In this exposition of important and yet often neglected developments in the history of Western spirituality, Stefan Rossbach reminds us of the philosophical and spiritual underpinnings of the Cold War era. He argues that the conflict's main protagonists - representing the "Third Rome" and the "New World" respectively - drew on the traditions of apocalypticism, millenarianism and "Gnostic" spirituality for the formation and articulation of their self-understanding as the key agents of providential history. In order to characterize the attitudes (...) reflected in these traditions, "Gnostic Wars" offers a historical analysis of conceptions of subjectivity and spiritual order which imply the possibility, and indeed the necessity, of a radical "externalization of evil". Beginning with the "Gnostic" systems of late Antiquity, the analysis follows "lines of meaning" which extend, through the millenarianism of the late Middle Ages and the Hermeticism and "Christian Cabala" of the Renaissance, right up to the present. From the long-term perspective which is thereby established, the spectre of a man-made nuclear apocalypse appears as the latest and most dramatic expression of an outlook on the human condition which refuses to accept limits in the imposition of human designs on the world. The concluding discussion of the paradoxical continuities that underlie the sense of epoch evoked by the end of the Cold War highlights this work's implications for our understanding of contemporary international politics. (shrink)

The bi-polar confrontation between the Soviet Union and the USA involved many leading game theorists from both sides of the Iron Curtain: Oskar Morgenstern, John von Neumann, Michael Intriligator, John Nash, Thomas Schelling and Steven Brams from the United States and Nikolay Vorob’ev, Leon A. Petrosyan, Elena B. Yanovskaya and Olga N. Bondareva from the Soviet Union. The formalization of game theory (GT) took place prior to the Cold War but the geopolitical confrontation hastened and shaped its evolution. In (...) our article we outline four similarities and differences between Western GT and Soviet GT: 1) the Iron Curtain resulted in a lagged evolution of GT in the Soviet Union; 2) Soviet GT focused more on operations research and issues of centralized planning; 3) the contemporary Western view on Soviet GT was biased and Soviet contributions, including works on dynamic stability, non-emptiness of the core and many refinements, suggest that Soviet GT was able to catch up to the Western level relatively fast; 4) international conferences, including Vilnius, 1971, fostered interaction between Soviet game theorists and their Western colleagues. In general, we consider the Cold War to be a positive environment for GT in the West and in the Soviet Union. (shrink)

The historic material culture produced by American Cold War nuclear weapons testing includes objects of scientific inquiry that can be generally categorized as being either ephemeral or enduring. Objects deemed to be ephemeral were of a less substantial nature, being impermanent and expendable in a nuclear test, while enduring objects were by nature more durable and long-lasting. Although all of these objects were ultimately subject to disappearance, the processes by which they were transformed, degraded, or destroyed prior to their (...) disappearing differ. Drawing principally upon archaeological theory, this paper proposes a functional dichotomy for categorizing and studying the historical trajectories of nuclear weapons testing technoscience artifacts. In examining the transformation patterns of steel towers and concrete blockhouses in particular, it explores an associated loss of scientific method that accompanies a science object's disappearance. (shrink)

The Second World War and its associated political events of a national and global scale brought new circumstances, which was considerably influenced the development processes of Tehran. During World War II, Iran hoped that Washington would keep Britain and the Soviet Union from seizing control of the country’s oil fields. In 1951 and 1952 Truman worked with Iranian Prime Minister, though unsuccessfully, to regain some of those lost oil rights for Iran. By the late 1950s and President Kennedy’s presidency, he (...) used aid as leverage for social reform. During the early years of 1960s, the Kennedy Administration was urging its allies in the third world to carry out necessary reforms in order to prevent popular discontent and enhance the dominant ideology of ‘modernism’. In 1968, a major piece of legislation, the Urban Development and Renewal Act, enabled the municipality to implement Tehran’s Comprehensive Plan (TCP 1968), which integrated all the elements of a 1960s’ American city such as the separation of functions, highways, suburbs, shopping centers and housing area. The export of these American cities principles can only be understood from the background of the Cold War period, in which the east and west were both competing for cultural colonization of Middle Eastern strategically important cities like Tehran. During this period, the new developments supported by the oil boom of 1970s, were built in different forms to constitute an expanding metropolis. In 1974, the second “International Congress of Architecture” with the theme of “Toward a Quality of Life” held at Persepolis and brought together all leading world architects and planners to review Iran’s progress in its professional response to the challenges posed by increasing oil revenues. This research aims to represent the export of planning as a political means of cultural colonization of the Third World during the cold war period. (shrink)

This paper argues that frontier AI competition increasingly reproduces a Cold War structure: rival actors justify accelerated capability development by reference to the danger of adversary access. However, the analogy fails at the point where it matters most. Unlike nuclear deterrence, advanced AI does not present a stable symmetry of threat, verification, or second-strike logic. Its risks include autonomous deployment, persuasion, cyber leverage, surveillance, institutional capture, recursive improvement, and large-scale bypass of human agency. -/- The central claim is that (...) a capability race cannot solve alignment because alignment is non-indexical: its constraints must hold regardless of which actor deploys the system. If competing actors lack preservation, non-bypassability, anti-domination, and repair/closure constraints, then each side’s accusation of the other intensifies the race while leaving the underlying architecture unchanged. -/- The paper concludes that the decisive distinction is not American versus Chinese AI, open versus closed AI, or commercial versus state AI, but kernel-bound systems versus systems whose constraints remain indexical to the deploying actor. It situates this argument within the Coherence Wall canon by defining the threshold at which capability outruns closure mechanisms and predicts strategic enclosure, access restriction, deterrence, or post-event governance when non-indexical closure is absent. (shrink)

In the pre-Independence era, our republic founders held the Cold War mindset strongly. Consequently, the Indonesian republic proclaimed in 1945 was based on a Cold War mindset; our state philosophy (Pancasila) and the Constitution (UUD '45) were understood and construed on the Cold War discourse basis; and binary oppositions of capitalism-socialism and liberalism-communism since then have been created. Up to the 2020s, the Cold War mindset has still been held by public intellectuals and the binary oppositions (...) have still been rampant in intellectual discourses. If the mindset were still held for three decades to come, it would cause a setback to the development of Indonesian philosophy history. This article is a call to stop and an invitation to escape from the retrogressive mindset. As a call, the article exposes first the evil root of the Cold War mindset as well as the philosophical critique towards it. Then, as an invitation, it suggests three realistic alternative mindsets to replace the Cold War mindset, i.e. post- Cold War capitalistic mindset, deconstructive mindset, and utopian mindset, which are called herein as three growth scenarios. It is believed that, if the three generating scenarios are followed, they will move Indonesian philosophy history forward, and its ongoing development will not hinder or retard. (shrink)

Review of a book on the social and epistemic unification of physicists working on general relativity and gravitation during the Cold War.

The Politics of Military Force uses discourse theory to examine the dynamics of discursive change that made participation in military operations possible against the background of German antimilitarist culture. Once considered a strict taboo, so-called out-of-area operations have now become widely considered by German policymakers to be without alternative. The book argues that an understanding of how certain policies are made possible (in this case, military operations abroad and force transformation), one needs to focus on processes of discursive change that (...) result in different policy options appearing rational, appropriate, feasible, or even self-evident. Drawing on Essex School discourse theory, the book develops a theoretical framework to understand how discursive change works, and elaborates on how discursive change makes once unthinkable policy options not only acceptable but even without alternative. Based on a detailed discourse analysis of more than 25 years of German parliamentary debates, The Politics of Military Force provides an explanation for: (1) the emergence of a new hegemonic discourse in German security policy after the end of the Cold War (discursive change), (2) the rearticulation of German antimilitarism in the process (ideational change/norm erosion) and (3) the resulting making-possible of military operations and force transformation (policy change). In doing so, the book also demonstrates the added value of a poststructuralist approach compared to the naive realism and linear conceptions of norm change so prominent in the study of German foreign policy and International Relations more generally. (shrink)

