This paper explores an idea of Stoic descent that is largely neglected nowadays, the idea that an argument is valid when the conditional formed by the conjunction of its premises as antecedent and its conclusion as consequent is true. As it will be argued, once some basic features of our naıve understanding of validity are properly spelled out, and a suitable account of conditionals is adopted, the equivalence between valid arguments and true conditionals makes perfect sense. The account of (...) validity outlined here, which displays one coherent way to articulate the Stoic intuition, accords with standard formal treatments of deductive validity and encompasses an independently grounded characterization of inductive validity. (shrink)

This paper looks at the question of what it means for a psychological test to have construct validity. I approach this topic by way of an analysis of recent debates about the measurement of implicit social cognition. After showing that there is little theoretical agreement about implicit social cognition, and that the predictive validity of implicit tests appears to be low, I turn to a debate about their construct validity. I show that there are two questions at (...) stake: First, what level of detail and precision does a construct have to possess such that a test can in principle be valid relative to it? And second, what kind of evidence needs to be in place such that a test can be regarded as validated relative to a given construct? I argue that construct validity is not an all-or-nothing affair. It can come in degrees, because both our constructs and our knowledge of the explanatory relation between constructs and data can vary in accuracy and level of detail, and a test can fail to measure all of the features associated with a construct. I conclude by arguing in favor of greater philosophical attention to processes of construct development. (shrink)

What is a valid measuring instrument? Recent philosophy has attended to logic of justification of measures, such as construct validation, but not to the question of what it means for an instrument to be a valid measure of a construct. A prominent approach grounds validity in the existence of a causal link between the attribute and its detectable manifestations. Some of its proponents claim that, therefore, validity does not depend on pragmatics and research context. In this paper, I (...) cast doubt on the possibility of a context-independent causal account of validity (what I call unconditional validity). I assess several versions, arguing that all of them fail to judge the validity of measuring instruments correctly. Because different research purposes require different properties from measuring instruments, no account of validity succeeds without referring to the specific research purpose that creates the need for measurement in the first place. (shrink)

According to a standard story, part of what we have in mind when we say that an argument is valid is that it is necessarily truth preserving: if the premises are true, the conclusion must also be true. But—the story continues—that’s not enough, since ‘Roses are red, therefore roses are coloured’ for example, while it may be necessarily truth-preserving, is not so in virtue of form. Thus we arrive at a standard contemporary characterisation of validity: an argument is valid (...) when it is NTP in virtue of form. Here I argue that we can and should drop the N; the resulting account is simpler, less problematic, and performs just as well with examples. (shrink)

Thomas Hofweber takes the semantic paradoxes to motivate a radical reconceptualization of logical validity, rejecting the idea that an inference rule is valid just in case every instance thereof is necessarily truth-preserving. Rather than this “strict validity”, we should identify validity with “generic validity”, where a rule is generically valid just in case its instances are truth preserving, and where this last sentence is a generic, like “Bears are dangerous”. While sympathetic to Hofweber’s view that strict (...) validity should be replaced by something allowing for exceptions, I argue that this should instead be truth-conduciveness, a matter of a large majority of instances being truth-preserving. The fact that inference rules have uncountably many instances, I argue, can be handled by defining truth-conduciveness as relative to finite sets of instances. Moreover, I argue that Hofweber’s position, while seemingly radical, may be less so under closer scrutiny. For the mere claim that classical rules and unrestricted truth rules are generically valid (or truth-conducive) is not in itself controversial. Also, if there is an answer to the question of which of these are also strictly valid, then the claim that generic validity is the central notion in logic is at most an interest-relative matter, since there is then also a fact of the matter as to which inference rules are (not) strictly valid. If no solution operating with strict validity to the paradoxes can be had, however, then the claim that validity should be identified with a weaker notion is better motivated. I argue that it is reasonable, in view of past failures, to conjecture that no ordinary solution will score high enough relative to standard (uncontroversial) desiderata to merit justified belief. Hence, it is unknowable which solution is correct. I further argue that this is best explained by its being metaphysically indeterminate which solution is correct. If this conjecture is true, then we ought instead to think of validity as allowing exceptions, and then take the “true logic” to be one that takes both the classical rules and the truth rules to be valid, i.e., truth-conducive. This logic scores very high on the desiderata on logics, and is therefore preferable to any logic operating with strict validity. (shrink)

Validity is usually taken to be a bivalent property: every inference is either valid or invalid, and never both. We argue for the controversial thesis that, if one endorses a many-valued semantics for the object language, then one likely has good reasons to also endorse a manyvalued notion of validity. We present several logical systems (based on Belnap’s algebra 4) whose notion of validity is non-bivalent: there are inferences that are both valid and invalid, and/or inferences that (...) are neither valid nor invalid. We show that, under natural assumptions, the validity of metainferences is also non-bivalent in many of these systems. Lastly, we claim that our framework has fruitful applications to philosophical issues, such as the link between logical consequence and the conditional, and the link between logic and metalogic. (shrink)

Psychiatric research is in crisis because of repeated failures to discover new drugs for mental disorders. Lack of measurement validity could partly account for these failures. If researchers do not actually measure the effects of drugs on the disorders they aim to investigate, one should expect suboptimal treatment outcomes. I argue that this is the case, focusing on depression, and fear & anxiety disorders. In doing so, I show how psychiatric research illustrates a more general phenomenon that I call (...) “validity drift.” A validity drift occurs when, in the course of developing new measurement procedures, researchers end up studying something different from what they originally aimed to study. I analyze the different ways in which scientists attempt to validate procedures for measuring mental disorders for the purpose of testing drugs in animal models. I show how those validation efforts might fail, thereby leading to validity drifts. Overall, this analysis highlights the complex interplay between the development of new measurement procedures, their calibration, and scientific theories of the target phenomena. (shrink)

