The siege of Ariminum, also known as the siege of Rimini, was an encounter in 538 AD during the Gothic War, where the Byzantine forces broke the siege by the Ostrogoths (Goths).
| Siege of Ariminum | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of the Gothic War (535–554) | |||||||||
First phase of Gothic War campaigns | |||||||||
| |||||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||||
| Byzantine Empire | Ostrogothic Kingdom | ||||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
| Vitiges | |||||||||
| Strength | |||||||||
|
Unknown under Belisarius[a] 7,000 under Narses[2] 3,200 garrison under John[3] | Unknown[b] | ||||||||
In early 538 and during the Siege of Rome (537–538), the besieged Byzantine General Belisarius sent John the Sanguinary to raid Picenum region. John took the initiative and captured Ariminum, near the Gothic capital, Ravenna, to entice the Goths into lifting the siege of Rome. Belisarius sent reinforcements to Ariminum and ordered John to leave the city, as his cavalry forces would not be useful in the case of a siege. However, John refused to obey and stayed in the city. In the meantime, fearing for their capital, the Goths retreated from Rome and moved to besiege Ariminum in March 538. They were unsuccessful in taking Ariminum by force, and instead, the leader of the Gothic forces, Vitiges, decided to starve the town.
Initially, the Byzantine leadership was divided over whether to rescue John despite his insubordination. Belisarius ultimately chose to save him after an appeal from Chamberlain Narses that John's loss would boost the morale of the Goths. Belisarius wanted to avoid direct battle engagement because the Goths outnumbered the Byzantine forces. He split his army into smaller groups and sent them to Ariminum by land and sea. The near-simultaneous arrival of Byzantine forces from multiple directions created the impression of a much larger army, unnerving the Goths. As a result, they abandoned the siege on 24 July 538 and withdrew to Ravenna. Despite the victory, disagreements over John's insubordination fractured the unity of the Byzantine leadership and shaped the course of the Gothic War.
Primary sources
editProcopius of Caesarea is the major Greek historian of Late Antiquity and the main source for Justinian I's reign of Byzantium.[7] In Books V–VIII of the Wars, Procopius described the Gothic War (535–554), and it is largely paraphrased by modern scholarship as it is the sole source that covered these events.[8] He was Belisarius's assessor, being an eyewitness to military engagements, having access to official information, and knowledge of military affairs. These advantages placed him in a unique position to reconstruct the wars in the East, Africa, and Italy.[9] He adopted a classical style in narrating the events, inspired by historians such as Thucydides and Herodotus, by prioritizing speeches, moral explanation, and dramatic structure over strict documentary accuracy.[10]
Procopius's work is largely factual, and even though he was on the Byzantine side, it is neither entirely neutral nor propaganda. He portrayed Belisarius favorably over other Byzantine commanders, reflecting personal loyalty, and disproportionately emphasized mounted combat, marginalizing the role of infantry in battles and sieges.[11] His view of Justinian ranges from enthusiasm and optimism in the first part of the Wars to open hostility in the Secret History.[10] Even in the Wars, there is a transition at the point when Belisarius left Italy in mid-summer 540 AD, presumably due to Belisarius's unbroken loyalty to Justinian, followed by the resurgence Gothic resistance led by charismatic Totila, who became the protagonist and a tragic hero in Procopius's narrative in the latter part of the Gothic War.[12]
Background
edit
In 476 AD, the last western Roman emperor, Romulus Augustulus, was deposed and authority passed to the Germanic general Odoacer, though he nominally recognized the supremacy of the Byzantine emperor in Constantinople.[13] In 493, Odoacer was overthrown and killed by Theodoric the Great, who sought the creation of an independent kingdom by balancing the Gothic military dominance with the preservation of Byzantine civil institutions. For several decades, Theodoric's regime maintained relative stability, fostering cooperation between the senatorial elite in Rome and the Gothic ruling class.[14] The Byzantines were unable to interfere in the Italian Peninsula. While Theodoric asked the then Byzantine Emperor Zeno permission to wear the royal regalia, the emperor died in 491 before deciding. Similarly, Emperor Anastasius initially did not consent, but in 497 accepted the usurpation. Theodoric used the titles rex and princeps (first citizen) and before his death, the Ostrogothic kingdom was the strongest barbarian nation occupying lands of the Western Roman Empire.[15]
