Most direct reference theorists about indexicals and proper names have adopted the thesis that singular propositions about physical objects are composed of physical objects and properties.1 There have been a number of recent proponents of such a view, including Scott Soames, Nathan Salmon, John Perry, Howard Wettstein, and David Kaplan.2 Since Kaplan is the individual who is best known for holding such a view, let's call a proposition that is composed of objects and properties a K-proposition. In this (...) paper, I will attempt to show that a direct reference view about the content of proper names and indexicals leads very naturally to the position that all singular propositions about physical objects are K-propositions.3 Then, I will attempt to show that this view of propositions is false. I will spend the bulk of the paper on this latter task. My goal in the paper, then, is to show that adopting the direct reference thesis comes at a cost problems the view has with problems such as opacity and the significance of some identity statements; it comes at even more of a cost). (shrink)

The use of language in hate speech is understandably offensive. Though words do not kill, they convey an alarming message that can harm the victim. To understand how words can harm, it is necessary to understand the nature of the meaning of pejoratives or slurs that are used in hate speech. Pejoratives are undeniably offensive. However, they are puzzling as they can be used in two directions, namely, the offensive power preservation and the offensive power destruction. This paper proposes that (...) the direct reference theory of pejoratives can solve the puzzle. A characterization of pejoratives is that it has the property of immediacy. They refer directly to the object of speech. Grounding on a shared context, any descriptions are unnecessary for understanding the offensive message of pejoratives. In this sense, pejoratives have indexical content as it is context-sensitive. The kind of indexical content that pertains to pejoratives is action-oriented. However, its object of reference is empty. In discussing pejoratives that are used in hate speech, some examples of Thai slurs are shown. (shrink)

I begin by distinguishing between what I will call a pure Fregean theory of reference and a theory of direct reference. A pure Fregean theory of reference holds that all reference to objects is determined by a sense or content. The kind of theory I have in mind is obviously inspired by Frege, but I will not be concerned with whether it is the theory that Frege himself held.1 A theory of direct reference, (...) as I will understand it, denies that all reference to objects is determined by sense or content. We will also distinguish between a theory of reference for thought, and for language. This gives us a fourfold classification of theories. What is puzzling about direct reference theories is not that the semantics of an expression in a public language should assign as its semantic value just a referent, but how such facts could be understood to reflect an underlying feature of thought. There are two interconnected aspects to this.. (shrink)

Nathan Salmón has been conferred the title of Distinguished Professor Emeritus at the University of California, Santa Barbara since 2024. In recognition of this significant milestone, Yuling Zhang conducted an interview with Professor Salmón, whose influential work in the theory of direct reference has cemented his reputation as a leading figure in the field of philosophy of language. The interview focuses on Nathan Salmón's contributions to contemporary philosophy, particularly his work related to Saul Kripke and David Kaplan.

In this paper I challenge recent externalist interpretations of Ockham’s theory of intuitive cognition. I begin by distinguishing two distinct theses that defenders of the externalist interpretation typically attribute to Ockham: a ‘direct reference thesis’, according to which intuitive cognitions are states that lack all internal, descriptive content; and a ‘causal thesis’, according to which intuitive states are wholly determined by causal connections they bear to singular objects. I then argue that neither can be plausibly credited to Ockham. (...) In particular, I claim that the causal thesis doesn’t square with Ockham’s account of supernaturally produced intuition and that the direct reference thesis sits uneasily with Ockham’s characterization of the intentional structure of intuitive states. (shrink)

Direct reference theory faces serious prima facie counterexamples which must be explained away (e.g., that it is possible to know a priori that Hesperus = Phosphorus). This is done by means of various forms of pragmatic explanation. But when those explanations that provisionally succeed are generalized to deal with analogous prima facie counterexamples concerning the identity of propositions, a fatal dilemma results. Either identity must be treated as a four-place relation (contradicting what just about everyone, including direct (...) reference theorists, takes to be essential to identity). Or direct reference theorists must incorporate a view that was rejected in pretty much our first lesson about identity—namely, that Hesperus at twilight is not identical to Hesperus at dawn. One way of the other, the direct reference theory is thus inconsistent with basic principles concerning the logic of identity, which nearly everyone, including direct reference theorists, take as starting points. (shrink)

