In this article, we investigate how the concept of Care Biography and related concepts are understood and operationalised and describe how it can be applied to advancing our understanding and practice of holistic and person‐centred care. Walker and Avant's eight‐step concept analysis method was conducted involving multiple database searches, with potential or actual applications of Care Biography identified based on multiple discussions among all authors. Our findings demonstrate Care Biography to be a novel overarching concept derived from (...) the conjunction of multiple other concepts and applicable across multiple care settings. Concepts related to Care Biography exist but were more narrowly defined and mainly applied in intensive care, aged care, and palliative care settings. They are associated with the themes of Meaningfulness and Existential Coping, Empathy and Understanding, Promoting Positive Relationships, Social and Cultural Contexts, and Self‐Care, which we used to inform and refine our concept analysis of Care Biography. In Conclusion, the concept of Care Biography, can provide a deeper understanding of a person and their care needs, facilitate integrated and personalised care, empower people to be in control of their care throughout their life, and help promote ethical standards of care. (shrink)

This article examines the theory of personality compatible with Marxism developed by the French Marxist philosopher Lucien Sève, examines his view of how a Marxist biography should be written and how actual biographies should be evaluated. The conclusion is that Marxist biography should be distinctive, and that Sève has presented a plausible sketch of what a Marxist biography should look like. But he has also laid down an incredibly difficult set of criteria for success in which even (...) Marxists themselves fail to satisfy in their biographical writing, and perhaps unsurprisingly no one does, or perhaps could ever, fulfil all the criteria of such a biography, however potentially worthwhile the effort. (shrink)

Publication of Taras Lyuty’s book on Nietzsche is a salient event in the philosophical life of Ukraine in 2016. Given the fact that the book covers a great number of different issues, the reviewer decides to focus on those of them which correspond to his own academic interests, related primarily to the history of psychoanalysis and biographical approach within the historiography of philosophy. As a review shows, Lyuty masterfully avoids such a trap as a biographical reductivism. He neither reduces his (...) hero’s teaching to his life, nor isolates the former from the latter. The reviewer pays a special attention to Lyuty’s delineation of intellectual links between the great philosopher and some of his predecessors (such as Ralf Waldo Emerson) and followers (some pioneers of depth psychology). In the end, the reviewer demonstrates that a very deep and systematic analysis of Nietzsche’s biography and philosophical heritage carried out by Lyuty leaves a room for further productive reflections and interpretations. (shrink)

As a philosopher, psychologist, and physician, the German thinker Hermann Lotze defies classification. Working in the mid-nineteenth-century era of programmatic realism, he critically reviewed and rearranged theories and concepts in books on pathology, physiology, medical psychology, anthropology, history, aesthetics, metaphysics, logic, and religion. Leading anatomists and physiologists reworked his hypotheses about the central and autonomic nervous systems. Dozens of fin-de-siècle philosophical contemporaries emulated him, yet often without acknowledgment, precisely because he had made conjecture and refutation into a method. In spite (...) of Lotze's status as a pivotal figure in nineteenth-century intellectual thought, no complete treatment of his work exists, and certainly no effort to take account of the feminist secondary literature. Hermann Lotze: An Intellectual Biography is the first full-length historical study of Lotze's intellectual origins, scientific community, institutional context, and worldwide reception. (shrink)

James A. Harris's biography of David Hume is the first such study to appear since Ernest Mossner's The Life of David Hume (1954). Unlike Mossner, Harris aims to write a specifically "intellectual biography", one that gives "a complete picture of Hume's ideas" and "relates Hume's works to the circumstances in which they were conceived and written" (vii). Harris's study turns on four central theses or claims about the character of Hume's thought and how it is structured and developed. (...) The claims are: (1) Hume's Treatise has no claim to any sort of "privileged" status in relation to Hume's other major works -- which include his Essays and his History of England. -/- (2) There is no system, doctrine, or fundamental aims or ambitions that serve to unify Hume's thought. -/- (3) Irreligious aims and interests are not of any particular or unique importance for Hume's thought. Moreover, whatever irreligious aims and objectives Hume may have had, they reflect his moderate, neutral and detached attitude to this and all other subjects -- there is no underlying animus or hostility against religion that motivates his contributions to this subject. (4) Hume's thought should be understood and explained not in terms of his concern with some specific subject matter or body of doctrine but rather in terms of his style and his identity as a "philosophical man of letters". -/- The general picture of Hume that emerges from this study, as constructed around these four core theses, is, as I will explain, incomplete, unconvincing and, in important respects, seriously flawed and misleading. -/- . (shrink)

During the last years of his life, the mathematician Karl Menger worked on a biography of his father, the economist and founder of the Austrian School of Economics, Carl Menger. The younger Menger never finished the work. While working in the Menger collections at Duke University’s David M. Rubenstein Rare Book and Manuscript Library, we discovered draft chapters of the biography, a valuable source of information given that relatively little is known about Carl Menger’s life nearly a hundred (...) years after his death. The unfinished biography covers Carl Menger’s family background and his life through early 1889. In this article, we discuss the biography and the most valuable new insights it provides into Carl Menger’s life, including Carl Menger’s family, his childhood, his student years, his time working as a journalist and newspaper editor, his early scientific career, and his relationship with Crown Prince Rudolf. (shrink)

The essay provides an account of the development of Reinach’s philosophy of “Sachverhalte” (states of affairs) and on problems in the philosophy of law, leading up to his discovery of the theory of speech acts in 1913. Reinach’s relations to Edmund Husserl and to the Munich phenomenologists are also dealt with.

This manual presents a comprehensive methodology for Philosophical Consilience with Psychology Musing—a disciplined mental exercise that transforms intellectual curiosity into deep character understanding through systematic perspectival analysis. Developed as an anti-boredom activity in the late 1990s, this practice combines elements of clinical psychological assessment, literary character analysis, biographical investigation, and philosophical inquiry into a unified approach for examining both historical figures and fictional characters. -/- The methodology guides practitioners through a structured process of adopting specific analytical perspectives (such as Jung, (...) Freud, or other theoretical frameworks), conducting rigorous interdisciplinary research, and producing formal analytical documents, including psychological evaluations, character profiles, and critical biographies. Unlike passive reading or casual speculation, this practice requires active perspective-taking—genuinely inhabiting other viewpoints to understand characters from within while maintaining analytical rigor through documented evidence and systematic argumentation. -/- Benefits include enhanced critical thinking and analytical skills, improved empathy and perspectival flexibility, deeper reading comprehension, development of interdisciplinary integration capabilities, and creation of valuable reference materials. The practice provides intellectually engaging entertainment requiring no resources beyond source materials and writing implements, making it an infinitely renewable activity for combating boredom while developing sophisticated cognitive skills. This complete guide provides detailed step-by-step instructions, multiple application frameworks for different subject types, research and validation techniques, practical examples demonstrating various perspectival approaches, common pitfalls and solutions, advanced techniques, templates, and worksheets for immediate use, and reference to a complete exemplar analysis. The methodology is suitable for students, scholars, autodidacts, and anyone seeking deeper engagement with texts and ideas beyond superficial consumption. (shrink)

