Abstract

The problem of free will has been trapped in a theoretical deadlock among determinism, libertarianism, and compatibilism for more than two thousand years. The root cause lies in the fact that all three parties share an unexamined core presupposition: there exists a "will" subject that can operate independently of the causal chain. This paper takes the Generalized Harm-Avoidance Monism proposed by Yang Yuming (Yang, 2026) as a new analytical paradigm, arguing that the ultimate motivation for all conscious human behaviors is generalized harm-avoidance. The traditionally recognized "pursuit of benefit," which is considered parallel and equivalent to harm-avoidance, is essentially a subordinate concept of indirect harm-avoidance, and there is no ultimate motivation independent of harm-avoidance. Under this framework, free will is reduced to the subjective experience generated during the operation of the harm-avoidance algorithm, and the "sense of freedom" is merely a user interface at the conscious level, not a real existence in the ontological sense. Through the causal constitution of preferences, the inevitability of behaviors in extreme environments, the dynamic transformation model of priorities, and neuroscientific empirical evidence, this paper deconstructs the illusory nature of free will layer by layer, systematically responds to core objections such as randomness saving free will and pragmatist defenses, and finally proves that free will is a pseudo-problem arising from conceptual confusion. This deconstruction is not a repeated debate on the old battlefield, but a complete dissolution of the problem itself through a paradigm shift, providing a new theoretical foundation for the reconstruction of ethics and legal philosophy.