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fcarbarb Collie librarc
FROM THE BEQUEST OF
EDWARD HENRY HALL
(Class of 1851)
OF CAMBRIDGE
1
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ESSAYS,
MILITARY AND POLITICAL,
WRITTEN IN INDIA.
BY THE LATE
SIR HENBY MONTGOMERY LAWRENCE, K.C.B.,
CHIEF COMMISIONER IN OUDE,
AND PROVISIONAL GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA.
LONDON :
W" H. ALLEN & CO., 7, LEADENHALL STREET.
1859.
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-U>nc( HL. \.'6 0
TO
SIR GEORGE KUSSELL CLERK, K.C.B.,
UNDER WHOM
THE WRITER OF THESE ESSAYS
GRADUATED IN THE BE8T 8GHOOL OF INDIAN STATESMANSHIP,
THIS VOLUME
IS RESPECTFULLY INSCRIBED.
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ADVERTISEMENT.
The Essays comprising this volume were contributed
by Sir Henry Lawrence to the Calcutta Review. They
are printed now with scarcely any alteration, beyond
the correction of typographical or clerical errors, and
an occasional excision or adaptation of those allusions
to existing times and local circumstances, which are
generally scattered, more or less, over our periodical
literature, but which the lapse of years renders, if not
unintelligible, unappreciable by the reader of to-day.
It'is not to be understood by this that there has been
any attempt to adapt these Essays to the circumstances
of the present times. It will be apparent after the
perusal of a few pages, that there is much in them
which, in one sense, may be described as " out of date."
But to have expunged all references to a bygone state
of things, and all recommendations of reforms which
have been carried out, would have been but scant justice
either to reader or to writer. For it would have dimin-
ished the historical interest of the volume, and would
have obscured the services rendered by Sir Henry Law-
rence to the cause of Military Reform. That many of
his suggestions were acted upon, we know ; that others
were not, we can only deplore. That he saw clearly the
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viii
ADVERTISEMENT.
rocks on which the vessel of the State was drifting, is to
be gathered from many passages in this volume. The
warning voice was lifted up in vain; but much still
remains from which instruction may be gathered, very
serviceable at the present time. The lessons which these
Essays teach us are not all too late for profitable study.
We have still an Indian army composed of all arms and
of all classes. Upon the constitution of this army now
turns, as on a pivot, the whole question of Indian
government. We must keep up an efficient army, at a
certain cost not to be exceeded, or we must cease to retain
our hold of the country. Now, the great object of Sir
Henry Lawrence, in his Military Essays, is to demon-
strate that what India requires is an army deriving its
strength, not from its numbers, but from its efficiency.
And this is the great matter which it behoves us to
ponder at the present time. What we want is, not
men, not money — but mind. A hundred men may'be
made to do the work of a thousand ; a hundred pounds,
wisely spent, may contribute more to the strength of
our empire than a thousand. Doubtless, the cost of an
efficient army might be brought within the amount
which the revenues of India can bear without exhaus-
tion, and the State can furnish without bankruptcy.
But to do this, we must look very gravely at the
matter, and heed the pregnant utterances of such expe-
rienced, honest, plain-spoken instructors as Sir Henry
Lawrence.
Of the Political Essays much need not be said in
this place. One observation, indeed, will suffice. The
reader will perceive how consistently opposed was Sir
ADVERTISEMENT.
ix
Henry Lawrence to what is called the " Annexation
Policy." He warmly advocated, on grounds alike of
justice and expediency, the maintenance of the Native
States of India, and deprecated all unnecessary inter-
ference with them. A different statement has been
made, very ignorantly, and very unjustly, upon this
point. It is of the more importance, therefore, that
his opinions should be laid before the public in his own
words, and that he should appear in his own proper
character, not as an " annexationist/' but as a teacher
ih that great school of which, in days gone by, Sir
John Malcolm was the chief, and at the head of which,
among living statesmen, now stands Sir George Clerk.
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CONTENTS
PAOB
Military Defence of our Indian Empire. [Written in 1844] 1
Thb Kingdom of Oude. [Written in 1845] .... 61
Mahratta History and Empire. [Written in 1845] .188
Lord Hardinoe's Indian Administration. [Written in 1847] 225
The Indian Army. [Written in 1855-56] . .362
Army Reform. [Written in 1856] 413
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LAWRENCE'S ESSAYS.
MILITARY DEFENCE OF OUR INDIAN
EMPIRE.
[written in 1841.]
In many learned volumes, more or less empirical, we
have an infinite variety of " sure means of preserving
health." New remedies for all the abundant evils to
which frail flesh is heir, start into being every day, and
doctors and disciples are so numerous in their diversities,
and so strong in their convictions, that the marvel is,
with so many infallible specifics, there is still so much
human woe. The health which we are thus taught to
preserve, after a variety of fashions so endless that it is
difficult to escape following some one of them by chance,
is the health of man as an individual unit; the health
of man, in those thousands and tens of thousands and
hundreds of thousands which constitute nations, is not
so tenderly cared for ; nor so assiduously watched ; nor
are such varied efforts made to preserve it. Still, ever
and anon national remedies, for the cure of national dis-
eases, are exhibited with an amount of confidence which
we may call dogmatism ; and whilst the wise men are
quarrelling over their theories, the world is left very
much to itself to suffer uncared for and unrelieved.
B
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2 MILITARY DEFENCE OP OUR INDIAN EMPIRE.
With the endless catalogue of ailments, which afflict a
nation, as an individual, we have, in this place, nothing
to do. In imitation of the medical writers of the
present day, who now, for the most part, consider one
organ and one disease, sufficient matter for an elaborate
treatise, we direct our attention to one especial item of
the great catalogue of national calamities. Peace is not
in itself national health ; but without it there can be no
national health ; and who will deny that the sage, who
should write a treatise on the " true means of preserving
peace," — really exhibiting what it professes to exhibit —
would entitle himself to a statue of gold in every city of
the universe ? There is no prospect, we fear, of such a
consummation ; but we have rival political schools, each
propounding with an air of more or less infallibility its
own profound dogmata; and often looking on with mar-
vellous unconcern, whilst great battles are fought, and
countries desolated in spite of their never-failing spe-
cifics. The two great schools may be described as the
irritative and sedative schools. The former, proceeding
upon the broad principle of the homceopathists, that
similia similibm cura?itury contend that war can only be
cured by war — that it is necessary to make war in order
to preserve peace. The other lays down, with no more
misgivings than its antagonist, the more desirable and
encouraging doctrine, that war does not check, but ge-
nerate war ; that peace ever engenders peace ; that there
is no security so certain as that which we purchase for
ourselves, by creating a sense of security in the breasts
of our neighbours.
We do not now purpose to examine these antagonist
doctrines. On whichsoever side worldly experience may
range itself, there is no disinclination on the part of
either to appeal to it, as the standard whereby the ques-
tion shall be settled. There is a better method of set-
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HOW TO PRESERVE PEACE. 3
tlement ; but it admits not of a conflict on equal ground,
for one party is more inclined to that mode of adjust-
ment than the other, whilst both are willing to appeal
to human experience. The irritatives contend that
there is no security without constant demonstrations of
strength ; that to be placid is to invite aggression ; that
to be ready to offend is the only way to escape being
offended ; that the birds of the air and the beasts of the
field daily teach us this lesson ; that we are instructed
in it from our earliest youth, during which we learn by
hard experience that we must fight our way up the
school-boy ladder to peace, and thus alone avoid mo-
lestation; that this same principle is at work in the
larger school of nations, and that the history of the
world declares the fact, that if we would escape the in-
juries and insults of our neighbours we must show, by
a few practical exhibitions of our strength, not only our
readiness, but our ability to resent them. The seda-
tives, on the other hand, declare that to be tranquil and
inoffensive is the surest means of inviting confidence,
and thus of stifling the inclination to injure us ; that
the fear of being injured tempts to the commission of
injury; and that, the converse of this being equally
true, it follows that there is the utmost protectiveness
in a peaceful and inoffensive character ; and that so long
as our neighbours consider themselves secure from our,
we shall be secure from their, aggressions. Experience
is said to demonstrate this : the man of peace is rarely
insulted; the unarmed traveller walks more safely in
the neighbourhood of the roving bandit, than he who
goes armed to the teeth; that in troubled times, the
man of peace and he alone escapes the perils of popular
commotions ; that with States, as with individuals, the
one which never arms itself — which never prepares itself
for aggression, or the resistance of aggression, is ever the
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4 MILITARY DEFENCE OF OUR INDIAN EMPIRE.
last to be assailed ; that as soon as there is a falling off
from such practical proofs of a firm reliance on Provi-
dence, the protection is at once withdrawn, and we take
up arms to have them turned against us. Such are the
arguments derived from human experience — we are not
at present to decide the contest.
Indeed, with regard to the matter now before us, it
is not necessary that we should decide it. A resort to
abstract speculation, however inviting, is no part of our
career of duty, and we would rather, avoiding all con-
troversies, build up our present structure on common
admitted grounds. Our empire in the East is of so
peculiar a nature, that we can scarcely make a just appli-
cation of the principles of either one party or the other.
It matters little what course would have been the best ;
we cannot now begin our work anew ; or betake our-
selves to new principles of action. We have reached an
epoch, at which it would appear to be our only course
to make a compromise between the irritative and the
sedative systems — or rather we should say, an epoch at
which it becomes our duty to allow the former to merge
into the latter. The irritative system has been tried
—has been carried out to its full extent. It has been
our practice now for nearly a century; and it would
seem that we had attained to that eminence, which has
been compared to the status of the school-boy who has
fought his way to the very summit of pugilistic renown.
If it be necessary for a nation to preserve itself from
injury and insult by demonstrating its power, surely the
British in the East have done so in the most unmis-
takable manner. There is little call for fresh demonstra-
tions ; for the weight of our arm is still acknowledged,
and many are yet reeling under the blows which it has
dealt out. We can now, therefore, afford to be pacific
— but we cannot afford to be weak. We have no occa-
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GOVERNMENT BY THE SWORD.
5
sion to put forth our strength ; but we must not suffer
ourselves to waste it. We must keep ourselves up to
the athletic standard ; and as we have made our election
we must abide by it — as we have fought our way to
power, we must show ourselves capable of retaining the
lofty position we have assumed. The time may come
when we shall find our best safeguard in the hearts of a
grateful people — but that time has not yet come, nor is
there a near prospect of its advent. The sword, whether
in the hand or in the scabbard, has yet its work to do ;
and the philanthropist may labour to some good pur-
pose, in endeavouring to show in what manner it may
best be shaped, for the preservation of peace and the
maintenance of that dominion, which we are justified in
regarding as a means, under Providence, of advancing
the happiness of the people who are compelled now to
bear our yoke.
At first sight, bayonets and red coats do not appear
to be precisely the instruments of Government which
a philanthropist would advocate ; but we belie or deceive
ourselves when we declare or fancy that our Govern-
ment is maintained otherwise than by the sword. And
in pronouncing it to be so, we are far from admitting
that it must therefore be one of oppression. The land
that has for nearly a thousand years been held by the
sword, and that has as often changed hands as that
sword has been blunted, or the grasp that held it re-
laxed; the land that knows no principality of longer
standing than our own ;* that in its length and breadth,
within the last fifty years, has seen Moguls, Patans,
Mahrattahs, Pindarees ; and mixed miscreants of every
caste and clan rooting up the old families, and settling
* It ia a curious fact, that not last century ; but that the families
only has the power of the Nizam, of the three bordering States, Bur-
the kingdom of Oude, and all the mah, Nepal, and Lahore, have been
Mahratta States risen within the established within that period.
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MILITARY DEFENCE OF OUR INDIAN EMPIRE.
themselves in their places — how could any Government,
however beneficent, subsist for a day simply by its civil
policy on the ruins of such a tempest-tost land ? How
in a day convert tribes who have lived only by war to
habits of peace ; how make cultivators, who for cen-
turies have never paid a rupee, but under fear of the
sword or the scourge — how induce them to pay their
dues, unless they know that the civil officer has the
power of calling in the military : and that the latter is
prompt and bold? It has been the fashion to exalt
the Mahommedan conquerors at the expense of the
British Government ; and some of those who have
most benefited by the latter, and possibly have in their
sphere oppressed the subject, against the views, opinions,
and orders of their masters, have been loudest in vitu-
peration of them ; but let any impartial person turn
over the pages of Dow— a violent hater of the system
of his day, and we fear with too much reason — and see
how little cause there is for singing the praises of the
Moslem rule, beyond that of the Christian. War,
eternal war, was then the sole business of royalty.
Akbar made some laws for the protection of the people,
but he is almost a solitary exception ; and having spent
the half-century of his reign in eternal battles and
ceaseless marches, he could have had but little time to
look to the improvement and cultivation of his empire.
Tn the early days of his reign, every province was in
rebellion, and with him, as with his predecessors and
successors, while Guzerat was being subdued, Cashmere
or Bengal would be in arms ; and while the royal troops
were employed against those States or in the Deccan,
the Punjab or Delhi itself would be in revolt. A freak
or favour to an individual would for a time remove the
Hindoo capitation tax ; while once in a century a tyran-
nical Governor would be trodden under the feet of the
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INDIA UNDEK THE MAHOMMEDANS.
7
imperial elephants. Seldom was the honest Minister or
Governor (when such rare creatures appeared) rewarded,
whilst the bold and the unprincipled amassed treasure
and bequeathed it to their children. Mark the fate of
Akbar's great minister Byram — the man to whom he
owed his throne ; whilst the Saadut Allys and Nizams
have left kingdoms to their descendants. Our only
wonder is, when reading the Moslem annals, that such
men as Asoph Jah, and his father, and Mohabat Khan,
should have lived (generally) prosperously and died in
their beds.
Utter selfishness was the Moslem motive ; the high
roads, the seraes, the plantations — were they for the
people? Not at all, but for the royal progresses to
Cashmere. The expense of one Badshahi serae would
have built a dozen for the people. Throughout the
country it was the same. In the direction the king
was likely to travel there would be roads and con-
veniences ; but elsewhere the people might sigh in vain
for paths, for water, or for shelter. The Newabs of
Oude, and Kings of Juanpore and of the Deccan did
the same. They beautified the neighbourhood of their
own favourite residences, made roads to their country
seats, built bridges over the rivers in their way, sunk
splendid wells and planted lines of trees. Some of
our own magistrates in the times of the good old
close-borough system did the same; and to this day
European convenience is more regarded than native
wants — the collector-and-magistrate being often con-
sidered more sacred than the thousands of poor around
him.
Despotism, unchecked power, in whatever hands and
in whatever quarter, produces the same fruit ; and we
would divest our minds of all clannish feeling in dis-
cussing its merits. Wars and their train of ills were
not confined to the Mahommedan times or States, in
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8 MILITARY DEFENCE OF OUR INDIAN EMPIRE.
India. A glance at the old Hindoo annals will show
that if the country so suffered in Moslem times, it was
not more free from such distractions in what are called
the bright days of Hindoo supremacy. Everywhere we
see that the present occupants of the soil are not the
aboriginals ; and almost every district in India has its
peculiar legend, how a Rajpoot, or other band, drove out,
or enslaved the original holders ; while another tale will
perhaps tell of how the late conquerors were themselves
overwhelmed; and how they eventually merged into
another and bolder race. We doubt whether India was
ever under an universal monarch ; and the Kings of the
Hindoo States of Oude, Kanouge, Muttra, Hustunapore
(Delhi), &c, &c, played but the game that warriors of
every age and every clime have ever played. They pros-
pered, or sank ; they conquered, or were themselves led
captive ; and then, as in later days, independent kingdoms
disappeared, and small States rose into great ones. Not
content with the usual and tolerably-sufficient grounds
for war, we read that Prithora the brave, the hero of a
hundred fights, amused himself with carrying off the
brides of the several kings, of whose intended marriage
he had information. He thus brought on himself many
wars, and eventually thereby lost his throne — but he
lost no credit, and is to this day the hero of Kajpoot
Romance. It would seem, indeed, to be mere idleness
to write and talk of the happiness and purity of a
people, who deified the perpetrators of every crime,
and whose very worship sanctioned every abomination.
When we read of the hundreds of thousands that took
the field with the Persian Kings and with the Moguls ;
and consider that they had no commissariat, we may
imagine the frightful famines that such armies them-
selves experienced, and the more frightful afflictions
they caused to the countries through which they passed.
Dow, in his preliminary dissertation to Ferishta, writes
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MAHOMMEDAN ARMIES.
9
of bazars, &c. in camp ; but nowhere do we find that
there were any regular establishments of the kind;
Brinjaries (themselves plunderers of the worst descrip-
tion) carrying grain, followed the camp or did not,
according to the individual genius and forethought of
the monarch or general of the day; but when Dow
goes on to tell us that each horseman received from
sixty to two hundred rupees * per month, we can under-
stand the value of his several dissertations. . We doubt
whether under any native ruler, in any age, Hindustani
horsemen received all their pay in cash; or if our
present rate of twenty rupees per month to Irregular
Horse was ever materially and continuedly exceeded.
And whatever was paid was in assignments on distant
lands, or in at least half grain and food as rations for
man and beast, and the small balance only in cash.
Dow goes on to say (page xviii. preface) that on such
high pay, the soldiery could afford to encourage the
grain-dealers, &c, who flocked in from neighbouring
towns and villages as armies advanced ; but the traveller
Bernier, with much more apparent truth, tells us that
there were no towns worth mentioning between Delhi
and Agra, and that the banks of the Jumna above
Delhi, being the line of the imperial progress towards
Lahore and Cashmere, were extensive hunting-grounds ;
that the imperial cortege usually left the high road, and
sported through these Shikargahs, while the troops
moved more directly forward.
We know that everywhere in the East, the track of
an army is marked by desolation — that villages and
towns are abandoned even at the intelligence of a
coming hostile force. In the south of India, as the
historian Wilkes tells us, such flights are called wulsa,
the people burying their valuables, and carrying with
them a few days' grain — flying to the hills or the
* Pago 18, Preface to Dow's Hindustan.
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10 MILITARY DEFENCE OF OUR INDIAN EMPIRE.
nearest fortress, and when the enemy remained longer
than their supplies lasted, famine and death ensuing.
While we should all endeavour, abstaining from idle
self-congratulations, to soften the rigour of the British
yoke, it is only fair to our country to show that the
English in India are not the monsters they are some-
times represented ; and that, — although much remains
to be done ; many improvements to be made ; many
legislative enactments to be set forth, and acted on;
much to be done, much to be undone — much for us to
do, more for us to let alone, — we have less to learn than
is generally thought from either our Mahommedan or
Hindoo predecessors.
Lord Valentia fifty years ago travelled in a palankeen
to Lucknow, and wrote a book in which he stated that
the Moguls had roads or causeways from one end of
their dominions to the other. Mr. Buckingham a
quarter of a century afterwards declared, and in his
time not untruly, that there was not a good road in
India above Barrackpore — and still more recently we
have heard a somewhat similar declaration made at a
great public meeting in Calcutta. But let the period
of our rule be counted, and let it be considered that it
does not materially exceed the united length of the
reigns of Aurungzebe and Akbar, and then let it be
remembered that we have a trunk road from Calcutta to
Delhi ; a better road than the Moguls or the Romans
ever had ; and that not a district in India but has its
branch roads, all doubtless more or less defective, want-
ing more or less bridges, ghats, seraes, wells, &c; but
still showing that some attention is now being paid to
the important subject. Let any impartial person visit
the Punjab, where he will scarcely see such a vehicle as
a hackery, or throughout the country alight upon a
road ;* let him then travel to Oude, where his experiences
* Written before its annexation to the British territories.
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IMPROVEMENT OP THE COUNTRY.
11
will be similar, and then let him cross the Grogra and
enter the Gorruckpoor District, not half a century in
our hands. At once he will find himself in a country
abounding with good roads, many of them bridged — and
every year the number of bridges and other improve-
ments are increasing. In this one district alone we
doubt whether there are less than a thousand miles
of road. We say let these comparisons be fairly made,
and then let England be exempted from the vitupera-
tions and unfair comparisons with which she is some-
times assailed ; and rather let those who would so assail
her, honestly do their own work ; and, however humble
be an individual's sphere, no one of us but has the
opportunity, if not of making a road, building a bridge,
or a serai ; at least of planting a tree, or of preserving
one that is planted. But if even this small means is
denied us, no poverty can prevent us from setting a
good example to those around us, by showing all that
come within our influence, that a Christian is not to be
recognised only by wearing a hat and coat, and by
attending neither at the mosque or the temple ; but by
purity of life and honesty of conduct.
But though compelled, in candour, to admit that
without sword-government the British in India could
not maintain their position, we feel strong in our hearts
the conviction that one good magistrate may be better
than a regiment; one sound law, well administered,
better than a brigade: that civilians must co-operate
with the military ; that neither unaided could maintain
our empire, but that a happy admixture of a just civil
administration with the strong hand will retain the
country in peace and happiness as long as it is good
that we should hold it; and it is not by believing
either ourselves or our laws all purity, or all corruption,
that we are likely to come to a right understanding of
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12 MILITARY DEFENCE OF OUR INDIAN EMPIRE.
what is best for India, but by a close study of its past
history ; of the mistakes, and the injustice of former
rulers, Hindoo, Mahommedan, and European ; and then
by setting ourselves down, each in his own sphere, and
honestly working out the details of a code honestly and
ably prepared ; not shifting and changing from day to
day, but founded on experience; and suitable to a rude and
simple people, who, like all people under the sun, prefer
justice to law, and the speedy obtainment of their ends to
eternal dangling about the precincts of dilatory courts.
But it behoves us, under every view of the case, to
keep up our strength. Debility, the result of apathy
and negligence, would be nothing short of a state of
crime. There are few national, as there are few bodily
ailments, which have not their seat in debility ; and
any very apparent symptoms of weakness in the do-
minant power, would, under the present combination of
circumstances, plunge the country into a state of terrible
disorder, and gird about with desolation every province
in Hindoostan.
Let us see then what is our military strength — what
are our means of national defence. Glance at the map,*
and see the enormous expanse which the Indian Army
is employed to protect— from Cape Comorin to the
Sutlej; from Kurrachee to the Gulf of Martaban — a
tract of country, containing, according to the calculations
of the Surveyor-general's department, a gross area of
1,076,590 square miles, to which must be added some
25,000 on account of our recent acquisitions on the
banks of the Indus. Our army has not only to protect
from foreign aggression this immense territory ; but also
* We may avail ourselves of this is, on the whole, the best and most
opportunity strongly to recommend convenient of all the maps of India
Allen's Map of India. It is dis- which have been publisheU.
tinguished by accuracy of detail and H. M. L.
great typographical excellence ; and
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STRENGTH OF THE INDIAN ARMY.
13
to coerce a population of not less than a hundred mil-
lions— many of them men of strong military, and others
of stronger predatory habits — twenty millions of them
Mussulmans — all feeling that they are under the yoke
of the stranger. And, however lightly that yoke be
imposed, we must know that, differing in colour, caste,
language, habits — everything; having indeed nothing
in common with our subjects, our rule can scarcely be
a loved one. It has been declared, in prophetic lan-
guage, that " Japhet shall live in the tents of Shem;"
but may we not attach to the figure more of a military
than of a pastoral character ?
But what is this Indian army, called upon thus to
defend this wide expanse of conquered territory? It
consists of 159 regiments of Eegular Infantry; 21 of
Cavalry ; 5 brigades of Horse Artillery ; 14 battalions
of Foot Artillery ; and three regiments of Sappers and
Miners. To these must be added about 40 Irregular
corps of Cavalry and Infantry, officered from the line,
to the extent of a commandant, a second-in-command,
and an adjutant — the commanders of troops and com-
panies being Eussaldars and Soobadars. In round
numbers we may say that our Indian army is something
very near the following : —
Eegular Infantry (European)
(Native) . .
Cavalry (Native) . .
Artillery (European)
(Native) . .
5,600
184,000
10,200
5,600 ^ cxclutive of
4,600 j La*cars-
Sappers andMiners (Native) 2,500
Irregular corps* .... 30,000
Total . 242,500
* This rough estimate does not Contingent, and the Police Batta-
include all the several components lions. — H. M. L.
of the Nizam's force, the Gwalior
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14 MILITARY DEFENCE OF OUR INDIAN EMPIRE.
To these regiments are attached, according to the
latest Army Lists of the several Presidencies, 5850 Eu-
ropean officers. Such, with some approach to accuracy,
for perfect accuracy is not easily attainable, is the extent
of the Indian army. By this we must be understood to
signify only the troops of the East India Company — but
in calculating our means of national defence we must
consider, in addition to these forces, the very important
item of some 20 or 30 regiments of European Infantry
and Cavalry, belonging to the army of Great Britain.
The number of regiments thus employed in India varies
according to the exigency of the times ; at present there
are in the three Presidencies, under the Company's rule,
29 regiments of Cavalry and of Infantry detached from
the army of the Crown.
But the strength of an army does not depend upon
its numbers, but on its efficiency : and the matter now
to be considered is the means of turning the troops at
our disposal to the best possible account. Let us show,
after some rough fashion of our own — suggesting rather
than elaborating — how this is to be done.
Our Engineer Corps can scarcely be so called. It is
a regiment of officers, perhaps not surpassed in ability
by any equal number of officers in the world ; but they
are too much employed as Civil Engineers; too little
engaged during peace in the functions that would best
prepare them for war ; and still less so their few sub-
ordinates. Barrack-building and repairing, and account-
keeping, are not the best preparatives for a campaign ;
and we know no inducement that the sappers, (all na-
tives, except four Serjeants to each company,) have for
exertion, for the enlargement of their minds, or the
study of engineering. The trigonometrical survey of
Ireland was almost entirely conducted by the Eoyal
Sappers ; Non-Commissioned officers and privates doing
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THE ENGINEER CORPS.
15
all parts of the work. An engineer officer used the
theodolite, but it was as often used by common sappers,
as was the microscope on the base operations ; and much
of the mapping was done by them. We do not mean
to say that every sapper was a Colby or an Everest ;
but that many, nay the majority, could read, and use
all the instruments, and understood the construction of
maps; — Why should it not be so with us? and why
should not at least every Serjeant and every native Non-
commissioned officer in our sappers be able to do as
much? Our trigonometrical and our revenue surveys
show how easily natives are to be taught surveying,
and, if looked after, how well they can survey. Why,
then, should not our sappers be employed on the sur-
veys, on the canals, on the roads ; not as coolies but as
workmen, until qualified as supervisors; and then, as
such, in positions graduated to their conduct and abi-
lities ? A company or more could be employed in the
same neighbourhood, so that, at a day's notice, they
could be ready for field service — how much more easily
when already in the field, than when summoned from
Delhi; and how much better qualified would officers
and men be for any duties that they might be called on
to perform, than as now, when coming from perfect idle-
ness or from mere bricklayers' work. Not that these
labours in the Barrack-masters department are without
their uses ; or that we object to sapper companies taking
their turn in cantonments ; but we do contend that field
work, surveys, laying out of canals and roads, especially
in hilly countries, draining of lands and so forth, are the
employments to call out the powers of engineers, and to
habituate them to do readily and quickly what, on vital
occasions, may be required of them in the field. Every
engineer should not only be able to make an accurate
map, but should be also accustomed to rapid sketching,
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16 MILITARY DEFENCE OF OUR INDIAN EMPIRE.
and practise to take in the features of a country; so
that at a glance he can comprehend the strong and weak
points of positions, the distances of points and their
bearings on the one he occupies, or that the army is to
take up. His subordinates of every grade should be
qualified for some work or other, beyond that of the
shovel, and while none should be ashamed to employ
himself in throwing up the trench or the battery, many
should be able to trace them out and superintend their
construction.*
We would double, nay treble or quadruple, the sap-
pers, and we would attach every engineer officer to
them ; not simply, as at present, a captain and a few of
the youngest subalterns. We should then, with the in-
struction and employment above suggested, have a most
valuable staff corps ; most useful in peace, invaluable in
war; and when we think how little is yet known of
India, how few the roads that are passable throughout
the year ; that are laid out on scientific principles or
kept in order on any plan ; how few the canals ; and
how much those in use pay in revenue, as well as what
a blessing they are to the lands through which they
pass — when we consider what is wanted for the com-
merce and for the military purposes of the country, in
roads and bridges, we shall find profitable work for
many corps of sappers. In short, we may make their
peace employments as useful to the Government and to
the country as to themselves.
While on this subject, we may incidentally observe
that, two years ago, Lord Ellenborough promised us a
* We need not point out to those under Mr. Trail's eye, would do cre-
who have much worked with na- dit to any engineer ; and it is our
tives, how peculiarly their talents fit opinion that if their moral qualifica-
tion* for all such duties as we have tions were equal to their intellectual,
mentioned ; the trace of the road there are native el&ves of the trigo-
from Scrinugger (in Gurhwal) to Ke- nomctrical survey fully competent
darnauth, marked out by a native to complete the work. — H. M. L.
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THE ARTILLERY.
17
military road from Simla to Mussourie ; and the result
has been that a single engineer officer took a glance at
the line, and no more has been heard of the project.
A road such as was projected would possibly have been
impracticable — that is, its expense would have far ex-
ceeded its advantages; but still there is no possible
reason why there should not be a military road from
Kumaon to the Sutlej, passable for guns on mules and
elephants — why the intervening streams should not be
bridged, instead of, as at present, that the only good
bridge, nominally" on the line (that over the Jumna),
should be really not on the line at all, but several miles
off — so placed, as we are credibly informed, because the
bank at that place offered a better abutment. When
we have good roads through and up to our Hills, we
shall find the value of them for our European soldiery —
but on this subject we shall presently enlarge.
Our artillery officers receive much the same education
as the engineers ; though their course of study is a less
extensive one. They receive, however, sufficient pre-
paration in England to enable them at Dum-Dum to
become excellent artillerists, which many of them are ;
and we owe it to their early education, and perhaps to
their having no loaves ready baked for them — to their
being obliged to work their own way to anything be-
yond a subaltern's birth with a company for eighteen
years, and then the command of a foot battery, that
we see more names among the Artillery as Persian
and Hindustani scholars than in any other branch of
the service.
The men are, as material — as machines, excellent;
but few are much more. Some few good laboratory
men are to be found among them — perhaps three or
four in a company. Thirty or forty per cent, can read
and write ; but not one in a hundred studies his duty
c
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18 MILITARY DEFENCE OP OUR INDIAN EMPIRE.
scientifically; and the obvious reason is, that he has
not the shadow of a motive for so doing. If he can
read and write and is decently sober, he is sure to
become a Serjeant. If he is smart at drill and well*
behaved and not too independent, he may rise to be a
serjeant-major. Or if his liver is sound, he may live to
be a conductor, or even, at the age of seventy, a deputy
commissary of ordnance. And so in the Golundauze :
if he has taken care of himself and not expended his
vital energies as a young man, he will live to be an old
one ; and when physically and mentally disqualified, he
will become a soobadar, or even a soobadar bahadoor;
and all this even though he may be very little deserving
of such promotion. He has the negative merit of
having outlived the companions of his youth, who
possibly got maimed, or killed, or lost their health,
when he who gained the palm, was absent from his
post or shirking at it ; but we are strongly of opinion
that old age is but a negative virtue, and should not
without positive merit be rewarded in soldiers ; but that
the young man should have some motive to emulate the
veteran.
There is little objectionable in the artillery system,
except its locations, its system of patronage, and its
utter sacrifice of the interests and usefulness of the
Foot Artillery to those of the mounted branch — Native
Artillery is stationed at Almorah in the Hills: they
dislike it, and are out of their element there. They
should be replaced by Europeans. Large bodies of
Golundauze should not be kept at Dum-Dum and at
Cawnpore, serving as Infantry, without guns and with-
out officers. At least half the European Artillery should
be located in hill stations; and the weakly and sick
men of the other half should be with them. Cherra
Poonjee, Dargeling, Kumaon, Mussourie, Sobathoo,
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PAUCITY OP OFFICERS.
19
Kussoulie, and the immediate neighbourhood of those
places, would amply accommodate them all.
To each company of Golundauze should be attached
three European Serjeants and three corporals; and to
every company, European and Native, there should not
be less than two officers when in cantonments and three
in the field. At present, while a single troop of Horse
Artillery has three or four officers, and they remain
with it for years, a company is lucky if it possesses one ;
and that one is sometimes changed two or three times
within a year. We have often and often seen lads of a
year's or two years' standing, going on service with two
or four guns, and even with a company. Indeed the
exception to the rule is, when a company of artillery
proceeds on service under a captain, and then the
chances are ten to one that he has been taken from
the staff, or suddenly drawn from another end of the
country to command men, on perhaps an emergency,
that he never saw before ; to take charge of stores and
guns that he has not a day to inspect ; and where, as a
stranger, he knows not the good from the bad men, and
has not only to do his own duty, but to be the labora-
tory man, and the everything-else for a time himself.
The consequence of all this is, that our Foot Artillery is
not at all what it might be, and that the Foot Artillery
officers, though harder worked and worse paid, are often
better artillerists, more practical, rough-and-ready men,
than their Horse Artillery brethren. But the reward
they look to, for making a bad company a good one —
for redeeming drunkards into respectability, slovens
into smart soldiers — is, to be removed from the company
into a troop ; and to throw back the poor fellows who
have learnt to appreciate their exertions, to the tender
mercies of an old officer who cares not for them, or to a
young hand who is learning his own duty, and each of
c 2
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20 MILITARY DEFENCE OP OUR INDIAN EMPIRE.
whom will possibly have gone his way before the year
has expired. Such a system is cruel in the extreme to
the men themselves, and most injurious to the service.*
The men, as material, are much the same in both
branches ; the officers are the same ; but whether it be
the Grolundauze and the Native Horse Artillery, or the
European Horse and Foot Artillery, there is a woeftd
difference between the two branches, entirely owing to
the different footing on which the two are placed, the
standing they occupy, and the way they are officered.
It is a dogma very staunchly upheld by some Horse
Artillery officers — generally not the wisest of them—
that their branch should be a close borough. We have
heard some captains, who spent most of their subaltern
days in the Foot, forgetful of this fact, uphold the
absurdity. We, as dispassionate observers, always
thought that if the Horse Artillery were to be a matter
of patronage and profit, it should be given to the best
artillery officers — to those who were best acquainted
with and best performed their duty; who could ride,
who could see, and who could hear. But too frequently
we have seen all these requisites neglected, and very
bad officers appointed simply through local interest ; and
as this is likely to continue the case as long as man is
man, we should be glad to see the Foot Artillery on a
full equality with the Horse as to all emoluments,
equipment, and officering. It would be materially to
* Wc cannot too strenuously in- that the four (now five) companies
sist on this point. We have known have fallen to the command of the
companies of Foot Artillery to be, in adjutant. It is impossible that, un-
the course of three or four months, der such a system, the officers can
commanded by as many officers. We take any interest in their men, or
have known subalterns to command that the men should place any con-
one after the other — or perhaps fidence in their officers, who neces-
two at a time — all the four com- sarily trust everything — even the
panies of a battalion within six promotions — to the pay-serjeant,
months ; and wc have known a bat- who really commands the company,
talion to be so destitute of officers
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HORSE BATTERIES.
21
the benefit of the service and to the advantage of the
artillery regiment at large. All artillery officers should
have Horse allowance and Cavalry pay, after they have
joined batteries, and as long as present with them. All
batteries should be horsed ; the additional expense to be
covered by reducing two guns from each of the Horse
Artillery troops. Three 6-pounders and a 12-pounder
howitzer well horsed, with — as at present — a double set
of horses, all picked ones, no roarers and man-eaters to
stop the team and vitiate the powers of the other five ;
but all steady first-rate cattle, accustomed to work with
Cavalry on all sorts of ground ; with every horse willing
to work either as leader or in the shafts. Such batteries
on the out-rider system would, on a long campaign, tell
more effectually than the six guns under the present
system ; and it is not the least merit of the plan we
propose that it would put at the head of troops the
young and active captains, or at least men who did not
seek such commands simply for the extra pay.