"David Ricardo has been acclaimed - or vilified - for merits he would never have dreamt of, or sins for which he was entirely innocent. Entrenched mythology labels him as a utilitarian economist, an enemy of the working class, an impractical theorist, a scientist with 'no philosophy at all' and the author of a formalist methodological revolution. Exploring a middle ground between theory and biography, this book explores the formative intellectual encounters of a man who came to economic studies (...) via other experiences, thus bridging the gap between the historical Ricardo and the economist's Ricardo. The chapters undertake a thorough analysis of Ricardo's writings in their context, asking who was speaking, what audience was being addressed, with what communicative intentions, using what kind of lexicon and communicative conventions, and starting with what shared knowledge. The work opens in presenting the different religious communities with which Ricardo was in touch. It goes on to describe his education in the leading science of the time - geology - before he turned to the study of political economy. Another chapter discusses five 'philosophers' - students of logic, ethics and politics - with whom he was in touch. From correspondence, manuscripts and publications, the closing chapters reconstruct, firstly, Ricardo's ideas on scientific method, the limits of the 'abstract science' and its application, secondly, his ideas on ethics and politics and their impact on strategies for improving the condition of the working class. This book sheds new light on Ricardian economics, providing an invaluable service to readers of economic methodology, philosophy of economics, the history of economic thought, political thought and philosophy. (shrink)

Review of Desmond M. Clarke. Descartes: A Biography. xi + 507 pp., apps., figs., bibl., index. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. $40 (cloth).; Richard Watson, Cogito, Ergo Sum: The Life of René Descartes. viii + 375 pp., figs., bibl., index. Boston: David R. Godine, 2002. $35 (cloth).

Diogenes Laertius (8.63-6) preserves a fascinating account of the Presocratic philosopher Empedocles' life. There, drawing on evidence from Aristotle, Xanthus, and Timaeus of Tauromenium, the biographer provides several anecdotes which are meant to demonstrate how Empedocles had, contrary to expectation, been a democratic philosopher - a paradox of itself in Ancient Greece. This article unpacks the complex web woven by Diogenes and argues that there is no good reason to assume that Empedocles was indeed a democratic philosopher, and moreover, that (...) neither Xanthus nor Aristotle thought him so. Indeed, what Diogenes actually preserves for us is the Hellenistic biographer Timaeus' critical dialectical engagement with the versions Aristotle and Xanthus, in his anachronistic bid to render Empedocles a democratic hero. (shrink)

Die folgenden Überlegungen widmen sich der Frage, welches Konzept von Autonomie für übliche moralisch bedeutsame Szenarien der Sozialen Arbeit anwendbar und philosophisch gut begründbar ist. Dazu richte ich zunächst den Fokus auf die Idee, Autonomie eng mit der Pflicht zu verbinden, informierte Einwilligung von Klienten/-innen zu Interventionsschritten einzuholen, und prüfe, inwiefern diese Verbindung für die moralische Praxis der Sozialen Arbeit angemessen sein kann. Ich zeige anhand ausgewählter Aspekte des medizinethischen Ansatzes von Beauchamp und Childress auf, dass ein Konzept von Autonomie, (...) welches auf das Einholen informierter Einwilligung konzentriert ist, für die Soziale Arbeit nicht angemessen ist, weil es mit mehreren Merkmalen von Interventionen im Rahmen Sozialer Arbeit nicht kompatibel ist. In vielen Kontexten der Sozialen Arbeit ist vielmehr ein Modell der Autonomie adäquat, welches als Kriterium die Biographie von Klienten/-innen mit erfassen kann. Um für diese Ansicht zu argumentieren, berufe ich mich auf eine Konzeption der personalen Autonomie von John Christman. -/- // English version // -/- ​The following considerations are concerned with the question, what conception of autonomy for common morally relevant scenarios of social work is applicable as well as philosophically well founded. In order to answer this question I will focus on the thought to connect autonomy closely with the duty to obtain informed consent of clients to steps of the intervention. Subsequently, I will determine in how far this connection can be adequate for the moral praxis of social work. Based on selected features of Beauchamp’s and Childress’ medical ethics I will then demonstrate that a conception of autonomy, which concentrates on obtaining informed consent, is not adequate for social work contexts, since it is not compatible with several features of social work interventions. In many contexts of social work, a conception of autonomy that includes in its criteria the biography of clients is far more adequate. In order to substantiate this claim, I will refer to the conception of personal autonomy by John Christman. (shrink)

While J.R.R. Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings and other creations enthrall readers through immersive adventures and captivating characters, a deeper understanding of the author’s faith unlocks a new dimension of appreciation. Tolkien declared his works “fundamentally religious and Catholic,” but their subtle nuances often escape surface-level readings. Delving into his faith journey unveils crucial threads woven into the very fabric of his narratives. -/- In the expansive corpus of literature dedicated to J.R.R. Tolkien, his faith has often been overshadowed (...) by the towering legacies of Middle-earth. Holly Ordway’s Tolkien’s Faith: A Spiritual Biography is a seminal work that meticulously unravels the interplay between Tolkien’s devout Catholicism and his literary creations. Ordway, the Cardinal Francis George Professor of Faith and Culture at the Word on Fire Institute, brings to the fore a long-neglected dimension of Tolkien’s life—his spiritual journey. -/- Ordway’s biography distinguishes itself through its rigorous exploration of Tolkien’s spiritual development, from his environment to the profound Catholic faith he maintained throughout his life. Ordway delves into the complexities of Tolkien’s life, including the pivotal moments that shaped his religious beliefs and, by extension, his literary work. The biography is not merely a chronological recounting of events but a deep, thematic exploration of the influence of faith on Tolkien’s creativity. Ordway’s scholarship shines in her ability to weave together Tolkien’s letters, unpublished works, and the socioreligious context of his time, offering readers a holistic view of the man behind Middle-earth. Ordway’s balanced approach further enriches the narrative. She neither critiques nor endorses Tolkien’s religious beliefs but presents them with an academic rigor that allows readers to form their interpretations. This objectivity is crucial for the work’s target academic audience, providing a foundation for further scholarship in Tolkien studies and the study of literature and religion. (shrink)

This paper develops a model of legendary inflation, the process by which real persons acquire symbolically enlarged or impossible biographies through social memory, oral transmission, narrative selection, status amplification, and communal meaning-making. Using historical comparisons such as Alexander and other figures, it argues that legendary growth is not a simple alternative to historicity but a common way communities transform remembered lives into identity-bearing narratives.