The Threat of Nuclear War Without Population Regulation -/- Introduction -/- The risk of nuclear war is one of the most pressing concerns of modern civilization. While many factors contribute to this threat—geopolitical rivalries, economic inequalities, and military expansion—one of the most overlooked yet critical factors is overpopulation. Without proper population regulation, resource scarcity, social unrest, and international conflicts may escalate to the point where nuclear war becomes not just possible, but inevitable. This essay explores how overpopulation intensifies global tensions (...) and why sustainable population policies are essential for long-term peace and stability. -/- Overpopulation and Resource Scarcity -/- As the global population continues to grow, the demand for essential resources such as food, water, energy, and land increases exponentially. However, Earth’s natural resources are finite. Many nations already struggle with shortages, leading to economic instability and competition. History has shown that resource scarcity often leads to conflicts—whether over oil, fresh water, or arable land. When nations perceive that their survival is at risk, they may resort to aggressive policies, including war, to secure their needs. -/- In a world where nuclear weapons exist, conflicts over resources could escalate beyond conventional warfare. Powerful nations with nuclear capabilities may feel compelled to use their arsenals to assert dominance or deter rival nations from taking aggressive actions. Without population control measures to balance resource consumption with sustainable growth, these tensions will only increase, raising the risk of global conflict. -/- Economic and Social Instability -/- Overpopulation is not just an environmental or resource issue; it also leads to economic and social instability. Rapid population growth in many developing nations has outpaced job creation, leading to high unemployment rates, poverty, and social unrest. Desperate populations are more susceptible to extremist ideologies, and political instability can make nuclear-armed states more unpredictable. -/- Furthermore, mass migrations caused by overpopulation and climate change put additional strain on already fragile regions. As developed countries struggle to accommodate large numbers of migrants, nationalist and militaristic policies may become more prevalent, increasing the likelihood of conflict. If such conflicts involve nuclear-armed nations or their allies, the risk of nuclear escalation grows. -/- Geopolitical Tensions and Military Expansion -/- As countries seek to secure their own survival in an overpopulated world, they often expand their military presence to protect their interests. Military build-ups create an arms race, which heightens tensions between rival nations. The Cold War is a historical example of how military competition, fueled by ideological and resource conflicts, nearly led to nuclear catastrophe. -/- In today’s multipolar world, with nuclear weapons in the hands of multiple states—including some with unstable governments—the risk is even higher. A single miscalculation or provocation could trigger a nuclear exchange. Population growth, by exacerbating existing geopolitical tensions, makes such miscalculations more likely. -/- The Role of Population Regulation in Preventing War -/- To reduce the likelihood of nuclear war, nations must adopt responsible population policies. These policies do not have to involve extreme depopulation but should focus on sustainable growth through education, healthcare, and economic planning. Providing universal access to family planning, promoting gender equality, and improving education systems can naturally slow population growth and create more stable societies. -/- Your universal formula, which emphasizes the law of balance in nature, aligns with this approach. If governments understand that unlimited population growth disrupts balance—leading to resource depletion, economic turmoil, and conflict—they may be more inclined to implement rational policies that maintain harmony between human civilization and the natural world. -/- Conclusion -/- Without population regulation, nuclear war remains a real possibility. Overpopulation intensifies resource conflicts, economic instability, and geopolitical tensions—all of which increase the risk of armed conflict between nuclear-armed states. However, through education, sustainable development, and rational governance, humanity can prevent this outcome. By integrating the universal law of balance in nature into educational and policy frameworks, we can create a future where population growth is managed responsibly, and the threat of nuclear war is minimized. -/- . (shrink)

Through analysing different case studies in the Middle East, this section uses rooted cosmopolitanism as a theoretical lens to explore exported modernism and architecture between socialist and capitalist countries during the Cold War. This research analyses the circulation and local applications of urban development and modernisation paradigms in so-called ‘Third World’ countries. For assessing the socialist and capitalist-inspired modernisation processes in the Middle East, this chapter studies the cosmopolitan and trans-cultural architecture created by global and local influences. Comparing two (...) types of cosmopolitan architecture (socialist and capitalist) during the Cold War period in third-world contexts will help us to analyse and compare their relative rootedness and to learn from the interconnected, multifaceted, and multilayered planning transfers and architectural exportations. (shrink)

The first thing we must keep in mind is that when saying that China says this or China does that, we are not speaking of the Chinese people, but of the Sociopaths who control the CCP -- Chinese Communist Party, i.e., the Seven Senile Sociopathic Serial Killers (SSSSK) of the Standing Committee of the CCP or the 25 members of the Politburo etc.. -/- The CCP’s plans for WW3 and total domination are laid out quite clearly in Chinese govt publications (...) and speeches and this is Xi Jinping’s “China Dream”. It is a dream only for the tiny minority (perhaps a few dozen to a few hundred) who rule China and a nightmare for everyone else (including 1.4 billion Chinese). The 10 billion dollars yearly enables them or their puppets to own or control newspapers, magazines, TV and radio channels and place fake news in most major media everywhere every day. In addition, they have an army (maybe millions of people) who troll all the media placing more propaganda and drowning out legitimate commentary (the 50 cent army). -/- In addition to stripping the 3rd world of resources, a major thrust of the multi-trillion dollar Belt and Road Initiative is building military bases worldwide. They are forcing the free world into a massive high-tech arms race that makes the cold war with the Soviet Union look like a picnic. -/- Though the SSSSK, and the rest of the world’s military, are spending huge sums on advanced hardware, it is highly likely that WW3 (or the smaller engagements leading up to it) will be software dominated. It is not out of the question that the SSSSK, with probably more hackers (coders) working for them then all the rest of the world combined, will win future wars with minimal physical conflict, just by paralyzing their enemies via the net. No satellites, no phones, no communications, no financial transactions, no power grid, no internet, no advanced weapons, no vehicles, trains, ships or planes. -/- There are only two main paths to removing the CCP, freeing 1.4 billion Chinese prisoners, and ending the lunatic march to WW3. The peaceful one is to launch an all-out trade war to devastate the Chinese economy until the military gets fed up and boots out the CCP. -/- An alternative to shutting down China’s economy is a limited war, such as a targeted strike by say 50 thermobaric drones on the 20th Congress of the CCP, when all the top members are in one place, but that won’t take place until 2022 so one could hit the annual plenary meeting. The Chinese would be informed, as the attack happened, that they must lay down their arms and prepare to hold a democratic election or be nuked into the stone age. The other alternative is an all-out nuclear attack. Military confrontation is unavoidable given the CCP’s present course. It will likely happen over the islands in the South China Sea or Taiwan within a few decades, but as they establish military bases worldwide it could happen anywhere (see Crouching Tiger etc.). Future conflicts will have hardkill and softkill aspects with the stated objectives of the CCP to emphasize cyberwar by hacking and paralyzing control systems of all military and industrial communications, equipment, power plants, satellites, internet, banks, and any device or vehicle connected to the net. The SS are slowly fielding a worldwide array of manned and autonomous surface and underwater subs or drones capable of launching conventional or nuclear weapons that may lie dormant awaiting a signal from China or even looking for the signature of US ships or planes. While destroying our satellites, thus eliminating communication between the USA and our forces worldwide, they will use theirs, in conjunction with drones to target and destroy our currently superior naval forces. Of course, all of this is increasingly done automatically by AI. -/- By far the biggest ally of the CCP is the Democratic party of the USA. -/- The choice is to stop the CCP now or watch as they extend the Chinese prison over the whole world. -/- Of course, universal surveillance and digitizing of our lives is inevitable everywhere. Anyone who does not think so is profoundly out of touch. -/- Of course, it is the optimists who expect the Chinese sociopaths to rule the world while the pessimists (who view themselves as realists) expect AI sociopathy (or AS as I call it – i.e., Artificial Stupidity or Artificial Sociopathy) to take over, perhaps by 2030. -/- Those interested in further details on the lunatic path of modern society may consult my other works such as Suicide by Democracy-an Obituary for America and the World 4th Edition 2019 and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century: Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization 5th ed (2019) . (shrink)

This paper considers George A. Reisch’s account of the role of Cold War political forces in shaping the apolitical stance that came to dominate philosophy of science in the late 1940s and 1950s. It argues that at least as early as the 1930s, Logical Empiricists such as Rudolf Carnap already held that philosophy of science could not properly have political aims, and further suggests that political forces alone cannot explain this view’s rise to dominance during the Cold War, (...) since political forces cannot explain why a philosophy of science with liberal democratic, anti-communist aims did not flourish. The paper then argues that if professionalization is understood in the right way, it might point toward an explanation of the apolitical stance of Cold War philosophy of science. (shrink)

The paper analyzes a book written by Volodymyr Yarymovych, Oleksandr Bilyk, and Mykola Volynskyi, entitled Narys istorii ukrainskoi studentskoi hromady ta Ukrainskykh poselen v Espanii 1946–1996 (An Overview of the History of the Ukrainian Student Community and Ukrainian Settlements in Spain, 1946–1996), which tells about the Ukrainian students who arrived in Madrid in 1946 and formed part of the early Ukrainian Diaspora in Spain. The book proves to be an important source of information, previously unknown to scholars, which describes the (...) dramatic and controversial process of constructing Ukrainian identity in the aftermath of World War II. The authors of the study consider the historical and cultural context of the Ukrainian emigration in the second half of the 20th century, its connection with Francoist ideology, and its integral role in the Spanish-Ukrainian cultural dialogue. (shrink)

