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VII. Britain and Italian Intervention, 1914–1915

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

C. J. Lowe
C. J. Lowe
Affiliation:
University of Alberta
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Extract

The negotiations leading up to the Treaty of London of 27 April 1915 afford a classic illustration of Grey's complaints concerning the difficulties of conducting diplomacy in wartime. Though manifold they may be reduced to two headings. In the first place diplomacy was dependent, hopelessly so, upon victory in the field. ‘A diplomacy which was suitable when the Allied armies were having success’, Grey wrote, ‘was hopelessly unsuitable when the Germans seemed to be winning.’ Whereas before the war the Foreign Office had exercised some influence upon the development of British naval and military strategy, now the boot was upon the other foot. Words could not compensate for military defeats: ‘in war words count only so far as they are backed by force and victories. Up to the end of 1916…Allied diplomacy had little enough of this backing’.

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Articles
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The Historical Journal , Volume 12 , Issue 3 , September 1969 , pp. 533 - 548
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1969

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References

1 Grey of Falloden, Twenty Five Years (1928 ed.), III, 106.Google Scholar

2 Ibid. 115.

3 Ibid. 109.

4 Ibid. 116.

5 ‘It was no uncommon situation for three different suggestions to be made.’ Ibid. p. 107.

6 The best summary of this is contained in Valiani, L., ‘La Guerra del 1914 e l'intervento italiano’, in Rivista Storica Italiana, LVIII (1966), 603–13.Google Scholar

7 E.g. Monticone, A., ‘Salandra e Sonnino verso la decisione dell ‘intervento’, in Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali, XXIV (1957), 64–89.Google Scholar

8 Gottlieb, W.W.Studies in Secret Diplomacy (London, 1957).Google Scholar

9 The Italian documents are still only published to October 1914 and the archives of the Foreign Ministry remain closed.

10 Gottlieb, , pp. 198–9: Documenti Diplomatici Italiani (D.D.I.), 5th series (Rome, 1954), vol. 1, no. 65.Google Scholar

11 Rodd to Grey, 9 Aug. 1914, F.O. 800/65.

12 Gottlieb, op cit. pp. 208–9.

13 Ibid. pp. 208–9: Rodd to Grey, 13 Aug. 1914, F.O. 371/2008/38816–17.

14 Rodd to Grey 14 Aug., F.O. 800/65. The point was also that there was more chance of keeping them secret at London (D.D.I. 5th series, 1, no. 201).

15 ‘All Italy's interests lie in the Mediterranean and she is apprehensive as to France obtaining overwhelming naval supremacy there’ (Rodd to Grey, Ibid.).

16 D.D.I. 5th series, 1, no. 276: Gottlieb, op. cit. pp. 211–23, 316.

17 Grey to Rodd, 18 Aug. 1914, F.O. 371/2008/41222: D.D.I. 5th series, 1, nos. 317, 319.

18 Rodd to Grey, 27, 29 Aug. 1914, F.O. 371/2008/43868, 44598.

19 Ibid. no. 50138.

20 D.D.I. 5th series, 1, nos. 703, 710, 726: F.O. 371/2008/51128.

21 Grey to Bertie, 20 September, ibid. Gottlieb's hypothesis (p. 203) thus falls to the ground.

22 Grey to Rodd, 18 September, F.O. 800/65.

23 Nicolson minute on Buchanan, 7 Oct. 1914, F.O. 371/2008/57095.

24 Minutes on Rodd to Grey, 20 Sept. 3 Oct., ibid., nos. 51128, 55732.

25 Grey to Bertie, 3 Oct., no. 55784; D.D.I. 5th series, 1, 873; Salandra, pp. 401–3.

26 F.O. 371/208/61179, 66643: D.D.I. 5th series, 1, 892.

27 Rodd to Grey, 12 Oct., minute by Clerk, no. 58629: Grey to Buchanan, 9 Nov., F.O. 800/74.

28 Ibid.; Grey to Rodd, 23 October, F.O. 800/65.

29 ‘A man of direct and straightforward character’, compared with San Giuliano's ‘scheming, contriving, subtle personality’. To Grey 7 November, F.O. 800/65.