After Theodoric's death in 526, his daughter, Amalasuntha, attempted to continue pro-Byzantine policies and maintain close ties with Byzantium under Emperor Justinian. Her reliance on Byzantine advisers and her son's Byzantine education and the assassination of her political opponents to maintain her position as regent until her son came of age,[16] however, alienated segments of the Gothic nobility. Her son died in 534, prompting the opposition to bring up the succession question.[17] Soon after Amalasuntha was deposed and later murdered by Theodahad in 535, Justinian considered this as a casus belli justification to intervene militarily in Italian Peninsula. Framing his campaign as both a defense of a legitimate ruler and a restoration of imperial authority, he launched a military campaign that became known as the Gothic War.[18]
At the time, the Byzantines had successfully conquered North Africa in the Vandalic War (533–534) and made preparations against the Goths. Following the fallout with Theodahad, Justinian opened two fronts against the Goths in 535. Specifically, Belisarius conquered Sicily and then southern Italian Peninsula with limited resistance, while Mundus and later Constantinianus seized Salona, the capital of Dalmatia region.[19] The Goths failed to counter the Byzantine offences, while at the same time, Theodahad was in secret negotiations with Justinian.[20] The capture of Naples by Belisarius in 536, prompted the assassination of Theodahad by the men of Vitiges.[21] Belisarius entered Rome on 9 December 536.[22]
Prelude
editSiege of Rome
editIn response to the loss of Rome, Vitiges, as the new king of the Goths, marched with an army that had superior numbers[c] to besiege the city. The Siege of Rome (537–538) featured repeated Gothic assaults on Rome's walls, countered by Belisarius's defensive preparations, use of artillery, and cavalry sorties that exploited the Goths' difficulties in countering mounted archers. Both sides suffered from shortages and disease, but Byzantine control of sea supply routes gradually weakened the besieging Goths, who faced greater logistical challenges in supplying their large army by land.[29]
Capture of Ariminum and John's insubordination
editIn March 538, and while the siege of Rome was ongoing, Belisarius sent John, nephew of the Byzantine general Vitalianus, to raid Picenum. John defeated the Gothic commander Ulitheus (uncle of Vitiges[30]) in battle, gaining a reputation among the Goths. He ignored the cities of Auximus and Urbinus due to their strong garrisons. When he approached Ariminum, its citizens invited John to take the town. John realized the importance of Ariminum, which was one to two days' march away from the Gothic capital of Ravenna, and its capture would force Vitiges to lift the siege of Rome.[31] The Gothic garrison retreated from Ariminum to Ravenna "as soon as they learned that [John's] army was approaching", and John took the city without resistance. In the meantime, Vitiges' wife, Mataswintha, opened negotiations with John and proposed the idea of marriage, on account of Vitiges marrying her by force. John's reputation was bolstered by the town's capture, and according to Procopius, John and Mataswintha frequently exchanged messages.[32]
The Goths, upon hearing the fall of Ariminum, lifted the siege of Rome on 12 March 538 and traveled towards Ravenna. Their travel was slow because they moved as a large army and took detours to avoid the Byzantine fortresses at Narnia, Spoletium, and Perusia.[33] Belisarius, anticipating that the Goths would attempt to besiege Ariminum, sent infantry forces to replace John and his cavalry unit, ordering John along the Via Flaminia with a thousand horsemen to arrive in Ariminum before the retreating Goths did.[34] Belisarius's order was motivated by two reasons: first, the Goths would not consider a small garrison with an unknown commander as a threat and focus their attention elsewhere. Second, John's cavalry would not be as effective in a siege as it was when it was harassing the Goths in the open, and during a siege, the horses would also consume additional food.[35] However, John disobeyed the orders and stayed in Ariminum with the infantry reinforcements sent by Belisarius.[36]
