The standard argument to the conclusion that artificial intelligence (AI) constitutes an existential risk for the human species uses two premises: (1) AI may reach superintelligent levels, at which point we humans lose control (the ‘singularity claim’); (2) Any level of intelligence can go along with any goal (the ‘orthogonality thesis’). We find that the singularity claim requires a notion of ‘general intelligence’, while the orthogonality thesis requires a notion of ‘instrumental intelligence’. If this interpretation is correct, they cannot be (...) joined as premises and the argument for the existential risk of AI turns out invalid. If the interpretation is incorrect and both premises use the same notion of intelligence, then at least one of the premises is false and the orthogonality thesis remains itself orthogonal to the argument to existential risk from AI. In either case, the standard argument for existential risk from AI is not sound.—Having said that, there remains a risk of instrumental AI to cause very significant damage if designed or used badly, though this is not due to superintelligence or a singularity. (shrink)

Recent authors have argued that it is overwhelmingly important to mitigate existential risks: risks that threaten the survival or development of humanity. This position is often supported by pessimistically high estimates of existential risk. In this paper, I extend a model by Toby Ord and Thomas Adamczewski to do two things. First, I argue, across a range of modeling assumptions pessimism tends to hamper rather than strengthen the case for existential risk mitigation. Second, I show that pessimism is unlikely to (...) ground the overwhelming importance of existential risk mitigation unless it is coupled with an empirical hypothesis: the time of perils hypothesis. However, I argue, the time of perils hypothesis is probably false. I conclude that existential risk pessimism may tell against the overwhelming importance of existential risk mitigation. GPI Working Paper No. 1-2022. (shrink)

First published in 1990, _Existentialism_ is widely regarded as a classic introductory survey of the topic, and has helped to renew interest in existentialist philosophy. The author places existentialism within the great traditions of philosophy, and argues that it deserves as much attention from analytic philosophers as it has always received on the continent.

Edward Feser defends the ‘Aristotelian proof’ for the existence of God, which reasons that the only adequate explanation of the existence of change is in terms of an unchangeable, purely actual being. His argument, however, relies on the falsity of the Existential Inertia Thesis, according to which concrete objects tend to persist in existence without requiring an existential sustaining cause. In this article, I first characterize the dialectical context of Feser’s Aristotelian proof, paying special attention to EIT and its rival (...) thesis—the Existential Expiration Thesis. Next, I provide a more precise characterization of EIT, after which I outline two metaphysical accounts of existential inertia. I then develop new lines of reasoning in favor of EIT that appeal to the theoretical virtues of explanatory power and simplicity. Finally, I address the predominant criticisms of EIT in the literature. (shrink)

The conventional discourse on existential risks (x-risks) from AI typically focuses on abrupt, dire events caused by advanced AI systems, particularly those that might achieve or surpass human-level intelligence. These events have severe consequences that either lead to human extinction or irreversibly cripple human civilization to a point beyond recovery. This decisive view, however, often neglects the serious possibility of AI x-risk manifesting gradually through an incremental series of smaller yet interconnected disruptions, crossing critical thresholds over time. This paper contrasts (...) the conventional decisive AI x-risk hypothesis with what I call an accumulative AI x-risk hypothesis. While the former envisions an overt AI takeover pathway, characterized by scenarios like uncontrollable superintelligence, the latter suggests a different pathway to existential catastrophes. This involves a gradual accumulation of AI-induced threats such as severe vulnerabilities and systemic erosion of critical economic and political structures. The accumulative hypothesis suggests a boiling frog scenario where incremental AI risks slowly undermine systemic and societal resilience until a triggering event results in irreversible collapse. Through complex systems analysis, this paper examines the distinct assumptions differentiating these two hypotheses. It is then argued that the accumulative view can reconcile seemingly incompatible perspectives on AI risks. The implications of differentiating between the two types of pathway—the decisive and the accumulative—for the governance of AI as well as long-term AI safety are discussed. -/- . (shrink)

Existentialism has been touted as a philosophy of freedom, authenticity, and the search for personal meaning for decades. It challenges one to face existence on their own terms, be accountable for one's choices, and live with purpose. But even in that freedom is a paradox: the same path toward authenticity will likely lead to a profound feeling of loneliness. The more one wants to "be oneself," the more one becomes alienated from others who do not share this same journey. This (...) study looks at existential loneliness—the alienation that comes from heightened self-consciousness—through philosophical interpretation and psychosocial analysis. Employing the works of Sartre, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Camus, Kafka, and contemporary psychologists Frankl, Fromm, and Yalom, it deconstructs the ways in which the search for self-consciousness can liberate and alienate. Empirical evidence is demonstrated by a limited mixed-method poll of twenty diverse-aged and gendered participants, assessing the dynamic between introspection, freedom, authenticity, and loneliness. Findings show that although self-awareness produces meaning and autonomy, it also can destroy a sense of belonging. The research asserts that loneliness is not a random side effect of existential investigation but a necessary requirement for true freedom. (shrink)

Quantum physics has dramatically reshaped our understanding of time and reality, revealing that the present moment occupies a uniquely privileged position within physical processes. In the first paper ("Quantum Physics Prefers the Present: A Temporal Ontology Grounded in Measurement"), we saw how quantum phenomena such as wavefunction collapse and measurement highlight the “now” as the only time when possibilities become actual. However, simply embracing presentism – the doctrine that only the present exists – is not enough. Presentism’s traditional metaphysical stance, (...) which conflates existence with reality by declaring all non-present things unreal, runs into serious conceptual roadblocks when confronted with quantum experiments and the demands of causality and truth over time. This second paper advocates Existential Realism (ER) as a more nuanced and robust ontological framework that builds on those quantum insights while overcoming presentism’s limitations. By rigorously distinguishing existence from reality, ER provides a richer account of quantum phenomena – one that honors the special role of the present without erasing the past or negating the future. We will argue that ER better captures the ontology implied by quantum mechanics, from delayed-choice experiments and collapse theories to decoherence, and that it empowers a view of time where “becoming” and temporal agency are coherent and defensible. In short, Existential Realism preserves the empirical centrality of the present while acknowledging the tangible reality of past causes and future possibilities — making it a more comprehensive fit for quantum reality. (shrink)

In this essay I argue that a comprehensive understanding of addiction and its treatment should include an existential perspective. I provide a brief overview of an existential perspective of addiction and recovery, which will contextualize the remainder of the essay. I then present a case study of how the six-step philosophical practice method of Logic-Based Therapy can assist with issues that often arise in addiction treatment framed through an existential perspective.

