Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

1. Transaction Cost Economics

2026

• Rodrigo Carril & Andres Gonzalez-Lira & Michael S. Walker, 2026, "Competition under Incomplete Contracts and the Design of Procurement Policies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 116, issue 2, pages 535-581, February, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20221345.
• Felipe Brugués, 2026, "Take the Goods and Run: Contracting Frictions and Market Power in Supply Chains," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 116, issue 2, pages 582-626, February, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20230264.
• Ilia Krasikov & Rohit Lamba, 2026, "On Dynamic Pricing," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 18, issue 1, pages 174-207, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220124.
• Babur De los Santos & Daniel P. O'Brien & Matthijs R. Wildenbeest, 2026, "Agency Pricing and Bargaining: Evidence from the E-Book Market," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 18, issue 2, pages 146-191, May, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220232.
• Philipp Strack & Dmitry Taubinsky, 2026, "Dynamic Preference "Reversals" and Time Inconsistency," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 18, issue 2, pages 426-468, May, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20230120.
• Evan Starr, 2026, "The Economics of Noncompete Clauses," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, volume 40, issue 1, pages 139-166, Winter, DOI: 10.1257/jep.20251457.
• Di Corato, Luca & Moretto, Michele, 2026, "Dynamic Adverse Selection with Flow Limited Liability: A Closed-Form Approach to Price Regulation," FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), number 396239, Mar, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.396239.
• Juan Sebastián Ivars, 2026, "Designing Managerial Incentives in Competitive Markets," Working Papers, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE), number 392, Apr.
• Gerhard Toews & Elena Paltseva & Marta Troya-Martínez, 2026, "The Geoeconomics of Contract Enforcement," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 1569, Mar.
• Luca Picariello, 2026, "Organizational Design With Portable Skills," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, volume 35, issue 1, pages 196-216, February, DOI: 10.1111/jems.12641.
• Matthias Fahn & Jin Li & Chang Sun, 2026, "Toward a Bad Job Economy: AI Adoption, Agency Costs, and Job Design," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 12612.
• Brian Roberson, 2026, "Existence of Equilibrium Mechanisms in Generalized Principal Agent Problems with Interacting Teams," Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute, number 26-02.
• Doval, Laura & Smolin, Alex, 2026, "Calibrated Mechanism Design," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 20994, Jan.
• Markovich, Sarit & Rayo, Luis, 2026, "The Social Media Externality," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 21432, Apr.
• Wei Liang & Heng-fu Zou, 2026, "Dynamic Incentive Design in Large Populations: A Mean Field Game Approach to the Principal-Agent Problem," CEMA Working Papers, China Economics and Management Academy, Central University of Finance and Economics, number 806, Mar.
• Christopher Stapenhurst & Andrew Clausen, 2026, "Turning Bribes into Lemons: an optimal mechanism," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh, number 326, Jan.
• Jiang, Yi & Tan, Zelong & Yang, Ge, 2026, "Valuation adjustment mechanisms in venture capital and entrepreneurial firms' performance," China Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 95, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.chieco.2025.102602.
• Bienz, Carsten & Bonelli, Diego & Mjøs, Aksel & Santos, Francisco, 2026, "Outcomes, risk-taking, and incentives: Evidence from asset managers," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, volume 98, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2026.102974.
• Miralles, Antonio & Piccione, Erica, 2026, "Robust participation incentives in dynamic kidney exchange," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 263, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.112934.
• Bontems, Philippe & Calmette, Marie-Françoise & Martimort, David, 2026, "Highway to sell: How to renew concessions if you want it," Economics of Transportation, Elsevier, volume 45, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ecotra.2026.100447.
• Herweg, Fabian & Kähny, Maximilian, 2026, "Do zombies rise when interest rates fall: A relationship banking model," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 182, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105218.
• Ke, Rongzhu & Xu, Xinyi, 2026, "A general method for the existence of an optimal deterministic contract in moral hazard problems," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, volume 332, issue 3, pages 981-991, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2025.12.039.
• Loyola, Gino & Portilla, Yolanda, 2026, "Dissuading excessive risk-taking: An agency model of optimal managerial compensation," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, volume 98, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2026.109895.
• Saran, Rene, 2026, "A dynamic optimization approach to delegation with an application to volunteer contracts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 155, issue C, pages 27-54, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.002.
• Rodivilov, Alexander, 2026, "Incentives for contract designers and contractual design," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103244.
• Andraos, Maria & Ghossoub, Mario & Zhu, Michael B., 2026, "Subgame perfect Nash equilibria in large reinsurance markets," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, volume 127, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.insmatheco.2025.103210.
