Beyond Falsifiability: The Structural Dissolution of Science’s Epistemic Warrant through Tier-Epistemology

Zenodo (2026)
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Abstract

This paper establishes that falsifiability cannot function as an epistemic warrant for claims about the structure of reality. The Tier‑Epistemology of Cognitional Mechanics (CM) introduces a strict three‑layer architecture—Tier‑1 algebraic structure, Tier‑2 geometric projections, Tier‑3 observational surface—and demonstrates that falsification operations are structurally confined to Tier‑3. As the text states, “the projection from Tier‑1 to Tier‑3 discards eight real dimensions of information,” and “the observation map is uniquely Tr,” eliminating all non‑linear or alternative observational routes. Lex elements remain invariant under observation, making Tier‑1 revision structurally impossible. The paper formalises the mismatch problem: divergences between theoretical and experimental values are ambiguous among Tier‑2 projection choice and Tier‑3 measurement precision, never Tier‑1. This resolves the Duhem–Quine underdetermination by establishing a structured revision space in which Tier‑1 is excluded by necessity. The analysis shows that falsifiability presupposes a flat epistemic landscape in which theory and observation occupy the same layer, a presupposition invalidated by the Tier architecture. The paper concludes that cross‑domain coherence without free parameters replaces falsifiability as the verification criterion for Tier‑1. Experiment is redefined as decoding rather than discovery: a high‑precision measurement is a precise readout of Tier‑3 coordinates of algebraic invariants fixed independently of observation. This hierarchical epistemology preserves the utility of falsifiability within Tier‑3 while relocating the epistemic warrant for structural claims to Tier‑1 coherence. Published on May 6, 2026 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.20046167

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