A small but growing number of studies have aimed to understand, assess and reduce existential risks, or risks that threaten the continued existence of mankind. However, most attention has been focused on known and tangible risks. This paper proposes a heuristic for reducing the risk of black swan extinction events. These events are, as the name suggests, stochastic and unforeseen when they happen. Decision theory based on a fixed model of possible outcomes cannot properly deal with this kind of event. (...) Neither can probabilistic risk analysis. This paper will argue that the approach that is referred to as engineering safety could be applied to reducing the risk from black swan extinction events. It will also propose a conceptual sketch of how such a strategy may be implemented: isolated, self-sufficient, and continuously manned underground refuges. Some characteristics of such refuges are also described, in particular the psychosocial aspects. Furthermore, it is argued that this implementation of the engineering safety strategy safety barriers would be effective and plausible and could reduce the risk of an extinction event in a wide range of possible scenarios. Considering the staggering opportunity cost of an existential catastrophe, such strategies ought to be explored more vigorously. (shrink)

This treatise operationalizes the Êtresophologique Socio-Intellectual Hierarchy (ESIH) for the domain of occupational psychology, proposing that existing career-matching frameworks—including Holland’s (1997) RIASEC model, the Strong Interest Inventory, and MBTI-based career guides—suffer from a common philosophical deficit: they match measurable psychological traits to occupational characteristics without addressing the ontological question of whether an occupation permits or suppresses the individual’s philosophical function. The treatise introduces the concept of existential misemployment—the condition in which an individual is occupationally competent but philosophically starving, performing adequately (...) by all psychometric criteria while experiencing the progressive erosion of the meaning-making function. Building upon the seven primary ESIH configurations and their binary opposites (Boether, 2026a), and drawing upon the PsyPhi Helix model H(t) = [Φ(t) × Ψ(t)]^DH, this work maps each personality configuration to its occupational orientation—not as a prescriptive career assignment but as a phenomenological account of the conditions under which each mode of being flourishes or diminishes. Particular attention is given to the Être-Masqué in organizational contexts, whose extraordinary capacity for performative adaptation poses unique challenges for hiring, leadership selection, and organizational culture. The Van Gogh Curve’s principle that cognitive differentiation represents specialization rather than deficit provides the epistemological foundation for arguing that occupational diversity—the presence of the full spectrum of ESIH configurations within an organization—constitutes a strategic and existential necessity. This treatise serves as an exemplar of operationalizing philosophical personality theory for applied contexts. (shrink)

Existentialism claims that propositions that directly refer to individuals depend on those individuals for their existence. I argue for two points regarding Existentialism. First, I argue that recent accounts of Existentialism run into difficulties accommodating the possibility of there being a lonely alien electron. This problem is distinct from one of the better-known alien problems—concerning iterated modal properties of aliens—and can’t be solved using a standard response to the iterated case. Second, though the lonely alien electron problem might seem to (...) be reason to reject the sort of Existentialist view at hand, there’s a plausible way to preserve the view: accept the existence of possible worlds that directly refer to individuals that don’t exist in those worlds. Such a solution might seem incompatible with Existentialism, but I show that Existentialists can avoid the incompatibility and should find the resulting view plausible. (shrink)

Existentialism concerning singular propositions is the thesis that singular propositions ontologically depend on the individuals they are directly about in such a way that necessarily, those propositions exist only if the individuals they are directly about exist. Haecceitism is the thesis that what non-qualitative facts there are fails to supervene on what purely qualitative facts there are. I argue that existentialism concerning singular propositions entails the denial of haecceitism and that this entailment has interesting implications for debates concerning the philosophy (...) of language, the nature of propositions, and the metaphysics of modality. (shrink)

The governance of artificial intelligence faces a fundamental challenge: determining which decisions must retain human involvement. Existing risk-based frameworks primarily classify decisions according to application domain and potential harm severity, yet neglect a foundational question—the ontological characteristics inherent to the decisions themselves. Beyond their external consequences, decisions vary structurally in the existential costs they carry: the irreversible burdens that only beings with embodied mortality can bear. This paper advances the "existential cost" concept from an abstract philosophical thesis to an operational (...) governance framework. We propose the Composite Cost Index (CCI), which operationalizes existential cost through five evaluable dimensions: irreversibility of consequences, temporal constraints, scope of affected parties, intensity of value conflicts, and estimated cognitive load. Based on weighted scoring across these dimensions, the CCI framework delineates three governance tiers—mandatory human retention, conditional delegation, and safe delegation—providing differentiated governance guidance for AI decisions at varying risk levels. Through four representative cases—autonomous vehicle emergency avoidance, AI-assisted medical diagnosis, content recommendation systems, and algorithmic sentencing assistance—we demonstrate the framework's analytical applications and address four potential theoretical objections. The framework's core contribution lies in transforming the normative question of "which decisions must be made by humans" from implicit intuitive judgment to explicit structured assessment, thereby establishing a new analytical tool and discussion platform for AI governance. (shrink)