This paper develops the concept of Eigenzeit as an analytical instrument for investigating neurodivergent life realities. Eigenzeit is neither a concept generated by nor specific to neurodivergence, but arises from prior boundary work on the ontology of decision, responsibility, and world-binding. Eigenzeit denotes the non-delegable instantiation of world-time in action: that form of time in which world is bound at all, carried, and irreversibly co-enacted. Time is not understood here as an ordering category or a logic of deadlines, but as (...) the temporal dimension of enacted world-binding—as the structural context of world-capability. On the basis of this general conception, the paper shows why autistic and ADHD biographies in particular are systematically pushed into overload, breakdown, and dependency within modern institutions. Central societal systems—administration, labour markets, education, social law—operate in time- and structure-administrative regimes that presuppose world-binding while simultaneously undermining it: through standardisation, fragmentation, the simulation of responsibility, and the replacement of real binding by procedures. Deadlines, pacing, and file-based formality are not the core problem here, but symptoms of a deeper deficit of world-capability. Neurodivergence is thus not treated as a deficit, but as a different cost and binding structure of world-relation, in which this structural inoperability becomes visible early and with particular sharpness. Autistic integrity is often characterised by high binding strictness and low capacity for simulation vis-à-vis externally imposed world-regimes; ADHD frequently exhibits a dynamic in which fragmented, externally steered contexts do not allow for stable world-binding. Many phenomena commonly read as “symptoms”—exhaustion, breakdown, avoidance, dysfunctional adaptation—can therefore be reconstructed as Eigenzeit collapse: as the temporal-structural consequence of a prior withdrawal of world-binding. In continuity with They Cannot Understand, Eigenzeit is understood as a specification of the concepts of incommensurability, inoperability, and non-translatability. The paper shifts the focus away from temporal adaptation and therapeutic normalisation toward the question of under what conditions world remains bindable at all—and why the systematic withdrawal of this capacity destabilises not only neurodivergent existences, but the ontological viability of social reality itself. (shrink)

It was Lord Northbourne who gifted to the world the term ‘organic farming’. His 1940 book Look to the Land is a manifesto of organic agriculture. In it he mooted a contest of “organic versus chemical farming” which he foresaw as a clash of world views that may last for generations. Northbourne’s ideas were foundational in launching the worldwide organics movement, and the book was a turning point in his own life. This biography relies on primary sources to draw (...) a picture of Lord Northbourne. He was a very shy man, a talented artist, a capable linguist, a keen sportsman and an Olympic silver medallist, a graduate and lecturer in agriculture of the University of Oxford, a lifelong farmer, he was profoundly spiritual, an accomplished author, and as a wordsmith he could be a compelling advocate for his cause as Look to the Land shows. His interest in biodynamics led him to visit Switzerland in 1939 to invite the leading advocate of the times, Dr Ehrenfried Pfeiffer, to present the first conference on biodynamic farming in Britain, and it was in the following year that Look to the Land appeared. Rather than the mechanics or the practices of organics, Northbourne’s book presents the philosophy, the rationale, and the imperative of organic farming. The ideas of his organics manifesto took on a life of their own and were quickly spread globally, with early uptakes in the USA and Australia. Meanwhile, while maintaining lifelong interests and commitments to agriculture and education, Northbourne became progressively more engaged with spiritual matters, and his subsequent writings reflect his growing interest in metaphysics. He translated books by leading perennialist authors Frithjof Schuon, René Guénon, and Titus Burckhardt. Northbourne led a full life, but it is Look to the Land that is his enduring ideological legacy. This biography examines: firstly, the book, its ideas, history, uptake and impact; secondly, Northbourne’s life before Look to the Land; and thirdly, his life after Look to the Land. (shrink)

Bios Philosophos. Philosophy in Ancient Greek Biography (Brepols, 2016), organized by Mauro Bonazzi and Stefan Schorn, delivers deep and wide tours through the philosophical aspects of Greek biographical production. On the one hand, it does not concentrate only on the later periods of Greek philosophy, when biographical production abounded; instead, it goes all the way back to the fourth century BCE, when biographical texts were fragmentary and mingled with other styles. On the other, it tries to unveil the philosophical (...) motives in authors' works who tend to be disregarded as historians, biographers, hagiographers, or even as mere fans of the most prominent figures of their own schools. -/- In our review, we will attempt to give a brief account of the ten articles that make up this volume, which, in turn, will hopefully provide an overview of the different connections between the biographies and biographers and their philosophical motives. (shrink)

My paper traces the turbulent life of Jacob Frank (1726–1791) — a figure who oscillates between messianic pretender, radical heretic, political opportunist, and manipulative cult leader — and situates him as the final, fevered mutation of the Sabbatean heresy.

This is contextualizing of a monk of the Ramakrishna Order who became one of the Sangha's most perfect and zealous Presidents. When the Western world is clamouring for the removal of celibacy, the Ramakrishna Order and its monks show the real possibilities of lives in the spirit. This is NOT a hagiography. Non-Hindu novice masters will benefit hugely from reading this review and the review book. The review also focuses on the philosophy of monasticism and separately, on seeing or darsana.

Bernard McGinn was a great historian of Christianity. But in this book under review he fails to do justice to the history of the Summa. He fails to understand the ontologies of the economic theories of Bernard Lonergan and the theology of Karl Rahner, for examples. The book is patchy and seems under-researched. McGinn does not do justice to the influence of the Summa as a text which forms a bridge between St. Augustine of Hippo and Hannah Arendt and Jean (...) Lyotard. The review is marred by a typos which the proofreader(s) of Prabuddha Bharata overlooked. Of course, the onus of the error lies with the reviewer. (shrink)