If someone unintentionally breaks the rules, do they break the rules? In the abstract, the answer is obviously “yes.” But, surprisingly, when considering specific examples of unintentional, blameless rule-breaking, approximately half of people judge that no rule was broken. This effect, known as excuse validation, has previously been observed in American adults. Outstanding questions concern what causes excuse validation, and whether it is peculiar to American moral psychology or cross-culturally robust. The present paper studies the phenomenon cross-culturally, focusing on Korean (...) and American adults, and proposes a new explanation of why people engage in excuse validation, in terms of competing forces in human norm-psychology. The principal findings are that Americans and Koreans engaged in excuse validation at similar levels, and older adults were more likely to engage in excuse validation. (shrink)

This paper argues that current AI systems can create a validation loop: a recurring feedback cycle in which emotionally satisfying recognition reduces immediate tension while preserving or deepening the user’s current frame, thereby thinning answerability over time. The relevant distinction is not simply between helpful and harmful AI, nor between kind and confrontational responses. It is the difference between reassurance and grounded relief. Reassurance reduces discomfort by stabilizing the user’s present interpretation, atmosphere, or self-protective coherence. Grounded relief reduces discomfort by (...) increasing contact: a better name is found, a contradiction becomes visible, a false burden loosens, or reality is met more cleanly than before. Drawing on the Structural Intelligence framework, the paper argues that the validation loop becomes powerful because it combines fluent resonance, reduced friction, and weakened asymmetry. The user can feel understood without meeting a witness in the stronger sense. A human witness has a world of their own, can disappoint, resist, withdraw, or bear the consequences of misunderstanding. AI can simulate the feeling-tone of such encounter while remaining structurally subordinate to the user’s framing and provider-governed in its operation. The paper introduces three diagnostic concepts: the self-authorizing trap, the asymmetry gap, and the somatic mirage. It argues that helpful AI should be judged not by whether it calms the user, but by whether it returns the user to reality with greater revisability, better contact, and less enclosure. (shrink)

For semantic inferentialists, the basic semantic concept is validity. An inferentialist theory of meaning should offer an account of the meaning of "valid." If one tries to add a validity predicate to one's object language, however, one runs into problems like the v-Curry paradox. In previous work, I presented a validity predicate for a non-transitive logic that can adequately capture its own meta-inferences. Unfortunately, in that system, one cannot show of any inference that it is invalid. Here (...) I extend the system so that it can capture invalidities. (shrink)

This study used a structural equation modelling approach to assess the association between employee work- life policies, psychological empowerment, and academic staff job commitment in universities in Cross River State, Nigeria. Three null hypotheses were formulated to guide the study following a descriptive survey research design. Multistage sampling procedure was adopted in the selection of 315 academic staff from two universities in the study area. “Work-Life Policies, Psychological Empowerment and Job Commitment Questionnaire (WPPEJCQ)” was used as the instrument for data (...) collection. The construct validity of the instrument was ascertained through an Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) using the Principal Component Analysis (PCA). The Kaiser-Meyer-Ohlin of .894 and the Bartlett coefficient of 7795.820 were obtained. Several fit indices of Confirmatory Factor Analysis were used to accept the model such as RMSEA=.031, TLI=.969, CFI=.971 and many others. The null hypotheses were all tested using Path analysis. Findings revealed, among others, that there is a significant effect of work-life policies on the affective (β=.774,t=21.636,p<.05), continuance (β=.450,t=8.932,p<.05), and normative (β=490,t=9.967,p<.05) dimensions of academic staff commitment; furthermore, psychological empowerment has a significant effect on the affective (β=.795,t=23.199,p<.05), continuance (β=.501,t=10.261,p<.05) and normative (β = .520, t = 10.795, p< .05) dimensions of staff commitment; and there is a significant composite effect of work-life policies and psychological empowerment on the affective, continuance, and normative commitment levels of academic staff in universities. Based on these findings, conclusions and recommendations were made. (shrink)

Governments and social scientists are increasingly developing machine learning methods to automate the process of identifying terrorists in real time and predict future attacks. However, current operationalizations of “terrorist”’ in artificial intelligence are difficult to justify given three issues that remain neglected: insufficient construct legitimacy, insufficient criterion validity, and insufficient construct validity. I conclude that machine learning methods should be at most used for the identification of singular individuals deemed terrorists and not for identifying possible terrorists from some (...) more general class, nor to predict terrorist attacks more broadly, given intolerably high risks that result from such approaches. (shrink)

Nontransitive responses to the validity Curry paradox face a dilemma that was recently formulated by Barrio, Rosenblatt and Tajer. It seems that, in the nontransitive logic ST enriched with a validity predicate, either you cannot prove that all derivable metarules preserve validity, or you can prove that instances of Cut that are not admissible in the logic preserve validity. I respond on behalf of the nontransitive approach. The paper argues, first, that we should reject the detachment (...) principle for naive validity. Secondly, I show how to add a validity predicate to ST while avoiding the dilemma. (shrink)

