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Distributed Dynamic Self-control Anonymity Management Model

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Security and Trust Management (STM 2024)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 15235))

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Abstract

In this study, we present a dynamic anonymity management model for communication networks that allows users to self-control their desired level of anonymity protection. Inspired by well-established closed-loop control systems, which continuously adjust parameters based on feedback, we incorporate similar feedback mechanisms into anonymous communication systems. With this continuous feedback mechanism, users can measure their current anonymity protection and take action (e.g., sending fake messages) to increase if their protection level is below than desired. Thereby, we distribute the task of anonymity protection between the user and the system. The experimental results demonstrate that the proposed model effectively achieves and maintains the desired level of anonymity protection.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Readers who are not familiar with the MIX technique are provided with a simple model in Sect. 3.1 under Mix networks, which contains the information required to understand our work.

  2. 2.

    We assume that implicit information is added to dummy messages, enabling only the recipient to efficiently recognize and delete them with minimal effort. A corresponding technique is detailed in [9].

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Acknowledgements

The first author would like to express gratitude to the Turkish Ministry of Education for funding his doctoral studies.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Friedrich-Alexander University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Erlangen, Germany

    Alperen Aksoy

  2. University of Regensburg, Regensburg, Germany

    Dogan Kesdogan

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  1. Alperen Aksoy
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  2. Dogan Kesdogan
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Correspondence to Alperen Aksoy.

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. IIT-CNR, Pisa, Italy

    Fabio Martinelli

  2. University of Malaga, Málaga, Spain

    Ruben Rios

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Aksoy, A., Kesdogan, D. (2025). Distributed Dynamic Self-control Anonymity Management Model. In: Martinelli, F., Rios, R. (eds) Security and Trust Management. STM 2024. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 15235. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-76371-7_2

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