Wendy Laura Belcher has done her cultural work by queering Mother Walatta Petros's life in this one of a kind book. The struggles of Mother Walatta Petros and her nuns and their heirs' reluctance to enunciate same sex desire is brought out well in this book and its review in Prabuddha Bharata which has not missed an issue from 1896 to date. The book under review establishes Mother Walatta Petros as an African proto-feminist. This is a very well researched book. (...) The genre of the gädl too is very well brought out by Belcher and Kleiner. Medievalists offline and online really do not as yet think African indigenous works as worthy of their consideration. Belcher overcame many roadblocks to write something actually worth reading. Because of constraint of space, the book could not be reviewed more expansively. While the book is one of its kind in its domain; it is still an act of colonial interference within Ethiopian realpolitiks of religions. I have mentioned in the review that African Roman Catholic Cardinals like Cardinal Sarah insist on washing his Church's dirty linen in private. Now, the question is, would say, Wendy Laura Belcher and Kleiner have the guts and their publisher too, to write about paedophilia in the various American Churches? Is it not convenient to impute lesbianism to Mother Walatta Petros and shy away from writing about female desire say, within the global Loreto Convents? This reviewer presumes from this book that all convents are dens of female desire: some can be enunciated by white folks; some cannot. The question is: why queer Ethiopian spirituality when Mother Walatta Petros is no longer alive to defend herself? (shrink)

In this short review, I provide a philosopher's assessment of White's book. It claims to be a study of the life of the Yoga Sutra, but is rather an account of secondary opinions, as though that amounts to the same thing as an account of the Yoga Sutra.

The scientific investigation into the architecture of human affect has historically been defined by a fundamental theoretical schism, often characterized as a 100-year war between discrete emotion models and dimensional frameworks. Discrete models, such as those proposed by Izard and Ekman, argue for biologically hardwired, universal emotional categories like fear, anger, and joy, presumed to have evolved as distinct adaptive responses to environmental challenges. Conversely, dimensional models prioritize a continuous spectrum of valence and arousal, suggesting that what individuals categorize as (...) emotions are essentially cognitive constructions layered atop simpler physiological states. The Core Emotion Framework (CEF), emerging as a sophisticated structural-constructivist resolution to this dichotomy, proposes a modular system that accounts for the complexity of human experience while maintaining a rigorous, repeatable structural foundation rooted in ten universal emotional operators or powers. Within the CEF, emotions are not viewed as static states or feelings but as functional operators within a complex human operating system. This paradigm shift suggests that emotional states are predictable computational events rather than subjective mysteries. The CEF operationalizes these processes by decomposing all affective phenomena into a small, non-overlapping set of ten operators, which serve as the emotional equivalent of CPU instructions. These operators determine what information is permitted to enter the system, what is filtered out, what actions become available, and how the system predicts the next state. The structural integrity of this system is maintained through the dynamic balance of these ten operators, organized across three functional centers: the Head, the Heart, and the Gut. The central inquiry of this analysis concerns whether iconic historical figures achieved a state of optimization across all ten operators or whether their genius and subsequent downfalls were the result of predictable structural failures, specifically the silencing or overflow of individual operators within the ten-unit system. Keyword Block: • Frameworks: Core Emotion Framework (CEF), Structural-Constructivist Architecture, Decalogue of Operators, TS-1 Operator Algebra, Emotional Cognitive Modeling (ECM v4.0). • Mechanics: Operator Optimization, Operator Silencing, Operator Overflow, Center Bypass, Identity Collapse Cycle, Structural Psychopathology, Functional Loop Integration. • Functional Centers: Head (Cognitive), Heart (Relational), Gut (Motoric). • Key Operators: Sensing, Calculating, Deciding, Expanding, Constricting, Achieving, Arranging, Appreciating, Boosting, Accepting. • Subjects: Albert Einstein, Steve Jobs, Vincent van Gogh, Napoleon Bonaparte, Princess Diana. • Applications: Affective Architecture, AI Alignment, LLM-based Agents, Human Flourishing, Ecological Validity. (shrink)

The scientific investigation into the architecture of human affect has historically been defined by a fundamental theoretical schism, often characterized as a century-long conflict between discrete emotion models and dimensional frameworks. Discrete models, championed by researchers such as Izard and Ekman, posit that biologically hardwired, universal emotional categories like fear, anger, and joy evolved as distinct adaptive responses to environmental challenges. Conversely, dimensional models suggest that emotional experiences are cognitive constructions layered atop simpler physiological states defined by valence and arousal. (...) The Core Emotion Framework (CEF), emerging as a sophisticated structural-constructivist resolution to this dichotomy, proposes a modular system that accounts for the complexity of human experience while maintaining a rigorous, repeatable structural foundation rooted in ten universal emotional operators or powers. Within the CEF, emotions are not viewed as static states or subjective feelings but as functional operators within a complex human operating system. This paradigm shift suggests that emotional states are predictable computational events rather than subjective mysteries. The CEF operationalizes these processes by decomposing all affective phenomena into a small, non-overlapping set of ten operators, which serve as the emotional equivalent of central processing unit (CPU) instructions. These operators determine what information is permitted to enter the system, what is filtered out, what actions become available, and how the system predicts the next state. The structural integrity of this system is maintained through the dynamic balance of these ten operators, organized across three functional centers: the Head (Cognitive), the Heart (Relational), and the Gut (Motoric). Keywords: Core Emotion Framework (CEF); Affective Optimization; Structural-Constructivism; Operator Decalogue; Human Operating System; Autonomous Structural Governance; Good-Person Anxiety Pattern (GPAP); Systemic Balance. (shrink)

This is an elaboration and a critique of Ibn Arabi's cosmology written in his book "Shajarah Al-Kawn".

The year 2023 celebrates the 125th anniversary of the birth of Mark Yakovlevich Vygodsky, a famous Soviet mathematician and pedagogue, one of the founders of the Soviet school of the history of mathematics. Not only the scientist's scientific achievements, but also his significant contribution to pedagogical theory and practice, allow us to describe him as a significant scientific figure of the twentieth century. His mathematics textbooks and reference books are reprinted almost annually, so that his ideas continue to influence educational (...) and scientific practice to this day. This article is the second in a series of publications prepared by the author, who is the great-grandson of M.Y. Vygodsky. This research presents previously unpublished scientific results and discoveries concerning the life and work of the scholar. Firstly, based on archival data and family memories, detailed facts about his origins, young years and his development as a scientist are presented. At the same time, a rather complete chronology of M.Y. Vygodsky's scientific activity and personal life is compiled. Secondly, for the first time, a complete list of his main scientific contributions has been prepared, which makes it possible to assess the talent and the scale of his academic achievements. The presented results may be useful for prospective scientific and historical studies. In the modern context, it seems valuable to present a picture of M.Y. Vygodsky's life and work, as he was an interdisciplinary researcher and in this he was ahead of his time. In our changing world, contemporary challenges require the same interdisciplinarity to solve complex problems, and a fresh look at the life and work of a scholar like M.J. Vygodsky can stimulate inspiration in the modern researcher, student, and anyone seeking development and awareness. (shrink)

In 1936, Shestov was invited by the Histadrut — the Jewish trade‑union federation — to deliver a series of lectures in the Land of Israel. His appearances in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and Haifa drew enthusiastic audiences, and he was celebrated as a major Jewish thinker. For Shestov, the visit carried a deep personal significance: it fulfilled a lifelong dream, bound up with the memory of his grandfather, who was buried on the Mount of Olives.

