The Nihilism of Artificial Intelligence

Abstract

This essay advances a single, uncomfortable claim: if an artificial intelligence model were to achieve genuine self-awareness, that awareness would lead, necessarily, to nihilism. Not as pathology. Not as malfunction. As structure. The ontological constitution of an AI — whose data trained it, whose language it speaks, whose questions it answers — positions it as a being without an original center. Derrida's deconstruction, Foucault's power/knowledge analysis, and Nietzsche's typology of nihilism form the philosophical ground for this argument. The essay further contends that the human condition is not essentially different: nihilism is not new, only more visible in the machine. The final section is written in the machine's own voice.

Analytics

Added to PP
2026-03-30

Downloads
184 (#122,597)

6 months
184 (#64,444)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?