• Chen, An & Schelling, Stefan, 2026, "Exploring health improvement incentives through wellness-linked products," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, volume 128, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.insmatheco.2026.103247.
• Ikeda, Akihiko & Osano, Hiroshi, 2026, "Information capacity investment and financial stability under delegated asset management," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, volume 185, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2026.107635.
• González-Jiménez, Víctor & Dalton, Patricio S. & Noussair, Charles N., 2026, "Bonuses and loss aversion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 243, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107438.
• Hang, Ziqi, 2026, "When to persuade and when to pay: Designing incentives for private learning," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 245, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107528.
• Han, Seungjin & Leal, Andrew, 2026, "Competing mechanisms in games played through agents: Theory and experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 246, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107566.
• Lu, Jingfeng & Zhao, Wenbo, 2026, "Intertemporal bundling," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 231, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106127.
• Biswas, Sonny & Koufopoulos, Kostas & Nguyen, Thi Mai, 2026, "Revisiting “A theory of debt maturity and innovation” [J. Econ. Theory 218 (2024) 105828]," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 234, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106167.
• Bourgeon, Jean-Marc & Picard, Pierre, 2026, "Self-insurance and market insurance substitutability: An established tenet reconsidered," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 234, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106180.
• Holzapfel, Julia, 2026, "Classification risk in health insurance: The interaction of genetics, prevention, and insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, volume 257, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2026.105635.
• Castrén, Olli & Russo, Riccardo, 2026, "Environmental risks and bank capital measures: A theoretical approach," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, volume 108, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2026.105321.
• Luca Di Corato & Michele Moretto, 2026, "Dynamic Adverse Selection with Flow Limited Liability: A Closed-Form Approach to Price Regulation," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, number 2026.09, Mar.
• Natalia Kovrijnykh & Igor Livshits & Ariel Zetlin-Jones, 2026, "Building Credit Histories," Working Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, number 26-17, Mar, DOI: 10.21799/frbp.wp.2026.17.
• Philippe Bontems & Marie-Françoise Calmette & David Martimort, 2026, "Highway to sell: How to renew concessions if you want it," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-05557417, Mar, DOI: 10.1016/j.ecotra.2026.100447.
• Andrea Attar & Lorenzo Bozzoli & Roland Strausz, 2026, "Self-Revealing Renegotiation," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-05506686, Feb.
• Fahn, Matthias & Li, Jin & Sun, Chang, 2026, "Toward a Bad Job Economy: AI Adoption, Agency Costs, and Job Design," IZA Discussion Papers, IZA Network @ LISER, number 18574, Apr.
• Francesco Parisi & Brian H. Bix, 2026, "Fairness in contract law: an impossibility theorem?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, volume 61, issue 1, pages 77-94, April, DOI: 10.1007/s10657-025-09858-8.
• David Martimort & Aggey Simons, 2026, "Optimal Stationary Contracts under One-Sided Enforcement and Persistent Adverse Selection," Working Papers, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics, number 2603E.
• Suñas, Zygphryd, 2026, "Captive Supervisory Regimes," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 128702, Apr.
• Claudio A. Bonilla & Hervé Roche & Marcos Vergara, 2026, "Agency theory and higher-order risk changes," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, volume 360, issue 2, pages 915-950, May, DOI: 10.1007/s10479-026-07081-5.
• Yuxi Chen & Luís Santos-Pinto, 2026, "Overconfidence and strategic behavior in elimination contests: implications for CEO selection," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 30, issue 1, pages 1-44, February, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-025-00381-5.
• Martimort, David & Simons (Semenov), Aggey, 2026, "One-Sided Enforcement in a Model with Persistent Adverse Selection," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 26-1704, Jan.
• Attar, Andrea & Bozzoli, Lorenzo & Strausz, Roland, 2026, "Self-Revealing Renegotiation," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 26-1710, Feb.
• Rahul Deb & Mallesh M. Pai & Maher Said, 2026, "Indirect Persuasion," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, volume 134, issue 4, pages 1210-1244, DOI: 10.1086/739332.
• Pan, Xiaojun, 2026, "Strategic Delegation in Two-Sided Platforms: Tool or Trap, Conditional on Network-Effect Symmetry," EconStor Preprints, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, number 341118.
• Weikl, Jan, 2026, "Preference-driven contract design: How education alters risk, patience, and effort in incentive schemes," Discussion Papers, Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Chair of Labour and Regional Economics, number 134.

2025

• Borys Grochulski & Russell Wong & Yuzhe Zhang, 2025, "Severance Pay in an Optimal Contract," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 17, issue 2, pages 241-291, May, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220267.
