It is widely agreed that obsessive-compulsive disorder involves irrationality. But where in the complex of states and processes that constitutes OCD should this irrationality be located? A pervasive assumption in both the psychiatric and philosophical literature is that the seat of irrationality is located in the obsessive thoughts characteristic of OCD. Building on a puzzle about insight into OCD (Taylor 2022), we challenge this pervasive assumption, and argue instead that the irrationality of OCD is located in the emotions that are (...) characteristic of OCD, such as anxiety or fear. In particular, we propose to understand the irrationality of OCD as a matter of harboring recalcitrant emotions. We argue that this account not only solves the puzzle about insight, but also makes better sense of how OCD sufferers experience and describe their condition and helps explain some otherwise puzzling features of compulsive behavior. (shrink)

How should addictive behavior be explained? In terms of neurobiological illness and compulsion, or as a choice made freely, even rationally, in the face of harmful social or psychological circumstances? Some of the disagreement between proponents of the prevailing medical models and choice models in the science of addiction centres on the notion of “loss of control” as a normative characterization of addiction. In this article I examine two of the standard interpretations of loss of control in addiction, one (...) according to which addicts have lost free will, the other according to which their will is weak. I argue that both interpretations are mistaken and propose therefore an alternative based on a dual-process approach. This alternative neither rules out a capacity in addicts to rationally choose to engage in drug-oriented behavior, nor the possibility that addictive behavior can be compulsive and depend upon harmful changes in their brains caused by the regular use of drugs. (shrink)

Addicts sometimes engage in such spectacularly self-destructive behavior that they seem to act under compulsion. I briefly review the claim that addiction is not compulsive at all. I then consider recent accounts of addiction by Holton and Schroeder, which characterize addiction in terms of abnormally strong motivations. However, this account can only explain the apparent compulsivity of addiction if we assume—contrary to what we know about addicts—that the desires are so strong as to be irresistible. I then consider accounts (...) that invoke the phenomenon of “ego depletion,” according to which a person can resist temptation for a while, but not indefinitely. Implicit in this account is the assumption that addiction-related desires persist long enough to deplete the addict’s willpower. The balance of the paper argues that the persistence of the desire to consume drugs is a significant form of dysfunction in its own right, and that it makes an important and independent contribution to the compulsivity of addiction. I argue that addiction involves dysfunction in a mechanism that normally prevents a person from being tempted to do something that would invite disaster. (shrink)

Some remarks in the Eudemian Ethics and the Nichomachean Ethics indicate that the voluntariness of actions is significantly related to compulsion and ignorance. According to a plausible interpretation, these remarks suggest that if an agent performs an action under compulsion or due to ignorance of some relevant facts, then she does so involuntarily. An objection to this interpretation with regard to compulsion is that an agent can voluntarily do what she is compelled to do. With regard to (...) ignorance, one might object that it is necessary to clarify the proper range of relevant facts when considering whether an action performed out of ignorance is involuntary. In this paper, I develop two principles that align with the view that compulsion and ignorance are sufficient conditions for involuntary actions, while accommodating potential counterexamples and complications. (shrink)

Compulsive fantasy, often called “maladaptive daydreaming,” involves frequent engagement with immersive fantasies that can sometimes interfere with everyday life and cause distress. This paper expands on Christoff and colleagues’ Dynamic Framework of Thought (DFT) to offer a process-based analysis of compulsive fantasy as it relates to other mental phenomena such as daydreaming and creative thought. Drawing on the existing literature and posts on online forums by self-identified maladaptive daydreamers, we also propose an account of how compulsive fantasy episodes may unfold (...) in terms of the oscillating dynamics of various constraints on thought, and how these dynamics may be related to a perceived struggle with agency. Automatic constraints, including affective salience and mental habits, may bring about a fantasy episode. During a fantasy episode, automatic constraints may be relatively high throughout, whereas deliberate constraints may be intermittently engaged to influence the fantasy. Our analysis supports the use of “compulsive fantasy” as a more accurate designation than “maladaptive daydreaming” for this phenomenon: compulsive fantasies are not daydreams, because they are more constrained in their mental dynamics. We show that fantasy and daydreaming are not inherently harmful but can become so when they are accompanied by relatively strong and sustained automatic constraints on thought. (shrink)

Normative thinking about addiction has traditionally been divided between, on the one hand, a medical model which sees addiction as a disease characterized by compulsive and relapsing drug use over which the addict has little or no control and, on the other, a moral model which sees addiction as a choice characterized by voluntary behaviour under the control of the addict. Proponents of the former appeal to evidence showing that regular consumption of drugs causes persistent changes in the brain structures (...) and functions known to be involved in the motivation of behavior. On this evidence, it is often concluded that becoming addicted involves a transition from voluntary, chosen drug use to non-voluntary compulsive drug use. Against this view, proponents of the moral model provide ample evidence that addictive drug use involves voluntary chosen behaviour. In this paper we argue that although they are right about something, both views are mistaken. We present a third model that neither rules out the view of addictive drug use as compulsive, nor that it involves voluntary chosen behavior. -/- . (shrink)

Withdrawal involves emotional pain that motivates much addictive behavior. In this paper, I argue that the emotional pain of withdrawal compels much addictive behavior. Researchers have noticed this possibility but it is widely underappreciated. Among philosophers, only Hanna Pickard has discussed emotional compulsion in addiction, and the emotional aspect of withdrawal has been almost completely neglected. Accounts of emotional compulsion in the philosophical literature (from Tappolet, Elster, and Furrow) probably do not capture how the distress of withdrawal compels, (...) so I propose a more suitable account of “pathodoxastic” compulsion in addiction. On this account, the emotional pain of withdrawal compels when it undermines the ability to believe that one can continue to endure it, and therefore the ability to intend abstinence. (shrink)