Grey zone attacks tend to paralyze response for two reasons. First, they present us with choice scenarios of inherently dilemmatic structure, e.g., Prisoners’ Dilemmas and games of chicken, complicated by difficult conditions of choice, such as choice under risk or amid vagueness. Second, they exploit our uncertainty about how much we do or should care about the things under attack¬—each attack is small in effect, but their effects accumulate: how should we decide whether to treat a given attack as something (...) meriting a serious response rather than a mere irritation to be ignored? This chapter brings standard decision theoretic tools to bear on the issues, tools such as the maximization of expected utility principle, and the precautionary principle. But it also develops three innovations. It shows that seeing it as possible to make choices not just of actions given our values, but also choices of values themselves, can extricate us from certain kinds of decision paralysis. It shows how we can rationally regard ourselves as having bright decision lines even when nothing in the circumstance of choice has these lines in its structure. And it shows how certain conflict escalation risks from the former two strategies can be managed by both parties seeing that cooperation can yield a sharable surplus of goods, and that cooperation can be rational upon a rationally defensible change in their values so that each comes to derive utility from the success of both parties. This yields cooperative solutions to what amount to Prisoners’ Dilemmas. The Cold War was prosecuted on the logic of strategic rationality and that part of game theory that is deterrence theory. We need a new logic from decision theorists for the games that constitute grey zone conflict. (shrink)

While current doctrines try to separate conflicts within two distinct categories – conventional versus irregular, there are, however, a series of contemporary conflicts that challenge this western view on war showing that the disjunctive manner of classification in ‘big and conventional’ versus ‘small and irregular’ is limited and simplistic. The military strategists as well as the academics used a series of concepts in order to describe the main shifts in the character of war – from the Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) (...) and ‘new wars’ to hybrid wars. This article aims to identify these mutations in war evolution in the new, post-Cold War international context. The traditional image we have on this well-known ‘labor division’ within the military field no longer reflects reality. (shrink)

This article examines Chris Knight’s lecture ‘Decoding Chomsky: Science and Revolutionary Politics’ (27 February 2018), situating it as both an intellectual self-clarification and a broader critique of postwar academic culture. Responding to Les Levidow’s appreciation of his book , Knight reconstructs the paradox at the heart of Noam Chomsky’s legacy: the coexistence of uncompromising dissident politics with a scientific career embedded in Cold War military research environments, particularly at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and its offshoot MITRE. The article traces (...) Knight’s argument that this paradox is not a biographical anomaly but a mythological solution to a deeper contradiction between science and politics institutionalised during the cognitive revolution. By analysing Knight’s use of anthropology, mythology, institutional history, and first-hand testimony, the article shows how the professional separation of theory and practice became an ‘ideology of anti-ideology’—one that sanitised language, depoliticised cognition, and normalised proximity to power while preserving moral authority. Rather than reducing Chomsky to hypocrisy or vindication, the article argues that Knight’s lecture reframes him as a cultural figure whose authority derives precisely from the unresolved tension between insider knowledge and public denunciation. The lecture thus functions as a critical lens on the moral economy of modern academia, where intellectual freedom, military funding, and ethical self-justification are structurally intertwined. (shrink)

Hannah Arendt's rich and varied political thought is more influential today than ever before, due in part to the collapse of communism and the need for ideas that move beyond the old ideologies of the Cold War. As Dana Villa shows, however, Arendt's thought is often poorly understood, both because of its complexity and because her fame has made it easy for critics to write about what she is reputed to have said rather than what she actually wrote. Villa (...) sets out to change that here, explaining clearly, carefully, and forcefully Arendt's major contributions to our understanding of politics, modernity, and the nature of political evil in our century.Villa begins by focusing on some of the most controversial aspects of Arendt's political thought. He shows that Arendt's famous idea of the banality of evil--inspired by the trial of Adolf Eichmann--does not, as some have maintained, lessen the guilt of war criminals by suggesting that they are mere cogs in a bureaucratic machine. He examines what she meant when she wrote that terror was the essence of totalitarianism, explaining that she believed Nazi and Soviet terror served above all to reinforce the totalitarian idea that humans are expendable units, subordinate to the all-determining laws of Nature or History. Villa clarifies the personal and philosophical relationship between Arendt and Heidegger, showing how her work drew on his thought while providing a firm repudiation of Heidegger's political idiocy under the Nazis. Less controversially, but as importantly, Villa also engages with Arendt's ideas about the relationship between political thought and political action. He explores her views about the roles of theatricality, philosophical reflection, and public-spiritedness in political life. And he explores what relationship, if any, Arendt saw between totalitarianism and the "great tradition" of Western political thought. Throughout, Villa shows how Arendt's ideas illuminate contemporary debates about the nature of modernity and democracy and how they deepen our understanding of philosophers ranging from Socrates and Plato to Habermas and Leo Strauss.Direct, lucid, and powerfully argued, this is a much-needed analysis of the central ideas of one of the most influential political theorists of the twentieth century. (shrink)

Judith Shklar is commonly acknowledged to be one of the twentieth century’s major American political theorists. Less well known, however, is that from the beginning of her publishing career until nearly the end, she consistently turned to the Nobel Laureate economist Friedrich Hayek as a foil for her own work. I argue that despite Shklar’s extended critique of Hayek, her liberalism of fear is much closer to his view than she (or her many interpreters) admit—in part due to her consistent (...) misreading, even caricaturing, of his work. In fact, a Hayekian right-variant of the liberalism of fear, once properly understood, overlaps with her left-variant to a remarkable degree. I also defend Shklar and Hayek against Samuel Moyn’s accusation that they are Cold War liberals who abandoned the Enlightenment at great cost to liberalism and to liberal societies more generally. (shrink)

The ascendance of critical theory to the status of a global intellectual paradigm is the result of a half-century-long search for the Frankfurt School’s foundations in philosophy and religion rather than its previously recognized source in contemporary social problems and the tradition of Marxism. Initiated by Max Horkheimer’s turn to religion and political conservatism in the late 1960s and early 1970s and then defended by West German contemporaries, the resulting canonization of critical theory has been more recently consolidated by leading (...) American representatives of Frankfurt School intellectual history. To reconstruct this process, this essay returns Horkheimer’s late work to its context in Cold War–era debates about American militarism, political emancipation, women’s rights, the “Third World,” and related social struggles before showing how the controversies surrounding his religious rewriting of critical theory continue to inform influential accounts of Frankfurt School history. (shrink)

Contemporary globalization is largely shaped by the predominant position and strength of the United States, and the concept of globalization is cast upon the polity and social aspects of P.R. China after Reform and Opening. Globalization, though substantially varied in a modern scene, is not without historical and cultural roots. The future holds anew, whereas newly arisen pieces of knowledge and information shed new light on the past, the blood and violence of the political progress on the Chinese soil. This (...) paper digs into the interactive aspect of the Chinese civilization with Western Civilization, and an empirical understanding on the evolvement of the country / nation to the recent shaping, with implication of which might change the dynamic of the Asian area after the global power politics whereof after World War II. (shrink)

The "second-generation indigenization" hypothesis of Huntington's phenomenological observations on totalitarianism in Cold War regime collapse subtly portrayed the realpolitik interest groups' political influences with autocracy disbandment processes. The research puts democratization as the premise and globalization as purpose for the analysis, with the cultural anthropological psychopathology & criminological elements of genocide and crime against humanity explained, underlying some of the Communist Party of China (CPC)’s organizational behaviors. With the regionalism purposes & approaches to multilateralism by People's Republic of China (...) (PRC), the end of democratization is leveraged against the procedural means with power politics of declared “decmocracy”. Between quantitative autocratic controls and realpolitik local-regional interest groups, the connotation of democratization in liberal international globalization has either been used for militant purposes or pushed the landscape of regime collapse into realpolitik local groups and autocratic controls in the process of globalization, with a case study on a local branch of Argricultural Bank of China on supply-side hijacking by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC). With the industrial interests omposed on realpolitik local groups, autocratic regionalism becomes of the "best interest scenario" for the realpolitik local groups with psychopathological spread of the criminological behaviors, by the cyber organizational criminal operations correlated with PRC’s approaches to international relations and multilateralism through bilateral trade & finance in monetary and currency domains, developed into the digitization of economies with criminological schemes in telecommunication, information, and informatics systems. However, the diminishing autonomy & freedom of the territorial population in turn derogated the real economy that wielded the prisoners' dilemma between autocracy and totalitarianism in a negative sum game deterioration cycle, with the censorship practices by the illicit regimes for propaganda controls sustaining "ideology security". In the democratization process of the dictatorial regime, "second-generation indigenization" is thus mapped to the sectarian interests respondent to dictatorial propaganda generation, other than a natural phenomenon out of autonomy and freedom premises in decision theory. The article recaps the coup d'état between Xi Jinping and Bo Xilai before Xi took the autocratic power, and analyzes the human rights situation in the obstacle of democratization and by the coercion mechanism imposed on the mainland China civil society for the militant purposes, with its behaviral spread of censorship to the “internet platforms” in liberal democratic countries by financial interest incentives and avoidance from war threats, whereby military backends in the cyber systems already indicate otherwise. (shrink)