Army movements and engagements
editSiege
edit
Vitiges besieged the town of Ariminum upon the arrival of the Gothic forces. They built a siege tower which, unlike during the siege of Rome, was not pulled by oxen, but moved by men stationed inside. The tower was placed relatively close to the wall with the expectation that it would be used the following day. During the night, the Byzantines sortied out of the town to dig a trench in front of the siege tower. When the Goths found out, they attacked the Byzantines, who retreated as soon as the trench was deep enough. In response, Vitiges had the trench filled with faggots before moving the siege over it. The weight of the tower caused it to sink slightly into the trench as the faggots were crushed and the earthwork, made of the dirt out of the trench, which was built behind it, stopped the advance entirely.[37] Vitiges ordered that the night guards responsible for this setback be executed.[38]
Vitiges decided to withdraw, taking the tower with him. John wanted to prevent this and sallied out, but was unsuccessful at destroying the siege tower. Having suffered many casualties, Vitiges decided against storming Ariminum and began starving it out.[39] Needing fewer men for this, he also sent men to attack Ancon.[40]
Debate on saving John
editBelisarius, after securing the surrounding area of Rome, took his main army and marched north in late June.[41] At Firmum he met Chamberlain (Cubicularius) Narses, who had arrived with 7,000-strong reinforcements from Constantinople.[2] In mid-summer 548, they convened a council of officers to decide whether the army should march to John's aid in Ariminum. Most of the officers opposed helping John, resentful of his challenge to Belisarius's authority. Narses, however, appealed to Belisarius and his officers to carry out the rescue.[42]
Now if John treated your commands with insolence, most excellent Belisarius, the atonement you have already exacted from him is surely ample, since it is now in your power either to save him in his reverse or to abandon him to the enemy. But see that you do not exact from the emperor and from us the penalty for mistakes committed by John through ignorance. For if the Goths capture Ariminum at the present juncture, it will be their good fortune to have made captive a capable Byzantine general, as well as a whole army and a city subject to the emperor.[43]
Narses's argument and John's message stating that he would be forced to surrender to the Goths in seven days if there was no support, convinced Belisarius to rescue John and Ariminum.[44]
Belisarius's stratagem
edit
Belisarius wanted to avoid actual fighting because the Goths outnumbered the Byzantines. He split his army into smaller groups, three of which were sent to the vicinity of Ariminum. The central idea was to surround the Goths from three sides, leaving only one safe passage to escape.[45] One group, led by Ildiger, was to move by sea, accompanied by a group led by Martinus on land. Meanwhile, Belisarius and Narses came through the Apennines, passing Urbisaglia. Their forces encountered a group of Gothic soldiers, who were defeated. The survivors fled back to the Gothic camp and claimed that the Byzantines were approaching with a large force from the north. This led the Goths to move their camps to the north of Ariminum.[46]
In the meantime, Martinus' forces approaching from the south lit numerous campfires at night, which projected a larger force than the true Byzantine strength. The appearance of the Byzantine fleet on the following day further shook the Goths. Later in the summer of 538, the Goths lifted their siege of Ariminum and moved to Ravenna. Belisarius and his army entered Ariminum around noon.[47]
Aftermath
editAfter the siege, John declined to express any gratitude to Belisarius and instead claimed that Narses deserved the credit because it was Narses who had compelled Belisarius to come to his rescue.[48] Narses and John, along with their supporters, withdrew from the main army and acted independently from Belisarius. Byzantine forces, unable to act together due to division in their leadership, became ineffective. Poor coordination led to the loss of the major city of Mediolanum (modern day Milan) to the Goths in early 539. The Goths executed the entire male population, which according to Procopius numbered 300,000,[d][50] sold the city's women to Burgundians, and razed the city to the ground.[51] In response to this setback, Emperor Justinian called Narses back to Constantinople, leaving Belisarius as the sole commander-in-chief of the Byzantine forces in Italy.[52]
