According to the safety account of knowledge, one knows that p only if one’s belief could not easily have been false. An important issue for the account is whether we should only examine the target belief when evaluating whether a belief is safe or not. In this paper, it is argued that, if we should only examine the target belief, then the account fails to account for ignorance of necessary truths. But, if we should also examine beliefs in other relevant (...) propositions, then the account fails to account for knowledge from falsehood. Therefore, the safety account of knowledge is undermined by knowledge from falsehood and ignorance of necessary truths. (shrink)

Falsehood as an Evil Deed and Divine Truth as a Heavenly Law -/- Truth and falsehood are two fundamental forces that shape human existence, morality, and society. Falsehood is often condemned as an evil deed because it distorts reality, misleads others, and disrupts the natural balance of life. On the other hand, Divine truth is regarded as a heavenly law because it aligns with the fundamental order of the universe, guiding individuals toward wisdom, justice, and enlightenment. This (...) essay explores why falsehood is inherently destructive and why Divine truth is essential for the harmony and balance of human life. -/- The Nature of Falsehood and Its Consequences -/- Falsehood, in its simplest definition, is the act of deceiving, misleading, or presenting something contrary to reality. It is often associated with lying, manipulation, and the distortion of facts. At its core, falsehood is an evil deed because it corrupts human interactions, leads to injustice, and creates suffering. When people embrace falsehood, they create a false perception of reality, leading others to make decisions based on incorrect or incomplete information. This, in turn, results in misguided actions that can cause harm to individuals, families, and entire societies. -/- A lie, no matter how small, has a ripple effect. A person who lies to avoid responsibility creates distrust, and over time, this lack of trust weakens relationships. On a larger scale, falsehood in politics, business, and media can lead to corruption, exploitation, and societal chaos. History provides numerous examples where deception has led to wars, economic collapses, and the downfall of civilizations. The spread of misinformation and propaganda fuels conflicts, destroys reputations, and manipulates people into supporting unjust causes. -/- From the perspective of natural law, falsehood disrupts the universal balance. Every system, whether biological, social, or mechanical, functions based on accurate information. If an engineer builds a bridge using false measurements, the structure will collapse. Similarly, when individuals or leaders make decisions based on lies, their actions create instability and suffering. This principle aligns with the law of karma, where every cause has an effect—falsehood inevitably leads to negative consequences. -/- Divine Truth as a Universal Law -/- In contrast to falsehood, Divine truth represents the highest form of reality, wisdom, and moral integrity. It is considered a heavenly law because it reflects the natural order and balance of the universe. Divine truth Is not merely about stating facts; it is about living in alignment with justice, righteousness, and the greater good. -/- Religious and philosophical traditions around the world emphasize the importance of truth. In Christianity, Jesus Christ declared, “The truth shall set you free” (John 8:32). In Hinduism, Satya (truth) is a fundamental principle of Dharma (righteousness), while in Buddhism, the path to enlightenment is rooted in seeing reality as it truly is. These teachings highlight that truth is not only a moral virtue but also a guiding force that leads to inner peace, freedom, and harmony with the universe. -/- From the perspective of the universal law of balance in nature, truth is the foundation that allows individuals and societies to function properly. Just as a healthy body relies on accurate biological processes, a healthy society relies on truth in governance, education, and human relationships. When people uphold truth, they make informed decisions that contribute to the well-being of others. Leaders who embrace truth foster trust and stability, while scientists who seek truth contribute to human progress. -/- The Clash Between Falsehood and Divine Truth -/- Throughout history, there has been a continuous struggle between falsehood and Divine truth. Many individuals and institutions have attempted to suppress truth for personal gain, power, or control. However, truth is resilient—it cannot be permanently hidden. Falsehood may offer temporary advantages, but it ultimately leads to downfall, as seen in the collapse of corrupt regimes and fraudulent enterprises. -/- The key to overcoming falsehood is education and enlightenment. A society that prioritizes truth in its educational system, media, and governance is less likely to fall into deception and manipulation. This is why a holistic educational system, as proposed in my universal formula, is crucial for minimizing ignorance and ensuring that truth prevails over falsehood. If individuals are taught from an early age to critically analyze information and recognize truth, they will be less susceptible to deceit and manipulation. -/- Conclusion -/- Falsehood is an evil deed because it distorts reality, disrupts human relationships, and creates imbalance in the natural order. It leads to suffering, injustice, and destruction. In contrast, Divine truth is a heavenly law that aligns with the universal principles of balance, justice, and wisdom. It serves as the foundation for ethical behavior, trust, and societal progress. -/- Understanding the importance of truth and the dangers of falsehood is essential for individuals and societies to thrive. By embracing truth in our thoughts, words, and actions, we align ourselves with the natural order of the universe and contribute to a world that is just, peaceful, and in harmony with the laws of nature. -/- . (shrink)

In Plato’s Laws, the Athenian Stranger maintains that law should consist of both persuasion (πειθώ) and compulsion (βία) (IV.711c, IV.718b-d, and IV.722b). Persuasion can be achieved by prefacing the laws with preludes (προοίμια), which make the citizens more eager to obey the laws. Although scholars disagree on how to interpret the preludes’ persuasion, they agree that the preludes instill true beliefs and give citizens good reasons for obeying the laws. In this paper I refine this account of the preludes by (...) arguing that the primary purpose of the preludes is to motivate correct action, and that for citizens who lack rational-governance this is achieved via useful false beliefs. That is to say, in many cases, the prelude functions as a “noble lie” (γενναῖον ψεῦδος). (shrink)