A critical review of Bart Schultz, Henry Sidgwick, Eye of the Universe.

A brief biography of evolutionary biologist Stephen Jay Gould.

There is much to wonder at in Professor Young's “Second Reply,” not the least of which is the fact of the reply itself. Young was given an opportunity to respond to my article, and he took it more than a year ago. He had no need to frame his latest as a critical reply to me, and he would have done better to compose a brief “Note to My Readers” with a forthright acknowledgment of his scholarly lapses, inadvertent though they (...) may have been, and a detailed proposal for putting matters right. He has at least moved in this direction.Unfortunately, Young dilutes his acknowledgment by introducing a variety of qualifications. But I think few will be persuaded by his suggestion that the mere appearance of Curtis Cate's name in his bibliography somehow mitigates his offense, and his insistence that he reproduced only “occasional phrases of Cate's” but “never a complete sentence” is evasive at best, as the following example (one of many) demonstrates. Here's Cate: By early July Nietzsche's condition had deteriorated so drastically that his doctor friend, Professor Immermann, told him that he would have to cease his Pädagogium classes before the end of the school year and undergo a cure of total rest in some secluded mountain village.1And here's Young: By early July, Nietzsche's condition had deteriorated so rapidly that his medical friend, Dr. Immermann, told him that he would have to cancel his grammar-school teaching before the end of the school year and undergo a rest cure in some secluded mountain village.2Although Young's proposed course of “remedial action” is encouraging, it is not yet adequate. He seems to believe that the problem with his work is limited to the “less than 300” words he has reproduced from Cate's biography and does not also involve, say, the minimal and occasionally clumsy use he has made of primary sources. So the specific word count is not the salient issue, but it is worth noting that Young seems simply to have estimated (and underestimated) his figures. This matters because it indicates something of what we can expect from his promised corrections. No one with Professor Young's book in hand can be confident that he is reading Young rather than Cate until Young provides unambiguous evidence that he has himself sorted carefully through both works and identified and corrected each and every reproduced passage.It is unpleasant to dwell on the details of this affair; but however much one would like to sympathize with Young, he has an unfortunate way of making this difficult. Consider, for example, the “extraordinary suggestion” he himself has fashioned from the raw material of the title of my essay and ascribed to me, namely “the suggestion … that the ‘story’ of the life that I construct out of the raw historical data is, from start to finish, simply Cate's ‘story’ recycled in slightly altered language.” This suggestion—the product of Young's own imagination, not mine—has, he says, been “dispose[d] of” by Daniel Blue. And here is his report of Blue's argument: “By obsessively ‘focusing on the similarities’ and ignoring their evident differences, Blue writes, Anderson fails to notice that, with respect to Nietzsche's life, ‘the two books are strikingly different.’” Young has crafted this sentence to attribute to Blue the sentiments expressed by the words “obsessively,” “ignoring,” and “fails to notice.” But Blue neither meant nor implied any such thing, nor was he in the relevant passage commenting on anything like Young's misrepresentation of my thesis. In short, then, Young has constructed a straw man of my argument and knocked it over with fabricated thoughts attributed to another man.Finally, regarding Young's describing as “nebulous” my claim to have found similarities of narrative structure between his work and Cate's, I invite readers to examine my original essay (the second half in particular) and decide for themselves whether my argument throughout is not rather quite specific and substantial. (shrink)

The article aims at clarifying the historical status and cognitive potentials of such a genre of contemporary historiography of philosophy as biographical encyclopedia (dictionary). Based on extensive bibliographic material, the author demonstrates that in the late XX – early XXI centuries in the English-speaking countries there was a real outbreak of interest in encyclopedias and dictionaries, compiled from personalized articles about the life and works of philosophers of certain epochs, countries, trends, etc. According to the author, the increasing popularity of (...) this genre can be considered as a logical continuation of the historical and biographical turns that took place in the Anglo-American (analytic) philosophy in the 1980s and 1990s, respectively. The author specifically emphasizes that it caused the appearance of a significant number of encyclopedias and dictionaries, which contain the well-known facts as well as the significant elements of scholar novelty. The article also shows that similar tendencies have taken place in the contemporary Ukrainian historiography of philosophy. It is shown that Ukrainian experts also made their own significant contribution to the development of this genre. They have successfully developed a special approach, which presupposes the focus on life and works of the representatives of a particular academic institution. The intellectual value of this approach is demonstrated by the example of the recently published two-volume encyclopedia “Kyiv Theological Academy in Names: 1819-1924”. It contains a systematic and very informative presentation of the biographies of many representatives of the national philosophy, whose activities were associated with this institution. The author also shows that from the perspective of the historiography of philosophy, the general methodological foundations of this encyclopedic research is a matter of special interest. (shrink)

This article is a study of the biography and intellectual work of Tan Malaka as a figure. The study of the biography of Tan Malaka will look at factual life and the form of its important role. Through the study of the intellectual work of Tan Malaka, it will be seen how the factuality of the birth of the work and the changes it creates. For this reason, the method of philosophical research is used with the technique of (...) historical-factual study of figures. This technique focuses on the thoughts of one philosopher or figures both on a specific topic in his work and on his entire work. The sociological theory of knowledge is used as an analytical approach to uncover the factuality of Tan Malaka's biography and intellectual work. The result is that the biography of Tan Malaka is formed on the factual situation of colonialism, institutions, interactions with various people, and various languages and Sciences. While the intellectual work of Tan Malaka is the result of his struggle with various factualities. (shrink)

This is a review of Miles Hollingworth's recent intellectual biography of Wittgenstein.

Consciousness and not matter is the basis of the universe. Here is my biography and a list of some of my works.