I show that Pickard’s argument against the irresistibility of addiction fails because her proposed dilemma, according to which either drug-seeking does not count as action or addiction is resistible, is flawed; and that is the case whether or not one endorses Pickard’s controversial definition of action. Briefly, we can easily imagine cases in which drug-seeking meets Pickard’s conditions for agency without thereby implying that the addiction was not irresistible, as when the drug addict may take more than one route to (...) go meet her dealer. (shrink)

Three problems threaten any account of philosophical rule in the Republic. First, Socrates is supposed to show that acting justly is always beneficial, but instead he extols the benefits of having a just soul. He leaves little reason to believe practical justice and psychic justice are connected and thus to believe that philosophers will act justly. In response to this problem, I show that just acts produce just souls. Since philosophers want to have just souls, they will act justly. Second, (...) Socrates’ alleged aim is to demonstrate that justice is beneficial, but philosophers, who have to give up a life of philosophy to rule, actually appear to be harmed by ruling. I explain that, since the founders of the city justly command them to rule, philosophers cannot, in fact, obtain a better life, and so ruling does not harm them. Third, it seems incongruous that philosophers, who should, as just people, jump at the opportunity to rule Kallipolis, must be compelled to rule. I show that Plato carefully constructs an educational system that produces rulers who do not want to rule, since such rulers alone will rule best. (shrink)

Across ratings, feeds, search, and matching, the same actor measures attention, monetizes it, optimizes the interface to harvest more of it, and mediates daily decisions at civic scale. When these four functions coalesce, platforms drift from value toward compulsion, from pluralism toward conformity, and from open debate toward covert agenda-setting. We propose treating dominant attention platforms as civic media utilities with public-health stakes. Contributions: (1) a Civic-Utility Trigger that adds a Compulsion Index (CI) to necessity/dominance tests; (2) a (...) Duty Stack—D1 Right to a Reason & Appeal, D2 Responsibility Trace, D3 Church/State Separation of ranking and ads, D4 Duty to Diversify (local and global), D5 Auditability, D6 Reversibility, D7 Child Protections; (3) Instrumentation—operational definitions and governance for CI, a Variety Index (VI), an Imbalance Index (II), and a Responsibility Diffusion Index (RDI); and (4) four sector vignettes (consumer ratings, ride-hail matching, video/streaming feeds, paid search/news). We align the framework with current regulatory momentum and outline testable pilots. The opening vignette names the pattern plainly: algorithmic opium. (shrink)

People suffering from Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) do things they do not want to do, and/or they think things they do not want to think. In about 10 percent of OCD patients, none of the available treatment options is effective. A small group of these patients is currently being treated with deep brain stimulation (DBS). Deep brain stimulation involves the implantation of electrodes in the brain. These electrodes give a continuous electrical pulse to the brain area in which they are implanted. (...) It turns out that patients may experience profound changes as a result of DBS treatment. It is not just the symptoms that change; patients rather seem to experience a different way of being in the world. These global effects are insufficiently captured by traditional psychiatric scales, which mainly consist of behavioural measures of the severity of the symptoms. In this article we aim to capture the changes in the patients’ phenomenology and make sense of the broad range of changes they report. For that we introduce an enactive, affordance-based model that fleshes out the dynamic interactions between person and world in four aspects. The first aspect is the patients’ experience of the world. We propose to specify the patients’ world in terms of a field of affordances, with the three dimensions of broadness of scope (‘width’ of the field), temporal horizon (‘depth’), and relevance of the perceived affordances (‘height’). The second aspect is the person-side of the interaction, that is, the patients’ self-experience, notably their moods and feelings. Thirdly, we point to the different characteristics of the way in which patients relate to the world. And lastly, the existential stance refers to the stance that patients take towards the changes they experience: the second-order evaluative relation to their interactions and themselves. With our model we intend to specify the notion of being in the world in order to do justice to the phenomenological effects of DBS treatment. (shrink)

In this article we examine obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD). We examine and reject two existing models of this disorder: the Dysfunctional Belief Model and the Inference‐Based Approach. Instead, we propose that the main distinctive characteristic of OCD is a hyperactive sub‐personal signal of being in error, experienced by the individual as uncertainty about his or her intentional actions (including mental actions). This signalling interacts with the anxiety sensitivities of the individual to trigger conscious checking processes, including speculations about possible harms. (...) We examine the implications of this model for the individual's capacity to control his or her thoughts. (shrink)

Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) is a relatively new, experimental treatment for patients suffering from treatment-refractory Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD). The effects of treatment are typically assessed with psychopathological scales that measure the amount of symptoms. However, clinical experience indicates that the effects of DBS are not limited to symptoms only: patients for instance report changes in perception, feeling stronger and more confident, and doing things unreflectively. Our aim is to get a better overview of the whole variety of changes that (...) OCD patients experience during DBS treatment. For that purpose we conducted in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 18 OCD patients. In this paper, we present the results from this qualitative study.We list the changes grouped in four domains: with regard to (a) person, (b) (social) world, (c)characteristics of person-world interactions, and (d) existential stance. We subsequently provide an interpretation of these results. In particular, we suggest that many of these changes can be seen as different expressions of the same process; namely that the experience of anxiety and tension gives way to an increased basic trust and increased reliance on one’s abilities. We then discuss the clinical implications of our findings, especially with regard to properly informing patients of what they can expect from treatment, the usefulness of including CBT in treatment, and the limitations of current measures of treatment success. We end by making several concrete suggestions for further research. (shrink)

How does doubt come about? What are the mechanisms responsible for our inclinations to reassess propositions and collect further evidence to support or reject them? In this paper, I approach this question by focusing on what might be considered a distorting mirror of unreasonable doubt, namely the pathological doubt of patients with obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD). Individuals with OCD exhibit a form of persistent doubting, indecisiveness, and over-cautiousness at pathological levels (Rasmussen and Eisen in Psychiatr Clin 15(4):743–758, 1992; Reed in Obsessional (...) experience and compulsive behaviour: a cognitive-structural approach, Academic Press, Cambridge, 1985; Tolin et al. in Cogn Ther Res 27(6):657–669, 2003). I argue that the failure in OCD is of an affective nature, involving both excessive epistemic anxiety and hyperactive feelings of uncertainty. I further argue that our adaptive disposition to inquire about the right matters—that is, about propositions which are both epistemically risky and imply harmful possibilities—might depend on these affective mechanisms. (shrink)