This paper introduces Existential Realism as a novel ontological framework in metaphysics that offers a rigorously technical alternative to presentism. In contrast to standard presentism’s claim that only the present exists, In contrast to standard presentism, which claims that only the present exists, Existential Realism distinguishes between existence—material, empirically accessible presence—and reality, which includes causal, epistemic, and anticipatory structures beyond the immediate present. This framework integrates insights from metaphysics, epistemology, and phenomenology to address the limitations of presentism and related theories (...) of time. We delineate how Existential Realism departs from presentism (and is not merely a variant thereof) by reinterpreting what it means for an entity or event to exist now, while still affirming the ontological significance of past and future entities as real despite their lack of present existence. Systematic comparisons are drawn between Existential Realism and the standard theories of temporal ontology – presentism, eternalism, and the growing block theory – with references to key contributors (Markosian, Crisp, Bourne, Zimmerman) to highlight differences in ontological commitments. We provide technically grounded examples—from causal traces in physics to cognitive-state evidence and time-indexed data structures—to show how entities can be real even without presently existing. The paper also addresses major objections, including the coherence of reality without existence, the epistemological access to entities that do not presently exist or are unobservable, and the compatibility of this framework with special relativity. A comparative table is included to map Existential Realism vis-à-vis other theories. In conclusion, Existential Realism is presented as a robust, integrative stance that preserves the empirical and experiential centrality of the present while acknowledging the enduring reality of the past and the looming reality of the future – thus serving as a stand-alone reference framework for future discourse in metaphysics and cognitive science. (shrink)

Charles Peirce developed Existential Graphs as a diagrammatic syntax for representing and reasoning about propositions, with three parts: Alpha for propositional logic, Beta for first-order predicate logic, and Gamma for aspects of modal logic, second-order logic, and metalanguage. He made several adjustments between 1909 and 1911 that merit further consideration: using heavy lines to denote possible states of things in which attached propositions would be true, drawing a red line just inside the edge of a page and writing postulates in (...) the resulting margin, shading oddly enclosed areas instead of drawing thin lines as their boundaries, and using multiple sheets of paper to represent different subjects within the overall universe of discourse. These modifications can be combined to constitute a plausible candidate for Delta, a fourth part that Peirce intended to add but never spelled out. It implements modern formal systems of modal propositional logic in accordance with a version of possible worlds semantics in which the laws for the actual state of things are facts in every possible state of things. (shrink)

The original interest of this article lies in existential import. It provides a broader view on the problem by reference to modern, symbolic logic (ch.1). Gradually, however, our interest will change into the amalgamated expressions often used in logic; that is, why are such expressions as “x is a round triangle” applied in logic? We critically discuss this question from an extensional viewpoint, namely model theoretic semantics (ch.2). We also touch on Church’s λ-calculus in the appendix (app.2).

Since Friedrich Nietzsche, philosophers have grappled with the question of how to respond to nihilism. Nihilism, often seen as a derogative term for a ‘life-denying’, destructive and perhaps most of all depressive philosophy is what drove existentialists to write about the right response to a meaningless universe devoid of purpose. This latter diagnosis is what I shall refer to as existential nihilism, the denial of meaning and purpose, a view that not only existentialists but also a long line of philosophers (...) in the empiricist tradition ascribe to. The absurd stems from the fact that though life is without meaning and the universe devoid of purpose, man still longs for meaning, significance and purpose. Inspired by Bojack Horseman and Rick and Morty, two modern existentialist masterpieces, this paper explores the various alternatives that have been offered in how to respond to the absurd, or as Albert Camus puts it; the only “really serious philosophical problem” and concludes that the problem is compatible with a naturalistic world-view, thereby genuine and transcending existentialism. (shrink)

This document accompanies the Existential Realism (ER) framework as a structural and accessibility supplement. It does not introduce new theses or extend the theory. Instead, it provides two complementary functions: (1) a concise overview of the ER papers to orient readers unfamiliar with the framework, and (2) a technical lexicon that stabilizes key terms through role-based, scope-bound definitions. Existential Realism relies on a controlled vocabulary to prevent drift in ontological, causal, and temporal claims. Because many of its central distinctions—such as (...) reality vs. existence, constraint vs. instantiation, and structure vs. model—are easily conflated in ordinary language, terminological precision is necessary for accurate interpretation. The lexicon therefore fixes usage conventions across the framework and clarifies discouraged shorthand formulations. This document is not a standalone contribution but an infrastructural component of ER. Its purpose is to improve clarity, internal coherence, and reader accessibility across the broader body of work. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophy of mind faces a methodological crisis: functionalist theories explain cognitive capacities while leaving the hard problem untouched, and physicalist accounts cannot distinguish genuine consciousness from sophisticated mimicry. This paper argues that the Dual-Closure framework—which grounds authentic feeling in non-duplicable existential vulnerability—not only withstands major objections from functionalism, physicalism, and psychological continuity theory but generates unique empirical predictions that competing theories cannot match. Through systematic engagement with Parfit's fission cases, Dennett's functionalism, neuroscientific counterexamples, and constructivist ethics, I demonstrate that (...) objections to the framework reveal the inadequacies of alternative accounts rather than undermining Dual-Closure claims. The framework stakes its validity on five testable empirical conditions—including consciousness survival through cryonic revival, upload discontinuity, and copy-indifference resistance—thereby meeting scientific falsifiability standards while preserving philosophical rigor. I introduce "denial trajectory analysis" as a diagnostic method for evaluating metaphysical frameworks and show that the escalating implausibility required to deny Dual-Closure constitutes independent evidence for its validity. The framework successfully explains phenomena across multiple domains—the hard problem, personal identity, animal consciousness, normative grounding, and AI ethics—within a unified account that competing theories cannot match. (shrink)

This essay utilizes the work of the comedy group, Monty Python, as a means of introducing basic concepts in Existentialism, especially as it pertains to the writings of Nietzsche, Sartre, and Camus.