Synthetic physicalism—understood as the view that while mental concepts are distinct from physical concepts, mental properties are nonetheless identical to physical properties—is the dominant type of reductive physicalism in the philosophy of mind. With a focus on phenomenal concepts, this article examines two competing versions of synthetic physicalism: the demonstrative approach and the constitutive approach, both of which attempt to cash out the common idea that phenomenal concepts directly refer to phenomenal properties. I aim to argue that the synthetic physicalist (...) is impaled on a dilemma in addressing what I call the problem of double aspect: the mental-physical conceptual distinction seems to imply property dualism at a new level. Either she adopts the demonstrative approach or she goes for the constitutive approach, but neither option is acceptable. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to address the semantic issue of the nature of the representation I and of the transcendental designation, i.e., the self-referential apparatus involved in transcendental apperception. The I think, the bare or empty representation I, is the representational vehicle of the concept of transcendental subject; as such, it is a simple representation. The awareness of oneself as thinking is only expressed by the I: the intellectual representation which performs a referential function of the spontaneity of (...) a thinking subject. To begin with, what exactly does Kant mean when he states that I is a simple and empty representation? Secondly, can the features of the representation I and the correlative transcendental designation explain the indexical nature of the I? Thirdly, do the Kantian considerations on indexicality anticipate any of the semantic elements or, if nothing else, the spirit of the direct reference theory? (shrink)

I argue that Fregeanism with respect to proper names—the view that modes of presentation are relevant to the contents of proper names—is able to account for the thesis that there are necessarily true a posteriori identity propositions such as the one expressed in “Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus”, whereas the Direct Reference Theory—according to which the semantic function of certain expressions, e.g., proper names, is only to pick out an object —is able to deal with only their necessary (...) truth. Thus, at least in so far as necessarily true a posteriori identity propositions are concerned, Fregeanism should be preferred to the Direct Reference Theory. (shrink)

This study systematically identified and enumerated Aquinas’ direct references to the two most frequently quoted Islamic and Jewish philosophers, Avicenna, Averroes, Rabbi Moyses, and Avicebron, in Summa Theologiæ (ST), analyzed Aquinas’ argumentative responses to their philosophical positions, and based on Aquinas’ alignment or divergence with the cited and attributed philosophical thought, categorized them according to agreement, partial agreement/disagreement, and disagreement. Furthermore, the study compared these arguments vis-à-vis their locus in ST, Aquinas’ stance, and philosophical and denominational origins. This investigation (...) introduced a novel data-driven methodology that integrated traditional textual and philosophical qualitative analyses with a structured quantitative assay and rigorous cross-examination of data, yielding precise qualitative and quantitative findings and filling the extant gap in Thomistic scholarship. The results demonstrated that Aquinas’ engagement with these philosophers was strategically selective. Aquinas’ direct reference-based arguments were most prevalent in ST I, followed by ST Supplement and ST I–II. Conversely, ST II–II and ST III featured minimal engagement. Avicenna and Averroes were the principal focus of Aquinas’ arguments, whereas Rabbi Moyses and, marginally, Avicebron received less attention. The correlational pattern identified herein originates in Aquinas’ realization of Aristotelian peripatetic philosophy and Abrahamic scriptural theology. Aquinas’ attainment of knowledge from divergent philosophical traditions represents a critical element of Thomistic theological synthesis, strengthening ST’s philosophically expansive yet doctrinally consistent character. Furthermore, it attests that Aquinas’ philosophical theology, as a scientific discipline, has matured in profoundly dynamic interactions with Islamic and Jewish traditions, remaining influential over the past 750 years since the composition of ST. (shrink)

Aquinas’ Summa contra Gentiles (SCG), in its apologetic discourse aimed at Jews and Muslims of the Latin Christendom, strategically engages with Islamic and Jewish sages of its scholastic era. Since existing scholarship has not sufficiently qualitatively and quantitatively evaluated Aquinas’ most frequently referenced Islamic and Jewish philosophers in SCG, leaving a significant scholarly lacuna, this study addressed the gap by analyzing Aquinas’ direct references to and argumentative engagements with Avicenna, Averroes, Maimonides, and Avicebron, showing their distribution, Aquinas’ argumentative stance (...) of agreements, partial agreements/disagreements, or disagreements, and purpose of these reference-based arguments, categorized as either Aquinas’ aim to refute the referenced proposition or utilize it to support, build upon, and advance his thesis. The methodology employed a dual analytical approach, consisting of a qualitative textual-philosophical analysis of the SCG text in the scholarly authoritative Editio Leonina, cross-verified against Vansteenkiste’s studies and Busa’s Index Thomisticus, followed by a quantitative assay. The results revealed that Aquinas directly referenced the Islamic and Jewish philosophers 61 times in the SCG’s 415 Capitula. Islamic philosophers (95%) Averroes (64%) and Avicenna (31%) are the most prominent. In contrast, Jewish philosophers, Maimonides and Avicebron, comprise only a minor fraction. These references are concentrated in SCG II, followed by SCG III and SCG I. The SCG IV, which deals with the Latin Catholic dogmatic theology, has only one direct reference to Avicenna. Aquinas often engaged with these philosophers through argumentative disagreements (81%), primarily based on Averroes’ arguments and secondarily on Avicenna’s. However, he never refuted the relatively few agreements (14%) and partial agreements (5%), instead utilizing them to build upon, advance, and support his thesis. Aquinas never agreed with Maimonides and Avicebron and always used these argumentative disagreements to refute their philosophical propositions. This pattern exhibits a strong correlation between Aquinas’ argumentative agreement level and purpose of direct reference-based argument, illustrating the Thomistic method of theological discernment, characterized by Aquinas’ selective appropriation, adaptation, and adoption of the other two Abrahamic traditions’ philosophies when compatible with the Latin Church’s teachings, and systematic refutations when incompatible, terming them ‘errors’ that must be countered. This study demonstrates that the Thomistic theological synthesis of Islamic and Jewish philosophy in Aquinas’ SCG Sacra Doctrina not only strengthened Thomistic theology and defended the Roman Catholic faith but also succeeded in bridging the three Abrahamic monotheistic traditions, Christian, Islamic, and Jewish, through their shared Peripatetic philosophy of universal truth, the truth that commences in God. (shrink)