The Navajo Nation, spanning 27,000 square miles across the American Southwest, faces pressing challenges linked to water rights and environmental sustainability. Despite holding legal rights to water from Navajo Lake since 1908, as upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court, access to clean and reliable drinking water remains a significant hurdle. Approximately 30% of the population depends on water transported from distant sources, underscoring severe scarcity compounded by environmental contamination. Legacy issues from uranium mining during the Cold War era have (...) tainted wells, while unregulated landfills and agricultural chemicals further degrade groundwater, threatening public health and ecosystems. Covering four major river basins — the Colorado, San Juan, Rio Grande, and Little Colorado — the Nation faces unique challenges in each. Twenty aquifers within its territory are increasingly at risk of depletion and heavy metal contamination, limiting their suitability for drinking water and agriculture. Climate change-induced droughts have raised salinity levels in lakes and aquifers, further straining resources for irrigation, wildlife, and agricultural productivity. Although the Nation oversees 212,000 acres of farmland, yielding $92 million annually in agricultural output, the region’s arid conditions pose significant obstacles to sustainable farming. This study employs a mixed-methods approach to analyze water rights and environmental challenges within the Navajo Nation, serving as a pedagogical base for research, education, and policymaking. It begins by exploring historical legal documents, such as Supreme Court rulings and regional water rights agreements, to trace the evolution of the Nation’s entitlements. To assess the human and environmental dimensions of water challenges, the research synthesizes available records and integrates broader contextual analysis to capture the scale and scope of these issues. By incorporating stakeholder perspectives, the study contextualizes the ongoing struggles and identifies key areas for intervention and improvement. Additionally, the research compares adaptive strategies used by other Indigenous communities facing similar challenges. This comparative lens not only informs actionable, context-sensitive solutions but also reinforces the study’s role as a foundational educational resource. By blending legal analysis and socio-environmental evaluation, the research provides a comprehensive view of the multifaceted water issues confronting the Navajo Nation. It underscores the importance of technological innovation, policy reform, and community-driven efforts to safeguard water resources, restore ecological balance, and promote sustainable development. As a pedagogical tool, the study aims to enrich discourse on Indigenous water rights and environmental justice, equipping educators, policymakers, and future researchers with a robust framework to address both historical and contemporary challenges. (shrink)

Nel 1956, in piena guerra fredda, una conferenza di scienziati al Dartmouth College negli Stati Uniti annunciò il lancio di un audace progetto scientifico, l’Intelligenza Artificiale (I.A.). Dopo l’iniziale fallimento degli sforzi della “Hard AI” di produrre un’intelligenza simile a quella umana, alla fine del XX secolo è emerso il movimento della “Soft AI”. Invece di essere orientato a imitare il comportamento umano in relazione a compiti specifici, ha preferito cercare modi alternativi di eseguire i compiti basati sulle particolari funzioni (...) e strutture della macchina. Il fattore decisivo è stata la combinazione della tecnologia di apprendimento automatico con le comunicazioni digitali online, l’incontro tra l’IA e Internet. Le applicazioni dell’IA “soft” sono quelle che vediamo nel mondo dei dispositivi automatici “intelligenti” che informano la nostra vita sociale digitale. Nel seguente articolo mi concentrerò su una particolare applicazione dell’IA per le discussioni online con utenti umani, ChatGPT, per mostrare le implicazioni della tecnologia digitale online nelle modalità storico-sociali dell’esistenza umana. ChatGPT è un’applicazione che combina l’IA con Internet, le possibilità della corrispondenza tra macchine e le potenzialità della tele-comunicazione umana. Il mio approccio si concentra sulle implicazioni fenomenologiche e storico-sociali della proliferazione della tecnologia AI per quanto riguarda la coscienza e la socialità umana. -/- Abstract (english) -/- In 1956, amidst the Cold War, a conference of scientists at Dartmouth College in the United States announced the launch of a bold, scientific project, Artificial Intelligence (A.I.). After the initial failure of “Hard AI” efforts to produce a human-like intelligence, the “Soft AI” movement emerged in the late 20th century. Instead of being oriented towards imitating human behaviour concerning specific tasks, it preferred to seek alternative ways of performing tasks based on the particular functions and structures of the machine. The decisive factor was the combination of Machine Learning technology with Digital Online Communications, the meeting between AI and the Internet. The applications of “Soft” AI are those we see in the world of “smart”, “intelligent” automatic devices that inform our digital social life. In the following article, I will focus on a particular application of AI for online discussions with human users, ChatGPT, in order to show the implications of online digital technology in the social-historical modalities of human existence. ChatGPT is an application that combines AI with the Internet, the possibilities of Machine correspondence with the potentialities of human telecommunications. My approach focuses on the phenomenological and social-historical implications of the proliferation of AI technology as regards human consciousness and sociality. (shrink)

Edward Said’s Orientalism revolutionized Western scholarship by exposing its deep-seated biases in studying non-Western societies, particularly the Arab-Islamic world. His critique revealed how Western narratives dehumanized the "Orient" through exaggerated differences, exoticization and imperialist assumptions. This intellectual framework, Said argued, distorted objective scholarship, allowing Western scholars to claim superior knowledge over the very societies they studied. This paper examines Said’s arguments and their enduring impact on Political Science, Political Philosophy and International Relations. It explores how Orientalist discourse persists in shaping (...) Western narratives, particularly in the post-Cold War era through scholars like Fukuyama and Huntington, as well as in studies on terrorism and democratization efforts in the Arab-Islamic world. Finally, it analyzes the evolution of Orientalism in its modern, neo-Orientalist configuration, which continues to influence global politics and academic discourse. (shrink)

Contemporary globalization is largely shaped by the predominant position and strength of the United States, and the concept of globalization is cast upon the polity and social aspects of P.R. China after Reform and Opening. Globalization, though substantially varied in a modern scene, is not without historical and cultural roots. The future holds anew, whereas newly arisen pieces of knowledge and information shed new light on the past, the blood and violence of the political progress on the Chinese soil. This (...) paper digs into the interactive aspect of the Chinese civilization with Western Civilization, and an empirical understanding on the evolvement of the country / nation to the recent shaping, with implication of which might change the dynamic of the Asian area after the global power politics whereof after World War II. (shrink)

John Dewey was the dominant voice in American philosophy through the World Wars, the Great Depression, and the nascent years of the Cold War. With a professional career spanning three generations and a profile that no public intellectual has operated on in the U.S. since, Dewey's biographer Robert Westbrook accurately describes him as "the most important philosopher in modern American history." In this superb and engaging introduction, Steven Fesmire begins with a chapter on Dewey’s life and works, before discussing (...) and assessing Dewey's key ideas across the major disciplines in philosophy; including metaphysics, epistemology, aesthetics, ethics, educational philosophy, social-political philosophy, and religious philosophy. This is an invaluable introduction and guide to this deeply influential philosopher and his legacy, and essential reading for anyone coming to Dewey's work for the first time. [The downloadable sample is Chapter Four, "Ethics Reconstructed."]. (shrink)

This essay argues that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be understood not as a fixed military alliance but as an evolving process. Drawing on the process philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, the paper presents a simple conceptual framework in which institutions are shaped by continuous change, relational dynamics, and adaptation. This perspective is contrasted with realism, a dominant theory in international relations that tends to view alliances as static tools driven by state interests and power balancing. The essay (...) then analyzes NATO’s historical development from the Cold War to the present, focusing on enlargement, new missions, internal disagreements, and recent geopolitical developments. Rather than interpreting these changes as signs of decline or breakdown, the paper shows how they reflect NATO’s ongoing transformation. The discussion highlights how stability can emerge through change and argues that NATO’s persistence is best understood as a process of continuous becoming. The conclusion suggests that viewing NATO in this way provides a more flexible and accurate framework for understanding its role in contemporary international politics. (shrink)

