Abstract

This paper is part of a conversation in the Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective (SERRC) about my paper “Epistemic Domination and ‘Gender Identity Fraud’ Prosecutions.” It replies to Talia Mae Bettcher’s “A Letter to Resa-Philip Lunau: Epistemic Domination, ‘Gender Identity Fraud,’ and Reality Enforcement.” In this response, I address the questions Bettcher raises about my arguments, including my decision not to propose that the sex/gender presentation of trans people be treated as evidence. I also develop a more nuanced engagement with Miranda Fricker’s and Katharine Jenkins’s work in “Epistemic Injustice, Ignorance, and Trans Experiences” to reinforce my claim that hermeneutical injustice did not play a role in “gender identity fraud” prosecutions. In doing so, I question Fricker’s strong linkage between experience, understanding, and the possession of concepts, and I extend my account of epistemic domination as a more accurate framework for understanding these cases.