Aims, Hopes, and Images: A Prologue to Sellars's Metaphilosophy

In László Kocsis & Krisztián Pete, Wilfrid Sellars’s Metaphilosophy: Two Images and the Philosophy in Between. London: Bloomsbury. pp. 1-23 (2026)
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Abstract

Wilfrid Sellars emphasizes the significance of metaphilosophical reflections, underscoring that philosophical theorizing is intrinsically connected to our conceptualizations of philosophy itself. He views this self-reflective attitude as a necessary condition for becoming and remaining a philosopher. In this paper, we aim to clarify Sellars's valuable contribution to the growing debate on metaphilosophical issues in contemporary philosophy by examining the main pillars of his views on the nature of philosophy and, in particular, on the aim of philosophy. First, we examine the synoptic view that Sellars believes to be the purpose of philosophy. To do this, we deploy the map analogy favored by Wittgenstein and Ryle, which presupposes a particular kind of reflective know-how (naturally based on factual knowing-that’s), on the basis of which we can reflectively know our way around where we are unreflectively at home. Secondly, we explore the nature and relationship of two fundamentally different understandings of the world and human beings in it: the manifest and the scientific images. We follow a dialectical path to what we believe to be the most comprehensive interpretation: the synoptic fusion of the two images, which is perhaps the most widely accepted today and most faithful to Sellars's intentions (as we understand them). Finally, we demonstrate how Sellars became one of the first proponents of the metaphilosophical approach, which has gained popularity in contemporary philosophy in recent years. The essence of this view is that the aim of philosophy is understanding, not knowledge. This paper is the introductory chapter of an edited volume on Sellars' philosophy, centered on his metaphilosophical views.

Author Profiles

László Kocsis
University of Pécs
Krisztián Pete
University of Pécs

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