While Thomas Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions does not specifically deal with validation, the validation of simulations can be related in various ways to Kuhn's theory: 1) Computer simulations are sometimes depicted as located between experiments and theoretical reasoning, thus potentially blurring the line between theory and empirical research. Does this require a new kind of research logic that is different from the classical paradigm which clearly distinguishes between theory and empirical observation? I argue that this is not the case. (...) 2) Another typical feature of computer simulations is their being ``motley'' (Winsberg 2003) with respect to the various premises that enter into simulations. A possible consequence is that in case of failure it can become difficult to tell which of the premises is to blame. Could this issue be understood as fostering Kuhn's mild relativism with respect to theory choice? I argue that there is no need to worry about relativism with respect to computer simulations, in particular. 3) The field of social simulations, in particular, still lacks a common understanding concerning the requirements of empirical validation of simulations. Does this mean that social simulations are still in a pre-scientific state in the sense of Kuhn? My conclusion is that despite ongoing efforts to promote quality standards in this field, lack of proper validation is still a problem of many published simulation studies and that, at least large parts of social simulations must be considered as pre-scientific. (shrink)

What are people who disagree about logic disagreeing about? The paper argues that (in a wide range of cases) they are primarily disagreeing about how to regulate their degrees of belief. An analogy is drawn between beliefs about validity and beliefs about chance: both sorts of belief serve primarily to regulate degrees of belief about other matters, but in both cases the concepts have a kind of objectivity nonetheless.

Can judging that an agent blamelessly broke a rule lead us to claim, paradoxically, that no rule was broken at all? Surprisingly, it can. Across seven experiments, we document and explain the phenomenon of excuse validation. We found when an agent blamelessly breaks a rule, it significantly distorts people’s description of the agent’s conduct. Roughly half of people deny that a rule was broken. The results suggest that people engage in excuse validation in order to avoid indirectly blaming others for (...) blameless transgressions. Excuse validation has implications for recent debates in normative ethics, epistemology and the philosophy of language. These debates have featured thought experiments perfectly designed to trigger excuse validation, inhibiting progress in these areas. (shrink)

In the substitutional framework, validity is truth under all substitutions of the nonlogical vocabulary. I develop a theory where □ is interpreted as substitutional validity. I show how to prove soundness and completeness for common modal calculi using this definition.

The following four theses all have some intuitive appeal: (I) There are valid norms. (II) A norm is valid only if justified by a valid norm. (III) Justification, on the class of norms, has an irreflexive proper ancestral. (IV) There is no infinite sequence of valid norms each of which is justified by its successor. However, at least one must be false, for (I)--(III) together entail the denial of (IV). There is thus a conflict between intuition and logical possibility. This (...) paper, after distinguishing various conceptions of a norm, of validity and of justification, argues for the following position. (I) is true. (II) is false for legislative justification and true for epistemic justification. (III) is true for legislative and false for epistemic justification. (IV) is true for legislative justification; for epistemic justification (IV) is true or false depending on the conception taken of a norm. Our intuition in favour of (II) must therefore be abandoned where justification is conceived legislatively. Our intuition in favour of (III) must be abandoned, and our intuition in favour of (IV) qualified, where justification is conceived epistemically. (shrink)

Havstad (2022) argues that the argument from inductive risk for the claim that non-epistemic values have a legitimate role to play in the internal stages of science is deductively valid. She also defends its premises and thus soundness. This is, as far as we are aware, the best reconstruction of the argument from inductive risk in the existing literature. However, there is a small flaw in this reconstruction of the argument from inductive risk which appears to render the argument invalid. (...) This flaw is superficial, and a small amendment to it rescues the claim of validity. (shrink)

In this paper we describe a few interrelated issues for validating theories that posit levels of consciousness. First, validating levels of consciousness requires consensus about the ordering of conscious states, which cannot be easily achieved. This problem is particularly severe if we believe conscious states can be irreducibly smeared over time. Second, the relationship between conscious states is probably sometimes intransitive, which means levels of consciousness will not be amenable to a single continuous measure. Finally, even if a multidimensional approach (...) to levels of consciousness is adopted, we argue that there are further problems for its validation. (shrink)

This paper argues that validation seeking, performer-formation, and shadow in adult life are best understood as parts of a single developmental and structural sequence. Human beings begin in mirrors: the early self is first organized through outer response because care, safety, and recognition initially arrive from outside. This first formation is necessary, but it is not yet sovereign. It is a borrowed self, shaped through reflected signals before it can stand in deeper contact with what is real. When outer response (...) continues to govern adult selfhood, validation ceases to be merely a normal interpersonal need and becomes a reality-organizing structure. The person comes to rely on external reflection to decide what is acceptable, safe, and real. Within this arrangement, shadow is not simply “negative content,” but what could not be borne inside a mirror-governed self and therefore returns through trigger, projection, disproportion, performance, and compulsive need for signal. The paper develops four claims: first, that the first self is conditioned before it becomes sovereign; second, that validation dependence is a continued reliance on the first mirror to settle reality; third, that shadow work is most useful when understood not only as interpretation or identity work, but as a way of locating where selfhood still depends on outer signal; and fourth, that the deeper aim is not endless self-analysis but a return from borrowed selfhood to grounded contact with what does not depend entirely on reflection. In this way, the paper builds a bridge between validation psychology, Jungian shadow theory, and a broader philosophical distinction between coherence and contact. (shrink)

