As engineers propose constructing humanlike automata, the question arises as to whether such machines merit human rights. The issue warrants serious and rigorous examination, although it has not yet cohered into a conversation. To put it into a sure direction, this paper proposes phrasing it in terms of whether humans are morally obligated to extend to maximally humanlike automata full human rights, or those set forth in common international rights documents. This paper’s approach is to consider the ontology (...) of humans and of automata and whether ontological difference between them, that pertains to the very bases of human rights, affects the latter’s claims to full human rights. Considering common bases of human rights, can these bases tell us whether a certain ontological distinction of humans from automata—or a de facto distinction about humans tacitly acknowledged by full-rights-recognizing societies—makes a difference in whether humans are morally obligated to assign these entities full rights? Human rights to security also arise. The conclusion is that humans need not be under any moral obligation to confer full human rights on automata. The paper’s ultimate point is not to close the discussion with this ontological cap but to set a solid moral and legal groundwork for opening it up tout court. (shrink)

Rezumarea automată este procesul de sumarizare a unui document text cu un program de calculator pentru a crea un rezumat care să rețină cele mai importante puncte ale documentului original. Tehnologiile care pot face un rezumat coerent iau în considerare variabile precum lungimea, stilul de scriere și sintaxa. Învățarea automată este un subdomeniu al inteligenței artificiale dedicat înțelegerii și construirii de metode care permit mașinilor să ”învețe”. Un algoritm de extragere a frazelor cheie este TextRank, careexploatează structura textului în sine (...) pentru a determina expresiile cheie care apar „centrale” pentru text. (shrink)

Early modern automata, understood as efforts to ‘model’ life, to grasp its singular properties and/or to unveil and demystify its seeming inaccessibility and mystery, are not just fascinating liminal, boundary, hybrid, crossover or go-between objects, while they are all of those of course. They also pose a direct challenge to some of our common conceptions about mechanism and embodiment. They challenge the simplicity of the distinction between a purported ‘mechanistic’ worldpicture, its ontology and its goals, and on the other (...) hand an attempt to understand ourselves and animals more broadly as flesh-and-blood, affective entities (that is, not just breathing and perspiring, but also desiring and ‘sanguine’ machines, as La Mettrie might have put it). In what follows I reflect on the complexity of early modern mechanism faced with the (living) body, and its mirror image, contemporary theories of embodiment. At times, embodiment theory seems to be governed by a fascination with what the Artificial Life researcher Ezequiel Di Paolo has called ‘biochauvinism’ (Di Paolo, “Extended Life”): an unquestioned belief that ‘living bodies are special’. Yet how does the theorist define this special status? The question is apparently a simple one, or at least promptly yields an aporia which appears simple: to borrow a provocative phrase from Terry Eagleton, embodiment theory is obsessed by the body but terrified of biology. Yet at the same time, at least since Hubert Dreyfus and Andy Clark’s groundbreaking works, embodiment has been a legit part of cognitive science, yielding the even more recently emerged field of ‘embodied cognition’ (see the work of Larry Shapiro), which seeks to depart from traditional cognitive science, especially the latter’s understanding of cognition as computational, in order to instead underscore “the significance of an organism’s body in how and what the organism thinks,” in Shapiro’s words. (shrink)

In some recent papers (G. ‘t Hooft and others), it has been argued that quantum mechanics can arise from classical cellular automata. Nonetheless, G. Shpenkov has proved that the classical wave equation makes it possible to derive a periodic table of elements, which is very close to Mendeleyev’s one, and describe also other phenomena related to the structure of molecules. Hence the classical wave equation complements Schrödinger’s equation, which implies the appearance of a cellular automaton molecular model starting from (...) classical wave equation. The other studies show that the microworld is constituted as a tessellation of primary topological balls. The tessellattice becomes the origin of a submicrospic mechanics in which a quantum system is subdivided to two subsystems: the particle and its inerton cloud, which appears due to the interaction of the moving particle with oncoming cells of the tessellattice. The particle and its inerton cloud periodically change the momentum and hence move like a wave. The new approach allows us to correlate the Klein-Gordon equation with the deformation coat that is formed in the tessellatice around the particle. The submicroscopic approach shows that the source of any type of wave movements including the Klein-Gordon, Schrödinger, and classical wave equations is hidden in the tessellattice and its basic exciations – inertons, carriers of mass and inert properies of matter. We also discuss possible correspondence with Konrad Zuse’s calculating space. (shrink)

In this paper, I seek to examine Deleuze’s fascination with “spiritual automata” as a counterpoint to his more famous notion, the “body without organs”. I shall argue that both are grounded in a deep reflection, on Deleuze’s part, on the problems and issues generated by Spinoza’s notion of parallel attributes. Ultimately, I argue, the development of the two notions is motivated by identical metaphysical worries regarding the tenability of transformation, persistence, and affective interrelations between individuals. The answer, for both (...) thinkers, is the insertion of a “third” relational term, which virtually interfaces with each without violation of their parallel development. For Spinoza, such term is the absolutely infinite substance; for Deleuze, it is instead the notion of sense and the faculty of sense-making. (shrink)

In this work we present the algorithms to produce deterministic finite automaton (DFA) for extended operators in regular expressions like intersection, subtraction and complement. The method like "overriding" of the source NFA (NFA not defined) with subset construction rules is used. The past work described only the algorithm for AND-operator(or intersection of regular languages); in this paper the construction for the MINUS-operator (and complement) is shown.

