Abstract

In his essay, “Intentionality and Physiological Processes,” Richard Sorabji claims that Aristotle maintains a sharp distinction between the formal and material causes of sensation.1 To that end, Sorabji interprets a cluster of Aristotelian formulae about sensation as descriptions that exclusively pertain to perception's material cause. This material cause, according to Sorabji, is the process that the sense organ undergoes during an episode of sensation. These Aristotelian formulae fall roughly into three main groups: the claim that what perceives receives form (which I will call the formal reception thesis), the claim that what perceives receives form without matter (which I will call the anahylic reception thesis2), and the claim that what perceives becomes actually like or such as its object from being potentially like or such (which I will call the likeness thesis). According to Sorabji, when Aristotle asserts any of these three theses, he is referring to one and the same physiological process by which the organ becomes actually and literally black or white, hot or cold, dry or fluid. In this paper, I show that this is not the case, because on a careful reading of _De Anima_ III. 4, _nous_ or mind is also receptive of form without matter for Aristotle, and that this, in fact, is essential for his arguments' success in this chapter.