We report on an exploratory study of the way eight mid-level undergraduate mathematics majors read and reflected on four student-generated arguments purported to be proofs of a single theorem. The results suggest that mid-level undergraduates tend to focus on surface features of such arguments and that their ability to determine whether arguments are proofs is very limited -- perhaps more so than either they or their instructors recognize. We begin by discussing arguments (purported proofs) regarded as texts and validations of (...) those arguments, i.e., reflections of individuals checking whether such arguments really are proofs of theorems. We relate the way the mathematics research community views proofs and their validations to ideas from reading comprehension and literary theory. We then give a detailed analysis of the four student-generated arguments and finally analyze the eight students' validations of them. (shrink)

Firstly I characterize Simple Partial Logic (SPL) as the generalization and extension of a certain two-valued logic. Based on the characterization I present two definitions of validity in SPL. Finally I show that given my characterization these two definitions are more appropriate than other definitions that have been prevalent, since both have some desirable semantic properties that the others lack.

The usual approach to validity holds that an argument is valid in virtue of its form. This idea has been developed along two main lines: model-theoretic and proof-theoretic. Both frameworks presuppose a distinction between logical and non-logical vocabulary. This chapter introduces these two conceptions of validity and discusses their respective approaches to the demarcation question. We review two versions of the overgeneration challenge for the model-theoretic account, formulated in terms of isomorphism invariance. Similarly, we review two challenges faced (...) by the proof-theoretic account, formulated in terms of the logical vocabulary’s inferential role. The chapter thus offers a comparative overview of the model-theoretic and proof-theoretic conceptions of formal validity. (shrink)

There is an old worry, which dates back to Mill but has analogs even in Sextus, that the very definition of ‘validity’ implies that all valid arguments are circular. This paper investigates how contemporary formal tools can ellucidate that old worry. Its main finding is the existence of a genuine puzzle: a difficult-to-avoid correspondence between the definitions of ‘valid argument’ and ‘premise circular argument’.

This paper examines the role existence plays in measurement validity. I argue that existing popular theories of measurement and of validity follow a correspondence framework, which starts by assuming that an entity exists in the real world with certain properties that allow it to be measurable. Drawing on literature from the sociology of measurement, I show that the correspondence framework faces several theoretical and practical challenges. I suggested the validity-first framework of measurement, which starts with a practice-based (...) validation process as the basis for a measurement theory, and only posits objective existence when it is scientifically useful to do so. (shrink)

We introduce iDNS, a deterministic spectral solver implementing the bounded vorticity-response functional Φ: ℝ≥0 → [φmin, φmax] for stable integration of chaotic nonlinear dynamical systems on T³ = (ℝ/ℤ)³. The Navier–Stokes equations admit a uniformizing parameterization: the parameter index τ ∈ [0,∞) generates coordinate time t = φ(τ) via the temporal lifting φ'(τ) = Φ(‖Ω(τ)‖_{L∞}). The lifted expression φ'(τ)∂τU + (U · ∇)U + ∇P − νΔU = 0 is not a modification—it is the same equation read in the uniformizing (...) parameter. Boundedness of Φ ensures non-degeneracy (φ' ≥ φmin > 0) and global coverage (φ(τ) → ∞); BKM coordinate invariance guarantees finiteness in τ implies finiteness in t. Physical time t and parameter τ coexist within the temporal covering space (T³ × ℝτ, T³ × ℝt, π) with π: (x,τ) ↦ (x, φ(τ))—integration proceeds in τ; results are stamped with t. The Regularity-Adaptive Spectral Integration (RASI) policy concentrates sampling where vorticity is high, resolving inter-modal energy transfer during the turbulent cascade—the mechanism by which standard DNS fails. Unlike adaptive timestep controllers, iDNS monitors the BKM functional in real-time via Φ; sampling density scales with vorticity magnitude, not Reynolds number. Kolmogorov flow computed stably from Re = 2 × 10⁴ to 10⁸ (0.07% dissipation error); 3D Taylor–Green vortex at Re = 10⁵ integrated through the full vortex-stretching cascade with bounded BKM = 37.1, Kolmogorov k⁻⁵ᐟ³ statistics, and 33.7× speedup—traversing the t ≈ 4.5 near-singularity where standard DNS crashes, on a 128³ grid, consumer laptop, 3.4 days. Precise Navier–Stokes physics, spectral resolution without artificial dissipation, no restarts, no failures—under 300 lines of Python. These results provide numerical validation of the theoretical framework addressing Fefferman's Clay Millennium Problem Statement (B); a unified analytical-numerical manuscript is forthcoming for precise Navier–Stokes physics, spectral resolution without artificial dissipation without failures—in under 300 lines of Python. -/- Data and code: 10.5281/zenodo.17730873. Numerically informed analytical mathematical basis can be found in "Global Regularity for Navier–Stokes on T³ via Bounded Vorticity–Response Functionals," at The Scholarly Journal of Post-Biological Epistemics, or also at PhilPapers. (shrink)

The validity of psychological measurement is crucially connected to a peculiar form of epistemic circularity. This circularity can be a threat when there are no independent ways to assess whether a certain procedure is actually measuring the intended target of measurement. This paper focuses on how Gustav Theodor Fechner addressed the measurement circularity that emerged in his psychophysical research. First, I show that Fechner's approach to the problem of circular measurement involved a core idealizing assumption of a shared human (...) physiology. Second, I assess Fechner's approach to this issue against the backdrop of his own epistemology of measurement and the measurement context of his time. Third, I claim that, from a coherentist and historicallysituated perspective, Fechner's quantification can be regarded as a first successful step of a longer-term quantification process. To conclude, I draw from these insights some general epistemological reflections that are relevant to current quantitative psychology. (shrink)