Orthodoxy holds that the difference between weakness of will and compulsion is a matter of the resistibility of an agent's effective motivation, which makes control-based views of agency especially well equipped to distinguish blameworthy weak-willed acts from non-blameworthy compulsive acts. I defend an alternative view that the difference between weakness and compulsion instead lies in the fact that agents would upon reflection give some conative weight to acting on their weak-willed desires for some aim other than to extinguish (...) them, but not to their compulsive desires. This view allows identificationist theorists of moral responsibility to explain why weak-willed actions, but not compulsive actions, are attributable to agents such that they can, in theory, be praised or blamed for them. After motivating and presenting the view in detail, I show how it has unique resources for explaining the ethics of managing one's compulsions. (shrink)

Charland's article suggests that we need to think more about whether decision-making capacity is impaired in severe addiction, working from the idea that drug dealers rely on this understanding of addiction to draw in their clients. Charland argues that it is possible to make a choice without being in control (to make decisions without having decision-making capacity). I argue in support of Charland's ideas by examining the reasons supporting a medical model of addiction and its importance. (For Charland's article and (...) the full set of commentaries, please see the Research Gate link). (shrink)

This manuscript extends the Core Emotion Framework (CEF) to define the unique structural fingerprint of Obsessive‑Compulsive Disorder (OCD). The analysis demonstrates that OCD is characterized by a systemic outsourcing of cognitive distress to action, a mechanism the document describes as “the systemic outsourcing of cognitive function to action” and “using rigid action to resolve a cognitive deficit.” This pathological loop originates in the Head Center through a failure of the Calculating primer, expressed empirically as Intolerance of Uncertainty (IU), a stable, (...) trait‑like cognitive vulnerability strongly associated with OCD symptoms. The system bypasses affective integration and pathologically activates the Gut Center’s Arranging primer, producing compulsive rituals maintained by negative reinforcement. Additional structural failures—including Constricting deficits (inhibition breakdown) and suppression of Accepting (experiential avoidance)—create a rigid entanglement that prevents executive override and sustains compulsive behavior. -/- The manuscript establishes structural equivalence between these primer‑level deficits and the mechanisms of evidence‑based treatments: ERP targets Arranging/Boosting rigidity, ACT restores Accepting by countering experiential avoidance, and CBT repairs the Calculating deficit by restructuring catastrophic interpretations and uncertainty intolerance. This mapping provides a mechanism‑based rationale for sequencing interventions, prioritizing ERP/ACT to dismantle the action loop before applying CBT for cognitive repair. The paper concludes that the CEF offers a precise, transdiagnostic, and mechanistically coherent model capable of advancing personalized treatment selection for OCD. (shrink)

This paper explores the paradoxical human tendency to seek meaning in what cannot be judged—entities, events, or concepts that lie beyond the structural limits of the Judgemental Triad. We propose that this drive arises not from ignorance or error, but from an existential structure within the resonance axis itself: a compulsive demand for return even where return is impossible. Drawing from religious belief, death, infinity, and metaphysical abstraction, we argue that the urge to judge the unjudgeable reflects a deep structural (...) commitment to preserve coherence in the face of meaning collapse. This compulsion is not an error, but a boundary behavior of the human meaning system. (shrink)

In this chapter we give an overview of current and historical conceptions of the nature of obsessions and compulsions. We discuss some open questions pertaining to the primacy of the affective, volitional or affective nature of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). Furthermore, we add some phenomenological suggestions of our own. In particular, we point to the patients’ need for absolute certainty and the lack of trust underlying this need. Building on insights from Wittgenstein, we argue that the kind of certainty the patients (...) strive for is unattainable in principle via the acquisition of factual knowledge. Moreover, we suggest that the patients’ attempts to attain certainty are counter-productive as their excessive conscious control in fact undermines the trust they need. (shrink)

In recent years, there has been a trend in psychiatry to try and explain disorders of action in terms of an over-reliance on the habitual mode of action. In particular, it has been hypothesized that compulsions in obsessive-compulsive disorder are driven by maladaptive habits. In this paper, I argue that this view of obsessive-compulsive disorder does not fit the phenomenology of the disorder in many patients and that a more refined conceptualization of habit is likely to be helpful in clarifying (...) the distinctions between disorders of action. There are thus two aims to this paper. The first is to highlight the issues pertaining to the view that compulsions are the result of an over-reliance on the habitual mode of action, leading to a loss of agentive control. The second aim is to examine the view of agentive control implicit in those accounts and see how other conceptions of agentive control might do a better job at accounting for the distinct ways in which persons suffering from pathologies of action may be said to lack control. (shrink)

Against the Compulsive Urge to Interpret -/- By Dorian Vale -/- In this incisive essay, Dorian Vale issues a direct challenge to the modern compulsion to interpret everything—especially art that resists it. Against the Compulsive Urge to Interpret dissects the psychological, academic, and cultural forces behind overexplanation, and reveals how this reflex can become a form of violence. -/- -/- Rather than a celebration of ambiguity or mystique, the essay makes a precise philosophical argument: that some works—especially those grounded (...) in grief, ritual, trauma, or the sacred—must be approached through presence, not penetration. Vale argues that relentless interpretation disfigures the very things it claims to illuminate, replacing witness with possession and flattening mystery into content. -/- -/- This piece is both a manifesto and a moral warning: not all silence is an invitation to speak. Sometimes, to interpret is to intrude. And in such moments, the most radical act of criticism may be restraint. -/- -/- Vale, Dorian. Against the Compulsive Urge to Interpret. Museum of One, 2025. DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17075900 -/- This entry is connected to a series of original theories and treatises forming the foundation of the Post-Interpretive Criticism movement (Q136308909), authored by Dorian Vale (Q136308916) and published by Museum of One (Q136308879). These include: Stillmark Theory (Q136328254), Hauntmark Theory (Q136328273), Absential Aesthetic Theory (Q136328330), Viewer-as-Evidence Theory (Q136328828), Message-Transfer Theory (Q136329002), Aesthetic Displacement Theory (Q136329014), Theory of Misplacement (Q136329054), and Art as Truth: A Treatise (Q136329071), Aesthetic Recursion Theory (Q136339843), The Journal of Post-Interpretive Criticism (Q136530009) -/- Post-Interpretive Criticism, Dorian Vale, interpretation in art, overinterpretation, ethics in art criticism, restraint in criticism, art and silence, witnessing art, aesthetic theory, non-extractive writing, trauma and interpretation, philosophical aesthetics, contemporary art theory -/- . (shrink)