Since the Nuremberg Code and the first Declaration of Helsinki, globally there has been increasing adoption and adherence to procedures for ensuring that human subjects in research are as well informed as possible of the study’s reasons and risks and voluntarily consent to serving as subject. To do otherwise is essentially viewed as violation of the human research subject’s legal and moral rights. However, with the recent philosophical concerns about responsible robotics, the limits and ambiguities of research-subjects ethical codes become (...) apparent on the matter of constructing automata that maximally resemble human beings (as defined hereunder). In this case, the automata themselves, as products of research and development, are in the very process of their construction subjects of research and development. However, such research faces a paradox: The subjects cannot give their informed consent to this research for their own development, although their consent would be needed for the research. According to ethical codes, this research would be unethical. The article then explores whether the background concepts giving rise to this paradox could be reframed in order to allow such research to proceed ethically. (shrink)

Some years ago, Hidding et al. suggest that the emergence of intricate and pervasive weblike structure of the Universe on Megaparsec scales can be approximated by a well-known equation from fluid mechanics, the Burgers’ equation. The solution to this equation can be obtained from a geometrical formalism. The resulting Adhesion formalism provides deep insight into the dynamics and topology of the Cosmic Web. It uncovers a direct connection between the conditions in the very early Universe and the complex spatial patterns (...) that emerged out of these under the influence of gravity. In the present paper, we describe a cellular automaton model of the Burgers’ equation, which can be investigated via a fast computer simulation. In the end, this suggests a Cellular Automata Adhesion Model of the Universe. (shrink)

Care is more than dispensing pills or cleaning beds. It is about responding to the entire patient. What is called “bedside manner” in medical personnel is a quality of treating the patient not as a mechanism but as a being—much like the caregiver—with desires, ideas, dreams, aspirations, and the gamut of mental and emotional character. As automata, answering an increasing functional need in care, are designed to enact care, the pressure is on their becoming more humanlike to carry out (...) the function more effectively. The question becomes not merely whether the care automaton can effect good bedside manner but whether the patient’s response is not feeling deceived by the humanlikeness. It seems the device must be designed either to effect explicit mere human-“likeness,” thus likely undermining its bedside-manner potential, or to fool the patient completely. Neither option is attractive. This article examines the social problems of designing maximally humanlike care automata and how problems may start to erode the human rights of users/patients. The article then investigates the alternatives for dealing with this problem, whether by industrial and professional self-regulation or public-policy initiatives. It then frames the problem in the broader historical perspective in terms of previous bans, moratoria, and other means of control of hazardous and potentially rights-violating techniques and materials. (shrink)

Can a videogame tell us something about what it means to be human? Or even further, what is human as such? Yoko Taro's NieR: Automata tries to answer these questions with the astonishing characteristic of the videogames: the immersion. Thanks to a coherent coincidence between playing subjectivity and virtuality given by the joypad, videogames can deeply investigate the subject about moral, ethical and existential questions. My aim in the paper is to explain what is about of the human in (...) Taro's work thanks to Heideggerian's view on technology. (shrink)

As we have prior result of regular grammars over set of computational problems, we are to present the universal ‘complexity automata’ which can be used in solving any problem.

In game theory, infinitely repeated games are seen as an optimal tool to study the rationality of cooperation. In this paper, we elaborate on a computational model of bounded rationality employing Moore machines and Turing machines. Revisiting relevant literature of the 1980s-90s, when these artificial devices were introduced in the infinitely repeated game of the prisoner’s dilemma, we address the infinite regress problem in the context of this game, where each decision making process—choice of a best-response finite automaton—is to be (...) carried out by Turing machines and where players seek to minimize the level of complexity of the decision-making process at each level. Our approach is thoroughly within the formalism of computability and complexity theory, with Rice’s theorem playing a central role in it. (shrink)

Despite the various criteria presented in the literature, most authors engaged in the debate about emergence agree on a fundamental distinction between strong/ontologically robust cases of emergence and weak/metaphysically innocent ones. The former typically involve entities that exhibit new causal capacities, while the latter are primarily associated with deductive unpredictability, conceptual novelty, and other qualities that highlight our epistemic limitations in understanding them. In this paper, I initially examine a paradigmatic example of weak emergence, namely the higher-level patterns generated by (...) virtual Cellular Automata (CAs) as analysed by Mark Bedau. Then, I demonstrate that the same mechanism can be observed in real biological systems, such as the dynamics governing the pigmentation ontogeny of the ocellated lizard (Timon lepidus). Unlike virtual CAs, however, real CAs produce patterns that seem to perform non-reducible functions. Therefore, I propose that despite the similarities between virtual and real CAs, the pigmentation pattern of the ocellated lizard should be regarded as a case of strong emergence. Moreover, I suggest that this analysis may shed light on the nature of biological emergent entities in general. Finally, the paper includes an Addendum introducing an issue that, while not exhaustively addressed here, is highly relevant: how to metaphysically conceptualise the causal efficacy exhibited by the pigmentation patterns. (shrink)

By separating the general concept of truth into syntactic truth and semantic truth, this article proposes a new theory of truth to explain several paradoxes like the Liar paradox, Card paradox, Curry’s paradox, etc. By revealing the relationship between syntactic /semantic truth and being-nothing-becoming which are the core concepts of dialectical logic, it is able to formalize dialectical logic. It also provides a logical basis for complexity theory by transferring all reasoning into a directed (cyclic/acyclic) graph which explains both paradoxical (...) and paradox-free reasoning. The different structure between cyclic graphs and acyclic graphs is the key to understanding paradoxes. By explaining the immanent between logic, paradox, and cellular automata, it also illustrates dialectical logic as ontology. (shrink)

Theory of Computation -- Computation by Abstracts Devices.

This paper introduces a journal-grade formal architecture for a synthetic neuromorphic proof engine: a verifier-gated artificial superintelligence framework designed to attack difficult conjectures by combining typed proof obligations, sand-tile proof-burden dynamics, cellular-automaton repair laws, k-dot operator enumeration, phenomenological tensor classification, context-playbook memory, and machine-learning-guided verifier stability. The system is written as an auditable mathematical object rather than as a rhetorical claim of omniscience: every conjecture is converted into a state space, every unclosed step becomes a measurable residue, every computation must (...) acquire analytic lift, and every candidate proof is blocked from theorem status until formal, human, referee, and cross-module gates commute. The new visual layer supplies ten sand-tile proof surfaces, five cellular automata, neural-circuit maps, histogram and ogive diagnostics, flowcharts, directional proof maps, and release circuits for tracking where a conjecture fails, how new machinery is generated, and when closure can be claimed relative to a declared axiom system. The resulting methodology is an aggressive but disciplined approach to mathematical discovery: it permits the engine to invent new invariants, bridges, flows, reductions, and classifier manifolds, while forcing every claimed closure through zero-residue, zero-scope-loss, zero-hallucination, and verifier-stable release predicates. (shrink)