Despite the end of the Cold War and the ascendancy of liberal democracy celebrated by Francis Fukuyama as “the end of history”, a growing number of scholars and political activists point to its inherent shortcomings. However, they have tended to dismiss it on the basis of one or two of its salient weaknesses. While this is a justifiable way to proceed, it denies the searching reader an opportunity to see the broad basis for the growing rejection of liberal democracy (...) among African political theorists. Consequently, in this article, I argue that from an African perspective, the almost hegemonic status of liberal democracy can be challenged on at least five grounds, namely, logical inconsistency, impracticability due to the largely communalistic outlook of many africans, inconsistency between affirmation and action, violation of the right to ethnic identity, and the moral imperative to assert the right to cultural emancipation. -/- I conclude by calling upon African and Africanist political theorists to utilise indigenous African political thought, coupled with emancipatory aspects of political thought from other parts of the world, to design practicable models of democracy for contemporary African states. I further conclude that in order to promote genuine inter-cultural dialogue on democratisation, people from Western cultures ought to acknowledge the equality of all cultures, and to recognise that systems of governance are part and parcel of those cultures. (shrink)

As historian Henning Schmidgen notes, the scientific study of the nervous system would have been “unthinkable” without the industrialization of communication in the 1830s. Historians have investigated extensively the way nerve physiologists have borrowed concepts and tools from the field of communications, particularly regarding the nineteenth-century work of figures like Helmholtz and in the American Cold War Era. The following focuses specifically on the interwar research of the Cambridge physiologist Edgar Douglas Adrian, and on the technology that led to (...) his Nobel-Prize-winning research, the thermionic vacuum tube. Many countries used the vacuum tube during the war for the purpose of amplifying and intercepting coded messages. These events provided a context for Adrian's evolving understanding of the nerve fiber in the 1920s. In particular, they provide the background for Adrian's transition around 1926 to describing the nerve impulse in terms of “information,” “messages,” “signals,” or even “codes,” and for translating the basic principles of the nerve, such as the all-or-none principle and adaptation, into such an “informational” context. The following also places Adrian's research in the broader context of the changing relationship between science and technology, and between physics and physiology, in the first few decades of the twentieth century. (shrink)

Why do some states pursue seemingly irrational, norm-breaking foreign policies that prioritize status over material gain? Mainstream International Relations theories, focused on rational calculations of power and interest, struggle to explain this behavior. This paper introduces the "Dignity Trap," a new theory grounded in political psychology, arguing that national humiliation is a primary and overlooked driver of revisionist foreign policy. We posit that when a state perceives itself as systematically humiliated by the international order, it revalues its stigmatized traits (e.g., (...) authoritarianism, defiance) into virtues of sovereignty and authenticity in a process of national-scale dignity inversion. To test this theory, we employ a mixedmethods approach. First, we conduct a quantitative discourse analysis of almost 80 years of UN General Debate speeches to create the Weighted Dignity Inversion Index (wDII), a novel measure of a state’s rhetorical posture. Second, we use process tracing in key case studies, such as post-Cold War Russia, to find direct evidence of humiliation as a motivator in pivotal foreign policy decisions. The findings show a strong correlation between perceived humiliating events, spikes in defiant rhetoric (measured by the wDII), and subsequent norm-breaking behavior. This work offers a new paradigm for understanding revisionist powers and re-integrates the "emotional grammar" of recognition and dignity into the heart of IR theory. (shrink)

Scholars have observed that AI image generators often produce racist and sexist results. In fact, AI systems have been shown not only to reproduce common racial stereotypes but sometimes to amplify biases present in the real world. Overall, images created by AI often include biased and stereotypical traits related to gender, skin color, occupations, nationalities, and more. However, scholars have yet to examine how AI imaging technologies and the stereotypes they rely on connect to their militaristic roots. From their beginnings (...) in the US Pentagon’s Cold War efforts against Communism, AI technologies have been consistently linked to America’s pursuit of mastering the dark military art of counter-insurgency. This article will explore the ongoing role of AI by demonstrating how AI image generation tools produce images that reinforce the principles of Western strategic thinking, especially the dominant doctrine of modern irregular warfare: counter-insurgency. Using a sample of 20 images, we will show that AI image generators enhance tropes related to targeting Black male militants in the US and depict sexual stereotypes that assume the benevolence and superiority of Western society—particularly the US—in promoting gender equality among non-Western and formerly colonized populations, while also portraying the protection or liberation of Black and Brown women from the threat of their ‘barbaric’ male counterparts. (shrink)

As the opening line of Dickens' classic novel suggests, it is very often the case that people can imagine both better and worse alternatives to their present reality. Although Dickens was writing about events that occurred over two centuries ago, it remains just as true today that we clearly live in neither the best nor the worst of possible worlds. For instance, we can wish for the amelioration of present difficulties in the Middle East yet still take comfort in the (...) fact that the threat of nuclear war has been greatly reduced since the end of the Cold War. On a more mundane level, it is easy for us to imagine how various aspects of our lives, such as our jobs, marriages, or physical fitness, could be both better and worse. Undoubtedly due to the pervasiveness and intrinsically fascinating qualities of this phenomenon of imagining alternatives to reality, there has been a veritable explosion of research in recent years on what have been termed mental simulation and counterfactual thinking processes. This chapter speculates upon and provides evidence for the antecedents and consequences of two types of counterfactuals: upward (it could have been better) and downward (it could have been worse). The importance of studying the antecedents and consequences of counterfactual direction lie in the differential structures, emotions, intentions, inferences, and behavioral consequences of upward versus downward counterfactual thinking. (shrink)

The first thing we must keep in mind is that when saying that China says this or China does that, we are not speaking of the Chinese people, but of the Sociopaths who control the CCP -- Chinese Communist Party, i.e., the Seven Senile Sociopathic Serial Killers (SSSSK) of the Standing Committee of the CCP or the 25 members of the Politburo etc.. -/- The CCP’s plans for WW3 and total domination are laid out quite clearly in Chinese govt publications (...) and speeches and this is Xi Jinping’s “China Dream”. It is a dream only for the tiny minority (perhaps a few dozen to a few hundred) who rule China and a nightmare for everyone else (including 1.4 billion Chinese). The 10 billion dollars yearly enables them or their puppets to own or control newspapers, magazines, TV and radio channels and place fake news in most major media everywhere every day. In addition, they have an army (maybe millions of people) who troll all the media placing more propaganda and drowning out legitimate commentary (the 50 cent army). -/- In addition to stripping the 3rd world of resources, a major thrust of the multi-trillion dollar Belt and Road Initiative is building military bases worldwide. They are forcing the free world into a massive high-tech arms race that makes the cold war with the Soviet Union look like a picnic. -/- Though the SSSSK, and the rest of the world’s military, are spending huge sums on advanced hardware, it is highly likely that WW3 (or the smaller engagements leading up to it) will be software dominated. It is not out of the question that the SSSSK, with probably more hackers (coders) working for them then all the rest of the world combined, will win future wars with minimal physical conflict, just by paralyzing their enemies via the net. No satellites, no phones, no communications, no financial transactions, no power grid, no internet, no advanced weapons, no vehicles, trains, ships or planes. -/- There are only two main paths to removing the CCP, freeing 1.4 billion Chinese prisoners, and ending the lunatic march to WW3. The peaceful one is to launch an all-out trade war to devastate the Chinese economy until the military gets fed up and boots out the CCP. -/- An alternative to shutting down China’s economy is a limited war, such as a targeted strike by say 50 thermobaric drones on the 20th Congress of the CCP, when all the top members are in one place, but that won’t take place until 2022 so one could hit the annual plenary meeting. The Chinese would be informed, as the attack happened, that they must lay down their arms and prepare to hold a democratic election or be nuked into the stone age. The other alternative is an all-out nuclear attack. Military confrontation is unavoidable given the CCP’s present course. It will likely happen over the islands in the South China Sea or Taiwan within a few decades, but as they establish military bases worldwide it could happen anywhere (see Crouching Tiger etc.). Future conflicts will have hardkill and softkill aspects with the stated objectives of the CCP to emphasize cyberwar by hacking and paralyzing control systems of all military and industrial communications, equipment, power plants, satellites, internet, banks, and any device or vehicle connected to the net. The SS are slowly fielding a worldwide array of manned and autonomous surface and underwater subs or drones capable of launching conventional or nuclear weapons that may lie dormant awaiting a signal from China or even looking for the signature of US ships or planes. While destroying our satellites, thus eliminating communication between the USA and our forces worldwide, they will use theirs, in conjunction with drones to target and destroy our currently superior naval forces. Of course, all of this is increasingly done automatically by AI. -/- By far the biggest ally of the CCP is the Democratic party of the USA. The choice is to stop the CCP now or watch as they extend the Chinese prison over the whole world. -/- Of course, universal surveillance and digitizing of our lives is inevitable everywhere. Anyone who does not think so is profoundly out of touch. -/- Of course it is the optomists who expect the Chinese sociopaths to rule the world while the pessimists (who view themselves as realists) expect AI sociopathy (or AS as I call it – i.e., Artificial Stupidity or Artificial Sociopathy) to take over, perhaps by 2030 Those interested in further details on the lunatic path of modern society may consult my other works such as Suicide by Democracy-an Obituary for America and the World 3rd Edition 2019 and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century: Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization 5th ed (2019) -/- . (shrink)