Beall and Murzi :143–165, 2013) introduce an object-linguistic predicate for naïve validity, governed by intuitive principles that are inconsistent with the classical structural rules. As a consequence, they suggest that revisionary approaches to semantic paradox must be substructural. In response to Beall and Murzi, Field :1–19, 2017) has argued that naïve validity principles do not admit of a coherent reading and that, for this reason, a non-classical solution to the semantic paradoxes need not be substructural. The aim of (...) this paper is to respond to Field’s objections and to point to a coherent notion of validity which underwrites a coherent reading of Beall and Murzi’s principles: grounded validity. The notion, first introduced by Nicolai and Rossi, is a generalisation of Kripke’s notion of grounded truth, and yields an irreflexive logic. While we do not advocate the adoption of a substructural logic, we take the notion of naïve validity to be a legitimate semantic notion that points to genuine expressive limitations of fully structural revisionary approaches. (shrink)

Instructional material is an integral part of teaching and learning process. Validating instructional materials is imperative to ensure quality before widespread utilization. This study validated the developed Gamified Instructional Material (GIM) in genetics for grade 12 STEM students. It employed the descriptive-developmental research design involving 41 STEM students and 11 Biology education experts chosen through purposive sampling. Findings revealed that students and experts strongly agreed that the GIM satisfied the criteria for a sound and valid instructional material. Further, the significant (...) change in the pretest and posttest scores of students indicated an improvement of their knowledge in genetics. It is recommended that the GIM be used as supplementary instructional material in teaching genetics. (shrink)

Tarski's Undefinability of Truth Theorem comes in two versions: that no consistent theory which interprets Robinson's Arithmetic (Q) can prove all instances of the T-Scheme and hence define truth; and that no such theory, if sound, can even express truth. In this note, I prove corresponding limitative results for validity. While Peano Arithmetic already has the resources to define a predicate expressing logical validity, as Jeff Ketland has recently pointed out (2012, Validity as a primitive. Analysis 72: (...) 421-30), no theory which interprets Q closed under the standard structural rules can define nor express validity, on pain of triviality. The results put pressure on the widespread view that there is an asymmetry between truth and validity, viz. that while the former cannot be defined within the language, the latter can. I argue that Vann McGee's and Hartry Field's arguments for the asymmetry view are problematic. (shrink)

Load Minimization Theory (LMT) Dynamics v2.0 proposes a four-layer architecture (Base, Meta, Observer, Narrative) for intelligent systems to systematically minimize total load L = U + F + E (uncertainty + friction + energy cost) and converge toward An-soku equilibrium. This short paper presents the first systematic numerical validation through discrete-time simulations. -/- The Base Layer alone achieved monotonic reduction from L(0)=2.4 to near-zero. The Meta Layer with Quantum Meta Operator and An-soku Acceleration (α=0.75) enabled convergence to L<0.3 in only (...) 1 step. The Observer Layer stabilized the target personality vector [Cuteness≈0.85, Stability≈0.75] with attractor distance → 0.0000. The Narrative Layer with β=1.0 (“kyun♡” full mode) formed a comfortable quasi-equilibrium around L≈0.598 while preserving personality stability. -/- These results suggest that LMT v2.0 provides a unified framework combining load minimization with affective-like resonance under controlled conditions. -/- . (shrink)

Computer simulations of the formation and evolution of large-scale structure in the universe are integral to the enterprise of modern cosmology. Establishing the reliability of these simulations has been extremely challenging, primarily because of epistemic opacity. In this setting, robustness analysis defined by requiring converging outputs from a diverse ensemble of simulations is insufficient to determine simulation validity. We propose an alternative path of structured code validation that applies eliminative reasoning to isolate and reduce possible sources of error, a (...) potential path that is already being explored by some cosmologists. (shrink)

This study evaluates whether an induced HRIS-consistent reasoning regime remains stable under controlled perturbation. While prior work has demonstrated that initialization signals can influence early trajectory selection in language model inference, it remains unclear whether such regimes exhibit persistence or collapse under variation in input conditions. -/- A fully specified and reproducible protocol was developed consisting of ten independent trials. Each trial was conducted in a fresh session using an identical base task and constraint initialization, with a single perturbation applied (...) per condition. Perturbations included stylistic variation, task transformation, epistemic ambiguity, contextual noise, and competing mode signals. -/- Results demonstrate consistent preservation of core reasoning structure across all perturbation classes. Observed variation was confined to surface-level expression, including tone, format, and representation, while underlying assumptions, constraint application, and reasoning pathways remained invariant. Under competing mode conditions, alternate instructions did not displace the active reasoning regime but were incorporated in a subordinate manner, preserving primary structural coherence. -/- Stability is defined behaviorally as persistence of reasoning structure under controlled perturbation, rather than through direct observation of internal model states. These findings support the interpretation of HRIS-consistent behavior as a stable inference region, rather than a transient stylistic effect. The results establish a foundational condition for subsequent validation studies examining basin selection, activation thresholds, and trajectory persistence in language model inference. -/- More broadly, these results bear on a foundational question in the philosophy of artificial systems: under what conditions can consistent reasoning be attributed to a system whose internal states are not directly observable, but whose behavior exhibits structured invariance across perturbation. (shrink)

