundamental division to study relationships between objects which exist as nodes and edges. Euler's Seven Bridges of Königsberg research marked the origin of what transformed into an essential mathematical field that includes computer science and network design and biological applications and other computational domains. Future developments in the field and current innovations get attention in the study.

In these days, there is an increasing technological development in intelligent tutoring systems. This field has become interesting to many researchers. In this paper, we present an intelligent tutoring system for teaching mathematics that help students understand the basics of math and that helps a lot of students of all ages to understand the topic because it's important for students of adding and subtracting. Through which the student will be able to study the course and solve related problems. An (...) evaluation of the intelligent tutoring systems was carried out and the results were encouraging. (shrink)

Call an explanation in which a non-mathematical fact is explained—in part or in whole—by mathematical facts: an extra-mathematical explanation. Such explanations have attracted a great deal of interest recently in arguments over mathematical realism. In this article, a theory of extra-mathematical explanation is developed. The theory is modelled on a deductive-nomological theory of scientific explanation. A basic DN account of extra-mathematical explanation is proposed and then redeveloped in the light of two difficulties that the basic theory faces. The final view (...) appeals to relevance logic and uses resources in information theory to understand the explanatory relationship between mathematical and physical facts. 1Introduction2Anchoring3The Basic Deductive-Mathematical Account4The Genuineness Problem5Irrelevance6Relevance and Information7Objections and Replies 7.1Against relevance logic7.2Too epistemic7.3Informational containment8Conclusion. (shrink)

In mathematics, the deductive method reigns. Without proof, a claim remains unsolved, a mere conjecture, not something that can be simply assumed; when a proof is found, the problem is solved, it turns into a “result,” something that can be relied on. So mathematicians think. But is there more to mathematical justification than proof? -/- The answer is an emphatic yes, as I explain in this article. I argue that non-deductive justification is in fact pervasive in mathematics, and (...) that it is in good epistemic standing. (shrink)

Mathematics does not constitute reality but encodes its observable regularities. The apparent “unreasonable effectiveness” of mathematics has often been taken as evidence of its primacy. This essay argues that such effectiveness is a structural consequence of patterned reality, not a metaphysical mystery. This work is a step in a broader exploration of the limits of knowability.

Quickly evolving technologies, such as Interactive Theorem Provers (ITPs), Automated Theorem Provers (ATPs), and Large Language Models (LLMs), all falling under the general heading ‘AI for mathematics,’ are transforming mathematical practice in profound ways. This chapter explores the implications of these innovations, focusing on their impact on how mathematical knowledge is created and shared. It also discusses how they are reshaping the social dimension of mathematics, altering collaboration dynamics, trust relationships, and the collective production of knowledge. For instance, (...) tools like ITPs facilitate large-scale collaborations and make new types of teamwork possible, where trust is not a necessary ingredient. ITPs also help us mitigate our human fallibility, yet they raise questions about the nature of formalization and the relationship between traditional and formal mathematics. Technologies such as LLMs are reshaping the division of epistemic labour between humans and machines and urge philosophers of mathematics to ask questions about the value of their work. (shrink)

Mathematical Platonism claims that mathematical structures exist independently of minds and experience, often treating them as more fundamental than physical reality itself. This paper demonstrates that mathematical Platonism commits the identical externalist error as materialism: using experientially-grounded concepts to assert the existence of entities supposedly independent of all possible experience. Building on the framework of Experiential Empiricism (Sergent, n.d.-a), which establishes valenced experience and logic as the only self-proving axioms, this analysis shows that mathematical concepts derive their entire meaning from (...) experiential grounding. Every mathematical concept, structure, and relation is learned, validated, and applied through experiential practice. Claiming these tools describe a realm independent of experience performs the same category fraud demonstrated in "The Logical Impossibility of Externalism" (Sergent, n.d.-b): applying semantic tools beyond the domain where they acquire meaning. When physicists claim abstract structures like Grassmannian manifolds or Haar measures are "fundamental reality" underlying experience, they invert the actual epistemic relationship. Mathematics succeeds because it provides precise formal languages for mapping experiential limitation patterns, not because numbers and structures occupy some ethereal Platonic realm more real than experiencing itself. This paper examines how mathematical Platonism functions as axiom camouflage, traces the pattern across physics (from Pythagoreans to contemporary quantum gravity), and demonstrates why Experiential Empiricism provides more parsimonious foundations: mathematics is our most refined tool for describing experiential regularities, not a metaphysical substrate explaining why experience exists. The explanatory arrow points the wrong direction. You cannot use experience to prove that non-experiential mathematical objects cause experience without performative contradiction. -/- . (shrink)