The first thing we must keep in mind is that when saying that China says this or China does that, we are not speaking of the Chinese people, but of the Sociopaths who control the CCP -- Chinese Communist Party, i.e., the Seven Senile Sociopathic Serial Killers (SSSSK) of the Standing Committee of the CCP or the 25 members of the Politburo etc.. -/- The CCP’s plans for WW3 and total domination are laid out quite clearly in Chinese govt publications (...) and speeches and this is Xi Jinping’s “China Dream”. It is a dream only for the tiny minority (perhaps a few dozen to a few hundred) who rule China and a nightmare for everyone else (including 1.4 billion Chinese). The 10 billion dollars yearly enables them or their puppets to own or control newspapers, magazines, TV and radio channels and place fake news in most major media everywhere every day. In addition, they have an army (maybe millions of people) who troll all the media placing more propaganda and drowning out legitimate commentary (the 50 cent army). -/- In addition to stripping the 3rd world of resources, a major thrust of the multi-trillion dollar Belt and Road Initiative is building military bases worldwide. They are forcing the free world into a massive high-tech arms race that makes the cold war with the Soviet Union look like a picnic. -/- Though the SSSSK, and the rest of the world’s military, are spending huge sums on advanced hardware, it is highly likely that WW3 (or the smaller engagements leading up to it) will be software dominated. It is not out of the question that the SSSSK, with probably more hackers (coders) working for them then all the rest of the world combined, will win future wars with minimal physical conflict, just by paralyzing their enemies via the net. No satellites, no phones, no communications, no financial transactions, no power grid, no internet, no advanced weapons, no vehicles, trains, ships or planes. -/- There are only two main paths to removing the CCP, freeing 1.4 billion Chinese prisoners, and ending the lunatic march to WW3. The peaceful one is to launch an all-out trade war to devastate the Chinese economy until the military gets fed up and boots out the CCP. -/- An alternative to shutting down China’s economy is a limited war, such as a targeted strike by say 50 thermobaric drones on the 20th Congress of the CCP, when all the top members are in one place, but that won’t take place until 2022 so one could hit the annual plenary meeting. The Chinese would be informed, as the attack happened, that they must lay down their arms and prepare to hold a democratic election or be nuked into the stone age. The other alternative is an all-out nuclear attack. Military confrontation is unavoidable given the CCP’s present course. It will likely happen over the islands in the South China Sea or Taiwan within a few decades, but as they establish military bases worldwide it could happen anywhere (see Crouching Tiger etc.). Future conflicts will have hardkill and softkill aspects with the stated objectives of the CCP to emphasize cyberwar by hacking and paralyzing control systems of all military and industrial communications, equipment, power plants, satellites, internet, banks, and any device or vehicle connected to the net. The SS are slowly fielding a worldwide array of manned and autonomous surface and underwater subs or drones capable of launching conventional or nuclear weapons that may lie dormant awaiting a signal from China or even looking for the signature of US ships or planes. While destroying our satellites, thus eliminating communication between the USA and our forces worldwide, they will use theirs, in conjunction with drones to target and destroy our currently superior naval forces. Of course, all of this is increasingly done automatically by AI. -/- By far the biggest ally of the CCP is the Democratic party of the USA. The choice is to stop the CCP now or watch as they extend the Chinese prison over the whole world. -/- Of course, universal surveillance and digitizing of our lives is inevitable everywhere. Anyone who does not think so is profoundly out of touch. -/- Of course it is the optomists who expect the Chinese sociopaths to rule the world while the pessimists (who view themselves as realists) expect AI sociopathy (or AS as I call it – i.e., Artificial Stupidity or Artificial Sociopathy) to take over, perhaps by 2030 Those interested in further details on the lunatic path of modern society may consult my other works such as Suicide by Democracy-an Obituary for America and the World 3rd Edition 2019 and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century: Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization 5th ed (2019) -/- . (shrink)

Since the end of the Cold War, international ethicists have focused largely on issues outside the traditional scope of security studies. The nuclear ethics literature needs to be revived and reoriented to address the new and evolving 21st century nuclear threats and policy responses.

Many anthropologists interpret neoliberalism as a radical break from and dangerous rupture in post-war societies that featured Keynesian economic policies and welfare provision. The allure of a mythic welfare state has boosted John Maynard Keynes’s popularity to many who embrace certain facets of socialism. Many critical social scientists have embraced Keynesianism in ways that overlook how the US used Keynesian policies to reengineer and redeploy state power. Keynes’s liberal synthesis inspired managers in the US Treasury Department to understand depression-era problems (...) of unemployment and poverty in ways that were consonant with the expansion of corporate power. For understanding Keynesianism, as it actually existed during the Cold War, we must analyse how the US Treasury and State Departments used Keynesian principles to rebuild the social reproductive capacities necessary for capitalist accumulation both domestically and in Western Europe. I focus on how the architects of postwar capitalism used full employment policies, labour laws and welfare provision to renovate the nexus of political practices and institutional structures in ways that formed a benevolent and caring image of ‘the state’ and the myth of a class compromise. Through these reforms, governmental planners and administrators used the ‘state idea’ to reorganize capital accumulation as if the post-war economy would represent ordinary people’s best interests. In the process, these sophisticated practices of power became reified as the ‘welfare state’ and the ‘Keynesian compromise’ in ways that endow these institutions and policies with a character divorced from practices of power. The post-war state embodied a dialectic of repression and reform that combined criminalizing dissent with full employment policies and welfare provision. Taking these aspects of power into account, we can see post-war Keynesianism in ways that inspire a robust and far-reaching criticism of the contemporary predicament of economic uncertainty, political instability and environmental degradation. (shrink)

The chapter examines Russian political theorist Aleksandr Dugin’s (b. 1962) challenge to the Western liberal order. Even though Dugin’s project is in many ways a theoretical epitome of Russia’s contemporary attempt to profile itself as a regional great power with a political and cultural identity distinct from the liberal West, Dugin can also be read in a wider context as one of the currently most prominent representatives of the culturally and intellectually oriented international New Right. The chapter introduces Dugin’s role (...) on the Russian right-wing political scene and his international networks, Russian neo-Eurasianism as his ideological footing, and his more recent “fourth political theory” as an attempt to formulate a new ideological alternative to liberalism as well as the two other main twentieth-century ideologies, communism and fascism. Dugin’s fourth ideology, essentially meant as an alternative to a unipolar post–Cold War global hegemony of victorious liberalism, draws inspiration from the German conservative revolutionary movement of the Weimar era. In particular, Martin Heidegger’s philosophy of history, with its thesis of the end of modernity and another beginning of Western thought, and Carl Schmitt’s pluralistic model of geopolitics are highlighted as key elements of Dugin’s eclectic political thought, which is most appropriately characterized as a form of radical conservatism. (shrink)

The US-Australia strategic relationship has evolved from more or less an adversarial position in the 19th century to an Australia largely dependent on the US during the Cold War to the interdependent partnership we see today. Strategic interdependence means that the US-Australia relationship is not merely a one-sided affair; that Australia has something of substance to offer the strategic relationship. Part of the reason that the relationship is strong is because of a shared language, similar social values, and compatible (...) political-legal systems. Moreover, the relationship has been thoroughly institutionalised via intelligence cooperation, defence science collaboration, and extensive personal relationships. But what the US really seems to value is Australia’s reliability as an ally. I argue that Australia best demonstrates its reliability as an ally, however, when it follows US strategic decision-making for the right reasons. This sense of reliability is more akin to trustworthiness than it is to loyalty. History demonstrates that Australia has not always agreed with the US. But agreeing doesn’t matter so much when Australia has established a track record of consistently applying sound reasoning to its strategic decisions and it has made substantive contributions to jointly sought after strategic outcomes. (shrink)