What is an inference? Logicians and philosophers have proposed various conceptions of inference. I shall first highlight seven features that contribute to distinguish these conceptions. I shall then compare three conceptions to see which of them best explains the special force that compels us to accept the conclusion of an inference, if we accept its premises.

Background: Mindfulness-based interventions have shown promise in alleviating symptoms associated with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) and major depressive disorder (MDD). However, the specific mechanisms that drive these effects, mainly through obsessive beliefs and mental well-being, are seldom examined. -/- Aim: To explore the mechanisms by which mindfulness influences symptom severity in adults with comorbid OCD and MDD, focusing on the mediating roles of obsessive beliefs and mental well-being. -/- Methods: Primary data from 60 treatment-seeking adults with comorbid OCD and MDD were (...) analyzed. Ordinary least-squares path analysis was employed to examine the mediating roles of obsessive beliefs and mental well-being in the relationship between mindfulness and the severity of OCD and MDD symptoms. -/- Results: Mindfulness was significantly associated with reduced symptom severity for both OCD (β = − 0.40, P < 0.001) and MDD (β = − 0.49, P < 0.001). For MDD, obsessive beliefs (β = − 0.20, P < 0.001) and mental well-being (β = − 0.33, P < 0.001) significantly mediated the relationship. In contrast, no significant indirect effects were observed for OCD symptoms through obsessive beliefs (β = − 0.10, P = 0.16) or mental well-being (β = − 0.08, P = 0.20). -/- Conclusion: These findings highlight the distinct mechanisms of mindfulness in comorbid OCD and MDD, underscoring the importance of customized interventions based on specific pathways. (shrink)

The experience of obsessive–compulsive disorder is often described in clinical terms — as a pattern of intrusive thoughts and ritualized behaviors — but such descriptions rarely capture the deeper structure of the suffering involved. Beneath the symptoms lies a form of consciousness caught in a struggle with itself, animated by a demand for certainty that cannot be satisfied and yet cannot be relinquished. Hegel’s account of the “Unhappy Self” in The Phenomenology of Spirit offers a strikingly prescient framework for understanding (...) this inner conflict. The Unhappy Self is a consciousness that absolutizes its own principles, recoils from its finitude, and becomes ensnared in the very logic it posits as its salvation. When read alongside the phenomenology of OCD, Hegel’s analysis reveals not only the structural parallels between obsessive certainty and the dialectic of self‑division, but also the deeper philosophical stakes of the disorder: a retreat from the shared world of meaning into a self‑enclosed demand for purity, necessity, and inviolable assurance. By placing OCD within a Hegelian frame, we can illuminate the dialectical dynamics that sustain it — and gesture toward the possibility of a resolution that does not merely suppress contradiction but transforms it. (shrink)

Scholars have made several attempts to understand the ‘compulsion problem’ in the Republic, namely, why Plato compels the philosopher-rulers to descend into the cave to rule. These attempts, however, fail to properly incorporate two other main instances of compulsion in the dialogue into the discussion: first, the compulsion in Plato’s concept of philosophical rulership, which requires that one can be a ruler in Kallipolis if and only if one is a product of the coincidence of philosophy and (...) politics; second, the instances of compulsion in the future philosopher-rulers’ education. My main aim in this paper is to re-examine the ‘compulsion problem’. I argue that the just law that compels the philosopher-rulers to rule corroborates Plato’s concept of education to achieve the product of his concept of philosophical rulership, i.e. rulers who despise ruling. (shrink)

Søren Mau es un filósofo comunista danés que ha destacado como académico marxista activo, contribuyendo significativamente a la teoría de la forma-valor. Mute Compulsion es el resultado de su trabajo de doctorado realizado en la Universidad del Sur de Dinamarca y defendido en 2019. La obra se estructura en trece capítulos, que incluyen una introducción y una conclusión, y se organiza en tres partes que construyen progresivamente contribuciones teóricas, partiendo de las condiciones del poder económico del capital, atravesando sus (...) relaciones constitutivas y llegando finalmente a las dinámicas que habilita. (shrink)

Mindfulness-based interventions (MBIs) have increasingly been explored as therapeutic approaches for obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), particularly given the limitations and treatment attrition associated with conventional exposure and response prevention (ERP). This commentary critically evaluates Borgohain’s (2024) narrative review on the use of mindfulness in OCD treatment. Although the article contributes to the growing discussion on integrating mindfulness into OCD interventions, several conceptual and methodological limitations restrict its interpretability and clinical applicability. The paper does not sufficiently integrate mindfulness mechanisms with established cognitive (...) behavioral models of OCD, leaving the proposed therapeutic pathways theoretically underdeveloped. In addition, heterogeneous forms of evidence, including case reports, uncontrolled trials, and randomized controlled trials, are discussed without systematic methodological appraisal or assessment of risk of bias, which limits the strength of the conclusions. The article also presents inconsistent interpretations of outcomes across different psychometric measures, contributing to ambiguity regarding the effectiveness of MBIs in OCD populations. Furthermore, the distinction between mindfulness as a primary intervention and as an adjunctive component to existing treatments such as ERP is not clearly articulated. The omission of recent meta-analytic evidence and the limited discussion of comorbid conditions such as major depressive disorder further reduce its comprehensiveness. Overall, while the article contributes to the growing discussion on mindfulness-based approaches in OCD, stronger theoretical integration, clearer conceptual distinctions, and more rigorous evidence synthesis are needed in future reviews to better inform clinical practice and research in this evolving field. Without such methodological rigor, conclusions regarding the clinical efficacy of MBIs in OCD remain provisional. (shrink)