In the Republic, mathematics turns students' souls from sensibles to intelligibles. While there has been plenty of discussion of the transition from sensibles to mathematics, the transition from mathematics to dialectic has received less attention. I argue that Plato sees mathematics as usefully flawed in a way that leads students to dialectic, just as the limits of perception led students to mathematics. Students recognise this not through the five mathematical subjects themselves, but through the "synoptic (...) view" with which their studies culminate. The synoptic view reveals not just the methodological unity of mathematics, but also the inherent limitations—its reliance on sensible images and hypotheses—that only dialectic can overcome. (shrink)

This paper supersedes Mathematics as the Unique Top-Down Projection of Intelligence: A Structural Theorem from Cognitional Mechanics and Noology (DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.19968224), which itself superseded the first edition of the programme (January 2026, DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.18280992). The first edition identified mathematical structures as stabilised residues of irreversible, non-commutative operational histories and positioned the framework as a meta-theoretical explanatory layer operating above existing mathematical foundations. The second edition established the stronger claim that mathematics is the unique top-down projection of the operational (...) structure of intelligence, with the induced mathematical category M uniquely determined up to identity automorphism and the projection map surjective with structurally undefined inverse. -/- The present work marks a foundational transition: it re-establishes all structural results of the second edition under Operatiology (DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.20350414), the framework that supersedes Cognitional Mechanics as the executive layer derived from Noology Version 2 (DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.18690463). The prior premise that the minimal operational structure is identified with M_3(C) is removed. The projection source is now the abstract rank-3 operational closure C^(3)_Πd itself, established within Tier-2 by Operatiology, without presupposing its identification with any specific algebraic structure. That identification is a separate Tier-3 question and does not enter any argument of the present work. -/- Under this clarified foundation, the central theorems are re-established: the projection Π_math from C^(3)_Πd to M is surjective with structurally undefined inverse; Aut(M) = {id}; and M is the unique fixed point of the Πd-saturation closure operator acting on Tier-3 formal structures. The prior corpus citations from the Cognitional Mechanics framework are retained for historical continuity only; no result derived by means of M_3(C) is invoked in any proof or definition. The sole logical foundation of the present paper is Operatiology, derived from Noology Version 2. -/- A new result absent from the second edition is introduced: an internal operational distance d_op on M, measuring the index family type required for operational determination of each mathematical structure. This yields a five-layer classification: Layer 1 (finite index families, algebra); Layer 2 (countable type, discrete infinite structures); Layer 3 (power-set type, continuous and geometric structures); Layer 4 (unrestricted type, axiomatic and functorial structures); Layer 5 (maximal type, large-cardinal and higher-categorical structures). Algebra occupies Layer 1 as the unique mathematical domain closest to C^(3)_Πd. The prior Operatiology mathematics series covering number systems, analytic structures, and set theory is positioned within this hierarchy. -/- Consequences include the dissolution of the Platonist-formalist dichotomy; the structural impossibility of alternative mathematics; the reinterpretation of mathematical effectiveness in physics as a tautology; and the reclassification of foundational competition among ZFC, category theory, and type theory as a compression-efficiency competition internal to Tier-3, evaluated from above by C^(3)_Πd. -/- Published on May 24, 2026 DOI:10.5281/zenodo.20362852. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to show that the mathematics of quantum mechanics (QM) is the mathematics of set partitions (which specify indefiniteness and definiteness) linearized to vector spaces, particularly in Hilbert spaces. That is, the math of QM is the Hilbert space version of the math to describe objective indefiniteness that at the set level is the math of partitions. The key analytical concepts are definiteness versus indefiniteness, distinctions versus indistinctions, and distinguishability versus indistinguishability. The key (...) machinery to go from indefinite to more definite states is the partition join operation at the set level that prefigures at the quantum level projective measurement as well as the formation of maximally-definite state descriptions by Dirac’s Complete Sets of Commuting Operators. This development is measured quantitatively by logical entropy at the set level and by quantum logical entropy at the quantum level. This follow-the-math approach supports the Literal Interpretation of QM—as advocated by Abner Shimony among others which sees a reality of objective indefiniteness that is quite different from the common sense and classical view of reality as being “definite all the way down”. (shrink)

This paper fixes mathematics within a non-modal structural framework. -/- Mathematics is not treated as quantity, calculation, logical derivation, or symbolic representation. It is fixed without causality, global temporality, or subject-dependent grounding. -/- The text does not explain mathematics. It delimits the conditions under which formal readable fixation remains fixed without explanatory equivalence. -/- No subject is introduced. No causality is introduced. No representational equivalence is assumed.