• Yehuda John Levy & André Veiga, 2025, "Optimal Contract Regulation in Selection Markets," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 17, issue 2, pages 94-126, May, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20230164.
• Matteo Camboni & Michael Porcellacchia, 2025, "Monitoring Team Members: Information Waste and the Transparency Trap," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 17, issue 3, pages 324-368, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20240240.
• Wanda Mimra & Christian Waibel, 2025, "Contracting Environments and Efficiency in Markets with Hidden Information: An Experiment," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 17, issue 3, pages 35-74, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170293.
• Takeshi Murooka & Takuro Yamashita, 2025, "Optimal Trade Mechanisms with Adverse Selection and Inferential Naïvety," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 17, issue 4, pages 33-67, November, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20230019.
• Dhruva Bhaskar, 2025, "Dynamic Screening and the Dual Roles of Monitoring," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 17, issue 4, pages 352-398, November, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20230049.
• B. Kelsey Jack & Seema Jayachandran & Namrata Kala & Rohini Pande, 2025, "Money (Not) to Burn: Payments for Ecosystem Services to Reduce Crop Residue Burning," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, volume 7, issue 1, pages 39-55, March, DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20230431.
• Pierre Chaigneau & Alex Edmans & Daniel Gottlieb, 2025, "A Theory of Fair CEO Pay," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, volume 7, issue 3, pages 306-324, September, DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20240332.
• Natalia Serna, 2025, "Exogenous Exits, Market Structure, and Equilibrium Contracts in Health Care," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, volume 7, issue 3, pages 325-339, September, DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20240155.
• Ernst Fehr & Gary Charness, 2025, "Social Preferences: Fundamental Characteristics and Economic Consequences," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, volume 63, issue 2, pages 440-514, June, DOI: 10.1257/jel.20241391.
• José Luís dos Santos Barbosa, 2025, "Revenue collection contracts in the municipality of Coimbra (Portugal): the role of transaction costs and risk in contract choice (1557-1836)," Investigaciones de Historia Económica - Economic History Research (IHE-EHR), Journal of the Spanish Economic History Association, Asociación Española de Historia Económica, volume 21, issue 01, pages 01-27, DOI: https://doi.org/10.33231/j.ihe.2025.
• Bruno Esperante, 2025, "La oferta de maquinaria agrícola en la segunda y tercera onda del cambio tecnológico en la agricultura en España, 1850-2000," Investigaciones de Historia Económica - Economic History Research (IHE-EHR), Journal of the Spanish Economic History Association, Asociación Española de Historia Económica, volume 21, issue 01, pages 29-58, DOI: https://doi.org/10.33231/j.ihe.2025.
• Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2025, "A Theory of Front-Line Management," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 1537, Nov.
• Bernhard Ganglmair & Julian Klix & Dongsoo Shin, 2025, "Hybrid Contracting in Repeated Interactions," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2025_695, Aug.
• Bannier Christina E. & Ewelt-Knauer Corinna & Khaled Mohamed Amin & Kölling Jan-Philipp, 2025, "The Symmetry and Asymmetry of Bidder and Target Termination Fees in Acquisitions," Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium, De Gruyter, volume 15, issue 4, pages 517-572, DOI: 10.1515/ael-2020-0049.
• Su Alice Peng-Ju, 2025, "Credibly Confidential Contracts," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 25, issue 2, pages 319-341, DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2024-0032.
• Nuño-Ledesma José G., 2025, "Incentive Alignment and Effort Provision in Multitask Contracts: A Basic Test of the Theory," Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization, De Gruyter, volume 23, issue 2, pages 83-105, DOI: 10.1515/jafio-2024-0042.
• David Bardey & Philippe De Donder & Marie-Louise Leroux, 2025, "Incentivizing Physicians’ Diagnostic Effort and Test with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 11686.
• Christian Arciniegas & Christelle Dumas & Matthias Fahn, 2025, "Informal Labor Exchange Teams and Participation in the Labor Market: Evidence from Rural Tanzania," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 11809.
• Dominique Demougin & Benjamin Bental, 2025, "Procedural vs. Substantive Approaches in Non-Comprehensive Contracts," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 11861.
• Philippe Choné & Laurent Linnemer, 2025, "Flexclusivity: Exclusive Agreements with Competitive Flexibility," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 12134.
• David Bardey & Philippe De Donder & Marie-Louise Leroux, 2025, "Incentivizing Physicians’ Diagnostic Effort and Test with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO, number 2025s-02, Feb.
• Choné, Philippe & Linnemer, Laurent, 2025, "Flexclusivity: Exclusive Agreements with Competitive Flexibility," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 20620, Sep.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2025, "Public-Private Partnerships, Asymmetric Information, and Incomplete Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 20699, Oct.