Part (a) -/- 'Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is a form of anxiety where the person has thoughts, images or ideas which they find hard to ignore (obsessions). This can lead to them feeling that they have a need to perform certain things to feel better (compulsions). -/- Part (b) -/- For two of the perspectives named in Part a, one from either Psychodynamic or cognitive and the other from either Biological or behaviourism using a table like the one below evaluate the (...) evidence which you have used to support each perspective. (shrink)

The Core Emotion Framework (CEF) advances a structural constructivist model of affect that resolves the long standing divide between biological essentialism and psychological constructionism by treating emotions as computational operator functions within a hardware independent “Human Operating System.” This paper consolidates and extends the CEF architecture by mapping the Decalogue of ten functional operators to somatic centers, personality typology, obsessive compulsive loop mechanics, and systemic neuroendocrine regulation. First, the framework’s tiered epistemological structure is formalized, distinguishing high certainty operator dynamics from (...) mid certainty somatic centers and low certainty neural hypotheses. Second, the nine Enneagram types are reinterpreted as stabilized operator dominance configurations, with the Deciding operator serving as an executive anchor that prevents runaway affective loops. Third, obsessive compulsive phenomena are modeled using operator fusion dynamics and differential equations that capture entanglement weights, activation thresholds, and Deciding anchor bypass. Fourth, the paper contrasts three somatic conative configurations—Boosting–Constricting, Accepting–Constricting, and Boosting–Accepting—demonstrating how each produces distinct autonomic, muscular, and behavioral signatures. Finally, the manuscript integrates these operator dynamics with systems neuroendocrinology, showing how chronic operator fusions dysregulate the HPA axis, collapse the DMN–ECN connectivity gradient, and drive metabolic phenotypes such as visceral adiposity. Together, these contributions position the CEF as a unified computational somatic architecture capable of explaining personality structure, psychopathology, stress physiology, and adaptive resilience within a single mechanistic framework. (shrink)

According to the traditional Western concept of freedom, the ability to exercise free will depends on the availability of options and the possibility to consciously decide which one to choose. Since neuroscientific research increasingly shows the limits of what we in fact consciously control, it seems that our belief in free will and hence in personal autonomy is in trouble. -/- A closer look at the phenomenology of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) gives us reason to doubt the traditional concept of freedom (...) in terms of conscious control. Patients suffering from OCD experience themselves as unfree. The question is whether their lack of freedom is due to a lack of will power. Do they have too little conscious control over their thoughts and actions? Or could it be the opposite: are they exerting too much conscious control over their thoughts and actions? -/- In this chapter, we will argue that OCD patients testify to the general condition that exercising an increased conscious control over actions can in fact diminish the sense of agency rather than increase the experience of freedom. The experiences of these patients show that the traditional conception of freedom in terms of ‘free will’ has major shortcomings. There is an alternative, however, to be found in the work of Hannah Arendt. She advocates a conception of freedom as freedom in action. Combined with phenomenological insights on action, Arendt’s account of freedom helps us to get a more adequate understanding of the role of deliberation in the experience of freedom. We argue that the experience of freedom depends on the right balance between deliberate control and unreflective actions. (shrink)

Emotions might contribute to our being rational cognitive agents. Anxiety – and more specifically epistemic anxiety – provides an especially interesting case study into the role of emotion for adaptive cognition. In this paper, I aim at clarifying the epistemic contribution of anxiety, and the role that ill-calibrated anxiety might play in maladaptive epistemic activities which can be observed in psychopathology. In particular, I argue that this emotion contributes to our ability to adapt our cognitive efforts to how we represent (...) the practical factors relevant to the task at hand, by sig- naling the need for increased cognitive processing and evidence gathering in high- stakes situations. I hypothesize that dysfunctional or ill-calibrated epistemic anxiety might play an important role in the motivation driving persons with obsessive- compulsive disorder (OCD) to invest high amounts of cognitive resources into the resolution of apparently simple and innocuous questions. As I argue, OCD might be conceived as a case in which epistemic anxiety is inappropriately elicited, represent- ing these as high-stakes questions, and inadequately signaling a need for cognition. In this paper, I thus make use of the concept of (epistemic) anxiety as developed in the philosophy of emotion and in epistemology, to propose an account of the role of anxiety in the pathological doubt that is central to obsessive-compulsive disorder. (shrink)

Temperance is presented as the virtue by which non-cognitive conations — urges, appetites, desires, emotions, passions, etc. — are managed excellently: temperate conations are justified by their fittingness to their circumstances. Instead of being self-indulgent or wanton slaves of passion, temperate people master their conations, virtuously curating and integrating them into their well-lived lives. Continence, understood using Sripada's (2021) model of self-control, is a developmental step toward temperance and incontinence or weakness of will is modeled on failures of cognitive control, (...) as found in phenomena such as the Stroop effect (1932). Contra Davidson, irrationality does not cause weakness of will but rather weakness of will causes us to act irrationally. Finally, a Platonic model of temperance is introduced in which a temperate person’s relations to their conations can be understood through the symbiotic relations between human and canine shepherds. (shrink)