At the beginning of the present century, a series of paradoxes were discovered within mathematics which suggested a fundamental unclarity in traditional mathemati­cal methods. These methods rested on the assumption of a realm of mathematical idealities existing independently of our thinking activity, and in order to arrive at a firmly grounded mathematics different attempts were made to formulate a conception of mathematical objects as purely human constructions. It was, however, realised that such formulations necessarily result in a (...) class='Hi'>mathematics which lacks the richness and power of the old ‘platonistic’ methods, and the latter are still defended, in various modified forms, as embodying truths about self-existent mathematical entities. Thus there is an idealism-realism dispute in the philosophy of mathematics in some respects parallel to the controversy over the existence of the experiential world to the settle­ment of which lngarden devoted his life. The present paper is an attempt to apply Ingarden’s methods to the sphere of mathematical existence. This exercise will reveal new modes of being applicable to non-real objects, and we shall put forward arguments to suggest that these modes of being have an importance outside mathematics, especially in the areas of value theory and the ontology of art. (shrink)

Recent works in the philosophy of mathematical practice and mathematical education have challenged orthodox views of mathematical explanation by developing Understanding-first accounts according to which mathematical explanation should be cashed out in terms of understanding. In this article, we explore two arguments that might have motivated this move, (i) the context-sensitivity argument and (ii) the inadequacy of knowing why argument. We show that although these arguments are derived from compelling observations, they ultimately rest on a misunderstanding of what Explanation-first accounts (...) are committed to and an underestimation of the resources available to them. By clarifying the terms at play in the debate and distinguishing different objects of evaluation, we show that the insightful observations about practice and education made by challengers to the orthodoxy are in fact best accounted for within the traditional Explanation-first framework. (shrink)

Can logic be fully detached from philosophy and absorbed into mathematics? In Logic: From Philosophy to Mathematics? Towards George Boole’s Algebra of Logic, Christian Toumba Patalé examines George Boole’s transformative project of recasting logic as a mathematical science. Traditionally rooted in Aristotelian and Stoic philosophies, logic underwent a major shift in the nineteenth century when Boole, inspired by Leibniz’s vision of a calculus ratiocinator, proposed expressing the laws of thought through algebra. By introducing a symbolic system based on (...) binary values (0 and 1), he laid the groundwork for modern symbolic logic and computer science. At the crossroads of Logic, Epistemology, Philosophy of Mathematics, and Philosophy of Computer Science, this work demonstrates that while Boole’s algebra revolutionized reasoning and shaped our contemporary computational civilization, it does not exhaust the richness and complexity of human thought. Logic emerges here as both a mathematical discipline and a philosophical inquiry, demanding rigor, but also constant critical vigilance. -/- Christian Toumba Patalé holds a Ph.D in Philosophy (Logic and Epistemology). He is Lecturer at the Faculty of Letters and Social Sciences of the University of Dschang (Cameroon). His field of research focuses on the use of Logic, of Philosophy of Science, and of Digital Humanities in understanding and interpreting current scientific developments. (shrink)

I argue for the Wittgensteinian thesis that mathematical statements are expressions of norms, rather than descriptions of the world. An expression of a norm is a statement like a promise or a New Year's resolution, which says that someone is committed or entitled to a certain line of action. A expression of a norm is not a mere description of a regularity of human behavior, nor is it merely a descriptive statement which happens to entail a norms. The view can (...) be thought of as a sort of logicism for the logical expressivist---a person who believes that the purpose of logical language is to make explicit commitments and entitlements that are implicit in ordinary practice. The thesis that mathematical statements are expression of norms is a kind of logicism, not because it says that mathematics can be reduced to logic, but because it says that mathematical statements play the same role as logical statements. ;I contrast my position with two sets of views, an empiricist view, which says that mathematical knowledge is acquired and justified through experience, and a cluster of nativist and apriorist views, which say that mathematical knowledge is either hardwired into the human brain, or justified a priori, or both. To develop the empiricist view, I look at the work of Kitcher and Mill, arguing that although their ideas can withstand the criticisms brought against empiricism by Frege and others, they cannot reply to a version of the critique brought by Wittgenstein in the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. To develop the nativist and apriorist views, I look at the work of contemporary developmental psychologists, like Gelman and Gallistel and Karen Wynn, as well as the work of philosophers who advocate the existence of a mathematical intuition, such as Kant, Husserl, and Parsons. After clarifying the definitions of "innate" and "a priori," I argue that the mechanisms proposed by the nativists cannot bring knowledge, and the existence of the mechanisms proposed by the apriorists is not supported by the arguments they give. (shrink)

