Abstract

In _Principia Mathematica,_ Russell thought that there are irreducibly general judgements with their own mode of truth. They are true in virtue of what the elementary judgements they collect together correspond to. In _The Philosophy of Logical Atomism_, Russell thought that they are true in virtue of general facts. In 1910, general facts are not even considered in order to reject them. In 1918, Russell announces that it cannot be doubted that there are general facts. This raises an intriguing question. What was it that led Russell to drop his 1910 view and drove him to the conclusion that there are general facts? I propose an answer that relies on a core aspect of Russell’s views on which he stayed firm throughout this period and on a preoccupation of his that began well before 1910: theories of truth and the problem of how false judgements are possible. I argue that Russell’s 1910 view failed to account adequately for the falsity of general judgements, while the correspondence theory of truth pushed him to accepting general facts. To round things off I also consider three independent arguments for general facts.