Our Foot Artillery batteries would then be on their
proper footing ; they would be well horsed with slow
but stout cattle ; they would be as well officered as the
Horse Artillery ; the officers would have no motive for
change, and their men would soon feel and appreciate
the difference, and be as smart and efficient as are now
their mounted brethren. Our 9-pounder batteries, in-
stead of, as at present, being considered incumbrances,
would always be up in action with the infantry ; and
would perform all the service they are capable of, but
which they are now seldom permitted to do. It is at
any rate a sheer waste of money, to keep the whole
Foot Artillery of India inefficient ; it is waste of money
now, we say ; for we look on two well-equipped guns
as more to the purpose than six ill-found ones. But
what is waste and folly now may, if not rectified, cost
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22 MILITARY DEFENCE OF OUE INDIAN EMPIRE.
life and treasure hereafter ; nay, may cost us India : and
most absurd does it seem that the one arm which our
enemies all dread ; which alone, from the days of Hyder
Ally to those of Akbar Khan, they all acknowledge they
cannot match — the arm which our own sepoys look to
and rely on — is the one we most neglect ; the one that
is in fact left to Providence. We could point out
innumerable instances; we will satisfy ourselves with
one — the state of the single battery at Ferozepoor when
the Cabul outbreak took place. For the two previous
years we all know how many reports there had been of
Seikh inroads and invasions, and yet in November, 1841,
when half that battery was ordered to Peshawur, it had
to borrow bullocks from the commissariat, and was sent
under an officer not three years in the service. The
battery was then under one of its many transitions ; it
had twice had horses and once camels, and we believe
twice bullocks within two years ; and of course when
wanted for the field had no cattle at all ; and the young
officer who went with the detachment had not joined
the company a month. The sooner such matters are
mended the better : we should at least know by this
time whether camels, bullocks, elephants, or horses are
best for draught ; and at any rate if experiments are to
be tried, our exposed frontier stations are not the ones
to dismantle, while the periodical mutations are in pro-
gress.*
We are amused to hear that it has been determined,
to add a captain to each Infantry Regiment, but not to
the Cavalry. If any branches of the service require
officers and good ones, they are the native cavalry
and native artillery. Either is almost useless without
* Wo are glad to hear that a added to a strong one of three, all
mountain train is again likely to bo placed with a couple of companies
equipped, and should be glad to see of Europeans at a hill station. —
an elephant battery of six pounders H. M. L. (1844).
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THE INFANTRY.
23
officers ; and yet the latter has only half the number
that the European branch has ; whilst the former is not
thought to require as many as the infantry. Had we
our will, there should be, in addition to a full comple-
ment of officers, half a dozen or more Europeans in
every troop of native cavalry ; say three Serjeants and
three corporals ; men promoted for smartness and gal*
lantry from the Dragoons and Horse Artillery. Such
men, with two officers to every troop, would bring up a
cavalry corps to the charge in the style in which it
should be done. We should have no pausing to count
the enemy ; nor would the few European officers have
to be casting in their minds whether their men would
follow them ; nor when the critical moment came would
they have a doubt that, wherever they led, the corps
would be at their heels.
But our Infantry must ever be our main-stay ; if it
is indifferent, the utmost efficiency in other branches
will little avail. We are inclined to advocate the pre-
sence of two European officers with each company of
every regular sepoy corps; but we would divide the
Native Infantry into three classes ; have a fourth of the
army on the footing of the Khelat-i-giljee corps; and
say an eighth forming a third class somewhat similar
to the Khelat-i-giljees and the several contingents, but
the officers commanding companies being solely natives;
and from them should be selected commandants, seconds
in command, and adjutants, for the corps formed and
commanded by natives, one of which should be in every
brigade to cause emulation and prevent suspicion ; and,
by a mixture of interests, interfere with combinations.
We will presently offer a scheme for doing away with
native officers in the regular corps ; but would desire
that all promotions to command of companies in the
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24 MILITARY DEFENCE OF OUR INDIAN EMPIRE.
corps of the 2nd and 3rd class should be made from
the Infantry at large.
Native officers have long since been voted useless.
They are great incumbrances in war ; they are nonen-
tities in peace. Occasionally a lion-hearted old fellow
of seventy will keep up with his company in a charge
or on a forced march ; but he forthwith dies of exhaus-
tion, after having, perhaps for a year or more during
the campaign, put the commissariat to the expense of
carrying grain for him, three or four servants, a pony,
and half or a whole camel. In quarters they have no-
thing to do but to brood over their position ; to feel
that they are nominally officers, and yet that the ser-
jeant-major is liable to command them, and that beard-
less boys are every day put over them. At Vellore and
elsewhere, they did not prevent or give warning of in-
tended massacre and insurrection ; nor have they in the
late cases of the 60th, 34th, 64th, and of the Cavalry
and Artillery, either given a clue to their officers of
what was the real motive of discontent, or do they
appear to have striven to prevent insubordination.
We conceive that the motive of Government in hav-
ing three native officers attached to each company and
troop — who have nothing to do, and whose ages may
be said to average sixty-two — must be their supposed
moral influence with the sepoys, and the encourage-
ment given to the latter by placing before their eyes
their kinsmen promoted to such grades, and living com-
fortably and in honour among them. If such be the
reason, how much more potent would this moral in-
fluence be, if the old men were comfortably seated
under their own neem or mangoe trees, talking to their
grandchildren and to the wondering villagers gathered
around them, of the beneficence of the Honourable
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NATIVE OFFICERS.
25
Company, instead of toiling in the hot winds on trea-
sure parties, or vexing themselves under young Euro-
pean officers in petty and discomforting duties unsuit-
able to their age, in which, though they are present in
person, they can scarcely be called performers.
We would fain see every soldier, European and Native,
and every native officer, appear before a committee at
fifty years of age, and be at once sent to the invalids,
or remanded for five years' further duty, according to
his health, after which time — that is, at latest after
fifty-five years of age — no man should be allowed to
remain with a regiment. European officers are less ex-
posed than their men ; the waste of vital energy is not
so great: but we are not sure that our commissioned
ranks might not benefit by some such weeding.
Allahabad, Chunar, and other fortresses, as well as
all treasuries and magazines — both of which should in-
variably be within forts, or redoubts of some kind or
other — should be garrisoned by invalids, supported by
small detachments of regulars for night and exposed
duties. Invalids should be sent to their homes at sixty
years of age, at latest ; or, as at present, earlier periods,
when disabled by sickness or wounds.
No sepoy, not considered qualified to rise to be a
soobadar, should be promoted beyond the rank of naick.
Havildars should be promoted, in their turn, to the rank
of jemadar, and if considered unfit for the active duties
of a lieutenant (jemadar) of a company or troop, to be
transferred to the garrison or home invalids, according
to age and strength. Jemadars should rise by seniority
to the rank of soobadar; but no native officer should
be promoted to second in command but for distin-
guished conduct. Seconds should rise to commandants
by seniority, subject of course to proof of continued
good conduct. The adjutants of these native corps
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26 MILITARY DEFENCE OF OUR INDIAN EMPIRE.
might be promoted at once from the rank of naick and
havildar; and as jemadars rise in their turn to com-
mand, naicks being steady soldiers, but passed over as
not being sufficiently smart for native officers, might be
invalided (when worn out, or beyond age) as havildars.
The Garrison Invalid corps should in all respects be
paid as troops of the line ; the Home Invalids as at pre-
sent ; and all ranks and orders should understand that
rates of pay will not be altered, that invalids will not
be remanded (as has been the case) to regimental duty ;
and the rates of pay, rations, foreign allowance, &c, &c,
should be as distinctly and fully laid down as possible,
so that no excuse could be given for error or miscalcu-
lation on the subject.
We should then have three descriptions of Native
Infantry ; the first class, regular infantry, officered by
a full complement of Europeans ; the second class, par-
tially so officered ; the third class, commanded and offi-
cered entirely by natives — but the two last always
employed in brigade, or at least in concert with the
regular corps.
The native officers would then have definite duties,
and not be too old to perform them. The old and worn-
out veterans would be comfortably located in quarters,
or enjoying themselves quietly at home. There would
be less clashing of interests, more contentment, and
greater efficiency, at perhaps a less expense than at
present ; for a much less number than seventy regular
infantry regiments would suffice for Bengal, if we were
to establish an increased number of such as form the
GwaKor Contingent, supported again by a few com-
manded by such soldiers as old Mahommed Issoof.*
* The reader of Indian History will of the Carnatic wars under Lawrence
remember the commandant of the was the only person who could safely
English sepoys, the famous Mahom- conduct our convoys through the
med Lssoof, who in the worst times enemy's country. We commend his
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EUROPEAN AND NATIVE LEADERS. 27
Let us not be met with an outcry about the attendant
decrease of European officers. We know their value
very well, but we know that there are many bad as
well as many good ones ; and we know that although,
where sepoys have been taught to follow only Euro-
peans, there should always be enough of the latter to
ensure vacancies being filled up in action, as leaders
fall; yet where men have not been so habituated, we
see not why our sepoys should not be permitted to
use the senses and the courage they possess, without
on every occasion relying on the leading and the life
of an individual. Shah Soojah's regiments behaved
admirably in Affghanistan ; and the discipline of Cap-
tain Mitchell's regiment of the old Gwalior Contingent
was the admiration of beholders. Clive's, Lawrence's*
and Coote's battalions had seldom with them more than
three or four officers ; and yet the deeds of those days
are not surpassed by those of the present.
Our regular issue of pay, and our pension establish-
ment, are the foundation-stones of our rule ; and there
cannot be a doubt that for the lower orders our service
is a splendid one. But it offers no inducement to
superior intellects, or more stirring spirits. Men so
endowed, knowing they can always gain their bread in
any quarter, leave us in disgust, and rise to rank in
foreign services. Did the times avail, they would raise
standards of their own, and turn against us the dis-
cipline they learnt in our ranks. Rank and competence
in our service would bind such men to our interests.
It is a straoiv that turns the current. Such men as
Nadir Shah and Hyder Ally did not, at the outset, aim
at sovereignty ; their ambition increased with their suc-
history as narrated by Wilkes to our jurious treatment and unjust sus-
rcadera, and especially the detail picions on the conduct of this fine
(page 326, voL L) of the effect of in- old Native soldier.— H. M. L.
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28 MILITARY DEFENCE OP OUR INDIAN EMPIRE.
cess, and what, early in life, would have contented them,
was, at a later day, despised.
There are many commandants in the Mahrattah and
Seikh service, who were privates in our army. General
Dhokul Singh, now at Lahore, was a drill naick in one
of our sepoy corps ; and Rajah Buktawar Singh, one of
the richest and most powerful men in Oude, was a havil-
dar in our cavalry. But is it not absurd that the rank
of soobadar major and russaldar major is the highest
that a native can attain in a native army of nearly
300,000 men, — in a land, too, that, above all others, has
been accustomed to see military merit rewarded, and
to witness the successive rise of families from the lowest
conditions, owing to gallantry in the field ?
There is always danger in handling edged tools, but
justice and liberality forge a stronger chain than a sus-
picious and niggardly policy. We hold that no place
or office should be absolutely barred to the native sol-
dier, although the promotion of every individual should
be grounded on his individual merits, and the requisite
cautions be taken that he should not be tempted be-
yond his strength. The grandsons of the Gauls who
opposed Csesar, were senators of Rome; and the Jye
Singhs and Jeswunt Singhs led the Mogul armies ; but
it cannot be said that it was to any such liberality the
empire of either Eome or Delhi owed its fall.
Whenever sepoys and Europeans know and under-
stand each other, the utmost harmony exists between
them; witness the 35th B. N. I. and H.M.'s 13th at
Julalabad; and we remember many such cases of old.
Indeed, it was only the other day that we heard a sepoy
of the 26th N. I. say, " If we go on service, send with
us Number Nine " (H.M.'s 9th, with which they were
brigaded in Affghanistan). Such a spirit should be
encouraged; and it would be well to attach perma-
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ENLISTMENT OF SEPOYS.
29
nently to each European regiment, while in India, a
couple of companies, or more, of picked men, chiefly
Mussulmans, and the lower tribes of military Hindus
— these companies to act as the Auxiliaries and Velites
did with the Eomans. Let them be Light Infantry ;
and, as picked and honoured troops, receive some ad-
ditional pay. We know that Europeans cannot march
in India without a detachment of natives accompany-
ing them, and that such duty, as at present performed,
is much disliked. But placed on some such footing as
above proposed, the service might be made a duty of
honour, and the sepoys of «such companies, working
well with Europeans, would be almost equal in value
to the latter. The system has been found to work well
with the gun lascars attached to the European Artillery,
§ven though they have not been cared for and made
much of, as we would propose all natives so employed
should be.
And now a few words on the subject of enlistment.
Our sepoys come too much from the same parts of the
country; Oude, the lower Dooab and upper Behar.
There is too much of clanship among them, and the
evil should be remedied by enlisting in the Saharunpoor
and Delhi districts, in the hill regions, and in the Malay
and Burmah States. We laugh at our hill men ; but
they are much the same class as form Rajah Grolab
Singh's formidable Jumboos. But what inducement do
we offer to any but coolies to enter into the Simoor or
Nussuree battalions, when we give the men only five
rupees per month, proportionably pay Native officers,
and calling the corps local battalions, have them one
day at Bhurtpoor, the next at Ferozepoor? Such
policy is very bad; and we should rather encourage
the military classes in the Hills to enter all our corps.
We would have, too, some companies or regiments of
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30 MILITARY DEFENCE OP OUR INDIAN EMPIRE.
Malaya ; of China-men ; of Mhugs and Burmese ; and
mix them up at large stations with our sepoy corps.
We would go further, and would encourage the now
despised Eurasians to enter our ranks, either into sepoy
corps where one or two here and there would be useful,
or as detached companies or corps. We are aware that
they are not considered a warlike race. We might
make them so, and we doubt not, with good officers,
could do so. Courage goes much by opinion ; and
many a man behaves as a hero or a coward, according as
he considers he is expected to behave. Once two Roman
Legions held Britain ; now as many Britons might hold
Italy.
There is no doubt that whatever danger may threaten
us in India, the greatest is from our own troops. We
should, therefore, while giving no cause of discontent ;
while paying them well and regularly providing for
them in their old age ; while opening a wide field for
legitimate ambition ; and rewarding, with promotion,
medals, jagheers, gallantry and devotion ; abstain from
indiscriminately heaping such rewards upon men unde-
serving of them ; and we should at all times carefully
avoid giving anything or doing anything, under an ap-
pearance of coercion, on the demand of the soldiery.
The corps that under General Pollock misbehaved at
Peshawur, should at least have been denied medals.
Had they been so, possibly we should have been spared
late events on the N. W. Frontier and in Scinde ; and
we should remember that every officer is not fitted for
command, much less to command soldiers of a different
religion and country ; and that where, as has repeatedly
of late years been shown, regiments were found to be
going wrong through the weakness or the tyranny of their
commanders — it matters not whether from too much
strictness or too little— full enquiry should at once be
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THE IRREGULAR CAVALRY.
31
made and remedial measures instituted. If commanders
cannot manage their regiments, they should he removed
from them, and that quickly, before their corps are
irremediably destroyed. How much better would it be
to pension, and to send to England, such men as we
have in command of some corps, than to allow them to
remain a day at the head of a regiment to set a bad
example to their men. We could, at this moment,
point out more than one commander answering our de-
scription ; and we would seriously call the attention of
those in high places to the injury that even one such
officer may commit. He may drive a thousand men
into discontent, and that thousand may corrupt many
thousands — and all this may be done by a man without
any positive evil in him ; but simply because he is not
a soldier, has not the feelings of a soldier ; frets the men
one day, neglects them the next : and is known by them
all to care for nothing beyond his personal interests and
his own hisab-kitab.
Before leaving this subject of the Native Army, wo
must devote a few sentences to one of its most important
components, of which we have made no specific mention.
The Irregular Cavalry is a most useful branch of tho
service, doubly so as providing for military classes that
do not fancy our regular s^vice. But we much doubt
whether we adopt the best method of keeping up tho
efficiency of the Irregulars, which are our light horse ;
but which we encumber, as we do all other branches,
with officers, and even privates, of sixty and even seventy
years of age. We are not sure that we could not point
out many native officers very much above seventy ; and
we once heard a commandant of one of these corps say
his old men were his smartest — no great compliment to
the quality of his young ones. But the fact is, that
the purwustee system is more injuriously employed in
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32 MILITARY DEFENCE OF OUR INDIAN EMPIRE.
the Irregular Horse than in any other branch of the
army; though generally from kind and good motives.
In times of peace these corps are little thought of, have
nothing to do, are on small outpost duty, or, where col-
lected, are entirely under their commander's authority
and eye ; but in service they are cruelly and often reck-
lessly knocked about and exposed ; no one has pity on
them, and their own officers have therefore need the
more to care for them. Mostly Patans or Rajpoots and
Mahommedans of family, they are men of expensive
habits, are almost all involved, and, from a system that
has gradually crept in, they do not (generally) receive
the pay allowed them by Government ; that is to say,
every man entering, in (we believe) seven out of the
nine corps, has not only to purchase his horse and
equipments, but to pay one hundred and fifty rupees or
thereabouts to the estate or family of the man whose
decease or invaliding created the vacancy. Such dona-
tion of course throws the recruit at once into the money-
lender's hands, and often leaves him for life a debtor.
If the man again has not the cash to purchase a horse,
he rides one belonging to a Native officer or to some
privileged person, and becomes what is called his bar-
geer — the soldier receiving only seven or eight rupees
a month, and the owner of the horse the balance of the
twenty allowed \>y Government.
There is much in all this and in the Kutchery and
Banking system, prevalent in almost every corps (and
without which, so deep-rooted is the evil, few Irregular
regiments could now take the field), that requires
gradual amendment, for while Government pays twenty
rupees a month to each man, it is calculated, one with
another, that the men do not receive above sixteen ; and
consequently, as far as efficiency is concerned, they are
as if they received only that much pay ; and when
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THE BANKING SYSTEM.
33
called on for service, instead of having a stock to draw
on to render them efficient, they have to call on their
banker ; and enter more deeply into his books.
We have heard officers say that but for these bankers
they did not know how they could have taken their
corps on service; and we know how much trouble,
vexation, and expense, has often been incurred by com-
manders, to render their regiments efficient. But
whatever be the motive — and we believe that in the Ir-
regular Horse it is a very good one — that makes close
boroughs of corps, bringing into them only the sons and
nephews of those already enlisted, when better men are
candidates, the result is bad ; and it is worse still, that
such fines should be paid at starting as tend. to shackle
the troopers for life. So great is the evil that we con-
sider that Government would do well to redeem all debts
as they "now stand and forbid the system for the future ;
and peremptorily order the service to be thrown open to
candidates out of the several regiments, being men of
respectability and bringing their own horses or able to
purchase that of the man who created the vacancy. The
fine we have mentioned is in some corps put on the price
of the horse, so that the recruit, instead of one hundred
and twenty-five rupees, has to pay two hundred and
seventy for his charger.
The consequence of all this is, that we have not the
horses, and often not the men, in the Irregular Cavalry,
that we might have for the twenty rupees per month
paid by Government. It is only justice to the Ir-
regulars to say that it is wonderful what they have done
on service, in spite of their old men and their smallf
poor horses; but having done well with little means,
they would assuredly do better under a more encourag-
ing system. The Poona Horse, we understand, receive
thirty rupees per month, and they are a most efficient
D
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84 MILITARY DEFENCE OF OUR INDIAN EMPIRE.
body. The matter of pay and equipment of the Ir-
regulars requires serious attention; bad Cavalry are
worth little, and we would prefer five regiments of first-
rate, to ten of indifferent, quality.
As our army is constituted, the Irregular Horse is the
only outlet for the native gentry. Every day it becomes
less so, while recruiting is restricted to dependants of
those already in the service. Lord EUenborough's
project of adding a portion of Irregulars, on increased
pay, to the Body-guard was a wise measure ; and we
should be glad to see still further encouragement held
out to gallantry and devotion. A Kassalah in each re-
giment might be formed from men who had distin-
guished themselves, each man of such troop receiving
four or five rupees additional monthly pay. We would
also give the command of half the Irregular corps to
Native officers; such commanders, with their seconds
and adjutants, to be selected for gallantry and good
conduct ; two brigades, each of two such corps, might
be formed in the Bengal presidency ; one stationed at
Umbala, the other at Cawnpore ; to be commanded by
a brigadier under the Native title of Bukshee with a
brigade-major under the designation of Naib — these
two (European) officers not interfering in regimental
details, further than paying the men and sanctioning
promotions — the Bukshees and Naibs to be officers
selected from present commandants. The system, we
are convinced, would work well as giving objects of am-
bition to the more adventurous spirits. And having
two good European officers with them, there would
always be a check on the conduct of the Native com-
manders, who, we believe, would feel pride in keeping
their corps in as efficient a state as those commanded by
European officers.
But after all, what could we do without the Euro-
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EUROPEAN TROOPS IN INDIA.
35
pean portion of the army? — useless of course by itself;
but without which all else would soon pass from our
hands. And yet how do we repay the gallant hearts
that daily bleed for us, that daily sink and expire in a
foreign land, uncared for and unpitiedj* "We chiefly y
allude to the Company's European troops, but much
will apply to Her Majesty's. How little is done, or at
least how much more might be done, for the comfort
and happiness of the men, and by the saving of their
lives, for the pockets of Government !
In the first place, we consider that Fort William is
about the worst station in India for Europeans, — espe-
cially for new comers. We would therefore see H. M.
Regiments at once proceed up the country; and
throughout India would have the Europeans, as far
as possible, on the Hills, not keeping a man more than
absolutely necessary on the plains. Three-fourths of
the European Infantry and Foot Artillery and one-half
of the Dragoons and Horse Artillery might easily be
established on the Hills; and of the corps at Fort
William, Madras, and Bombay, all the weakly men
should be at Cherrah Poonjee or Darjeeling; or at
the sanataria of the other presidencies. Nature haa
given us chains of hills in all directions, not only east
and west, but through Central India, that would enable
us to have moderately-cool stations in every quarter;
and when the expense in life and in death of Europeans
on the present system is considered; when it is re-
membered that every recruit costs the Government one
thousand rupees, or £100 ; that barracks, with tatties
and establishments and hospitals, must be kept up at
great expense, and that with all appliances the life of
an European is most miserable, how clear it is, that we
should alter the old system, and, following the laws of
nature, avail ourselves of the means and localities at
d 2
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86 MILITARY DEFENCE OP OUR INDIAN EMPIRE.
our disposal that enable us, at a much less expense, to
keep up our Europeans in double their present efficiency
in the Hills ; entailing, it is true, a certain first outlay,
but which would be soon covered by the saving of
life and the reduction in establishments, rations, &c.
If Lord Ellenborough had done nothing else in India,
he would deserve well of his country for establishing
three European stations on the Hills. Three more may
easily be so placed on the Bengal presidency ; and the
proportion of Artillery and Cavalry we have mentioned
be posted there. But we must have good roads and
ample means of conveyance on all the routes and
rivers leading to such locations ; we must have a
certain proportion of carriage kept up ; and have our
rivers covered with boats, and among them many
steamers.
We would advocate the employment, or permission
to employ themselves, of half the Europeans on the
Hills as handicrafts, in agriculture, trade, &c. A large
proportion of the household troops are so employed in
London ; and yet the Guards of England have never
been found wanting. Rations, establishments and bar-
racks in half quantities would thus only be required;
and perhaps a portion of the pay of men so employed
would in time be saved. Small grants of land, too,
might be given on the Hills or in the Dhoon to Euro-
pean invalids of good character, on terms of military
service within a certain distance ; or on terms of sup-
plying a recruit, for seven or ten years, to a European
corps.
Three-fourths of the European children, who now die
in the barracks on the plains, would live on the Hills,
and would recruit our corps with stout healthy lads,
such as may be seen in Mr. Mackinnon's school at
Mussouree, instead of the poor miserable parboiled
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ADVANTAGES OF RAILROADS.
37
creatures, that we see as drummer boys throughout the
service.
The Chunar establishment bodily moved to the Mus-
sourie neighbourhood would be an incalculable benefit
and blessing. Indeed, it is marvellous that the cruelty
of such a location as Chunar for European invalids has
not been oftener brought to notice, and that the hottest
rock in India has been permitted to continue to this
day as a station for European invalids.
All that we have mentioned is not only feasible but
easy; and we doubt not that all the expense which
would be incurred by the change of locations and aban-
donment of barracks would be cleared by the several
savings within seven years. We must walk before we
can run ; and we therefore only advocate roads, metalled
roads, to each hill station; but we hope and expect
soon to see railroads established on each line, so that
in twelve hours the corps from Kussowlee, Sobathoo,
and Mussourie could be concentrated at Delhi. Great
as would be the first outlay on such rails, we are well
satisfied that they would pay ; and who can calculate
the benefit of being at once able to keep our Europeans
in a good climate, and, at the rate of twenty or thirty
miles an hour, to bring them to bear upon any point ?
We should then realize Hyder Ally's notion, and really
keep our Europeans in cages ready to let slip on occa-
sions of necessity.
Every inducement should be held out to our Euro-
pean soldiers to conduct themselves as respectable men
and good Christians. Eeading-rooms and books in
abundance should be provided : all sorts of harmless
games encouraged; the children of all on the plains
be sent to the Hills, and placed in large training
establishments, where boys and girls might (separately)
be instructed in what would make them useful and
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88 MILITARY DEFENCE OF OUR INDIAN EMPIRE.
respectable in their sphere of life ; and be taught from
the beginning to stir themselves like Europeans, and
not with the listlessness (as is usual in the barrracks)
of Asiatics.
We cannot write too emphatically on this most im-
portant branch of our subject. The morality of our
European army in India is a matter which should
engage the anxious attention not only of the military
enquirer, but of every Christian man— every friend of
humanity in the country. It is not simply a question
of the means of making good soldiers; but of the
means of making good men, and therefore good soldiers.
We do not judge the European soldier harshly, when
we say that the average standard of barrack morality is
very low, for we cheerfully admit, at the same time, that
the temptations to excess are great ; the inducements to
good conduct small ; the checks wholly insufficient. It
would be a wonder of wonders, if, neglected as he is,
the European soldier were to occupy a higher place in
the scale of Christian morality, but whatever he may
have to answer for, it is almost beyond denial that the
responsibilities of the officer are far greater than his
own. The soldiers sins of commission are not so
heavy as the officer's sins of omission, from which they
are the direct emanations. The moral character of a
regiment, be it good or bad, fairly reflects the amount
of interest taken by the officers in the well-being of
their men* The soldier wanders out of garrison or
cantonment and commits excesses abroad, because he
has no inducements to remain within the precincts of
the barrack square. He goes abroad in search of
amusement — and he finds not amusement but excite-
ment ; he makes his way to the village toddy-shop, or
to the punch-house ; he seeks other haunts of vice ; and
when both money and credit are gone, perhaps he takes
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DUTIES OF THE BRITISH OFFICER.
39
to the high road. This would not happen, if regi-
mental officers really did their duty to their men.* It
is not merely the duty of an officer to attend parade, to
manoeuvre a company or regiment, to mount guard, to
sanction promotions, to see the pay issued, to sign
monthly returns, and to wear a coat with a standing
collar. The officer has higher duties to perform; a
duty to his sovereign ; a duty to his neighbour ; a duty
to his God, not to be discharged by the simple obser-
vance of these military formalities. He stands in loco
parentis; he is the father of his men ; his treatment of
them should be such as to call forth their reverence and
affection ; and incite in them a strong feeling of shame
on being detected by him in the commission of un-
worthy actions. It is his duty to study their cha-
racters; to interest himself in their pursuits; to
enhance their comforts ; to assist and to encourage,
with counsel and with praise, every good effort; to
extend his sympathy to them in distress ; to console
them in affliction — to show by every means in his
power, that though exiles from home and aliens from
their kindred, they have yet a friend upon earth, who
will not desert them. These are the duties of the offi-
cer— and duties too which cannot be performed without
an abundant recompense. There are many idle, good-
hearted, do-nothing officers, who find the day too long,
complain of the country and the climate, are devoured
with ennui, and living between excitement and reaction,
perhaps, in time sink into hypochondriasis — but who
would, if they were to follow our advice, tendered not
arrogantly but affectionately, find that they had dis-
* The wives of the officers have merely in word, but in deed. — To all
also a duty to perform ; and the would we say " Go and do likewise."
moral influence which they might It is possible that in a future article
exercise is great. Some ladies are we may enlarge upon this subject,
willing to acknowledge this, not
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40 MILITARY DEFENCE OP OUR INDIAN EMPIRE.
covered a new pleasure ; that a glory had sprung up in
a shady place ; that the day was never too long, the
climate never too oppressive; that at their up-rising
and their down-sitting serenity and cheerfulness were
ever present — that in short they had begun a new life,
as different from that out of which they had emerged,
as the sunshine on the hill-top from the gloom in the
abyss. Some may smile — some may sneer — some may
acknowledge the truth dimly and forget it. To all we
have one answer to give, couched in two very short
words — Try it.
We need scarcely enter into minute details to show
the manner in which this is to be done. Every officer
knows, if he will know, how it is to be done. The
youth of a month's standing in the army, endowed
with ordinary powers of observation, must perceive
that there are fifty ways open to his seniors, by which
they may advance the well-being and happiness of the
inmates of the barracks. Let them see, think, and act,
as men endowed with faculties and understandings;
and we shall hear no more of that intense longing after
transportation to a penal settlement, which has of late
possessed many of our soldiers and urged them to the
commission of capital offences. Does not this one fact
declare trumpet-tongued the misery of a barrack life in
India— does it not pronounce the strongest condemna-
tion on those, who make no effort to shed a cheering
light upon the gloomy path of the exiled soldier ?
But we must do something more than alleviate the
sufferings of the present — we must render him hopeful
of the future; we must brighten up his prospects;
animate him with a new-born courage ; fill him .with
heart and hope that he may " still bear up and steer
right on," until better days shall dawn upon him ; and
the wretchedness and humilitation of the past shall have
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PROMOTION FROM THE RANKS.
41
a subduing influence in the retrospect, and shall lift up
his soul with devout feelings of gratitude and love.
The commissioned ranks of the army should not be
wholly closed against the deserving soldier in the Com-
pany's service, more than in the Queen's. There are no
English regiments, which contain so many young men
of family and education, as the few European corps and
battalions in the army of the East India Company ; and
we should be truly glad to see the present great paucity
of officers in the Native Army, in some degree, remedied
by the appointment to each regiment of Cavalry and
Infantry, and battalion or brigade of Artillery, and to
the corps of Engineers, an ensign or second-lieutenant
from the Non-Commissioned ranks ; and that henceforth
a fourth or fifth of the patronage of the army should be
appropriated to the ranks.
For such promotion, we should select in some such
fashion as the following. Let examination committees
be held at Calcutta, Cawnpore, and two of the Hill
stations twice a year; let any European soldier that
wished appear before it ; and having passed some such
examination as is required at Addiscombe, substituting
a course of history and geography, and what by late
orders is required in Hindustani before officers can hold
Companies, for some of the Addiscombe requisites ; let
such men be held eligible for commissions in the En-
gineers and Artillery, and those passing in Hindustani
and in a more limited course of mathematics for the Ca-
valry and Infantry ; but before any man received a com-
mission, he should have served one year as a Sergeant
Major, Quarter-Master Serjeant or Colour Sergeant, or
as a Sub-Conductor, and produce a character for sobriety
and good conduct and general smartness as a soldier.
With such a stimulus what might not our European
soldiery become? The educated and unfortunate,
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42 MILITARY DEFENCE 0* OUR INDIAN EMPIRE.
instead of being our worst characters, would be inspired
with hope, while many would wipe away the stain of
early misconduct, and, by recovering their characters and
position, bring peace to their bereaved families. By the
infusion, too, of a different class into our covenanted ser-
vice, we should all be more put on our metal ; and in fact
not only would the whole tone and position of the Gora-
log be elevated, but their rise would in a certain degree
raise the European character throughout the country.
As Secretary-at-War, our present Governor-General*
did much for the British soldier ; he thoroughly under-
stands their wants, and by his acts he has proved that
he does not consider that they should be shut out
from hope. We beseech his good offices on behalf of
the European soldiers of India — the majority of them
exiles for life ; and when we consider the effect of cha-
racter everywhere, the moral influence of one honest, of
one good and zealous man, who would lightly discard
any means of raising the tone of our Europeans ? Too
lamentable is the effect of their present misconduct, of
their drunkenness, their violence, their brutality, for us
to deny that the present system does not answer, and
that it calls loudly for change. Every individual Eu-
ropean, be he officer or private soldier, we look on as in
his sphere a missionary for good or for evil. We have
hinted that one indifferent commanding officer may ruin
a whole corps. The experience of many will furnish an
example. From violence, injustice, meanness, or indif-
ference—from seeds of different sorts the equally baneful
fruit is produced, discipline is undermined, discontent
engendered, and misbehaviour and its train ensues.
On the other hand, what may not one Christian soldier
do ? However lowly his position, how much has he not
within his power? The man who, a Christian at heart,
* The late Lord Hardinge.
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THE CHBI8TIAN SOLDIER.
43
devotes himself to his duties, and, vexing neither him-
self nor those under him with harassing frivolities, per-
severingly acts up to what he believes his duty — not
with mere eye or lip service, but as evincing his love
to God by performing his duty to man — such a man will
not be the one to quail in the hour of danger; his
shoulder is ever at the wheel, whether it be in the dull
duties of cantonment, the trying times of sickness and
famine, or the exhilarating days of success ; all will find
him cheerful, all will find him at his post.
We fear there is still a very common under-estimate
of military character and military duty. The philo-
sophical moralist who calls the soldier a mere licensed
murderer ; the Epicurean who only wonders at the mad-
ness of men who consent to stand and be shot at, when
they could get their bread in some pleasanter way ; the
narrow-minded Christian, who thinks of soldiers and
their possible salvation in the same dubious tone as Cor-
poral Trim, when he asked "a negro has a soul, an
please your honour?" and the country gentleman who
pronounces on the blockhead or blackguard among his
sons, that " the fellow is fit for nothing but the church
or the army," all, all, are equally wide of the mark. A
soldier — it is a trite commonplace, we know, but, like
many trite commonplaces, often forgotten — is not neces-
sarily a man who delights in blood, any more than a
physician is one who delights in sickness. Both pro-
fessions will cease with human crime and misery. The
prophecies that hold out to us a prospect of the days,
when " nation shall not lift up sword against nation,
neither shall they learn war any more," tell us likewise
of that period, when " none shall say I am sick."
We may refresh our spirits by the contemplation of
these promises, and pray for the coming of that king-
dom ; but our own personal duty lies under a different
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44 MILITARY DEFENCE OF OUR INDIAN EMPIRE.
order of things. War is probably the sorest scourge
with which our race is visited ; but constituted as the
world is, a good army is essential to the preservation of
peace. Military discipline at large comes not within
the province of individual soldiers ; but if every man who
enlists took care that there was one good soldier in the
army, our commanders would have easy work.
No man attains to excellence in any design without
setting before him a lofty standard, and Christianity,
where it is more than a name, incites us always to take
the highest. It is no easy slipshod system of shuf-
fling about the world ; but " up and be doing," is the
Christian's motto. Cecil's opinion was that "a shoe-
black, if he were a Christian, would try to be the best
shoe-black in the whole town."
There is some grave defect in our religious instruction,
which almost every one feels, when he awakens to the
importance of the world to come. Somehow, the duties
of time and the duties of eternity, instead of being in-
separably blended, present themselves to the mind, as
Dr. Johnson expresses it, " as set upon the right hand
and upon the left, so that we cannot approach the one
without receding from the other and the consequence
is, that while some take one side, to the neglect of the
other, the majority pass quietly between the two, on the
broad road of self-pleasing. The great problem to be
solved is, how we may put the soul of high principle
and imperishable aim, into the body of our daily acts,
small as well as great, as the quaint but delightful old
poet George Herbert tells us —
" The man who looks on glass,
On it may stay his eye ;
Or if he pleaseth, through it pass,
And then the heavens espy."
Applying these general remarks to military duties ;
we desire to see every soldier set before himself a lofty
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THE HAPPY WARRIOR.
45
standard ; remembering that if high qualities and high
principles are requisite in the man who would lead and
influence his countrymen, they must be more so in the
European who would gain the affections of a race differ-
ing from him in colour, language, and religion. Mind-
ful of their own religious observances, the Hindoo and
Mahommedan soldier, far from despising their Christian
officer, will respect him the more, on seeing that he has
a religion ; and the rudest of them will appreciate the
man, who, first in the fight — first in the offices of peace
— is staunch to the duty he owes to his God.
The Apostle Paul, of whom Paley, no bad judge, says,
that " next to his piety he is remarkable for his ffood
sense" when he speaks figuratively of the Christian
warfare, gives some of the best maxims for the literal
warrior; he lays down, "holding fast a good con-
science" as indispensable to " warring a good warfare,"
and tells us that " a good soldier" must "endure hard-
ness." That religion unfits a man to be a soldier, is a
maxim that may be placed in the same category as that
marriage spoils one. Both assertions arise from mis-
apprehension of what a soldier, a Christian, and a
married man, ought to be. We have quoted an Apostle,
let us now refer to a Poet —
u Who is the happy warrior t who is he *
That every man in arms should wish to be ?