In “Story of Your Life” and “Anxiety Is the Dizziness of Freedom,” Ted Chiang explores questions that would be at home in contemporary scholarship on free will, agency, and moral responsibility. In “Story of Your Life,” Chiang asks whether knowledge of the future is compatible with free will. And the prism technology in “Anxiety Is the Dizziness of Freedom” prompts questions of whether we are responsible for out-of-character actions. If such actions were genuine anomalies, would we be less responsible for (...) them? In these stories, however, these questions are entangled with questions more at home in the existentialist tradition. Put in conversation with Friedrich Nietzsche and Soren Kierkegaard, Chiang’s stories present a compelling picture of existential responsibility and what it means to live a rich human existence, in particular, what it means to affirm our lives (Nietzsche) and to become selves (Kierkegaard). (shrink)

Four Qurʾānic verses — Sūrat al-Anʿām 6:32, Sūrat al-ʿAnkabūt 29:64, Sūrat Muḥammad 47:36, and Sūrat al-Ḥadīd 57:20 — deploy an identical formula: اَلْحَيَاةُ الدُّنْيَا لَعِبٌ وَلَهْوٌ (laʿibun wa-lahwun). Standard translations render this formula as moral deprecation — “idle play and vain amusement” — yet the grammatical operator مَا ... إِلَّا (mā … illā) functions in classical Arabic not as censure but as exhaustive definitional restriction (ḥaṣr): an identification of essential constitution. -/- Taken seriously on its own linguistic terms, before evaluative (...) gloss is applied, the formula discloses a structural ontology of temporal existence. In doing so, it corrects the inadequate metaphor of worldly life as a test with the richer paradigm of worldly life as an arena: designed, consequential, intrinsically relational, and offered by ٱلرَّحْمَٰنِ ٱلرَّحِيمِ to beings constituted to inhabit it fully and joyfully. -/- Through careful analysis of the semantic fields of لَعِب (laʿib) and لَهْو (lahw) in classical Arabic lexicography, and drawing on the philosophical distinction between constitutive and regulative rules, seven theses are developed: -/- Worldly life is a bounded, rule-governed arena of intrinsically purposive and absorptive engagement. -/- Its cosmic rule-set operates at three ontologically distinct levels. -/- All participants are ontologically equal agents playing together in an arena constitutively structured for taʿāruf (mutual recognition). -/- لَعِب (laʿib) is categorically distinct from عَبَث (ʿabath), foreclosing nihilist readings. -/- Three distortions are condemned — over-investment, addictive absorption, and the refusal of the game — grounded in the primordial covenant of 7:172. -/- ʿIbādah (51:56) designates the correct existential orientation toward the arena. -/- Taqwā is reconceived as sportivitas: the disposition of the player who plays seriously, honestly, and joyfully in full awareness of the arena’s non-ultimacy. -/- The paper concludes with Adam’s conscious entry into worldly existence as the paradigm case of the khalīfah’s vocation — and with the theological observation that an arena designed by the Most Compassionate is not an ordeal to be survived but a gift to be inhabited. (shrink)

This paper presents a conceptual model of human agency, Existential Structural Understanding, which treats action, thought, affect, values, and philosophical stance as an integrated, multi-layered structure. The primary aim is to reconceptualize the phenomenon of “understanding what one ought to do yet being unable to act”—together with recurrent oscillations between self-negation and self-salvation—not as a deficit of willpower or character, but as a structural inconsistency between layers and modes of the self. -/- The model has two complementary dimensions. On the (...) static side, it posits seven layers (indexed 0–6): 0: biological survival; 1: order (with two internal modules: order-maintenance and order-expansion); 2: hyper-metakognition (超メタ認知) as a capacity to objectify one’s own structure; 3: values; 4: affect; 5: intention; 6: embodied layer as the integration of 0–5 into concrete action. -/- These layers are further grouped into three domains: an affective–bodily A-domain (0, 4, 6), an existential B-domain (1, 2, and the philosophical mode), and a cognitive–projective C-domain (3, 5). -/- On the dynamic side, the model distinguishes between a constant core and a variable driver. The core is defined as always located in Layer 4 (affect): affect is the experiential center of gravity that colors all access to self and world. What changes over time is the driver, i.e., the structure that orients the direction and persistence of action. The paper proposes a three-stage driver model corresponding to three philosophical modes (Ph-1, Ph-2, Ph-3): 1. Ph-1: Philosophy – the ordinary mode of life-guiding convictions; driver = intention (Layer 5). 2. Ph-2: Existential Philosophy – a mode triggered by the first recognition of the existential domain (B-domain), where a non-verbal “structural feel” of oneself emerges; driver = existential-philosophical mode, a half-structured intention. 3. Ph-3: Existential Structural Philosophy – the deepest mode, grounded in stable hyper-metakognition (Layer 2); driver = hyper-metakognition plus will (意志), where intention becomes structurally anchored and resilient. -/- Within this framework, “understanding without acting” is characterized as a state in which Layer 2 (hyper-metakognition) adequately grasps structural constraints, yet the driver remains at the level of unstructured or half-structured intention, failing to reach the level of will that could carry understanding into embodied continuity. -/- The paper articulates a genesis model tracing the emergence of agency from existence-recognition, through hyper-metakognition and “order prediction,” to philosophical stance, values, intention, and finally will. It also theorizes three routes by which the existential domain becomes accessible—despair, felt contribution to others, and radical hope—and situates them within this generative trajectory. The argument is grounded in a single, deeply analyzed autobiographical case and is offered not as a universal account of content but as a universally usable structural framework for describing human agency and its breakdowns. -/- . (shrink)