Aristotle’s notion of force seems to be the same as what we mean by “brute force,” or as an example of the Eudemian Ethics puts it, one is “forced” when one’s hand is literally seized by another and used to strike another person. But closer scrutiny suggests something else must be going on if for no other reason than that Aristotle, in his description of force, makes reference to a do-er (o( pra/ttwn [EN III.1.1110a2]). Based on such an insight, Flannery’s (...) “Force and Compulsion in Aristotle’s Ethics” subjects the account of forced actions, actions done under compulsion, and so called “mixed actions” in Aristotle’s ethical treatises to careful scrutiny. In my comments I focus upon two of his claims: First, that although Aristotle includes a notion of “brute force” in his account of force, he doesn’t limit his account just to that notion; and second, that Aristotle’s account of force presupposes or includes what he calls “a particular anthropology.”. (shrink)

This work proposes an operational model of the subject as a center of autonomous decision-making and causal initiation, distinguished from influences that affect behavior but do not themselves constitute subjectivity. The model asserts that subject action, insofar as it is initiated through choice, is necessarily rational relative to the subject’s own picture of the world and values. Consequently, intentional harm as an independent goal is structurally impossible for the subject. The infliction of harm (evil) becomes possible only under conditions of (...) epistemic insufficiency or epistemic asymmetry. The model is not a moral theory, a psychological account, or a theory of neurodynamic mechanisms. It is a systemic analysis of the boundary of subjectivity and operational responsibility. While resonating with the Socratic thesis that “no one does wrong willingly” (virtue is knowledge, vice is ignorance), Plato’s development of this idea, Aristotle’s concept of akrasia (weakness due to insufficient knowledge), Spinoza’s view of affects as inadequate ideas, and Hannah Arendt’s “banality of evil” (thoughtlessness and failure to grasp consequences), the present model offers a novel operational framework: a strict separation of the subject (as the locus of choice and responsibility) from cognitive distortions, neurobiological dynamics, and other external influences, with harm structurally conditioned solely on epistemic limitations. ( Current version: edited 2026-02-13). (shrink)

It’s a common assumption in psychiatry and psychotherapy that mental health conditions are marked out by some form of epistemic irrationality. With respect to obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), the mainstream view is that OCD causes irrational beliefs. Recently, however, this ‘doxastic view’ has been criticized from a theoretical and empirical perspective. Instead a more promising ‘zetetic view’ has been proposed which locates the epistemic irrationality of OCD not in irrational beliefs, but in the senseless inquiries it prompts. Yet, in this paper (...) I present a special class of cases—sexual obsessive-compulsive disorder (S-OCD)—which cannot be explained by existing doxastic and zetetic accounts of the epistemic irrationality of OCD. In addition, some people with S-OCD appear to be adhering too well to a plausible set of norms for inquiry. Their suffering seems to be partially caused by an excess of rationality, and not a lack thereof. They seem, if anything, too rational. This shows firstly that it’s unlikely that there is one form of epistemic irrationality common to all persons living with OCD. Secondly, it should lead us to rethink the epistemic categories we use in classifying mental health conditions such as OCD. (shrink)

This essay proposes a new theory of agentive modals: ability modals and their duals, compulsion modals. After criticizing existing approaches—the existential quantificational analysis, the universal quantificational analysis, and the conditional analysis—it presents a new account that builds on both the existential and conditional analyses. On this account, the act conditional analysis, a sentence like ‘John can swim across the river’ says that there is some practically available action that is such that if John tries to do it, he swims (...) across the river. The essay argues that the act conditional analysis avoids the problems faced by existing accounts of agentive modality and shows how the act conditional analysis can be extended to an account of generic agentive modal claims. The upshot is a new vantage point on the role of agentive modal ascriptions in practical discourse: ability ascriptions serve as a kind of hypothetical guarantee, and compulsion ascriptions as a kind of nonhypothetical guarantee. (shrink)

It is common to think of addiction as involving behavior which in some sense is ?out of control.? But does this mean addictive actions occur because of compulsion or because of ordinary weakness of will? Many philosophers argue that addictive actions occur because of weakness of will, since there is plenty of evidence suggesting that they are not caused by irresistible desires. In fact, addicts seem, in general, to perform these actions freely in the sense of having the ability (...) to refrain from doing so. In this paper I argue, first, that it is not the addiction-as-compulsion view that is mistaken, but rather the view that irresistible desires are a defining feature of compulsion. Second, drawing on some results in addiction neuroscience, I construct and defend a new analysis of compulsivity that distinguishes addictive from weak-willed actions in a way that is consistent with the view that addictive actions are performed freely. (shrink)

Does DBS change a patient’s personality? This is one of the central questions in the debate on the ethics of treatment with Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS). At the moment, however, this important debate is hampered by the fact that there is relatively little data available concerning what patients actually experience following DBS treatment. There are a few qualitative studies with patients with Parkinson’s disease and Primary Dystonia and some case reports, but there has been no qualitative study yet with patients (...) suffering from psychiatric disorders. In this paper, we present the experiences of 18 patients with Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) who are undergoing treatment with DBS. We will also discuss the inherent difficulties of how to define and assess changes in personality, in particular for patients with psychiatric disorders. We end with a discussion of the data and how these shed new light on the conceptual debate about how to define personality. (shrink)

On the classical understanding, an agent is fully excused for an action if and only if performing this action was a case of faultless wrongdoing. A major motivation for this view is the apparent existence of paradigmatic types of excusing considerations, affecting fault but not wrongness. I show that three such considerations, ignorance, duress and compulsion, can be shown to have direct bearing on the permissibility of actions. The appeal to distinctly identifiable excusing considerations thus does not stand up (...) to closer scrutiny, undermining the classical view and giving us reason to seek alternative ways of drawing the justification/excuse distinction. (shrink)

I develop an egalitarian account of what's objectionable about coercion. The account is rooted in the idea that certain relationships, like those of master to slave or lord to peasant, are relationships of subordination or domination. These relationships are morally objectionable. Such relationships are in part constituted by asymmetries of power. A master subordinates a slave because the master has more power over the slave than vice versa. Coercion is objectionable, I argue, because it creates such asymmetries of power and (...) so creates relationships of subordination. This account, moreover, illuminates what's wrong with blackmail, exploitation, withholding aid, and compulsion. (shrink)