• • * Who, doomed to go in company with pain
And fear and bloodshed, miserable train ;
Turns his necessity to glorious gain ;
In face of these doth exercise a power
Which is our human nature's highest dower ;
Controls them and subdues, transmutes, bereaves
Of their bad influence and their good receives :
By objects which might force the soul to abate
Her feelings, rendered more compassionate ;
Is placable— because occasions rise
So often that demand such sacrifice ;
More skilful in self-knowledge, even more pure,
As tempted more ; more able to endure,
* Wordsworth's Happy Warrior.
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46 MILITARY DEFENCE OF OUR INDIAN EMPIRE.
As more exposed to suffering and distress;
Thence also more alive to tenderness.
— Tis he whose law is reason ; who depends
Upon that law as on the best of friends ;
whence in a state where men are tempted still
To evil for a guard against worse ill,
And what in quality or act is best
Both seldom on a right foundation rest,
He fixes good on good alone and owes
To virtue every triumph that he knows :
Who if he rise to station of command,
Rises oy open means ; and there will stand
On honourable terms or else retire ;
And in himself possess his own desire ;
Who comprehends his trust, and to the same
Keeps faithful with a singleness of aim ;
And therefore does not stoop, nor lie in wait
For wealth and honours, or for worldly state ;
Whom they must follow, on whose head must fall
Like showers of manna if they come at all :
Whose powers shed round him in the common strife,
Or mild concerns of ordinary life,
A constant influence, a peculiar grace ;
But who, if he be called upon to face
Some awful moment to which Heaven has joined
Great issues good or bad for human kind,
Is happy as a Lover, and attired
With sudden brightness, like a man inspired ;
And, through the heat of conflict, keeps the law
In calmness made, and sees what he foresaw;
Or if an unexpected call succeed,
Come when it will, is equal to the need.
He who, though thus endued as with a sense
And faculty for storm and turbulence,
Is yet a soul whose master bias leans
To home-felt pleasures and to gentle scenes ;
Sweet images I wh ich, wheresoever he be,
Are at his heart; and such fidelity
It is his darling passion to approve,
More brave for this, that he hath much to love.
# * # ♦ *
Whom neither shape of danger can dismay,
Nor thought of tender happmess betray —
# # # # #
This is the happy warrior, this is he
Whom every man in arms should wish to be.1'
We would willingly quote the whole of this noble
Poem, but as space forbids, we can but recommend
every soldier to read it in the volume from which it is
taken. We wish the same hand that drew the warrior
had given us a picture of a fitting wife for him.
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THE DOMESTIC AFFECTIONS.
47
That neither piety nor domestic affection* spoil
a soldier, we see in both classes and individuals. The
Puritans and Covenanters fought and suffered as
bravely as if they had owned their be-all and their
end-all here, and the history of America testifies! to
the fact that the Winthrops, the Williamses, and
others, while most loveable in all the relations of
life, were as brave, and daring as were the ruffian
bands of Cortes and Pizarro. And where does His-
tory show such bright examples of genuine heroism,
as in the persons of the royalists of La Vendee — in
Lescure ; in Henri Larochjacqueline ; in their brave
and devoted associates, who, with hearts full of love
towards God and the tenderest domestic affections,
rushed from the village church, or started from their
knees on the greensward, to stem with their rude
phalanxes the disciplined battalions of the National
Guard, and met death on the field with the serenity
and constancy of Christian martyrs ?
Washington's life is better than a hundred homilies ;
it may offer an useful lesson to the martinet. How
clearly it shows what integrity, good sense, and one-
ness of purpose may effect. The simple land-surveyor
by his energy and honesty keeping together the ragged
and unwilling militia of the States, training and accus-
toming them to victory, and, having performed his
work, retiring to private life, is an example that even
Britons may set before themselves; but we want not
good and great soldiers of our own land, — who more
* Was Hector or was Paris the Poetry to History, what character of
better soldier? There is no finer il- antiquity, drawn in the breathing
lustration — though unintentional — pictures of Plutarch, is more admir-
of the difference between the mili- able than that of Agesilaus ?
tary husband and the military ba- t See Bancroft's History of the
chelor than in the pages of the Iliad. United States, passim : a most in-
The hero of the Odyssey, too, is teresting and instructive work, pub-
drawn as one eminent in all the lished at Boston,
domestic relations. Turning from
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48 MILITARY DEFENCE OP OUR INDIAN EMPIRE.
so than Hampden, Colonel Gurdiner, Admiral Colling-
wood, and a host of others ?
But a soldier, though always ready for the fight,
is not always fighting ; and the beauty of right prin-
ciples, and exalted aims, is, that they need not the
stimulus of a concussion to arouse them, but are
operative in the daily and hourly details of life. It
is here that a Christian soldier shines, as much as
in the conflict ; and it would be difficult to over-
estimate the influence and utility of a good (using the
word in its widest sense) commanding officer in the
barracks and the field. Devoting himself to his pro-
fession, he will have an interest in every man under
him; his example will check the dissolute, encourage
the good, and confirm the wavering. A king among
his subjects, a father among his family, a master
among his pupils, a physician among* his patients —
the officer's position partakes of the power, the re-
sponsibility and the interest of all these positions.
A living homily himself, he aids by his example and
influence the labours of those appointed to teach and
preach; having cultivated his own mind, he tries to
bestow the blessings of intellect on those under him ;
having studied the feelings and circumstances of his
men, he can estimate their temptations, and determine
the best means of helping them out of vice, and into
virtuous habits. Above all, he works not for self-
gratification, or outward applause. He has before
him a rule of right, a hope of reward, independent of
present success; and therefore is he able to persevere
against obloquy and failure, to go straight forward,
" doing with all his might whatever his hand findeth
to do."
But we must return to our military details. We
had purposed to have offered some remarks on the
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WANT OF AN INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT. 49
different branches of the Staff: but our limits are
already nearly exhausted. What we have said re-
garding the Engineers applies even more strongly
to the Quarter-Master-General's Department; at best
but the shadow of an Intelligence Corps, consisting
as it does of eight or ten officers, and they not selected
for peculiar qualifications, as linguists and surveyors,
and not having any permanent establishment of non-
commissioned officers or privates under them. In fact,
it may be said that with more need for an Intelligence
Department than any army in the world, we are worse
supplied than any other. A handful of officers, how-
ever well qualified, does not form an establishment or
department ; and it is a cruelty to impose on officers
important duties, involving often the safety of armies,
without placing efficient means at their disposal.
When the Army of the Indus assembled at Feroze-
poor in 1838, we are credibly informed that Major
Garden, the deputy quarter-master-general, about to
proceed in charge of his department with the expedi-
tion, had not a single European at his disposal ; and
not a dozen clashies. Three officers were then ap-
pointed, without any experience as intelligencers, and
altogether it may be said that the army marched, as
if it did not require information ; as if the commander
had perfect maps of the country, and had some special
means, independent of the legitimate channel, for ac-
quainting himself with what was going on in his
front and on his flanks. The exertions of Major
Garden are well known ; and if he had been shot, as
he possibly might have been any morning, the Bengal
Division at least would have been without a Quarter-
Master-General's Department. Colonel Wild, it is
well known, was sent in December, 1841, on perhaps
as difficult and hazardous an undertaking as has, for
E
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50 MILITARY DEFENCE OP OUR INDIAN EMPIRE.
many years, been entrusted to an officer of his rank ;
with four Begiments of Native Infantry and one hun-
dred Irregular Cavalry; a Company of Golundauze
without guns, and one of Sappers (the two latter
being under officers of less than two years' standing),
and without staff of any kind — Quarter-Master-Grene-
ral's, or Commissariat Department. A regimental
officer was for the occasion appointed brigade-major;
and with him began and ended the staff of Brigadier
Wild, who, had he had half a dozen guns and as many
good staff officers, might have reached Jellalabad early
in January, 1842; and have thereby, perhaps, averted
the final catastrophe at Cabul. To this it may be
added, that two days before the battle of Maharajpore,
extra establishments were ordered for officers in the
field.
These are recent instances of defects in our military
organization, and misapplication of the means at our dis-
posal ; but the experience of our military readers will
tell them, each in his own line and from his own re-
miniscences, how often an apparently trifling deficiency
has vitiated the exertions of a detachment. Only last
December, or January (1843-44), all Oude was alarmed
by the report of a Nepalese invasion, and then indi-
viduals were called upon to lend horses to move the
guns at Lucknow; and scarce twelve months before,
when a small party was beaten at Khytul in the Seikh
States within forty or fifty miles of Kurnaul, — one of
our Army Division stations — it was three days before
a small force could move ; it was then found that there
was no small-arm ammunition in store, and ascertained
that a European corps could not move under a fortnight
from Sobathoo.
At that time, when both Kurnaul and Ambala were
denuded of troops ; and every road was covered with
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PROPHETIC UTTERANCES.
51
crowds of armed pilgrims returning from the Hurd-
war Fair; the two treasuries containing, we have
heard, between them, not less than thirty lakhs of
rupees, were under parties of fifty sepoys in exposed
houses or rather sheds close to the Native towns;
and, extraordinary as it may appear, both within fifty
or a hundred yards of small forts in which they would
have been comparatively safe; but into which, during
the long years that treasuries have been at those
stations, it seems never to have occurred to the autho-
rities to place them.
The treasury at Delhi is in the city, as is the maga-
zine ; the latter is in a sort of fort, — a very defence-
less building, outside of which in the street, we under-
stand, a party of sepoys was placed, when the news
of the Cabul disasters arrived. We might take a
circuit of the country and show how many mistakes
we have committed, and how much impunity has em-
boldened us in error; and how unmindful we have
been that what occurred in the city of Cabul, may,
some day, occur at Delhi, Benares, or Bareilly.
It needs not our telling that improvements are
required in the Commissariat. We observe that Bamjee
Mull, who was a man of straw in the department
at Bhurtpoor in 1824, died at Delhi, the other day,
worth twenty-four lakhs of rupees ; and not long since
one of the Calcutta papers gave a biographical sketch
of Mr. Reid, who in 1838 was a hungry omedwar,
and in 1843 died worth about two lakhs of rupees,
having been in the receipt of a salary amounting to
perhaps one hundred and fifty or two hundred rupees
per month. We recollect being amused by the naive
expression that his gains were all honestly made.
It is just possible that Bamjee Mull's were so : but
we look on it as something highly improper that Mr.
e 2
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62 MILITARY DEFENCE OF OUR INDIAN EMPIRE.
Keid, a salaried public servant, should have made
anything beyond his pay. He took contracts, but
he should not have been allowed to do so; and in
taking them he was only entering into partnership
with Native Gomashtahs or Principals, such as Bamjee
Mull, Doonee Chund, &c, who, by combining, raised
their charges on Government ; and it is clear that, in
so participating or even in being a contractor on his
own bottom, he became useless as an assistant to the
Commissariat officer in checking fraud on the part
of other subordinates.
We have repeatedly seen the charge of a batch of
camels on ten rupees per month preferred by an in-
dolent Mootusuddee to a quiet one of thirty or forty
rupees; the inference is, that they have a percentage
on the grain of the animals ; and so it is throughout
the establishment; and low rates of pay only are au-
thorized. Commissariat officers are actually in the
power of their subordinates ; they have not the means
of paying respectable men, and being generally called
on suddenly, they are, in self-defence, thrown on their
monied dependants or hangers-on.
The whole establishment requires reform. The few
European officers are now no check on the subordi-
nates; they are, indeed, often screens; and it some-
times occurs that a gentleman-like, inexperienced officer,
considers it a personal offence to have it proved that his
gomashta watered the grog, or served out short grain.
Commissariat officers should be carefully chosen, and
should then be armed with sufficient authority to do
their duty efficiently. They have now just power
enough to do harm — none to do good, unless they are
bold enough to risk their own prospects, and even cha-
racter. A commissariat officer may easily starve an
army and yet bear no blame ; but if he saves a detach*
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RECAPITULATION.
53
ment from starvation and loses his vouchers, or, under
extreme difficulties, if he has failed to procure them, he
is a ruined man. Oh, how much more in this, as in
every other, department, are forms looked to rather
than realities; and how much does Government seem
to prefer being robbed according to the usual forms,
than to act on the plain principles of common sense
that would actuate the same Government taken indi-
vidually instead of in its collective character !
But we must draw our remarks to a conclusion, first
briefly recapitulating our recommendations : —
1st. To increase the Engineer regiment, and to make
it the nucleus of a General Staff Corps, available in
peace for all Civil Engineering operations — giving all
ranks opportunities to qualify themselves for field
duties, and by having acquired intimate acquaintance
with the language, habits, and manners of the people,
and the features of the country ; by giving them habits
of enquiry, and practice in such duties as they may be
called on to perform during war.
An immediate increase to the Engineers might be
made by volunteers from the Line and Artillery — all
ranks of such volunteers passing an examination in
the requisite scientific points. They might then, ac-
cording to standing, be drafted into the present Engi-
neer corps, or form a new regiment of two, three, or
more battalions.
We advocate the more efficient officering of the Foot
Artillery, its elevation to an equality with the Horse
Artillery — or at least that the latter should not be
unduly cared for to the neglect of the former.
The Eegular Cavalry should have some smart Euro-
pean dragoons attached to each troop; the Irregulars
should be paid in all cases the full twenty rupees per
month ; bargeers not being admitted, unless in the case
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54 MILITARY DEFENCE OP OUR INDIAN EMPIRE.
of Native officers, who might each be allowed to have
their own sons or nephews (failing sons) as bargeers ; but
their number should be limited to four to each officer.
We further desire that some regiments of Irregular
Cavalry, and some of Native Infantry, should be com-
manded and officered by Natives, and placed in brigade
under Europeans.
We would fain see the army, year after year, more
carefully weeded of incapables. Age should no longer
be the qualification for promotion ; jemadars and sooba-
dars should either be pensioned at their homes, or be
real and effective lieutenants and captains. We have
shown how the deserving old soldier, unqualified to he
an officer, may be provided for by being allowed to
return to his home as a havildar, on completion of his
service. Our army being, in relation to the country it
has to defend, a small one, it requires that every man
should be effective; its subalterns and Native officers
should not be hoary-headed invalids, but young and
active men, and its field officers and commanders should
not be worn-out valetudinarians. We need hardly say
that, gallantly as the army has ever behaved, and much
as it has done, more might often have been effected, at
less expense of life and treasure, if a few years could
have been taken from the ages of all ranks. We have
all experience before us in proof that great military
achievements have been generally performed by young
armies, under young leaders ; Hannibal and Napoleon
had conquered Italy before they could have been brevet
captains in the Company's army ; at as early an age the
victories of Caesar were gained, and at an equally early
age Alexander had conquered the world. Forty years
ago the victories of the Great Duke were gained in
India, and happily he is still (1844) at the head of the
British army ; and we doubt if the ages of all the gene-
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PE0P08ED IMPROVEMENTS.
55
ralfl commanding divisions under Wellington, or against
him, in the Peninsula, would amount, in the aggregate,
to the ages of an equal number of captains of the Ben-
gal army ; and this, be it remembered, in a climate
where Europeans are old men at forty ; and where, as
there are but few of us, those few should be of the
right sort, and full of energy, mental and physical.
The location in strength of Europeans in the Hills —
having good roads and carriage by land and water for
at least a portion of them always ready— is another of
our schemes ; as it is also our hearty desire to see the
commissioned ranks of the army opened to them, and
hope no longer shut out from the inmates of the bar-
racks. The better education of European children, and
colonization on a small scale, under restrictions, is a
part of this scheme.
The attachment of Native Companies to European
Regiments as posts of honour, or, at any rate, the per-
manent brigading of different classes of troops, seems to
us highly desirable, as likely to enhance the good feel-
ing of all, improve the tone of the sepoys and soften
the asperities of Europeans.
The greater mixture of classes in our Native army
we also hold to be desirable, so as never to give a
designing Brahmin the opportunity of misleading a
whole regiment. Instant and full enquiry into every
case of discontent or disaffection we hold to be of vital
moment — no glossing over to save individual feelings
or what is wrongly considered to save the credit of the
service. No army in the world has been at all times
without taint ; but where insubordination or dictation
once was permitted — or donatives resorted to, where
summary punishment should have been inflicted — that
army soon mastered their Government.
We would make the Staff of the army, in all its
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MILITARY DEFENCE OF OUR INDIAN EMPIRE.
branches, efficient ; keep it so and practise it, while
opportunity offers during peace, so that it may be
always ready for war. We would have a baggage
train ; and precise orders that shottld be obeyed as to the
amount of carriage and servants and camp-followers,
which under all circumstances on service should accom-
pany our armies. We should not take mobs of hangers-
on, or the luxuries of the capital, into the field ; and it
should be understood to be as much the duty of all
ranks to obey orders in such matters, as in doing their
duty when actually under fire.
We can see many advantages in having the three
armies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, united into one
Indian army, having one Commander-in-Chief and one
General Staff'; having rates of pay, equipments, and all
else as far as possible, assimilated ; and having four
Commanders of the Forces with subordinate Major-
Generals, all having sufficient authority to order and
finally dispose of many matters of detail that now go to
Army Head-quarters, and some that cannot now be
there settled, with the power of bringing up the bulk
of the Madras Cavalry and a portion of their other
branches to our North- West Provinces ; while the
Bengal Presidency might send down a few Native
Infantry Eegiments to the central stations — all being
on the same footing as to pay and batta, &c. Much
good would thus accrue to the service. Emulation
between the natives of different provinces would be
excited and the danger of combination be greatly les-
sened.
We have necessarily but glanced at the various
branches of our noble army. We have not forgotten
our own deep personal interest in its honour and wel-
fare ; but as we hold that our presence in India depends,
in no small measure, on the contentedness and happi-
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HOW TO STIMULATE THE NATIVE ARMY.
57
ness of our native soldiery, we have prominently put
forth what has long been our opinion, that something
more is wanted for the sepoy than that at the age of
sixty he should, by possibility, reach the rank of Suba-
dar Major, and with it the first class of Sirdar Bahadoor.
Doubtless such hope and expectation is sufficient to
influence nine out of ten of our sepoys ; but it is for
the tenth we want a stimulus ; for the man of better
education, the superior character, the bold and daring
spirit that disdains to live for ever in subordinate place ;
and it is for such we firmly believe that is absolutely
required some new grade where, without our risking the
supremacy of European authority, he may obtain com-
mand and exert in our behalf those energies and talents
which under the present system are too liable to be
brought into the scale against us. Commands of Irre-
gular Corps, Jagheers, titles, civil honours, pensions to
the second and third generation, are among the
measures we would advocate for such characters ; while
we would give the invalid pensions, at earlier periods
and under increased advantages, to men who had dis-
tinguished themselves in the field or by any peculiar
merit in quarters. For all such and such only there
should be medals and orders, and not for whole regi-
ments who may have happened to be in the field on
a particular day.
Much reform is required in the Native Army, but
still more in the European branch of the service. The
system of terror has long enough been tried and been
found wanting; the system that filled the American
navy with British sailors and drove the flower of the
French army into the ranks of their enemies, and that
daily drives many Europeans in India, who under dif-
ferent circumstances might turn out good soldiers, to
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58 MILITARY DEFENCE OF OUR INDIAN EMPIRE.
suicide, and to the high road, should at once be ex-
ploded. Under a better regime our Europeans, instead
of enacting the part of highwaymen, might be rendered
as available to purposes of peace as of war, and be as
well conducted during one period as another. With
commissions open to the ablest, and subordinate staff
employment after certain periods to all the well-
behaved ; with aids to study and to rational amusement
in barracks, instead of eternal drills, whose beginning
and end is to torment and disgust men with a noble
service, how much might be done with the materials at
our command, and how much would our Government
be strengthened and the value of every individual
European's services be enhanced !
To raise men from the ranks, we feel, will be con-
sidered a terrible innovation, but we have not ourselves
as a body of officers been so long emancipated from de-
grading restrictions that we should not have some fellow-
feeling for our brother soldiers. Argument is not re-
quired in the matter ; common sense dictates tfye mea-
sure. All history teaches its practicability ; the Eoman
Legionary, nay the barbarian auxiliary, lived to lead the
armies of the empire ; almost every one of Napoleons
marshals rose from the ranks, and at this day and with
all the preventions of aristocracy and moneyed interests,
scarcely less than a fifth of Her Majesty's army, is
officered by men who rose from the ranks. Indeed,
since this paper was commenced we have observed not
less than six staff-serjeants promoted to Ensigncies,
Adjutancies, or Quarter-Masterships in a single gazette;
but it is reserved to the army of a Company of merchants
that her sentinels should be blackballed — should be
driven with the lash instead of led by consideration and
common sense.
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JU8TICE TO THE EUROPEAN SOLDIER.
59
Wonderful indeed is it, that this subject should have
been left for our advocacy, and that, situated as we are
in the midst of a mighty military population, we should
fail to see the necessity — the common prudence — of
turning our handful of Europeans to the best advantage;
and that while we foster the Native, we degrade our
own countrymen. Drive away hope from the former,
make transportation, or death, a boon — a haven to the
heart-broken or desperate sepoy ; and then see whether
the lash will be required in the Native army as well as
the European. We would not abate a jot of discipline
with the one or the other ; each should be taught his
duty thoroughly, which at present he seldom is : he
should be a good marksman or swordsman according to
the branch of his service, and until he is master of his
weapon, he should be kept at drill ; but there should be
no after drill and parades to keep men out of mischief —
to disgust them with their duty. They should have as
much of exercise and instruction as should keep them
practised and able soldiers, and their lives should be
rendered happy, that they might remain willing and
contented ones. The lash should be reserved for mutiny,
desertion, and plunder — for Natives, as well as Europeans
— and while the worthless and incorrigible are thus
dealt with according to their deserts, the indifferent
soldier should be encouraged to become a good one ; and
the best be rewarded according to their abilities by pro-
motion to the non-commissioned Staff, and the commis-
sioned ranks ; and by comfortable provision in old age
in climates suited to their constitution.
We cannot expect to hold India for ever. Let us so
conduct ourselves in our civil and military relations as
when the connection ceases, it may do so, not with con-
vulsions, but with mutual esteem and affection; and
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60 MILITARY DEFENCE OF OUR INDIAN EMPIRE.
that England may then have in India a noble ally, en-
lightened and brought into the scale of nations under
her guidance and fostering care.
Note. — In an article on the mili-
tary defence of the country, it is
obvious that some detailed notice
should have been taken of so im-
portant a point, as the means of
rapid locomotion. We had not over-
looked it ; but the subject is too in-
teresting and too important to be
lightly touched upon in a rough de-
sultory article, like the foregoing,
which aspires not to teach but to
suggest. A small force, which can
be moved, at an hour's notice, from
one part of the country to another,
with a celerity that will disconcert
the measures of an enemy — be the
hostile demonstration from without
or within — is of more real service in
the defence of the country, than an
overgrown, cumbrous army, which
cannot be put in motion without
much difficulty and much delay. To
attain this great end, it is not only
necessary that our troops should be
prepared to move, but that they
should have good roads along which
to move. Now roads and bridges —
we are uttering but a trite common-
place—are excellent things, not only
as they strengthen our position, but
as they conduce to the prosperity of
the country — they are blessings to
all, and no mean part of the real
wealth of a nation. In a military
point of view they are of incalcu-
lable value ; and when the country
is not only intersected with good
roads, but boasts of at least one
railroad alone the main line, from
the sea to the nor-western boun-
dary ; when our rivers are spanned
at the most important points with
bridges, and ever alive with magic
steamships, then will it be found
that our army of a quarter of a mil-
lion is equal, in real strength, to an
army of a million of men ; and that,
with this facility of transporting
troops and stores to any given point
—of concentrating a large army,
with all the muniments of war, in a
few hours — we have acquired an
amount of military strength, the
mere prestige of which will be suf-
ficient to overawe our enemies, and
to secure an enduring and honour-
able peace.
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THE KINGDOM OF OUDE.
[written in 1845.]
No portion of India has been more discussed in
England than Oude. Affghanistan and the Punjab
are modern questions, but, for half a century, country
gentlemen have been possessed of a vague idea of a
province of India, nominally independent in its home
relations, but periodically used as a wet nurse to
relieve the difficulties of the East India Company's
finances.* The several attacks that were made on
Warren Hastings, Lord Wellesley, and the Marquis
of Hastings, have all served to keep up the interest
of the Oude question. Scarcely had the case of the
plundered Begums and flagellated eunuchs been decided,
and the folios of evidence elicited by Warren Hastings'
trial been laid before the public, than proceedings
scarcely less voluminous appeared regarding the ter-
ritorial cessions extorted by Lord Wellesley. These
were followed in turn by attacks on Lord Hastings'
loan measures, with the several vindications of his
Lordship's policy. We are among those unfashionable
people who consider that politics and morals can never
be safely separated ; that an honest private individual
* "The King of Oude's Sauce" "Man for Galway" tells us that
has found its way into London " The King of Oude is mighty
shops, and even Charles O'Malley's proud."
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62
THE KINGDOM OF OUDE.
must necessarily be an honest official, and vice versa;
but we confess that we have been staggered by a study
of Oude transactions. Most assuredly Warren Hastings,
Lord Teignmouth, Lord Wellesley, Lord Hastings, and
Lord Auckland would never have acted in private
life, as they did in the capacity of Governors towards
prostrate Oude. Lord W. Bentinck, and Lords Corn-
waJlis, Minto, and Ellenborough, appear to have been
the only Governors-General who did not take advantage
of the weakness of that country to dismember it or
increase its burdens.
The earliest offender against Oude was Warren
Hastings. Mr. Gleig undertakes to give a true and
correct picture of Mr. Hastings' private character and
public administration. With the former we have here
nothing to do, beyond remarking that the very lax
morality of the clerical biographer, when treating of
domestic life, vitiates his testimony, and renders his
judgment on questions of public justice valueless.
Mr. Gleig's theory, moreover, that the wrong which
is done for the public good is a justifiable wrong,
tends to upset the whole doctrine of Eight. When
he vindicates his hero by asserting that, " if Mr. Hast-
ings was corrupt, it was to advance the interests of
England that he practised his corruption," and proceeds
in a similar strain, of what he seems to consider ex-
culpation, he asperses the illustrious person he would
defend, far more than do Mr. Hastings' worst enemies.
We have a higher opinion of Hastings than his bio- •
grapher appears to have had, but we have a very
different opinion from that of Mr. Gleig regarding
the duty of a Governor-General. Thorough-going
vindication, such as Mr. Gleig's, does far more injury
to the memory of a sagacious and far-seeing, though
unscrupulous, ruler like Warren Hastings, than all
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EVILS OF INTERFERENCE.
63
the vehement denunciations of Mill the historian.
Oude affords but a discreditable chapter in our Indian
annals, and furnishes a fearful warning of the lengths
to which a statesman may be carried, when once he
substitutes expediency and his own view of public
advantage, for the simple rule of right and wrong.
The facts furnished by every writer on Oude affairs,
all testify to the same point, that British interference
with that Province has been as prejudicial to its Court
and people as it has been disgraceful to the British
name. To quote the words of Colonel Sutherland,
an able and temperate writer, "there is no State in
India with whose Government we have interfered so
systematically and so uselessly as with that of Oude."
He most justly adds, " this interference has been more
in favour of men than of measures ; a remark, by the
way, applicable to almost every case in which our
Government has intermeddled with Native States." It
is through such measures that Moorshedabad, Tanjore,
and Arcot, have perished beneath our hands. Nagpoor
we were obliged to nurse for a time; Hyderabad is
again " in articulo mortis," and Mysore is under strict
medical treatment. At Sattara, we are obliged to put
down the puppet we had put up. Kholapore, another
principality of our fostering, has, for nearly a twelve-
month, given employment for more troops than its
revenues will pay in twenty years. Already, and
almost before the ink of the subsidiary treaty is dry,
the regular troops at Gwalior have been employed
in police duties. The Minister of our selection has
had his life ^threatened ; and we are, again, in the pre-
dicament of being pledged to support a Government
whose misdeeds we cannot effectually control. In
short, wherever we turn, we see written in distinct
characters the blighting influences of our interference.
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THE KINGDOM OP OUDE.
The only unmixed advantage of despotism is its
energy, arising from its indivisibility. An able and
virtuous despot may dispense happiness ; the same
ruler, saddled not only with a Minister but with a
Eesident, can only diffiise wretchedness. He has no
possible motive for exertion. He gets no credit for his
good acts, and he is not master in his own country,
Much casuistry was expended, some years ago, on the
defence of the Dewani and Double-government system,
which was, at best, but one of the poor cloaks of expe-
diency, and was gradually thrown off as our strength
increased. The subsidiary and protected system is,
if possible, worse. If ever there was a device for
insuring mal-government, it is that of a native ruler
and minister, both relying on foreign bayonets, and
directed by a British Eesident. Even if all three were
able, virtuous, and considerate, still the wheels of
Government could hardly move smoothly. If it be
difficult to select one man, European or Native, with
all the requisites for a just administrator, where are
three, who can, and will, work together, to be found?
Each of the three may work incalculable mischief,
but no one of them can do good if thwarted by the
others. It is almost impossible for the Minister to be
faithful and submissive to his Prince, and at the same
time honest to the British Government ; and how
rarely is the European officer to be found who, with
ability to guide a Native State, has the discretion
and good feeling to keep himself in the background —
to prompt and sustain every salutary measure within
his reach, while he encourages the Ruler and Minister
by giving them all the credit — to be the adviser and
not the master — to forget self in the good of the
People and of the protected Sovereign ! Human nature
affords few such men, and therefore, were there no
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ANCIENT HISTORY OP OUDE.
6S
other reason, we should be chary of our interference.
From Tanjore to Gwalior the system has been tried,
and everywhere has equally failed. In Oude each new
reign has required a new treaty to patch up the system.
Having little legitimate scope for ambition, the sove-
reigns have alternately employed themselves in amass-
ing and in squandering treasure. The hoards of Saadut
Ally were divided among fiddlers and buffoons : the
penurious savings of the late King have been little
more creditably employed by his successor; and the
Government of Oude, like that of the Deccan, is now
as bankrupt in purse as in character. And yet there
are men who advocate interference with Native States !
Satisfied as we are of the evils of the system, and de-
sirous, by a record of the past, to offer a beacon for the
future, we shall present a brief sketch of Oude affairs,
and will then venture to suggest the policy which,
under existing circumstances, appears fittest for our
Government to adopt.
We will first briefly set before our readers a sketch of
the kingdom of Oude, as it was and as it is.
Ajoodhya, or Oude, is celebrated in Hindoo legends
as the kingdom of Dasaratha, the father of Rama, who
extended his conquests to Ceylon, and subdued that
island. The Mahommedan invaders at an early period
conquered Oude, and it remained, with fewer changes
than almost any other province of India, an integral
portion of the Mogul empire until the dissolution of
that unwieldy Government. Under the Delhi Kings,
the Soubadaree, including what are now the British
districts of Goruckpore and Azimghur, comprehended
an area about one-fourth greater than the limits of the
present kingdom. Abulfazel states, that " the length,
from Sircar Goruckpore to Kinoje, includes 135 coss;
and the breadth, from the northern mountains of Sed-
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THE KINGDOM OP OUDE.
dehpore to the Soobah of Allahabad, comprises 115
coss."
During the decadence of the Delhi empire, the
Viziers Saadut Khan and Sufder Jung, each employed
his power, as minister of the pageant King, to increase
the bounds of the Oude viceroyalty. Both cast greedy
glances on Rohilcund, and Sufder Jung made many at-
tempts at its acquisition ; but it was not till the time
of Shooja-oo-dowlah that it became subject to Oude.
The dominions of that prince, when he first came in
contact with the British Government, extended over
the greatest portion of Soubah Allahabad, including
the districts of Benares and Ghazepoor. While our
troops defended Allahabad and Oude proper, he took
advantage of the absence of the Mahrattahs in the
Deccan to seize and occupy the middle Doab, or dis-
tricts of Futtehpoor, Cawnpoor, Etawah, and Mynpoo-
ree, close up to Agra. During the ensuing year,
Colonel Champion's brigade, by the decisive battle of
Kutterah, near Bareilly, placed the province of4 the
Rohilcund at his feet, and enabled him to seize Fur-
ruckabad as a fief. Thus Shoojah-oo-dowlah not only
owed his existence as a sovereign to the clemency, or
perhaps to the fears, of his conquerors after the battle
of Buxar, but his subsequent accessions of territory
were the fruits of British prowess. He left his suc-
cessor a territory paying annually not less than three
millions of money, and capable of yielding double that
sum. On the conquest of Rohilcund, in 1774, he at
first rented that province at two millions ; but it yearly
deteriorated, so that not a quarter of that amount was
obtained from it when ceded to the British in 1801.
The cessions then made were estimated at 1,35,23,474
rupees, or, in round numbers, at one and a third million
of money, being above half the Oude possessions ; but,
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CHARACTER OP THE COUNTRY.
67
by improvement and good management, the Ceded Dis-
tricts can scarcely yield, at the present time, less than
two and a half millions. The area of the Oade re-
served dominions is estimated to contain 23,923 square
miles. They are bounded on the North and N. E. by
the Nepal mountains ; South and S. W. by the Eiver
Ganges ; East and S. E. by the British districts of
Goruckpore, Azimghur, Juanpoor, and Allahabad ; and
West by Rohilcund. The kingdom is very compact,
averaging about two hundred miles in length by one
hundred and twenty in breadth. Lucknow, the capital,
in N. latitude 26° 51', and longitude 80° 50', is admi-
rably situated on the navigable river Goomtee, nearly
in the centre of the kingdom. The Oude dominions
form an almost unbroken plain. The general flow of
the rivers is towards the south-east. The Ganges, the
Gogra, the Sai, and the Goomtee, are all navigable
throughout their respective courses within the Oude
territory ; but owing to the long unsettled state of the
country, and the impositions practised on traders, the
last three are little used ; and, even on the Ganges, few
boatmen like to frequent the Oude bank, for fear of
being plundered in one shape or another. The popu-
lation is estimated at three millions, four-fifths of
whom, perhaps, are Hindoos, and they furnish the
best-disciplined infantry in India. Three-fourths of
the Bengal Native Infantry come from Otide, and re-
cruiting parties from Bombay are sometimes seen to the
east of the Ganges.
A few remarks on the past and present capital of
Oude, the only part of their dominions which Indian
rulers much regard, will not be out of place here.
The ancient city of Ajoodhya, which either receives
its name from the province, or gives its own name to it,
must, even from present appearances, have been a place
f 2
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68
THE KINGDOM OF OUDE.
of prodigious extent, though we do not pledge ourselves
to the precise accuracy of the dimensions given by Abul-
fazel, who states its length at 1 48 coss, and its breadth
at 36 coss. Ajoodhya is a place of Hindoo pilgrimage,
and is situated on the south side of the river Gogra, in
N. latitude 26° 48', and E. longitude 82° 4'. Its ruins
still extend along the banks of the stream, till they
meet the modern, but already decayed, city of Fyzabad.
This last town, Shoojah-oo-dowlah made his capital,
and adorned with some fine buildings; but it was
abandoned by his successor, Asoph-oo-doulah, and has
consequently fallen into decay, and bears little trace
of any former magnificence. Lucknow, the present
capital, consists of an old and a new city, adjoining
each other; the former, like other native towns, is
filthy, ill-drained, and ill-ventilated. The modern city,
situated along the south bank of the river Goomtee, is
strikingly different, consisting of broad and airy streets,
and containing the Eoyal Palaces and gardens, the
principal Mussulman religious buildings, the British
Eesidency, and the houses of the various English
officers connected with the Court. This part of Luck-
now is both curious and splendid, and altogether un-
like the other great towns of India, whether Hindoo
or Mahommedan. There is a strange dash of European
architecture among its oriental buildings. Travellers
have compared the place to Moscow and to Constanti-
nople, and we can easily fancy the resemblance. Gilded
domes, surmounted by the crescent ; tall, slender pil-
lars ; lofty colonnades ; houses that look as if they had
been transplanted from Regent Street; iron railings
and balustrades; cages, some containing wild beasts,
others filled with "strange, bright birds;" gardens,
fountains, and cypress trees; elephants, camels, and
horses ; gilt litters and English barouches ; all these
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LUCKNOW.