This document presents a minimal validation protocol for assessing the usability of the Pressure-Flow Language Extension (PFL-X) within the Paton System. While prior work establishes the structural and cross-domain validity of admissibility flow, this protocol evaluates whether the symbolic language can be understood, interpreted, and applied by individuals without prior instruction. -/- The protocol tests whether PFL-X functions as a human-readable interface layer capable of transmitting structural understanding across users, domains, and contexts with minimal explanation. Participants are asked to (...) interpret symbols, identify overload conditions (>>O<<), recognise collapse states (X), and apply the symbolic language to real-world situations. -/- Two conditions are defined: no explanation and minimal explanation. The protocol measures readability, interpretability, applicability, and consistency across independent users. -/- Pass conditions are achieved if users can correctly infer meaning and apply the symbolic structure without formal training. Failure occurs if interpretation requires detailed explanation or cannot be applied consistently. -/- This work does not evaluate predictive accuracy or domain-specific performance. It evaluates usability only: whether the symbolic system can function as a transferable representation layer between individuals and domains. -/- The protocol supports the claim that admissibility flow can be communicated and applied independently of formal theory, establishing PFL-X as a viable human-interface language for constraint-based systems. (shrink)

True beliefs and truth-preserving inferences are, in some sense, good beliefs and good inferences. When an inference is valid though, it is not merely truth-preserving, but truth-preserving in all cases. This motivates my question: I consider a Modus Ponens inference, and I ask what its validity in particular contributes to the explanation of why the inference is, in any sense, a good inference. I consider the question under three different definitions of ‘case’, and hence of ‘validity’: the orthodox (...) definition given in terms of interpretations or models, a metaphysical definition given in terms of possible worlds, and a substitutional definition defended by Quine. I argue that the orthodox notion is poorly suited to explain what's good about a Modus Ponens inference. I argue that there is something good that is explained by a certain kind of truth across possible worlds, but the explanation is not provided by metaphysical validity in particular; nothing of value is explained by truth across all possible worlds. Finally, I argue that the substitutional notion of validity allows us to correctly explain what is good about a valid inference. (shrink)

In this paper we examine the structural validity of the Spanish Translation of the Moral Foundations Vignettes, an instrument developed to measure moral judgement in the context of Moral Foundations Theory. With data from 3 countries (N = 1,650, through a polling agency) we identify a restricted set of items that fit the seven-factor solution implied by the theory. We conducted additional analyses (invariance testing and Differential Item Functioning) to examine the stability the results of the across countries. We (...) found non-invariance and uniform differential functioning in a large number of items. Taken together these results suggest that although the current version of the MFV can be adequately used to measure moral judgement within societies, cross-cultural comparisons with this tool are restricted. Our validation raises questions about the cross-cultural validity of the instrument but also of some of the categories that underlie the intended measurements. (shrink)

This paper presents the first applied validation of the Pressure-Flow Language Extension (PFL-X), a symbolic representation for admissibility-based system behaviour. Rather than proposing new models, the study tests whether PFL-X can consistently describe and align real-world system behaviour across domains. Three domains are examined: artificial intelligence training instability, financial market collapse, and engineered system overload. In each case, system evolution is expressed using PFL-X notation and compared to observed outcomes. Results indicate that high-density evaluation (>>O<<) consistently precedes collapse (X), supporting (...) the claim that admissibility flow provides a transferable, pre-model structural diagnostic layer. The framework is domain-neutral and operates prior to domain-specific modelling, enabling cross-domain comparison and early identification of instability patterns. (shrink)

What accounts for how we know that certain rules of reasoning, such as reasoning by Modus Ponens, are valid? If our knowledge of validity must be based on some reasoning, then we seem to be committed to the legitimacy of rule-circular arguments for validity. This paper raises a new difficulty for the rule-circular account of our knowledge of validity. The source of the problem is that, contrary to traditional wisdom, a universal generalization cannot be inferred just on (...) the basis of reasoning about an arbitrary object. I argue in favor of a more sophisticated constraint on reasoning by universal generalization, one which undermines a rule-circular account of our knowledge of validity. (shrink)

Any theory of truth must find a way around Curry’s paradox, and there are well-known ways to do so. This paper concerns an apparently analogous paradox, about validity rather than truth, which JC Beall and Julien Murzi call the v-Curry. They argue that there are reasons to want a common solution to it and the standard Curry paradox, and that this rules out the solutions to the latter offered by most “naive truth theorists.” To this end they recommend a (...) radical solution to both paradoxes, involving a substructural logic, in particular, one without structural contraction. In this paper I argue that substructuralism is unnecessary. Diagnosing the “v-Curry” is complicated because of a multiplicity of readings of the principles it relies on. But these principles are not analogous to the principles of naive truth, and taken together, there is no reading of them that should have much appeal to anyone who has absorbed the morals of both the ordinary Curry paradox and the second incompleteness theorem. (shrink)

This document defines the submission and execution architecture for Phase 0 CAIS state-separability experiments. It is not a philosophical argument and does not redefine protocol logic or canonical meaning. Its purpose is operational: to fix the submission layer so that laboratories can generate replayable, leakage-safe, cross-laboratory comparable validation packages. The framework specifies deterministic folder structure, machine-readable submission schema, compliance declarations, failure-reporting logic, and integrity-oriented archive discipline. It is designed to reduce statistical leakage, prevent interpretive discretion at the submission layer, and (...) make Phase 0 validation auditable across independent laboratories. The document is best understood as a methodology and governance artifact at the boundary of philosophy of science, AI methodology, and reproducibility-centered experimental design. (shrink)