The goal of this essay is to explore "the highly contested nature of [decision-making through adopting] a historically comparative and interdisciplinary approach." Internalist history of game theory treats decision theory as a science of making choices to maximize expected gain. Game theory is applied to nuclear deterrence and military strategy, building markets and designing institutions, analyzing collective action, developing jurisprudence, and addressing crime and punishment. This essay draws on recent historiography of Cold War decision-making to draw into focus the (...) constructive aspects of decision theory to argue that the perceived need to avoid worst-case scenarios has instead contributed to a world in which the worst outcome is probabilistically assured to occur over the long duree timeframe. (shrink)

In this article, it is argued that a significant internal tension exists in John Rawls' political liberalism. He holds the following positions that might plausibly be considered incongruous: (1) a commitment to tolerating a broad right of freedom of political speech, including a right of subversive advocacy; (2) a commitment to restricting this broad right if it is intended to incite and likely to bring about imminent violence; and (3) a commitment to curbing this broad right only if there is (...) a constitutional crisis. By supporting a broad right of freedom of political speech in Political Liberalism, he allows militant intolerant people such as Jihadists, White Supremacists and Neo-Nazis to advocate publicly their dangerously intolerant beliefs. Public advocacy of dangerously intolerant beliefs can be construed as subversive advocacy. As demonstrated by the historical examples of the Weimar Republic and the Second Spanish Republic, militant intolerant groups could use a right of subversive advocacy to threaten the stability of liberal democracies. Hence, by allowing them to exercise a broad right of freedom of political speech, Rawls could jeopardize that which he intends to defend, namely the actual political stability of a liberal democratic order. Lastly, Rawls' conception of ideal constitutional interpretation, which privileges a broad right of freedom of political speech, might be insufficient to deal effectively with the threat posed by militant intolerant groups. Yet a tradition of American constitutional interpretation that balances freedom of speech with other important constitutional and/or political values has overcome a civil war, two world wars, the Cold War and the 9/11 terrorist attacks without abandoning democracy or permanently renouncing those values. Still, Rawls' ideal approach to constitutional interpretation might, in hindsight, help us to understand some of the excesses and deficiencies of American jurisprudence in times of emergency.<br><br><br><br>. (shrink)

Communities of nuclear workers have evolved in distinctive contexts. During the Manhattan Project the UK, USA and Canada collectively developed the first reactors, isotope separation plants and atomic bombs and, in the process, nurtured distinct cadres of specialist workers. Their later workplaces were often inherited from wartime facilities, or built anew at isolated locations. For a decade, nuclear specialists were segregated and cossetted to gestate practical expertise. At Oak Ridge Tennessee, for example, the informal ‘Clinch College of Nuclear Knowledge’ aimed (...) to industrialise the use of radioactive materials. ‘We were like children in a toy factory’, said its Director: ‘everyone could play the game of designing new nuclear power piles’. His counterpart at Chalk River, Ontario headed a project ‘completely Canadian in every respect’, while the head of the British project chose the remote Dounreay site in northern Scotland because of design uncertainties in the experimental breeder reactor. With the decline of secrecy during the mid-1950s, the hidden specialists lauded as ‘atomic scientists’ gradually became visible as new breeds of engineers, technologists and technicians responsible for nuclear reactors and power plants. Mutated by their different political contexts, occupational categories, labour affiliations, professional representations and popular depictions, their activities were disputed by distinct audiences. This chapter examines the changing identities of nuclear specialists and the significance of their secure sites. Shaped successively by Cold War secrecy, commercial competition and terrorist threats, nuclear energy remained out of site for wider publics and most nuclear specialists alike. The distinctive episodes reveal the changing working experiences of technical workers in late-twentieth and early twenty-first century environments. (shrink)

-/- Title: The Aftermath of Communism: What Happened When Communist Countries Transitioned -/- Introduction -/- Communism, as a political and economic ideology, shaped the lives of millions of people throughout the 20th century. Promising classless societies, public ownership, and central planning, communist regimes spread across Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. However, by the late 1980s and early 1990s, communism collapsed in most of these countries, especially after the fall of the Soviet Union. The collapse did not merely signal (...) the end of a political system—it initiated a series of profound transformations in governance, economy, and society. This essay explores the consequences of the fall of communism across multiple nations and analyzes its lasting impact, supported by scholarly and historical sources. -/- 1. Political Transformations -/- The most visible consequence of communism’s failure was the dismantling of one-party systems. In Eastern Europe, the revolutions of 1989 were largely non-violent but deeply transformative. Countries like Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia negotiated peaceful transitions to democracy through popular movements like Solidarity in Poland and civic forums in Czechoslovakia (Ash, 1990). -/- In contrast, Romania experienced a violent revolution. The regime of Nicolae Ceaușescu collapsed after mass protests were met with violence, ultimately leading to his execution (Siani-Davies, 2005). Meanwhile, the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991 into 15 independent republics, ending the Communist Party’s rule after nearly 70 years. -/- However, democratization was not uniform. In Russia, initial democratic reforms under Boris Yeltsin were overshadowed by economic turmoil and political chaos. This paved the way for the rise of Vladimir Putin, who re-established centralized authoritarian control while maintaining the appearance of electoral democracy (Sakwa, 2008). -/- 2. Economic Transition and Its Discontents -/- The shift from centrally planned economies to capitalist market systems was arguably the most dramatic change. Under communism, governments controlled production, prices, and wages. The post-communist period, often referred to as “shock therapy,” involved rapid liberalization, privatization, and stabilization measures intended to integrate these economies into global markets (Åslund, 2002). -/- In Russia and other former Soviet republics, this transition led to hyperinflation, mass unemployment, and a sharp decline in GDP. Life expectancy dropped in Russia from 70 years in 1987 to 64 years by the mid-1990s (Cornia & Paniccià, 2000). Oligarchs gained control over former state assets in rigged privatization schemes, contributing to massive inequality and corruption (Klein, 2007). -/- Eastern European nations that joined the European Union, such as Poland, the Czech Republic, and the Baltic states, saw more stable transitions. They benefited from EU investment, structural reforms, and access to European markets, which helped their economies grow in the 2000s (Inglot, 2008). -/- 3. Social Dislocation and Cultural Identity -/- The social cost of post-communist transformation was immense. For many citizens, the collapse of communism meant the disappearance of guaranteed employment, subsidized housing, healthcare, and education. Rising unemployment, crime, and homelessness defined the early years of transition. Entire generations faced disillusionment and uncertainty, especially in countries that struggled to rebuild functional state institutions. -/- Nostalgia for communism began to appear in several countries. In Russia, surveys indicated that a significant portion of the population viewed the fall of the Soviet Union as a mistake (Pew Research Center, 2019). This sentiment was fueled by memories of stability and national pride, despite political repression. -/- In former East Germany, the term Ostalgie (nostalgia for the East) described a longing for the social security and community spirit of the former German Democratic Republic (Berdahl, 1999). Such nostalgia reveals the complexity of communist legacies and the psychological effects of rapid change. -/- 4. Conflict and Ethnic Tensions -/- In multi-ethnic states like Yugoslavia, the fall of communism unleashed nationalist forces that had been suppressed under authoritarian rule. The collapse of central authority led to brutal civil wars throughout the 1990s. The Bosnian War (1992–1995), marked by ethnic cleansing and genocide, was one of the bloodiest conflicts in Europe since World War II (Glenny, 1996). -/- In contrast, countries like Czechoslovakia peacefully separated into the Czech Republic and Slovakia in what became known as the “Velvet Divorce” in 1993, reflecting how different historical, ethnic, and political contexts shaped post-communist outcomes. -/- 5. Varied Legacies and Ongoing Impacts -/- Not all communist regimes collapsed. China, Vietnam, Laos, and Cuba retained communist leadership but adopted various forms of economic liberalization. China, in particular, became a global economic powerhouse after introducing market reforms under Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s, while still maintaining strict political control (Naughton, 2018). -/- The global influence of Marxist thought declined dramatically after the Cold War, but the legacies of communism remain visible in institutional cultures, economic inequalities, and national identities. Many countries are still dealing with the long-term effects of rapid privatization, social polarization, and weakened civic institutions. -/- Conclusion -/- The fall of communism marked a turning point in world history. While it opened doors to democracy and economic freedom for millions, it also unleashed chaos, inequality, and identity crises. The varied outcomes across post-communist countries highlight that the transition was not merely a rejection of one system but a complex and ongoing process of societal reinvention. As the world continues to grapple with rising authoritarianism, populism, and inequality, the lessons from post-communist transitions remain relevant—reminding us that ideological change alone does not guarantee human flourishing. -/- References -/- Ash, T. G. (1990). We the People: The Revolution of ’89 Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin, and Prague. Vintage. -/- Åslund, A. (2002). Building Capitalism: The Transformation of the Former Soviet Bloc. Cambridge University Press. -/- Berdahl, D. (1999). Where the World Ended: Re-Unification and Identity in the German Borderland. University of California Press. -/- Cornia, G. A., & Paniccià, R. (Eds.). (2000). The Transition: Economic Collapse and Recovery. Oxford University Press. -/- Glenny, M. (1996). The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War. Penguin Books. -/- Inglot, T. (2008). Welfare States in East Central Europe, 1919–2004. Cambridge University Press. -/- Klein, N. (2007). The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism. Metropolitan Books. -/- Naughton, B. (2018). The Chinese Economy: Adaptation and Growth. MIT Press. -/- Pew Research Center. (2019). European Public Opinion Three Decades After the Fall of Communism. -/- Sakwa, R. (2008). Putin: Russia’s Choice. Routledge. -/- Siani-Davies, P. (2005). The Romanian Revolution of December 1989. Cornell University Press. -/- . (shrink)