Natural recursion in syntax is recursion by linguistic value, which is not syntactic in nature but semantic. Syntax-specific recursion is not recursion by name as the term is understood in theoretical computer science. Recursion by name is probably not natural because of its infinite typeability. Natural recursion, or recursion by value, is not species-specific. Human recursion is not syntax-specific. The values on which it operates are most likely domain-specific, including those for syntax. Syntax seems to require no more (and no (...) less) than the resource management mechanisms of an embedded push-down automaton (EPDA). We can conceive EPDA as a common automata-theoretic substrate for syntax, collaborative planning, i-intentions, and we-intentions. They manifest the same kind of dependencies. Therefore, syntactic uniqueness arguments for human behavior can be better explained if we conceive automata-constrained recursion as the most unique human capacity for cognitive processes. (shrink)

The iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma has become the standard model for the evolution of cooperative behavior within a community of egoistic agents, frequently cited for implications in both sociology and biology. Due primarily to the work of Axelrod (1980a, 198Ob, 1984, 1985), a strategy of tit for tat (TFT) has established a reputation as being particularly robust. Nowak and Sigmund (1992) have shown, however, that in a world of stochastic error or imperfect communication, it is not TFT that finally triumphs in (...) an ecological model based on population percentages (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981), but ‘generous tit for tat’ (GTFT), which repays cooperation with a probability of cooperation approaching 1 but forgives defection with a probability of l/3. In this paper, we consider a spatialized instantiation of the stochastic Prisoner’s Dilemma, using two-dimensional cellular automata (Wolfram, 1984, 1986; Gutowitz, 1990) to model the spatial dynamics of populations of competing strategies. The surprising result is that in the spatial model it is not GIFT but still more generous strategies that are favored. The optimal strategy within this spatial ecology appears to be a form of ‘bending over backwards’, which returns cooperation for defection with a probability of 2/3 - a rate twice as generous as GTFT. (shrink)

What does it mean, for Spinoza, to treat someone or something as an “automata, completely lacking a mind”, in a universe where all things are “animate” and endowed with a mind? By answering this question, I shed light on a complicated issue tied to Spinoza’s conception of human nature: namely, how to distinguish specifically human mentality and behaviour, given Spinoza's panpsychism and the absence of any definition of “humans” in his works. In my paper, I demonstrate that Spinoza’s solution (...) is to deploy what can be regarded as an original kind of simulation theory of mindreading: an account of human empathy, according to which we ascribe our own thoughts and feelings to others, based on our capacity to imitate their observable behaviour. I show that this theory of empathic behaviour explains, in Spinoza, not only how humans recognize one another, but also what counts as a human being. For Spinoza, the attribution of humanity is identical with successful mindreading, and humans themselves are identified as individuals who successfully engage in mutual empathic behaviour. (shrink)

3rd ed, 2021. A circumscription of the classical theory of computation building up from the Chomsky hierarchy. With the usual topics in formal language and automata theory.

First quantitative measurement of dimensional boundary information loss. Discovered 86% scaling law across 1,500 cellular automata patterns. Fully reproducible with open code and data. -/- Keywords: dimensional boundaries, information loss, cellular automata, complexity science, dimensional embedding, information theory, curse of dimensionality, entropy, spatial information, scaling laws, information geometry, pattern analysis, complex systems, nonlinear dynamics, consciousness.

The Existence Threshold (v2.1) builds on a statistically significant framework for understanding pattern persistence in complexity science. -/- Using the corrected formula Φ = R·S + D, this work validates that disorder is a necessary component of existence. -/- Features comprehensive experimental success across ten cellular automata systems, establishing testable predictions for self-organization, emergence, and entropy in binary discrete environments. -/- Keywords: Existence Threshold, cellular automata, pattern persistence, binary discrete systems, self-organization, emergence, complexity science, information theory, system integration, (...) thermodynamic entropy, Conway's Game of Life, dynamical systems, state transitions, reproducibility, implementation details, experimental validation, statistical significance, domain boundaries, consciousness hypothesis, cosmological expansion, dark energy mechanism, recursive processing, integrated information theory. (shrink)

In early modern times it was not uncommon for thinkers to tease out from the nature of God various doctrines of substantial physical and metaphysical import. This approach was particularly fruitful in the so-called beast-machine controversy, which erupted following Descartes’ claim that animals are automata, that is, pure machines, without a spiritual, incorporeal soul. Over the course of this controversy, thinkers on both sides attempted to draw out important truths about the status of animals simply from the notion or (...) attributes of God. Automatists – led by Nicolas Malebranche and Antoine Dilly – developed six such arguments, appealing to divine justice, providence, economy, glory (twice) and wisdom, while opponents to animal automatism developed two arguments, appealing to divine wisdom and goodness. In this article I shall examine the substance of all eight of these arguments, along with their origins, patronage, and variations, and the objections they elicited from opponents, with the aim of determining their suitability for use in contemporary debates about animal sentience and consciousness, and hence their relevance for contemporary philosophers. (shrink)

In the spatialized Prisoner's Dilemma, players compete against their immediate neighbors and adopt a neighbor's strategy should it prove locally superior. Fields of strategies evolve in the manner of cellular automata (Nowak and May, 1993; Mar and St. Denis, 1993a,b; Grim 1995, 1996). Often a question arises as to what the eventual outcome of an initial spatial configuration of strategies will be: Will a single strategy prove triumphant in the sense of progressively conquering more and more territory without opposition, (...) or will an equilibrium of some small number of strategies emerge? Here it is shown, for finite configurations of Prisoner's Dilemma strategies embedded in a given infinite background, that such questions are formally undecidable: there is no algorithm or effective procedure which, given a specification of a finite configuration, will in all cases tell us whether that configuration will or will not result in progressive conquest by a single strategy when embedded in the given field. The proof introduces undecidability into decision theory in three steps: by (1) outlining a class of abstract machines with familiar undecidability results, by (2) modelling these machines within a particular family of cellular automata, carrying over undecidability results for these, and finally by (3) showing that spatial configurations of Prisoner's Dilemma strategies will take the form of such cellular automata. (shrink)