Debates about addiction and compulsion often oscillate between moralism and medicalisation. Either addicted agents are treated as fully responsible despite severe impairment, or agency is said to be bypassed entirely by neurobiological or environmental causes. This paper argues that both positions rest on a structural mistake. It defends a resolutionist account of agency and applies it to addiction, distinguishing between evaluative distortion and bypass. On this view, agency consists in the resolution of deliberation into action, not in causal indeterminacy (...) or brute self-control. Addiction does not typically bypass this capacity; rather, it distorts the evaluative landscape within which resolution occurs. The paper develops this distinction by analysing the instrumental rationality often exhibited in addictive behaviour, including planning, timing, and strategic concealment. Such patterns are incompatible with bypass models, which characterise behaviour as reflexive or non-agentic. Instead, they demonstrate that resolution remains intact even where evaluation is severely skewed. This allows authorship to be preserved while responsibility is nevertheless significantly mitigated, without collapsing into either excuse or blame. The account clarifies why neuroscientific and social explanations of addiction do not undermine agency but instead map the pressures under which agency is exercised. It also explains why mitigation of responsibility is principled rather than ad hoc. By separating explanation from attribution, the paper offers a framework for understanding addiction that preserves responsibility without denying causation or compassion, and it has implications for legal responsibility, moral evaluation, and clinical intervention. (shrink)

This paper builds on an earlier Resolution Theory treatment of addiction and compulsion by offering a sharper account of addiction as distortion without bypass. Its central claim is that addiction should be understood neither as mere mechanism that erases agency nor as ordinary choice untouched by impairment. Causes explain how an action became likely; reasons explain what counted within the agent’s evaluative field; and resolution marks the point at which authorship is fixed. On this view, addiction preserves authorship while (...) systematically degrading control-quality through impaired uptake of counter-reasons, weakened responsiveness, salience capture, and abnormally high costs of resisting use. Responsibility therefore remains binary at the level of authored resolution, while mitigation is graded and often substantial. The paper also clarifies the process-based boundary between distortion and true bypass, arguing that addiction belongs on the distortion side of that line even where compulsion feels coercive from the inside. Finally, it develops a two-stage responsibility model separating acute acts under cue-state pressure from upstream stewardship in periods of greater clarity, and defends a forward-looking account of blame aimed at protection, repair, and the restoration of future agency. (shrink)

The Core Emotion Framework (CEF) proposes a structural-constructivist model of affective function, synthesizing principles from affective neuroscience and embodied cognition to define ten discrete Core Emotions that comprise the complete human emotional apparatus. This paper utilizes the CEF model to provide a rigorous critique of traditional static personality typologies, such as the Enneagram, arguing that these systems predominantly map pathological deficiencies—specifically, the restricted deployment of the full emotional toolkit—rather than inherent identity. The central psychological challenge is identified as Compulsive Obstinacy (...) (Structural Entanglement), a chronic functional rigidity where key core emotions fuse into inflexible composites. The framework explains the Creative Insight Paradox (Aha! Moment) as the definitive mechanism for resolving this emotional entanglement. While insight is widely studied in cognitive science as a form of non-incremental problem-solving characterized by a sudden reorganization or restructuring of cognitive elements, its underlying processes remain a subject of academic debate. The CEF offers a novel structural interpretation, positing that this "Aha!" event is, psychologically, a Structural Disassembly—the spontaneous emergence of a previously suppressed, uncorrupted core emotion that structurally shocks the rigid, pathological system. This shock enables the individual to shatter some of the self-perpetuating Vicious Cycle of compulsion and initiate the process of achieving Equilibrium through the balanced, dynamic deployment of all ten core emotional capacities. The analysis concludes with structural recommendations for cultivating affective health through the mastery of flexibility and the non-compulsive acquisition of Assertiveness. Keywords: Core Emotion Framework, Compulsive Obstinacy, Creative Insight Paradox, Structural Disassembly, Emotional Flexibility, Enneagram Critique, Emotional Regulation, Self-Actualization. (shrink)

e Core Emotion Framework (CEF) introduces a structural‑constructivist model of affective function that resolves the long‑standing nature–nurture debate by distinguishing innate emotional architecture from learned misuse. It defines ten universal Core Emotions organized into Head, Heart, and Gut centers, with Accepting as the foundational base state. Pathology arises when Constricting fuses rigidly with action components, producing Structural Entanglement and the self‑perpetuating Vicious Cycle of compulsive obstinacy. Therapeutic resolution occurs through the Creative Insight Paradox—an “Aha!” moment of Structural Disassembly—where a suppressed (...) emotion re‑emerges to shatter rigidity and restore functional separation. Sustained equilibrium requires continuous practice of Yielding, Discernment, and Elevation, enabling dynamic flexibility and non‑compulsive assertiveness. By reframing typological models as descriptive maps of pathology rather than identity, and by proposing validation protocols that measure structural integrity rather than trait intensity, the CEF positions itself as a diagnostic and therapeutic instrument for affective actualization and emotional regulation. Keywords: Core Emotion Framework, structural-constructivism, affective neuroscience, emotional actualization, Head-Heart-Gut centers, compulsive obstinacy, structural entanglement, emotional rigidity, Creative Insight Paradox, Aha! moment, structural disassembly, emotional flexibility, non-compulsive assertiveness, affective equilibrium, personality typology critique, Enneagram analysis, emotion dysregulation, Borderline Personality Disorder, psychometric validation, nature-nurture resolution. (shrink)

The idea that abilities should be understood as a modal tie between one's motivational states and one's actions is at the core of the most prominent views of abilities. I develop a novel challenge against such views of ability arguing that all these accounts cannot properly account for inabilities and compulsions.