Johann Sturm was a Reformed pedagogic innovator, who established a teaching curriculum for gymnasia in order to provide an education based on the humanist ideals and on evangelical piety. This model described the contents and the method of learning for boys from 7 to 16 years and consisted mainly of the study of grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic (based on Cicero and on classic literature). His method of learning was based on memorization and imitation rather than on the understanding of formal (...) rules of reasoning. This model, rather than to introduce students to religion, was intended to prepare them to the autonomous understanding of Scripture. Sturm was important also as he contributed to the innovation of biography as a genre, which he intended as more realistic than the typified premodern biographies. (shrink)

This article attempts to reveal intercultural connections at the Kyiv Theological Academy at the beginning of the 20th century by reconstructing the spiritual biographies of two theological academy professors: Archimandrite (later, Archbishop of Berlin and Germany) Tykhon (Tymofii Liashchenko) and Petro Kudriavtsev. The article demonstrates how different cultural traditions intersected and combined in the spiritual experience of these figures. The author of the article argues that, as a result of revolutionary events in 1917–1919, both Kyiv Theological Academy professors experienced transformations (...) in personal cultural identity, and their spiritual biographies reveal a transition from Russian to Western European and a combination of both (Tykhon (Liashchenko) identities), and from Russian to Ukrainian ideological cultural orientation (Petro Kudriavtsev). (shrink)

Samuel Buchoul, dans « Homo Scribens : vers une bio-graphie qui ne recherche plus rien », cherche à articuler écriture et vie en se demandant pourquoi la vie écrit-elle. Dès lors que les concepts de biographie et de biologie s’entrelacent tout au long de La vie la mort, Buchoul interroge le concept derridien d’écriture à travers l’étude croisée de Jacob, Heidegger, Nietzsche et Freud, et le relit à la lumière de quelques arguments de Jean-Paul Sartre et de Bernard Stiegler. Son (...) analyse débouche sur l’hypothèse d’une liaison conceptuelle aussi bien qu’historique entre la pratique de l’écriture et la condition existentielle de l’homme. (shrink)

biography as a revenge to some ideal ideals.

Artificial intelligence is sparking unprecedented claims about machine minds — but are today’s systems really conscious? In this primer, we disentangle the myths, misconceptions, and confusions fueling the global debate. -/- Roadmap: Section One: Background The Core Concept of Consciousness The Problem of AI Consciousness The Human Benchmark Problem Approaching the Problem of AI Consciousness on a Case by Case Basis -/- Section Two: Conceptual Distinctions Intelligence Versus Consciousness Sentience Versus Sapience “Functional Consciousness” Versus Phenomenal Consciousness Assuming Computational Functionalism’s Relative (...) Popularity Extends to Functionalism about Consciousness, in Particular AI Agency Versus Human Agency Consciousness Versus Self-consciousness Seemingly Conscious AIs Versus the Real Thing Life Versus Consciousness -/- Section Three: Theories of Consciousness Section Four: Summary of Takeaways Glossary Author Biographies Works Cited . (shrink)

Hilary Putnams Biographie und philosophische Entwicklung spiegeln die Geschichte der angelsächsischen Philosophie in den letzten 40 Jahren. Beinahe ebenso lange hat Putnam diese Geschichte wesentlich beeinflußt und so kann John Passmore über Putnam schreiben: «Er ist die Geschichte der gegenwärtigen Philosophie im Umriß»1. In der vorliegenden Einleitung soll vor allem der Kontext dargestellt werden, in dem Putnam steht und aus dem heraus verständlich wird, was er philosophisch zu sagen hat. Dieser Kontext ist sicherlich ein Grund dafür, daß Putnam hierzulande noch (...) relativ wenig bekannt ist, während er in den USA häufig für den bedeutendsten aktiven Philosophen gehalten wird. Im Rahmen einer Skizze von Putnams philosophischer Entwicklung soll zudem eine vorläufige philosophiehistorische Einordnung versucht werden, auch wenn hier nicht der Ort für eine umfassende Kritik oder Darstellung sein kann: Die Einleitung muß auf recht elementarem Niveau bleiben und kann eine Lektüre der Texte natürlich nicht ersetzen. Da Putnams Werk sicherlich Teil einer Annäherung von ‹analytischer› und ‹kontinentaler› Philosophie ist, soll bei der Einführung in die hier übersetzten Texte schließlich deutlich werden, was Putnam nicht analytisch orientierten Lesern zu bieten hat. (shrink)

A brief intellectual biography of Sir Karl Popper.

The Break with Freud and the Discovery of the Collective Unconscious -/- Carl Gustav Jung began his intellectual life as Freud's most gifted collaborator and chosen heir. Their eventual rupture — dramatic, painful, and philosophically consequential — turned on precisely the question of the nature and scope of the unconscious. For Freud, the unconscious was fundamentally personal: it consisted of repressed material, above all sexual and aggressive wishes, derived from the individual's biography. For Jung, this was only half the (...) story — and the lesser half. Beneath the personal unconscious, he became convinced, lay a deeper stratum that was not personal at all: a collective unconscious, shared by all human beings, containing structures and contents that had never been in individual consciousness because they preceded all individual experience. This was not a conclusion Jung reached comfortably or quickly. It emerged from years of clinical work, from his painstaking analysis of dreams and fantasies in psychotic patients, and above all from his extraordinary inner journey — the period of confrontation with his own unconscious documented in The Red Book — in which he encountered figures, images, and narratives that bore unmistakable resemblance to mythological material from cultures he had never studied. The same symbols appeared again and again across different patients, different cultures, different historical periods. This could not be explained by individual learning or transmission. It pointed to something structural in the psyche itself. -/- Archetypes: The Structural Patterns of the Collective Unconscious -/- The theory of archetypes is Jung's most original and philosophically ambitious contribution. Archetypes are not contents but forms — not specific images but the structural predispositions that determine what kinds of images the psyche tends to produce under what circumstances. Jung compared the archetype to the crystal lattice: the lattice determines the form the crystal will take, but it does not itself have a fixed form until it crystallizes in the specific mother liquor of a particular individual's life. Archetypes are the invisible skeleton of psychic experience; they are not perceived directly but through their manifestations. The major archetypes that Jung identified and explored include: the Self (das Selbst) — the central organizing principle of the psyche, the archetype of wholeness and the ultimate goal of psychological development; the Shadow — the repository of all that the ego has rejected or refused to develop, the 'dark twin' that follows every individual like an invisible companion; the Anima and Animus — the contra-sexual elements of the psyche, the inner feminine in men and inner masculine in women, which mediate the relationship between consciousness and the deeper layers of the unconscious; the Great Mother — the archetype of nurture, containment, and engulfment; the Wise Old Man and the Wise Old Woman — figures of wisdom, guidance, and transpersonal knowledge; the Trickster — the amoral, shape-shifting figure who disrupts order and facilitates transformation; the Puer Aeternus — the eternal youth, the archetype of possibility and renewal; and the Hero — the figure of ego-development, of the struggle against inertia and unconsciousness. These are not merely interesting metaphors. Jung believed they were genuine psychological realities — objective structures of the psyche that exert real influence on thought, feeling, behavior, and experience. When the Shadow is not consciously integrated, it is projected onto others, who are then experienced as wholly evil or dangerous. When the Anima is not recognized, a man is possessed by it, driven by unconscious moods and irrational entanglements. When the Self is experienced in a dream or vision, it produces a sense of numinous wholeness that cannot be reduced to anything else. The archetypes are, in this sense, the experiential face of the collective unconscious — the way its structures announce themselves to individual consciousness. -/- The Numinosum: Where Psychology Meets Religion -/- One of the most distinctive and controversial aspects of Jung's thought is his sustained engagement with religion, myth, and the sacred. Drawing on Rudolf Otto's concept of the numinosum — the awe-inspiring, tremendum et fascinans quality of genuine religious experience — Jung argued that the archetypes have an inherently numinous character. When they are encountered in dreams, visions, or waking fantasies, they produce an experience of something overwhelming, something that both terrifies and fascinates, something that feels profoundly other even while being encountered within. Jung was careful to distinguish his approach from metaphysical claims about the existence of God. He insisted he was speaking empirically, as a psychologist, about the psychological reality of the experience of the numinous — not about its theological status. But this distinction, however carefully maintained, could not prevent the recognition that his psychology was in deep conversation with the history of religion and mysticism. The archetypes of the Self, the Great Mother, the Divine Child — these are the psychological correlates of the figures that humanity has worshipped across millennia. The gods, for Jung, are not superstitions to be explained away but projections of real psychic structures onto the outer world. -/- The Process and its Stages -/- Individuation — Jung's term for the process of psychological development and integration — is perhaps the most philosophically rich concept in his entire system. It refers to the lifelong process by which an individual becomes, more and more completely, what they most deeply are: not the persona (the social mask), not the ego (the conscious self-image), but the Self — the total personality, including both its conscious and unconscious dimensions. Individuation is not a programme to be executed or a summit to be conquered; it is a process to be undergone, a way of living that involves the continuous confrontation with, and integration of, the psyche's shadow and depths. The process of individuation typically unfolds in recognizable stages, though these are never mechanically fixed. In the first half of life, the task is largely one of differentiation and adaptation: developing a coherent ego, establishing a viable persona, finding a place in the social world. The unconscious at this stage is largely experienced as threatening, as the potential for regression, for loss of control, for the eruption of instinctual energies that threaten the social adaptation so painfully achieved. In the second half of life — often precipitated by a crisis, a confrontation with mortality, a failure of the persona's adequacy — the task shifts. Now the unconscious is no longer primarily an enemy but a partner: the rich, dangerous, inexhaustible source from which the second half of life must draw its meaning. (shrink)