Contrary to common misconceptions, today's logic is not devoid of existential import: the universalized conditional ∀ x [S→ P] implies its corresponding existentialized conjunction ∃ x [S & P], not in all cases, but in some. We characterize the proexamples by proving the Existential-Import Equivalence: The antecedent S of the universalized conditional alone determines whether the universalized conditional has existential import, i.e. whether it implies its corresponding existentialized conjunction.A predicate is an open formula having only x free. An existential-import predicate (...) Q is one whose existentialization, ∃ x Q, is logically true; otherwise, Q is existential-import-free or simply import-free.How abundant or widespread is existential import? How abundant or widespread are existential-import predicates in themselves or in comparison to import-free predicates? We show that existential-import predicates are quite abundant, and no less so than import-free predicates. Existential.. (shrink)

This paper proposes Relational Existentialism, a new structural foundation for existential and ethical theory, predicated on the Non-Connection Axiom. The axiom states that Existence A and Existence B can never directly connect; subjects are structurally barred from accessing the genuine inner reality of another. Instead, interaction occurs solely through the Relational Existence (B@A), defined as the overlap (or "seam") created by B's external manifestation and A's interpretive code. Crucially, the paper argues that this B@A becomes an entirely independent, third entity (...) the moment it leaves B's hand, proceeding to possess an autonomous existence regardless of B's true inner state. This theory shifts the focus of ethics from the pursuit of impossible connection (empathy/true understanding) to the inescapable responsibility one bears towards the independent, observable entity B@A—even if this entity contradicts the inaccessible truth of B. In doing so, the structure logically formalizes the Ethic of Sisyphus: moral action is not about achieving perfect knowledge, but about maintaining integrity and response within a structurally desperate, non-connected reality. This framework provides a rigorous basis for rethinking relational ethics and existential responsibility. (shrink)

Schnieder (2020) argues, against Orilia (2009) and Koslicki (2013), that claims of existential grounding of the form “the fact that x exists is grounded in the fact that y is F” cannot be grounded in claims of existential dependence of the form “x existentially depends on y” and defends the view that the latter claims are grounded, via a definition of existential dependence, in the former. I will firstly argue that Schnieder’s main point against the claim that existential grounding is (...) grounded in existential dependence is not conclusive; I will then put forward a proposal concerning how claims of existential grounding can be grounded in claims of existential dependence. The proposal is a third way between those of Schnieder and Orilia/Koslicki which, although accepting the former’s definition of existential dependence in terms of grounding, makes room for the latter’s idea that existential dependence does the real job in structuring reality. (shrink)

Existential Realism (ER) is a present-centered ontological framework that distinguishes between existence, restricted to the present, and reality, which spans the causally or informationally relevant past and future. This paper explores how core processes of human temporal cognition—memory, anticipation, and the perception of the present—support ER’s framework. Insights from cognitive neuroscience suggest that the brain actively constructs time: the mind extends beyond the instantaneous now by retaining recent past information and projecting immediate future possibilities, all within a conscious “window of (...) presence.” We examine how memory encodes past events both as physical traces in the brain and as reconstructed experiences in consciousness, how anticipation and predictive coding generate internal models of probable futures, and how our perception of ‘now’ is an integrated interval, not a dimensionless instant. These findings reinforce ER’s claim that only the present moment is ontologically existent, while past and future are real insofar as they are cognitively represented and integrated into the present through internal models. By linking philosophical ideas of time with empirical neuroscience, we show that human brains treat the past and future as parts of reality (through records and expectations) despite their lack of present existence. This interdisciplinary approach lends naturalistic support to Existential Realism’s view of time and offers a clearer understanding of why the present looms so large in experience even as past and future remain experientially—and ontologically—significant. (shrink)

Several countries have legalized euthanasia on the basis of medically diagnosable suffering over the last decennial; the criteria to which they adhere differ. The topic of this article is euthanasia on the basis of existential suffering. This article presents a recent proposal to legalize euthanasia for people who experience such suffering and then discusses the issue of what the value of life may be, and whether the standard that life is normally something positive should be accepted. This provides the foundation (...) to answer the question of whether euthanasia on the basis of existential suffering should be allowed. (shrink)

Personal recovery entails the idea of learning to live a good life in the face of mental illness. It takes place in a continuous dynamic between change and acceptance and involves the existential dimension in the broadest sense. With cognitive self-regulation and empowerment as central elements, however, current models of recovery mostly have an individual focus instead of a relational one. Furthermore, there seems to be an emphasis on the component of change. Little attention is payed to the role and (...) integration of dealing with loss in personal recovery. In this paper, the role of loss in mental illness will be elaborated from an existential perspective. This will be done by relating existential changes to possibly disruptive experiences of loss in wider experience. With the help of several perspectives on dealing with loss it will be argued this can be integrated in processes of recovery. Then, it will be elaborated how reexperiencing a state of being surrounded, or being included, being held is a necessary part of recovery. The result consists of a refinement of the view on personal recovery. The aim of this paper is therefore twofold: (1) to arrive at a better understanding of what existential loss and loss in wider experience in the context of psychopathology entails, and (2) to further develop perspectives on recovery in mental health care. (shrink)

Modern society is largely structured by economic power, institutional authority, and identity-based frameworks. While wealth influences political and cultural systems, it does not necessarily cultivate existential clarity. This paper argues that awareness—not economic status, education, or ideological affiliation—is the fundamental condition for authentic human living. Drawing from existential phenomenology and critical social theory, the study examines how awareness allows individuals to experience life directly, prior to rigid identity formations such as patriarchy, matriarchy, feminism, and LGBTQ+ categorization. Without dismissing the socio-historical (...) necessity of such movements, the paper proposes that deep awareness dissolves psychological fixation on identity while preserving ethical engagement with social realities. Ultimately, awareness is positioned as a transformative capacity that enables individuals to live “to life” rather than to ideology. (shrink)