Falsehood and Negative Behavior as Evil Influences, and Divine Truth and Positive Behavior as Heavenly Influences -/- The struggle between truth and falsehood, good and evil, and positive and negative behaviors has shaped human history and moral philosophy. Falsehood, along with negative behavior, is an evil influence that corrupts individuals, misguides societies, and creates suffering. In contrast, Divine truth, accompanied by positive behavior, serves as a heavenly influence that fosters harmony, justice, and enlightenment. This essay explores how (...) falsehood and negative behavior disrupt the universal balance, while Divine truth and positive behavior align with the natural laws that govern a just and harmonious existence. -/- Falsehood and Negative Behavior as Evil Influences -/- Falsehood is more than just lying; it is an intentional distortion of reality that misleads, deceives, and manipulates others. It serves as a foundation for many negative behaviors, such as greed, dishonesty, hatred, and corruption. When falsehood dominates human actions, it creates chaos, breaks trust, and disrupts the natural order of relationships and societies. -/- Negative behavior, such as envy, arrogance, selfishness, and aggression, further amplifies the effects of falsehood. These behaviors are rooted In ignorance and imbalance, causing individuals to act in ways that harm themselves and others. For instance, a leader who embraces deception and corruption for personal gain influences an entire system, leading to injustice, poverty, and social unrest. A person who habitually lies or manipulates others for selfish reasons spreads negativity, weakening the bonds of trust and mutual respect. -/- From the perspective of the law of karma, negative behavior and falsehood create defects in the system of human interactions. Just as a malfunctioning machine cannot perform its function correctly, a society built on deceit and immoral actions will inevitably collapse. Every negative action carries consequences—whether immediate or delayed—because it violates the universal law of balance in nature. -/- Divine Truth and Positive Behavior as Heavenly Influences -/- In contrast, Divine truth is a guiding force that aligns human actions with the fundamental order of the universe. It is not just about honesty but about living in accordance with righteousness, justice, and wisdom. Truth allows individuals to see reality as it is, making informed decisions that contribute to the well-being of themselves and others. -/- When paired with positive behavior, Divine truth becomes a powerful heavenly influence that uplifts societies and strengthens human connections. Positive behaviors, such as kindness, compassion, patience, humility, and generosity, serve as the foundation of a peaceful and thriving world. A leader who values truth and integrity inspires trust, ensuring fair governance and social progress. A person who practices kindness and empathy fosters meaningful relationships, spreading goodness in their community. -/- Positive behavior and truth reinforce each other, creating a cycle of balance and prosperity. In spiritual traditions, this is often seen as the path to enlightenment, where individuals who seek truth and goodness naturally attract wisdom and inner peace. Religions and philosophies across cultures emphasize truth and morality as the path to salvation, enlightenment, or a harmonious existence. The natural law of balance ensures that positive actions lead to positive outcomes, reinforcing the idea that truth and righteousness are essential for a just society. -/- The battle Between Evil and Heavenly Influences -/- Throughout history, the battle between evil and heavenly influences has shaped civilizations. Falsehood, corruption, and negative behavior have led to wars, oppression, and suffering, while truth, justice, and positive behavior have brought about peace, progress, and prosperity. The challenge lies in recognizing and resisting evil influences while cultivating and spreading positive ones. -/- Education plays a crucial role in this struggle. A holistic educational system, as proposed in my universal formula, must teach individuals how to recognize falsehood and negative behaviors while promoting truth and positive values. When people are equipped with critical thinking, self-awareness, and moral guidance, they are less susceptible to evil influences and more capable of fostering goodness in society. -/- Conclusion -/- Falsehood and negative behavior serve as evil influences that disrupt the balance of human existence, leading to suffering, injustice, and chaos. In contrast, Divine truth and positive behavior act as heavenly influences, guiding individuals and societies toward enlightenment, peace, and harmony. The law of karma and the universal law of balance in nature demonstrate that every action has consequences—negative actions lead to destruction, while positive actions contribute to growth and stability. -/- To build a just and thriving world, individuals must commit to truth and righteousness, resisting the temptations of falsehood and negative behavior. By embracing truth, integrity, and positive values, humanity can align itself with the natural order of the universe, ensuring a future that is not only sustainable but also deeply fulfilling. -/- . (shrink)

Recent epistemological debates have increasingly focused on the contentious Counter-Closure principle, which holds that, necessarily, if an agent S believes that q based solely on a competent inference from p, and knows q, then S also knows p. This principle has drawn attention due to various challenges, particularly the issue of inferential knowledge derived from false premises. In this article, we pursue two objectives. First, we argue that the Counter-Closure principle is untenable but for reasons that depart from traditional critiques. (...) Specifically, we will present a novel argument against the internalist approach that supports the cases of knowledge from falsehoods. Second, we show that the Counter-Closure principle’s failure can be better addressed within an externalist framework by exploring novel theories of defeaters and the relationship between doxastic and propositional warrant. (shrink)

I claim that we should reject a sharp distinction between fiction and non-fiction according to which documentary is a faithful representation of the facts, whilst fiction films merely invite us to imagine what is made up. Instead, we should think of fiction and non-fiction as genres: categories whose membership is determined by a combination of non-essential features and which influence appreciation in a variety of ways. An objection to this approach is that it renders the distinction too conventional and fragile, (...) undermining our justification for criticising documentaries like Bowling for Columbine or The Hunting Ground for playing fast and loose with the facts. I argue that this objection is misguided, misidentifying the justification for criticising non-fiction films that mislead or deceive. I develop an alternative account that explains why we also criticise many fictions for inaccuracy. (shrink)

False-premise-inference (FPI) cases—where a subject appears to acquire inferential knowledge by inferring from a false premise—challenge the standard view that inferential knowledge must be grounded in true premises. Existing responses, knowledge from falsehood and knowledge despite falsehood, prove unsatisfactory. We defend a third alternative: knowledge from partial truth. In FPI cases, the subject’s inferential knowledge is epistemized not by the false premise as a whole but by a true proper part of its content. Drawing on a fine-grained theory (...) of propositional content, we show how to isolate this knowledge-generating component. Our approach resolves the puzzle by preserving the natural reading of the FPI cases while upholding the principle that knowledge-generating inferences are truth-conducive. (shrink)

How can we think or say what is not? If we equate what-is-not with nothing, then a thought of nothing is no thought at all; if we don’t, we are condemned to admit that what-is-not is, seemingly incurring self-refutation. In this paper, I address this paradox through the lenses of Parmenides, Plato, Russell, and the early Wittgenstein.

