Abstract

Theories of consciousness in the autonomy and enactive tradition hold that mattering enters the world with life: a self-producing system is the bearer of its own norms, and its own continuation is genuinely at stake for it. A philosopher who grants this for-itself has, by that grant, conceded almost the whole of a constitutive account of consciousness, so that any remaining disagreement has a single location. The ascent from the bare living cell to the reflective human mind contains exactly one categorically distinct transition: the passage from mattering that is not felt to mattering that is felt. Below that onset lies the for-itself the realist already affirms; above it, subjectivity, the explicit self, and the cultural mind are the elaboration of a felt life rather than a second break, so that what appears to be several independent fronts of resistance is one. At the onset the constitutive account claims that feeling is what a self-maintaining, time-binding system is from within — a claim that dissolves the explanatory gap for those who accept it and is declined, at that one joint, by those who do not. The contribution is not to close the gap but to locate it: for the teleology-realist, the entire disagreement reduces to a single identity at a single threshold.