The concept of modes of existence of semiotic entities underlies (post)Greimasian semiotics, yet it seems to have received little attention. Modes of existence can be used in different senses. For Greimas, from the perspective of narrative semiotics, when Michelangelo first receives a block of marble and decides to sculpt the David, his intention is in a virtual mode; as Michelangelo progresses he ends up bringing the David into existence, and his intention comes to the realized mode. In Fontanille’s tensive semiotics, (...) however, modes of existence can have to do with how one can narrow or broaden the scope of our apprehension of the David as our eyes look at it in order to produce a meaningful experience. In this work, the perspectives of narrative and tensive semiotics are contrasted both theoretically and practically applying both to a number of examples. In order to identify all possible modes of existence and all the possibilities of transitioning from one to the other in the examples presented, we resort to the method of finite-state automata from computer science. In the end, we propose a robust narrative account of modes of existence that relies on narrative semiotics for its definition, but into which intent and apprehension from tensive semiotics can be integrated. This work calls for the need of establishing a syntax of modes of existence, since both Greimas and Fontanille construe them as being necessary to account for the production of signification. (shrink)

Objective: To examine the mechanism of artificial intelligence as a computing system in a valid operating state, to establish an externally observable boundary between humans and computing systems, and to determine whether technological iteration can make artificial intelligence a subject. Method: The argument is developed from basic theories of computation. The halting problem is used to clarify the necessity of external observation for system output and operating state. Automata theory is used to explain the relation between external input, program (...) execution, and state transition. On this basis, the operating process of computing systems is summarized as “solving,” and the mechanism of “accepting input—running programs—presenting externally observable states” is defined as “forced closure.” The Church–Turing thesis is further used to extend this constraint from individual Turing machines to all computable systems, including multi-agent and multi-machine systems. Result: A computing system in a valid operating state cannot initiate solving outside the given solving structure. After accepting valid external information input, it must enter a rule-governed process and present an externally observable closed state. Without new external information input, it cannot actively break its existing externally observable stable state. Therefore, artificial intelligence remains a solver constrained by forced closure. In contrast, human beings can suspend the relation between input and action, and can actively maintain or break an externally observable stable state. Conclusion: The observable human-machine boundary lies in suspension. Current technological routes, including generative models, chain-of-thought reasoning, tool use, retrieval augmentation, reinforcement learning, multi-agent collaboration, and embodied intelligence, only optimize solving capacity within the structure of forced closure. Within the theoretical boundary of computable systems, technological iteration cannot generate subjectivity in artificial intelligence. This conclusion provides a computational-theoretical basis for the human-centered principle in artificial intelligence governance. 目的：研究合法运行状态下计算系统的机制本质，建立人机可观测边界，并判断技术迭代能否使人工智能成为主体。基于上述回答，为人工智能治理原则提供计算理论依据。 方法：从基础理论出发进行推导。以图灵停机问题明确输出的可观测性；以自动机理论论证接受输入与程序运行的关联性，揭示“接受输入—强制运行程序—强制输出可观测状态”的机制，定义计算系统为“强制闭合”的“求解 器”。以丘奇—图灵论题将约束范围扩展所有计算系统，包括多机体系。 结果和结论：通过是否接受输入/是否打破既有稳定状态的行动差异，明确了人类与计算系统的可观测边界。经对当前主流技术路线在理论基础和应用层面的逐项判定，明确了技术迭代无法突破“强制闭合”，人工智能无法成为 主体。“以人为本”的治理原则有了计算理论支持。. (shrink)

Self-emulation of automata is a switch to the ultimate state that leads the automaton into a never-ending loop. In this paper, we describe the technological singularity and critical points reached when a self-reproducing deterministic finite automaton, realized through modern AI technology, triggers an intelligence explosion, and we examine the phenomena that unfold beyond that point. We also explain the existence of a cognitive realm, one that surpasses humanity’s ability to distinguish reality from unreality caused by superintelligence, as well as (...) the new world created through its nesting. By understanding the properties of the perceptual matrix produced by deterministic finite automata, it becomes possible to offer a consistent explanation, one that does not contradict various theories, for why humanity cannot observe the randomly expanding colonies of extraterrestrial beings under a deterministic worldview in which “God does not play dice,” thereby providing a solution to the Fermi Paradox. We refer to this series of philosophical theories as “Emulationism,” and propose it here. Note: In the creation of this paper, we have undertaken all writing ourselves and have not used generative AI for text generation except for translation purposes. (shrink)

In this paper, we present an intelligent tutoring system developed to help students in learning Computer Theory. The Intelligent tutoring system was built using ITSB authoring tool. The system helps students to learn finite automata, pushdown automata, Turing machines and examines the relationship between these automata and formal languages, deterministic and nondeterministic machines, regular expressions, context free grammars, undecidability, and complexity. During the process the intelligent tutoring system gives assistance and feedback of many types in an intelligent (...) manner according to the behavior of the student. An evaluation of the intelligent tutoring system has revealed reasonably acceptable results in terms of its usability and learning abilities are concerned. (shrink)

We use the myth of Pygmalion as a lens to investigate and frame the relationship between women and artificial intelligence (AI). Pygmalion was a legendary ancient king of Cyprus and sculptor. Having been repulsed by women, he used his skills to create a statue, which was imbued with life by the goddess Aphrodite. This can be seen as one of the primordial AI-like myths, wherein humanity creates intelligent life-like self-images to reproduce or replace ourselves. In addition, the myth prefigures historical (...) and present gendered dynamics within the field of AI and between AI and society at large. Throughout history, the theme of women being replaced by inanimate objects (e.g. automata, algorithms) has been repeated, and continues to repeat in contemporary AI technologies. However, this socially detrimental pattern in technology — what we dub Pygmalion displacement — is often overlooked, whether due to naive excitement about new developments, or due to an unacknowledged sexist history of the field itself. As we demonstrate herein, Pygmalion displacement prefigures heavily, but in an unacknowledged way, in the original Turing test, the imitation game: a central thought experiment, foundational to AI. With women, and the feminine generally, being both dislocated and erased from and by technology, AI is and has been (presented as) created mainly by privileged men, subserving capitalist patriarchal ends. This poses serious dangers to women and other marginalised people. By tracing the historical and ongoing entwinement of femininity (from a patriarchal perspective) and AI, we aim to understand, make visible, and start a dialogue on the ways in which AI harms women. (shrink)

