Abstract

Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs) are usually considered a philosophically neutral logicwith respect to paraconsistency, in the sense that they provide a good basis to think in termsof dialetheias, i.e. true contradictions, or in terms of conflicting information, a notion weakerthan truth. In this article, I will show how this claim of neutrality fails in the face of the LiarParadox: in classical logic, the sentence A: “A is false.” implies a contradiction. By adoptinga paraconsistent logic, we avoid that contradictions lead to triviality. LFIs, however, add aconsistency operator that recovers classical logic to propositions to which it applies. In thiscontext, the Liar Paradox arises once again by a type of Liar’s Revenge: now, we can constructthe sentence B: “B is only false.”, and that gives us triviality once again. With this result, weconclude that LFIs are not suitable logics to deal with semantic paradoxes.