The paper defends a version of Direct Reference for indexicals on which reference-fixing material (token-reflexive conditions) plays the role of an ancillary presupposition.

This article presents phenomenological meta-analysis of Tymieniecka's phenomenology of life with regard to its strategies of knowledge. The novelty of phenomenology of life consists in special orientation of direct intuition of Tymieniecka's insight. The analysis suggests that the positioning of the direct intuition differes from philosopher to philosopher. Even though this perspective pays attention to individual differences in philosophical thinking, this view has to be distinguished froll1 psychologism as criticized by Husser!. and rather, seen as a development of (...) Husserl 's lheory of direct intuition. A framework for such analysis can be also found in Islamic philosophies of Suhrawardi and Ibn 'Arabi, who introduced the concepts of individual predisposition, modes of knowledge, and self-knowledge mediated by knowledge by presence. These concepts can be applied to understanding of the origins of philosophical insight. The paper examines in depth the workings of direct, or presentive, intuition in Tymieniecka's descriptions of the phenomenal field of life, and of life per se as a dynamic object. It demonstrates the dialogical nature of interrogation, and the sentience of logos as a horizon of philosophical inquiry. Finally, the paper introduces the concept of process phenomenology, and suggests directions of future research with regard to phenomenology of imagination. (shrink)

This paper continues the defense of a version of scientific realism, Tautological Scientific Realism, that rests on the claim that, excluding some areas of fundamental physics about which doubts are entirely justified, many areas of contemporary science cannot be coherently imagined to be false other than via postulation of radically skeptical scenarios, which are not relevant to the realism debate in philosophy of science. In this paper we discuss, specifically, the threats of meaning change and reference failure associated with (...) the Kuhnian tradition, which depend on a descriptivist approach to meaning, and we argue that descriptivism is not the right account of the meaning and reference of theoretical terms. We suggest that an account along the lines of the causal-historical theory of reference provides a more faithful picture of how terms for unobservable theoretical entities and properties come to refer; we argue that this picture works particularly well for TSR. In the last section we discuss how our account raises concerns specifically for perspectival forms of scientific realism. (shrink)

The anchoring focus of this paper is a cluster of complaints that have been raised against reference-based approaches to semantics, in particular against the view defended by Scott Soames (2002). I am going to lump the complaints that I have in mind under the heading of the Threat of Collapse (or the Threat, for short). At the heart of the Threat of Collapse is the accusation that various moves referentialists make in dealing with well-known problems end up undercutting the (...) motivations for a reference-based semantics in the first place. (shrink)

Electronic Health Records (EHRs) are organized around two kinds of statements: those reporting observations made, and those reporting acts performed. In neither case does the record involve any direct reference to what such statements are actually about. They record not: what is happening on the side of the patient, but rather: what is said about what is happening. While the need for a unique patient identifier is generally recognized, we argue that we should now move to an EHR (...) regime in which all clinically salient particulars – from the concrete disorder on the side of the patient and the body parts in which it occurs to the concrete treatments given – should be uniquely identified. This will allow us to achieve interoperability among different systems of records at the level where it really matters: in regard to what is happening in the real world. It will also allow us to keep track of particular disorders and of the effects of particular treatments in a precise and unambiguous way. We discuss the ontological and epistemological aspects of our claim and describe a scenario for implementation within EHR systems. (shrink)

Abstract. The strong similarity between the use of ostension and that of a simple demonstrative to predicate something of an object seems to conflict with equally strong intuitions according to which, while “this” does usually refer to an object, the gesture of holding an object in your hand and showing it to an audience does not refer to the demonstrated object. This paper argues that the problem is authentic and provides a solution to it. In doing so, a more general (...) thought is given support by the approach used. Namely, the thought that our abilities to directly refer to things require some basic referential abilities exhibited in ostension and the use of demonstratives which, in their turn, rest upon our abilities to cooperate in performing non-communicative actions on our environment. Several concepts introduced in order to solve the initial problem can be used to articulate this thought in more detail. (shrink)