09
form a dazzling picture. We once observed at Luck-
now a royal carriage drawn by eight elephants, and
another by twelve horses. Yet, brilliant and pic-
turesque as Lucknow is, still there is a puerility and
want of stability about it, characteristic enough of its
monarchs. The Shah Nujeef, or royal Imam-bara, forms
a striking feature in the group of buildings, half Frank,
half Asiatic, that meets the eye, after passing through
the Room-i-durwaza,* a gateway, said to be built on
the model of one at Constantinople. The Imam-bara
is a lofty and well-proportioned building. Hamilton
gives the dimensions of the centre room as 167 feet
long, by 52 wide ; but its contents resemble those of a
huge auction room or toy-shop, where the only object
is to stow away as much incongruous splendour as pos-
sible. Mirrors, chandeliers, gigantic candlesticks, ban-
ners, manuscripts, brocades, weapons of all sorts, models
of buildings, gaudy pictures, and a thousand other
things, all bespeak a ruler who possesses wealth, with-
out knowing how to employ it. That this is no mere
vague assertion our readers will believe, from the fact
that Asoph-oo-doulah expended £150,000 sterling on
double-barrelled guns, a million of money on mirrors
and chandeliers, and 160,000 gold mohurs, or £320,000,
on a single taziah.f
The Fureed Buksh palace is a place of some interest.
In 1837 it was the scene of the only insurrection which
has occurred during our connection with Oude. The
event, though recent, is comparatively forgotten, for
the tumult was promptly crushed. With less energetic
measures there might have been a rehearsal of the
Cabul tragedy. On the night of the 7th July, 1837,
when Nusseer-oo-deen expired, the Badshahi Begum
* Gate of Room or Constants t Model of tho Tomb of the Mar-
nople. tyr Hoosseiq.
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THE KINGDOM OF OUDE.
forcibly placed on the throne the boy Moona Jan.
During the twelve hours' tumult that ensued, the Resi-
dent, his suite, and the rightful heir to the throne,
were all in the hands of an infuriated mob. Armed
soldiers with lighted torches and lighted matchlocks
in their hands, held possession of the palace, stalked
throughout its premises, and spared no threats against
the British authorities, if they did not assent to the
installation of their creature, Moona Jan. The nearest
succour had to come five miles from the cantonment.
Five companies of sepoys, with four guns, however,
soon arrived. The Resident managed to join his friends.
He then gave the insurgents one quarter of an hour's
grace. When that had expired, the guns opened, — a
few rounds of grape were thrown into the disorderly
mass, who thronged the palace and its enclosures.
Morning dawned on an altered scene ; the rioters had
succumbed or dispersed ; the dead were removed ; the
palace was cleared out ; and, by ten o'clock in the fore-
noon, the aged, infirm, and trembling heir to the crown
was seated on the throne that, at midnight, had been
occupied by the usurper. The Resident placed the
crown on the new king's head, and the event was
announced to the people of Lucknow by the very guns
which a few hours before had carried death and con-
sternation among the Oude soldiery.
The Fureed Buksh palace is built close to the Goom-
tee, and, viewed from the opposite side of that river, has
a very pleasing effect. But within, there is nothing to
satisfy the eye or the mind. Enormous sums have
been expended in decorating the rooms, but all these
luxuries give the idea of having been collected from
the love of possessing, not from the desire of using,
them. The apartments are so crammed that there is
no judging of their height or proportion. The room
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SUBURBS OP LUCKNOW.
71
containing the throne is long and has a dismal appear-
ance. It is laid out after the European fashion, with
glass windows and scarlet cloth curtains, but these are
dirty, musty, and moth-eaten. The throne itself must
be of great value ; it is a large, square seat, raised several
steps from the ground. The sides are, if we remember
rightly, of silver, richly chased, and gilt, set with a pro-
fusion of precious stones. Of these, many were plun-
dered during the insurrection mentioned above ; as they
have not been replaced, the throne, with all its splen-
dours, partakes of the prevailing air of incompleteness.
The neighbourhood of Lucknow, still more than its
interior, differs from other cities of Hindoostan. At
Delhi, Agra, and elsewhere, one is struck with the bleak,
desolate aspect of the country, up to the very walls.
Lucknow, on the contrary, is surrounded by gardens,
parks, and villas, belonging to the King and his nobles.
Besides these, there is the fine park and house of Con-
stantia, the property of the late General Martine. The
life and death of this soldier of fortune, are illustrative
of Indian, and especially of Oude, politics. He be-
queathed £100,000 to found a school at Calcutta to be
called La Martiniere, and a sum nearly equal in amount
for a like institution at Lucknow. Martine's will shows
his estimate of Saadut Ali's conscience. He dreaded
lest his estate of Constantia, where he intended the
school to be built, should be seized by the Nawab after
his death. A Mussulman might violate property, and
even frustrate charitable intentions, but he would re-
verence a grave. The General, therefore, ordered that
his own body should be interred in one of the under-
ground apartments of his house, thus consecrating the
whole building as a tomb. The buildings intended for
the Lucknow charitable institution are now, after the
lapse of nearly half a century, in progress of erection ;
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THE KINGDOM OF OUDE.
and we hope ere long to see the Lucknow Martiniere
diffusing the blessings of education through the Oude
territory.
The soil of Oude is generally fertile, though light ;
when properly cultivated and watered, it is capable of
producing all crops. Not only are rice, wheat, barley,
with the many kind of vetches and oil plants, grown,
but opium, sugar-cane, and indigo are produced. From
the numerous large rivers and numberless small streams,
as well as the proximity of water in wells, irrigation,
that first necessary to the Indian farmer, is easy and
cheap. Indeed, in no division of India has nature done
more for the people ; in none has man done less. Else-
where, famine, cholera, and the invaders' swords have
reduced gardens to wastes ; but to no such causes can
the progressive deterioration of Oude be attributed.
For eighty years the country has not known foreign
war ; the fertility of the soil and its facilities of irri-
gation have usually averted from this province the
famines that have desolated other parts of the country ;
and its general salubrity is not to be surpassed by any
portion of India. What then has laid waste whole
districts, driven the inhabitants to emigration, or, still
worse, compelled them, like beasts of prey, to take
refuge in the forests, and abandon their habitations to
the stranger and to the licensed plunderer ? The answer
is easily given. A double Government. An irrespon-
sible ruler, ridden by a powerless pro-consul.
It may seem that we are exaggerating the evils of the
system. Theoretically, it might be argued that a King,
freed from all fear of foreign aggression, secured from
domestic insurrection, and commanding a large, and
what might be an unencumbered revenue, would have
leisure for the duties of a good ruler, and would make
it his ambition to leave some record of himself in the
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SOURCES OF MISRULE.
73
grateful remembrance of his people. Experience, how-
ever, proves that slavery, even though its fetters may be
concealed or gilded, works the same mischievous effects
on nations as on individuals. Independent freedom of
action is as necessary to develope the powers of the
mind as those of the body. The Eoman system very
much resembled that which has hitherto prevailed in
British India. The Eoman Provinces were gradually
broken into the yoke. The subject Kings, shorn of
their independence, and bereft of all means of good go-
vernment, were continued for a time, until each volun-
tarily surrendered his load of care, or until the outraged
people called aloud for absorption. That which was the
result of a systematic plan with Eome, has arisen chiefly
from a fortuitous combination of circumstances with
Great Britain. During our weakness, we made treaties
that have been a dead weight on our strength. These
original arrangements have often dishonoured us, and
have generally proved grievous to our proteges.
Human nature is much the same in the East as in the
West. The same principle holds good with nations as
with individuals. The man, whether king or servant,
who has no fears, has no hopes. The man who is not
called on for exertion must be almost more than mortal
if he bestir himself. We see the principle daily exem-
plified: the child born to competence seldom distin-
guishes himself in life, while the beggar stripling often
reaches the top of the ladder. Subject States and gua-
ranteed rulers, now as of old, verify the same remark ;
and no better example can be offered than that of Oude.
It has had men of more than average ability, and of at
least average worth, as rulers and ministers, who, if left
to themselves, would have been compelled in self-defence,
to show some consideration for the people they governed.
Failing to do so, their exactions would have called into
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THE KINGDOM OF OUDE.
play the rectifying principle of Asiatic monarchies, and
the Dynasty of Saadut Khan would long since have be-
come extinct. But, protected by British bayonets, the
degenerate rulers have felt secure to indulge in all the
vices generated by their condition j sacrificing alike the
welfare of their subjects and the character of the lord
paramount.
Our arrangements, in Oude as elsewhere, have been
the more mischievous because they have been invariably
incomplete. Lord Wellesley's great measure was a most
arbitrary one, but, if thoroughly carried out, in the
spirit in which it was conceived, would only have in-
jured one individual. Saadut Ali, alone, would have
suffered; his subjects would have gained by it. But
unhappily, in Oude, as in other parts of India, one Go*
vernor-General and one Agent decrees and others carry
out, or rather fail to carry out, their views. Not only
does no systematic plan of action prevail, but no such
thing as a general system of policy is recognised. The
only portion of Lord Wellesley's treaty that was
thoroughly carried out, was that of increasing the sub-
sidy to 135 lakhs, and seizing territory to cover this
enormously-increased subsidy. In all other points, we
played fast and loose, going on the usual seesaw
practice which depends so much on the digestion of the
local Eesident and the policy of the Governor-General
of the day. Saadut Ali, according to all report, was an
extremely able, and naturally by no means an ill-disposed,
man. Learned, intelligent, and studious, he was one of
the few rulers of Oude who have been personally capable
of managing their country, and yet, practically, he was
more meddled with than even his silly predecessor, and
very much more so than the silliest of his successors.
The British Government came to the reformation of
Saadut Ali's administration with dirty hands. They
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EEIGN OF SAADUT ALL
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commenced by depriving him of half his dominions, and
could therefore hardly expect that their advice regard-
ing the remainder should be kindly taken, Nor was it
so; Saadut Ali's talents were henceforth employed in
obtaining all the advantage he could from the Kesident's
presence, and in procuring from him the use of British
troops to collect his revenues, while, at the same time,
he treated him and his advice with all the neglect and
dislike that he dared to show. The consequence was,
that the British Government and its Agent were wearied
out, and failed to enforce the very provision of the treaty
which, at all hazards, should have been primarily at-
tended to. In the acquisition of one-half the Oude ter-
ritory we seemed to forget that we had become respon-
sible for the good management of the other half. Hav-
ing secured our subsidy, we not only abandoned the
people of the reserved Oude dominions, but lent our
bayonets to fleece them ; and Saadut Ali, who, under a
different system, might have consecrated his energies to
the improvement of his country, lived merely to extract
every possible rupee from his rack-rented people. It is
hardly a stretch of imagination to conceive him delibe-
rately blackening the British character by the use he
made of their name in revenge for his wrongs, real
and supposed. Mr. Maddock has recorded, that " His
temper was soured by the perpetual opposition (thus)
engendered, and his rule, though vigorous and efficient,
was disfigured by cruelty and rapacity."
Such is the present misrule of Oude that, odious as
was the revenue system of Saadut Ali, it is now remem-
bered with considerable respect. Doctor Butter re-
peatedly refers to his reign as the period when there
was some law in the land, "but since his death, no
court of justice has been held by the Nawabs, and
the Chuckledars attend to nothing but finance/'
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THE KINGDOM OF OUDE.
Further on he says, " During the reign of Saadut Ali,
a single cannon-shot could not be fired by a Chuckledar
without being followed by immediate enquiry from
Lucknow as to its cause: now a Chuckledar may
continue firing for a month without question." Again,
"Since the death of Nawab Saadut Ali, in 1814, no
lease has been granted for more than one year." Thus
the period which, not only the Resident of the day, but
the Military Officers' employed in Oude designated as a
reign of terror, is now remembered as one of compa-
rative mercy and tranquillity. Saadut Ali, being a man
of ability, plundered for himself; his imbecile successors
suffer their minions to devastate the land. Under
Saadut Ali there was one tyrant ; now there are at least
as many as there are local officers. Saadut Ali left his
dungeons full of his ex-amils, and fourteen millions of
money and jewels in his coffers.
Sir John Malcolm somewhere remarks that the quality
of a Native Government may be estimated by the cha-
racter of its district officers, and the infrequency of
change among them. He might have offered a more
brief and even a better criterion in "the revenue
system." Throughout India, the land is the source of
Revenue. Under almost every Native Government, the
collections are farmed, and in no part of India are these
vicious arrangements so viciously carried out as in Oude.
On one occasion we were personally witness to a default-
ing village being carried by storm ; seven or eight of the
inhabitants were killed and wounded, and all the rest
were taken captive by the amil. Such occurrences are
frequent.* "While we write we observe in the daily
* The injury done to British bor- around the village, after the aumiPs
der districts by these affrays may be army had retired, we taxed them with
estimated from the fact that, on the participation in the fight This they
occasion alluded to, seeing a number at first denied, but on taking a match-
of armed British subjects flocking lock from one of the men, we ob-
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REVENUES OF OUDE.
77
papers, a detailed account of the death in battle of the
amil of Baraitch, and of the victorious Talookdar hav-
ing, in consequence, taken to the bush, to be a felon
probably for life, or at least until he pay the blood-
money at Court. Tear by year several of the largest
landholders are thus temporarily outlawed. No man
owing a fortalice thinks of paying the public revenue,
until a force, large or small, is brought against him.
Barely indeed is the sum demanded conformable to the
agreement made. The demand almost invariably de-
pends on the nature of the crop, and on the Zemindar's
means, real or supposed, to pay or to withhold pay-
ment.
The present income of Oude may be estimated at a
million and a half sterling, and it arises almost entirely
from the land revenue. The fiscal divisions are ar-
bitrary. Mr. Maddock in 1831 showed twenty-four.
Doctor Butter in 1837, twelve; and we have before us
a list of twenty-five, large and small districts, obtaining
during the present year. The charge of each chukla, or
district, is generally sold by the Minister and his favour-
ites to the highest bidder, or is given to a creature of
his own. Lucknow bankers sometimes engage for large
districts and appoint their own agents. These are by
no means the worst cases, for low persons, who have
risen to notice by the vilest arts, are often appointed
amils. They have not only their own fortune to make,
but to pay the Court bribes, while their friends remain
in office ; a change of Ministry turns the majority of
them adrift. #
The revenue contractors have all the powers of Judge
and Magistrate; they are, in short, unshackled, un-
served that it had been just dis- late, it having been surrounded dis-
charged. The parties then allowed ing the night and the assault made
that they had come to join in the at daylight. Thus are our subjects
defence of the village, but were too taught club and matchlock law.
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THE KINGDOM OP OtfDE.
checked governors of their chuklas. Five of the present
twenty-five divisions are under what is called amaunee
management; that is, of salaried officers, who collect
the Government rents; but this system only obtains
in districts so deteriorated that no one will bid for
farming them, and in such cases the Ameens are under
so little check that the cultivators are at their mercy
nearly as much as under the farming system. Mr.
(now Sir Herbert) Maddock, in an able memorandum,
shows the modes by which the situations of amils are
procured, and the sort of people who in his time filled
the office, including, for instance, " Nawab Ameer-ood-
dowlah," who has been raised to the dignity of an amil
from the " very humble duties of a fiddler. His sister,
formerly a concubine, or nautch girl, having gained
the royal favour, is now one of the King's wives, desig-
nated by the title of 'Tauj Mahal/ and receives a
Jageer, for the support of her dignity, of which her
brother, the ' Nawab Ameer-ood-dowlah/ is the manager.
In like manner, the individual placed in charge of
Annow, &c, was formerly the humble attendant upon
nautch girls, but has lately been advanced to the title of
'Nawab Allee Bux/ through female influence in the
palace." Sir Herbert Maddock furnishes a detailed list
of nuzerana received by one Minister (Mohumud-ood-
dowlah) amounting to more than seventeen lakhs of
rupees, and estimated that the amils share among them
nearly fifty lakhs of rupees yearly.
^ Matters are fa* from improved since Sir Herbert
Maddock wrote. The weak are still squeezed, while
those who "are secured by forts and backed by troops"
continue to pay pretty much as they choose. The
picture drawn by Sir Herbert of the career of an amil
in the year 1830 stands good for the same official
of to-day. Bules and rates, justice and mercy, are
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STAtE OF ffi* POLICE.
79
disregarded now, as they were then, and in his words
it may still be truly said that, "a few seasons of ex-
tortion such as this lays waste the fields and throws
a multitude upon the world, now almost deprived
of honest means to gain subsistence. These, driven
from their homes, betake themselves to crime, and
goaded by poverty, become thieves and robbers, in-
festing the country on every side." "The amil or
his officers, finding a yearly decrease of revenue, are
naturally urged to further exactions, until, at length,
the kingdom has arrived at such a crisis that hundreds
of villages have gone to ruin, the former cultivation
is now a waste, and the hamlets once occupied are
now deserted." The foregoing brief quotation is as
applicable to the state of the police, and of the revenue,
at the present day, as it was when Sir H. Maddock
wrote. In the year 1806, when several gentlemen
were examined before Parliament on the Oude question,
Major Ouseley, an Aide-de-Camp, and personal friend
of the reigning Nawab, Saadut Ali, testified to the
infamous state of the police. The evidence of all others
was to the same effect.
Sir H. Maddock, Dr. Butter, and all modern writers,
show that the condition of the police is now, to the
full, as bad as it was half a century ago. The latter
gentleman states " that nothing is said about a murder
or a robbery ; and, consequently, crime of all kinds has
become much more frequent, especially within the
last sixteen years, and in the smaller towns and villages.
Gang-robbery, of both houses and travellers, by bands
of 200 and 800 men, has become very common. In
most parts of Oude, disputes about land, and murders
thence originating, are of very frequent occurrence;
feuds are thus kept up, and all opportunities of ven-
geance laid hold of." Again, "Pipar, five miles
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80 THE KINGDOM OP OUDE.
N. N. E. of Gonda in Amethi, contains a population of
4000 ch'hatris, who are robbers by profession and in-
heritance ; every bnllock and horse stolen in this part
of Oude, finds its way to Pipar." Also, "Sarangpur,
ten miles sonth of Tanda, has a population of 9000
Hindu thieves, dakoits (gang-robbers), and t'hugs,
whose depredations extend as far as Lak'hnau, Go-
rak'hpur, and Benares." In the same page, it is stated
that "In November, 1834, Tanda and its neigh-
bourhood were plundered by the notorious freebooter
Fatteh Bahadoor of Doarka, who surprised and defeated
the Faujdar, and a toman of 100 men stationed there,
and carried off about 100 of the principal inhabitants,
who, on pain of death, were compelled to procure their
own ransom, at sums varying from 50 to 400 rupees.
Of this outrage no notice was taken by the Govern-
ment."
The army is in much the same condition as it was when
Sir James Craig declared that it would be useful only
to the enemy. It is dangerous to the well-being of the
State ; utterly useless for war, most mischievous during
peace. In round numbers the army may now be esti-
mated at fifty-two thousand men, and its expense at
thirty-two lakhs of rupees yearly.* Doctor Butter's
account, written in 1837, describes its present condition
with sufficient accuracy.
"The Army of Oude, excluding the brigade raised
by Local Colonel Koberts, is an ill-paid, undisciplined
rabble, employed generally in coercing, under the Chuck-
ledar's orders, the 'refractory' Zemindars of his dis-
tricts; in conveying to Lak'hnau, under the exclusively
military orders of their own officers, the revenue when
* There are, also, not less than a
hundred thousand armed men em-
ployed by the Talookdars and Zemin-
dars, to defend their forts and fight
against the Government.
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THE NATIVE ARMY OP OUDE.
81
levied ; and occasionally, in opposing the armies of
plunderers, who harass the eastern districts of Oude."
And, again, "The nominal pay of the Sipahi is four
rupees, but he receives only three, issued once in every
three or four months, and kept much in arrears; he
has also to find his own arms and ammunition. He
gets no regular leave to his home, but takes it occa-
sionally for ten or fifteen days at a time; and little
notice is taken of his delinquency by the tumandar.
There is a muster, once in every five or six months ;
and the man who is absent from it gets no pay."
" This army has no fixed cantonments, no parades,
no drill, and no tactical arrangement : when one pultan
is fighting, another may be cooking. Encounters hand
to hand are thought disreputable, and distant can-
nonading preferred, or a desultory match-lock fire,
when no artillery is available. There is no pension
or other provision for the severely wounded, who, de
facto, are out of the service, and return to their homes
as they can." * * * " They have no tents ; but
when they make a halt, if only for two days, they build
huts for themselves, covering them with roofs torn
from the next villages."
We refer to Colonel Sleemans little volume "On
the Spirit of Military Discipline/* pages 10 and 11,
for a very striking anecdote, exemplifying at once
the Oude Eevenue system and the value of its present
military force.
Having thus, from sources sufficiently independent,
set forth the past and present condition of the finance,
police, and military system of Oude, we shall now
offer a brief historical sketch of the progressive causes
of this condition.
Saadut Khan, the founder of the Oude dynasty,
was one of the many bold spirits that came from the
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THE KINGDOM OF OUDE.
westward to seek their fortunes in Hindoostan. He
combined with the usual qualities of a good soldier,
the rarer talents required for an able administrator.
Mr. Elphinstone has fallen into the error of earlier
historians in calling him a merchant; he was, in
reality, of noble birth, and his original name was
Mahommed Anieen. In the year 1705, while still
but a lad, he arrived at Patna, to join his father and
elder brother, who had preceded him thither. On his
arrival, finding the former dead, he and his brother
proceeded to push their fortunes at Delhi. His first
service was with Nawab Sirbulund Khan, whom, how-
ever, he soon quitted, resenting a taunt uttered by
his master on occasion of some trifling neglect. The
youth took his way to Court, where he soon acquired
favour; and having materially assisted his imbecile
sovereign in getting rid of Hosein Ali (the younger of
the Syuds of Bara, who were at that time dragooning
the King), Mahommed Ameen was rapidly promoted
to the viceroyalty of Oude, with the title of Saadut
Khan. He found the province in great disorder, but
soon reduced the refractory spirits and greatly increased
the revenue. He protected the husbandmen, but
crushed the petty chiefs who aimed at independence.
Modern historians question the fact of Saadut Khan
having, in concert with Nizam-ool-Moolk, invited Nadir
Shah's invasion. We have not room to detail the evi-
dence on which our opinion rests, but a careful com-
parison of authorities leads us to believe that he was
guilty of this treacherous deed. The atrocities com-
mitted by Nadir are familiar matters of history. The
traitor chiefs did not escape, and Nizam-ool-Moolk and
Saadut Khan were especially vexed with requisitions.
They were not only themselves plundered, but were
made the instruments of extorting treasure from the
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THE CAREER OF SAADUT KHAN.
83
distant provinces. Nizam-ool-Moolk, jealous of the
power and ability of Saadut, took advantage of the
persecutions of Nadir Shah to execute a plan for
getting rid of his rival. He affected to confide to him
his own determination of suicide, and agreed with
Saadut Khan that each should take poison. The latter
drank his cupfull, and left the hoary schemer without
a rival in the empire.*
Saadut Khan, who had but a few years before been
a needy adventurer, and had now been plundered by
Nadir Shah, was still enabled to leave his successor
a large treasure, estimated by some at nine millions of
money. Though he accumulated so much wealth, he
has not left behind him the character of an oppressor.
On the contrary, he seems rather to have respected the
poor, and to have restricted his exactions to the rich.
He overthrew many lordlings, and established in their
stead one stronger, and therefore better, rule. No
qualms of conscience stood in his way. The aggran-
dizement of his own family was his one object, in fur-
therance of which he was regardless alike of gratitude,
loyalty, or patriotism. So long as his own territory
escaped, he cared not that Persian or Mahratta should
ravage the empire, and humble the monarch, in whose
weakness he found his own strength. He reaped much
as he had sown ; his ability and management established
a sovereignty ; his faithlessness brought him to a pre-
mature and ignominious end. He proved no exception
to the rule, that they who are busiest in entrapping
others are themselves the easiest deluded.
On the death of Saadut Khan, his two nephews,
• Mr. Elphinstone, noticing the many others which are believed in
current story of Saadut Khan's times of agitation, disappear when
death, and of his and Asoph Jah's full light is thrown on the period."
(Nizam-ool-Moolk) having called in We regret to say that this " full
Nadir, observes, " these fictions, like light" has yet to appear.
G 2
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THE KINGDOM OP OUDE.
Sher Jung and Sufder Jung, each applied to the all-
powerful Nadir Shah for the investiture of Oude : the
petition of the latter, who had married Saadut Khan's
daughter, being backed by the Hindoo vakeel of the
late Viceroy, with an offer of a nuzzur of two millions
sterling, he was of course invested with the Govern-
ment.* Nawab Sufder Jung was accounted an able
ruler; for a time he sustained the tottering authority
of the King of Delhi. In the year 1743 his son
Shoojah-oo-dowlah was married to the Bhow Begum,
who, in after days, became so conspicuous in Anglo-Oude
annals. On Nadir Shah's death, Ahmed Shah Abdalli
seized the throne of Affghanistan, invaded India, and
killed the Vizier Kumer-ood-deen Khan at Sirhind.
At this juncture Sufder Jung distinguished himself
by his zeal and ability. Mahommed Shah the emperor
of Delhi dying shortly after, his son Ahmed Shah
appointed Sufder Jung to the post of Vizier; that
nobleman also retaining his viceroyalty of Oude. The
first design of the new Vizier was, in 1746, against
the Bohillahs, who were troublesome neighbours to his
Oude viceroyalty. The period was favourable to his
views ; for Ali Mahommed, the founder of the Bohillah
family, was dead, and Sufder Jung induced Kaim
Khanf Bungush, the Affghan chief of Furruckabad,
to conduct the war against his countrymen. Kaim
Khan fell in the cause of his ally, who, in return,
plundered his widow and seized the family jagheer,
giving a pension to Ahmed Khan, the brother of the
deceased chief. The Vizier made over his new acquisi-
tion, with the province of Oude, to his deputy Bajah
Newul Boy, and himself proceeded to Delhi.
* Indian historians generally call be the correct version,
these two millions cash taken from t The fine village, or rather town,
baadut Khan, but, after comparing of Kaimgunje, in Furruckabad, is
many authorities, we believe ours to called after the old chief.
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WAR WITH THE AFGHANS.
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It was not long before Sufder Jung tasted the bitter
fruits of his own tyranny and ingratitude: the train
of disaffection was laid, and a spark soon kindled it.
An Affghan woman of the Afredi tribe, who gained
her livelihood by spinning thread, was maltreated by
a Hindoo soldier of Newul Roy. She went direct
to Ahmed Khan, the Vizier's pensioner, and crying
for justice, exclaimed, " Cursed be thy turban, Ahmed
Khan, who permittest an Afredi woman to be thus
treated by a Kaffir. It had been better that God had
given thy father a daughter than such a son as thou."
Ahmed Khan was roused ; in concert with bolder
spirits, he plundered a rich merchant, and with the
funds thus procured, raised an army, killed the Kotwal
of Furruckabad, seized the city, and, within a month,
was in possession of that whole district. Rajah Newul
Roy, who was a brave man, came to the rescue from
Lucknow, was met near the Kalinuddy, by the Affghan
army, defeated, and slain. The victors crossed the
Ganges and were soon in possession of the whole vice-
royalty of Oude. Sufder Jung, on hearing of the
disaster that had befallen his lieutenant, assembled
a large army, estimated in the chronicles of the day
at 250,000 men, and, accompanied by Sooruj Mul, the
Jaut chief of Bhurtpoor, moved against Ahmed Khan,
who came out to meet him, at the head of a very
inferior force, but, by a sudden attack on the wing
of the army commanded by the Vizier himself, wounded
him and drove him from the field. His troops, ob-
serving that their commander's elephant had left
the field, fled in confusion, and left Ahmed Khan
undisputed master of the provinces of Oude and
Allahabad. The Affghans had fought bravely, but
they could not agree among themselves. Dissensions
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THE KINGDOM Of OUDE.
arose in Oude, and after a brief struggle the late con-
querors were expelled the country.
Sufder Jung, as unscrupulous as the other leaders of
the day, called in the Mahrattas to his support, and
with an immense force again marched against Ahmed
Khan, who, alarmed at the formidable aspect of affairs,
forgave the Eohillah chiefs the death of his brother,
and entered into a treaty of mutual defence with them.
Unable to meet the Vizier in the field., Ahmed Khan
crossed the Ganges, and fell back on his Eohillah con-
federates, who, giving way to their fears, abandoned
the open country, and allowed themselves to be
hemmed in under the Kumaon mountains. There they
were reduced to such straits that a pound of flesh was
sold for a pound sterling. Terms were at length
granted, and the Mahrattas returned to their country
loaded with the plunder of Eohilcund, and their leaders
enriched by two and a half millions of subsidy. Sufder
Jung was so far a gainer that he not only humbled,
but crippled his Affghan opponents.
Factions soon arose at Delhi, and the Vizier was
often sore pressed, and put to many shifts to retain
his authority. The Queen mother was enamoured of
an eunuch, of the name of Jawid, who, supported by
the King as well as his mother, sought to supplant
the Vizier during his absence in Eohilcund. Sufder
Jung, on his return to Delhi, settled the dispute by
inviting the eunuch to a feast, and there causing him
to be assassinated. The King was enraged at this act,
and employed Ghazi-ood-deen to avenge it. This
youth was the grandson of Nizam-ool-Moolk, and had
been brought forward by the Vizier himself. After
some intriguing and bullying with varied result, the
Vizier withdrew to his viceroyalty, and his rival assumed
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INVASIONS OP AHMED SHAH.
87
the functions of the vizarut. No sooner had Sufder
Jung retired, than the pageant King found that in
his new minister Ghazee-ood-deen he had saddled
himself with a hard master. Hoping to escape from
this yoke, he wrote to recall his late Vizier; but the
letter found Sufder Jung dying; and Ghazee-ood-deen,
on hearing of the effort thus made to supplant him,
caused both the King and his mother to be blinded,
and raised one of the Princes of the blood to the throne,
under the title of Alumgeer the Second.
Shoojah-oo-dowlah, the son of Sufder Jung, had been
brought forward during his father's lifetime, and on
his death was placed on the musnud of Oude, now
become hereditary in the family of Saadut Khan. A
rival to Shoojah-oo-dowlah, however, arose in the person
of his cousin, Mahommed Kooli Khan, the Governor of
Allahabad, whose pretensions were unsuccessfully sup-
ported by Ishmael Khan Kaboolee, the chief military
adherent of the late Viceroy.
Ahmed Shah Abdallee on his third invasion of India
in 1756, after capturing Delhi, sent Ghazee-ood-deen,
the Vizier of the so-called Great Mogul, to raise a
contribution on Oude. No sooner had the Abdallee
retired, than the Vizier called in the Mahrattas, upset
all the arrangements made by Ahmed Shah, and, in
concert with his new allies, who had not only captured
the imperial city of Delhi, but had overrun a great
portion of the Punjab, planned the reduction of Oude.
Alarmed at the threatened danger, Shoojah-oo-dowlah
entered into a confederacy with the hereditary enemies
of his family, the Eohillahs, and when the Mahrattas
invaded Eohilcund, carrying desolation in their path,
and destroying thirteen hundred villages in little more
than a month, Shoojah-oo-dowlah came to the rescue,
surprised the camp of Siridea, the Mahrattft commander,
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THE KINGDOM OP OUDE.
and drove him across the Ganges. Ahmed Shah was
at this time making his fourth descent on Hindoostan,
and called on the Mahommedan chiefs to join his
standard against the Mahrattas. The Kohillahs did
so, but Shoojah-oo-dowlah hesitated between the two
evils of Affghan and Mahratta enmity. A move on
Anopshuhur, on the Oude frontier, made by the Abdali,
determined the choice of Shoojah, who, however, while
he professedly joined the Affghan, kept up close com-
munication with the Mahrattas. Throughout the
battle of Panneput, which took place in January, 1761,
the Oude ruler continued to temporize, holding his
ground, but taking as little part in the action as
possible. The entire success of either party was con-
trary to his views. He desired a balance of power,
which would check a universal monarchy, either Hindoo
or Affghan.
We must here retrace our steps. In the year 1758,
when the wretched Emperor, Alumgeer the Second, was
in daily danger of death from his own Vizier, Ghazee-
ood-deen, he connived at the escape from Delhi of his
heir, Prince Alee-gohur (afterwards Shah Alum), who,
after seeking an asylum in various quarters, was honour-
ably received by Shoojah-oo-dowlah and by the kinsman
of the latter, Mahommed Kooli Khan, the Governor of
Allahabad. Thus supported, and having received from
his own father the investiture of the government of
Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, Prince Alee-gohur crossed
the Caramnassa river, with a design of expelling the
English and their puppet, Nawab Jaffier Ali. At the
head of a motley band of adventurers, the Prince ap-
peared before Patna ; and, so ill was that place supplied,
that he might have taken it, had not his principal
officer, Mahommed Kooli Khan, suddenly left him,
in the hope of recovering the fort of Allahabad, which
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OPPRESSIONS OF THE ENGLISH.
89
had been treacherously seized by his kinsman Shoojah.
Alee-gohur was now obliged to relinquish his attempt ;
but, two years after (in 1760), though driven, in the
interval, to the greatest distress for the very necessaries
of life, he was again contemplating an attempt on
Bengal, when his father was put to death, — another
victim to the sanguinary Ghazee-ood-deen. The Prince,
assuming the vacant title of emperor, appointed Shoo-
jah-oo-dowlah his Vizier, with a view of securing the
support of that noble ; and now appeared again as Shah
Alum, before Patna, cut off a small British detachment,
and might have got possession of that city had he acted
vigorously. It would be foreign to our subject to
detail the circumstances by which the English were
victorious, and Shah Alum was compelled to confirm
their creature Cossim Ali in his viceroyalty of Bengal.
The crest-fallen Emperor prepared, as soon as possible,
for his return to Delhi, on the guarantee of his new
Vizier, of Nujeeb-oo-dowlah, and other chiefs. He
was anxious also to obtain the protection of a British
escort, but though there was much desire to grant one,
he was only escorted, by Major Carnac, to the border of
Behar.
In 1763, Cossim Ali was driven by the oppressions of
the English, and their disregard of all decency in the
matter of the inland trade, to abolish all duties on the
internal commerce of the country. This measure, which
should have been warmly encouraged by the British
authorities, was the main cause of the hostilities that
followed. One outrage brought on another. Mr.
Ellis, the most violent and injudicious of the many
violent men then in authority, precipitated matters
at Patna. The result was, that Cossim Ali was
removed, and Jaffier Ali restored to the musnud.
Cossim Ali could still muster some troops, with which
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TAB KINGDOM OF OUDE.
he met the British, was defeated, and, on his flight* per-
petrated that massacre of his English prisoners which
will brand his name, as long as it is remembered.
After this act of butchery, he fled for refuge to Shoojah-
oo-dowlah, taking with him three hundred and eighty-
five elephants loaded with treasure. The exile offered
Shoojah a lakh of rupees for every day's march, and half
that sum for every halt, as long as the war might last,
with three millions sterling, and the cession of the
Patna district, on the recovery of Bengal, if he would
join him against the English. But Cossim Ali, desiring
to have two strings to his bow, offered at the same time
a large bribe to the Emperor for his own appointment
to the viceroyship of Oude, in supercession of Shoojah-
oo-dowlah. The latter intercepted Cossim Ali's letter
and forthwith placed him under restraint, after gaining
over Sumroo and other military officers with their
troops. A mutiny in the English camp cramped, for a
time, the British commander, but on the 22nd October,
1764, the battle of Buxar decided the fate not only of
Bengal and Behar, but of Oude.
The immediate result of the battle was the surrender
of the unhappy Emperor, who, instead of having been
re-instated at Delhi, had been detained prisoner by his
Vizier. The latter also begged for terms, and offered
fifty-eight lakhs to the English Government and army.
The victors refused to make any terms until Cossim Ali
and Sumroo had been surrendered. The Vizier had
plundered and arrested the former, but hesitated to sur-
render him: he offered, however, to connive at his
escape, and to cause the assassination of Sumroo. As
the British commander would not accede to this propo-
sal, the negotiation with the Vizier failed ; and arrange-
ments were made with the EmperoT, stipulating that
he should be placed in possession of Shoojah-6o*
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dowlah's dominions, including Allahabad, and should
in return grant Benares and Ghazeepoor to the British.