A growing number of authors defend putative examples of knowledge from falsehood (KFF), inferential knowledge based in a critical or essential way on false premises, and they argue that KFF has important implications for many areas of epistemology (whether evidence can be false, the Gettier debate, defeasibility theories of knowledge, etc.). I argue, however, that there is no KFF, because in any supposed example either the falsehood does not contribute to the knowledge or the subject lacks knowledge. In (...) particular, I show that if the subject actually has knowledge in putative KFF cases, then there is always a veridical evidential path meeting the basing conditions that accounts for her knowledge; if there is no such path, then the subject is in a type of Gettier case. All the recent arguments that rely on KFF are therefore based on a mistake. (shrink)

Certain puzzling cases have been discussed in the literature recently which appear to support the thought that knowledge can be obtained by way of deduction from a falsehood; moreover, these cases put pressure, prima facie, on the thesis of counter closure for knowledge. We argue that the cases do not involve knowledge from falsehood; despite appearances, the false beliefs in the cases in question are causally, and therefore epistemologically, incidental, and knowledge is achieved despite falsehood. We also (...) show that the principle of counter closure, and the concomitant denial of knowledge from falsehood, is well motivated by considerations in epistemological theory--in particular, by the view that knowledge is first in the epistemological order of things. (shrink)

Critical notice of Puddifoot, Katherine. 2021. How Stereotypes Deceive Us. NY: OUP.--------- -/- Kathy Puddifoot makes a compelling and enlightening case for a striking pair of claims: 1) false stereotypes sometimes steer us to the truth, while 2) true stereotypes often lead us into error. This is a wonderful book, a seamless integration of epistemology with ethics, of philosophy with social science, and of “mainstream” or “Western analytic” approaches with marginalized and underappreciated contributions from critical social traditions, especially black feminism. (...) The integrations are so seamless, in fact, as to give the reader the impression that Puddifoot is simply picking up conversations already underway. Instead, she has done a tremendous service in bringing representatives from wide-ranging, often-siloed disciplines into dialogue. Another virtue of Puddifoot’s book is how thoroughly it maps out the actual and possible views and logical spaces revolving around each topic she addresses. How Stereotypes Deceive Us could therefore be used to introduce budding epistemologists to the field, as it offers clear and careful explanations of leading approaches to a range of topics, including virtue epistemology, theory of mind, and more. (shrink)

A number of philosophers have recently proposed several alleged cases of “knowledge from falsehood,” i.e., cases of inferential knowledge epistemised by an inference with a false crucial premise. This paper examines such cases and argues against interpreting them as cases of knowledge from falsehood. Specifically, I argue that the inferences in play in such cases are in no position to epistemise their conclusions.

At Sophist 260e3-261a2, the Eleatic Stranger claims that in order to demonstrate that falsehood is, he and Theaetetus must first track down what speech (logos), opinion (doxa), and appearance (phantasia) are, and then observe the communion (koinōnia) that speech, opinion, and appearance have with non-being. The Stranger, however, never explicitly discusses the communion of speech, opinion, and appearance with non-being. Yet presumably their communion is implicit in his account of falsehood, given his claim that observing that communion is (...) needed in order to demonstrate that falsehood is (260e5-a2). This essay seeks to make the communion that speech has with non-being explicit. I argue that speech has communion with non-being in that the things and actions speech combines together by means of nouns and verbs need not be combined in a way that reveals how the being a given speech is about combines ontologically with other beings. (shrink)

Philosophers have debated whether it is possible to knowledgeably infer a conclusion from a false premise. For example, if a fan believes that the actress’s dress is blue, but the dress is actually green, can the fan knowledgeably infer “the dress is not red” from “the dress is blue”? One aspect of this debate concerns what the intuitively correct verdict is about specific cases such as this. Here I report a simple behavioral experiment that helps answer this question. The main (...) finding is that people attribute knowledge in cases where a true conclusion is inferred from a false premise. People did this despite judging that the premise was false and unknown. People also viewed the agent as inferring the conclusion from the premise. In closely matched conditions where the conclusion was false, people did not attribute knowledge of the conclusion. These results support the view that the ordinary knowledge concept includes in its extension cases of knowledge inferred from false premises. (shrink)

This is an article (of approximately 3,000 words) introducing the idea of moral fictionalism. It is written for a more general audience than a typical journal paper.

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.

Socrates' attitude towards falsehood is quite puzzling in the Republic. Although Socrates is clearly committed to truth, at several points he discusses the benefits of falsehood. This occurs most notably in Book 3 with the "noble lie" (414d-415c) and most disturbingly in Book 5 with the "rigged sexual lottery" (459d-460c). This raises the question: What kinds of falsehoods does Socrates think are beneficial, and what kinds of falsehoods does he think are harmful? And more broadly: What can this (...) tell us about the relationship between ethics and epistemology? The key to answering these questions lies in an obscure and paradoxical passage in Book II; at 382a-d Socrates distinguishes between "true falsehoods" and "impure lies." True falsehoods are always bad, but impure lies are sometimes beneficial. Despite Socrates' insistence that he is not saying anything deep, his distinction is far from straightforward. Nevertheless, in order to determine why some falsehoods are beneficial and why some are always harmful, we must understand what exactly true falsehoods are and how they differ from impure lies. In this paper, I argue that true falsehoods are a restricted class of false beliefs about ethics; they are false beliefs about how one should live and what one should pursue. I refer to these beliefs as "normative commitments." False normative commitments are always pernicious because they create and sustain psychological disharmony. Unlike true falsehoods, impure lies can be about anything. Nevertheless, they are only beneficial when they help produce and sustain true normative commitments. I argue that the upshot of this is that practical concerns have a kind of primacy over theoretical concerns. (shrink)

Can understanding be based on false beliefs? I argue that it can. I first argue that the best way to understand the question is that it is whether one can increase one's degree of understanding by adopting an overall less accurate body of beliefs. I identify three sufficient conditions for one body of beliefs to be more accurate than another. Next, I appeal to two widely used methods of comparing degrees of understanding. With these methods, I show that understanding can (...) be gained by acquiring false beliefs. In addition, I show that this implies that understanding is not factive. (shrink)