We present a comprehensive investigation into the minimal axioms required to derive quantum structure from classical computation. Through systematic analysis of multiple computational models—SK combinatory logic, reversible logic gates (Toffoli, Fredkin), reversible cellular automata, and lambda calculus—we establish that no form of computation, whether irreversible or reversible, can generate quantum structure. Our main results are: 1. The No-Go Theorem: Reversible n-bit gates are 2^n × 2^n permutation matrices that embed into the classical symplectic group Sp(2·2^n, R), not the unitary (...) group U(2^n). This theorem has been formally verified in Coq. 2. Axiom Identification: Using Generalized Probabilistic Theories (GPTs), we identify A1 (state space extension/superposition) as the unique primitive axiom that cannot be derived from computation. 3. Universality: Results hold across all Turing-complete computation models tested, establishing computation-model independence. These findings definitively answer the question "Can quantum structure be derived from computation?" with: No, without the superposition axiom A1. The gap between classical and quantum is precisely A1—and this gap is mathematically unbridgeable by computation alone. (shrink)

It has been known for long time that the cosmic sound wave was there since the early epoch of the Universe. Signatures of its existence are abound. However, such a sound wave model of cosmology is rarely developed fully into a complete framework. This paper can be considered as our second attempt towards such a complete description of the Universe based on soliton wave solution of cosmological KdV equation. Then we advance further this KdV equation by virtue of Cellular Automaton (...) method to solve the PDEs. We submit wholeheartedly Robert Kurucz’s hypothesis that Big Bang should be replaced with a finite cellular automaton universe with no expansion. Nonetheless, we are fully aware that our model is far from being complete, but it appears the proposed cellular automaton model of the Universe is very close in spirit to what Konrad Zuse envisaged long time ago. It is our hope that the new proposed method can be verified with observation data. But we admit that our model is still in its infancy, more researches are needed to fill all the missing details. (shrink)

Since the advent of computers, humans have pursued automata with superior information-processing capabilities. In the endeavor to create new entities that converge toward intellectual functions, the emergence of large language models (LLMs) that emulate AI surpassing ourselves has become a reality. With the intelligence explosion triggered by AI and the consequent emergence of superintelligence, the improvement of simulation capabilities accelerates. As this surpasses humans’ discriminative perceptual abilities between reality and unreality, a paradox arises wherein, from a modern scientific standpoint, (...) science becomes unscientific. It is thought that as our controllability over the reality we perceive is ultimately enhanced by superintelligence, even whether we ourselves exist, what happiness is, what ethics are, and whether concepts themselves ever existed become matters of uncertainty. -/- Note: In the creation of this paper, we have undertaken all writing ourselves and have not used generative AI for text generation except for translation purposes. (shrink)

“There’s Plenty of Room at the Bottom”, said the title of Richard Feynman’s 1959 seminal conference at the California Institute of Technology. Fifty years on, nanotechnologies have led computer scientists to pay close attention to the links between physical reality and information processing. Not all the physical requirements of optimal computation are captured by traditional models—one still largely missing is reversibility. The dynamic laws of physics are reversible at microphysical level, distinct initial states of a system leading to distinct final (...) states. On the other hand, as von Neumann already conjectured, irreversible information processing is expensive: to erase a single bit of information costs ~3 × 10−21 joules at room temperature. Information entropy is a thermodynamic cost, to be paid in non-computational energy dissipation. This paper addresses the problem drawing on Edward Fredkin’s Finite Nature hypothesis: the ultimate nature of the universe is discrete and finite, satisfying the axioms of classical, atomistic mereology. The chosen model is a cellular automaton with reversible dynamics, capable of retaining memory of the information present at the beginning of the universe. Such a CA can implement the Boolean logical operations and the other building bricks of computation: it can develop and host all-purpose computers. The model is a candidate for the realization of computational systems, capable of exploiting the resources of the physical world in an efficient way, for they can host logical circuits with negligible internal energy dissipation. (shrink)