Evidence from cognitive science supports the claim that humans and other animals see the world as divided into objects. Although this claim is widely accepted, it remains unclear whether the mechanisms of visual reference have representational content or are directly instantiated in the functional architecture. I put forward a version of the former approach that construes object files as icons for objects. This view is consistent with the evidence that motivates the architectural account, can respond to the key arguments (...) against representational accounts, and has explanatory advantages. I draw general lessons for the philosophy of perception and the naturalization of intentionality. (shrink)

Philosophy of mind, cognitive science, and AI lack a unified model to explain how systems form meaningful propositional attitudes—states like belief, desire, and intention. This work introduces and defends the Trialectics framework as a response to this theoretical gap. We propose that any system capable of forming meaningful propositional attitudes—that is, internal states with truth-evaluable, compositionally structured content that can be rationally evaluated and guide goal-directed behavior—must instantiate three interdependent functional capacities: Reference (R), the ability to establish semantic links; (...) Inference (I), the capacity to process and transform content systematically; and Preference (P), the function of internal evaluation and goal-orientation. The central thesis is that these capacities are not modular but mutually conditioning: meaningful content arises only from their dynamic entanglement, where reference shapes and is shaped by inference and preference, and so on. By embedding evaluation (P) within the cognitive loop, Trialectics offers a naturalized solution to the problem of normativity in reasoning and reconciles representational requirements with enactivist critiques by defining reference functionally rather than metaphysically. The framework’s utility is demonstrated by showing how it implicitly structures existing cognitive architectures (e.g., BDI, Active Inference) and provides a powerful diagnostic and design tool for AI, particularly concerning alignment, generalization, and interpretability. Ultimately, Trialectics posits a fundamental architectural condition for any system—biological or artificial—to achieve the flexible, offline, and rationally evaluable propositional attitudes characteristic of sophisticated intelligence. (shrink)

In their contribution to this volume, Müller & Polakof (M&P) ask whether sentential reference is possible and, following Frege, answer affirmatively. They focus on action sentences and claim that such sentences refer to the truth-values the True and the False, not directly but through truth-conditions that, depending on the particular content of each sentence, may involve different objects in different configurations. Using cross-linguistic evidence, M&P claim that since events play a crucial role in truth-conditions for these sentences, one has (...) every reason to accept them as part of natural language ontology. Theirs is a suggestive, well-argued, and inspiring contribution. Unfortunately, I am rather sceptical concerning the kind of referential connections events supposedly track, as well as about their role in the justification of sentential reference. I raise my case using two well-known arguments in the philosophical literature that scholars of event semantics rarely, if ever, consider. (shrink)

The goal of referent tracking is to create an ever-growing pool of data relating to the entities existing in concrete spatiotemporal reality. In the context of Electronic Healthcare Records (EHRs) the relevant concrete entities are not only particular patients but also their parts, diseases, therapies, lesions, and so forth, insofar as these are salient to diagnosis and treatment. Within a referent tracking system, all such entities are referred to directly and explicitly, something which cannot be achieved when familiar concept-based systems (...) are used in what is called “clinical coding”. In this paper we describe the components of a referent tracking system in an informal way and we outline the procedures that would have to be followed by healthcare personnel in using such a system. We argue that the referent tracking paradigm can be introduced with only minor – though nevertheless ontologically important – technical changes to existing EHR infrastructures, but that it will require a radically different mindset on the part of those involved in clinical coding and terminology development from that which has prevailed hitherto. (shrink)

Around 1970, both Keith Donnellan and Saul Kripke produced powerful arguments against description theories of proper names. They also offered sketches of positive accounts of proper name reference, highlighting the crucial role played by historical facts that might be unknown to the speaker. Building on these sketches, in the following years Michael Devitt elaborated his well-known causal theory of proper names. As I have argued elsewhere, however, contrary to what is commonly assumed, Donnellan’s and Kripke’s sketches point in two (...) rather different directions, by appealing to historical or causal facts of different sorts. In this paper, I shall discuss and criticize Devitt’s causal theory, which confuses things, I shall argue, by mixing, so to speak, Donnellan’s and Kripke’s sketches. (shrink)

Objective: Reference values have gained universal acceptance as the most powerful material that helps the decision-making-implementation process of the clinical laboratory. These values ​​may be affected by the geographical location, dietary habits, and other lifestyle changes of individuals applying to the clinical laboratory. Our study aims to determine the reference ranges for the biochemistry test panel, thyroid function tests, and insulin hormone levels, which are frequently needed by clinicians for the province of Gaziantep, with samples obtained from healthy (...) individuals. -/- Materials and Methods: In the study phase, the selection of reference individuals was carried out using the direct method a priori. For the study group, healthy individuals (224 men, 243 women) aged 18-45 were selected. Reference intervals (95% limit) were calculated according to the non-parametric method. -/- Results: When the reference intervals obtained in our study were compared with the reference intervals of the manufacturer, there were differences (> 10% lower or higher) in the upper and lower limits in urea (female and male), creatinine (male), HDL (female), AST (female and male), ALT (female), GGT (female), ALP (common), Lipase (common), CK (male), iron (male), TSH (female and male) markers. Male and female reference intervals for HDL, AST, ALT, and TSH differed significantly. Manufacturer reference ranges for these parameters were common to both sexes. -/- Conclusion: As a result, differences were determined between most of the reference intervals obtained in our study and the reference intervals we routinely use. We think the difference in the reference intervals is due to the differences in dietary habits and environmental factors. (shrink)

