Moving beyond anecdotes: An empirical investigation of scientists' and engineers’ views about and engagement with philosophy of science

Abstract

Several prominent scientists have publicly expressed negative views about philosophy of science—and philosophy more generally—ranging from declarations that philosophy is dead to assertions that philosophy of science is a waste of time for scientists. Some philosophers of science have responded by defending the relevance of philosophy to scientific practice, illustrating how philosophical concepts, skills, and approaches can help make scientific research more epistemically and ethically sound. Such defenses are often motivated at least in part by claims that many scientists are antagonistic towards philosophy of science. A recent empirical study even suggests that philosophers of science perceive a ‘lack of interest from scientists’ as one of the main barriers to fruitful engagement between the two. These claims raise the question: How widespread are negative views of philosophy of science across the broader scientific community? We empirically investigated this and other research questions with data from a standardized survey administered to a probability-based sample of over 2000 scientists and engineers at 54 universities across Canada and the USA. Our findings indicate that the negative sentiments described above are not representative of the wider scientific community. Many respondents even expressed interest in pursuing research collaborations with philosophers of science. Moreover, a majority of respondents reported having informally engaged with philosophers of science in one way or another. This study demonstrates why it is essential to empirically examine scientists' views rather than generalizing from a few cases, regardless of how prominent they may be.

Author Profiles

Kathryn Plaisance
University of Waterloo
Chad Gonnerman
University of Southern Indiana

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2026-01-23

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