Following our previous work establishing that complex structure does not automatically emerge from SK combinatory logic, we investigate whether reversible computation provides the missing ingredient for quantum structure. Through systematic analysis of four computational models—reversible logic gates (Toffoli, Fredkin), continuous-time quantum walks, reversible cellular automata, and the non-commutativity of SK operators—we establish a hierarchy of quantum-like behaviors: Level 0 (Irreversible): SK computation—classical, deterministic Level 1 (Discrete Reversible): Toffoli/Fredkin gates, RCA—classical, embeddable in Sp(2N,R) where N = 2^n for n-bit gates (...) Level 2 (Continuous-Time): U(t) = exp(-iHt) evolution—interference emerges (note: i is introduced by hand) Level 3 (Quantum): Quantum circuits—superposition, entanglement Our main finding is that reversibility alone is insufficient for quantum behavior: discrete reversible gates on n bits are 2^n × 2^n permutation matrices that embed into the classical symplectic group Sp(2·2^n,R), not the unitary group U(2^n). While continuous-time evolution introduces interference patterns, it does not generate genuine superposition. We conclude that quantum structure requires additional axioms beyond any form of computation, discrete or continuous. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Spinoza and the Theory of Organism HANS JONAS I CARTESIANDUALISMlanded speculation on the nature of life in an impasse: intelligible as, on principles of mechanics, the correlation of structure and function became within the res extensa, that of structure-plus-function with feeling or experience (modes of the res cogitans) was lost in the bifurcation, and thereby the fact of life itself became unintelligible at the same time that the explanation (...) of its bodily performance seemed to be assured. The impasse became manifest in Occasionalism : its tour de force of an extraneous, divine "synchronization" of the outer and the inner world (the latter denied to animals) not only suffered from its extreme artificiality, the common failing of such ad hoc constructions, but even at so high a cost failed to accomplish its theoretical purpose by its own terms. For the animal machine, like any machine, raises beyond the question of the "how" that of the "what for" of its functioning---of the purpose for which it had thus been constructed by its maker.1 Its performance, however devoid of immanent teleology, must serve an end, and that end must be someone's end. This end may (directly) be itself, as indeed Descartes had implied when declaring self-preservation to be the effect of the functioning of the organic automaton. In that case the existence as such of the machine would be its end--either terminally, or in turn to benefit something else. In the former case, the machine would have to be more than a machine, for a mere machine cannot enioy its existence. But since, by the rigorous conception of the res extensa, it cannot be more than a machine, its function and/or existence must serve something other than itself. Automata in Descartes ' time were mainly for entertainment (rather than work). But the raison d'etre of the living kingdom could not well be seen in God's indulging his mechanical abilities or in the amusement of celestial spectators--especially since mere complexity of arrangement does not create new quality and thus add something to the unrelieved sameness of the simple substratum that might enrich the spectrum of being. For quality, beyond the primitive determinations of the extended per se, is the subjective creature of sensation, the confused representation of quantity in a mind; and thus organisms cannot harbor it because as mere machines they lack mentality, and pure spirits cannot because they lack sensuality, or the privilege of confusion and thereby of illusion with its possible enjoyment. And as to their intellectual enjoyment, even that, deprived of the thrill of discovery by the same token, would pale in the contemplation of what to sufficiently large The concept of "machine," adopted for its strict confinementto efficientcause, is still a finalisticconcept,even thoughthe final cause is no longer internal to the entity, as a mode of its own operation,but external to it as antecedent design. [43] 44 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY intellects is nothing but the ever-repeated exemplification of the same few, elementary (and ultimately trivial) truths. There remained, then, the time-honored--Stoic as well as Christian--idea that plants and animals are for the benefit of Man. Indeed, since the existence of a living world is the necessary condition for the existence of any of its members, the self-justifying nature of at least one such member (= species) would justify the existence of the whole. In Stoicism, Man provided this end by his possession of reason, which makes him the culmination of a terrestrial scale of being that is also self-justifying throughout all its grades (the end as the best of many that are good in degrees) ; in Christianity, by his possession of an immortal soul, which makes him the sole imago Dei in creation (the end as the sole issue at stake) ; and Cartesian dualism radicalized this latter position by making man even the sole possessor of inwardness or "soul" of any kind, thus the only one of whom "end" can meaningfully be predicated as he alone can entertain ends. All other life then, the product of physical necessity, can be considered his means. However, this traditional idea, in its anthropocentric vanity never a... (shrink)

The geosciences include a wide spectrum of disciplines ranging from paleontology to climate science, and involve studies of a vast range of spatial and temporal scales, from the deep-time history of microbial life to the future of a system no less immense and complex than the entire Earth. Modeling is thus a central and indispensable tool across the geosciences. Here, we review both the history and current state of model-based inquiry in the geosciences. Research in these fields makes use of (...) a wide variety of models, such as conceptual, physical, and numerical models, and more specifically cellular automata, artificial neural networks, agent-based models, coupled models, and hierarchical models. We note the increasing demands to incorporate biological and social systems into geoscience modeling, challenging the traditional boundaries of these fields. Understanding and articulating the many different sources of scientific uncertainty – and finding tools and methods to address them – has been at the forefront of most research in geoscience modeling. We discuss not only structuralmodel uncertainties, parameter uncertainties, and solution uncertainties, but also the diverse sources of uncertainty arising from the complex nature of geoscience systems themselves. Without an examination of the geosciences, our philosophies of science and our understanding of the nature of model-based science are incomplete. (shrink)

A hypergroup, as a generalization of the notion of a group, was introduced by F. Marty in 1934. The first book in hypergroup theory was published by Corsini. Nowadays, hypergroups have found applications to many subjects of pure and applied mathematics, for example, in geometry, topology, cryptography and coding theory, graphs and hypergraphs, probability theory, binary relations, theory of fuzzy and rough sets and automata theory, physics, and also in biological inheritance.

With the advent of computers in the experimental labs, dynamic systems have become a new tool for research on problem solving and decision making. A short review of this research is given and the main features of these systems (connectivity and dynamics) are illustrated. To allow systematic approaches to the influential variables in this area, two formal frameworks (linear structural equations and finite state automata) are presented. Besides the formal background, the article sets out how the task demands of (...) system identification and system control can be realised in these environments, and how psychometrically acceptable dependent variables can be derived. (shrink)

This paper attempts to answer a central question in unsupervised learning: what does it mean to “make sense” of a sensory sequence? In our formalization, making sense involves constructing a symbolic causal theory that both explains the sensory sequence and also satisfies a set of unity conditions. The unity conditions insist that the constituents of the causal theory – objects, properties, and laws – must be integrated into a coherent whole. On our account, making sense of sensory input is a (...) type of program synthesis, but it is unsupervised program synthesis. Our second contribution is a computer implementation, the Apperception Engine, that was designed to satisfy the above requirements. Our system is able to produce interpretable human-readable causal theories from very small amounts of data, because of the strong inductive bias provided by the unity conditions. A causal theory produced by our system is able to predict future sensor readings, as well as retrodict earlier readings, and impute (fill in the blanks of) missing sensory readings, in any combination. In fact, it is able to do all three tasks simultaneously. We tested the engine in a diverse variety of domains, including cellular automata, rhythms and simple nursery tunes, multi-modal binding problems, occlusion tasks, and sequence induction intelligence tests. In each domain, we test our engine's ability to predict future sensor values, retrodict earlier sensor values, and impute missing sensory data. The Apperception Engine performs well in all these domains, significantly out-performing neural net baselines. We note in particular that in the sequence induction intelligence tests, our system achieved human-level performance. This is notable because our system is not a bespoke system designed specifically to solve intelligence tests, but a general-purpose system that was designed to make sense of any sensory sequence. (shrink)