With an increased emphasis on upstream activity and Defence Engagement, it has become increasingly more important for the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) and government to understand the relationship between conflict and regional instability. As part of this process, the Historical and Operational Data Analysis Team (HODA) in Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl) was tasked to look at factors that influenced the regional spread of internal conflicts to help aid the decision making of government. Conflict contagion is the process (...) by which a conflict in one state (State A) influences the outbreak of conflict in another state (State B). The aim of looking at these factors was to produce a tool to assist in the cost/benefit analysis of intervening in future conflicts. The task was carried out by quantitatively studying a selection of contagion and non-contagion case studies over a set of 14 numerical variables that covered structural, political, socioeconomic and cultural factors of both States A and B. All case studies took place after the end of the Cold War. The dataset used contained both binary and continuous data. A range of statistical techniques were used including correlation, regression and principal component analyses along with graphical analytical methods. Unfortunately creating a tool to predict contagion has proven difficult and so the scope of the study was changed-as no statistically relevant link was found. However, it was shown that some links do exists between the variables and the existence of contagion, and it also appears it is a combination of variables which has an effect on the likelihood of contagion. Conflict contagion is a rare event and was only recorded in less than 1% of cases present in the dataset. Of the variables analysed, the most significant factor was the number of refugees present in State B who originated in State A for the year before the case study. It is recommended that further work be conducted. It is possible that a more detailed investigation, using a broader range of techniques and/or a wider selection of variables might be successful in assessing the likelihood of conflict contagion. (shrink)

Did the pragmatic turn encompass the linguistic turn in the history of philosophy? Or was the linguistic turn a turn away from pragmatism? Some commentators identify the so-called “eclipse” of pragmatism by analytic philosophy, especially during the Cold War era, as a turn away from pragmatist thinking. However, the historical evidence suggests that this narrative is little more than a myth. Pragmatism persisted, transforming into a more analytic variety under the influence of Quine and Putnam and, more recently, a (...) continental version in the hands of Richard Rorty and Cornel West. In this paper, I argue that proof of the linguistic turn’s presence as a moment in a broader pragmatic turn in philosophy can be garnered from close examination of a single article, W. V. O. Quine’s “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” and a single issue: whether the analytic-synthetic distinction is philosophically defensible. (shrink)

This essay from 1999, republished in Notre Dame Magazine online in July 2023, explores how the 1950s were a time of fundamental transformations in American society, a time when the United States went fully megatechnic. The hugely increased power of military, corporate-industrial and “big science” institutions developed during the 1950s signaled the transformation to megatechnic America, with atomic bombs and nuclear testing, automobiles and televisions as key symbols of that transformation. Figures such as J. Robert Oppenheimer and Edward Teller illustrated (...) the battle between national security dictates controlling nuclear bomb testing and responsible science. -/- Since the Second World War the United States has been problematically guided by a power-oriented culture, which, in the names of national security and convenience, has tended to reshape America toward an increasingly hierarchical model of society based on the system requirements of a machine. This same era gave birth to a generalized economic prosperity in the United States, to the civil rights movement, to feminism, literary and artistic innovations, and to other openings of public equality and freedom. Yet the magnification of bureaucratic-corporate structures in that postwar, cold war prosperity has ultimately tended to restructure America against the basic requirements of democratic community. (shrink)

This paper provides a concise historical and strategic analysis of West Papua’s political development from 1945 to 2026, examining decolonisation, international mediation, incorporation into Indonesia, and the emergence of sustained resistance movements. Situating West Papua within broader post-colonial and Cold War geopolitical structures, it interrogates the tension between legal-political integration and indigenous self-determination. Despite decades of documentation, advocacy, and international appeals — including engagement with the United Nations, the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), and the (...) African, Caribbean and Pacific Group — the structural conditions of domination remain largely intact. The paper argues that this persistence demands a fundamental rethinking of resistance strategy: a shift away from the psychopathology of permanent victimhood and moral spectacle, and towards sovereign state-building, civilisational reconstruction, and strategic leverage. Drawing on comparative cases from colonised cosmobian (peoples in cosmological relationship with their land and planet) societies in Australia, Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific, and rooted in the Psycho-Cosmocide theoretical framework, the analysis concludes with an unambiguous demand: Papuan resistance movements must transform their entire worldview — from sporadic protest to the concentrated, sovereign protection of Bumi Cenderawasih, the planet of the Bird of Paradise — or face extinction by default. (shrink)

Atomic energy developed from 1940 as a subject shrouded in secrecy. Identified successively as a crucial element in military strategy, national status and export aspirations, the research and development of atomic piles (nuclear chain-reactors) were nurtured at isolated installations. Like monastic orders, new national laboratories managed their specialist workers in occupational environments that were simultaneously cosseted and constrained, defining regional variants of a new state-managed discipline: reactor technology. This paper discusses the significance of security in defining the new subject in (...) the USA, UK and Canada – wartime allies with similar political traditions but distinct trajectories in this field during the Cold War. The intellectual borders and content of the subject developed differently in each country, shaped under the umbrella of secrecy by disparate clusters of expertise, industrial traditions, and national goals. The nascent cadre was contained until the mid 1950s by classified publications and state-sponsored specialist courses. The early context of high security filtered its members and capped enduringly both their professional aspirations and public engagement. (shrink)

This essay connects Kafka's German and his Jewish linguistic sources, and explores the trans-national perspective on literary tradition they helped him create. I begin with a critique of Deleuze and Guattari's view of Kafka as a minority writer, showing how their cold war nationalism scants the positive contributions that Yiddish and Hebrew made to his work. I continue with an examination of the "twilight of containment," when this postcontemporary Kafka began to break through his cold war canonization after (...) 1989. Other sections include: "German-Jewish Traditions: The Echoes of Yiddish," on Kafka's cultural politics; "Hebrew: Zionism in a Transnational Key"; and "Goethe's Jewish Voices," on Yiddish as a model for Kafka's new conception of national writing. I conclude by considering the Jewish and other sources of Kafka's "linguistic turn," and the general, transnational focus on tradition that Jewish languages brought to his classic texts. (shrink)

A co-founder of the Catholic Worker Movement, its newspaper, and hospitality houses, the writer Dorothy Day promoted public peace nationally and internationally as a journalist, an organizer of public protests, and a builder of associational communities. Drawing upon Hannah Arendt’s conceptions of the role of speech and action in creating the public realm, this paper focuses on several of Day’s most controversial public positions: her leadership of non-cooperation against Civil Defense drills intended to prepare New York City residents to survive (...) a nuclear war; her urging of Catholics to find common cause with the Cuban revolutionary government; and her support for interracial farming communities in the Southern United States. As Arendt asserts about Rahel Varnhagen’s salon in Berlin, by being public meeting spaces hosted in private houses, Catholic Worker communities fostered egalitarian rather than “agonal” politics. Like Gandhi’s newspapers and ashrams as well as “Occupy” communities such as Zuccotti Park, Day’s newspaper was a center for incubating and implementing social reform. The Catholic Worker provided a place where writers could question the official rhetoric of such conflicts as World War II and the Cold War, put forward different interpretations of unfolding events, and chart possible alternatives to establishment agendas. (shrink)