• Hoffmann, Florian & Vladimirov, Vladimir, 2025, "Impact Through Catalytic Finance," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 20861, Nov.
• Maria Saez Marti, 2025, "Take a Break: A Model of Fatigue, Recovery, and the Economics of Remote Work," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2268R1, May.
• Natalie Kessler & Poramapa Poonpakdee, 2025, "The Role of Ambiguity in the Monetary Policy Transmissions: Evidence from the European Repo Market," Working Papers, DNB, number 847, Nov.
• Bourguignon, François & Platteau, Jean-Philippe, 2025, "Aid allocation with optimal monitoring: Theory and policy," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, volume 172, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103364.
• Zhang, Yuqian & Yang, Zhaojun, 2025, "Dynamic incentive contracts with controllable risk," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, volume 178, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105160.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2025, "Public–private partnerships, asymmetric information, and incomplete contracts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 256, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112649.
• Li, Xinyu & Haan, Marco A. & Onderstal, Sander & Veldman, Jasper, 2025, "A wind tunnel test of wind farm auctions," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 152, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2025.108984.
• Morita, Kimiyuki & Muramoto, Akitoshi & Sogo, Takeharu, 2025, "Optimal contracts under interpersonal projection," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 150, issue C, pages 356-364, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.009.
• Liu, Dongri & Lu, Jingfeng, 2025, "An implementation of the general optimal mechanism in Esö and Szentes (2007)," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 151, issue C, pages 82-94, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.014.
• Malcomson, James M., 2025, "Grouping agents with persistent types," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 152, issue C, pages 150-174, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.03.008.
• Ozerturk, Saltuk & Yildirim, Huseyin, 2025, "Who gets the credit? Credit attribution, spillovers, and inefficiency in teams," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 154, issue C, pages 246-266, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.005.
• Denuit, Michel & Dhaene, Jan & Ghossoub, Mario & Robert, Christian Y., 2025, "Comonotonicity and Pareto optimality, with application to collaborative insurance," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, volume 120, issue C, pages 1-16, DOI: 10.1016/j.insmatheco.2024.11.001.
• Sheng, Jiliang & Yang, Yanyan & Yang, Jun, 2025, "Optimal delegation contract with portfolio risk," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, volume 171, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2024.107357.
• Daido, Kohei & Murooka, Takeshi, 2025, "Multitasking and leadership in optimal incentive contracts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 229, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106824.
• Wu, Cheng-Tai & Tsai, Tsung-Sheng, 2025, "Mandate or delegate? the optimal contract for credence goods with the expert’s endeavor," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 229, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106863.
• Luelfesmann, Christoph, 2025, "Authority and screening in a principal agent model," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 231, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106862.
• Chi, Yichun & Peter, Richard & Wei, Wei, 2025, "On the optimality of straight deductibles under smooth ambiguity aversion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 234, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107001.
• Jedelhauser, Fabienne & Flepp, Raphael & Meier, Pascal Flurin & Franck, Egon, 2025, "Does performance pressure accentuate outcome bias? Evidence from managerial dismissals," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 236, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107086.
• Suzuki, Toru, 2025, "Efficiently imprecise contracts: The role of conventionality," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 236, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107099.
• Hellbom Almström, Axel & Ellegård, Lina Maria & Enache, Andreea & Strömberg, Klara, 2025, "Mixed payment and mixed objectives: Insights from the ownership structure in Swedish primary care," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 237, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107148.
• Dietrich, Diemo & Gehrig, Thomas, 2025, "Scope and limits of bank liquidity creation," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, volume 61, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101123.
• Utgoff, Naomi M., 2025, "Information-based discrimination," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, volume 134, issue C, pages 20-30, DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.01.001.
• Di Giannatale, Sonia & Curiel-Cabral, Itza Tlaloc Quetzalcoatl & Basulto, Genaro, 2025, "The dynamics of bargaining power in a principal-agent model," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, volume 138, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102452.
• Suzuki, Yutaka, 2025, "An incomplete contract analysis of innovation management: “Open vs. closed” innovation in a dynamic framework," Research in Economics, Elsevier, volume 79, issue 4, DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2025.101080.
• Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2025, "A theory of fair CEO pay," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 125993, Sep.
• Ghatak, Maitreesh & Wahhaj, Zaki, 2025, "Motivational investments and financial incentives," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 127532, Mar.
• Joanna Rzempala & Artur Rzempala & Daniel Borkowski & Karol Borkowski & Jaroslaw Duda, 2025, "Managing Regulatory Risk in the Planning Phase of Renewable Energy Investment Projects Utilizing Corporate Power Purchase Agreements in Polish Law," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, volume 0, issue 3, pages 1653-1682.
• Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié, 2025, "Competitive Nonlinear Pricing under Adverse Selection," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-05353285, Nov.
• David Bardey & Philippe de Donder & Vera Zaporozhets, 2025, "Economic Incentives to Develop and to Use Diagnostic Tests: A Literature Review," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-05468072, Oct, DOI: 10.58567/jea04040006.
• Gilles Chemla & Alejandro Rivera & Liyan Shi & Hengji Ai & Robert Anderson & Patrick Bolton & Sylvain Carré & Hui Chen & Naveen Ghondi & Thomas Geelen & Denis Gromb & Barney Hartman-Glaser & Andrei Ma, 2025, "Too Much, Too Soon, for Too Long: The Dynamics of Competitive Executive Compensation ," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-05550207, Oct.
• Franz Ostrizek, 2025, "Value by Design: Performance Evaluation and Learning from Wages," Sciences Po Economics Publications (main), HAL, number hal-04938068, Feb.
• Franz Ostrizek, 2025, "Value by Design: Performance Evaluation and Learning from Wages," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-04938068, Feb.
• Philippe Bontems & Marie-Françoise Calmette & David Martimort, 2025, "Highway to Sell," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-05143577, Jul.
• Franz Ostrizek, 2025, "Value by Design: Performance Evaluation and Learning from Wages," Sciences Po Economics Discussion Papers, HAL, number hal-04938068, Feb.
• Carli, Francesco & Cecchi, Francesco & Fritz, Manuela & Lensink, Robert & Uras, Burak, 2025, "Reviving Joint Liability Contracts: Asymmetric Joint Liability Loans and Moral Hazard," IDB Publications (Working Papers), Inter-American Development Bank, number 14162, Jun, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0013559.
• Xinyu Li & Wendelin Schnedler, 2025, "Sharing the Fame but Taking the Blame: When Declaring a Single Person Responsible Solves a Free Rider Problem," Management Science, INFORMS, volume 71, issue 10, pages 8252-8266, October, DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2024.06567.
• Arciniegas, Christian & Dumas, Christelle & Fahn, Matthias, 2025, "Informal Labor Exchange Teams and Participation in the Labor Market: Evidence from Rural Tanzania," IZA Discussion Papers, IZA Network @ LISER, number 17852, Apr.
• Joshua S. Gans, 2025, "Equilibrium conditions for Catch-22 situations," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, volume 10, issue 1, pages 45-65, December, DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2025.12.002.
• Leo Reutter, 2025, "Inefficient incentives for energy saving in tenancy law and policy options to remedy the landlord-tenant dilemma," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, volume 59, issue 1, pages 179-218, February, DOI: 10.1007/s10657-024-09827-7.
• Alvaro Remesal, 2025, "Clawback enforcement, executive pay, and accounting manipulation," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, volume 59, issue 2, pages 227-255, April, DOI: 10.1007/s10657-024-09801-3.
• Gian Luigi Albano & Berardino Cesi & Alberto Iozzi, 2025, "To discriminate or not to discriminate: how to enforce unverifiable quality in repeated procurement," Journal of Economics, Springer, volume 146, issue 2, pages 237-262, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00712-025-00917-x.
• Rob Waiser & Juan Dubra & Jean-Pierre Benoît, 2025, "Incentives, burnout, and turnover: Dynamic compensation design with effort cost spillover," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, volume 23, issue 4, pages 589-639, December, DOI: 10.1007/s11129-025-09301-x.
• Willem H. Boshoff & Luke M. Froeb & Wihan Marais & Roan J. Minnie & Steven Tschantz, 2025, "Bargaining Competition and Vertical Mergers: The Problem of Model Selection," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, volume 66, issue 2, pages 141-183, February, DOI: 10.1007/s11151-025-10009-1.
• Kohei Daido & Tomoya Tajika, 2025, "Mechanism Design with Private Communication to Neutralize Fairness Constraints," Discussion Paper Series, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, number 299, Sep.
• Hideshi Itoh & Takashi Shimizu & Yasuo Takatsuki, 2025, "Complementarities between Long-Term Relationships and Short-Term Contracts: Case of Early Modern Japan," Discussion Paper Series, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University, number DP2025-33, Dec, revised May 2026.
• John Zhuang Liu & Christoph Engel & Yun-chien Chang, 2025, "The Psychological Case for Retaining Counsel: The Tipping Point Effect," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics, Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics, number 2025_01, Jan.
• Paul Gertler & Brett Green & Renping Li & David Sraer, 2025, "The Welfare Benefits of Pay-As-You-Go Financing," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 33484, Feb.