30 Ibid. 4, 7, 20 Nov.

31 Malagodi, A., Conversazioni della guerra (Milan, 1960), p. 31.Google Scholar

32 E.g. Bollati to Avarna, 27 January 1915; ‘he just wants to draw the matter out’ (Gottlieb, op. cit. p. 391): ‘una strada che altro sbocco non aveva se non ia guerra’ (Monticone, loc. cit. p. 65). See also Salandra to Sonnino, 16 March 1915, p. 69.

33 Valiani, loc. cit. pp. 605–7.

34 Gottlieb, op. cit. p. 306.

35 Ibid. pp. 319–20.

36 Rodd to Grey, 16 Feb., F.O. 800/65.

37 Gottlieb, op. cit. p. 320.

38 Minutes on Rodd to Grey, 28 Feb. 1915, F.O. 371/2375/23560.

39 Hankey, 1, 271, 283: Cab. 42/2/1.

40 Sonnino to Salandra, 1 Mar., Monticone, loc. cit. p. 68.

41 Grey to Bertie, 4 Mar., to Buchanan, 5 Mar., F.O. 371/2375/23560.

42 Gottlieb, op. cit. pp. 66–70.

43 Cab. 42/2/1,

44 Gottlieb, op. cit. p. 322.

45 ‘French Government recognize… essential thing is to conquer as soon as possible’ (Bertie to Grey, 4 Mar., F.O. 371/2375/25017).

46 Buchanan to Grey, 5 Mar., no. 26334.

47 Clerk minute on above.

48 Dallin, A. and others, Russian Diplomacy and Eastern Europe 1914–17 (New York, 1963), pp. 172,Google Scholar 177–8.

49 Asquith to the king, 24 Mar., Cab. 37/126/21.

50 Rodd to Grey, 20 Mar., F.O. 800/65.

51 Ibid. 2 Apr., Cab. 37/127/11.

52 Gottlieb, op. cit. pp. 331, 334.

53 Cab. 42/2/1, 5.

54 Cab. 37/127/1, 5.

55 Asquith to the king, 24 Mar., Cab. 37/126/21.

56 See Hankey, 1, 271; Cab. 42/2/1; Cab. 37/126/3.

57 Grey to Buchanan, n Mar., Ibid.: Hankey, 1, 287.

58 Grey to Buchanan, 22 Mar., Trevelyan, pp. 296–7.

59 Asquith to the king, 24 Mar., Cab. 37/126/21.

60 Grey, op. cit. m, 181.

61 Minute on Buchanan to Grey, 31 Mar., F.O. 371/2376/37639.

62 Gottlieb, op. cit. p. 336.

63 Ibid. p. 337.

64 Grey to Rodd, 25 Mar., Cab. 37/126/30.

65 Ibid.

66 Gottlieb, op. cit. p. 339.

67 Ibid. pp. 341–3.

68 Trevelyan, p. 297.

69 Grey to Rodd, I Apr., Cab. 37/127/4.

70 Rodd to Grey, 2 Apr., Cab. 37/127/11.

71 ‘I do not think Sonnino is merely bargaining to get the most he can’ (Rodd to Asquith, 2 Apr., F.O. 800/65).

72 Ibid.

73 Gottlieb, op. cit. pp. 343–4.

74 Buchanan to Grey, 1 Apr., Cab. 37/127/3.

75 Bertie to Asquith, 5 Apr., F.O. 800/57.

76 Gottlieb, op. cit. p. 347.

77 ‘ He did not place [the] fighting qualities of the Italian army very high’ (Buchanan to Grey, 4 Apr., Cab. 37/127/12).

78 Gottlieb, op. cit. p. 348.

79 Buchanan to Grey, 7 Apr., Cab. 37/127/15.

80 Asquith to Bertie, 9 Apr., Cab. 37/127/19.

81 Grey to Bertie, 14 Apr., Cab. 37/127/27.

82 ‘Salandra al momento della firma del patto di Londra era pienamente cosciente di operare contro la grande maggioranza degli italiani’ (Monticone, loc. cit. p. 88).

83 Grey, op. cit. III, 166.