Many manipulation arguments against compatibilism rely on the claim that manipulation is relevantly similar to determinism. But we argue that manipulation is nothing like determinism in one relevant respect. Determinism is a "universal" phenomenon: its scope includes every feature of the universe. But manipulation arguments feature cases where an agent is the only manipulated individual in her universe. Call manipulation whose scope includes at least one but not all agents "existential manipulation." Our responsibility practices are impacted in different ways by (...) universal and existential phenomena. And this is a relevant difference, especially on Strawsonian approaches to moral responsibility, which take facts about our responsibility practices to be deeply connected to the nature of responsibility itself. We argue that Strawsonian accounts of moral responsibility are immune to manipulation arguments, and no attempt to modify the scope of manipulation or determinism featured in these arguments will help incompatibilists secure their desired conclusion. (shrink)

Existential Realism (ER) is a novel ontological framework that distinguishes between existence (the empirically accessible present) and reality (the broader tapestry of past and future entities and events). This two-tier ontology preserves the primacy of the present now while granting ontological status to non-present times in a way that avoids the pitfalls of both presentism and eternalism. We summarize ER’s core definitions and motivations, drawing from metaphysics, cognitive science, and physics to illustrate why separating existence from reality matters. ER offers (...) a synthesis: like presentism it holds that only the present exists, yet like eternalism it affirms that past and future entities can still be real. We provide examples from neuroscience (memory and anticipation), physics (causal traces and relativity), formal logic (truthmakers and temporal reasoning), and ethics (duties to past and future) to demonstrate ER’s explanatory power. We discuss implications for our understanding of time’s flow, the self’s persistence, causality, and moral agency. The tone is rigorous and realistic, yet forward-looking: ER is presented as both a capstone summary of an emerging framework and an invitation for interdisciplinary inquiry into the nature of time and reality. (shrink)

This paper introduces a structured collapse-test methodology for evaluating metaphysical theories of time and applies it to Existential Realism (ER) in order to test its ontological distinctiveness. Metaphysical theories can fail in two fundamentally different ways: either by (i) collapsing into an already established rival ontology or by (ii) remaining formally distinct while proving explanatorily idle. The present study addresses only the first failure mode: identity and distinctness.

Why humanism, still/again? The very same question was asked – not for the first time, nor for the last – by Sartre, in a rhetorical mood, in his 1946 landmark treatise, L’existentialisme est un humanisme, a work which propounded many of the topics and doctrines that were to become the core of the new French existentialist movement in philosophy and literature. In differentiating “his” philosophy from the other humanist traditions of the time – from those allied with it, like Marxism, (...) to those hostile to it, like Christianity – he chose to define “existentialist” humanism as radically distinct from “essentialist” or “classical” humanism (basically everything pre-Sartre or pre-Existentialism). Humanism he defined as “une theorie qui prend l’homme comme fin et comme valeur supérieure." In his reading of history, this pre-existentialist humanism of his forebears, as represented by Enlightenment’s offspring, unduly emphasized such things as “human nature”, “human rights” (god-given or natural) and social law-likeness – all essentialist, anti-individualistic theories of the human condition. Existentialism wanted to strip away the last vestiges of any essentialist salvaging of the absoluteness of Man’s condition: “l’homme est libre, l’homme est liberté”; “Nous sommes seuls, sans excuses … l’homme est condamné à être libre." Instead of history or the social condition being the sculptor of man, it is man himself who is the author of his own destiny and of the course of history. This open up possibilities of progress but also temptations of hubris and disaster. (shrink)

Can a ruthlessly amoral villain embody the height of philosophical authenticity? This paper investigates the existential dialogue between Fang Yuan and Bai Ning Bing in the xianxia epic Reverend Insanity, presenting a radical reinterpretation of Heideggerian ontology within a brutal fantasy realm. While Bai Ning Bing is initially paralyzed by the terror of finitude, Fang Yuan embodies a chillingly perfect Being-towards-death, transforming the acceptance of mortality into a weapon of absolute freedom. By dissecting their collision, this study reveals how Fang (...) Yuan's 'Uncanny Trajectory' (Unheimlich) serves not as a rejection of meaning, but as the ultimate assertion of Dasein's autonomy against the 'They' (das Man). It challenges the reader to witness how a conversation on a snowy peak can dismantle the fear of death and ignite the terrifying pursuit of one's own True Self. (shrink)

This article critically examines the positions taken by Stephen E. Toulmin, Robert C. Coburn, and and Gordon D. Kaufman on existential experience and limiting questions and answers.

A relatively common approach in game studies understands gameworlds as constituting an existential situation for the player. Taking that stance, which is rooted in the European philosophical tradition of Existentialism, in this chapter we investigate the relationships and similarities between our existence within and without gameworlds. To do so, we first provide a review of existing literature in ‘existential ludology’ - work in game studies which considers our engagement with gameworlds from an existential perspective. In the second part of the (...) chapter, we then engage with some of the most notable ideas of the Norwegian philosopher Peter Wessel Zapffe. Zapffe understood human life as inherently meaningless and identified four ways in which human beings typically protect themselves from the existential panic that accompanies the awareness of that meaninglessness: isolation, anchoring, distraction, and sublimation. These four categories are used as the foundation for an examination of gameworlds as technologies for repressing existential panic. (shrink)

This essay articulates a kind of conservatism that it argues is the most fundamental and important kind of conservatism, viz. existential conservatism, which involves an affirmative and appreciative stance towards the given world. While this form of conservatism can be connected to political conservatism, as seen with Roger Scruton, it need not be, as seen with G. A. Cohen. It is argued that existential conservatism should be embraced whether or not one embraces political conservatism, though it is also shown that (...) existential conservatism imposes constraints on our political thinking. In particular, it is argued that Cohen's ‘luck egalitarianism’ stands at odds with his existential conservatism and that one should be a sufficientarian rather than an egalitarian with regard to economic justice. (shrink)