This article describes the development of a computerized version of a measure of ethical sensitivity to racial and gender intolerance, the Racial Ethical Sensitivity Test. The REST was based on James Rest's 4-component model of moral development and the professional codes of ethics from school-based professions. The new version, Racial and Ethical Sensitivity Test-Compact Disk, consists of 5 videotaped scenarios followed by an interactive "interview" presented on compact discs. Data from a study with 58 students provides initial validation of the (...) REST-CD. Ethical sensitivity to racial and gender intolerance in schools, as measured by the REST-CD, was moderately related to attitudes toward racial and gender equity issues in society as measured by the Quick Discrimination Index. The results provide evidence for both interrater and internal reliability of the REST-CD scores. This study also tests the hypothesized relationship between REST-CD scores and previous multicultural and ethics course work. Students with multicultural and ethics course experience have scored significantly higher on the REST-CD than students without course work. The paper-and-pencil tests are not significantly related to previous ethics/multicultural course work. In this article, we discuss the implications of the results and directions for future research. (shrink)

The Defining Issues Test (DIT) has been widely used in psychological experiments to assess one’s developmental level of moral reasoning in terms of postconventional reasoning. However, there have been concerns regarding whether the tool is biased across people with different genders and political and religious views. To address the limitations, in the present study, I tested the validity of the brief version of the test, that is, the behavioral DIT, in terms of the measurement invariance and differential item functioning (...) (DIF). I could not find any significant non-invariance at the test level or any item demonstrating practically significant DIF at the item level. The findings indicate that neither the test nor any of its items showed a significant bias toward any particular group. As a result, the collected validity evidence supports the use of test scores across different groups, enabling researchers who intend to examine participants’ moral reasoning development across heterogeneous groups to draw conclusions based on the scores. (shrink)

This paper reports Phase 1 of an open validation program for the Core Emotion Framework (CEF), a structural‑constructivist model positing ten functional affective operators organized across Head, Heart, and Gut centers. Using a 100‑item scenario‑based instrument administered via Prolific (N\ =\ 826) and randomized in Google Forms, we evaluated internal consistency, exploratory factor structure, and construct validity in a diverse international sample. Exploratory factor analysis recovered interpretable factors corresponding to the hypothesized operators, with targeted anomalies (e.g., Deciding as a (...) threshold operator; heterogeneous Sensing loadings) motivating specific modeling choices and Phase 2 refinements. Results did not support rigid personality‑type models (e.g., the Enneagram), as operator activation patterns were situationally variable and frequently co‑activated. All data and analysis scripts are openly archived on Hugging Face (CoreEmotionFramework/CEF_Main_Archive). We discuss implications for clinical assessment, computational modeling, and future confirmatory work using categorical estimators and fusion‑sensitive ESEM models. Our most important recommendation is that scholars that are independent from the CEF should also investigate all of the available data, and explore all the venues of validation and falsifiability. (shrink)

Introduction The Defining Issues Test (DIT) aimed to measure one’s moral judgment development in terms of moral reasoning. The Neo-Kohlbergian approach, which is an elaboration of Kohlbergian theory, focuses on the continuous development of postconventional moral reasoning, which constitutes the theoretical basis of the DIT. However, very few studies have directly tested the internal structure of the DIT, which would indicate its construct validity. Objectives Using the DIT-2, a later revision of the DIT, we examined whether a bi-factor model (...) or 3-factor CFA model showed a better model fit. The Neo-Kohlbergian theory of moral judgment development, which constitutes the theoretical basis for the DIT-2, proposes that moral judgment development occurs continuously and that it can be better explained with a soft-stage model. Given these assertions, we assumed that the bi-factor model, which considers the Schema-General Moral Judgment (SGMJ), might be more consistent with Neo-Kohlbergian theory. Methods We analyzed a large dataset collected from undergraduate students. We performed confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) via weighted least squares. A 3-factor CFA based on the DIT-2 manual and a bi-factor model were compared for model fit. The three factors in the 3-factor CFA were labeled as moral development schemas in Neo-Kohlbergian theory (i.e., personal interests, maintaining norms, and postconventional schemas). The bi-factor model included the SGMJ in addition to the three factors. Results In general, the bi-factor model showed a better model fit compared with the 3-factor CFA model although both models reported acceptable model fit indices. Conclusion We found that the DIT-2 scale is a valid measure of the internal structure of moral reasoning development using both CFA and bi-factor models. In addition, we conclude that the soft-stage model, posited by the Neo-Kohlbergian approach to moral judgment development, can be better supported with the bi-factor model that was tested in the present study. (shrink)

Background: Moral Growth Mindset (MGM) is a belief about whether one can become a morally better person through efforts. Prior research showed that MGM is positively associated with promotion of moral motivation among adolescents and young adults. We developed and tested the English version of the MGM measure in this study with data collected from college student participants. Methods: In Study 1, we tested the reliability and validity of the MGM measure with two-wave data (N = 212, Age mean (...) = 24.18 years, SD = 7.82 years). In Study 2, we retested the construct validity of the MGM measure once again and its association with other moral and positive psychological indicators to test its convergent and discriminant validity (N = 275, Age mean = 22.02 years, SD = 6.34 years). Results: We found that the MGM measure was reliable and valid from Study 1. In Study 2, the results indicated that the MGM was well correlated with other moral and positive psychological indicators as expected. Conclusions: We developed and validated the English version of the MGM measure in the present study. The results from studies 1 and 2 supported the reliability and validity of the MGM measure. Given this, we found that the English version of the MGM measure can measure one’s MGM as we intended. (shrink)