Hostilities were accordingly recommenced against the
Vizier ; the British troops entered Oude, and took pos-
session of Lucknow, the capital; while Shoojah-oo-
dowlah, sending his family for refuge to Bareilly, sought
for allies in every quarter. But when the news of the
proposed arrangements reached England, the Court of
Directors were exceedingly alarmed. They sent out
positive orders against any such demented scheme of en-
larging the British territory, and forbade all meddling
with Delhi politics. The despatch arrived just in time
to save the Vizier, who had been defeated in a skirmish
at Korah, on the 3rd May, 1765. Deserted by his
Bohillah and Mahratta allies, he came into General
Carnac's camp on the 19th of the same month, and
threw himself on British mercy. Not being behind the
scenes, the Vizier was astonished and delighted at the
moderation of the terms granted to him, which were
that he should pay fifty lakhs of rupees to the British :
that he should pledge himself not to molest Bulwunt
Singh, the Zemindar of Benares, and that he should
cede Allahabad and Korah to the Emperor. It is a
curious feature in this case, and a damning proof how
iniquitous had been our proceedings in Bengal, that the
Vizier, now at the mercy of his conquerors and ready to
cede all, or any portion, of his territory, yet demurred
against admitting the English to trade, free of all duties*
Government probably felt the justice of his apprehen-
sions, for in the words of Mills, " Clive agreed, in the
terms of the treaty, to omit the very names of trade and
factories."
Next year (1766), Lord Clive had an interview with
the Emperor and the Vizier at Chupra. The latter
again expressed his satisfaction at the terms of peace,
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THE KINGDOM OF OUDE.
and paid up the fifty lakhs of rupees ; and the Emperor
again, vainly, requested an escort to Delhi. This first
treaty did not involve any right of internal interference
on the part of the British ; yet little time elapsed before
very stringent terms were dictated. They relinquished
Oude because they would not, or, it was supposed in
England, could not, keep it. They did not give it to
the Emperor, because they considered that such a gift
would imply future protection, and involve them in the
wars of Upper India, a dilemma from which Government
believed itself to have escaped by restoring the Vizier.
On the conclusion of these arrangements, a brigade of
British troops remained in the Allahabad district for the
support of the King and the Vizier against the Mah-
rattas, without any provision for the payment of the
brigade by those who benefited by its services. In the
year 1766, however, the Court of Directors wrote, "As
all our views and expectations are confined within the
Caramnassa, we are impatient to hear that our troops
are recalled from Allahabad." During the same year
the Bengal Government became alarmed at the military
schemes of the Vizier, at his " amazing improvement in
making small arms/' and at the large levies of troops
entertained by him. In consequence of these suspicions,
a deputation was sent to meet the Vizier at Benares,
towards the end of 1768, when, after a warm discussion
and much opposition on his part, he agreed to reduce
his army to 35,000 men, of whom 10,000 were to be
cavalry and only ten battalions were to be trained
sepoys.
About this time Shoojah seized one of his principal
officers, Rajah Benee Bahadoor, and caused his eyes to
be put out. An attempt was made to procure British
interference in his favour, but the reply given was, " that
the Vizier was master within his own dominions/1 The
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THE RO HILL AH WAR.
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occasion was an ill-chosen one for announcing the fact ;
but it would have been well had the law continued. In
the year 1769, three of the Oude battalions mutinied;
they were promptly put down ; but their conduct some-
what reconciled the Vizier to the late compulsory re-
duction of his troops. In 1771, the Emperor left Alla-
habad and threw himself into the arms of the Mahrattas,
after having made some secret terms with the Vizier for
the cession of Allahabad. The next year the Mahrattas
threatened Rohilcund and thereby Oude. Upon this
the Vizier entered into terms with the Kohillah chiefs,
and induced the Calcutta Council to allow Sir Kobert
Barker to accompany him with a British brigade. The
combined force, however, did not prevent the Mahrattas
from penetrating to the very heart of Bohilcund and
even threatening Oude. It was during this campaign
that the Vizier made the arrangement with the Kohillah
chiefs, to relieve them of their Mahratta scourge, in
return for which they were to pay him a subsidy of forty
lakhs of rupees. The failure of payment was the excuse
for the famous, or rather infamous, Kohillah war. In
the year 1773 the district of Korah was included within
the line of British defensive operations; but Colonel
Champion, the commander of the advanced brigade, was
instructed that, "not a single sepoy was to pass the
frontiers of the Vizier's territories." The measure was
induced by the forced grant of Korah and Allahabad by
the Emperor to his jailors, the Mahrattas, which cession
the British authorities determined to oppose, and to
reserve its ultimate destination to themselves.
Up to this time, the diplomatic relations between the
two Governments appear to have been conducted by a
Captain Harper who commanded a regiment of sepoys
in attendance on the Vizier. Mr. Hastings, however,
desired to have a person in his own confidence at Luck-
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THE KINGDOM Of OUDE.
now, and therefore recalled Captain Harper. The order
was opposed by Sir Robert Barker the commander-in-
chief, who, on his own authority, sent the Captain back
to the Vizier. The Governor-General was not a man to
be so bearded; he carried his point after some angry
correspondence, the commencement of that acrimony
which prevailed in the discussion of Chide affairs during
Mr. Hastings's administration, and which has been so
prominent a feature in most of the discussions that have
since occurred regarding that province. In September,
1773, Mr. Hastings meet Shoojah-oo-dowlah with a
view of revising the treaty, " as the latter might call
upon the Company for assistance, and yet was under no
defined obligation to defray the additional charge thrown
upon them by affording such assistance." On the 19th
of the same month the new treaty was concluded, mak-
ing over the districts of Allahabad and Korah to the
Vizier, on condition of his paying to the Company the
sum of fifty lakhs of rupees, and stipulating that he
should defray the charges of such portion of the British
troops as he might require ; which were fixed at two
lakhs and ten thousand rupees per month for each bri-
gade. At this meeting the Vizier felt the Governor-
General's pulse as to the support he was likely to receive
in his project, already contemplated, against the Ro-
hillahs.
Mr. Hastings took the opportunity to arrange for the
reception of a permanent British Resident at Lucknow,
telling the Vizier at a private conference that, " he de-
sired it himself; but unless it was equally the Vizier's
wish, he would neither propose nor consent to it."
Shoojah declared he would be delighted, and Mr. Mid-
dleton was accordingly appointed. Scarcely had the
Governor joined his Council when the Vizier wrote that
he understood Hafiz Ruhmut and the other Rohillah
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THE R0 HILL AH WAR.
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sirdars were about to take possession of Etawah and the
rest of the middle Doab, which he would never allow,
especially " as they had not made good a daum of the
forty lakhs of rupees, according to their agreement." The
Vizier added, " On condition of the entire expulsion of
the Kohillahs, I will pay to the Company the sum of
forty lakhs of rupees in ready money, whenever I shall
discharge the English troops ; and until the expulsion
of the Rohillahs shall be effected, I will pay the expenses
of the English troops ; that is to say, I will pay the sum
of rupees 2,10,000 monthly." The Council affected some
squeamishness about the Doab, which, however, they did
not prevent the Vizier from seizing. Respecting the
operations against Kohilcund, they gave a half-and-half
sort of answer, but held a brigade in readiness to await
the requisition of the Vizier.
The tale of the Rohilcund campaign has been often
told; we shall not add to the number of narratives.
Suffice it to say that the brunt of the battle of Kuttera
fell on the British detachment ; Colonel Champion re-
porting that the Vizier had evinced the most " shameful
pusillanimity." The English commander was however
not an unprejudiced judge. Shoojah-oo-dowlah, what-
ever were his faults, was never before accused of
cowardice, and on several occasions, especially at Buxar,
evinced great courage. It is to the credit of Colonel
Champion that he did not like the work in which he
was employed ; and looking with abhorrence at the de-
solation caused by the Oude troops, who had ill sup-
ported him in the fight, he was not chary of his re-
marks on them or on their Prince. But it is no proof
that a Native chief is a coward because he does not fight.
He often looks on to await the result of the day. The
British brigade were Shoojah's mercenaries ; they were
hired to fight his battles. He let them do so, and we
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THE KINGDOM OP OUDE.
are by no means certain that if the battle of Kuttera
had gone against the British, and Colonel Champion
had fallen instead of Hafiz Kuhmat, that the isolated
English brigade would not have found a foe instead of
friend in Shoojah-oo-dowlah. This campaign, with all
its concomitant circumstances, forms the darkest spot
in Indo-British history. Little can be said in behalf
of the Vizier, and no sophistry can extenuate the con-
duct of a Governor and his Council, who hired out their
troops for butcher work, openly avowing that they did
so because they required the offered subsidy to meet the
pressure on the local finances and to answer the demands
of the home Government. Having given this unquali-
fied opinion, it is just to add that report greatly exagge-
rated the virtues of the Eohillahs as well as the atrocities
of their destroyers. Warren Hastings' conduct was
made a party question both in India and England, and
his deeds were accordingly misrepresented by enemies
and slurred over by friends.
The Eohillah war was scarcely concluded, when the
new arrangements for the Government of India gave
Mr. Hastings' opponents a majority in Council. They
lost no time in pronouncing their disapproval of his
measures ; they recalled Mr. Middleton, the Eesident he
had placed at Lucknow, and gave the appointment to a
Mr. Bristow, notwithstanding his being personally ob-
noxious to the Governor-General. The men, however,
who thus stigmatized Hastings' measures carried their
zeal for reform no further than words. They scrupled
not to receive the wages of iniquity. They not only
pressed the Vizier for payment of the subsidy, but took
advantage of the critical state of his affairs to raise their
demand on him. The earthly career, however, of Shoo-
jah-oo-dowlah drew near its close. He obtained Mr.
Hastings' sanction for his return to Fyzabad, that he
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CHARACTER OF ASOPH-OOD-DOWLAH. 97
might make arrangements for liquidating his engage-
ments to Government. On reaching his capital, he was
seized with a violent illness which terminated his life.
He expired on the 26th January, 1775, and was sue-
ceeded by his eldest son, Mirza Amanee, who assumed
the name of Asoph-ood-dowlah.
No public man, not Cromwell himself, has ever been
painted in more opposite colours than Shoojah-oo-dow-
lah. Taking Colonel Duff's version, the Vizier was
"the infamous son of a still more infamous Persian
pedlar," * * " cruel, treacherous, unprincipled, deceit-
ful ; possessing not one virtue except personal courage."
Yet the same writer shows that when danger gathered
round, Shoojah had sufficient resolution to relinquish
the pleasures of the harem, and the field sports to which
he was addicted, that he might set himself to reform the
discipline of his troops, and retrieve the embarrassments
of his finance. On the other hand, Francklin describes
the Vizier as " an excellent Magistrate, a lover of justice,
and anxiously desirous of the prosperity of his country."
Still stronger is the praise bestowed by Jonathan Scott.
He says of Shooj ah-oo-dowlah that, " as a prince he was
wise and dignified in character, as a private man, affable,
humane, and generous." * * * " Sincerely beloved by
his own subjects, even the sons of Hafiz Ehamat wept
at his death." From these discordant materials, and
the fact that after having virtually lost his sovereignty
at Buxar, he not only recovered his position, but left to
his son an inheritance nearly double what he had re-
ceived from his own father; it may be inferred that
Shoojah-oo-dowlah was an able, energetic, and intelli-
gent prince, and that he possessed at least the ordinary
virtues of Eastern rulers.
Asoph-ood-dowlah lost no time in sending a peshcush,
or offering, to the Emperor, with five thousand men ;
H
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THE KINGDOM OF OUDB.
they arrived just in time to relieve the unfortunate mo-
narch from the hands of Zabita Khan, and the op-
portune aid secured for their sender the post of Vizier,
in succession to his father. The province of Oude had
now descended to the fourth generation, and the office of
Vizier to the third. On the accession of Asoph-ood-
dowlah, the Calcutta Council affected to consider that
the treaty with his father died with his death. After
much discussion, the new Resident, Mr. Bristow, ne-
gotiated fresh terms, on the 21st May, 1775, the chief
clauses of which were, that the Vizier should cede
Benares and Ghazepoor, worth 23 lakhs annually, to
the Company ; raise the monthly subsidy from rupees
2,10,000 to 2,60,000 for the service of a British brigade,
and agree to dismiss all foreigners from his service, and
to deliver up Cossim Ali and Sumroo, if they should
ever fall into his hands. He further consented to pay
up all arrears due by his father. In return for these
advantages, the English undertook to defend Oude, in-
cluding Corah and Allahabad, as also the late conquests
in Rohilcund and the Doab. The services of a second
brigade, entitled " the temporary brigade " were, at the
same time, placed at the disposal of the Vizier.
Another affair was now transacted, important at
the time, and pregnant with future evil. The British
Agent, supported by the anti-Hastings majority at
the Council table, made over the treasures of the late
Vizier to his widow, the Baho (Bhow) Begum, who
was likewise put in possession of a princely jageer.
To her this wealth proved a fatal possession, leading to
the atrocities afterwards practised on herself and her
servants. On the part of our Government the bestowal
of it was both unreasonable and unprecedented. Shoojah
had died largely their debtor, and the sum now made
over to his widow effectually barred the settlement of
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THE BHOW BEGUM.
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their claims. The Begum, it is true, claimed the
money as a legacy from her husband ; but it is almost
needless to say that under no native Government would
such a bequest, even if effectually made, have been
carried into effect. Uninterfered with, Asoph-ood-
dowlah would have assumed possession of his fathers
wealth as naturally as of his place, and his mother
would have been satisfied with whatever jageer or
pension he assigned her. But party spirit in Calcutta
divided the house of Oude against itself, and involved
the ruler in difficulties which issued in crimes per-
petrated by him against his mother, at the instigation
of a British Governor-General.
The first year of the new Nawab's authority had not
passed before he was surrounded by perplexities. The
arrears of subsidy not coming in, tunkhwas or orders
on the revenue, were obtained for four lakhs per
annum, and the Baho Begum was induced, at the
intercession of the Besident, to assist the necessities
of the State with fifty-six lakhs of rupees, on condition
however of Mr. Bristow's ratifying her son's engage-
ment not to molest her with further demands. The
Nawab had at length leisure to attend to the state
of his army. Desiring to introduce discipline among
his troops, he applied for, and obtained, the services
of several European officers. They were not ill received
by the soldiery, but soon after, on the discharge of
some Irregulars, a mutiny broke out. An engagement
took place between the Kegulars and the Match-
lockmen; 2,500 of the latter supported an engagement
for some time with great spirit against 15,000 regulars,
repeatedly repulsing them. The fight was only brought
to an end by the explosion of a tumbrel. The mutineers
lost six hundred men and the Nawab's Sepoys three
hundred.
h 2
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THE KINGDOM OF OUDE.
While such was the condition of the army, the Nawab
gave himself up to drunkenness and dissipation. All
authority fell into the hands of the minister, Moortaza
Khan, whose rule was, however, brief. Kwajah Busunt,
a eunuch, but the bravest soldier in the service, took
advantage of the general dissatisfaction to encourage
a party in favour of Saadut Ali, the second and favourite
son of the late Vizier. Kwajah Busunt invited the
minister to a banquet. In the midst of the feast,
making some excuse for quitting the guest-chamber,
he gave the signal for the slaughter of the unwary
Moortaza Khan in the midst of the nautch girls and
singers. Asoph-ood-dowlah himself had been invited
to the entertainment, probably that he too might be
got rid of; the murderer, however, reeling from the
effects of the debauch in which he had participated,
came boldly into the presence, and boasted of the deed
he had performed. The Nawab ordered him to be
executed on the spot. Saadut Ali, hearing of what had
occurred, and alarmed for his own safety, immediately
took horse and fled beyond the frontier. Thus, in
one day, the Vizier lost his Minister, his General, and
his Brother.
The troops were still in a very unsettled state, and
discontent regarding the new arrangements and the
introduction of British officers daily increased. Some
of the European officers were so maltreated by their
own men that they fled to the nearest English camp ;
others braved the storm, but it was only by the timely
arrival of two of the Company's battalions that the
mutineers were reduced or disbanded.
Such was the state of the army. The finances were
in scarcely less disorder. The regular subsidy was
originally 25£ lakhs, the Francis junto raised it to 31|,
but what with the expense of the temporary brigade,
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CHANGE OF AGENTS.
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extra troops, and numerous officers employed with the
Oude army, as well as various miscellaneous accounts,
the demands during seven years of Mr. Hastings'
administration averaged 100 lakhs annually, while, in
spite of constant screwing, the receipts only averaged
70 lakhs; leaving in 1781 a deficit of 2iV* crores of
rupees. To meet this frightful item, there was a
materially-decreased revenue.
Another point here requires remark. We have said
that Mr. Middleton was recalled by the majority in
Council, as one of their first measures. Mr. Hastings
no sooner recovered his ascendancy by the death of
Colonel Monson in 1776, than he removed Bristow and
reinstated Middleton. The former was restored in
1780, in obedience to repeated and positive orders from
the Court of Directors, which, however, were only
obeyed on a compromise with Mr. Francis. Mr. Bristow
was displaced a second time in 1781, by the Governor-
General, who said that he required to have a confidential
Agent at Lucknow. To complete the story of the
bandying about of Agents, we may here mention that
Mr. Bristow was again restored by orders from home in
1782, and, finally, again ousted by Mr. Hastings in
* On Oude financial questions
Mr. Mill is both ambiguous and
contradictory. At page 629, vol. ii.
(4to edition), he states " the debt
with which he (the 1 Nawab ') stood
charged in 1780, amounted to the
sum of £1,400,000," but at page 650
remarks that although when the
treaty of Chunar was concluded (in
1781), "the balance appeared to stand
at forty-four lakhs, the demand
next year (1782) "by claims of un-
known balances, exceeded consider-
ably two crores and a half, that is,
were at least equal to twice the an-
nual revenue of the whole country."
In the text we have shown that the
current demand having been from
70 to 130 lakhs, and the receipts
having averaged only seventy lakhs,
there needed no "claims of unknown
balances" to swell the amount of de-
ficit. The last portion, moreover, of
the quotation making the total re-
venue to be only one and a quarter
crore, dovetails ill with Mr. Mill's
own showing at page 493, vol. iii.,
that the revenue in 1801 was about
Rs. 2,30,12,929. An increase of more
than a million of money during
twenty years of progressive deteri-
oration ! Mr. Mill quotes Middle-
ton for his first statement, and
" Papers " for the second, but ap-
pears to have overlooked their dis-
crepancy.
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THE KINGDOM OP OUDE.
1788. The Governor-General affected to have acted
only for the public good in these several transfers. He
declared he had no personal dislike for the man he so
repeatedly removed, and much respect for his conduct ;
but "the creature Bristow" (as on one occasion Mr.
Hastings registered him) was odious in his eyes, inas-
much as that gentleman's appointment to Lucknow was
a standing proof of his own discomfiture in Council.
The Governor-General hated him accordingly, and few
men loved or hated as did Warren Hastings.
This double explanation is requisite as a clue to the
proceedings we have next to record. In the year
1780-1, the finances of the Company were in a most
disastrous condition. The authorities had reckoned on
certain sums from the Vizier, and were disappointed.
Mr. Hastings, therefore, determined, himself to proceed
to Lucknow. In August, 1781, the Governor-General
reached Benares when the outbreak occurred, provoked
by his arbitrary proceedings against Eajah Cheyt Sing.
During these transactions, Mr. Hastings, as usual,
evinced great courage, the Nawab great fidelity. The
latter joined Mr. Hastings in September at Chunar,
when he contrived to convert the Governor-General from
a violent and imperious taskmaster into a warm advocate.
For two years the NawaVs remonstrances and entreaties
had been treated with contempt or indifference: they
were now listened to and complied with, and for a brief
space he was treated with respect. An arrangement was
effected that led to the withdraval of the temporary bri-
gade and three regiments of cavalry, leaving only one
brigade and one regiment to be paid by the Vizier.
He was also allowed to resume all jageers, giving cash
for certain estates guaranteed by the Company; all
British officers were also withdrawn ; and sanction was
given to plunder the two Begums, the wife and mother
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CASE OF THE BEGUMS.
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of Shoojah-oo-dowlah, though, as already observed, one
of them had been previously guaranteed by Mr. Bristow.
The result of the several " arrangements was, an imme-
diate supply of fifty-five lakhs of ready money to the
Company, and a stipulation for the payment of an addi-
tional twenty lakhs, to complete the liquidation of his
debt to them."
Approving entirely of the decrease of the Nawab's
permanent burthen thus effected, we cannot too strongly
reprobate the mode by which he was authorized, and
indeed eventually urged, to raise present funds. Mr.
Hastings' defenders vindicate his proceedings towards
the Begums, on the ground that these ladies abetted
Cheyt Singh's rebellion, and that they had no right to
the treasure they possessed. The latter statement is
true. One wrong, however, does not justify another !
What had been granted and guaranteed, even wrong-
fully, should have been respected. The falsity of the
first plea has been frequently shown. We need not,
therefore, here repeat the evidence. If any justification
for the Governor-General is to be found in the fact, it is
true that he was at this time put to his wits' end for
cash. As the Court of Directors importuned him, so he
pressed the Oude Government. Such was his anxiety
on the subject that in May, 1782, he deputed his se-
cretary, Major Palmer, to Lucknow, with the express
object of realizing the arrears of subsidy. The mission
gave such offence to Mr. Middleton that he resigned
his appointment ; and to add to the Governor-General's
difficulties, his own special Agent allowed himself to be
talked over and stultified by the Oude Officials.
Large as was the balance due, the Major was per-
suaded into believing that the sheet was clear; and
instead of enforcing old claims he listened to offers of a
loan. Mr. Hastings was much provoked both at the
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THE KINGDOiM OF OUDE.
gullibility of Major Palmer and at Mr. Middleton's
abandonment of his post in his (the Governor-General's)
difficulty. He wrote to Mr. M. in severe terms ; and
on the 10th August, 1782, addressed Hyder Beg, the
Oude Minister, under his own hand, in a most extra-
ordinary letter, considering it to be addressed to the
minister of a sovereign possessing a shadow of indepen-
dence. After telling Hyder Beg that he owed his
position to him (the Governor-Genera!) and that he had
been disappointed in him, he added, " I now plainly
tell you that you are answerable for every misfortune
and defect of the Nawab Vizier's Government." He
then demanded that the balance due to the Company
should be liquidated by the end of the year, or threat-
ened that Hyder Beg should be made over to the tender
mercies of his master, for the examination of his
conduct. Hyder Beg understood full well the process
by which the examination of the conduct of disgraced
ministers was conducted in Oude as elsewhere. Strin-
gent, however, as were the measures taken, they did not
realize the subsidy. They did not effect Mr. Hastings'
wishes, but they did much to upset the authority of the
Nawab in his own territory.
Mr. Hastings had very correct abstract notions on
the subject of interference. His practice and theory
were, however, sadly at variance. When money was
wanted for the Company, he stuck at nothing. His
two nominees, Middleton and Palmer, had failed him ;
and he now, in despair, re-appointed the Company's
protege, Mr. Bristow, arming him with the most
extensive authority. The new Agent was informed
that " The Resident must be the slave and vassal of
the Minister, or the Minister at the absolute devotion
of the Resident * * it will be necessary to declare to
him (the minister) in the plainest terms, thg footing
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POLICY OF WARREN HASTINGS.
105
and conditions on which he shall be permitted to retain
his place; with the alternative of dismission, and a
scrutiny into his past conduct, if he refuses." Mr.
Bristow was further told that he was to " control the
appointment of officers, nay, peremptorily to oppose
it," when he (the Eesident) considered opposition in
any case advisable. In the face, however, of such
instructions, Mr. Hastings was not ashamed, in October,
1783, to thus characterize the Eesident's conduct: —
" Mr. Bristow, after an ineffectual attempt to draw the
minister Hyder Beg into a confederacy with him to
usurp all the powers of the Government, proceeded to
an open assumption of them to himself.,, And, on the
strength of this shameless allegation, Mr. Bristow was,
for the third time, removed.
Unable to realize his views by proxy, Mr. Hastings,
in March, 1784, again visited Lucknow, where he re-
mained five months, during which time he effected
the liquidation of a further portion of the Vizier's debt,
removed another detachment of troops, restored a por-
tion of the confiscated jageers, and endeavoured to
put the Oude affairs into some sort of order. At
Benares, on his return, he addressed the home Govern-
ment in these prophetic words : — " If new demands are
raised on the Vizier, and accounts overcharged on one
side, with a wide latitude taken on the other to swell
his debts beyond the means of payment : if political
dangers are portended, on which to ground the plea of
burthening his country with unnecessary defences and
enormous subsidies, the results would be fatal." Mr.
Hastings knew how wide a latitude he had himself
taken, " to swell the NawabV ' debts beyond the means
of payment, and judging of the future by the past,
he concluded that another Governor-General might
arise who, portending political dangers, would make
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THE KINGDOM OF OUDE.
them "the plea of burthening his (viz. the Vizier's)
country with unnecessary defences and enormous sub-
sidies." In short, Warren Hastings foretold, in 1784,
exactly what occurred in 1801.
We have entered somewhat fully into the occurrences
of Mr. Hastings' administration, as they gave their
colouring to the British connection with Oude.
When Lord Cornwallis assumed the government
of India, the Oude minister, Hyder Beg, was sent to
wait on his Lordship. The negotiations that ensued
were concluded on the 21st July, 1787, by a treaty,
relieving the Vizier from certain balances still due;
and declaring him in all respects independent within
his own territory. The letter of the Governor-General
contained the following remarkable paragraph : — " It is
my firm intention not to embarrass you with further
expense than that incurred by the Company from their
connection with your Excellency, and for the protection
of your country, which, by the accounts, I find amounts
to fifty lakhs of Fyzabad rupees per year. It is my
intention, from the date of this agreement, that your
Excellency shall not be charged with any excess on
this sum, and that no further demand shall be made;
any additional aid by the Company is to be supplied
on a fair estimate."
The abuses of the Oude Government repeatedly
attracted the attention of Lord Cornwallis and Sir John
Shore. Both were anxious to effect some reform, but
were deterred by the difficulty of interfering with any
good effect. At length the Vizier's extravagance and
debauchery brought affairs into such terrific disorder
that, in the year 1797, Sir John Shore proceeded to
Lucknow. His visit, however, had a double purpose.
The ostensible, and we hope chief design, was to give
the Nawab good advice, but his Highness was also
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to be supplied with a minister, and another pull was
to be made at his purse- strings. The Company had
resolved to strengthen their cavalry, and, in the face of
Lord Cornwallis's treaty, it was thought convenient
to make the Nawab bear a portion of the increased
expenses attendant on this augmentation. The helpless
Vizier consented, stipulating that the charge should
not exceed five and a half lakhs per annum, to pay the
expenses of two regiments. The Governor-General
took some credit to himself, that in this transaction he
had talked and not dragooned the Nawab into con-
cession. There was more difficulty in effecting a change
of ministry. The Governor-General consented that
the eunuch Almas should be appointed, but just as he
had given his sanction, he discovered an order by Lord
Cornwallis against the employment of that person.
The Nawab, debarred from the selection of his own
favourites, at length consented to receive Tufuzzel
Hoosein, a learned, able, and we believe respectable,
man, who then held the office of Oude Vakeel in Cal-
cutta. It was, however, a sore trial of the honesty of
that minister to be thus brought from Calcutta, and
forced upon his Sovereign by the Lord paramount.
Had Sir John Shore been as experienced in human
nature as he was in revenue details, and in Indian
politics, he would not have thus introduced the new
minister to the Nawab directly as the creature of the
British Government.
Scarcely had the Governor-General, left Lucknow,
when the Vizier died, and the disposal of the vice-
royalty of Oude was in the hands of a simple English
gentleman. As in another paper * we have fully con-
sidered the claims of Vizier Ali, and described the
process by which he was put up and put down, we
* « Calcutta Review," No. 1 ;— Article "Lord Teignmouth."
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THE KINGDOM OF OUDE.
need not here repeat the story. But we are bound
to record even more emphatically than before, our
opinion that Vizier Ali was unjustly treated. The plea
of his spurious birth would not, by Mahommedan law,
have interfered with his succession ; and never would
have weighed with the English authorities had he not
rendered himself obnoxious to them by desiring to
degrade Tufuzzel Hoosein the minister, who was con-
sidered " as the representative of the English influence.,,
Tufuzzel Hoosein met Sir John Shore on his way
to Lucknow with all sorts of stories about the violence
and debauchery of the Lord Vizier Ali, but the Governor-
General seemed to forget that this report might be
biassed by personal motives ; perhaps, too, he was
unaware that Tufuzzel Hoosein had been the tutor
of Saadut Ali, and even during Asoph-ood-dowlah's
life was suspected of intriguing in favour of the Vizier's
brother. But enough ; Vizier Ali was degraded after
a few weeks' enjoyment of authority, and Saadut Ali
was raised to the musnud. New terms were of course
dictated to the new Prince. It was no time for making
objections. The treaty was signed; and protected
by British bayonets, the new Nawab entered his ca-
pital. The ex-ruler, similarly guarded, was removed
to Benares.
The treaty thus made was signed on the 21st Feb.,
1798. It raised the subsidy from fifty-six to seventy-
six lakhs, and provided for the discharge of all arrears.
The fortress of Allahabad was ceded, and the sum
of eight lakhs of rupees made over for its repairs.
Three lakhs were likewise given for the repairs of
Futtyghur, and twelve lakhs more were to be paid
for the expenses incurred in the late revolution. The
Nawab, moreover, agreed to reduce his establishments,
and to consult, as to the manner of doing so, with the
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British Government. No Europeans were to be
allowed to settle in Oude, and no political relations
were to exist without the knowledge of the British
Government. In return for all this, the British gua-
ranteed Oude, and agreed to maintain for its defence not
less than ten thousand men. If it should at any time
be necessary to increase the number of troops beyond
thirteen thousand, the Nawab was to pay the expense ;
if they could be reduced below eight thousand, a
suitable reduction of the subsidy was to be allowed.
The advantages accruing to the Company from this
arrangement are manifest ; it not only gave them
possession of Allahabad, but it increased the subsidy
twenty lakhs, and defined, though not distinctly, to
what extent the subsidy might be lightened or increased.
Unfortunately it left the time quite undetermined,
and on this omission were based the unwarrantable
demands made by the next Governor-General in 1801.
What will perhaps most strike the English reader of
Sir John Shore's treaty is, the entire omission of the
slightest provision for the good government of Oude.
The people seemed as it were sold to the highest bidder.
Vizier Ali was young, dissolute, and needy : Saadut
Ali was middle-aged, known to be prudent, and believed
to be rich. Being of penurious habits, he had, even
on his petty allowances as a younger son, amassed
several lakhs of rupees; and, in short, was a more
promising sponge to squeeze than his nephew. From
the general tenor of Sir Jbhn Shore's life, we believe
that his heart was in the right place, though this his
last diplomatic transaction, might, if taken alone, lead
us to a different conclusion. wTierever his heart was,
his head at least must have been wool-gathering. He
set a bad precedent. He made the musnud of Oude
a mere transferable proparfc^in the hands of the British
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THE KINGDOM OP OUDE.
Governor, and he left the people of Oude at the mercy
of a shackled and guaranteed ruler. This may have
been liberality, but it was liberality of a very spurious
sort. Much as we admire Lord Teignmouth's domestic
character, we are obliged entirely to condemn the whole
tenor of his Oude negotiations. Historians have
hitherto let him down lightly, but his Lordship must
be judged by the same standard as other public officers ;
by the right or by the wrong that he committed, and
not by his supposed motives, or his private character.
A Governor-General of far different calibre succeeded.
One of the first objects of the Marquis Wellesley, on
his assumption of the Government of India, was the
reformation, or rather the reduction of the Oude Army,
and the substitution in their stead of a British force.
The Nawab set his face against the measure. The
Governor- General was not to be thus baffled. Early
in 1799, he applied for the services of the Adjutant-
General of the army, Colonel Scott, an able and respect-
able, but austere man. In the first instance he was
placed at the service of Mr. Lumsden, the Resident, but
the latter gentleman was shortly after recalled, and
the appointment bestowed on Colonel Scott. So
stringent were the measures now taken, that Saadut
Ali threatened to resign the musnud. It was but
a threat, and intended to alarm or to mollify his per-
secutors. The Governor-General, however, seized upon
the words, and putting his own constructions on them,
insisted on their literal fulfilment; adding a proviso,
which, at any rate, the Nawab had never contemplated,
that on his abdication, the East India Company should
inherit the principality of Oude, to the injury of his
own children. Much disgraceful altercation ei^sued.
The Governor-General returned the Nawab's remon-
strances with angry and threatening remarks ; insisted
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POLICY OF LORD WELLESLEY.
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on the immediate execution of his orders, and finally
marched the British troops into Oude without sanction
of the nominal ruler. The Resident issued orders to
the district officers to receive and provide for the
English battalions, and was obeyed. Saadut Ali now
felt himself within the iron grasp of a power that could
crush him, and made the most abject appeals for mercy.
The Governor-General, however, seized this opportunity
for carrying out his own views. Referring to the
Nawab's previous statements regarding the inefficiency
of his army and their danger to himself rather than to
an enemy, Lord "Wellesley insisted on its reduction,
and the reception, in its stead, of a force of twelve
battalions of British infantry, and four regiments of
Cavalry. A large portion of the Oude troops were
accordingly disbanded, and so judiciously was this re-
duction managed by Colonel Scott, that not a single
disturbance ensued.
The Nawab finding himself once more secure on his
uneasy throne, had time to reflect how he was to bear
the increased burthen laid upon him. His predecessor
had been put to continued shifts to discharge the subsidy
of fifty lakhs : he had, himself, by better economy, con-
trived to pay seventy-six lakhs, but how was he now
to meet the farther demand of fifty-four lakhs, to set
against which there was only a diminished expenditure
of sixteen and a half lakhs caused by the reduction
of a portion of his army ? He accordingly declared his
entire inability to pay the required sum. The Governor-
General wanted just such a declaration. He made it
an excuse for the dismemberment of the Principality,
and proceeded to carry out the finance arrangements
with as little delicacy as had been shewn in effecting
the military alterations. Mr. Henry Wellesley was
deputed as Commissioner to Lucknow, and in concert
with the Resident, dictated the cessions that were
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THE KINGDOM OF OUDK.
to be made when the former, in virtue of his office as
Lieutenant-Governor of the ceded districts, made the
primary arrangements for their management. The
lands thus extorted were, at the time, estimated to
be worth 1,35,23,474 rupees per annum. We have had
occasion at the commencement of these remarks to show
that they must now yield double that sum.
Lord Wellesley's conduct in this transaction was
most despotic. As a wise statesman he judged rightly
that the subsidy to his Government was better secured
by a territorial cession than by a bond for cash payment ;
but, in extorting the former, literally at the point of the
bayonet, and at the same time nearly doubling the
subsidy, he shut his eyes to the most obvious rules
of justice.
This treaty, which was signed on the 10th September,
1801, left the Nawab shorn of the best half of his
territory ; we may easily judge in what spirit he pre-
pared to introduce " an improved system of adminis-
tration with the advice and assistance of the British
Government" into the remainder. Such were the vague
terms of the only stipulation contained in the present
treaty, for the benefit of the people. We need hardly
add that it remained a dead letter. This may have
been only a negative evil ; but a similar looseness
of expression in Sir John Shore's treaty admitted of
more positive perversion. We allude to the provision,
that when it should be necessary to increase the con-
tingent beyond 13,000 men, the Nawab should pay
the expense. Sir John Malcolm more shrewdly than
honestly observes, that if there was any meaning in
the provision, it left the British Government to judge
when the necessity should arise, and how long it should
continue. The Marquis Wellesley did not hesitate to
consider that time to be when Oude had just escaped
invasion by Zeraan Shah, and the period to last for ever.
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ZEMAN SHAH.
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There was danger from Zeman Shah ; no one who reads
the history of those times attentively can deny the fact.
The state of the Oude army, the position of Sindea, and
the advance of Zeman Shah called for arrangements for
the defence of Oude. But the truth is, that almost
as soon as the tidings of Shah Zeman's approach
reached the British authorities, the danger had passed
away. Sir James Craig stated before Parliament:
"The first certain accounts we had were, I believe,
in September or October — I rather think October
(1798);" and again, "The accounts of the Shah
returning from Lahore, which may be considered as
his abandonment of his enterprise, reached Anopshere
in January 1799." Thus the knowledge of the danger
lasted, at the farthest, five months. Arrangements
were made as quickly as possible to meet the invasion ;
and extra troops were kept in Oude from November,
1798, until November, 1799, being ten months after the
Shah's retirement, and a special charge of more than
thirty-eight lakhs of rupees was made to cover their
expenses. This was all fair and proper. It was right
that the sum expended should be charged ; but surely
there is no excuse for adding to the above contingent
charge a fixed annual demand of fifty-four lakhs to
cover a danger that no longer existed, and which, from
that day to the present, now forty-five years, has never
arisen. The claim was clearly opposed to the spirit of
Sir John Shore's treaty, and to both the spirit and
letter of that of Lord Cornwallis.