Rawls famously argues that the parties in the original position would agree upon the two principles of justice. Among other things, these principles guarantee equal political liberty—that is, democracy—as a requirement of justice. We argue on the contrary that the parties have reason to reject this requirement. As we show, by Rawls’ own lights, the parties would be greatly concerned to mitigate existential risk. But it is doubtful whether democracy always minimizes such risk. Indeed, no one currently knows which political (...) systems would. Consequently, the parties—and we ourselves—have reason to reject democracy as a requirement of justice in favor of political experimentalism, a general approach to political justice which rules in at least some non-democratic political systems which might minimize existential risk. (shrink)

This working preprint (v0.1.2) proposes a theoretically-applied conceptual framework linking three problem domains: the hypothesis of Existential Entropy as a background tendency toward disintegration of the subjective “I”; the Theory of Paradox, which treats internal contradictions of human existence as catalysts for transformation; and a hypothesis on the role of empathic artificial intelligence in creating deep-anchoring retentive environments that reduce vulnerability to entropy and support restoration of personal coherence. This version includes the conceptual framing, core definitions, an extended glossary of (...) authorial terms, and working hypotheses. The author continues to refine the material and will release updated, version-tagged iterations as the work matures. -/- Update - v0.1.2 (24 August 2025) -/- corrected the “Concept DOI” line inside PDFs; no substantive changes. -/- Glossary refined: tightened definitions and status tags. Framing clarified: concise statements on scope, non-clinical status, and author’s position. Citations: added concise “how to cite” lines for terms. (shrink)

In "Existential Humanism and Moral Freedom in Simone de Beauvoir's Ethics" Tove Pettersen elucidates the close connection between Beauvoir’s ethics and humanism, and argues that her humanism is an existential humanism. Beauvoir’s concept of freedom is inspected, followed by a discussion of her reasons for making moral freedom the leading normative value, and her claim that we must act for humanity. In Beauvoir’s ethics, freedom is not reserved for the elite, but understood as everyone being “able to surpass the given (...) toward an open future.” By addressing the continuing friction between individual freedom and public interests, Beauvoir’s normative thinking remains highly relevant today. It also exemplifies the enduring importance of humanistic reflections and demonstrates how, through critical and creative thinking, the humanities can contribute to a free, well-functioning democratic society. (shrink)

Since the release of ChatGPT, there has been a lot of debate about whether AI systems pose an existential risk to humanity. This paper develops a general framework for thinking about the existential risk of AI systems. We analyze a two-premise argument that AI systems pose a threat to humanity. Premise one: AI systems will become extremely powerful. Premise two: if AI systems become extremely powerful, they will destroy humanity. We use these two premises to construct a taxonomy of ‘survival (...) stories’, in which humanity survives into the far future. In each survival story, one of the two premises fails. Either scientific barriers prevent AI systems from becoming extremely powerful; or humanity bans research into AI systems, thereby preventing them from becoming extremely powerful; or extremely powerful AI systems do not destroy humanity, because their goals prevent them from doing so; or extremely powerful AI systems do not destroy humanity, because we can reliably detect and disable systems that have the goal of doing so. We argue that different survival stories face different challenges. We also argue that different survival stories motivate different responses to the threats from AI. Finally, we use our taxonomy to produce rough estimates of ‘P(doom)’, the probability that humanity will be destroyed by AI. (shrink)

This paper critically evaluates Existential Realism (ER) by testing whether its distinctive ontology of present instantiation provides genuine explanatory advantages over block-based accounts of spacetime. Rather than asking whether ER is conceptually distinguishable from eternalism or structural realism, the analysis focuses on a stronger criterion: explanatory necessity. Five domains commonly invoked in debates about temporal ontology are examined as diagnostic tests—relativity, modal openness of the future, thermodynamic asymmetry, the ontological status of the past, quantum actualization, and temporal phenomenology. In each (...) case the central question is whether ER explains the relevant phenomena more effectively than a block ontology supplemented with standard physical or probabilistic structure. The analysis finds that while ER offers a coherent framework that aligns naturally with certain intuitions about temporal becoming, its explanatory advantages remain unclear. Many of the phenomena ER aims to illuminate can be accounted for within block-based models without introducing additional ontological primitives. The result is not a refutation of ER but a reframing of the debate: the key challenge for ER is to demonstrate a domain in which the ontology of becoming delivers explanatory leverage that cannot be replicated by block ontology. Until such advantages are clearly articulated, the explanatory economy of block-based accounts remains a significant competing consideration. (shrink)

This chapter provides an overview of how existential phenomenology has influenced qualitative research methods across a range of disciplines across the social, health, educational, and psychological sciences. It focuses specifically on how the concepts of “existential structures,” or “existentials”—such as selfhood, temporality, spatiality, affectivity, and embodiment—have been used in qualitative research. After providing a brief introduction to what qualitative research is and why philosophers should be interested in it, the chapter provides clear, straightforward examples of how qualitative researchers have (...) used existentials to analyze qualitative data and design qualitative studies. The chapter is intended to introduce philosophers to existential approaches to phenomenological qualitative research, with the aim of facilitating interdisciplinary dialogue and collaboration. (shrink)

In current philosophy of mind, there is lively debate over whether emotions, moods, and other affects can extend to comprise elements beyond one’s organismic boundaries. At the same time, there has been growing interest in the nature and significance of so-called existential feelings, which, as the term suggests, are feelings of one’s overall being in the world. In this article, I bring these two strands of investigation together to ask: Can the material underpinnings of existential feelings extend beyond one’s skull (...) and skin? To begin, I introduce and adopt a componential-systemic view of extended affectivity. In doing so, I specify the vehicle externalist criteria for extension employed in my analysis. I then define what existential feelings are and pinpoint several key issues in their potential extension. More specifically, I identify sensorimotor ‘know-how’ as a possibly extending component of existential feeling and posit it as the fulcrum of my argument. Finally, I move on to consider the extension of existential feeling via sensory substitution, especially through so-called Tactile Visual Sensory Substitution (TVSS) devices. Informed by both philosophical and empirical studies, I argue that, under certain conditions, (a) the agent’s implicit sensorimotor processing and a TVSS device can become coupled into a new systemic whole, which in turn (b) reconfigures the material underpinnings of the agent’s pre-intentional world-experience. This, I conclude, counts as a cogent case for extended existential feeling. (shrink)