In 539, Belisarius proceeded to secure strongholds in the surrounding region of Ravenna. With the fall of Auximus, he advanced to besiege Ravenna, aiming to starve the garrison since the city had strong defensive advantages. While the Goth nobility negotiated their surrender and Justinian was willing to offer generous terms, Belisarius employed a stratagem to induce the Goths to surrender by offering them the Western Roman imperial crown. At the last moment, he refused the crown, but by then the Byzantine troops were in control of the city and had captured the Gothic king. The fall of Ravenna concluded the first phase of the Gothic War, with most of Italy under Byzantine control. The stratagem spooked Justinian. Although Belisarius returned to Constantinople in mid-summer 540 with the Ravenna's treasury and the defeated Gothic King Vitiges as a prisoner, Justinian refused him a triumph. The general's departure was also needed on the eastern front against the Persians in the upcoming Lazic War (541–562).[53] However, the premature departure of Belisarius and the failure of Justinian in appointing a sole commander-in-chief in Byzantine forces in Italy reignited the Gothic resistance and prolonged the Gothic War by more than a decade.[54][55]
Scholarly assessment
editHistorians argued that Belisarius's actions during the Siege of Ariminum are notable primarily for achieving victory without a fight against a numerically superior adversary. Specifically, they praise his ability as a commander to anticipate the enemy's reactions and, through strategy and psychological warfare, make maximum use of the forces available to him to achieve success.[56] Historian J. B. Bury said about the siege of Ariminum, "when Belisarius set his mind to the problem he solved it triumphantly."[57] Historian Ilkka Syvänne placed the break of the Siege of Ariminum as a prime example of Sun Tsu's principle of "Subjugating the enemy without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence."[58]
Despite Belisarius's military prowess, he was unable to prevent the rising tensions within the Byzantine army's networks, where authority depended more on personal loyalties.[59] John's risky decision to act beyond orders, which brought considerable fame, posed a challenge to Belisarius's preference to keep the Goths outside Rome's walls and to achieve victory through a slow war of attrition with repeated hit-and-run tactics.[60] These tensions were amplified by Justinian, who feared the rising popularity of Belisarius, sending Narses to inquire about the pace of the war.[61] Narses was a senior civil official with his own network of support, but it was not enough on its own to challenge Belisarius. By aligning with John and securing the backing of commanders who opposed Belisarius, Narses had enough support to assert his authority. However, this course of action effectively fractured the Byzantine command.[62] Bury observes that the internal divisions within the Byzantine command structure caused considerable harm that could not be compensated for by the bloodless victory at Ariminum.[63]
See also
editReferences
editNotes
edit- ↑ Belisarius had 5,000 men under his command during the Siege of Rome. Although he received reinforcements, his army was still small compared to the Gothic army.[1]
- ↑ Estimated at 110,000 Goths, based on Procopius provided numbers. This assumes a starting force of 150,000[4] for the Siege of Rome (537–538), a loss of 30,000 men during the siege,[5] and Vitiges leaving men behind to reinforce several Gothic outposts during his return to Arinimum (9,800 men[6]).
- ↑ Contemporary Procopius provided 150,000 as the size of Gothic forces. Modern historians doubt this number, providing lower estimates, but without a clear consensus: Ian Hughes considers 20,000–25,000,[23] Leif Petersen estimates at 25,000–30,000,[24] Roy Boss provides 40,000,[25] and Dupuy estimates 50,000.[26] Historians Torsten Jacobsen and Ilkka Syvänne argued that Procopius's number should not be doubted as the Gothic army was a national army in which every able male had to participate, and the peace and prosperity of the last decades had increased the population of the Goths.[27] Will Durant also used Procopius's number.[28]
- ↑ Historian John Bury argued this number may be exaggerated. Furthermore, Bury noted that, according to this figure, Milan had a population of approximately 600,000, similar to its population in 1958.[49]
Citations
edit- ↑ Syvänne 2021, pp. 139, 155.