This volum includes 37 papers of mathematics or applied mathematics written by the author alone or in collaboration with the following co-authors: Cătălin Barbu, Mihály Bencze, Octavian Cira, Marian Niţu, Ion Pătraşcu, Mircea E. Şelariu, Rajan Alex, Xingsen Li, Tudor Păroiu, Luige Vlădăreanu, Victor Vlădăreanu, Ştefan Vlăduţescu, Yingjie Tian, Mohd Anasri, Lucian Căpitanu, Valeri Kroumov, Kimihiro Okuyama, Gabriela Tonţ, A. A. Adewara, Manoj K. Chaudhary, Mukesh Kumar, Sachin Malik, Alka Mittal, Neetish Sharma, Rakesh K. Shukla, Ashish K. Singh, (...) Jayant Singh, Rajesh Singh, V.V. Singh, Hansraj Yadav, Amit Bhaghel, Dipti Chauhan, V. Christianto, Priti Singh, and Dmitri Rabounski. (shrink)

By analysing several characteristic mathematical models: natural and real numbers, Euclidean geometry, group theory, and set theory, I argue that a mathematical model in its final form is a junction of a set of axioms and an internal partial interpretation of the corresponding language. It follows from the analysis that (i) mathematical objects do not exist in the external world: they are imagined objects, some of which, at least approximately, exist in our internal world of activities or we can realize (...) or represent them there; (ii) mathematical truths are not truths about the external world but specifications (formulations) of mathematical conceptions; (iii) mathematics is first and foremost our imagined tool by which, with certain assumptions about its applicability, we explore nature and synthesize our rational cognition of it. (shrink)

Recent experimental evidence from developmental psychology and cognitive neuroscience indicates that humans are equipped with unlearned elementary mathematical skills. However, formal mathematics has properties that cannot be reduced to these elementary cognitive capacities. The question then arises how human beings cognitively deal with more advanced mathematical ideas. This paper draws on the extended mind thesis to suggest that mathematical symbols enable us to delegate some mathematical operations to the external environment. In this view, mathematical symbols are not only used (...) to express mathematical concepts—they are constitutive of the mathematical concepts themselves. Mathematical symbols are epistemic actions, because they enable us to represent concepts that are literally unthinkable with our bare brains. Using case-studies from the history of mathematics and from educational psychology, we argue for an intimate relationship between mathematical symbols and mathematical cognition. (shrink)

The triumph of scientific materialism in the Seventeenth Century not only bifurcated nature into matter and mind and primary and secondary qualities, as Alfred North Whitehead pointed out in Science and the Modern World. It divided science and the humanities. The core of science is the effort to comprehend the cosmos through mathematics. The core of the humanities is the effort to comprehend history and human nature through narratives. The life sciences can be seen as the zone in which (...) the conflict between these two very different ways of comprehending the world collide. Evolutionary theory as defended by Schelling developed out of natural history, but efforts have been made to formulate neo-Darwinism through mathematical models. However, it is impossible to eliminate stories from biology. As Stuart Kauffman argued, mathematical models attempt to pre-state all possibilities, but in evolution there can be adjacent possibles that can be embraced by organisms but cannot be pre-stated. To account for such actions it is necessary to tell stories. Mathematics provides analytic precision allowing long chains of deductions, but tends to deny temporal becoming and cannot do justice to the openness of the future, while narratives focus on processes and events, but lack exactitude that would provide precise deductions and predictions. In advancing mathematics adequate to life, Robert Rosen argued that living beings as anticipatory systems must have models of themselves, and strove to develop a form of mathematics able to model life itself. It has been convincingly argued that narratives are central to human self-creation and they are lived out before being explicitly told. Their models of themselves are first and foremost, stories or narratives. If this is the case, might not living beings as biological entities be characterized by proto-stories or narratives in their models of themselves? Biosemiotics, largely inspired by C.S. Peirce, provides a bridge between mathematical and narrative comprehension, conceiving them as different forms of semiosis. The study of life through biosemiotics could reveal how mathematics and narratives can be understood in relation to each other. This could have implications for how we understand science and the humanities and their relationship to each other. In this paper I will examine work in theoretical biology that might advance these efforts. (shrink)