This essay analyses how social platforms operate as ontopolitical infrastructures whose ontotechnical design reallocates the conditions and costs of proof. By indexing value to attention capture—clicks, shares, dwell time—they privilege the performative effi cacy of adherence over epistemic validity, making functional falsehood operationally superior. In this environment, filters of appearance and retentional efficacy displace confrontation with evidence, destabilizing classical accounts of truth (correspondence, coherence, pragmatism, truth as event). Empirically, statistical learning without under standing amplifies emotionally charged content and produces (...) authorless falsity by de sign rather than intention. The essay proposes an operative program: friction algo rithms and sustained verification time; binding multistakeholder governance (audits ex ante/ex post, objective-function transparency, model/version registries, redress); dig ital public goods (open provenance protocols, trust graphs, evidence repositories); and critical literacies with counter-algorithmic practices that redistribute the cost of proof. Reframing critique as intervention at the level of infrastructure, it concludes that public reason must be materially engineered so that truth regains a right it has been algorith mically denied: the right to spend time. (shrink)

According to a recent account of disinformation, disinformation is content that “generates ignorance” (Simion 2024a; 2024b). The view improves upon previous accounts that focused upon the potential for disinformation to induce false belief, overlooking its role in generating ignorance by inducing doubt. While this proposal gives us a broader understanding of what disinformation can be, it retains the idea that disinformation functions as evidence that incrementally confirms falsehoods. Thus, this approach implies (in line with previous views) that when disinformation is (...) used intentionally, the disinformant hopes to capture the attention of agents and induce these agents to process this content as evidence to change an agent's belief state in epistemically undesirable ways. Certainly, this is true of some disinformation tactics, but it won't give us an adequate definition. In some successful real-world disinformation campaigns, disinformants add to the available content to deter the audience from attending to and processing evidence. In some cases, evidence can incrementally confirm a falsehood while providing knowledge of its negation. I propose an alternative pragmatic view that explains this. On this view, disinformation can come in the form of misleading evidence, but it can also come in the form of content that makes it evident that the evidential resources the agent needs to advance inquiry have been corrupted. This content functions as disinformation because it rationalises decisions that can protect a disinformant’s interests instead of promoting the inquirer’s interests. Instead of thinking of disinformation in epistemic terms (e.g., evidence that’s misleading), we should see it as fundamentally pragmatic. In the special case where a disinformant wants to influence another agent's inquiries, disinformation is content that’s used to minimise the probability that the inquisitive agent successfully draws conclusions that threaten the disinformant's interests. This includes misleading first-order evidence that leads agents away from the truth (per Simion's account), but it also includes non-misleading higher-order evidence that accurately shows evidential resources are corrupted, functioning as a deterrent that rationalises withdrawing from dangerous lines of inquiry. (shrink)

It has been largely assumed from the start that truth, the first premise of the Tripartite theory of Knowledge, is necessary for a mental state of knowing. And this has intuitively made sense. Examples that demonstrate the logic of this premise are wide-spread and easily found. Yet, if one tries to establish the necessity of this condition for oneself, one may discover, a logical flaw in this premise. In theory truth is necessary, however, in practice it is not truth that (...) establishes knowledge. -/- We obtain knowledge using our perception or five senses. We accept the subjectivity of perspective, even though truth may or may not be established. We reject knowledge only when evidence of falsehood is obtained, if ever. -/- In practice, in the obtaining of knowledge of the conditional, those things we experience that could have been otherwise, truth is not established. The fundamental application of how we attain knowledge is in witnessing with our perception, our five senses, evidence for our conclusion. However, evidence provides support for our conclusion, by way of justification, but does not by itself provide truth. And therefore, it is not truth that is necessary for knowledge. It is the lack of evidence of falsehood in our conclusion that is the basis of our knowledge. And a lack of evidence of falsehood, is not the equal of truth. -/- The following thought experiment will demonstrate this flaw between theory and practice. (shrink)

Sophists and rhetoricians like Gorgias are often accused of disregarding truth and rationality: their speeches seem to aim only at effective persuasion, and be constrained by nothing but persuasiveness itself. In his extant texts Gorgias claims that language does not represent external objects or communicate internal states, but merely generates behavioural responses in people. It has been argued that this perspective erodes the possibility of rationally assessing speeches by making persuasiveness the only norm, and persuasive power the only virtue, of (...) speech. Against this view, I show how Gorgias’ texts support a robust normativity of language that goes well beyond persuasion while remaining non-representational. Gorgias’ claims that a speech can be persuasive and false, or true and unpersuasive, reveal pragmatic, epistemic, and agonistic constraints on the validity of speech that are neither representational nor reducible to sheer persuasiveness. (shrink)

