Skip to main content
Log in

Sprumont's characterization of the uniform rule when all single-peaked preferences are admissible

  • Published:
Review of Economic Design Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract.

Sprumont (1991) has established that the only allocation rule for the division problem that is strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous is the uniform rule when the domain is the set of all possible profiles of continuous single-peaked preferences. Sprumont's characterization of the uniform rule is shown to hold on any larger domain of single-peaked preferences.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Subscribe and save

Springer+
from $39.99 /Month
  • Starting from 10 chapters or articles per month
  • Access and download chapters and articles from more than 300k books and 2,500 journals
  • Cancel anytime
View plans

Buy Now

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Additional information

Received: 15 December 1998 / Accepted: 12 April 1999

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Weymark, J. Sprumont's characterization of the uniform rule when all single-peaked preferences are admissible. Rev Econ Design 4, 389–393 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580050044

Download citation

  • Issue date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580050044