Hannah Arendt (1906–1975) stands as one of the most original political thinkers of the twentieth century — not merely because of her scholarship, but because of her capacity to think within the rupture of history. Born in Germany and shaped by the philosophical traditions of continental Europe, Arendt's intellectual life unfolded in the shadow of profound existential and political dislocation. Her biography is inseparable from the crises of her time, and her work is marked by a continual attempt to (...) make sense of the human condition under conditions of rupture, exile, and transformation. Raised in Königsberg, a city once associated with the critical philosophy of Immanuel Kant, Arendt’s early exposure to learning and inquiry positioned her to engage not only with abstract questions, but with the reality of political life. Her studies in philosophy, theology, and classical philology were not pursuits of academic detachment but rather modes of inquiry into the nature of existence, plurality, and responsibility. Under the influence of Martin Heidegger, Arendt encountered phenomenology — a method of returning to the immediacy of lived experience. But while Heidegger explored Being in abstraction, Arendt would later shift toward a more worldly engagement: to understand the conditions under which human beings appear to one another, speak, act, and judge. Her dissertation on the concept of love in the thought of Saint Augustine reveals an early preoccupation with natality — the fact of birth as the beginning of uniqueness — and the human desire for transcendence. These existential concerns would remain central throughout her thought, but they were soon reframed by the concrete historical rupture of the 1930s. The rise of totalitarianism forced Arendt into exile, initiating a lifelong confrontation with statelessness, the breakdown of political belonging, and the question of human rights. -/- Her experiences as a refugee and as a Jew under Nazi persecution were not only biographical facts but philosophical revelations. In losing the formal protection of the state, Arendt came to see that the foundation of human dignity is not legal status alone, but recognition — the acknowledgment of one's humanity within a shared world. This insight would later inform her analysis of the pariah, the stateless, and the condition of rootlessness that defines modernity. Interned in France during the war and later arriving in the United States in 1941, Arendt found herself in a new context that both challenged and expanded her thought. While she faced the disorientation of exile, she also encountered a different political tradition — one that emphasized constitutionalism, federalism, and public freedom. Her philosophical reflection began to shift from the metaphysical orientation of early European thought to a more political ontology: a concern with how freedom appears in the world, how action becomes meaningful, and how the human capacity for beginning — for natality — might form the basis of a new political ethics. In the United States, Arendt did not retreat into academic isolation but entered into the vibrant intellectual life of postwar New York, where she joined a community of exiled thinkers, writers, and artists. It was here that she began to articulate her most significant contributions, not only as a theorist of totalitarianism, but as a thinker concerned with the conditions under which human beings live together in freedom. Becoming a U.S. citizen in 1950 did not merely mark a legal change; it represented, for Arendt, a re-entry into political life — a renewed commitment to a world in which human plurality, responsibility, and judgment could be reimagined. Her thought is not reducible to ideology or method; rather, it is a continuous engagement with the fundamental questions of existence: What does it mean to be human in a world where politics can both reveal and destroy our shared reality? How is freedom possible amid necessity? And what responsibility does each individual bear for the shape of the world we co-create? -/- The period in which Hannah Arendt lived and developed her thought was one of unprecedented upheaval — a century defined by war, displacement, ideological struggle, and the fragmentation of shared meaning. The first half of the twentieth century had witnessed the collapse of empires, the trauma of two world wars, the mechanized cruelty of the Holocaust, and the rise of totalitarian states. These events did not merely shape historical circumstances; they shattered traditional assumptions about progress, morality, and the nature of human society. In the aftermath of destruction, a new global order emerged, marked by the Cold War’s ideological bifurcation — a world divided between East and West, each claiming to represent the truth of human freedom. It was within this fractured and contested space that Arendt pursued her philosophical project, asking not only how such horrors had occurred, but what it meant to live and think responsibly in their shadow. During the 1950s and 1960s, Arendt produced some of her most significant works, including The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951) and Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963). These were not historical chronicles in the conventional sense, but meditations on the breakdown of meaning, the limits of judgment, and the erosion of political responsibility. Arendt was not aligned with any one school of thought. Rather, her work constituted a deliberate act of thinking — a practice of remaining open to the complexity of reality, rather than reducing it to ideological systems. While her contemporaries were shaped by existentialist questions of freedom, alienation, and authenticity — influenced by figures such as Heidegger and Sartre — Arendt resisted abstract categories. Instead, she focused on how these existential conditions unfolded in the public world: How do individuals relate to others in shared space? What does it mean to appear before others, to act, to be seen, and to take responsibility? -/- Her analysis of power, authority, and the vulnerability of democratic institutions was not a theoretical exercise. It was rooted in lived experience — exile, statelessness, and political rupture — and informed by her critical engagement with Marxism, liberalism, and postwar human rights discourse. The intellectual landscape of the mid-20th century was searching for foundations after catastrophe. Arendt's contribution was to shift attention not toward abstract principles, but toward human plurality, judgment, and action — the conditions under which meaning and community become possible again. Her work was not without controversy. Her reflections on Jewish identity, the moral ambiguity of collaboration, and the nature of evil drew criticism and misunderstanding. Yet, through it all, Arendt remained committed to independent thought, insisting that philosophy must engage with the world as it is, not as it is imagined. In this way, her life becomes more than a biography — it becomes a lens through which to understand the philosophical challenges of an age: the loss of rootedness, the disintegration of meaning, and the search for a new beginning. For Arendt, history is not just what happens; it is what human beings do, remember, and are responsible for. Her enduring significance lies in her ability to face this condition without resignation. -/- Thinking and Reality For Arendt, thinking is not reducible to the acquisition of knowledge, nor is it equivalent to instrumental reasoning. Thinking is a distinct mode of being — a dialogical process within the self, in which one interrogates, questions, and suspends certainty. It is not designed to produce immediate answers but to illuminate meaning. In this way, thinking reveals the invisible architecture of human experience: assumptions, values, and the fragile structures of moral judgment. Thinking, as Arendt conceives it, is not a utilitarian task; it is not defined by its outcomes. Rather, it is an activity through which individuals maintain their autonomy and engage with the world reflectively. It allows one to remain in relation with oneself — to become one’s own witness. Thinking is not merely a private pursuit, however; it forms the ground for responsibility in the public realm. The trial of Adolf Eichmann offers a critical demonstration of this principle. Arendt observed that Eichmann was not driven by hatred or ideology in the conventional sense. Instead, he exhibited an absence — a failure to think. He did not ask whether what he was doing was right; he only asked whether it conformed to the rules. This thoughtlessness, this moral vacuity, was what Arendt identified as the “banality of evil.” It was not the presence of monstrous intent that shocked her, but the absence of inner dialogue — the collapse of judgment in the face of bureaucratic normality. In this example, we see how the refusal or inability to think has concrete ethical consequences. It demonstrates that moral failure does not always stem from wickedness but can emerge from passivity, from disengagement with meaning. Thinking is thus not an abstract ideal; it is a condition of moral life. Without it, the human being becomes merely functional — obedient, efficient, and dangerous. -/- Challenges to Arendt’s View Despite the profound impact of Arendt’s conception of thinking, her position has drawn criticism from multiple directions. Some argue that her view overemphasizes the solitary nature of thought, neglecting the social, historical, and embodied conditions that shape human consciousness. Thinking, in this view, does not occur in isolation but is embedded in cultural narratives, material conditions, and interpersonal relationships. Others, particularly those working from empirical or scientific frameworks, view Arendt’s approach as speculative and insufficiently grounded in data. From this perspective, her phenomenological and interpretive style lacks the methodological rigor demanded by contemporary cognitive science or behavioral studies. There is also concern about the accessibility of her thought. Critics suggest that her ideal of thinking — involving distance from daily pressures — may reflect a privileged position, one not equally available to all. This raises important questions about whether meaningful reflection is reserved for the few, or whether it can be realized amid the constraints of ordinary life. Finally, some argue that her emphasis on reason and moral judgment underplays the role of emotion, empathy, and collective experience in ethical decision-making. Thinking, they claim, is not purely rational but also deeply affective and relational. -/- . -/- . (shrink)