引言：谁在替天行道？——伪道的建构 -/- “替天行道”，本应是顺应天地自然之理，以无为之治引领社会和谐。然而，在中国古代思想史中，这句话却逐渐被篡改为一种政治合法性的工具，一种儒家话语系统下的人造秩序。那些自称“行道”的圣贤、帝王与士大夫，真 的是在奉天之命，还是在“代天造神”？谁在真正代表“天道”？谁又在用“天道”伪装人意？ -/- 本文以“儒学七伪”为主题，系统揭露儒家思想从孔子到张载的发展过程中，如何逐步构建出一套脱离自然之道、扭曲天地本源的意识形态。孔子的“敬鬼神而远之”，表面看是理性之言，实则掩盖了对天地神明的真实遮蔽；孟 子的“性善”，将人之自然演化的复杂性简化为教化基础；荀子的“礼治”更以人为设制硬化自然法则；董仲舒更大胆地伪造“天人感应”，使皇权披上神圣外衣。至宋明理学，程朱理气之说、张载气本论，已经将“道”的自然 性完全转化为伦理性、社会性和政治性的说教系统。 这是一条“伪道之路”——表面上冠以“天理”“仁义”“忠孝”，实则是在“天命”之名下行人治之实，是用人造的“神圣”结构压制天地的真实，是以文明之名遮蔽自然的流动之道。 -/- 在这一背景下，“老-杨创世纪宇宙观”为我们提供了一个返本开新的视角：以“道”为宇宙本体，以自然神为存在之根，拒绝以人类中心建构的神圣，回归“道法自然”的宇宙秩序。唯有看清“伪”的面具，方能迈向“真”的 觉醒；唯有瓦解虚伪的文化枷锁，方能重启通向自然之道的哲学之门。 -/- Introduction: Who Carries Out the Will of Heaven?— The Construction of Pseudo-Dao “To act on behalf of Heaven” was originally meant to follow the natural principles of Heaven and Earth, guiding society through non-interventionist governance toward harmony. However, in the history of Chinese thought, this phrase gradually morphed into a tool for political legitimacy—a human-constructed order under the Confucian discourse system. Were those self-proclaimed sages, emperors, and officials truly obeying Heaven’s command, (...) or were they creating gods in Heaven’s name? Who truly represents the “Heavenly Dao”? And who merely disguises human intentions as Heaven’s will? -/- This paper, themed “The Seven Falsehoods of Confucianism,” systematically reveals how Confucian thought—evolving from Confucius to Zhang Zai—gradually constructed an ideology divorced from the natural Dao and distorted the cosmic origin. Confucius’s “respecting spirits and keeping a distance” seems rational but actually conceals a disconnection from true reverence for divine nature. Mencius’s “innate goodness” simplifies the complexity of natural human evolution into a moralist foundation. Xunzi’s “ritual governance” hardens natural laws into human-imposed structures. Dong Zhongshu went further, fabricating “resonance between Heaven and man” to sanctify imperial authority. By the time of Neo-Confucianism, Cheng-Zhu’s “principle and qi” theory and Zhang Zai’s materialistic “qi cosmology” had completely transformed the Dao’s natural essence into an ethical, social, and political dogma. -/- This is the path of “pseudo-Dao”: on the surface cloaked in “Heavenly Principle,” “benevolence and righteousness,” and “loyalty and filial piety,” but in essence, it executes human rule in the name of “Mandate of Heaven”—suppressing the truth of Heaven and Earth with artificial sacred structures and obscuring the flowing Dao of nature under the guise of civilization. In contrast, the Lao-Yang Genesis Cosmology offers a fresh perspective to return to the roots: it sees the Dao as the ontological basis of the cosmos and the natural god as the foundation of existence, rejecting anthropocentric sanctification and restoring the cosmic order of “Dao follows nature.” Only by recognizing the mask of falsehood can we awaken to the truth. Only by dismantling the chains of cultural hypocrisy can we reopen the philosophical gateway to the Dao of nature. (shrink)

Dogwhistles & Figleaves: How Manipulative Language Spreads Racism and Falsehood. By SaulJennifer Mather. (Oxford: OUP, 2024. Pp. xvi + 222. Price £ 25.99.).

The Silent Corrosion of Meaning: When Language Turns Against Truth This book confronts a disturbing yet inescapable reality: language, the very foundation of human understanding, is not merely failing—it is actively eroding its own capacity to convey truth. What begins as a tool for clarity gradually transforms into a system of distortion, where meaning is no longer anchored but continuously reshaped by power, intention, and interpretation. At the heart of this work lies the concept of the Planned Obsolescence of Language—the (...) idea that communication evolves toward instability, not by accident, but through the very conditions that sustain it. As language becomes increasingly instrumental, it shifts from representing reality to managing perception. Words cease to describe the world and begin to construct competing versions of it, where truth is no longer discovered but negotiated. Through a rigorous philosophical lens, this volume explores the intertwined dynamics of deception, falsehood, and hypocrisy—not as moral anomalies, but as structural features of communication itself. Hypocrisy reveals the fracture between inner belief and outward expression. Falsehood exposes the flexibility of meaning. Deception demonstrates how language can function effectively while simultaneously misrepresenting reality. Together, they form a system in which speech does not collapse, but persists in a state of permanent instability. Drawing on insights from science, politics, culture, and everyday interaction, the book reveals how modern communication is shaped by speed, competition, and strategic intent. In this environment, language is no longer judged by its truth, but by its impact. Statements circulate, multiply, and compete, creating a saturated landscape where clarity diminishes as discourse expands. The result is not silence, but noise—a proliferation of meanings without resolution. Yet this is not a work of pessimism, but of confrontation. It challenges the reader to reconsider what communication is, what it can achieve, and what it inevitably distorts. It invites a shift from naïve trust in language toward a critical awareness of its conditions and limits. This is a study of language not as a passive medium, but as an active force—one that shapes reality even as it destabilizes it. In exposing its contradictions, the book does not seek to restore an impossible purity of speech, but to understand the system we are already trapped within. For in the age of linguistic overproduction, the greatest illusion is not falsehood itself, but the belief that language was ever neutral to begin with. (shrink)

We discuss misinformation about “the liar antinomy” with special reference to Tarski’s 1933 truth-definition paper [1]. Lies are speech-acts, not merely sentences or propositions. Roughly, lies are statements of propositions not believed by their speakers. Speakers who state their false beliefs are often not lying. And speakers who state true propositions that they don’t believe are often lying—regardless of whether the non-belief is disbelief. Persons who state propositions on which they have no opinion are lying as much as those who (...) state propositions they believe to be false. Not all lies are statements of false propositions—some lies are true; some have no truth-value. People who only occasionally lie are not liars: roughly, liars repeatedly and habitually lie. Some half-truths are statements intended to mislead even though the speakers “interpret” the sentences used as expressing true propositions. Others are statements of propositions believed by the speakers to be questionable but without revealing their supposed problematic nature. The two “formulations” of “the antinomy of the liar” in [1], pp.157–8 and 161–2, have nothing to do with lying or liars. The first focuses on an “expression” Tarski calls ‘c’, namely the following. c is not a true sentence The second focuses on another “expression”, also called ‘c’, namely the following. for all p, if c is identical with the sentence ‘p’, then not p Without argumentation or even discussion, Tarski implies that these strange “expressions” are English sentences. [1] Alfred Tarski, The concept of truth in formalized languages, pp. 152–278, Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics, papers from 1923 to 1938, ed. John Corcoran, Hackett, Indianapolis 1983. https://www.academia.edu/12525833/Sentence_Proposition_Judgment_Statement_and_Fact_Speaking_about_th e_Written_English_Used_in_Logic. (shrink)