Historically embryogenesis has been among the most philosophically intriguing phenomena. In this paper I focus on one aspect of biological development that was particularly perplexing to the ancients: self-organisation. For many ancients, the fact that an organism determines the important features of its own development required a special model for understanding how this was possible. This was especially true for Aristotle, Alexander, and Simplicius, who all looked to contemporary technology to supply that model. However, they did not all agree on (...) what kind of device should be used. In this paper I explore the way these ancients made use of technology as a model for the developing embryo. I argue that their different choices of device reveal fundamental differences in the way each thinker understood the nature of biological development itself. In the final section of the paper I challenge the traditional view (dating back to Alexander's interpretation of Aristotle) that the use of automata in GA can simply be read off from their use in the de motu. (shrink)

We propose a simple and intuitive algorithm for solving md-DFA problem using algorithm concepts within extended operators, our approach shows quadratic polynomial time and hence proves the equivalence between polynomial and non-polynomial classes, we have also shown that minimal non-emptiness of automata problem can be solved in polynomial time with help of modified subset construction, rather that building a product automaton, which lead to factorial size of the memory and time, in this work we also have used many non-tractable (...) existing examples and computed them in polynomial time, which guarantees that our algorithm solves NP-complete problem in almost linear polynomial time, we have also avoided the problem of product automata by an algorithmic approach, we are also giving the starting ground for the proof of back-reference problem which was discussed before, notion to the globally local increment is also given as the main argument towards the resolution of "P versus NP" theorem, which coincides with the finitarity term in general mathematics. (shrink)

Analog computation is an alternative to digital computation, that has recently re-gained prominence, since it includes neural networks. Further important examples are cellular automata and differential analyzers. While analog computers offer many advantages, they lack a notion of universality akin to universal digital computers. Since analog computers are best formalized as dynamical systems, we review scattered results on universal dynamical systems, identifying four senses of universality and connecting to coalgebra and domain theory. For nondeterministic systems, we construct a universal (...) system as a Fraïssé limit. It not only is universal in many of the identified senses, it also is unique in additionally being homogeneous. For deterministic systems, a universal system cannot exist, but we provide a simple method for constructing subclasses of deterministic systems with a universal and homogeneous system. This way, we introduce sofic proshifts: those systems that are limits of sofic shifts. In fact, their universal and homogeneous system even is a limit of shifts of finite type and has the shadowing property. (shrink)

Dynamic epistemic logic (DEL) extends purely modal epistemic logic (S5) by adding dynamic operators that change the model structure. Propositional dynamic logic (PDL) extends basic modal logic with programs that allow the de nition of complex modalities. We provide a common generalisation: a logic that is dynamic in both senses, and one that is not limited to S5 as its modal base. It also incorporates, and signi cantly generalises, all the features of existing extensions of DEL such as BMS [3] (...) and LCC [21]. Our dynamic operators work in two steps. First, they provide a multiplicity of transformations of the original model, one for each action in a purely syntactic action structure (in the style of BMS). Second, they specify how to combine these multiple copies to produce a new model. In each step, we use the generality of PDL to specify the transformations. The main technical contribution of the paper is to provide an axiomatisation of this general dynamic dynamic logic (GDDL). This is done by providing a computable translation of GDDL formulas to equivalent PDL formulas, thus reducing the logic to PDL, which is decidable. The proof involves switching between representing programs as terms and as automata. We also show that both BMS and LCC are special cases of GDDL, and that there are interesting applications that require the additional generality of GDDL, namely the modelling of private belief update. More recent extensions and variations of BMS and LCC are also discussed. (shrink)

The concept of morality underpins the moral responsibility that not only depends on the outward practices (or ‘output,’ in the case of humanoid robots) of the agents but on the internal attitudes (‘input’) that rational and responsible intentioned beings generate. The primary question that has initiated the extensive debate, i.e., ‘Can humanoid robots be moral?’, stems from the normative outlook where morality includes human conscience and socio-linguistic background. This paper advances the thesis that the conceptions of morality and creativity interplay (...) with linguistic human beings instead of non-linguistic humanoid robots, as humanoid robots are indeed docile automata that cannot be responsible for their actions. To eradicate human ethics in order to make way for humanoid robot ethics highlights the moral actions and adequacy that hinges the myth of creative agency and self-dependency, which a humanoid robot can scarcely express. (shrink)

Abstract For centuries, the free will debate has been paralyzed by a false binary: either human agents possess metaphysical “uncaused causation” or we are deterministic automata. I argue that free will is not a binary property but a scalar capacity inherent to life itself—the capacity to redirect causal flow toward persistence. This capacity, which I term Hormē (Ὁρμή), is the constitutive drive of living systems and scales through evolutionary complexity: from bacterial taxis to hu- man deliberation. By reframing free (...) will as what life does—not what minds have—I dissolve the traditional stalemate and provide an empirically grounded, testable account of freedom across the tree of life. The framework yields a graduated spectrum of agency—from vegetative (plants) to reflective (human)—each with measurable degrees of causal influence. This approach naturalizes free will without reducing it, offering a unified account that respects both the laws of physics and the lived reality of choice. The result is not just a philosophical solution but a scientifically testable framework with implications for neuroscience, artificial intelligence, mental health, and ethics. -/- Keywords: free will, scalar agency, Hormē, causal flow, degrees of freedom, life‐agency continu- ity, thermodynamics, navigation. (shrink)

his article will focus on the mechanistic origins of the computer metaphor, which forms the conceptual framework for the methodology of the cognitive sciences, some areas of artificial intelligence and the philosophy of mind. The connection between the history of computing technology, epistemology and the philosophy of mind is expressed through the metaphorical dictionaries of the philosophical discourse of a particular era. The conceptual clarification of this connection and the substantiation of the mechanistic components of the computer metaphor is the (...) main goal of this article. The statement is substantiated that the invention of mechanical computing devices, having a long history in the European engineering tradition, formed the prerequisites for the emergence of machine functionalism in the modern philosophy of mind. The idea of multiple implementation stems from the principle that a formal symbol system prescribes rules for the use of rational abstractions through the physical architecture of a computational engine. The article considers the reasons for the conceptual shift and reveals the semantic foundations for the metaphorical transfer of the properties of abstract objects from the theory of automata to the field of modern philosophy of mind. The criticism and ways of protecting the philosophical program of machine functionalism are analyzed by changing the content of the metaphor “Mind as machine”. The reasons for the stability of the information-computer approach in cognitive sciences are also disclosed and explained. (shrink)