I argue for a theory of the optimal function of the speech act of referring, called the edenic theory. First, the act of singular reference is defined directly in terms of Gricean communicative intentions. Second, I propose a doxastic constraint on the optimal performance of such acts, stating, roughly, that the speaker must not have any relevant false beliefs about the identity or distinctness of the intended object. In uttering a singular term on an occasion, on this theory, one (...) represents oneself as not having any confused beliefs about the object to which one intends to refer. This paves the way for an intentionalist theory of reference that circumvents well-known problems, which have not been adequately addressed before in the literature. (shrink)

Perceptual Control Theory (PCT) explains behavior as the active maintenance of perceptual variables relative to internally specified reference conditions. Standard formulations, however, often treat environmental disturbance as explanatorily primary and reference signals as fixed setpoints against which deviation is corrected. This paper reconstructs PCT by reversing that priority. It introduces the notion of reference-induced perturbation: a change counts as a disturbance only relative to an active reference, and error presupposes the prior establishment of a standard that (...) makes deviation matter at all. Here, normativity is neither imposed from outside the system nor derived from interpretation, inference, or social agreement. It is an architectural consequence of control itself. Reference signals partition perceptual states into acceptable and unacceptable regions, generating correctness conditions internal to the system and organizing behavior as the maintenance of constraint under variation. Agency here consists in the capacity of hierarchically organized systems to generate, sustain, and reorganize such reference conditions. The framework clarifies the structure of motivation, agency, and rule-following without invoking inner rules or interpretive regress. It also distinguishes reference-based normativity from probabilistic expectation, separating value from mere surprise and insistence from mere prediction. By locating normativity in maintained constraint rather than statistical inference or externally defined reward, the reconstruction offers a unified account of minimal normativity, agential caring, and socially scaffolded rule-following. These results bear directly on ongoing debates in phenomenology, enactivism, predictive processing, and reinforcement learning concerning the source of normativity in cognitive systems. (shrink)

The paradigm of referent tracking is based on a realist presupposition which rejects so-called negative entities (congenital absent nipple, and the like) as spurious. How, then, can a referent tracking-based Electronic Health Record deal with what are standardly called ‘negative findings’? To answer this question we carried out an analysis of some 748 sentences drawn from patient charts and containing some form of negation. Our analysis shows that to deal with these sentences we need to introduce a new ontological relationship (...) between a particular and a universal, which holds when no instance of the universal has a specific qualified ontological relation with the particular. This relation is found to be able to accommodate nearly all occurrences of negative findings in the examined sample, in ways which involve no reference to negative entities. (shrink)

This brief article explores a phenomenological parallel between ego dissolution in deep meditation or psychedelic states and the dissolution of the reference frame in relativity. This is also the immediate difference between a measuring device as an observer and a conscious observer. A conscious observer can undergo ego dissolution or reference frame dissolution when the default mode network in the brain desintegrates. When a conscious observer ceases to define themselves as a fixed point in space-time, the zero-point of (...) their reference frame, perception no longer occurs from a localized standpoint. Instead, the observer directly experiences space-time as it is: all times and all places existing simultaneously in a non-local, eternal now. This experiential state, often described by mystics as “unity with the universe,” reveals a consciousness that no longer observes reality as the unfolding from moment to moment of events through time, but as space-time itself: all at once in an eternal now. (shrink)

This thesis builds a foundation for the philosophy of the Web by examining the crucial question: What does a Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) mean? Does it have a sense, and can it refer to things? A philosophical and historical introduction to the Web explains the primary purpose of the Web as a universal information space for naming and accessing information via URIs. A terminology, based on distinctions in philosophy, is employed to define precisely what is meant by information, language, representation, (...) and reference. These terms are then employed to create a foundational ontology and principles of Web architecture. From this perspective, the Semantic Web is then viewed as the application of the principles of Web architecture to knowledge representation. However, the classical philosophical problems of sense and reference that have been the source of debate within the philosophy of language return. Three main positions are inspected: the logicist position, as exemplified by the descriptivist theory of reference and the first-generation Semantic Web, the direct reference position, as exemplified by Putnam and Kripke’s causal theory of reference and the second-generation Linked Data initiative, and a Wittgensteinian position that views the Semantic Web as yet another public language. After identifying the public language position as the most promising, a solution of using people’s everyday use of search engines as relevance feedback is proposed as a Wittgensteinian way to determine sense of URIs. This solution is then evaluated on a sample of the Semantic Web discovered by via using queries from a hypertext search engine query log. The results are evaluated and the technique of using relevance feedback from hypertext Web searches to determine relevant Semantic Web URIs in response to user queries is shown to considerably improve baseline performance. Future work for the Web that follows from our argument and experiments is detailed, and outlines of a future philosophy of the Web laid out. (shrink)