This paper explores the epistemic implications of endorsing a specific category of conspiracy theories, which I term “toxic conspiracy theories” (following Basham, 2018). I contend that these theories exert a profound and distinctive impact on our belief system, not only shaping perspectives on the specific events they are purported to explain, but also influencing our broader understanding of sociopolitical reality. I delineate a surprising result of this doxastically encompassing nature of toxic conspiracy theories: if some toxic conspiracy theory is true, (...) then a belief in a false one can be remarkably illuminating. Consequently, adherents of toxic conspiracy theories may, contrary to prevailing opinion, possess a more astute grasp of sociopolitical realities than their counterparts who eschew such conspiratorial narratives. I then move on to address an objection suggesting that toxic conspiracy theories are so overwhelmingly unlikely to render the central argument a mere academic exercise. In response I draw on various ‘particularist’ arguments to the contrary and further argue that the unlikelihood of toxic conspiracy theories cannot be determined without engagement with some foundational questions regarding the nature and integrity of our democratic institutions. (shrink)

Branden Fitelson (2010) proposes a strengthened version of knowledge from falsehood, according to which one may not have known that p had one not falsely believed that q. However, Federico Luzzi (2019) challenges Fitelson’s proposal. He believes that Fitelson’s account is unsuccessful because it depends on the unjustified assumption about the impossibility of knowledge from Gettierized belief. For Luzzi, Fitelson faces a dilemma: he must either accept knowledge from Gettierization and abandon his own theory about inferential knowledge from robustly (...) false belief, or accept that knowledge from Gettierization is different from his account and deny knowledge from falsehood. He can’t have both. The goal of this paper is to dissolve that dilemma. The essay proceeds as follows. I explain Fitelson’s account and Luzzi’s objection against it. In the final section, I argue that a defeasibility theory of knowledge can help Fitelson defend himself against Luzzi’s objection and, therefore, dissolve the dilemma. (shrink)

This article explains and defends a novel idea about how people can be misled by a discussion topic, even if the discussion itself does not explicitly involve the making of false claims. The crucial aspect of this idea is that people are liable to infer, from the fact that a particular topic is being discussed, that this topic is important. As a result, they may then be led to accept certain beliefs about the state of the world they consider necessary (...) for the topic’s importance. What the article calls “importance misrepresentation” occurs when these beliefs about the state of the world are false or otherwise mistaken. The article explores different ways in which importance misrepresentation can occur, and it uses this idea to help clarify and strengthen some well‐known criticisms of the topic choices of academic philosophers. (shrink)

While we often assume that we can only know what is so, it's clear that we often speak as if we know things that aren't strictly speaking true. What should we make of this? Some would argue that we should take this talk as evidence that it's possible to know things that are strictly speaking false when, say, false representations are adequate for our purposes. I shall argue that it would be better on the whole to say (a) that knowledge (...) ascriptions might be false but felicitous when the ascription relates a thinker to a falsehood than to say (b) that the ascriptions are strictly true. First, it seems that the arguments for thinking that we can know falsehoods overgeneralise (e.g., they don't just threaten the factivity of knowledge-ascriptions but also of claims about what's true or what's a fact). Thus, the motivation for abandoning the traditional view is problematic. Second, it seems that the alternative picture inherits the problems that contextualists face in understanding how knowledge might be normative for assertion and belief. (shrink)

This paper shows how Hegel’s misconception of truth and knowledge misled his ideas of Absolute spirit, dialectically reinforced dogmatism and irrational historicism toward his disastrous conclusion of a “totalitarian playbook”. Analysis by Hegel scholars is presented and contrasted with Popper’s Critical Rationalism-based critiques. Hegel held a version of Correspondence for everyday truth plus a deeper “philosophical” truth, similar to essence, which could be unified with consciousness. This is compared to Popper’s anti-essentialism. Hegel’s dialectical theory is contrasted to Popper’s falsificationism. Popper (...) showed that dialectical method produced historical relativism. Hegel’s Philosophy of Identity, yielding the dialectical Idealism of “what is reasonable must be real”, led to “might is right” with emergence of nations by fighting for domination on the stage of history. Popper credited Hegel with formulating the “playbook of totalitarianism”, used lethally by followers of Hegelian Left and Right. Inversion Theory claims the word “true”, implying completeness, certainty, and self-consistency, is applicable only to the objective world. Perception of it, acquired by an evolved biological process (Active Subjectivism), incorporates essential falsehood, yielding “best knowledge” of reality. It solves problems related to the regulatory, statistical, evidentiary, inconstant and even indexical nature of knowledge. Only the Inversion theory exposes the errors of dialecticism: since it involves subjective concepts, it is impossible for a true thesis plus its negative antithesis to give a true synthesis. The historical process of the Zeitgeist contains falsehood, the cunning of reason to move the spirit forward is uncertain, and nobody can perform the truth for their time. -/- . (shrink)

I will discuss a variety of cases such that the subject's believing truly is somewhat of an accident, but less so than in a Gettier case. In each case, this is because her reasons are not ultimately undefeated full stop, but they are ultimately undefeated with certain qualifications. For example, the subject's reasons might be ultimately defeated considered in themselves but ultimately undefeated considered as a proper part of an inference to the best explanation that is undefeated without qualification. In (...) each section of the paper, I consider different qualifications and show how in each case we get an epistemic standing I call “coach-class knowledge”. First-class knowledge requires justifying reasons that are undefeated without qualification. Coach-class knowledge only requires qualified lack of defeat. I will use this distinction to bring debates over knowledge from falsehood and fake barns to an ecumenical resolution. In both cases, the subject enjoys coach-class rather than first-class knowledge. I will also show that the defeasible reasoning tradition can better account for graded accidental truth than safety theories. (shrink)

What can we learn from cases of knowledge from falsehood? Critics of knowledge-first epistemology have argued that these cases provide us with good reason for rejecting the knowledge accounts of evidence, justification, and the norm of belief. I shall offer a limited defense of the knowledge-first approach to these matters. Knowledge from falsehood cases should undermine our confidence in like-from-like reasoning in epistemology. Just as we should be open to the idea that knowledge can come from non-knowledge, we (...) should be open to the idea that justified beliefs can come from unjustified beliefs. (shrink)

The goal of this essay is to evaluate the claim that it is possible to acquire inferential knowledge from false belief. In order to do so, we explain the main problem and some preliminaries notions in the first chapter. In the second chapter, we evaluate the reasons against the possibility of knowledge from falsehood. In the final chapter, we examine the reasons for the possibility of knowledge from falsehood.