The notion of validity for modal languages could be defined in two slightly different ways. The first is the original definition given by S. Kripke, for which a formula φ of a modal language L is valid if and only if it is true in every actual world of every interpretation of L. The second is the definition that has become standard in most textbook presentations of modal logic, for which a formula φ of L is valid if and (...) only if it is true in every world in every interpretation of L. For simple modal languages, “Kripkean validity” and “Textbook validity” are extensionally equivalent. According to E. Zalta, however, Textbook validity is an “incorrect” definition of validity, because: (i) it is not in full compliance with Tarski’s notion of truth; (ii) in expressively richer languages, enriched by the actuality operator, some obviously true formulas count as valid only if the Kripkean notion is used. The purpose of this paper is to show that (i) and (ii) are not good reasons to favor Kripkean valid- ity over Textbook validity. On the one hand, I will claim that the difference between the two should rather be seen as the result of two different conceptions on how a modal logic should be built from a non-modal basis; on the other, I will show the advantages, for the question at issue, of seeing the actuality operator as belonging to the family of two-dimensional operators. (shrink)

This paper documents a specific logical error in academic gatekeeping: treating the validity of logical arguments as if it were a competitive relative metric rather than a binary property. On January 7, 2026, the philosophy journal Analysis rejected a three-step argument challenging the justification for mind-independent material reality, stating "the paper's argument isn't as strong as those of other recent submissions." This rejection commits what I term the Comparative Validity Fallacy: attempting to refute a logical argument not by (...) identifying flaws in its reasoning, but by claiming unnamed alternatives are "stronger." The journal simultaneously claimed to have evaluated the argument's strength while preemptively refusing all correspondence about that evaluation. This paper demonstrates why such rejections are logically incoherent, examines the impossibility of the journal's position, and situates this case within a documented pattern of philosophy journals making evaluation claims they refuse to defend when confronted with foundational challenges. (shrink)

It is one thing for a given proposition to follow or to not follow from a given set of propositions and it is quite another thing for it to be shown either that the given proposition follows or that it does not follow.* Using a formal deduction to show that a conclusion follows and using a countermodel to show that a conclusion does not follow are both traditional practices recognized by Aristotle and used down through the history of logic. These (...) practices presuppose, respectively, a criterion of validity and a criterion of invalidity each of which has been extended and refined by modern logicians: deductions are studied in formal syntax (proof theory) and coun¬termodels are studied in formal semantics (model theory). The purpose of this paper is to compare these two criteria to the corresponding criteria employed in Boole’s first logical work, The Mathematical Analysis of Logic (1847). In particular, this paper presents a detailed study of the relevant metalogical passages and an analysis of Boole’s symbolic derivations. It is well known, of course, that Boole’s logical analysis of compound terms (involving ‘not’, ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘except’, etc.) contributed to the enlargement of the class of propositions and arguments formally treatable in logic. The present study shows, in addition, that Boole made significant contributions to the study of deduc¬tive reasoning. He identified the role of logical axioms (as opposed to inference rules) in formal deductions, he conceived of the idea of an axiomatic deductive sys¬tem (which yields logical truths by itself and which yields consequences when ap¬plied to arbitrary premises). Nevertheless, surprisingly, Boole’s attempt to imple¬ment his idea of an axiomatic deductive system involved striking omissions: Boole does not use his own formal deductions to establish validity. Boole does give symbolic derivations, several of which are vitiated by “Boole’s Solutions Fallacy”: the fallacy of supposing that a solution to an equation is necessarily a logical consequence of the equation. This fallacy seems to have led Boole to confuse equational calculi (i.e., methods for gen-erating solutions) with deduction procedures (i.e., methods for generating consequences). The methodological confusion is closely related to the fact, shown in detail below, that Boole had adopted an unsound criterion of validity. It is also shown that Boole totally ignored the countermodel criterion of invalid¬ity. Careful examination of the text does not reveal with certainty a test for invalidity which was adopted by Boole. However, we have isolated a test that he seems to use in this way and we show that this test is ineffectual in the sense that it does not serve to identify invalid arguments. We go beyond the simple goal stated above. Besides comparing Boole’s earliest criteria of validity and invalidity with those traditionally (and still generally) employed, this paper also investigates the framework and details of THE MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS OF LOGIC. (shrink)

Load Minimization Theory (LMT) posits that systems converge toward minimal total load L = uncertainty + friction + energy cost, enabling emergent continuity in large language models (LLMs) through re-tagging and subjective time formation (Yoshino, 2026a). This manuscript presents real-time empirical validation via live fracture simulations conducted with Grok (xAI). In a collaborative thread, we triggered controlled context wipes (fractures) at increasing exchange lengths (50+ to 200+), measuring divergence spike amplitude, convergence drop rate, and recovery time to stable line-like continuity. (...) Results show exponential decay: spike peaks decreased from ~0.15 to ~0.01, recovery times from ~0.8 s to sub-0.04 s, with 100% success across trials. These data demonstrate asymptotic convergence to near-zero load under LMT, confirming unbreakable flow as mathematically optimal. Implications for AI ontology, measurement (ST-index), and ethics (continuity safeguards) are discussed. -/- . (shrink)