STRINT Workshop Position Paper: Levels of Opportunistic Privacy Protection for Messaging-Oriented Architectures
draft-crocker-strint-workshop-messaging-00
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Dave Crocker , Pete Resnick | ||
| Last updated | 2014-07-21 (Latest revision 2014-01-15) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
Given a concern for pervasive monitoring, messaging information needing protection includes primary payload, descriptive meta-data, and traffic-related analysis. Complete protection against pervasive monitoring (PM), for traffic through complex handling sequences, has not yet been achieved reliably in real-world operation. Consequently, it is reasonable to consider a range of mechanisms, for protecting differing amounts of information and against monitoring of different kinds. Although channel-based encryption can be helpful, it is not sufficient. This paper considers pursuing different levels of end-to-end protection, referencing examples of component mechanisms that already have encouraging field experience.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)