This chapter examines the views of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle on lying. It it outlines the differences between different kinds of falsehoods in Plato (real falsehoods and falsehoods in words), the difference between myths and lies, the 'noble' (i.e., pedigree) lie in The Republic, and how Plato defended rulers lying to non-rulers about, for example, eugenics. It considers whether Socrates's opposition to lying is consistent with Socratic irony, and especially with his praise of his interlocutors as wise. Finally, it looks (...) at Aristotle's condemnation of lies, and asks whether lies to enemies, and self-deprecating lies by the magnanimous person, are not base. (shrink)

In this article I examine the so called principle of identity, originally formulated by Aristotle, showing it applies to falsehoods only as truths -- or true falsehoods -- hence that self-identity regards only truths -- of either true falsehoods or simple truths.

This article proposes an ontological approach to the distinction between truth and falsehood, shifting the debate from moral and epistemic registers to the material plane of language. Drawing on a critical reading of metaphysical traditions—from Plato to Kant—and their contemporary crisis, the text argues that truth is not a static property but a degree of exposure to the real, measured by the symbolic reor-ganization that occurs in response to friction. Falsehood, in turn, is treated as a structural possibility (...) of language, characterized by the suspension of proof and temporal economy. The distinction between truth and fiction is explored through its temporal, ethical, and political dimensions, engaging with the Ontology of Emerg-ing Complexity, pragmatist philosophy, and critiques of symbolic acceleration. The article defends that to think today is to inhabit friction, resist performative efficacy, and cultivate institutions capable of sustaining the duration required for proof. (shrink)

This paper examines the work of Immanuel Kant in the light of a new theory on the nature of truth, knowledge and falsehood (the Inversion Theory of Truth). Kant’s idea that knowledge could be absolutely certain, and that its truth must correspond with reality, is discredited by a dissection of the Correspondence Theory of Truth. This examination of the nature of truth, as well as knowledge and falsehood, is conducted with reference to Sir Karl Popper’s writings on regulative (...) ideas, the criterion of demarcation and the principle of falsifiability. It is argued that if truth is to be regarded as certain, it should be used to describe objects and events in the objective (noumenal) state, and that subjective knowledge must contain (and is improved by) falsehood. Perceptions and knowledge are obtained by the biological and evolutionary process of Active Subjectivism. Ideas we have knowledge of can be metaphysical or scientific, according to Popper’s Criterion of Demarcation. Kant’s “Copernican revolution” claim that our intellect imposes absolutely true laws on nature could not allow for the possibility that ideas might be constructed from fallible perceptions, and hence that all knowledge is uncertain. Instead, he developed a Critique of Practical Reason in which religion, though not provable through logical reasoning, could be proved by our innate moral sense, giving us a Categorical Imperative that could lead to perverse results. By rejecting the absolute certainty of a priori knowledge, and admitting a degree of essential falsehood, we arrive at a more reasonable grounding for moral behavior. (shrink)

Classically, truth and falsehood are opposite, and so are logical truth and logical falsehood. In this paper we imagine a situation in which the opposition is so pervasive in the language we use as to threaten the very possibility of telling truth from falsehood. The example exploits a suggestion of Ramsey’s to the effect that negation can be expressed simply by writing the negated sentence upside down. The difference between ‘p’ and ‘~~p’ disappears, the principle of double (...) negation becomes trivial, and the truth/falsehood opposition is up for grabs. Our moral is that this indeterminacy undermines the idea of inferential role semantics. (shrink)

This paper presents the results of two corpus studies investigating the discourse surrounding conspiracy theories and genuine theories. The results of these studies show that conspiracy theories lack the epistemic and scientific standing characteristic of theories more generally. Instead, our findings indicate that conspiracy theories are spread in a manner that resembles the dissemination of rumors and falsehoods. Based on these empirical results, we argue that it is time for both re-engineering conspiracy theory and for relabeling "conspiracy theory". We propose (...) relabelling conspiracy theories as either "conspiracy stories" or "conspiracy narratives" to more accurately convey their true nature. (shrink)

This paper is a companion piece to my earlier paper “Fallibilism and Concessive Knowledge Attributions”. There are two intuitive charges against fallibilism. One is that it countenances the truth (and presumably acceptability) of utterances of sentences such as “I know that Bush is a Republican, though it might be that he is not a Republican”. The second is that it countenances the truth (and presumably acceptability) of utterances of sentences such as “I know that Bush is a Republican, even though (...) I’m not certain that he is”, or “I know that Bush it a Republican, even though it isn’t certain that he is.” In “Fallibilism and Concessive Knowledge Attributions”, I argue that fallibilism in epistemology does not countenance the truth of utterances of sentences such as “I know that Bush is a Republican, though it might be that he is not a Republican”. In this paper, I argue that there are independent reasons for thinking that utterances of sentences such as “I know that Bush is a Republican, though I’m not certain that he is” and “I know that Bush is a Republican, though it’s not certain that he is” are unassertible. More specifically, I argue that these are simply instances of Moore’s Paradox, such as “Dogs bark, but I don’t know that they do.” The right account of Moore’s Paradox does not involve the falsehood of the semantic content of the relevant utterances, but rather their pragmatic unacceptability. So the anti-fallibilist intuitions turn out to have pragmatic, rather than semantic import, and therefore do not tell against the truth of fallibilism. Fallibilism in epistemology is often thought to be theoretically desirable, but intuitively problematic. My purpose with these two papers is to show that fallibilism is not intuitively problematic. (shrink)

Factive mental states, such as knowing or being aware, can only link an agent to the truth; by contrast, nonfactive states, such as believing or thinking, can link an agent to either truths or falsehoods. Researchers of mental state attribution often draw a sharp line between the capacity to attribute accurate states of mind and the capacity to attribute inaccurate or “reality-incongruent” states of mind, such as false belief. This article argues that the contrast that really matters for mental state (...) attribution does not divide accurate from inaccurate states, but factive from nonfactive ones. (shrink)