One of the earliest evils resulting from Lord Welles-
ley's arbitrary measures was, that the Resident became
personally obnoxious to the Nawab. Colonel Scott
was a man whose character passed unscathed through
an ordeal of the strictest inquiry, both in and out of
Parliament; but Saadut Ali could only be expected
I
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THE KINGDOM OF OUDE.
to see in him the instrument of disbanding a large
portion of his own army — that chief symbol of Oriental
sovereignty — the agent who had arranged the forced
cession of the best half of his territory. Thus circum-
stanced, Colonel Scott could hardly be an acceptable
ambassador, and in fact, was rather deemed a hard
taskmaster. Unfortunately his manner had in it
nothing to compensate for the matter of the invidious
duties imposed on him. Habituated to military details,
and late in life called on to negotiate delicate questions
of diplomacy and civil administration, Colonel Scott
performed his disagreeable task rather with the bluff-
ness of the military martinet, than with the suavity of
the accomplished diplomatist. He carried qut his
orders honestly,, but harshly. He effected the views
of Government regarding the Oude army, as well as,
perhaps better than, any other officer of the day could
have done; but there his services ended He did
nothing for the improvement of the country. He was
rather an obstacle in its way. The Nawab having a
reduced field of action, secure from personal danger,
and hemmed in by British bayonets, screwed his
wretched people. The Resident was not only unable to
prevent these oppressions, but by the provisions of the
treaty was compelled to be the instrument in their
execution. Year after year were British troops seen
throughout Oude realizing the revenues, enforcing the
most obnoxious orders, and rendering nugatory to the
oppressed their last refuge, military opposition. Great
as was the interference in Asoph-ood-dowlah's time,
it was now much greater. In former times the pressure
of the Resident's authority was occasional, and on
specific questions, and was chiefly felt at Lucknow ; the
incubus was now a dead weight bearing down the
provinces, as well as the capital. The Nawab was also
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EVILS OF BRITISH INTERFERENCE.
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as much vexed and irritated as ever by the presence
and conduct of the Eesident, by his interference in
favour of, or in opposition to, persons and things in the
very capital.
Such conduct, however, at this time tended less than
formerly to weaken the rulers power. The British
army was now believed to be at the beck of the Oude
Government to support its revenue arrangements.
The Nawab was thus, though degraded in character,
strengthened in position. The previous (authorized)
interference had told rather against the Oude Court ; it
was now in its favour. The powerful were now sup-
ported against the weak. This system went on for
years, and under several Residents. It was brought
prominently to notice when Colonel Baillie was in
office. A long, vexatious, and fruitless correspondence
took place between the Nawab and the Government.
Colonel Baillie was anxious to promote improvements,
the Nawab liked neither the matter nor the manner
of the suggestions offered. He cared for his cash, and
for nothing else. No person however can read his
replies to Colonel BaiUie's demands without being
satisfied that, under kindlier treatment at the outset,
much might have been done with such a prince. We
are specially struck at his being in advance of the
Bengal Government of the day on Eevenue arrange-
ments. Colonel Baillie proposed that ameens should
be sent into the districts to collect statistical informa-
tion, that they should visit every village, and procure
the revenue papers of former years. — "Those papers,
after the minutest investigation which may be practi-
cable, to be transmitted, under the signature of the
revenue officers, to the presence, when your Excellency
and I shall consider them, and be enabled to form an
accurate judgment of the real resources and assets of
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THE KINGDOM OF OUDE.
every district in your dominions."* The Nawab replied,
" I shall issue my orders to the ameens, agreeably
to what you have suggested; but I recommend that
this measure be carried into effect by actual measure-
ment of the cultivated and waste lands, and of lands
capable of being cultivated; in which case the exact
measurement of the lands, as well as the amount of
the jumma, will be ascertained, and the boundaries of
villages will also be fixed, so as to preclude future
claims or disputes among the Zemindars on questions
of unsettled boundary."* The following reply to
another suggestion shows how much better the Nawab
understood his people, and how much better he was
able to manage Oude than was the Eesident : —
" You suggest, that such ameens as perform their duties properly shall
hereafter be appointed tehsildars ; but in this case, if the ameeus be pre-
viously informed, that after ascertaining the jumma of their elakas (dis-
tricts), and transmitting the revenue papers for ten years with the Wasil-
bunkee accounts of the revenue, they will be appointed to the office of
tehsildar, it is probable that, for their own future advantage, they will
knowinglv lower the jumma, and state less than the real amount. I there-
fore think it would be more advisable to separate the two offices entirely ;
or, at all events, that no ameen should be appointed tehsildar in the Zillah
in which he may have acted as ameen. In this latter mode, the ameens
who are found to be deserving may still be rewarded, and the opportunity
for fraud may be prevented." *
The readers who have accompanied us through this
hasty sketch of Saadut Ali's career, will perhaps concur
in the opinion we gave at the commencement of this
article, that his raalgovernment was mainly attributable
to English interference, to the resentment he felt for
his own wrongs, and the bitterness of soul with which
he must have received all advice from his oppressors, no
less than to the impunity with which they enabled him
to play the tyrant.
Lord Minto at length checked the ^Resident's inter-
ference against the people; he did not thoroughly
* Minutes of Evidence. Appendix No. 26, page 383.
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GHAZEE-OOD-DEEN HYDER.
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understand the nature and extent of that at Court, and
therefore disturbed not Colonel Baillie's domestic as-
cendancy. The Marquis of Hastings looked more into
the matter and prohibited it entirely.
Saadut Ali died in July, 1816, and was succeeded by
his eldest son Kufsat-ood-dowlah, under the designation
of Ghazee-ood-deen Hyder. His accession delighted
Colonel Baillie, and scarcely pleased the Calcutta
Government less. The new Nawab, of course, agreed
to every proposition of the Resident, whom he
addressed as " My Uncle," and who reported that liis
advice was not only acceptable to Ghazee-ood-deen, but
was urgently requested by him. The very spirit of
credulity seems, at this period, to have possessed our
countrymen. Not only does Colonel Baillie appear to
have swallowed the sugared words of the Nawab, but
the authorities in Calcutta adopted his views ; and,
taking advantage of what was deemed the amiable
spirit of the grateful Nawab, authorized the several
measures of reform, which, to say the least, Colonel
Baillie was little competent to carry through.
A new light however soon broke in on the Governor-
General, and he ascertained that Ghazee-ood-deen loved
reform as little as his father had done. It was dis-
covered that both Nawab and Resident had been
puppets in the hands of the Residency Moonshee, who,
by threatening Ghazee-ood-deen with the fate of Vizier
Ali, contrived to bend him to what were called British
views, while he found his account in allowing the
Resident to fancy himself the friend and counsellor of
the Nawab. The discovery of these intrigues induced
a peremptory order from the Governor-General for-
bidding all interference, and the affair ended in the
removal of Colonel Baillie, who, however, had in the
interim negotiated a loan of two crores of rupees. The
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THK KINGDOM OP OTJDE.
friends of Lord Hastings have asserted that these loans
were voluntary, but Colonel Baillie has shown the
transaction in a very different light. The money was
extorted from the Nawab by the importunity of the
Resident, who acted on repeated and urgent instructions
from the Governor-General. During the Burmese war,
and under another administration, a third crore was
borrowed, we know not exactly by what process, but, as
the greater part of the interest was settled on the
minister of the day, Motumed-ood-dowlah (more
generally known in India as Aga Meer), and his life,
honour, and property were guaranteed, it may be in-
ferred that he managed the matter.
Loans of this sort are generally discreditable to the
borrowers ; in Oude they have been doubly prejudicial.
Most of them have been compulsory, and they have been
the means of perpetuating, and immeasurably extending
the guarantee system. The interest of each loan,
whether from Nawab, King, or Begum, has been settled
on the connections and servants of the several parties
lending the money, with provision in each case that the
pensioner was to be protected by the British Govern-
ment. Thus, for the sake of temporary pecuniary
relief, have we established and fostered a system which
must vitiate any Government, and is doubly destructive
to a Native State. At Lucknow, for years, the Resi-
dents held public durbars, where the guaranteed at-
tended, and pleaded against their own Sovereign or his
servants. Thus were the Monarch and his subjects
arrayed against each other! thus was the Sovereign
degraded in his own capital.
This abuse has been checked ; but a still greater evil
exists to the present day. The guaranteed are hun-
dreds: the privileged are thousands. Every British
sepoy from the Oude dominions can, through his com*
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KING-MAKING.
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manding officer, refer a fiscal or judicial case to the
Resident. This at first sight appears a valuable pri-
vilege to our Native soldiery, of whom, (as already
stated,) the greater proportion are raised in Oude ; but
the plan works badly. Zemindars throughout the
country will buy, beg, borrow, or steal the name of a
British sepoy, in the hope of thus gaining attention to
their petty claims. The consequence is, that the just
appeals of real sepoys are frequently neglected, while a
false claim is now and then forwarded. We are,
indeed, of opinion that, much as the Oude Government
is molested and degraded by sepoys' claims, true and
false, the men themselves are rarely benefited by the
Besident's interference. Litigation is promoted, hopes
are excited, and eventually the party who would, if left
to his own resources and the practices of the country,
have arranged or compromised his quarrel, is led on to
his ruin. But we have been drawn from the thread of
our narrative.
In the year 1819, the Nawab Ghazee-ood-deen
Hyder was encouraged to assume the title of King.
Lord Hastings calculated on thus exciting a rivalry
between the Oude and Delhi families; the Nawabs
having hitherto paid the descendants of the Mogul all
outward homage, and affecting still to consider them-
selves only as lieutenants of the Emperor. This ar-
rangement was somewhat akin to some of the masque-
rades with which the Company commenced their career.
While ruling Bengal and the Carnatic they were
entitled Dewans ; and now, while lording it over Oude,
the puppet Nawab must, forsooth, be encouraged to
assume a royal title, in order to act as a counterpoise to
the Great Mogul!
Death will not, however, spare a King any more than
a Nawab vizier. Ghazee-ood-deen died, and was suc-
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THE KINGDOM OF OUDE.
ceeded by his son, Nuseer-ood-deen Hyder, who more
than perpetuated the worst practices of his predecessors.
Engaged in every species of debauchery, and sur-
rounded by wretches, English, Eurasian, and Native, of
the lowest description, his whole reign was one con-
tinued satire upon the subsidiary and protected system.
Bred in a palace, nurtured by women and eunuchs, he
added the natural fruits of a vicious education to those
resulting from his protected position. His Majesty
might one hour be seen in a state of drunken nudity
with his boon companions ; at another he would parade
the streets of Lucknow driving one of his own elephants.
In his time all decency, all propriety, was banished from
the Court. Such was more than once his conduct that
Colonel Low, the Eesident, refused to see him, or to
transact business with his minions.
In 1831 Lord William Bentinck visited Oude. He
had received a frightful report of its misrule from Mr.
Maddock, the Eesident ; but questioned the reality of
the picture laid before him. He now traversed the
country and judged for himself; he saw every proof of
misgovernment, and was at length convinced that the
existing system could not, and ought not to, last. He
had one hope for Oude. Momtuzim-ood-dowlah, better
known as Hakeem Mehndy Alee Khan Bahadoor, was
then minister, and his energy and ability might, if
unshackled, save the sinking State. To encourage his
efforts, Lord William studiously manifested his regard
for the minister, and forbade all further interference of
any kind on the part of the Eesident, who was pro-
hibited from even advising unless his opinion was asked.
The Governor-General warned the King of the con-
sequences of continued misrule; he gave him and his
minister a fair chance of recovering their common
country; and resolved that, if it failed, the most
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DEGRADATION OF THE MINISTER.
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stringent measures should be adopted, involving the
entire management of Oude by British officers. His
Lordship writes on 31st July, 1831 — "But I am san-
guine in my hope of a great present amelioration from
my belief in the capacity and willingness of the present
minister to effect it ; and from the entire possession he
has of the confidence of the King." * * * Sad proof
how incompetent is the wisest European to read an
Asiatic heart. The Governor-General left Lucknow
fully impressed with the opinions above quoted. Ha-
keem Mehndy had effected much good, had reduced the
public expenses, and had brought some order into the
management of affairs. The subordinate officials feared
him ; the talookdars and village chiefs respected him.
Under his strong administration the country at length
tasted peace. In August, 1834, however, just three
years after Lord William Bentinck's visit, the minister
found himself, without the slightest warning, deprived
of office, and threatened with dishonour, if not with
death. The charges brought against him were, dis-
respect to the Boyal relatives, and even to the Queen
Mother. This was all fudge. At Lucknow, as through-
out the East generally, the King is everything; his
nearest relatives are nothing. An affront to the lowest
minion about the Court would more probably have been
resented, than one to a connection of the King. The
pretext, however, was plausible ; the minister was de-
graded, and nothing but the strong arm of the Resident
saved his wealth, life, and honour. His real crimes
were his ability, energy, and fidelity;* had he been
more subservient and less faithful, he might have
* We are quite aware that the Ha- pacious men that ever breathed,"
keem has been differently painted, but any acquainted with the pater-
In the Calcutta India Gazette, he was nity of those remarks would at once
depicted, in 1833, as "one of the perceive how little dependence could
most intriguing, avaricious, and ra- oe placed on them.— -H. M. L
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THE KINGDOM OF OUDE.
escaped his exile to Furruckabad, where he lingered for
some years, constantly affecting preparations for a
pilgrimage to Mecca, but really longing and watching
for a return to power. His wishes were at length
fulfilled, and under a more virtuous ruler he died as
Minister of Oude. But, during the interval, Hakeem
Mehndy's head and hand had become feebler, while the
flood of abuse had swelled. Unable to stem the current,
he died at the helm, in the bold attempt. Often during
his exile, we have heard the old man dilate upon the
evils that ruined Oude, and declare that with fair play
and a fair field he could yet recover the country. We
then considered his day gone by, and little contem-
plated his having another opportunity of treading the
slippery path of politics. The Hakeem's merits must
be judged of by comparison with other ministers ; and
he will appear just, firm, and sagacious. It is therefore
to be lamented that such a man was lost to Oude while
his energies were still vigorous. On the accession of
Mahommed Ali, Hakeem Mehndy was recalled to
power, but his health was then declining, and his life
was near its close.
His nephew and heir Munowur-ood-dowlah Ahmed
Ali, a respectable but unenergetic man, has since been
twice at the head of affairs : he is a better sportsman
than a cabinet minister, and is altogether too honest
and unpractised in court affairs to cope with the Ameen-
ood-dowlahs and Shureef-ood-dowlahs of the day.
Lord William Bentinck, in his report of 11th July,
1831, entering into many details of past circumstances,
and explaining his proposals for the future, added, " I
thought it right to declare to his Majesty beforehand,
that the opinion I should offer to the home authorities
would be, that unless a decided reform in the admini-
stration should take place, there would be no remedy
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LORD W. BENTINCK'S MINUTE.
123
left except in the direct assumption of the management
of the Chide territories by the British Government."*
His Lordship with propriety adds, " I consider it un-
manly to look for minor facts in justification of this
measure, but, if I wanted them, the amount of military
force kept up by his Majesty is a direct infraction of
the treaty." The Minute continues in the following
honest and disinterested strain : —
u It may be asked of me — and when yon have assumed the management,
how is it to be conducted, and how long retained ? I should answer, that
acting in the character of guardian and trustee, we ought to frame an
administration entirely native ; an administration so composed as to in-
dividuals, and so established upon the best principles, revenue and judicial,
as should best serve for immediate improvement, and as a model for future
imitation ; the only European part of it should be the functionary by
whom it should be supenntenaed, and it should only be retained till a
complete reform might be brought about, and a guarantee for its con-
tinuance obtained, either in the improved character of the reigning Prince,
or, if incorrigible, in the substitution of his immediate heir, or in default
of such substitute from nonage or incapacity, by the nomination of one of
the family as regent, the whole of the revenue being paid into the Oude
treasury. *
In reply to his suggestions to the home Government,
Lord William Bentinck received instructions in the
year 1 833, at once to assume charge of Oude, unless, in
the meantime his advice had been followed, and decided
improvement had ensued. Averse to so strong a mea-
sure, and ascertaining that affairs were slightly amended,
his Lordship postponed the measure, again warning his
Majesty as to the inevitable result of continued misrule.
Nuseer-ood-deen Hyder, however, encouraged by long-
continued impunity, persevered in his mal-practices.
The treasures of his grandfather, Saadut Ali, were now
drained to the last rupee, and every device was invented
to recruit the finances of the State, or rather to supply
the privy purse of the Bang. A low menial was his
chief confidant ; any man who would drink with him
was his friend. In 1837 he became ill, and for some
* Minutes of Evidence. Appendix No. 27, page 404.
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THE KINGDOM OF OUDE.
weeks was confined to his palace, but he was not con-
sidered in danger, when, suddenly at midnight of the
7th July, 1837, the Resident was informed that his
Majesty was no more.
When describing the Fureed Buksh palace, we
touched upon the occurrences of which it was the
theatre on that eventful night. If space permitted, we
should now gladly detail those brilliant operations. It
was a sudden crisis, an unforeseen emergency, that
tested the stuff of which our officers were made. Not
only Colonel Low himself, but his assistants, Captain
Patton and Captain Shakespeare, shewed admirable
courage and coolness. A moment's indecision on the
part of the Resident, or a failure on the part of either
of the assistants in the duties assigned to them, would
have deluged the city of Lucknow with blood, and cost
the Residency party their lives ; as it was, they were in
great danger, especially Captain Patton, and were only
rescued from the hands of the rebels by the speedy
arrival of the 35th regiment. The conduct of the
gallant Noke-ka-pultun that night was a good augury
of the laurels they were so soon to earn in the more
trying field of Afghanistan.
The case of the boy Moona Jan was dissimilar from
that of Vizier Ali : the latter was acknowledged, the
former disowned by his reputed father.
The new King, Mahommed Ali, was a cripple, a
respectable old man, who had never dreamt of royalty,
and whose very insignificance and previous seclusion
saved his life during the emeute of the soldiery on the
7th of July. Grateful for his elevation, which he attri-
buted to the British Government, he was willing to
acquiesce in any reasonable terms that might be dictated
to him, consistent with what he deemed his inzut* He
* Honour,
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COLONEL LOW.
125
fell into good hands ; never was there a Eesident more
kind and considerate than Colonel Low. He under-
stood his own position, and had sense to perceive that
he gained more credit in fulfilling its duties than by-
stepping out of his sphere. Contented with exercising
the legitimate authority of his station, he had no am-
bition to be " Mayor of the Palace" at Lucknow, or to
maintain the balance of power between the rival factions
around the throne. He was satisfied to look on in
small matters — ready to advise in great ones. He was
a plain soldierly man, who, having served an appren-
ticeship to politics under Malcolm, fought at Mehidpoor,
and afterwards trod the intricate paths of Indian diplo-
macy at Jeypore, and with Bajee Rao, was well adapted
for the Lucknow Court : doubly so as being in his own
character the very antithesis of everything there;
straightforward integrity, opposed to crooked chicanery.
Colonel Low had seen enough of native courts to
understand and fathom them, while he had escaped
their corruptions. Inaccessible alike to bribes, threats,
and cajoling, he was feared by the vile Nuseer-ood-deen
Hyder, and respected by the amiable Mahommed Ali.
The new King had soon a new treaty laid before
him ; the document bears internal evidence of not being
Colonel Low's work; indeed some of the clauses wore
entirely opposed to his views. Its two prominent
features were, first, the introduction into Oude of an
auxiliary force of two regiments of Cavalry, five of
Infantry, and two companies of Golundauze at an
annual expense of sixteen lakhs of rupees, to be defrayed
by the local Government. The other was a stipulation
for the management by British officers of such districts
of Oude as should be notoriously oppressed by the local
agents. Colonel Low was, we know, averse to saddling
the King with more troops ; but his views were over-
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THE KINGDOM OP OUDE.
ruled, and a portion of the regiments were raised. The
measure was, however, very properly disapproved of by
the Court of Directors, and the enrolment of the new
levy prohibited, as being an exaction on the Oude State.
Mahommed Ali was evidently so much in earnest in
his efforts for the improvement of his kingdom, that
Government overlooked the glaring mismanagement
still existing in parts of Oude, and did not act on the
permission given by the new treaty.* The King's
intentions were good, and the character of the Court
rose very much during his short reign. He was un-
fortunate in the death of his two able ministers, Moom-
tuzim-ood-dowlah (Mehndy Ali Khan) and Zaheer-oo-
dowlah. The nephew of the former, as already men*
tioned, then succeeded, and held office for two years :
on his resignation a young nobleman, by name Shurreef-
oo-dowlah, the nephew of Zaheer-oo-dowlah, assumed
the reins of government, and retained them until the
old King's death. Shurreef-oo-dowlah is a man of good
ability; of considerable firmness and activity. His
manners are pleasing ; he possesses habits of business ;
on the whole he is considered the ablest and most
respectable candidate for the ministry. He is however
personally disliked by the present King.
On the death of his father in May, 1842, Mahommed
Amjud Ali, the present King, ascended the throne.
His conduct towards his minister was such as to cause
his resignation within two months. He then ap-
pointed a personal favourite, one Imdad Hooseen,
entitling him Ameen-oo-dowlah. After a trial of five
months he was found wanting, and removed, and Muno-
wur-oo-dowlah having returned from pilgrimage was
reinstated. The new minister, unable to stem the
current of Lucknow intrigue, held the office scarcely
* The whole treaty was disallowed by the home Government. — Ed.
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RECAPITULATION.
127
seven months, when Ameen-oo-dowlah was recalled to
his master's councils. The favourite is generally sup-
posed quite incompetent for the duties of his office, and
indeed is said to trouble himself very little about them.
He takes the profits and leaves the labours to his
deputy, Syud-ood-dowlah, a low person who has rapidly
risen from penury to power by the prostitution of his
own sister. Not long since this man was an omedwar
for the office of moonshee to one of Col. Roberts's
regiments. So goes round the wheel! The King
pays no attention to business, will abide by no warn-
ings, will attend to no advice, and, it is rumoured,
has secretly confirmed his imbecile ministers in their
places for four years, in spite of the remonstrances
of the Resident.
Let us briefly recapitulate. The condition of Oude
is yearly becoming worse. The revenue is yearly
lessening. There are not less than 100,000 soldiers in
the service of Zemindars. The revenue is collected by
half that number in the King's pay. In more than
half the districts of Oude are strong forts, most of
them surrounded with dense jungle, carefully rendered
as inaccessible as possible. Originally the effect of a
weak or tyrannical Government, such fortresses per-
petuate anarchy. The amite and other public officers,
are men of no character who obtain and retain their
position by Court bribery. Only the weak pay their
revenue ; those who have forts, or who, by combinations,
can withstand the amil, make their own revenue
arrangements. Throughout the country nothing exists
deserving the name of a judicial or Magisterial Court.
The newswriters are in the pay of the amils, generally
their servants; nevertheless, not less than a hundred
dacoities, or other acts of violence attended with loss of
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THE KINGDOM OF OUDE.
life, are annually reported; how many hundreds then
pass unnoticed! Within the last six months, the
Government dawk has been robbed: within the last
three, an amil has been slain. While we write (1845),
the British cantonment of Cawnpoor has been insulted ;
and month after month, the local press tells of new
atrocities. In short, the Government of the country is
utterly palsied ; its constitution is altogether destroyed*
no hope remains. Were any vitality left in Oude, the
country has, during the last twelve years, had a fair
opportunity of recovering. If the system of a King, a
Minister, a Resident, and a protecting army could sub-
sist without ruin to the . country so ruled, it has had a
trial. The scheme cannot be said to have failed for lack
of good instruments. The Oude rulers have been no
worse than monarchs so situated usually are; indeed
they have been better than might have been expected.
Weak, vicious, and dissolute they were, but they have
seldom been cruel, and have never been false. In the
storms of the last half century, Oude is the one single
Native State that has invariably been true to the British
Government ; that has neither intrigued against us nor
seemed to desire our injury. It may have been weak-
ness, it may have been apathy, but it is at least fact,
that the Oude Government has ever been faithful, and
therefore it is that we would not only advocate liberality
towards the descendants of Saadut Khan, but the
utmost consideration that can be shown them, consistent
with the duty we owe to the people of Oude. Among
her ministers have been as able individuals as are usually
to be found in the East; and there have not been
wanting good men and true as Residents. It is the
system that is defective, not the tools with which it has
been worked. We have tried every variety of inter-
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WANT OF A CONSISTENT POLICY.
129
ference. We have interfered directly, and we have in-
terfered indirectly ; by omission as well as by commis-
sion ; but it has invariably failed.
One great error lias been our interference in trifles,
while we stood aloof when important questions were at
issue. Another crying evil has beeif, the want of any
recognised system of policy in our negotiations with the
Lucknow Court. Everything seems to have been mere
guess-work and experiment. One Governor-General or
one Eesident has adopted one plan ; the next has tried
something wholly different. The Nawab, or the King,
the Minister, and the Eesident, have each had their
turn. One or other has alternately been everything
and nothing. If an able minister was appointed or
encouraged by the British Government, he was, as a
matter of course, suspected and thwarted by his master ;
if the King did happen to employ an honest servant,
the power of the latter was null, unless he had the
Resident's support. The amils neglected him, the
zemindars despised him. There could be no neutrality
in the case : the British agent must be friend or foe ;
he must be for or against the minister. Thus could
each member of the triumvirate vitiate the exertions
of one or both the others ; any individual of the three
could do incalculable evil ; but the three souls must be
in one body to, effect any good. Such a phenomenon
never occurred; there never was an approach to it,
unless perhaps for a few months in Colonel Low's
time.
On reverting to the past, it will be found that we
have interfered in the city, and have held aloof in the
country ; that at another time, while we spared the
palace, we have entered the villages with our tunkhwas
(revenue orders). Again, for a time, we have left both
Court and country unmolested. Such sullen silence
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THE KINGDOM OF OtTDE.
was always construed into the most direct interference ;
for, the King being guaranteed, it was believed that he
was then at liberty to work his will without fear of con-
sequences, since British bayonets would appease what-
ever tumult might arise. Our troops have carried the
fortresses of the oppressed by storm, and put the brave
defenders to the sword. On one occasion a terrible
example was made, and not a man escaped. Our cavalry
surrounded the fort, the infantry entered; and of the
doomed defenders, not a soul survived.* At that period
we not only guaranteed the Buler, but were made
the executioners of his will. A revulsion came : such
acts were shown in all their naked deformity ; and both
Court and country were again for a while left to them-
selves. Fraud was then substituted for force, and
occasionally large bands o£ ill-paid and licentious sol-
diery were sent to devastate the country they could not
subdue. The British troops did their work of destruc-
tion speedily, and therefore with comparative mercy.
The royal rabble spread, like locusts, over the land, and
killed by famine what they could not destroy by the
sword.
From this mass of mischief, who is the gainer? It
may be supposed that the amils at least gain ; not they.
There may perhaps be twenty families in all Oude, that
had profited by Government employ; but all others
have been simply sponges. The officials have sucked
others to be themselves squeezed in turn. Is it to
remain thus for ever ? Is the fairest province of India
always to be harried and rackrented for the benefit of
one family, or rather, to support in idle luxury one
individual of one family ? Forbid it justice, forbid it
mercy 1 Had any one of the many Governors-General
who spoiled Oude remained a few years longer in office,
* The fort of Puther Serai, in the year 1808.
TREATY OBLIGATIONS.
131
he might have righted her wrongs. But, unhappily,
while several have been in authority long enough to
wound, not one has yet had time to bind up and heal.
Hastings began the "stand and deliver" system with
the Nawabs. More moderate governors succeeded, who
felt ashamed to persecute a family that had already been
so pillaged. They pitied the monarch, but they forgot
that misdirected mercy to him was cruelty to his
subject-millions.
For this culpable indifference, our Government had a
standing excuse, — their hands were tied by the treaties
of their predecessors, and their interference, even if
justifiable, would do more harm than good. Poor
casuistry ! The truth is, that where a question admits
of doubt, there can be little danger if, with clean hands,
we take the weaker side; if, foregoing all thought of
personal or political profit, we arbitrate in favor of the
mass. There was no treaty for Warren Hastings' acts,
or for half the acts of half his successors. A hole was,
however, generally found for creeping out of every
dilemma which affected our own interests. At the very
worst, when a vacancy occurred on the musnud, a new
negotiation soon set all to rights. On each occasion we
dictated our own terms ; on each of these opportunities
we might as readily have made arrangements for
securing good government as for securing our own
subsidy : we were explicit enough on the one point ; all
else was left indefinite, the stronger party being, of
course, the interpreters of the law. The Oude Govern-
ment therefore suffered by diplomatic quibbles; the
Oude subjects by revenue ones. In each case the
weakest have gone to the wall. The result is before our
eyes; the remedy is also in our hands. No one can
deny that we are now authorized by treaty to assume
the management of the distracted portions of the
k 2
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THE KINGDOM OF OUDE.
kingdom. — All are more or less distracted and mis-
governed. Let the management of all be assumed under
some such rules as those which were laid down by
Lord W. Bentinck. Let the administration of the
country, as far as possible, be native. Let not a rupee
come into the Company's coffers. Let Oude be at last
governed, not for one man, the King, but for him and
his people.
We must be brief in the explanation of the plan we
would recommend.
The King has made himself a cypher ; he has let go
the reins of Government; let us take them up. He
should be prevented from marring what he cannot or
will not manage. In every eastern court the Sovereign
is everything or nothing. Mahommed Amjud Ali has
given unequivocal proof that he is of the second class ;
there can, therefore, be no sort of injustice in confirming
his own decree against himself, and setting him aside.
He should be treated with respect, but restricted to his
palace and its precincts. The Eesident should be
minister, not only in fact, but in name. Let it not be
said that he works in the dark ; but give him the re-
sponsible charge of the country, and make him answer-
able to the British Government for its good or ill
management. While his personal demeanour to the
King must be deferential, he should be no more under
his authority than the commissioner of Delhi is under
the Great Mogul. Divide the country into five dis-
tricts ; in each, place a British officer, as superintendent,
who shall receive appeals against the Native officers.
Abolish, in toto, the farming system. Give as quickly
as possible a light assessment for five years, fixed as far
as possible by the people themselves ; that is, let the
one-and-a-quarter million (or thereabouts), the country
may be supposed able to bear, be subdivided in a great
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HOW TO DEAL WITH OUDE.
133
assembly of the people among the five districts; and
then let the district, pergunnah, and village quotas be
similarly told off, under the eye of British super-
intendents.
Due consideration must be given to the circum-
stances of all, and to the privileges that may have arisen
from long exemption; and it must be remembered that
one village may be ruined by paying half what another,
in apparently similar circumstances, can easily afford;
let the rich and powerful pay as well as the poor and
weak. Keference must be had, and some consideration
granted to past payments and past privileges as well as
to present condition. Perfect equalization cannot be
expected at once.
While the first arrangements are in progress, a strong
military force should be at hand; and the first act of
recusancy should be severely punished. The dismissal of
the rural armies should be effected, and all forts belong-
ing to notorious persons should be dismantled. Where
possible, an amnesty should be given for the past. No
individual, whom it may be possible to reclaim, should
be branded. The motives that had driven men to the
bush should be considered, and penalty bonds having
been taken, they should be received and treated as
reformed members of society. Under firm but liberal
treatment, many a supposed desperado would retrieve
his reputation. Speedy and severe examples should be
made of amils and others convicted of fraud, extortion,
or other oppression; and it should be early and dis-
tinctly understood that no position will screen male-
factors or defaulters. The rule will disgust a few, but
will delight the many.
The revenue settlement is the first great question in
all eastern countries ; when it is well effected, all
remaining work is comparatively easy. At the risk
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THE KINGDOM OF OTJDE.
then of being set down by men who deal in forms,
rather than in realities, as a very unsound lawgiver, we
say, first settle the revenue question satisfactorily, and
the path of amendment will be smooth. Let men's
minds be relieved as to the past and the future, and
they will readily settle down for the present. Three
months, at the utmost, should suffice to make the sum-
mary settlement we propose ; no niceties need be
entered into. Let the assessment be light, and let
every man, high and low, who has to pay, have his
quota distinctly registered, whether it be in cash or in
kind ; and let prompt and severe punishment follow the
earliest instances of infringement of recorded agreements.
Let a date be fixed, anterior to which no Government
claims for revenue shall be advanced. Let it also be at
once promulgated that no civil case will be attended to
of more than twelve, or at the utmost of twenty years'
date ; and no police case of more than three ; and that
all claims must be filed within one year of the date
of the introduction of the British rule. All these cases
should be made over to punchayets, superintended by
the best men in the land. Brief reasons of decision
in each case should be entered in a book, and copies of
the same sent weekly to the superintendent. For
ordinary civil, fiscal, and police duties, courts should
be established or old ones confirmed in the several
zillahs : punchayets should be encouraged ; honest mem-
bers* of such assemblies should be honoured and
favoured, and dishonest ones discountenanced and
disgraced.
What a change would such a system, honestly and ably
worked out, effect within a single twelvemonth ! It is
* In ©very community there are men are usually elected sur-punck,
individuals whom disputants will or president, by the members cnosen.
readily receive as arbitrators : such — H. M. L.
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EMPLOYMENT OF THE NATIVES.
135
delightful to think of it. We see the difficulties in the
way, but difficulties ore not impossibilities. No plan is
all smooth, no measure of amelioration is without ob-
stacles. Our main difficulty would be to select super-
intendents of sufficient experience, possessing at the
same time energy and ability, strength of body and of
mind, to face the chaos that would at first be presented
them. Such men are, however, to be found. They
must be paid, and liberally too, not in the Scinde and
Saugor fashion. It would be the worst of all economy
to employ men who would not remain at least five years
to work otlt the primary scheme.
Our plan involves the employment of every present
Oude official, toilling to remain, and able to perform the
duties that would be required of him. The majority of
the present amils would resign, as would most of the
officers about the Court. All valid tenures of land
would of course be upheld, and all superannuated offi-
cials having claims to pension, would be considered.
It would be desirable to retain the services of one or
two respectable men, to assist the Resident and form
with him a court of appeal from the superintendent's
decrees.
When matters were thus put in train, village boun-
daries should be defined ; a revenue survey, and a set-
tlement for thirty, or even fifty, years should follow.
We do not anticipate the necessity of any permanent
increase of establishment. If Mr. Maddock's estimate
is correct, half the sum now plundered by the amils
and the ministers would amply remunerate all the
requisite officials.
The primary arrangements would probably require
cash ; but as the improvement of the country would be
secured, an Oude loan of a crore of rupees might be
raised, which the increase of cultivation and general
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THE KINGDOM OF OUDE.
amelioration of the State would enable us easily to pay
off in ten or fifteen years. We repeat that the assess-
ment should be light. The people as well as the Court
should benefit by improvement, if they are expected to
further it. There should be a liberal allowance for the
King — twenty, thirty, or even fifty lakhs per annum
might, as the revenues increased, be allowed. He
should be furnished, to his heart's content, with silver-
sticks, but very scantily with matchlocks. The King
would be dissatisfied, let him remain so. . He is not
particularly well pleased just now, and, so long as we
act honestly, the state of his temper is not of much con-
sequence. In whatever spirit he might meet our pro-
posed radical reform he would find few to sympathize
in his dissatisfaction. His brothers, uncles, and cousins
would be delighted with the change.
The guaranteed would be in ecstacies. Almost all
others would rejoice at the reformation. The people of
Oude — the men who recruit our " beautiful regiments"
— would bless John Company.
The scheme we have here indicated, rather than de-
tailed, is not for a day, nor for any specific number of
years. It is refined cruelty to raise the cup to the lip
and then to dash it away. Let us not deal with Oude
as we have done with Hyderabad and Nagpore. The
kings of Oude, generally, have, as rulers, been weighed
and found wanting. His present Majesty has habitually
disregarded the spirit and letter of the terms concluded
between his father and the British Government. The
family must be placed beyond the power of doing
further mischief. We have not been guiltless ; in re-
penting of the past, let us look honestly to the future ;
for once let us remember the people, the gentles, the
nobles, the royal family, and not legislate merely for the
King.
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CONCLUSION.
137
If the Oude Kesidency could, with honour, be with-
drawn, or if we believed that there was a possibility of
the Government of the King holding together for a
month, when abandoned by the British Government,
we should at once advocate giving his Majesty the op-
portunity of trying to stand on his own legs; but
knowing the thing to be impossible, we have offered the
only practicable remedy for the ills that afflict the
country, and shall be delighted to see it, or some such
scheme, speedily carried out. This scheme is given in
the rough. We have not even attempted to round it
off ; the principle is all we advocate. The details may
be indefinitely improved, but whatever outcry or oppo-
sition our sentiments may elicit, we sit down satisfied
with the reflection that we have suggested no breach
of faith, but have promulgated a plan which the most
conscientious servant of the State might be proud to
work out.
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MAHBATTA HISTOEY AND EMPIRE.