- 1 2 Bury 1958, p. 197.
- ↑ Syvänne 2021, pp. 161–162.
- ↑ Syvänne 2021, p. 131.
- ↑ Syvänne 2021, p. 139.
- ↑ Hughes (2009), pp. 159–160; Syvänne (2021), p. 162.
- ↑ Cameron 2006, pp. 2–3.
- ↑ Cameron 2006, p. 3.
- ↑ Meier & Montinaro 2022, pp. 180–181.
- 1 2 Evans 1970, p. 219.
- ↑ Rance 2005, pp. 426, 429.
- ↑ Cameron 2006, p. 7.
- ↑ Jacobsen 2009, pp. 65–66.
- ↑ Jacobsen 2009, pp. 72–74.
- ↑ Jacobsen 2009, pp. 72–73.
- ↑ Jacobsen 2009, p. 76.
- ↑ Heather 2018, pp. 150–151.
- ↑ Jacobsen (2009), p. 76; Evans (2002), pp. 137–138.
- ↑ Hughes 2009, pp. 122–125.
- ↑ Jacobsen 2009, p. 80.
- ↑ Evans 2002, p. 140.
- ↑ Syvänne 2021, p. 129.
- ↑ Hughes 2009, pp. 126–127.
- ↑ Petersen 2013, p. 343.
- ↑ Boss 1993.
- ↑ Dupuy & Dupuy 2007, p. 203.
- ↑ Jacobsen (2009), p. 103; Syvänne (2021), p. 131.
- ↑ Durant 1950, p. 109.
- ↑ Hughes 2009, pp. 157–158.
- ↑ Martindale 1992, p. 653.
- ↑ Hughes (2009), pp. 156–157; Heather (2018), pp. 171–172.
- ↑ Procopius (1919), Book VI.x.8–14; Syvänne (2021), p. 161; Jacobsen (2009), p. 149.
- ↑ Hughes 2009, p. 160.
- ↑ Heather 2018, p. 172.
- ↑ Hughes (2009), p. 161; Heather (2018), p. 173.
- ↑ Procopius (1919), Book VI.xi.18–22; Parnell (2015), pp. 119–120.
- ↑ Procopius (1919), Book VI.xii.10–14; Syvänne (2021), p. 163.
- ↑ Jacobsen 2009, p. 154.
- ↑ Procopius (1919), Book VI.xii.24–25; Jacobsen (2009), p. 155.
- ↑ Procopius (1919), Book VI.xiii.5–7; Hughes (2009), p. 162.
- ↑ Heather 2018, p. 173.
- ↑ Parnell 2015, pp. 119–120; Martindale 1992, p. 654.
- ↑ Procopius (1924), Book VI.xvi.8–11; Parnell (2015), pp. 119–120.
- ↑ Parnell 2015, pp. 119–120.
- ↑ Syvänne 2021, p. 165.
- ↑ Procopius (1924), Book VI.xvii.17–20; Syvänne (2021), p. 165.
- ↑ Procopius (1924), Book VI.xviii.1–2; Syvänne (2021), pp. 165–166; Heather (2018), pp. 173–174.
- ↑ Procopius (1924), Book VI.xviii.2–3; Syvänne (2021), p. 166.
- ↑ Bury 1958, p. 204.
- ↑ Procopius (1924), Book VI.xxi.39–40; Syvänne (2021), p. 168.
- ↑ Parnell (2015), pp. 120–122; Bury (1958), p. 204.
- ↑ Parnell 2015, p. 122.
- ↑ Syvänne 2021, pp. 172–176, 244.
- ↑ Bury 1958, pp. 226–230.
- ↑ Hughes 2009, p. 207.
- ↑ Syvänne (2021), p. 166; Hughes (2009), p. 165.
- ↑ Bury 1958, p. 198.
- ↑ Syvänne 2021, p. 379.
- ↑ Parnell 2015, pp. 117–121, 127–129.