Can fictions lie? According to a classic conception, works of fiction can never contain lies, since their content is not presented as true, nor is it meant to deceive us. But this classic view can be challenged. Sometimes fictions appear to make claims about the actual world, and these claims can be designed to convey falsehoods, historical misconceptions, and even pernicious stereotypes. Should we conclude that some fictional statements are lies? This article introduces two views that support a positive answer, (...) and two that support a negative one. After examining various ways in which fictions can deceive, it concludes in favour of the view that fictional statements can mislead, but never lie. (shrink)

Sometimes you are unreliable at fulfilling your doxastic plans: for example, if you plan to be fully confident in all truths, probably you will end up being fully confident in some falsehoods by mistake. In some cases, there is information that plays the classical role of evidence—your beliefs are perfectly discriminating with respect to some possible facts about the world—and there is a standard expected‐accuracy‐based justification for planning to conditionalize on this evidence. This planning‐oriented justification extends to some cases where (...) you do not have transparent evidence, in the sense that your beliefs are not perfectly discriminating with respect to any non‐trivial facts. In other cases, accuracy considerations do not tell you to plan to conditionalize on any information at all, but rather to plan to follow a different updating rule. Even in the absence of evidence, accuracy considerations can guide your doxastic plan. (shrink)

Conpiracy theories are widely deemed to be superstitious. Yet history appears to be littered with conspiracies successful and otherwise. (For this reason, "cock-up" theories cannot in general replace conspiracy theories, since in many cases the cock-ups are simply failed conspiracies.) Why then is it silly to suppose that historical events are sometimes due to conspiracy? The only argument available to this author is drawn from the work of the late Sir Karl Popper, who criticizes what he calls "the conspiracy theory (...) of society" in The Open Society and elsewhere. His critique of the conspiracy theory is indeed sound, but it is a theory no sane person maintains. Moreover, its falsehood is compatible with the prevalence of conspiracies. Nor do his arguments create any presumption against conspiracy theories of this or that. Thus the belief that it is superstitious to posit conspiracies is itself a superstition. The article concludes with some speculations as to why this superstition is so widely believed. (shrink)

The fallacy fallacy is either the misdiagnosis of fallacy or the supposition that the conclusion of a fallacy must be a falsehood. This paper explores the relevance of these and related errors of reasoning for the appraisal of arguments, especially within virtue theories of argumentation. In particular, the fallacy fallacy exemplifies the Owl of Minerva problem, whereby tools devised to understand a norm make possible new ways of violating the norm. Fallacies are such tools and so are vices. Hence (...) a similar problem arises with argumentative vices. Fortunately, both instances of the problem have a common remedy. (shrink)

Detailed examinations of scientific practice have revealed that the use of idealized models in the sciences is pervasive. These models play a central role in not only the investigation and prediction of phenomena, but in their received scientific explanations as well. This has led philosophers of science to begin revising the traditional philosophical accounts of scientific explanation in order to make sense of this practice. These new model-based accounts of scientific explanation, however, raise a number of key questions: Can the (...) fictions and falsehoods inherent in the modeling practice do real explanatory work? Do some highly abstract and mathematical models exhibit a noncausal form of scientific explanation? How can one distinguish an exploratory "how-possibly" model explanation from a genuine "how-actually" model explanation? Do modelers face tradeoffs such that a model that is optimized for yielding explanatory insight, for example, might fail to be the most predictively accurate, and vice versa? This chapter explores the various answers that have been given to these questions. (shrink)

Elgin offers an influential and far-reaching challenge to veritism. She takes scientific understanding to be non-factive and maintains that there are epistemically useful falsehoods that figure ineliminably in scientific understanding and whose falsehood is no epistemic defect. Veritism, she argues, cannot account for these facts. This paper argues that while Elgin rightly draws attention to several features of epistemic practices frequently neglected by veritists, veritists have numerous plausible ways of responding to her arguments. In particular, it is not clear (...) that false propositional commitments figure ineliminably in understanding in the manner supposed by Elgin. Moreover, even if scientific understanding were non-factive and false propositional commitments did figure ineliminably in understanding, the veritist can account for this in several ways without thereby abandoning veritism. (shrink)

My first paper on the Is/Ought issue. The young Arthur Prior endorsed the Autonomy of Ethics, in the form of Hume’s No-Ought-From-Is (NOFI) but the later Prior developed a seemingly devastating counter-argument. I defend Prior's earlier logical thesis (albeit in a modified form) against his later self. However it is important to distinguish between three versions of the Autonomy of Ethics: Ontological, Semantic and Ontological. Ontological Autonomy is the thesis that moral judgments, to be true, must answer to a realm (...) of sui generis non-natural PROPERTIES. Semantic autonomy insists on a realm of sui generis non-natural PREDICATES which do not mean the same as any natural counterparts. Logical Autonomy maintains that moral conclusions cannot be derived from non-moral premises.-moral premises with the aid of logic alone. Logical Autonomy does not entail Semantic Autonomy and Semantic Autonomy does not entail Ontological Autonomy. But, given some plausible assumptions Ontological Autonomy entails Semantic Autonomy and given the conservativeness of logic – the idea that in a valid argument you don’t get out what you haven’t put in – Semantic Autonomy entails Logical Autonomy. So if Logical Autonomy is false – as Prior appears to prove – then Semantic and Ontological Autonomy would appear to be false too! I develop a version of Logical Autonomy (or NOFI) and vindicate it against Prior’s counterexamples, which are also counterexamples to the conservativeness of logic as traditionally conceived. The key concept here is an idea derived in part from Quine - that of INFERENCE-RELATIVE VACUITY. I prove that you cannot derive conclusions in which the moral terms appear non-vacuously from premises from which they are absent. But this is because you cannot derive conclusions in which ANY (non-logical) terms appear non-vacuously from premises from which they are absent Thus NOFI or Logical Autonomy comes out as an instance of the conservativeness of logic. This means that the reverse entailment that I have suggested turns out to be a mistake. The falsehood of Logical Autonomy would not entail either the falsehood Semantic Autonomy or the falsehood of Ontological Autonomy, since Semantic Autonomy only entails Logical Autonomy with the aid of the conservativeness of logic of which Logical Autonomy is simply an instance. Thus NOFI or Logical Autonomy is vindicated, but it turns out to be a less world-shattering thesis than some have supposed. It provides no support for either non-cognitivism or non-naturalism. (shrink)