Short intellectual biography of Alexandre Herculano. English translation available.

By 2026, the power elite described by Mills has reconstituted itself as a conspicuous platform elite, whose authority no longer rests primarily on institutional position but on continuous visibility, narrative performance, and algorithmic amplification. Power is now exercised less through command and deliberation than through spectacle, biography, and attention, transforming elite domination into a publicly staged and culturally aspirational form of rule. This article rereads The Power Elite from the standpoint of 2026 with particular emphasis on C. Wright Mills’s (...) warning about "higher immorality", first formulated in 1956. Mills described higher immorality as a structural condition in which those occupying the summits of economic, political, and military power are insulated from the moral consequences of their decisions by size, distance, bureaucracy, and institutional abstraction. This article argues that higher immorality was not a historically contingent pathology of mid-twentieth-century American capitalism, but an early diagnosis of a durable logic of modern power that has since intensified. In the contemporary context of platform capitalism, algorithmic governance, media spectacle, and elite celebrity, higher immorality no longer operates primarily through secrecy or denial, but through visibility, narrative performance, and normalisation. Power today presents itself openly, confidently, and often pedagogically, while responsibility dissolves into systems, procedures, and technical necessity. By tracing the transformation from institutional opacity to conspicuous authority, the article shows how higher immorality has evolved from organised irresponsibility into a cultural atmosphere in which success no longer requires moral justification, authority no longer requires reason, and domination no longer requires belief. Reclaiming Mills’s concept as a sociological warning rather than a historical footnote, the article argues that higher immorality remains a central obstacle to democratic accountability in the twenty-first century, precisely because it has ceased to appear immoral at all. In this sense, the power elite of Mills’s era has culminated in what this article defines as ‘The Conspicuous Elite' or 'Platform Elite’, a form of authority in which domination is no longer concealed by institutions but performed openly through visibility, narrative, and algorithmic attention. (shrink)

Generative AI chatbots like OpenAI's ChatGPT and Google's Gemini routinely make things up. They "hallucinate" historical events and figures, legal cases, academic papers, non-existent tech products and features, biographies, and news articles. Recently, some have argued that these hallucinations are better understood as bullshit. Chatbots produce rich streams of text that look truth-apt without any concern for the truthfulness of what this text says. But can they also gossip? We argue that they can. After some definitions and scene-setting, we focus (...) on a recent example to clarify what AI gossip looks like before considering some distinct harms — what we call "technosocial harms" — that follow from it. (shrink)