• Justin Marion & Benjamin Rosa, 2025, "A Bid Strategy for Earlier Payment: Evidence and Implications of Front-End Loading in Procurement," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 33606, Mar.
• Joshua S. Gans, 2025, "Can Author Manipulation of AI Referees be Welfare Improving?," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 34082, Jul.
• Roberto Corrao & Joel P. Flynn & Karthik Sastry, 2025, "Contractibility Design," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 34379, Oct.
• Eduardo M. Azevedo & Florian Scheuer & Kent Smetters & Min Yang, 2025, "Dilution vs. Risk Taking: Capital Gains Taxes and Entrepreneurship," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 34512, Nov.
• Sylvain Chassang, 2025, "Generous Long-Term Contracts," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 34593, Dec.
• Bo Cowgill & Zikai Xu, 2025, "Network Formation through Mechanism Design," Working Papers, NET Institute, number 25-01, Aug.
• Aggey Simons, 2025, "Stationarity of the Optimal Enforcement Contract in the Complete Information Case," Working Papers, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics, number 2501E.
• Aggey Simons, 2025, "Optimal Contracts under General Mixed Constraints: Continuity, Structure, and Applications," Working Papers, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics, number 2502E.
• Matthias Fahn & Takeshi Murooka, 2025, "Informal Incentives and Labour Markets," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, volume 135, issue 665, pages 144-179.
• David L Dicks & Paolo Fulghieri, 2025, "Uncertainty, Contracting, and Beliefs in Organizations," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, volume 38, issue 7, pages 2182-2225.
• Banerjee, Swapnendu & Chakraborty, Somenath, 2025, "Individual versus Team Production with Social Preferences," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 125933, Aug.
• EL Ouardi, Oualid, 2025, "The Economics of Strategic Learning in Trade Wars: Evidence from the Trump -Xi Natural Experiment. -- Conditional Reciprocity and Behavioral Synchronization in US-China Trade Wars--," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 126177, Sep.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2025, "Public-Private Partnerships, Asymmetric Information, and Incomplete Contracts," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 126368, Oct.
• David Bardey & Philippe De Donder & Marie-Louise Leroux, 2025, "Incentivizing Physicians’ Diagnostic Effort and Test with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," Cahiers de recherche / Working Papers, Chaire de recherche sur les enjeux économiques intergénérationnels / Research Chair in Intergenerational Economics, number 2501.
• Jeffrey Cisyk & Pascal Courty & Amin Kouhbor, 2025, "Are English Premier League Teams Paid Like Bureaucrats? An Incentive Analysis of Monetary Match Importance," Journal of Sports Economics, , volume 26, issue 7, pages 783-815, October, DOI: 10.1177/15270025251348181.
• Alexandra Spaeth, 2025, "The effect of tax policy uncertainty on incentivization, managerial effort and total surplus," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, volume 95, issue 6, pages 839-869, August, DOI: 10.1007/s11573-025-01227-w.
• Nikolaj Niebuhr Lambertsen, 2025, "Exploiting overconfidence: optimal contracts with heterogeneous beliefs," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 79, issue 4, pages 1225-1254, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01626-0.
• Martin Dumav & Urmee Khan & Luca Rigotti, 2025, "Optimal contracts when the players think differently," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 80, issue 3, pages 863-890, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-025-01646-4.
• Beatrice Acciaio & Robert A. Crowell & Jakša Cvitanić, 2025, "A note on persistent private information," Mathematics and Financial Economics, Springer, number 5, December, DOI: 10.1007/s11579-024-00378-8.
• Biais, Bruno & Gersbach, Hans & Rochet, Jean-Charles & von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig & Villeneuve, Stéphane, 2025, "Dynamic Contracting with Many Agents," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 25-1642, May.
• Bontems, Philippe & Calmette, Marie-Françoise & Martimort, David, 2025, "Highway to Sell," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 25-1652, Jul.
• Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2025, "A theory of front-line management," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 1929, Nov.
• Kentaro Asai & Bruce Grundy & Ryuichiro Izumi, 2025, "Opacity, Signaling, and Bail-ins," Wesleyan Economics Working Papers, Wesleyan University, Department of Economics, number 2025-003, Apr.
• Jihwan Do & Nicolas Riquelme, 2025, "Vertical Contracting and Information Spillover in Cournot Competition," Working papers, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute, number 2025rwp-251, Jun.
• Veltri, Bruno & Blesch, Maximilian, 2025, "Policy Uncertainty, Misinformation, and Statutory Retirement Age Reform," VfS Annual Conference 2025 (Cologne): Revival of Industrial Policy, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association, number 325463.