This paper introduces the Calculus of Qualia (CQ), a novel formal system that transcends the referential paradigm of traditional language by incorporating non-referential terms. These terms directly present phenomenal experiences, such as blackness, rather than referring to them, addressing longstanding limitations in expressing subjective consciousness. Building on insights from phenomenology and philosophy of mind, CQ defines qualations—expressions involving non-referential terms--qualia--with distinct logical behaviors like instance preservation and resistance to collapse. The framework offers new tools to formalize the hard problem of (...) consciousness and challenges classical thought experiments like the zombie argument, suggesting that qualia’s irreducibility demands a presentational rather than referential approach. This calculus bridges rigorous analysis and experiential meaning, opening pathways for rethinking language, consciousness, and their formal representation. (shrink)

The paper argues that the reference of perceptual demonstratives is fixed in a causal nondescriptive way through the nonconceptual content of perception. That content consists first in spatiotemporal information establishing the existence of a separate persistent object retrieved from a visual scene by the perceptual object segmentation processes that open an object-file for that object. Nonconceptual content also consists in other transducable information, that is, information that is retrieved directly in a bottom-up way from the scene (motion, shape, etc). (...) The nonconceptual content of the mental states induced when one uses a perceptual demonstrative constitutes the mode of presentation of the perceptual demonstrative that individuates but does not identify the object of perceptual awareness and allows reference to it. On that account, perceptual demonstratives put us in a de re relationship with objects in the world through the non-conceptual information retrieved directly from the objects in the environment. (shrink)

This paper provides a defense of intentionalism about episodic reference. This is the view that a person’s intentions and self-interpretations determine the singular events to which their episodic rememberings and future directed episodic thoughts refer. Intentionalism distinguishes itself by providing a single account of reference for memory and imagination, where some other approaches result in an awkward disjunction. The view is also shown to be compatible with the spirit of both simulationist and causalist approaches to memory and coheres (...) well with the experimental methodologies and empirical findings that motivate those approaches. Intentionalism is able, in addition, to accommodate the phenomenon of unintentional remembering, be it during intrusive memories or mind wandering. (shrink)

This brief article explores a phenomenological parallel between ego dissolution in deep meditation or psychedelic states and the dissolution of the reference frame in relativity. This is also the immediate difference between a measuring device as an observer and a conscious observer. A conscious observer can undergo ego dissolution or reference frame dissolution when the default mode network in the brain desintegrates. When a conscious observer ceases to define themselves as a fixed point in space-time, the zero-point of (...) their reference frame, perception no longer occurs from a localized standpoint. Instead, the observer directly experiences space-time as it is: all times and all places existing simultaneously in a non-local, eternal now. This experiential state, often described by mystics as “unity with the universe,” reveals a consciousness that no longer observes reality as the unfolding from moment to moment of events through time, but as space-time itself: all at once in an eternal now. -/- Publicly available at Zenodo (DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17340466). This is a revised and expanded version of the earlier upload (October 2025). (shrink)

Three distinct turning points (“bottleneck breakings”) in universal evolution are discussed at some length in terms of “self-reference” and (corresponding) “Reality Principles.” The first (origin and evolution of animate Nature) and second (human consciousness) are shown to necessarily precede a third one, that of Marxist philosophy. It is pointed out that while the previous two could occupy a natural (so in a sense neutral) place as parts of human science, the self-reference of Marxism, as a _social_ human phenomenon, (...) through its direct bearings on the _practice_ of society, did have a stormy history. I conclude that the fall of Bolshevism was unavoidable, and still, we might uphold our hope for a truly free society of humankind, just on the very basis of what we have learned of the fate of Marxist philosophy as such, as a _recursively evolving_ social _practice_: the freedom of humankind of its own ideological burdens (constraints). (shrink)

The answer I shall sketch is not mine. Nor, as far as I can tell, is it an answer to be found in the voluminous literature inspired by Kripke’s work. Many of the elements of the answer are to be found in the writings of Wittgenstein and his Austro-German predecessors, Martinak, Husserl, Marty, Landgrebe and Bühler. Within this Austro-German tradition we may distinguish between a strand which is Platonist and anti-naturalist and a strand which is nominalist and naturalist. Thus Husserl’s (...) account of what he calls “directly referring” uses of singular terms invokes senses or individual concepts, albeit simple, not descriptive senses. But the account of reference fixing and reference given by Landgrebe, Bühler and Wittgenstein rejects senses.1 I confine further reference to these writers to footnotes since my aim here is to develop and unify some of their suggestions, in particular by comparing them with more recent work (cf. Mulligan 1997). (shrink)

