The non-identity problem (also called the paradox of future individuals[1]) is a problem in population ethics concerning actions that affect the existence, identity, or well-being of future people. It arises from the observation that even small changes can alter the timing and circumstances of child conception, leading to entirely different individuals coming into existence, similarly to the butterfly effect in chaos theory. Actions affecting future generations will thus not simply affect the welfare of individuals, but rather cause different individuals to come into existence. The problem was described and explored by Derek Parfit in his 1984 book Reasons and Persons.[2] It is a challenge to person-affecting views, which are based on the intuition that "what is bad must be bad for someone".[3]
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An example proposed by Parfit involves thinking of two policies: "conservation" and "depletion". In the depletion strategy, current generations have a slightly higher quality of life, but unchecked use of natural resources eventually leads to depletion, significantly degrading the welfare of future generations. Parfit argues that person-affecting views would favor the depletion policy because it benefits current generations of identifiable people, even though the conservation policy is generally considered ethically superior.[2] He eventually became convinced that personal identity is irrelevant to ethics.[4]
A solution to the problem is to adopt impersonal views, theories that don't rely on the notion of personal identity, such as utilitarianism. But impersonal views lead to what Parfit calls the "repugnant conclusion", the idea that for any possible population with very high quality of life, there could be a much larger imaginable population whose existence would be better, even though its members have lives that are barely worth living.[3] Some philosophers consider, however, that almost all credible theories of population ethics imply some form of the repugnant conclusion anyway.[5][3]
"Non-identity reasoning" can be sustained by a range of compatible theories of identity such as versions of origin essentialism[6][7] as well as actualism and thisness.[8][9]
Additional applications
editThe non-identity problem and non-identity reasoning more generally have been employed beyond the non-identity problem itself.
Philosophy of religion
editNon-identity reasoning has been employed in philosophy of religion to address the problem of evil[7][9] and the hiddenness argument.[8] The basic contribution in both cases is that particular persons can only come into existence under certain circumstances, which include evil and nonresistant nonbelief, even on God's existence.[8][7][9]
Longtermism
editLongtermism, which centers on the idea that future people have moral worth and that this should affect our decisions, is affected by the non-identity problem.[10] Specifically, since the identities of future people are altered depending on what we do today, then they do not have any claim on our help today—at least as long as their lives are overall worth living.[10] This parallels Parfit's conservation vs. depletion case in a way specific to longtermism.[10][2]
See also
editReferences
edit- ↑ Kavka, Gregory (1982). "The Paradox of Future Individuals" (PDF). Philosophy and Public Affairs.
- 1 2 3 Wilkinson, Dominic; Doolabh, Keyur (12 June 2017). "Should we take ethical account of people who do not yet exist?". Aeon. Retrieved 26 January 2025.
- 1 2 3 Roberts, M. A. "The Nonidentity Problem". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 17 December 2015.
- ↑ Matthews, Dylan (3 January 2017). "The whole philosophy community is mourning Derek Parfit. Here's why he mattered". Vox. Retrieved 26 January 2025.
- ↑ Zuber, Stéphane; Venkatesh, Nikhil; Tännsjö, Torbjörn; Tarsney, Christian; Stefánsson, H. Orri; Steele, Katie; Spears, Dean; Sebo, Jeff; Pivato, Marcus; Ord, Toby; Ng, Yew-Kwang; Masny, Michal; MacAskill, William; Lawson, Nicholas; Kuruc, Kevin (13 April 2021). "What Should We Agree on about the Repugnant Conclusion?". Utilitas. 33 (4): 379–383. doi:10.1017/S095382082100011X. hdl:10852/90849. ISSN 0953-8208.
- ↑ "Arguments for Origin Essentialism". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- 1 2 3 Hill, Scott (2022). "Why God allows undeserved horrendous evil". Religious Studies. 58 (4): 772–786. doi:10.1017/S003441252100038X. ISSN 0034-4125.
- 1 2 3 Broadhurst, Grant Walker (31 December 2025). "Non-Identity Reasoning and the Hiddenness Argument: The Love of God for Persons Contingent on Nonresistant Nonbelief". TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology. 9 (2): 276–303. doi:10.14428/thl.v9i2.84933. ISSN 2593-0265.
- 1 2 3 Vitale, Vince R. (2020). Non-identity theodicy: a grace-based response to the problem of evil. Oxford theology and religion monographs. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780198864226.
- 1 2 3 Emma J, Curran (18 August 2025). "Longtermism and the Complaints of Future People". Oxford Academic. Retrieved 4 April 2026.
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Further reading
edit- Alina Omerbasic (2018). "Genome Editing, NonIdentity and the Notion of Harm, Between Moral Hazard and Legal Uncertainty", doi:10.1007/978-3-658-22660-2_5, (67-81)
- Robert Sparrow (2021). "Human Germline Genome Editing: On the Nature of Our Reasons to Genome Edit", The American Journal of Bioethics, doi:10.1080/15265161.2021.1907480, 22, 9, (4-15)