[written in 1845.]
Maharashtra, or the country of the Mahrattas, is, ac-
cording to Hindoo geographers, one of the five principal
divisions of the Deccan,* or, country south of the Nar-
badda and Mahanaddi rivers. The limits of Maha-
rashtra are variously given : Mahommedans seldom
troubled themselves about geographical questions, and
it tv as long after they had overrun the different pro-
vinces of India, before they inquired respecting their
original divisions. Mahrattas, indeed, are seldom men-
tioned by Mahommedan writers until the deeds of
Shahjee, and his son Sivajee, brought their countrymen
prominently to notice. When the historian Ferishtah
alludes to the Mahrattas he calls them " the Hindoos,"
" the Bergis," meaning, by the first appellation, the
population generally, in contradistinction to their Mos-
lem conquerors ; by the second, designating them ma-
rauders, f
* The Deccan of the Hindus com-
prised the whole peninsula south
of the Narbadda and Mahanaddi,
but Europeans have adopted the
Mahommedan definition, and limit
it to Telingana, Gondwana, and
that portion of Maharashtra above
the Western Ghats, being generally
the country between the Narbadda
and Kistna rivers.— H. M. L.
t Mr. Elphinstone states, at page
467, vol ii. of his History of India,
" The word Mahrattas first occurs in
Ferishta, in the transactions of the
year a J). 1485, and is not then ap-
plied in a general sense." This is an
error. It strikes us we have repeat-
edly seen them mentioned at earner
dates. By a hasty reference we have
now found three such references:
a.d. 1342, Ferishtah, as translated by
Dow, says, "He at the same time
conferred the Government of Dou-
lutabad and of the country of the
MahraUors upon Cuttulech, his pre-
ceptor."— Page 289, vol. i. Again, at
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EAELY HI8T0BT.
139
Two points of the Mahratta history have, however,
been recovered from the mazes of antiquity. Ptolemy
tells us that, in the second century, there was a large
city called Tagara, one of the principal marts of the
Deccan, or country of the south; well known to the
Greeks, and frequented by Egyptian merchants, 250
years before Christ. Its exact position has been the
subject of controversy. Mr. Elphinstone considers that
the site has yet to be ascertained, while Grant Duff
places it on the Godavery, about fifty miles below
Pyetan, — supposed to have been the Paithana of
Ptolemy. Learned natives recognise the name of Ta-
gara, and Grant Duff alludes to ancient deeds of grants
of land engraved on copper plates, styling its monarch
" the Chief of the Chiefs of Tagara." The second fact
is, that a conquering sovereign, by the name Salivahan,
whose era begins a.d. 77, and is the one now ordi-
narily used in the Deccan, ruled in the Mahratta
country. He is said to have subdued the famous Vi-
kramaditya, king of Malva; but this could not have
been the case, as there are 135 years between their eras.
The capital of Salivahan is recorded to have been at
Pyetan on the Godavery.
The foregoing seem to be the only facte that can be
gleaned from the mass of legendary accounts regarding
Maharashtra, and its many petty independent States,
antecedent to the inroad of the Mahommedans under
Alla-ud-deen, in the year of our Lord, 1294. At this
time, Jadow Ram-deo Rao was king, rajah, or mayhap,
only "chief of the chiefs/' He was at least sovereign of an
extensive country, though there were at the time several
two places, in page 320 of the same of " Feroze Shaw's" zenana, in a.d.
volume, "Sirvadon, Chief of the 1398, are noted "Bajpootneea, Ben-
Mahrattors," is mentioned. In Scott's galees, Guzratees, Telinganees, Ma-
translation of Ferishtah's History harattins" — H. M. L.
of the Deccan, among other inmates
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140
M AH R ATT A HISTORY AND KM PI RE.
other chiefs in Maharashtra independent of his authority.
Jadow Ram-deo Rao ruled at Deogurh, the modern
Doulutabad. His conquerors, astonished at his wealth
and power, styled him King of the Deccan. The plun-
der of his capital supplied Alla-ud-deen with the wealth
which enabled him to usurp the throne of Delhi.
To make our subsequent historical details intelligible,
it will be requisite briefly to describe the position and
features of the Mahratta country. Mr. Elphinstone's
History of India gives the following boundaries of Ma-
harashtra. On the north, the Sautpoora range of hills,
from Naundode, near Baroach, on the western coast, to
the source of the Wurda river. On the east, the Wurda
river, which, taking a south-easterly course, joins the
Wyne Gunga, south-west of Chanda. On the south, the
boundary is a waving line, running past Beder and Ko-
lapoor to Goa ; while the western limit is the line of
coast from Goa to Damaun, and thence inland to Naun-
dode.
The trapezium enclosed within this outline covers
about one hundred thousand square miles, and is esti-
mated to contain between six and seven millions of in-
habitants. Some portions of the country are thickly
inhabited ; but large tracts are desolate, or very thinly
peopled, giving as the average of the whole, scarcely
above sixty to the square mile.* The most marked
feature of the country, whose boundaries we have de-
fined, is the Syhadree range of mountains, commonly
* Mr. Tone, who was an officer in had been, we consider his statement
the service of the Peishwa, says, "I to be above the mark. The Satara
believe it may be safely asserted and Poona lands now bear a far dif-
that through the whole country ferent aspect ; indeed, wherever Bri-
(Bengal and Behar excepted) one tish influence extends, and common
acre m fifty is not cultivated. He care and intelligence is exerted, the
wrote in 1818, and doubtless alluded change is soon extraordinary. We
to the country around Poona, where have, in more than one quarter, seen
he had served ; but even there, and cultivation doubled, nay trebled, in
distracted as the Peishwa's territory a single year; — H. M. L.
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GEOGRAPHICAL LIMITS.
141
called the Ghats. They run along the western coast of
India, at an average distance of thirty-seven miles from
the sea : their summits are from three to five thousand
feet in height, rising abruptly from the west, and sup-
porting a table-land, which averages three thousand feet
above the sea and slopes gradually towards the east.
This range divides Maharashtra into three great tracts,
the Concan, the Concan-Ghat-Mahta, and the Desh
(Des), or country to the eastward of the high lands. The
Concan is that portion of the country which lies between
the Syhadree mountains and the sea, and extends in a
long narrow strip from the river Taptee, at Surat, to
the Portuguese town of Goa. This division varies in
breadth from twenty-five to fifty miles, and contains
about twenty thousand square miles, or one-fifth of all
Maharashtra. The Concan is a very rugged country,
" interspersed with huge mountains and thick jungles ;
intersected by rivers and numberless rivulets." Some
portions, however, especially near the coast, are remark-
ably fertile. Towards the Ghats the country is wild
and picturesque in the extreme, the jungle verdure is
there perpetual, and vegetation most luxuriant.
The table land above the passes is called the Concan-
Ghat-Mahta, or Concan above the Ghats. The highest
part of the Syhadree range is that which immediately
faces the Concan. The breadth of this chain of moun-
tains is about twenty or twenty-five miles, including the
space from the summit of the ridge facing the Concan
to the termination of the branches on the east side ; the
whole intervening space being designated Concan-Ghat-
Mahta.* The area will thus be equal to rather more
* The general elevation of the is 4700 ; the height above the sub-
Bombay sanatarium in that portion jacent country in the Concan is 4000
of the Syhadree range called the feet, and above the general level of
Muhabaleshwur hills is 4500 feet the Deccan, at its eastern base, 2300
above the sea : the highest summit feet. The average breadth of the
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142
M AH R ATT A HISTORY AND EMPIRE.
than half that of the Concan. The whole tract from
Joonere to Kolapoor is fairly populated, and the valleys
are well cultivated. The people are hardy and patient,
and under Sivajee made excellent soldiers. The Mawu-
lees (or Mahratta inhabitants of a portion of the table
land and valleys called the Mawuls) were the main in-
struments of his rise. North of Joonere, the valleys are
less cultivated, and are occupied by Bheels and Coolies
who were all plunderers, but many of whom have been
reclaimed. The summits of the hills are frequently
crowned with huge basaltic rocks, forming natural
fortresses of great strength. Many of them have been
improved by art, and from the earliest times these
mountain fortresses have been considered among the
strongest in India. Mr. Tone says, " I have counted,
in a day's march through Candeish, nearly twenty
fortresses, all in sight, in different directions." Often as
the majority of these places have changed hands, they
have seldom been taken by main force. Many contain
springs of pure water; all have reservoirs, and, in
native warfare, their weak garrisons could defy power-
ful armies. Gold or stratagem, treachery, famine or a
coup-de-main usually gained them ; it was reserved for
the British to carry by storm in open day such places
as Panaila, Samungurh, and Manogurh. The third
great division of Maharashtra is the Desh, or Des, being
the open country eastward from the foot of the Ghat-
Mahta. The Desh is by no means an unvaried level,
but becomes less broken as it recedes easterly. It is
intersected by four chains of mountains, running east
and west, — the Sautpoora, Chandore, Ahmednuggur, and
Mahdeo hills ; the first being the northern boundary of
Maharashtra, the last lying to the north of Satara.
table land on which the settlement and a half, and the average length
has been established is eleven miles eleven miles.— H. M. L.
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THE PEOPLE.
143
The general aspect therefore of the Mahratta country,
is hilly. The valleys are well watered, hut indifferently
cultivated. Five great rivers — the Narhadda, the Tap*
tee, the Godavery, the Deema, and the Kistna — per-
meate the country.
The mass of the inhabitants are Hindus,* separated,
as elsewhere in India, into the four great classes ; but, as
usual, innumerably sub-divided. The Brahmans have
long almost monopolized all civil and military offices ;
though, while thus secularly employed, they forfeit the
veneration evinced towards those who devote their lives
to spiritual concerns. They commenced as servants;
they now command in almost every Mahratta durbar.
The name of Mahratta is applicable to all the inha-
bitants ; but Grant Duff states, that " amongst them-
selves a Mahratta Brahman will carefully distinguish
himself from a Mahratta. That term, though extended
to the Koonbees, or cultivators, is, in strictness, con-
fined to the military families of the country, many of
whom claim a doubtful, but not improbable descent
from the Rajputs/' He might have added that, all over
India, the Mahratta chiefs are considered to be Soodras
of the three great divisions, husbandmen, shepherds, and
cowherds* Mahratta women are well treated ; those of
rank are generally veiled, but it is little, if any, disgrace
for them to appear uncovered. Scott Waring witnessed
the wife of the Peishwa, Bajee Rao, practising her
horse; and Mr. Tone says; at page 9, "I can affirm
having seen the daughter of a prince making bread
with her own hands, and otherwise employed in the
* " The Hindus" are too generally between the Hindu of Taniore, My-
conaidered, or rather talked and sore, Bengal, Oude, Maharashtra, and
written of, as one race, much as half- Rajputana there is quite as much dif-
"ghtened Indians believe all Fe- ferenee in language, customs, forma,
ringhis (Franks) to be one people : and features as obtains between Bus-
their ignorance may be excused, but sians, Germans, French, Spaniards,
Englishmen should understand that Italians, and Englishmen. — H. M. 1*
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144 MAHRATTA HISTORY AND EMPIRE.
ordinary business of domestic housewifery." Widows
usually perform suttee with the bodies of their husbands,
unless when they have infant children, or are them-
selves called to govern, which has so often happened of
late at every Mahratta court. In such cases the veil is,
in a great measure, relinquished. The widow having
then to counsel with men, and even to go into battle,
forgets that she is a woman. Within an area ot
100,000 square miles, there must doubtless be great
variety of form and feature, but the Mahrattas gene-
rally may be considered small, active, well-made men.
For Hindus their features are coarse. They are hardy,
persevering, and abstemious. The cultivators and shep-
herds are frugal, patient, and industrious, and possess as
many good qualities as can be expected from a people
whose country has for centuries been a battle-field.
They have the cunning incidental to their condition ;
to a race who have long lived on the defensive, who
have been accustomed to be squeezed, and who have
learnt to pay nothing that could not be enforced. The
notions of Mahratta chiefs and soldiers are, for Indians,
peculiar. They have none of the pride and dignity of
the Eajput, Sikh, Jat, or Patan, and little of their
apathy or want of worldly wisdom. The Mahratta con-
siders plunder and profit to be the object of war; for
this he will undergo fatigue, privation, and danger ; but
he has no notion of endangering or sacrificing his life on
a mere punctilio. Mr. Elphinstone, after strikingly show-
ing the points of difference between the sentiments of
the Mahratta and the Eajput, affecting even the outward
appearance of the two nations, remarks, " there is some-
thing noble in the carriage even of an ordinary Eajput ;
and something vulgar in that of the most distinguished
Mahratta. The Eajput is the most worthy antagonist,
the Mahratta the most formidable enemy ; for he will
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THE VILLAGE SYSTEM.
145
not fail in boldness and enterprize when they are indis-
pensable, and will always support them, or supply their
place by stratagem, activity, and perseverance."
The village system prevailed in great purity in Ma-
harashtra; all the accessible land in the country was
portioned off into villages, the boundaries of which
were defined. The arable land was divided into fields,
and every field was named and registered. The ma-
jority of the cultivators were hereditary occupants
(meerasdars), who could not be ejected as long as they
regularly paid the assessment on their fields. The
Government servants in charge of circles of villages
were called Deshmukhs, and their accountants, Desh-
pandyas; the first answering to the Talukdar or Ze-
mindar, the second to the Canungo of Hindoostan.
There were also a class of farmers of the revenue called
Khotes. One or other of the above would occasionally
take advantage of circumstances, and usurp the lands
over which they had been appointed mere collectors.
During a period of anarchy, and under native rule,
such persons effected in Maharashtra what, in a time
of peace, and under a British Government, was deli-
berately accomplished in Bengal ; showing that hasty,
though well-intentioned, legislation may affect the
rights and welfare of a people even as much as the
worst tyranny. Every village was a miniature com-
monwealth. Each had its establishment of officials.
The Patail, or head man, was usually a Sudra ; he held
an office nearly corresponding to the Punch, Mokudum,
or Lumberdar of the N. "W. Provinces. He super-
intended the cultivation, and managed the police.
Disputes that he could not adjust were referred to a
punchayet of "the inhabitants best acquainted with
the circumstances." The Patail's clerk was termed
Koolkurnee ; he was usually a Brahman, though occa-
L
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146 mahrattA HlBfdRY And empire.
sionally, as in Hindoostan* of any other caste* Hi&
office corresponded with that of Patwafee* or tfecord
keeper.* There was likewise the Mhat, or Dher* being
the Goreiti Bolahar* or Dowaha* that is, ihe scout,
guide, and watchman of the Tillage. Then there Were
the handicraftsmen, and others^ few of whom are now
found as public servants in villages undef British
administration, but who are all over India fetiogniBed
as remnants of the primitive village System, and Used
to be paid by assignments of land. Though ill the
Concan, as in Bengal, the Khotes, or faftiiert of the
revenue, and the Pergunnah chiefs have generally
transmitted their office to their sons* and superseded
the village maliks ; in the Ghat-Mahta, each village has
still its Patail and Koolkurnees.
Ten years ago Colonel Sutherland pronounced the
Berar (Nagpore) and Satara Governments the best
native administrations in India* implying that their
demands were the lightest oU the cultivator. The
injunction of the Shaster, that the Prince dhould only
take one-sixth of the crop, is everywhere disregarded ;
where payments are in kind, three times that Amount,
or half the crop, is tnore usually exacted ; it is a lenient
administration that demands only one-third from irrk
gated and good lands, and one-fourth from dry and
poor soils. As elsewhere* there are other petty but
vexatious cesses, and the Customs system among the
Mahrattas, m in other parts of India, is a fruitftil
source of annoyance to traders* yielding little corre-
sponding profit to the rulers. The Cultivators are
divided into two great felasses> Meerasdars, or here^
ditary occupants, with certain proprietary rights, and
* The Patail and Koolkurnee are if the village manager, Gramadeka-
terms introduced by the Mussul- ree ; the Kalkarni was designated
mans. The original Hindoo appel- Gramlekak. — H. M. L.
lation of the former was Gaora, or,
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THE M AH R ATT A 8TATES.
147
Ooprees or tenants at will. " All property, or shares of
hereditary right in land, or in the district and village
establishments, termed under the ancient Hindoo Go-
vernments, torittee, is now best known throughout the
Mahratta country, by the name of wutun, and the
holder of any such enjoys, what is considered very
respectable, the appellation of wutundar." — Grant Duff,
vol. i. p. 43. So much are rural honours valued, that
the fractional portions of the office of Patail were often
sold at high prices ; each holder of a portion designating
himself Patail. When the monarch of an empire,
Sindhia clung to what he called his hereditary Patail-
ship.
Of the nine existing Mahratta States,* none, except
Sawunt-waree, a petty chiefship, can claim any
antiquity. Satara ranks from 1664 ; Kolapoor, from a
younger branch of Sivajee's family that separated in
the year 1729. The rest are formed from later acqui-
sitions granted to military commanders, chiefly by the
Peishwa, to be held in subordination to the empire,
but which never paid allegiance to Satara, and a very
brief one to Poona. All the principalities, except Sa-
tara, Kolapoor, and Sawunt-waree, are beyond the
limits of Maharashtra; and except about Nagpore,
where there are a few Mahrattas, the ruling classes in
* They are — small State dependent on Beeja-
1. Gwalior, or Sindhia's Country. poor, the chiefs of which are
2. Indore, or Holkar's ditto. called Dcsaee, Deshmukh, or
3. Berar, or Bhonala of Nagpore. Sawunt, hence Sawunt-waree.
4. Baroda, or Qhaekwar. There are also many Jaghirdars,
6. Satara} or the lineal descendants more or less powerful, some holding
of Sivajee's son, Sambagee. direct from the British Government,
6. Kolapoor, or the lineal descendant others depending on Satara, Kola-
of 8ivajee*s second son, Rajah poor, &c.
Ram. Absorbed into the British Terri-
7. ( Dhar, tory :—
8. ( Dewas, are pettv chiefships held 1. Poona, or the Peishwa's Princi-
by two of the oldest of the Mah- pality.
ratta families, a the Powars." 2. Tanjore, or the Territory of Vcnka-
9. Sawunt-waree, properly Waree, a jee, brother of Strajee. — H. M. L.
L 2
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148 MAHRATTA HISTORY AND EMPIRE.
those countries are as much foreigners as are the
Mahommedans in Oude, or the English in Calcutta.
With this brief general sketch we now proceed to
our historical notice. In the year 1294 Alla-ud-deen,
the governor of Oude and nephew of the Khiljee king
of Delhi, J elal-ud-deen, without asking the sanction of
his uncle, moved across the mountains and forests of
the Vindhya range, and, after a toilsome and dangerous
march of 700 miles through hostile countries, reached
the El Dorado of Deogurh. His force consisted only
of 8000 men, a small army for so formidable an under-
taking, but as large a one as its bold leader could have
fed on such a route. Eamdeo Eao Jadow, the Mah-
ratta prince of Deogurh, negotiated terms, but his son
broke the treaty, and drew on his country doubly
severe terms. Large cessions of territory were made,
and the victor carried back with him the accumulated
treasuries of centuries. Thus enriched, Alla-ud-deen
returned to Delhi, only to assassinate his uncle, and
seize the imperial throne. During the reign of Alla-
ud-deen almost all Maharashtra was subdued ; but on
his death the Mahrattas recovered the greater part of
their territory, and endeavoured to regain Deogurh.
Its Mussulman garrison was, however, relieved by the
Emperor Mubarik, who took the Mahratta leader Hirpal
Deo, prisoner, and caused him to be flayed alive.
Several insurrections occurred. The Emperor Ma-
hommed Tughluk, among other wild schemes, endea-
voured to remove all the inhabitants of Delhi to Deo-
gurh, the name of which place he changed to Doulut-
abad, intending to make it the seat of empire. He
had partially executed his merciless design when the
Deccan fell from his hands, to be recovered after nearly
four hundred years by Aurungzebe, only to remain a
nominal appendage of the Mogul Empire for less than
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EARLY HISTORY.
149
the term of a single life, and then to be for ever rent
from the Delhi throne.*
The rebellion of the fugitive nobles, — who, in the
year 1344, fearing the royal treachery, rose on their
guards, slew them, fled to Doulutabad, and there,
electing one of their own number, a simple commander
of a thousand horse, as their king, raised the standard
of rebellion, — belongs to the record of the Mahom-
medan empire in the South ; but without a brief notice
of the circumstance the Mahratta history would be
unintelligible. The rebels agreed on a plan of warfare
which has ever been the favourite one in the Mahratta
country. A portion of the allied force under the new
King, Nazir-ud-deen, defended Doulutabad, while the
other chiefs acted on the communications and supplies
of the besiegers. The Emperor divided his force ac-
cordingly, and himself prosecuting the siege, he sent a
strong force against the field detachments.
The Delhi Empire never was at peace. It was espe-
cially troubled during Mahommed Tughluk's reign ; and
now, when he had nearly reduced Doulutabad, he was
urgently called away by an insurrection in the North.
The confederates, emboldened by his departure, gained
courage ; they were joined by many Mahratta chiefs,
and, under Zuffir Khan, one of their own ablest leaders,
gave the Imperial general battle, slew him, and gained
a great victory. Nazir-ud-deen came out from Doulut-
abad to meet his victorious army, but, observing the
influence that Zuffir Khan had obtained, wisely resigned
the throne in his favour. Zuffir Khan had originally
been the slave of a Brahman, who treated him kindly
* Aurungzebe only completed the occupancy of thirty-six years, in re-
conquest of the Deccan in the year ward for centuries of exertion and
1687, and Nizam-ul-mulk became in- incalculable expenditure of life and
dependent in 1723. Thus the Mo- treasure. — B. M, L,
guts had a troubled and exhausting
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150
M A II R ATT A HISTOEY AND EMPIRE.
and foretold his future rise. The new king changed his
own name to Alla-ud-deen Husein Kangoh Brahmani, in
gratitude to his old master, whom he appointed his
treasurer. Thus originated the name of the Brahmani
dynasty.
Alla-ud-deen commenced his reign in the year 1347.
His rise was mainly caused by the succours afforded by
the native (Mahratta) chiefs, to whom he was not
ungrateful. His dynasty lasted aboxit 150 years.
Maharashtra was, at his accession, divided into petty
principalities. Every holder of an inaccessible hill or
deep jungle was a polygar, literally a rebel. The new
sovereign subdued the weak among those in the plains,
and conciliated others by grants of lands, or by the
confirmation of their possessions. By such means he
made himself master of almost all Maharashtra, except
part of the Concan-Ghat-Mahta, which his 'successors
did not succeed in conquering until a century later.
During this period there were several insurrections, but
chiefly induced by Mahommedan officers. The Mah-
ratta chiefs were generally faithful.
In 1396 the terrible famine designated "the Durga
Dewee" commenced, and lasted for twelve years, depo-
pulating large tracts, and leaving traces of its effects for
forty years after. The inhabitants of whofe districts
were swept away ; village land-marks were lost ; their
boundaries were forgotten, and, when the periodical
rains returned, and endeavours were made to restore
cultivation, the whole country was discovered to be in
one mass of disorder. The polygars had increased in
all directions ; the hill forts formerly reduced by the
Mahommedans, and abandoned in the great dearth,
were now held by banditti, who infested the country
and destroyed the returning hopes of those who had
escaped nature's terrible calamity. Great efforts were
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EAE^Y HISTORY.
151
made during successive years to repeopie the villages
and to reduce the hill forts, Ifo rent was demanded
for lands during the $rst year of fresh occupation, and
only a tobrs, (horseb^g) full of grain for each bigah
during the second year. But little was effected until,
by a systematic plan, the robber forts were reduced
throughout the Syhadree range. An able commander,
by name Mullik-ul-tijar, had great success. He sub-
dued the whole Ghat-Mahta, and carried his arms into
the stilj. unconquered part of the Concan. He besieged
and obliged a rajah, whose surname was Sirkay, to
surrender, insisting on his embracing Islamism. The
Mahratta consented, but deluded the Moslem into a
previous expedition against the Bajah of Kondan, whom
he designated his hereditary enemy. A detachment
of 7000 Mahominedans started under the immediate
orders of their pommander, and guided by Sirkay, as
to an assured victory, were led into an ambuscade, and
every man massacred. The Deccanees, Hindoo and
Moslem, have always been noted for such wiles of
warfare.
Mahomnied Shah, the second Brahmani monarch, di-
vided his Jdngdom into four turufs (or quarters), to
each of which he appointed a governor, or Turufdar;
but as the empire extended by conquests from the rajahs
of Telingana,Beejaungur, Orissa, and the Concan, it was
found necessary further to subdivide the management
of the country, separating each of the former divisions
into two. Several arrangements were also made with a
view of securing the fidelity of the local governors ; but
they oil failed- Mahommedans can conquer, they can-
not retain. There seems to be something in their creed
and customs opposed to permanency and to good go-
vernment. The subdivision into eight governments
took place in the year 1478, and only eleven years after-
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152 MAHRATTA HISTORY AND EMPIRE.
wards, Adil Khan, the governor of Beejapoor, the
founder of the Adil Shahee dynasty, declared his inde-
pendence: soon after, four other Chiefs assumed the
purple. Only three of these States,* formed from the
extinction of the Brahmani dynasty, were in existence
when the Mahrattas rose into notice*. The revolutions
in the several Mahommedan States of the Deccan all
aided the eventual emancipation of the original inha-
bitants. The majority of the forts, especially in un-
healthy parts of the country, were held by Mahrattas,
sometimes as hired soldiers of the Mahommedan Govern-
ment, but more frequently as Jaghirdars and heredi-
tary defenders of the soil. In all times of weakness or
of tumult these garrisons, called Gurhkuris, made their
own terms ; they either throw off the yoke altogether,
or joined the party or pretender that offered the best
terms. Deshmukhs, Dessaees, and other [rural chiefs
also, whether they acquired authority by birth, or as
Collectors of revenue, or as military leaders holding
lands in wild and secluded quarters, all made their
harvest of Mahommedan dissensions and of Moslem
pride and ignorance. From these Chiefs are descended
the present " Mankurees," literally great men, many of
whom, though reduced to poverty, claim superiority to
the present mushroom monarchs of their race, and pay
them very unwilling homage.
Except the Sawunt-waree family and the Powars of
Dhar and Dewas, the princes of the present day are men
of yesterday, descended at best from petty village of-
ficers. The Holkars were shepherds, and Mulhar Eao,
the first leader of the name, for years grazed his uncle's
sheep in Candeish. The Sindhias were of a higher,
though broken family, so that Banoojee, the modern
* The Beejapoor, or Adil Shahee ; the Golcondah, or Kootub Shahee.—
th e Ahmednuggur, or Nizam Shahee ; H. M. L.
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EARLY HISTORY.
153
head of the clan, served the second Peishwa as a com-
mon bargir, and report says, even carried his slippers.
Damajee Grhaekwar and Pursojee Bhonslay were stirring
leaders who rose from the ranks and occupied and be-
queathed to their descendants the countries they were
sent to plunder or to manage. Ballajee Wishwannah
Bhutt, the first Peishwa, was hereditary accountant of
a village in the Concan, and was originally employed as
a common revenue karkoon or clerk. The family of
Powar were Deshmukhs of Phultun in the sixteenth
century ; and the Sawunts were, even earlier, Dessaees
or Deshmukhs of their present country of Waree, near
Goa, and rose into importance under the kings of Bee-
japoor during the war with the Portuguese.* Bhonslah
was the original name not only of the Waree family,
but of the respective founders of the Berar, (Nagpore,)
Satara, and Kolapoor houses, though only the two latter
were related to each other. We will now ^briefly trace
the history of their common ancestors.
Babjee Bhonslah was hereditary patail of several vil-
lages near Doulutabad. He had two sons, the elder
named Mallojee, the younger Wittojee. Mallojee Bhon-
slah was an active, stirring soldier, and was employed
under the banner of Lookhjee Jadow Rao, a Mahratta
chief of rank in the Beejapoor service. Mallojee, having
been for several years childless, engaged the services of
a celebrated Mahommedan saint in his favour. A fine
boy was in due time born, and, in gratitude to the Saint,
was called after him, "Shah," with the adjunct of
respect, " jee." Thus in the year 1 593 was born Shah-
jee, the father of Sivajee. Mallojee, by an act of extra-
ordinary impudence, took advantage of a jocose speech
of his leader Jadow Rao on the occasion of the Hooli
* Hamilton erroneously dates bajee, the son of Sivajee, — H. M. L,
their origin from the time of Sam-
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154 MAHRATTA BIST0&Y AND EMPIRE.
saturnalia, and procured the unwilling acquiescence of
that Chief to his daughter Jeejee's betrothal to his son
Shahjee. Mallojee's opportune discovery of a large
quantity of treasure reconciled Jadow Rao, and enabled
him to purchase the rank of Commander of 5000 horse,
with the title of Bajah, from the weak and venal court
of Ahmednuggur, upon which the nuptials between the
young couple were celebrated. Mallojee's good fortune
was attributed to the auspices of the goddess Bhowanee,
who prophesied that one of Mallojee's race should be-
come a king, re-establish Maharashtra, protect Brah-
mans, and the temples of the gods; and that his
posterity should reign for twenty-seven generations,
With his new title, Mallojee received charge of the
forts of Sewneree and Ohakun, and of the pergunnahs
pf Poona and Sopa.
The Peccan monarchies were at this time constantly
assailed by the Moguls. The Mahratta chiefs played
their own game during these contentions. As a
specimen of the times and of the value that was at-
tached to their alliance, we may mention that JShahjee's
father-in-law, Jadow Rao, having deserted the Ahmed-
nuggur standard in the year 1621, was rewarded by the
Emperor Jehangir with the rank and authority of Com-
mander of J.5,000 horse. He did not long enjoy his
honours. Nine years afterwards he desired to return to
his allegiance, was inveigled into a conference within
the walk of Doulutabad, and there murdered- On this,
his widow, a woman of masculine habits, with her fol-
lowers and many of her connections, for ever abandoned
the cause of the Nizam-shahee monarchs,
Shahjee, who had now succeeded his father and was
recognised as a bold and able leader, followed the
example of his mother-in-law, and received the rank of
a commander of 5000 horse with a suitable jaghir. j-£e
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155
was, however, soon disgusted, and offered his services to
the Beejapoor Government to act against the Moguls,
who were then effecting the conquest of the Ahmed*
nuggur State. His offer was accepted, and he soon ob-
tained the distinction of being considered the most
active and dangerous enemy of the Imperial arms.
Doulutabad however fell to the Moguls; its minister
became a pensioner, and its monarch a prisoner* Shah-
jee did not lose courage. He proclaimed another prince,
assumed the management of the remaining Ahmednug*
gur territory, and soon recovered a great portion of what
had been lost. In the year 1635, Shah Jehan was at
length excited by the audacity of Shahjee to make a
great effort to reduce both him and his supporters. An
overwhelming force, in four divisions, moved against
them, and the Deccanees were beaten at all points. The
Beejapoor king then agreed to pay a tribute of twenty
lakhs of pagodas ; and, the forts of Shahjee being cap*
tured, he petitioned for re-admittance into the Imperial
service. This was refused, but he was told that he
might enter that of Beejapoor,
In the year 1627 Sivajee had been born in the fort
of Sewneree, close to the town of Joonere, fifty miles
north of Poona. Three years afterwards, to the great
displeasure of Jeejee Bye and her friends, Shahjee mar*
ried a second wife, Tuka Bye Mohitey, by whom he
had a son called Venkajee. He had a third son, Sunta-
jee, whose mother was a dancing girl.
In the year 1637, the Beejapoor Government en-
trusted Shahjee with the post of the second-in-comr
mand of an expedition into the Carnatic. On his
departure, he left his family and his Poona jaghir in
charge of a Brahman named Dadajee Konedeo. The
agent was an able revenue officer and a faithful servant.
He recovered the broken districts, encouraged agricul-
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156 MAHRATTA HISTORY AND EMPIRE.
ture, and, by good management, greatly increased the
prosperity of hi$ charge. Shahjee's services in the
Carnatic obtained for him a grant of several of the
valleys called the Mawuls of Concan-Grhat-Mahta in the
neighbourhood of Poona; these he likewise placed
under the Brahman's care. Dadajee found their hardy
and simple inhabitants in the utmost penury, scarcely
clothed, and barely able to defend their wretched huts
from the wild beasts of the forest which daily increased
on them. He took many of the Mawulees into his
service, gave advances of seed grain to others, and by
demanding no rents for nine years, and then establish-
ing very light assessments, recovered a considerable
portion of country. It is pleasant to find in the dark
catalogue of Indian Rulers an occasional Dadajee Kone-
deo. Would that there were more such as he among
our own ranks ! Men who live for their duty, for the
improvement of their respective charges, and not simply
for the accumulation (even though it be honestly) of so
many thousand rupees to take with them to Europe.
The men of business in Maharashtra were Brahmans.
It was no part of the duty of a soldier to bend to the
work of a scribe. Dadajee gave his masters son a good
education, according to the notions of the times and
the country. Sivajee could never sign his name, but he
was an excellent horseman and marksman. He could
use the matchlock as well as the bow, and was master
of the different kinds of swords and dagger used in the
Deccan. He was also instructed in the rules and obser-
vances of his caste, and in the popular parts of Hindoo
mythology. He loved to hear the " Kuthas," or tales,
in verse or prose, of the gods and heroes of antiquity ;
he delighted in martial exercises, and he hated the
Mahommedans, as Hannibal hated the Romans. While
a mere boy he joined some plundering bands in the
RISE OF SIVAJEE.
157
Concan-Ghat-Mahta ; and, taking a fancy to the rude
Mawulees, was often absent for whole days with parties
of them, on plundering and hunting excursions. He
thus became familiar with the defiles and paths of the
rugged country around Poona, and attached to himself
the most daring of the wild inhabitants. He marked
the positions of the strongholds in his neighbourhood,
and early determined to seize one of them. As peace
now existed with the Moguls, and the Beejapoor army
was employed in the Carnatic, the hill forts, generally
neglected, were guarded even more slenderly than
usual. Sivajee took advantage of this neglect: he
bribed the Killadar of Torna, near Poona, to yield the
place to him, and then wrote to the Beejapoor court,
offering increased rent for the surrounding district, and
protesting that he had nothing in view but his sove-
reign's advantage. His statement being backed by
liberal bribes to the courtiers, he was allowed for several
years to pursue his own schemes unmolested. Treasure
was found at Torna ; and its discovery of course attri-
buted to Bhowanee, the tutelar goddess of Sivajee's
family. Arms and ammunition were purchased, and
within three miles of Torna he erected, on the mountain
of Morbudh, the fortress of Rajgurh.
Sivajee now advanced step by step ; one stronghold
after another fell into his hands, and with them the
command of the circumjacent territory. These con-
tinued successes at length alarmed the weak Beejapoor
monarch, who could however hit upon no better expe-
dient for reducing the rebel son, than to decoy and
imprison the loyal father, then usefully employed in
the Deccan. Bajee Grhorepuray, another jaghirdar, was
the tool chosen for this act of treachery : he invited
Shahjee to his house, and then had him seized. It was
sufficiently well known that he was guiltless of any
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168 MAHRATTA HISTORt AND EMPIRE.
connection with Bivajee ; but it was believed that the
son, whom the royal arms could not reduce, might be
brought to yield, if the torture and imprisonment of his
father was the alternative. Shahjee was accordingly
confined in a stone dungeon, the door of which was
built up, and he was informed that the single remaining
aperture should be closed if his son did not submit
within a certain period. Tor four years, Shahjee re-
mained a prisoner, and eventually owed his release to
disturbances in the Carnatic and to the king's fear that
Sivajee, who had opened communications with the
Emperor Shah* Jehan, would offer his allegiance to the
Moguls. On releasing his prisoner, the king permitted
him to return to the Carnatic, first binding him not to
avenge himself on Bajee Ghorepuray . Shahjee agreed to
the terms. He verbally complied with all the demands
made on him, but he did not forget that his brother of
the faith had invited him to his house, and there seized
his guest, and delivered him to Moslem bonds. He Was
therefore no sooner clear of the toils than he wrote to
Sivajee, " If yotl are my son, punish Bajee Ghorepuray of
Moodhole." This is the only record of communication
between the father and son during many years. Well did
Sivajee execute the vindictive order. He watched Ghore-
puray's movements until the year 1661, when, finding a
fitting opportunity, he pounced upon his victim, slew him
and many of his family, and plundered and burnt their
village. Shahjee was loud in acknowledgment of the
pious deed, and soon after, came from the Carnatic to
visit his son, and thank him in person for his filial
conduct.