The materialist approach to the body is often, if not always understood in ‘mechanistic’ terms, as the view in which the properties unique to organic, living embodied agents are reduced to or described in terms of properties that characterize matter as a whole, which allow of mechanistic explanation. Indeed, from Hobbes and Descartes in the 17th century to the popularity of automata such as Vaucanson’s in the 18th century, this vision of things would seem to be correct. In this (...) paper I aim to correct this inaccurate vision of materialism. On the contrary, the materialist project on closer consideration reveals itself to be, significantly if not exclusively, (a) a body of theories specifically focused on the contribution that ‘biology’ or rather ‘natural history’ and physiology make to metaphysical debates, (b) much more intimately connected to what we now call ‘vitalism’ (a case in point is the presence of Théophile de Bordeu, a prominent Montpellier physician and theorist of vitalism, as a fictional character and spokesman of materialism, in Diderot’s novel D’Alembert’s Dream), and ultimately (c) an anti-mechanistic doctrine which focuses on the unique properties of organic beings. To establish this revised vision of materialism I examine philosophical texts such as La Mettrie’s Man a Machine and Diderot’s D’Alembert’s Dream; medical entries in the Encyclopédie by physicians such as Ménuret and Fouquet; and clandestine combinations of all such sources (Fontenelle, Gaultier and others). (shrink)

While Autonomous Weapons Systems have obvious military advantages, there are prima facie moral objections to using them. By way of general reply to these objections, I point out similarities between the structure of law and morality on the one hand and of automata on the other. I argue that these, plus the fact that automata can be designed to lack the biases and other failings of humans, require us to automate the formulation, administration, and enforcement of law as (...) much as possible, including the elements of law and morality that are operated by combatants in war. I suggest that, ethically speaking, deploying a legally competent robot in some legally regulated realm is not much different from deploying a more or less well-armed, vulnerable, obedient, or morally discerning soldier or general into battle, a police officer onto patrol, or a lawyer or judge into a trial. All feature automaticity in the sense of deputation to an agent we do not then directly control. Such relations are well understood and well-regulated in morality and law; so there is not much challenging philosophically in having robots be some of these agents — excepting the implications of the limits of robot technology at a given time for responsible deputation. I then consider this proposal in light of the differences between two conceptions of law. These are distinguished by whether each conception sees law as unambiguous rules inherently uncontroversial in each application; and I consider the prospects for robotizing law on each. Likewise for the prospects of robotizing moral theorizing and moral decision-making. Finally I identify certain elements of law and morality, noted by the philosopher Immanuel Kant, which robots can participate in only upon being able to set ends and emotionally invest in their attainment. One conclusion is that while affectless autonomous devices might be fit to rule us, they would not be fit to vote with us. For voting is a process for summing felt preferences, and affectless devices would have none to weigh into the sum. Since they don't care which outcomes obtain, they don't get to vote on which ones to bring about. (shrink)

The advance of mechanism in science and philosophy in the 17th century created a great interest to machines or automata. Leibniz was no exception - in an early memoir Drôle de pensée he wrote admiringly about a machine that could walk on water, exhibited in Paris. The idea of automatic processing in general had a large role in his thought, as can be seen, for example, in his invention of the binary code and the so-called Calculemus!-model for solving controversies. (...) In metaphysics, the idea of an automata was expressed most clearly in the 1695 article New System of the Nature of Substances and their Communication, and the ensuing correspondence with, among others, Foucher, Bayle, Lamy, Jaquelot and Masham. In the article Leibniz discusses the soul as a spiritual machine in the context of pre-established harmony, arguing that God can "give to a substance at the outset a nature or internal force which could produce in it an orderly way (as in spiritual or formal automaton; but a free one, in the case of a substance which is endowed with a share of reason) everything that is going to happen to it, that is to say, all the appearances or expressions it is going to have, and all without the help of any created thing." The basic idea of Leibniz's spiritual machine is that the soul or entelechy is an autonomous and spontaneous unity, consisting of internal active force and producing its own perceptions (both confused and distinct). It is a self-moving machine, driven by its perceptions and appetites, but it follows (without being conscious of it) a lawful series or programme created by God. The entelechy remains the same despite undergoing an infinite number of changes. To Foucher he explained that each state of the individual substance is a consequence of its preceding one, "as if there were only God and the substance in the world". Despite this, the spiritual machine is related not only to God, but through the pre-established harmony to bodies or natural machines. However, as it is not dependent on them, the spiritual machine is superiot to natural machines. In this paper I concentrate on three moral themes related to the spiritual machine: moral deliberation, moral identity and the goal of moral action. All these themes are more or less implicit in the New System, but are discussed in more detail in the ensuing correspondence after the publication of the article. Finally, the themes are given an extended discussion especially in the second book of New Essays on Human Understanding (1704, published 1765), written partly at the same time as some of the correspondence and unpublished related material. I will first give an overview of Leibniz's position concerning the spiritual machine or automaton in the New System and then go on to explore the three moral themes one by one, as they feature in the subsequent correspondence and in the New Essays. I will show that the three topics are essential to the function of the spiritual machine – to Sophie Charlotte Leibniz wrote: "...let us say that everything in bodies happens mechanically, or in accordance with laws of motion, and that everything in the soul happens morally, or in accordance with perceived good or evil." There are many texts that anticipate the views in the New System (notably the unpublished memoir De Affectibus of 1679) and Leibniz continued to discuss its themes later on (in addition to correpondence, for example, in Theodicy of 1710 and Monadology and Principles of Nature and Grace of 1714). Here I focus on the short-term development of Leibniz's views on the topic (around 1695-1705), but I argue that his basic view of the spiritual machine did not change much after finishing the dialogue with Locke in 1704. (shrink)