- ↑ Syvänne 2021, p. 161.
- ↑ Browning 2003, p. 47; Jacobsen 2009, pp. 157–158.
- ↑ Parnell 2015, p. 121.
- ↑ Bury 1958, p. 199.
Primary sources
- Procopius (1919) [545–553 AD]. Procopius: History of the Wars, Books V and VI. Translated by Dewing, Henry Bronson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. OCLC 1454934700.
- —————— (1924) [545–553 AD]. Procopius: History of the Wars, Books VI and VII. Translated by Dewing, Henry Bronson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. OCLC 491843455.
Secondary sources
- Boss, Roy (1993). Justinian's Wars, Belisarius, Narses and the Reconquest of the West. Stockport: Montvert Publications. ISBN 9781874101017. OCLC 29520779.
- Browning, Robert (2003). Justinian and Theodora. Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press. ISBN 1-59333-053-7.
- Bury, John Bagnell (1958). History of the Later Roman Empire: From the Death of Theodosius I to the Death of Justinian. Vol. 2. Mineola, New York: Dover Publications, Inc. OCLC 1240424678.
- Cameron, Averil (2006). Procopius and the Sixth Century. London & New York: Routledge. ISBN 978-11-34-76465-5. OCLC 36048226.
- Dupuy, Richard Ernest; Dupuy, Trevor Nevitt (2007) [1970]. The Collins Encyclopedia of Military History, From 3500 BC to the Present (4th ed.). Glasgow: Book Club Associates in association with HarperCollins Publishers. OCLC 28765642.
- Durant, William (1950). The Story of Civilization. Vol. IV. The Age of Faith: The Story of Civilization. New York: Simon and Schuster. OCLC 731309107.
- Evans, J. A. S. (1970). "Justinian and the Historian Procopius". Greece & Rome. 17 (2): 218–223. JSTOR 642766.
- —————— (2002). The Age of Justinian, The Circumstances of Imperial Power. London and New York: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-02209-6. OCLC 48139819.
- Jacobsen, Torsten C. (2009). The Gothic War, Rome's Final Conflict with the West. Yardley, PA: Westholme. ISBN 978-1-59416-084-4. OCLC 294885264.
- Heather, Peter J. (2018). Rome Resurgent: War and Empire in the Age of Justinian. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-199-36274-5. OCLC 1007044617.
- Hughes, Ian (2009). Belisarius: The Last Roman General. Yardley, PA: Westholme Publishing. ISBN 978-1-59-416085-1. OCLC 294885267.
- Martindale, John R. (1992). The Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire 2 Part Set: Volume 3, AD 527-641. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-20160-5. OCLC 614787910.
- Meier, Mischa; Montinaro, Federico, eds. (2022). A Companion to Procopius of Caesarea. Leiden & Boston: Brill. ISBN 978-90-04-49876-1. OCLC 1294383379.
- Parnell, David Alan (2015). "The social networks of Justinian's generals" (PDF). Journal of Late Antiquity. 8 (1): 114–135. doi:10.1353/jla.2015.0009.
- Petersen, Leif Inge Ree (2013). Siege Warfare and Military Organization in the Successor States (400–800 AD): Byzantium, the West and Islam. Leiden: Brill. ISBN 978-90-04-25446-6. OCLC 859744803.
- Rance, Philip (2005). "Narses and the Battle of Taginae (Busta Gallorum) 552: Procopius and sixth century warfare". Historia (54): 424–472. ISSN 0341-0056. JSTOR 4436789.
- Syvänne, Ilkka (2021). Military History of Late Rome 518–565. Yorkshire, PA: Pen and Sword Military. ISBN 978-1-47-389530-0. OCLC 1251765729.
Further reading
edit- Scott, Ian C. J. Belisarius: The Sword of Byzantium (PDF) (Thesis). University of Missouri.
- Hodgkin, Thomas (1896). Italy and Her Invaders: The imperial restoration, 535–553. Oxford: Clarendon Press. OCLC 5080433.