In attempting to form rational personal probabilities by direct inference, it is usually assumed that one should prefer frequency information concerning more specific reference classes. While the preceding assumption is intuitively plausible, little energy has been expended in explaining why it should be accepted. In the present article, I address this omission by showing that, among the principled policies that may be used in setting one’s personal probabilities, the policy of making direct inferences with a preference for (...) frequency information for more specific reference classes yields personal probabilities whose accuracy is optimal, according to all proper scoring rules, in situations where all of the relevant frequency information is point-valued. Assuming that frequency information for narrower reference classes is preferred, when the relevant frequency statements are point-valued, a dilemma arises when choosing whether to make a direct inference based upon relatively precise-valued frequency information for a broad reference class, R, or upon relatively imprecise-valued frequency information for a more specific reference class, R*. I address such cases, by showing that it is often possible to make a precise-valued frequency judgment regarding R* based on precise-valued frequency information for R, using standard principles of direct inference. Having made such a frequency judgment, the dilemma of choosing between and is removed, and one may proceed by using the precise-valued frequency estimate for the more specific reference class as a premise for direct inference. (shrink)

Gareth evans has proposed a type of case which shows that kripke's sketch of a causal theory of proper names is in need of modification. Kripke has himself suggested a way in which the modification might proceed, But I argue that this suggestion leads in the wrong direction. I consider a development of kripke's view by michael devitt which may overcome evans' case, But which is shown false by a different sort of case. The latter kind of case also shows (...) that a view of names recently proposed by donnellan is in need of revision. (shrink)

Brentano distinguishes between intentionality and reference. According to Brentano, all mental acts are intentionally directed toward something. Some mental acts also refer to something, which is the case when their object exists in reality. For Brentano, such acts, besides their intentionality, have a peculiar relation of similarity to their object. However, there is no mention of Brentano’s distinction between intentionality and reference in the literature. Drawing on some lesser known texts, this paper aims both at showing that Brentano (...) makes such a distinction and at underscoring the philosophical significance of his position. (shrink)

This paper investigates the necessary functional architecture underlying complex cognitive states such as belief, desire, hope, and fear, specifically those characterized as Meaningful Propositional Attitudes About Something Not Itself (MPAASNI). MPAASNI are defined as states possessing directed propositional content, susceptibility to systematic processing, and an internal stance conferring functional significance within a system. We identify three fundamental functional capacities required for such states: Reference (R), providing directed content; Inference (I), providing systematic processing and relation of contents; and Preference (P), (...) providing the internal stance, weighting, and functional significance. The core contribution of this paper is the articulation and defense of the Trialectics, defined as the specific functional mode of operation characterized by systematic and constitutive mutual conditioning among R, I, and P. Through rigorous, descriptive conceptual analysis, we argue that this Trialectic functioning—this deep functional integration where each capacity's state and operation conditions and is conditioned by the others—is not merely one possible arrangement but constitutes a necessary condition for the possibility of any system exhibiting MPAASNI. The necessity is demonstrated by showing that the functional integration inherently required by the definition of MPAASNI logically entails the mutual conditioning described by the Trialectics. This framework, derived non-empirically, applies to attitudes directed towards both tangible and non-tangible domains and posits a fundamental structure necessary for intentionality, rationality, and other sophisticated cognitive phenomena dependent on meaningful propositional attitudes. (shrink)

In a recent article, Joel Pust argued that direct inference based on reference properties of differing arity are incommensurable, and so direct inference cannot be used to resolve the Sleeping Beauty problem. After discussing the defects of Pust's argument, I offer reasons for thinking that direct inferences based on reference properties of differing arity are commensurable, and that we should prefer direct inferences based on logically stronger reference properties, regardless of arity.

I argue, in this thesis, that proper name reference is a wholly pragmatic phenomenon. The reference of a proper name is neither constitutive of, nor determined by, the semantic content of that name, but is determined, on an occasion of use, by pragmatic factors. The majority of views in the literature on proper name reference claim that reference is in some way determined by the semantics of the name, either because their reference simply constitutes their (...) semantics (which generally requires a very fine-grained individuation of names), or because names have an indexical-like semantics that returns a referent given certain specific contextual parameters. I discuss and criticize these views in detail, arguing, essentially, in both cases, that there can be no determinate criteria for reference determination—a claim required by both types of semantic view. I also consider a less common view on proper name reference: that it is determined wholly by speakers’ intentions. I argue that the most plausible version of this view—a strong neo-Gricean position whereby all utterance content is determined by the communicative intentions of the speaker—is implausible in light of psychological data. In the positive part of my thesis, I develop a pragmatic view of proper name reference that is influenced primarily by the work of Charles Travis. I argue that the reference of proper names can only be satisfactorily accounted for by claiming that reference occurs not at the level of word meaning, but at the pragmatic level, on an occasion of utterance. I claim that the contextual mechanisms that determine the reference of a name on an occasion are the same kinds of thing that determine the truth-values of utterances according to Travis. Thus, names are, effectively, occasion sensitive in the way that Travis claims predicates and sentences (amongst other expressions) are. Finally, I discuss how further research might address how my pragmatic view of reference affects traditional issues in the literature on names, and the consequences of the view for the semantics of names. (shrink)