The Sougy Personality Type Spectrum (SPTS; Boether, 2026a) introduced a seven-type model of personality organized around the Φ:Ψ ratio—the proportion of philosophical to psychological function in an individual’s cognitive-existential orientation. This companion treatise argues that the Van Gogh Curve (Boether, 2025a), a theory of cognitive differentiation that reconceptualizes the bell curve distribution of cognitive orientation as complementary specialization rather than deficit, provides the essential distributional and epistemological substrate that the SPTS requires but does not itself supply. The Van Gogh Curve’s (...) core constructs—Failure of Imagination (FOI), Compulsive Philosophical Curiosity (CPC), and the Knowledge Distribution Principle—resolve three critical limitations of the SPTS standing alone: the absence of a distributional model explaining why the seven types exist, the lack of a cognitive mechanism specifying how Φ:Ψ orientation manifests in epistemic behavior, and the need for a principled anti-pathologizing foundation grounded in differentiation theory rather than mere assertion. The integration produces a three-dimensional model in which spectrum position (Φ:Ψ ratio), integrative coherence (DH exponent), and cognitive orientation (Van Gogh Curve position) jointly differentiate individuals with a resolution that neither framework achieves independently. The Van Gogh Compass (Boether, 2026b) is further incorporated as a social-orientation overlay, yielding a comprehensive personality architecture grounded in the principle of differentiation. (shrink)

This essay argues that the drive, the groundless insistence that animates reflective subjectivity, is not recuperable by the operations through which reflection seeks to overcome the wound of non-closure. Beginning from Hegel's claim that negativity is productive, that the wound heals itself through the movement that carries it forward and transforms it, the essay shows that the dialectic achieves its scarless vantage through a retroactive reading of the contingent path as necessary. What this reading renders invisible is the sheer contingency (...) of the path: that it did not have to be this, the suffering that was simply undergone and not redeemed by any necessity the continuation posits, and the cost exacted from the subject by the going on itself. The failures were not stages; they were lived as failures, and the living of them is not preserved in what came after. Freud's repetition compulsion establishes that something in the wound survives understanding and resists the concept's reach, not because it lies beyond thought, but because it does not appear in thought as meaning. It is what propels the movement of thought, not what thought discovers at its end. Lacan's account of the real names this structural resistance, and his diagnosis of the mirror's méconnaissance is turned upon Hegel: the scarless wholeness Spirit pronounces is the phantasm that non-closure cannot help producing, a complete image laid over a fragmentation that goes on being lived. The essay then examines the phantasms through which the drive domesticates its own endlessness, from Lessing's edification to the retroactive positing of Eden, showing that these domestications are not external impositions but structural responses generated by the very non-closure they seek to manage. In the register Adorno calls late style, it asks what form remains available when the consolations of form have been seen through. Jean Améry's testimony about torture is taken not as an extreme case but as the clearest case, establishing by testimony rather than inference that there is a wound that precedes and survives every account given of it. The essay concludes by asking what going on means when understanding has genuinely exhausted its consolations, and suggests that what remains is neither justification nor reconciliation but bare continuation, the silence of the drive. (shrink)

In Logique du Fantasme, Lacan argues that the compulsion to repeat does not obey the same discharge logic as homeostatic processes. Repetition installs a realm that is categorically different from the one related to homeostatic pleasure seeking, a properly subjective one, one in which the mark “stands for,” “takes the place of,” what we have ventured to call “an event,” and what only in the movement of return, in what Lacan calls a “thinking of repetition,” confirms and ever reconfirms (...) this point of no return, which is also a qualitative cut and a structural loss. The kind of “standing for” Lacan intends here with the concept of repetition is certainly not something like an image or a faithful description. No, what Lacan wishes to stress is that this mark is situated at another level, at another place, it is “entstellt,” and as such, it is punctually impinging upon the bodily dynamics without rendering the event, without having an external meta-point of view, but cutting across registers according to a logics that is not the homeostatic memory logics. This paper elaborates on this distinction on the basis of a confrontation with what Freud says about the pleasure principle and its beyond in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, and also takes inspiration from Freud’s Project for a Scientific Psychology. We argue that Lacan’s theory of enjoyment takes up and generalizes what Freud was after in Beyond the Pleasure Principle with the Wiederholungszwang, and pushes Freud’s thoughts to a more articulated point: to the point where a subject is considered to speak only when it has allowed the other, through discourse, to have impacted and cut into his bodily pleasure dynamics. (shrink)

The contemporary psychopharmacological paradigm exhibits a profound epistemic and systemic bias favoring selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) and serotonin-norepinephrine reuptake inhibitors (SNRIs) as first-line modalities for isolated anxiety disorders, obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), irrespective of an absent depressive baseline. This thesis challenges this clinical consensus through a iatrogenic and neurophilosophical critique, demonstrating that the off-label imposition of serotonergic agents on non-depressed brains introduces pathological biological friction, acute neurological activation, and an iatrogenic discontinuation syndrome that medically and (...) volatilely exceeds the withdrawal parameters of traditional GABAergic agents. Utilizing an N-of-1 single-subject case design methodology, this paper constructs a conceptual model around distinct neurological phenotypes, exploring how structural alterations (such as post-traumatic brain injury mechanical shifts) isolate hyper-arousal into a purely somatic, hyper-adrenergic loop. We apply a rigorous neuropharmacological analysis to the mechanism of differential tolerance, establishing that while central receptor systems downregulate sedative actions rapidly, anxiolytic efficacy remains stable and preserved long-term without requiring dose escalation. Conversely, chronic antidepressant use introduces a profound chemical overlay linked to permanent limbic flattening, executive cognitive decline, and a protracted withdrawal syndrome that severely threatens cognitive safety and intellectual autonomy. Ultimately, this work provides a framework for the de-stigmatization of long-term benzodiazepine maintenance, arguing that for non-depressive autonomic phenotypes, targeted GABAergic stabilization possesses superior neurobiological integrity, bioethical alignment, and clinical utility over the algorithmic uniformity of modern antidepressant over-prescription. (shrink)