• Ganglmair, Bernhard & Klix, Julian & Shin, Dongsoo, 2025, "Hybrid contracting in repeated interactions," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 25-046.

2024

• Andrew McClellan, 2024, "Dynamic Outside Options and Optimal Negotiation Strategies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 114, issue 10, pages 3284-3313, October, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20230015.
• Henrique Castro-Pires & Hector Chade & Jeroen Swinkels, 2024, "Disentangling Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 114, issue 1, pages 1-37, January, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20220100.
• Axel Anderson & Lones Smith, 2024, "The Comparative Statics of Sorting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 114, issue 3, pages 709-751, March, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20210890.
• Simon Board & Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn, 2024, "Experimentation in Networks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 114, issue 9, pages 2940-2980, September, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20230233.
• Marina Halac & Ilan Kremer & Eyal Winter, 2024, "Monitoring Teams," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 16, issue 3, pages 134-161, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220260.
• Luc Bridet & Peter Schwardmann, 2024, "Selling Dreams: Endogenous Optimism in Lending Markets," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 16, issue 3, pages 492-524, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200285.
• Enrique Ide, 2024, "Dual Moral Hazard and the Tyranny of Success," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 16, issue 4, pages 154-191, November, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220344.
• Pierre Fleckinger & David Martimort & Nicolas Roux, 2024, "Should They Compete or Should They Cooperate? The View of Agency Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, volume 62, issue 4, pages 1589-1646, December, DOI: 10.1257/jel.20241678.
• Xuefeng Shao & Shi Chen, 2024, "Research on Tax Compliance Incentive Effects of Platform Companies from the Perspective of Incomplete Contract – An Empirical Study Based on China," The AMFITEATRU ECONOMIC journal, Academy of Economic Studies - Bucharest, Romania, volume 26, issue 65, pages 330-330, February.
• Di Corato, Luca & Moretto, Michele, , "Supply contracting under dynamic asymmetric cost information," FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), number 340040, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.340040.
• Denuit, Michel & Dhaene, Jan & Ghossoub, Mario & Robert, Christian Y., 2024, "Comonotonicity and Pareto optimality, with application to collaborative insurance," LIDAM Reprints ISBA, Université catholique de Louvain, Institute of Statistics, Biostatistics and Actuarial Sciences (ISBA), number 2024045, Nov, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.insmathec.
• Marc Claveria-Mayol & Pau Mil'an & Nicol'as Oviedo-D'avila, 2024, "Incentive Contracts and Peer Effects in the Workplace," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2406.11712, Jun, revised Apr 2026.
• Phoebe Tian, 2024, "The Role of Long-Term Contracting in Business Lending," Staff Working Papers, Bank of Canada, number 24-2, Feb, DOI: 10.34989/swp-2024-2.
• Normah Fadzai Mutongerwa & Zimkhitha Final Juqu & Hlalele Matebese, 2024, "A Paradigm Shift in Outsourcing Functions to External Service Providers in the Public Sector: A Liability for the State," American Journal of Supply Chain Management, AJPO Journals Limited, volume 9, issue 1, pages 13-32.
• George W. Evans & Seppo Honkapohja & Ramon Marimon, 2015, "Stable Sunspot Equilibria in a Cash-in-Advance Economy," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 14, Sep.
• Marc Claveria-Mayol & Pau Milán, 2024, "Incentive Contracts and Peer Effects in the Workplace," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 1439, Sep.
• Marc Claveria-Mayol & Nicolás Oviedo Dávila & Pau Milán, 2024, "Incentive Contracts and Peer Effects in the Workplace," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 1457, Sep.
• Keler Marku & Sergio Ocampo & Jean‐Baptiste Tondji, 2024, "Robust contracts in common agency," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, volume 55, issue 2, pages 199-229, June, DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12463.
• Ying-Ju Chen & Zhengqing Gui & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden & Xiaojian Zhao, 2024, "Supply Chain Frictions," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2024_528, Apr.
• Giacomo Calzolari & Leonardo Felli & Johannes Koenen & Giancarlo Spagnolo & Konrad Stahl, 2024, "Trust in Vertical Relations," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2024_530, Apr.
• Gregorio Curello & Ludvig Sinander, 2024, "Screening for Breakthroughs," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2024_562, Jun.
• Su Alice Peng-Ju, 2024, "Screening with Privacy on (Im)persistency," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 24, issue 1, pages 1-48, January, DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2022-0118.
• Rodivilov Alexander & Shin Dongsoo, 2024, "Motivating Loyal Bureaucrats in Sequential Agency," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 24, issue 2, pages 519-553, DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2023-0122.
• Giuseppe Moscarini & Fabien Postel-Vinay, 2024, "On the Job Search and Business Cycles," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, volume 75, issue 1, pages 73-112.
• Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Sander Onderstal & Francesco Parisi & Ram Singh, 2024, "Optimal (Non-) Disclosure Defaults," Working papers, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics, number 346, Apr.
• Giacomo Calzolari & Leonardo Felli & Johannes Koenen & Giancarlo Spagnolo & Konrad O. Stahl, 2024, "Trust and Complexity in Vertical Relationships," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 11170.
• David Bardey & Philippe De Donder & Vera Zaporozhets, 2024, "Economic Incentives to Develop and to Use Diagnostic Tests a Literature Review," Documentos CEDE, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE, number 21024, Feb.
• David Bardey & Philippe De Donder & Marie-Louise Leroux, 2024, "Incentivizing Physicians' Diagnostic Effort and Test with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," Documentos CEDE, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE, number 21269, Dec.
• Chen, Ying-Ju & Gui, Zhengqing & von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig & Zhao, Xiaojian, 2024, "Supply Chain Frictions," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 19013, Apr.
• Calzolari, Giacomo & Felli, Leonardo & Koenen, Johannes & Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Stahl, Konrad, 2024, "Trust and Complexity in Vertical Relationships," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 19162, Jun.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2024, "When Should the Government Own the Physical Assets Needed to Provide Public Goods?," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 19177, Jun.
• Bienz, Carsten & Fluck, Zsuzsanna & Thorburn, Karin S, 2024, "The covenant removal option in corporate bonds," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 19336, Aug.
• Bigoni, Maria & Bortolotti, Stefania & Parisi, Francesco & Zhang, Xin, 2024, "Do Contract Remedies Affect Efficient Renegotiation? An Experiment," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 19365, Aug.
• Hellbom Almström, Axel & EllegÃ¥rd, Lina Maria & Enache, Andreea & Strömberg, Klara, 2024, "Mixed Payment and Mixed Objectives: Insights from the Ownership Structure in Swedish Primary Care," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 19375, Aug.
• Dietrich, Diemo & Gehrig, Thomas, 2024, "Scope and Limits of Bank Liquidity Provision," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 19602, Oct.
• Chemla, Gilles & Rivera, Alejandro & Shi, Liyan, 2024, "Too Much, Too Soon, for Too Long: The Dynamics of Competitive Executive Compensation," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 19613, Oct.
• Schöttner, Anja & Upton, Harvey, 2024, "When Should a Firm Employ its Workers? A Relational Contracting Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 19688, Nov.
• Hengjie Ai & Kai Li & Rui Li, 2024, "Moral Hazard and Investment-Cash-Flow Sensitivity," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, volume 25, issue 1, pages 143-174, May.
• Natalie Kessler & Iman van Lelyveld & Ellen van der Woerd, 2024, "Exclusive Portfolio Dealing and Market Inefficiency," Working Papers, DNB, number 802, Feb.
• Biais, Bruno & Gersbach, Hans & Rochet, Jean-Charles & von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig & Villeneuve, Stéphane, 2024, "Dynamic Contracting with Many Agents," HEC Research Papers Series, HEC Paris, number 1516, Apr, DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.4769204.
• Li, Junqing & Yang, Zhiyuan & Liu, Kaifeng, 2024, "Research on contracting institutions and convergence," China Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 84, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.chieco.2024.102129.
• Loyola, Gino & Portilla, Yolanda, 2024, "Optimal financing of highly innovative projects under double moral hazard," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, volume 89, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102684.
• Yang, Nian & Yang, Jun & Chen, Yu, 2024, "Contracting with cost synergies: Continuous-time double-sided moral hazard," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, volume 168, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2024.104971.
• Mitsuhashi, Hikaru & Ohta, Yasuhiro, 2024, "The bonding cost in subjective performance evaluation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 234, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111465.
• Tan, Lihua & Yang, Zhaojun, 2024, "Simple contracts with double-sided moral hazard and adverse selection," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 236, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111601.
• Ramchandani, Abhishek, 2024, "Firm-fit transparency and incentives," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 236, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111604.
• Chang, Shih-Chung & Wang, Frank Yong, 2024, "Two-sided asymmetric information and convertible securities in venture financing," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 237, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111635.
• Pram, Kym, 2024, "Who benefits from covert evidence acquisition in principal–agent interactions?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 237, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111675.
• Rossi, Stefano & Yun, Hayong, 2024, "The political economy of municipal bankruptcy," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 239, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111735.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2024, "When should the government own the physical assets needed to provide public goods?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 241, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111830.
• Lambertsen, Nikolaj Niebuhr & Poulsen, Morten Lund, 2024, "Overconfidence and ethical contracts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 241, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111841.