The main concern of this paper is the proper analysis of the NP celui-ci in French. The contribution of L. Tasmowski to this discussion is well known. In my view, this contribution makes two important points: 1) in its anaphoric uses, celui-ci cannot be analysed as a "nominal anaphoric" along the lines suggested by Corblin for its exophoric uses. This point is also made in Kleiber, Zribi-Hertz, Imoto ; 2) eventhough celui-ci like pronouns and definite NPS must be linked in (...) its anaphoric uses to a familiar discourse referent, it involves "une rupture de familiarité" [a familiarity break]. Basically, I will argue in this paper that these two points are correct, although they seem to draw the analysis of celui-ci in two opposite directions and look somewhat paradoxical. In this paper, I propose a solution to those difficulties which is based on the analysis of celui-ci as a "mentional NP". Other mentional NPs in French are, for instance, le premier, le second, ce dernier. Mentional NPS, it will be claimed, are just NPs which are associated to a previously established discourse referent by using only the properties of the previous mention having evoked this discourse referent in the discourse context. I will claim that there is a strong association between mentionals and NPs without a noun in French, namely that mentional references are achieved by NPs without a noun. I will show moreover that this specific kind of reference based on contingent properties of a discourse referent is the key for understanding how a coindexed NP produces the break in topic continuity noted by Tasmowski. (shrink)

Gareth Evans, in The Causal Theory of Names, states that the causal theory of reference needs to be expanded to include what he calls multiple "bases". After the initial baptism, the use of the name in the presence of the person can, under the right circumstances, be considered as reinforcing the name in its referent. For those who are in direct contact with the person, the reference for the expression of the name is solved by means of (...) a causal chain that includes people who knew him during the "baptism", or by indexing the person to the name at the time of communication. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.28651.08484 . (shrink)

Many Perdurantists have been drawn to the “Conventionalist” idea that our person-directed attitudes can determine whether or not we survive events such as teletransportation. In this paper, I suggest a novel “Contextualist Conventionalism” according to which Conventionalism is true with respect to some, but not all, contexts in which we ask “will I survive?”—instead in “reflexive” contexts, “I” reflexively refers to a thinker whose persistence conditions are mind-independent. Unlike one form of Conventionalism which implies that the reference of “I” (...) is never constrained to reflexively referring to the thinker (cf. Zimmerman, D. (2012). Personal identity and the survival of death. In B. Bradley, F. Feldman, & J. Johansson (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of death (pp. 97–154). Oxford University Press.), Miller, K. (2013). Personal identity minus the persons. Philosophical Studies, 166, S91–S109.), Kovacs, D. (2020). Diachronic self-making. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 98(2), 349–362.), Kurtsal, I. (2022). Self-Determination in Plenitude. Erkenntnis, 87, 2397–2418.), Longenecker, M. (2023). Conventionalism about Persons and the Nonidentity Problem. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 101(4), 954–967.), Contextualist Conventionalism instead implies that there are some important contexts where the “I” is so constrained. And unlike another form of Conventionalism that secures such reflexive reference by holding that the survival of the thinker is a mind-dependent matter (a view which might be attributed to Braddon-Mitchell, D., & West, C. (2001). Temporal Phase Pluralism Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXII(1), 59–83.), or Braddon-Mitchell, D., & Miller, K. (2004). How to be a conventional person. The Monist, 87(4), 457–474., 2020), Contextualist Conventionalism secures reflexive reference while avoiding such a radical metaphysical commitment. (shrink)

The reference class problem arises because an individual belongs to indefinitely many classes that yield conflicting probability estimates. I argue that the problem decomposes into two questions: given a grouping structure, how should information be combined across its levels to yield a probability for an individual (the combination question); and which grouping structure is the right one (the structure question)? I defend four claims. First, the combination question has an operational answer, developed independently in statistics: partial pooling in multilevel (...) models, with the posterior predictive distribution as the direct-inference probability. Second, the classical answer to that question— Reichenbach’s narrowest-class rule—is not merely vague but decision-theoretically defective. By the Stein inadmissibility results for the canonical normal-means setting, the no-pooling estimator it induces is dominated by shrinkage in total risk, uniformly over the parameter space and without assuming the hierarchical model is correct. This defect is inherited by every selection rule in the literature, since each defers to the narrowest class where its statistics are deemed reliable. Third, the classical proposals of Reichenbach, Carnap, Kyburg, and Pollock are recoverable as limits or special cases of the same pooling apparatus. Fourth, the structure question survives, but as a checkable modeling question rather than an undecidable selection, and the regress it threatens is benign rather than vicious. The reference class problem is thereby reduced, not dissolved. (shrink)