This paper introduces the Existential Equation, a unified informational ontology connecting information, projection, and reality. It proposes that all existence—physical, mental, and abstract—arises from a single relational process: the irreversible projection of a closed in- formational manifold onto the real domain. The resulting formalism expresses being as a balance between informational closure, observable projection, and the measure of consistency that binds them. This framework provides a minimal foundation from which mathematics, physics, and metaphysics can be derived as complementary views of (...) one underlying structure of existence. (shrink)

The chapter explores Heidegger's view on the body within the framework of enactivism, focusing on Autopoiesis and Embodied cognition. It analyzes how our conceptualization of the body influences our experiences, particularly delving into the sense of helplessness. Moving from Heidegger's philosophy to a naturalistic approach, it seeks to bridge the gap between phenomenology and the philosophy of biology, shedding light on the transformative nature of Dasein's existential shift.

This article develops a comparative and interdisciplinary analysis between classical and contemporary existentialism (Heidegger, Sartre, Lévinas, Taylor, Nussbaum, Foucault, Butler, Han, Ricoeur, Merleau-Ponty, Damasio, Braidotti, among others) and the Philosophy of Belonging formulated by Carlos Federico Obregón Díaz. The study proposes a theoretical shift from being-toward-death and radical freedom toward a relational, emotional, institutional, and scientific ontology of belonging, grounded in the thesis “to be is to belong.” Integrating philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, economics, evolutionary biology, and institutional theory, the article argues (...) that subjectivity, freedom, identity, ethics, and justice are not merely individual or abstract phenomena but capacities constructed through affective bonds, shared narratives, and stable institutional structures. In contrast to traditional existentialist pessimism centered on alienation, anguish, and finitude, the Philosophy of Belonging introduces a constructive post-existential framework oriented toward emotional stability, structural inclusion, and institutional architectures of belonging. The paper positions belonging as the ontological infrastructure of human existence, the ethical foundation of recognition, and the socio-economic condition for agency, development, and dignity. It also advances a scientific relational humanism that synthesizes existentialism, neurophilosophy, social theory, and political economy into a unified framework applicable to contemporary challenges such as inequality, exclusion, institutional fragility, and the crisis of meaning in modern societies. Ultimately, the work contributes to 21st-century philosophy by proposing a post-existential paradigm in which freedom is understood as co-belonging, justice as structural inclusion, and identity as emotional-institutional belonging within interdependent human and social systems. (shrink)

Suicide among individuals under probation supervision constitutes a significant concern within public health and criminal justice systems, owing to rates that consistently exceed those observed in the general population. Conventional approaches to suicide prevention primarily emphasise clinical interventions, psychological risk assessments, and multi-agency collaboration. In contrast, an emerging body of literature in philosophical and contemplative traditions, particularly that concerning Aṣṭāṅga Yoga, offers complementary methodologies grounded in ethical self-cultivation, embodied awareness, and transformative introspection. The present article is a theoretical and philosophical (...) inquiry. It does not aim to provide empirical validation but to develop a conceptual framework that reinterprets suicidality in probation contexts through a cross-cultural philosophical lens. The analysis further draws on established psychological models of suicide, including Shneidman's Psychache model, Joiner's Interpersonal Theory, Williams' Cry of Pain model, and O'Connor's Integrated Motivational-Volitional model, to examine how the existential, ethical, and symbolic dimensions of suicidality may enrich and extend clinical understandings of suicide risk. The paper investigates the potential contributions of Aṣṭāṅga Yoga philosophy and ethics to suicide prevention in probation contexts, arguing that its integration of moral reflection and somatic mindfulness may promote psychological resilience, autonomy, and sustainable reintegration into the fabric of society. In doing so, the discussion draws upon Mircea Eliade's philosophy of religion to frame probation not simply as a legal condition, but as a modern instance of existential liminality, in which symbolic reintegration becomes essential to survival. The paper also approaches Aṣṭāṅga Yoga through the perspective of pragmatist philosophy, with particular emphasis on practical somaesthetics as developed by Richard Shusterman. (shrink)

Peirce’s Existential Graphs provide a geometrical understanding of a variety of logics (classical, intuitionistic, modal, fi rst-order). The geometrical interpretation is given by topological transformations of closed (Jordan) curves on the plane, but it can be extended to other surfaces (sphere, cylinder, torus, etc.) The result provides the appearance of new logics related to the shapes of the surfaces. Going beyond, one can draw existential graphs over general Riemann Surfaces, and, introducing tools from algebraic geometry (Sheaves, Grothendieck Toposes, Elementary Toposes), (...) one can try to capture both the logics and the geometrical shapes through a new Topos of Existential Graphs over Riemann Surfaces, and through the classifi er subobject of the topos. We off er new perspectives (concepts, defi nitions, examples, conjectures) along this road. -/- Os Grafos Existenciais de Peirce oferecem uma compreensão geométrica de uma variedade de lógicas (clássica, intuicionista, modal, de primeira ordem). A sua interpretação geométrica é dada por transformações topológicas de curvas fechadas (Jordan) no plano, mas pode ser estendida a outras superfícies (esfera, cilindro, toro etc.). Além disso, é possível desenhar grafos existenciais sobre superfícies de Riemann gerais e, introduzindo ferramentas da geometria algébrica (Feixes, Toposes de Grothendieck, Toposes Elementares), é possível tentar capturar as lógicas nas formas geométricas por meio de um novo Topos de Grafos Existenciais sobre Superfícies de Riemann e por meio do subobjeto classifi cador do topos. Oferecemos novas perspectivas (conceitos, defi nições, exemplos, conjecturas) ao longo desse caminho. (shrink)