During his father's incarceration, Sivajee had been
comparatively quiet, but no sooner was Shahjee released,
than his son successfully resumed his unscrupulous
efforts for effecting the conquest of the entire Ghat-
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DISSOLUTION Of 6flEjA*O0ft.
159
Mahta and Concan, At this time (1666), Prince
AurungBebe was his father's viceroy in the Deccan,
fttid Was entering on those intrigues with the Celebrated
Meer Joomleh, the minister of Gtolcondah, which led to
the direct interference of the Moguls in that State \
and which ended in the entire reduction of Golcondah,
and thfe admittance of Meer Joomleh into the Mogul
service. The Mahommedan power in the Deccan was
fast approaching its close, but the wily* and occasionally
sagacious Aurung2eb6 little thought that, while under-
mining and gradually absorbing the Mussulman prin*
cipalities ther6, he was only clearing the field for a more
powerful rival,^— that he was preparing the way for " a
people of fierce countenance," whose banner, within
thirty years of his own death, Should wave over the
walls of Delhi, and whose leaders should soon after
be levying contributions from Lahore to Tanjorfc.
Beejapoor was at this juncture in the throes of disso-
lution ; it had lately Very narrowly escaped the clutches
of Aurungatebe, and was distracted by a factious and
treacherous nobility, tinder the Weak administration of
an infant king. An effort Was, however, how made to
put down the insurrection of SiVajee \ a large force was
collected^ and Afeool Elian, an officer of high rank,
appointed to the command, He Was a bold but arro-
gant man, and boasted, at taking leave, that he Would
bring back the rebel in chains to the footstool of the
throne. Afeool Khan, however, knew the strength of
the Country in Which he Was employed and gladly
listened to the humble messages of Sivajee, who, af*
focting only to desire peace, disclaimed all thought of
opposing sb great a personage as the Khan. "The
Moslem was deluded, and sent Puntojee Gopinat, a
Brahman in his employ, to arrange With Sivajee the
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160 M AH E ATT A HI8TORY AND EMPIRE.
terms of the Mahratta's submission. The envoy was
received with all honour, and Sivajee conducted himself
during the first interview with great humility. During
the ensuing night, the rebel leader secretly visited his
guest's quarters, and, addressing him as his spiritual
superior, appealed to him as a Brahman, in favour of his
own cause, which he stated to be that of the Hindus
generally. Sivajee urged that he had been called on by
the goddess Bhowanee herself, to protect Brahmans
and kine, to punish the violators of temples, and to
resist the enemies of religion. These arguments were
seconded by large promises, and the interview ended in
Puntojee's entering into a scheme for assassinating his
master. Accordingly, the Brahman returned to the
Mogul camp to report that Sivajee was in great alarm
and ready to surrender, if he could only receive a gua-
rantee of his personal safety from the mouth of the
Beejapoor commander. The deluded Khan fell into
the snare. The place appointed for the meeting was a
space, cleared for the occasion, at the foot of the fort of
Pertabgurh. One road through the jungle was cleared ;
all other avenues were closed. A force was told off to
attack the Beejapoor main army, when the death of
Afzool Khan should be announced, by a signal of five
guns from Pertabgurh. Parties were also so disposed
as to cut off whatever escort might accompany the
victim. Two persons only were let into the secret of
the dark deed about to be perpetrated.
Sivajee prepared for the death-grapple, as for a
religious though desperate deed. Having performed
his ablutions, he placed his head at his mother s feet
and besought her blessing. Then, attiring himself with
a steel chain cap and hauberk under his turban and
cotton gown, he concealed a bichwa, or crooked dagger,
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MURDER OP AFZOOL KHAN.
101
under his right sleeve, and placing on the fingers of his
left hand a wagnuk,* he leisurely proceeded down the
hill to the interview. Fifteen hundred troops escorted
Afzool Khan ; but he was requested by the traitor
Puntojee to halt them, when within a few hundred
yards of the base of the hill, lest Sivajee should be
alarmed and decline the interview. The Khan accord-
ingly advanced, armed simply with his sword, and
attended only by a single soldier. Sivajee, too, was
accompanied by one attendant, and as he approached
the place of interview, repeatedly halted as if in alarm.
To give him confidence, the traitor Brahman begged
that Afzool Khan's follower might fall back. The
chiefs then advanced and being introduced by Puntojee,
gave each other the usual oriental embrace. f Sivajee,
while his right arm was round the Khan's neck, with
the left struck the wagnuk into his bowels. Afzool
Khan, feeling himself wounded, pushed the assassin
from him, and attacked him sword in hand. The chain
armour of Sivajee resisted the blow, and, before the
Khan's single attendant could step up to his support,
the chief was slain, and his brave servant, refusing
quarter, shared his fate. The signal was forthwith
given; the ambuscades rushed out, few of the escort
escaped, and it was only through especial orders, sent
by Sivajee, that the slaughter of the main body of the
enemy ceased.
The success of this abominable scheme established
Sivajee's power ; the plunder of the Beejapoor army
* A steel instrument with three Amasa by the beard, with the right
crooked blades, like tiger's claws, hand, to kiss him ; but Amasa took
made to fit on the fore and little no heed to the sword that was in
linger. — H. M. L. Joab's hand ; so he smote him there-
f How unchanged are Asiatics ! with in the fifth rib, and shed out his
Nearly three thousand years ago bowels to the ground." — 2 Sam. xx.
" Joab said to Amasa, ( Art thou in 9, 10. Joab's weapon must have been
health, my brother ? ' and Joab took something like a wagnuk. — H. M. L.
M
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162 M AH R ATT A HI8TORY AND EMPIRE.
provided him with military equipments as well as with
treasure; and the fame of the exploit encouraged his
friends and terrified his foes. He fulfilled his promise
to the traitor Puntojee Gropinat, who received the stipu-
lated reward and afterwards rose to high rank in the
Mahratta service. A hundred years afterwards the
descendant of Puntojee paid the penalty of his ances-
tor s perfidy on the very spot where the traitor Brah-
man had betrayed the confiding Beejapoori.
Another effort was, however, soon made against Siva-
jee. A force, twice the strength of that lately sent
under Afzool Khan, was employed under Seedee Johur.
Sivajee's light troops devastated the enemy's country,
while he threw himself into the fort of Panalla. The
Seedee prosecuted the siege for four months, during the
worst season of the year. The post was still tenable,
but all the approaches to it were occupied, and Sivajee
felt the error he had committed in thus allowing him-
self to be encaged. But, treacherous himself, he knew
whom he could trust. He asked for terms and pro-
ceeded, slightly attended, to one of the enemy's batteries
to negotiate a surrender. He thus threw the Seedee off
his guard, and during the ensuing night, descended the
hill, at the head of a chosen band of Mawulees, passed
the besieger's posts, and was well on his march to the
fort of Bangna before his flight was observed. When
the fact was ascertained, lie was sharply pursued, and
was overtaken at a defile within six miles of the fortress.
He left a party of his Mawuls under command of Bajee
Purvoe, who had formerly been his enemy, with orders
to hold the pass until a signal from the fort of Bangna
announced his own safety. The orders were obeyed,
the post was held, but at the cost of the life of the
generous Purvoe. Sivajee himself thus escaped, but
many of his forts were captured, and the Mahrattas
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SIVAJEE WARS WITH THE MOGULS.
163
would have suffered more severely, but for the court
intrigues that caused the removal of the brave Seedee
from the command of the invading army. This was,
however, an expiring effort on the part of the Beeja-
poor Government ; the revulsion expedited its own fall j
while Sivajee, bending to the storm he could not brave,
quickly recovered his temporary losses and was soon
again in the field with fresh strength.
At this time (1662), the Sawunts, or lords, of Waree
offered, if supported by the Court, to reduce the rebel,
but they were soon abandoned by their weak paramount,
and the whole of their own territory was subdued by
Sivajee, who, however, restored their Deshmukhee rights,
and by his judicious treatment soon attached them
warmly to his cause. He occupied Sawunt-waree with
his own troops, and drew their infantry to fight his
battles in distant quarters. Sivajee was now master of
a long line of sea-coast. He built ships and commanded
an advantageous treaty from the already degenerate
Portuguese of Goa, who supplied him with guns and
naval stores. The successful rebel had now become a
powerful Prince. Through his father's timely mediation,
he was admitted to treat with the Beejapoor minister,
and was recognised as master of a tract of country more
than 250 miles in length, averaging 50 miles in breadth
and in parts extending 100 miles eastward from the
sea. He also had at command a devoted army of not
less than 50,000 foot and 7000 horse.
Being at peace with Beejapoor, Sivajee next turned
his arms against the Moguls. For a time the Mah-
rattas were unsuccessful ; many forts fell into the hands
of the enemy, who established their camp at Poona.
Sivajee was not slow to take advantage of their po-
sition, and to use his own knowledge of its localities.
Understanding that the Mogul commander, Shaisteh
m 2
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MAHRATTA HISTORY AND EMPIRE.
Khan, occupied the very house in which he had himself
passed his boyhood, Sivajee determined to cut him off
in the midst of his guards. Accordingly, with twenty-
five favourite Mawulees, the Mahratta Chief entered
Poona at night; passed through the Mogul troops,
wounded Shaisteh Khan, slew his son and many of his
personal attendants, and then leisurely retreated, light-
ing his torches in defiance as he ascended the hill of
Singurh, in the face of his pursuers.
In the year 1664, Shahjee was killed by a fall from
his horse. He died in possession of large jaghirs, in-
cluding the whole territory of Tanjore, to all which his
younger son Venkajee, who was on the spot, succeeded ;
Sivajee reserving the assertion of his own right until
a favourable opportunity should offer. In January of
that year, having effected the requisite arrangements
and gained perfect information as to localities, he made
a feint of attacking the Portuguese settlements at Bas-
sein, and then, at the head of four thousand horse, made
a dash on the rich city of Surat, systematically plun-
dered it for six days, and leisurely carried off his booty
to the fort of Bajgurh. The Dutch and English
factories only escaped. Their small garrisons stood on
the defensive, and by their gallant bearing, created a
very favourable impression on the minds of the Moguls
as well as of the Mahrattas. Shaisteh Khan had been
recalled, and the great Jey Sing in conjunction with
Dilere Khan was now employed against Sivajee, and
carried on the war with unusual energy. Sivajee in-
cautiously threw himself into the strong fortress of
Poorundhur, which was reduced to extremity, and the
Mahratta was induced to trust to Jey Sing's guarantee
and surrender himself. Sivajee's conduct seems un-
accountable. At no time had he been so strong, and
dissension was rife in the Mogul camp. Poorundhur
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VANITY OF HUMAN CALCULATIONS.
165
might have fallen, but Sivajee would not have been
himself if he could not have effected his own escape.
Raja Golab Sing's conduct at the present day in the
Punjab seems much akin to this; unscrupulously cut-
ting off all who trust him, he is constantly trusting him-
self in his enemy's hands. Man is everywhere unac-
countable ; but he who has to deal with Asiatics can
least calculate, with certainty, on the future by the past.
He must be prepared for every vagary, for the violation
of the plainest dictates of prudence during peace, for the
neglect or breach of all the rules of strategy during war.
He may reasonably expect that to be done which should
not be done, that to be neglected which should be
effected. No European diplomatist or soldier is so
likely to be ensnared as he who, having taken the
usual precautions, feels himself secure. The treaty
signed, the picquets doubled, neither can be regarded
as a guarantee of safety. Certain eventual destruction
may await the enemy's move ; he may be assured of it
on all rational calculations, but the goddess Bhowanee
or some other deity or demon may have promised suc-
cess— the day of the Feringees may have passed, and
the infatuated wretches rush on destruction. Their
desperation then is dangerous. Rashness, nay madness,
has succeeded in striking a blow where the best plans
have failed. Indian officials should ever be on the
alert.
Sivajee at once surrendered twenty forts, with the
territories attached to them, and trusted to the fidelity
of Jey Sing to be secured in possession of the remainder
of his conquests as a Mogul fief, as well as for sanction
to spoil the Beejapoor territory. Aurungzebe generally
confirmed Jey Sing's arrangement and invited Sivajee
to court. He accepted the invitation; but previously
assembling his officers, gave them strict orders as to
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166 MAHRATTA HISTORY AND EMPIRE.
their conduct during his absence, warned them not to
obey any order sent by himself, unless it was brought
by certain messengers, and then, at the head of 500
choice horse and 1000 Mawulees, proceeded with his
son Sambajee to Delhi. Aurungzebe, though possessing
considerable ability, was a very short-sighted politician.
It was foreign to his character to keep his word, or
even to break it in a straightforward manner. He
might have at once put Sivajee to death ; he preferred
to degrade him, probably with the intention of even-
tually taking his life, or, when sufficiently humbled, of
employing him, like Jeswunt and Jey Sing, as a tool of
his own policy. Sivajee was accordingly received con-
temptuously, and when his bold spirit revolted, he was
placed under surveillance and made to expect the worst.
He soon decided on the course he should pursue, and
found an ally in Bam Sing, the son of Jey Sing, under
whose charge he was placed. Indignant that his
fathers engagement should have been violated, he aided
the prisoner's flight. The circumstances of Sivajee' s
escape, concealed in a basket, are not among the least
romantic of his actions. He returned to the Deccan,
and soon recovered all his lately-ceded possessions.
The first exploit now performed was the recovery by
escalade of the strong fortress of Singurh, which among
others had fallen into the enemy's hands. The fort is
situated on the eastern side of the great Syhadree range,
and is nearly isolated, being connected only by narrow
ridges with the Poorundhur hills, while north and south
it has a continued acclivity, often almost perpendicular,
of half a mile. The summit is capped by a huge black
rock, forming a craggy precipice, more than forty feet
high and two miles in circumference. This rock was
girdled by a stone wall, with towers at intervals, and
was strongly garrisoned by a select body of Kajputs
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CAPTURE OP 8INGURH.
167
under a leader of renown. Having ascertained that,
in the confidence of their own prowess, and of the
strength of their fastness, the garrison had become
negligent, Sivajee consulted Tannajee Maloosray, one of
his bravest officers, as to the best plan of surprizing
the place. Tannajee replied that, if permitted to take
his own younger brother and 1000 selected Mawulees,
he would engage to seize the fortress. His offer was
accepted. A dark night was selected for the assault.
Having received their orders at Kajgurh, the Mawulees
separated, and by different paths, known only to them-
selves, proceeded to the rendezvous in the vicinity of
Singurh. Tannajee then divided his men into two
parties, one to storm, the other to support. He selected
the most precipitous point of the rock, and by means
of rope-ladders, led his advanced party, one by one, up
the precipice. Scarcely three hundred had ascended
when the garrison were alarmed. The challenge of the
foremost sentinel was answered by an arrow, and the
bowmen then plied their weapons in the direction where
they perceived, by the lights, that the garrison were
collecting. A desperate conflict ensued, and the
Mawulees were gaining ground, when their leader was
slain. They then fell back, and were on the point of
retreating by the fearful path they had ascended, when
Tannajee's brother, Sooryajee, with the relief, appeared,
rallied the fugitives, and upbraided them for deserting
their Chief, saying, " Will you leave your fathers
corpse to be tossed into a pit by Mhars?" He added
that the rope-ladders were destroyed, and that now
was their time to prove themselves Sivajees Mawu-
lees. In an instant the tide was turned, and, with a
deafening shout of their battle cry, "Hur Hur Ma-
hadeo," they returned to the charge and were soon in
possession of the fort. Of the Mawulees, nearly one-
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MAHRATTA HISTORY AND EMPIRE.
third were killed or wounded, and five hundred of the
Rajputs, with their commander, were found dead or
wounded.
Sivajee was hardly consoled for the loss of his gallant
officer by the capture of the important post. When
congratulated on the success of his arms he sorrowfully
replied, " The den* is taken, but the lion is slain ; we
have gained a fort, but alas ! I have lost Tannajee
Maloosray!" Sivajee, who, as he paid his soldiers
regularly, was chary of gifts, on this occasion gave
every surviving Mawulee a pair of silver bangles, and
rewarded the officers proportionally.
A new tide of conquest had now opened on Sivajee ;
again, fort after fort fell before his arms or his finesse.
The city of Surat (October, 1670) was again plundered;
and for three days, at the head of 15,000 men, he
leisurely squeezed all who had anything to yield. The
English factory, as before, defended themselves. Hear-
ing of the approach of a Mogul army, Sivajee suddenly
decamped, leaving behind him a letter for the inhabi-
tants in which he demanded a tribute of 12 lakhs of
rupees as the price of exemption from future plunder.
Such was often, with the Mahrattas as with the Sikhs,
the origin of their territorial acquisitions. They plun-
dered the weak, and gradually assumed a proprietary
right in all they had the power to destroy or molest.
Their visits were commuted for chouth, or a fourth of
the produce, to be paid as protection, or rather exemp-
tion money; gradually the stronger party appointed
their own collectors, and, step by step, assumed the
government of the lands they had originally wasted.
This year, we first hear the word Ckouth. The large
town of Kurinja being plundered, a regular agreement
Singurh — i. c. the Lion's dwelling.
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was taken from the local authorities to pay one-fourth
of the yearly revenue ; in consideration of which they
were not only to be exempted from plunder but pro-
tected.
Sivajee's attention was now turned to the sea as well
as the land, and his exertions were unremitting on both
elements. He sought either to expel the Portuguese
from the coast or to reduce them to the condition of
tributaries. His troops, who had hitherto rather
harassed than attacked the Moguls and had been for-
midable chiefly in forests and fastnesses, began to meet
the Emperor's troops boldly in the plain and daily with
increased success. His usual tactics were to affect
retreat; to draw on the Mogul horse in their usual
tumultuous disorder, and then, either to lead them into
an ambuscade, or, suddenly rallying his apparently
broken parties, to return to the offensive, and, by
repeated attacks on the broken squadrons, to sweep all
before him. The Mahratta and also the Sikh horsemen
were long famous for such manoeuvres ; and so prevalent
is this Parthian policy, not only among the Mahrattas,
but throughout Indian warfare, that it is not unusual,
as at the battle of Assaye, for gunners, when ridden
over by cavalry, to lie quietly down till the torrent has
passed, and then to rise and turn their guns on the
squadrons that have overwhelmed them.
In 1673, Sivajee, after a siege of several months,
captured the fort of Satara. The place had been long
used as a state prison : its captor little anticipated that
it would be the dungeon of his successors, whence they
would be released and reinstated by the English traders,
with whom, in their merely mercantile character, he
now first became acquainted. Sivajee, who had long
struck coins and styled himself Maharaja, was in June
of this year formally enthroned. He was weighed
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MAHRATTA HI8TORY TlND EMPIRE.
against gold, the whole of which being then given to
the Brahmans, sharpened their wits for the discovery
that the donor was of high Eajput descent.
Aurungzebe's attention had been for some time with-
drawn from the Deccan by the disturbances arising from
his revival of the jezia or Hindoo capitation tax, a mea-
sure which transformed the Rajputs from faithful
dependants and followers into stout rebels. Raja
Jeswunt Sing had died at Kabul, fighting the Mogul
battles. He was rewarded by an attempt to convert
his children by force, but this outrage on his family,
together with the jezia, drove the Rajputs into a hos-
tile confederation which occupied the Emperor for two
years. In the year 1676, he again felt at liberty to
turn his attention towards the Deccan, and at this time
he seems to have believed that his schemes for weaken-
ing the several kingdoms in that quarter had taken
effect.
The Mogul influence had for some time been para-
mount at Golcondah; there was, what was called, a
close alliance with Rajapoor; and even Sivajee now
found it his interest to pay temporary tribute. Having
determined to proceed to the Carnatic and oblige his
brother to yield (according to Hindoo law) half their
father's inheritance, he came to an understanding with
the King of Golcondah, and took t^e politic step of
offering a sop to the Mogul commander to spare his
possessions during his absence ; jocosely comparing his
paying tribute to giving oil-cake to his milch cow, by
which " she would produce the more milk." In 1676-7
he proceeded on his expedition at the head of 30,000
horse and 40,000 foot, but Venkajee soon found the
inutility of opposition, and agreed to divide the revenues
of Tanjore and his other districts ; on which peace was
concluded between the brothers. After an absence of
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eighteen months, Sivajee returned to Maharashtra and
was soon again in hot hostility with the Emperor.
The Moguls, having now thrown off the mask
towards both Golcondah and Beejapoor, appeared before
the latter place. The Kegent called urgently on Sivajee
for aid. He gave it effectually, cut off the Mogul's
supplies, and obliged them to raise the siege. His
reward was the abrogation of the Beejapoor rights of
sovereignty over all the conquests he had at different
times made. During this campaign Sivajee's son, Sam-
bajee, fled in discontent from his father to the Mogul
commander Dilere Khan, who proposed to Aurungzebe
to set him up as a counterpoise to Sivajee, but the
Emperor declined to take a step that would virtually
recognise, and thereby strengthen, the predatory system.
Dilere Elian being soon after displaced, avenged him-
self by conniving at Sambajee's escape. The latter
returned to his father and received partial forgiveness,
but was detained at large in the fort of Panalla.
Scarcely were the terms of the engagement with
Beejapoor concluded, when Sivajee's earthly career
closed. His last illness was caused by a swelling in the
knee-joint, ending in fever that carried him off on the
5th April, 1680, in his 58rd year. Few conquerors
have effected so much with equal means. Long dis-
owned by his father, and unaided by the local chiefs,
until by his own stripling arm he had rendered himself
independent, he died the recognised ruler of a territory
fifty thousand square miles in area; his name was
dreaded from Surat to Taiyore, and in every quarter
between those remote points, his bands had levied con-
tributions and tribute. The Mahommedan yoke was
now for ever broken in Maharashtra. The long- dor-
mant military spirit of the people was roused, to be
quelled only in the entire disruption of that system on
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M AH RAIT A HISTORY AND EMPIRE.
which it had risen. The genius of Sivajee emancipated
the Mahrattas : succeeding chiefs, by neglecting the
policy which had aggrandized their founder, and
adopting an organization which they could never per-
fectly master, precipitated the State to a second downfall.
Our brief sketch will have shown the line of tactics
that Sivajee pursued. Personally brave, he never
fought when he could fly, or wrhen stratagem or treachery
could effect his object : but whatever was his design,
he weighed it deliberately, gained the most accurate
information on all necessary points, and then, when
least expected, pounced upon his prey. The heavy and
slow-moving Moguls must have been sadly puzzled at
encountering such a foe. Many stories are told of the
terror his very name inspired. He was equally feared as
a soldier, a marauder, and an assassin. His own dagger,
or those of his emissaries, could reach where his troops
could not penetrate ; no distance or precaution could
keep his prey from him. The old Jaghir system, under
which the Mahratta chief served the Deccan kings, was
a good foundation for the regenerator of his country to
work upon ; but it must be remembered that it was not
with the chiefs that Sivajee commenced operations, but
with the despised and half-starving peasantry of the
Ghat-Mahta and Sawunt-waree. It was when Sivajee
had gained a name, and had himself become a chief y that
chiefs joined his standard. It is ever so in India.
There is always ample material abroad to feed the
wildest flame of insurrection; but not until it has
assumed a head, will those who have a stake in the land
join it. They will talk, they will write, they will plot ;
but seldom, unless in instances of great infatuation,
when misled by false prophets, will the chiefs of the
land join an insurrectionary move, so long as their own
izzut has not been touched.
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sivajee's career.
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During Sivajee's whole career, he cannot be said to
have enjoyed, or rather suffered, one single year of
peace. He seems from the outset to have declared per-
petual hostility against all who had anything to lose.
His pacifications, or rather truces, were but breathing
spaces, to enable him to recruit or collect his means, or
to leave him unshackled to direct his whole force in
another quarter. Aurungzebe played into Sivajee's
hands by his timid and suspicious policy. The Em-
peror was incessantly changing his commanders, and
feared to entrust any one of his sons or generals with
means sufficient to quell the Deccan insurrections, lest
the power so deputed should be used, as he himself had
used it, to the usurpation of the throne. Thus dis-
trusted, his children and officers managed the war with
Sivajee, as with Beejapoor and Golcondah, for their own
aggrandizement. They fought as little as they could,
while they plundered and received bribes as much as
possible.
There was thus much in the times, and there was still
more in the condition and feeling of the country, favour-
able to Sivajee. His cause was, or appeared to be, that
of the people. They had long groaned beneath a Ma-
hommedan yoke, and some openly, all secretly, hailed
a liberator of their own blood, caste, and country. It
was this strong feeling in his favour that enabled him to
procure the excellent intelligence for which he was noted ;
his spies were in every quarter, in the very zenanas
and durbars of his enemies, and always gave timely
warning of all designs, and full information of the weak
points against which to direct his enterprizes. "With
all these advantages it may seem more surprising that
Sivajee's rise was not quicker, than that it made the
progress we have shown ; but it must be remembered
that the Mahratta chiefs were never unanimous, that
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174 MAHRATTA HISTORY AND EMPIRE.
few ever joined the founder of their empire, that
Sivajee's officers and soldiers were the creatures of his
own genius, and that for many years the majority of
his troops were infantry, excellent in their own strong
country, but ill adapted for foreign conquest. Above
all, there was the prestige of antiquity and of power
around the Mahommedan thrones, and especially around
that of the Great Mogul. In no quarter of the world
does so much respectful fear attach to long-established
authority as in India. If there is little veneration for
sovereignty, there is abundance of awe. Loyalty and
patriotism we put out of the question; but in every
case of insurrection the majority of chiefs and men of
war, of all castes, will first offer their services to the
established power to fight either for or against their
own kindred and country ; and it is only when refused
employment that they flock to the newly-displayed
banner. The middle and lower classes act differently ;
their sympathies will be with their fellows, but they
will naturally be cautious to conceal their feelings until
the progress of events and the conduct of the contend-
ing parties afford some clue to the probable result of
the struggle. Thus Aurungzebe might originally have
commanded the services of all that were then considered
the fighting classes of Maharashtra; but his suspicious
temper, fearing to admit Hindus into his ranks, and
even refusing the services of the Deccan Mussulmans,
drove them into the ranks of his enemy. The Mahom-
medan Government in India had, in short, lost its tact,
elasticity, and vigour : luxury had sapped the Moslem
strength, and deadened their one solitary virtue. Their
hardihood declined, and with it their empire fell.
Sivajee was the first to take advantage of the imperial
decay, and his example was soon followed in every
quarter of India.
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Sivajee early established a strict military system.
His infantry, as already stated, were originally re-
cruited chiefly from the Concan and Ghat-Mahta. The
Hetkurees of the former were good marksmen, but his
chief dependence was on the Mawulees, or inhabitants
of the mountain valleys. He employed the latter on all
undertakings requiring cool courage and hand-to-hand
work. They never failed him. The usual arms of both
were a sword, shield, and matchlock ; but a bow was sub-
stituted for the matchlock of every tenth man, as being
useful in ambuscades and night attacks. The cavalry
were of two classes, Sillidars, or men bringing their own
cattle, and Bargeers, who were mounted on horses of
the State. A select body of the latter, forming a third
and very important class, were designated the Fagah,
or household troops. Individuals of this body were
mingled with the sillidars and ordinary bargeers to
overawe them, and act as spies on their conduct. Horse
and foot of all ranks were hardy, active, and abstemious.
Camp equipage was unknown among them, a single
blanket, in addition to their light coarse vestments, com-
pleted their wardrobe ; and a small bag of parched grain
sufficed for their commissariat supplies. Thus furnished,
the infantry would for days and days thread the defiles
and jungles of their wild country, and, by paths known
only to themselves, appear where least expected ; while
the cavalry, supplied with small saddle-bags to hold
such grain or plunder as they might pick up, swept the
country at the rate of fifty, sixty, and even eighty
miles within twenty-four hours. The grand secret of
Mahratta hardihood was, that chiefs and officers shared
equally in the privations of their men. A picture was
once taken of the Peishwa Bajee Rao by order of his
enemy, the great Nizam-ul-Mulk, as he chewed his
dinner of parched grain, sitting on his horse with all his
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MAHRATTA HISTORY AND EMPIRK.
baggage under him, and his long Mahratta spear stuck
in the ground by his side, while he thus took his repast.
Plunder and profit formed the object of all expedi-
tions, the test, and in Mahratta eyes the only proof, of
victory. During Sivajee's life, all plunder was public
property. It was brought at stated periods to his
durbar, where the man who had taken it was praised,
rewarded, or promoted.
" Then lands were fairly portioned ;
Then spoils were fairly sold :
The Bergees were like brothers
In the brave days of old."
#
Sivajee had sense enough to perceive how much he
should personally gain by the punctual payment of his
army. The pay of the infantry varied from three to ten
rupees per month, that of bargeers from seven to
eighteen, and of sillidars from twenty to forty. All
accounts were closed annually : assignments were given
for balances on collectors, but never on villages. Cows,
cultivators, and women were exempt from plunder.
Rich Mahommedans and Hindus in their service, were
favourite game. Towns and villages were systema-
tically sacked, and where money or valuables were not
forthcoming, Sivajee would take promissory notes from
the local authorities. He shed no unnecessary blood ;
he was not cruel for cruelty's sake, but on these
occasions of plunder he mercilessly slaughtered and
tortured all who were supposed to have concealed
treasure. An Englishman, captured by Sivajee at
Surat, reported that he found the marauder, surrounded
by executioners, cutting off heads and limbs.
The mountain fortresses were the key-stones of his
power. His treasure, plunder, and family safe, he could
freely move wherever an opening offered. His garrisons
were under strict discipline, and were composed of
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177
mixed classes as mutual checks. All were told off to
such duties as were respectively suited to their habits.
Brahmans, Mahrattas, Eamoosees, Mhars and Mangs
were in every fort. The whole were called Gurhku-
rees, and were maintained by hereditary assignments of
rent-free land in the neighbourhood. The Eamoosees,
Mhars, and Mangs were the scouts and intelligencers ;
the Mahrattas formed the garrison. All relied for their
daily bread on the charge of their post ; it was, in Grant
Duff's words, " the mother that fed them."
The rainy season was usually the holiday of the
Mahrattas; the infantry took their ease, the cavalry
horses grazed at will on the rich pasture lands, — and, as
often as possible, on those of the enemy. This was, how-
ever, a busy time for Sivajee and his confidants. They
now made their inquiries, and spied out the land for the
ensuing campaign. At the autumnal dussera, the
scattered bands were collected ; the Bhugwa Jenda, or
national flag, was unfurled, and the wild marauders
poured like a torrent over the country. Under penalty
of death, not a woman was taken into camp,* and, un-
fettered and unencumbered, Sivajees bands struck the
severest blows at points most distant from the places
where they were expected.
It is only justice to state that this extraordinary man,
while devastating other lands, was not unmindful of the
duty he owed to his own subjects. In his conquered
territory, and where the inhabitants had compounded
for security, he was kind, considerate, and consequently
popular. He usually took two-fifths of the crop, and
protected the ryot in the enjoyment of the remainder.
He set his face altogether against the farming and
* In this, and in some other mat- Endless trains of cattle and camp*
ters, the English might with ad van- followers constitute a wry weak point
tage take a leaf out of Sivajce's book, in our military system. — H. M. L.
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MAHRATTA HISTORY AND EMPIRE.
assignment system, now, as formerly, so prevalent
throughout the Mahratta and other native States. In
civil cases he employed punchayets, the best, if not
the only resource in countries where official honesty
is uncertain. Punchayets may decree wrongfully ; but,
under efficient superintendence and such checks as are
easily applied, they will administer quicker and more
substantial justice, among a rude and simple people,
than the most strait-laced courts. The truth or false-
hood of nine out of ten cases that are tried in cutcheries,
and that may long enough puzzle the wits of strangers,
is well known in the adjoining villages. It needs,
therefore, only that interested parties be prevented from
being members of punchayets, that such courts be open,
and, as far as possible, that suits be decided by them at
a single sitting, which may be effected in ninety-nine
cases out of a hundred.
To assist in the management of affairs, Sivajee ap-
pointed eight principal officers, the chief of whom, or
Prime Minister, he designated Peishwa, an ominous
name for his descendants. Among his countrymen and
admirers, Sivajee is still spoken of as an incarnation of
the Deity, to which opinion his deeds of blood and
treachery are no drawback. Mahrattas consider that
political assassination is wise and proper, and that ne-
cessity justifies murder.
Sivajee was small of stature, and of dark complexion.
His countenance was intelligent and animated, his eyes
piercing, his frame active rather than powerful, and, as
already mentioned, he was master of all the weapons
commonly used in his country. Scott Waring calls him
a good son to a bad father, but he does not show that
there was ever any intercourse between them ; and, as
we have shown, the only proof he gave of dutiful regard
was in the destruction of his father's enemy ; unless,
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179
indeed, it be considered an act of filial piety that he
seized his parent's jaghir in his absence, and by his re-
bellion against Beejapoor occasioned Shahjee's long and
cruel imprisonment. On the whole, we may pronounce
the founder of the Mahratta empire to have been the
man of his day in India : greater than any of the Mah-
ratta chiefs who succeeded him, and unrivalled since,
even by Hyder Ally or Eunjeet Sing. Sivajee could
not only conquer and destroy, but he could legislate and
build up. There is the germ of civil organization in
his arrangements ; and had he lived the ordinary period
of man's life, he might have left to his successors a
united and well-established principality. He died
suddenly, and with him his empire may be said to have
expired.
Sivajee left immense treasure. The amount has been
variously estimated; but always in millions of pounds
sterling. Heaped together in his coffers at Rajgurh
were the dollars of Spain, the sequins of Venice, the
pagodas of the Carnatic, and all the various gold mohurs
of the different quarters of India, with innumerable
kinds of rupees of every shape and stamp. But all his
spoil, the harvest of more than thirty years of crime
and blood, of restless nights, of ceaseless and unseason-
able marches, did not bring peace to the owner, nor save
his son from a fearful death ; it did not preserve his suc-
cessors from the prison his own hands had prepared,
nor his people from being split into factions that soon
sealed their own destruction.
Sivajee had four wives ; two survived him, of whom
one performed suttee; the other, having intrigued to
raise her own son, Raja Ram, to the guddee, was put to
a cruel death by her step-son, Sambajee, who executed
all the parties concerned in this scheme for his super-
cession.
n 2
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M AH R ATT A HI8TORY AND EMPIRE.
Once established in power, Sambajee showed, indeed,
a soldierly spirit in the field ; but his government was
lax, cruel, and corrupt. His troops plundered the hus-
bandman with impunity; and this relaxation of dis-
cipline, though it attracted a large accession of daring
and dissolute adventurers to the Mahratta standard, yet
proved a bad preparation for meeting the formidable
power that was coming against them. Aurungzebe was
now employed in the final conquest of Golcondah and
Beejapoor. When the absorption of those two king-
doms had been effected, he pushed the Mahrattas more
closely, and, after some desultory operations, at length
by a bold stroke, such as Sivajee had so often struck
against the Moguls themselves, seized Sambajee, while
in a state of intoxication, at an outpost slenderly
guarded. Aurungzebe offered his captive life on con-
dition of his becoming a Mahommedan. " Not if you
give me your daughter," was the bold answer of Samba-
jee. Stung by the insult, the Emperor caused him to
be cruelly mutilated, and then beheaded.
Sambajee's life might have injured the cause of his
people : his cruel death, in the words of Grant Duff,
" aroused their vengeance without alarming their fears."
Baja Ram, the surviving son of Sivajee, was now de-
declared regent, during the minority of his brother
Sambajee's son. The boy was, however, soon after taken
prisoner by the Moguls, and was kindly treated by the
daughter of Aurungzebe, who familiarly called him
Sahoo, or Shao,* his name being Sivajee, For a time
* Among the elegant English the year 1764, Guthrie, the Malte
misnomers of Indian words was that Brun of his day, thus described the
of Shao Raja, whom the Bombay Mahrattas and their country, " Mah-
factors of his day designated " the rattas are a kind of mercenaries in-
Sow Roger." The ignorance as to all habiting the mountains between India
that concerns India to this day in and Persia." Malte Brun, following
England is great, but some light has Tone, is generally correct. — H. M. L.
broken on our countrymen since, in
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SUCCESS OF AURUNGZEBE.
18!
the tide continued against the Mahrattas, but, far from
being disheartened, their energies were rather thus
drawn out. Raja Earn, after making arrangements for
Maharashtra, and for the re-assemblage of his friends
around the " Bhugwa Jenda," or national flag, when
fortune should be more propitious, took refuge in the
Carnatic. On the plea of his nephew's captivity, he
assumed the government in his own name, was en-
throned, distributed the usual presents, and made
extensive grants of lands, including much that was
not in the actual possession of the Moguls, but more
that had never belonged to his predecessors.
After a brief but eventful career, Raja Ram died of
fatigue, caused by long exposure when escaping from
Zoolfikar Khan, the ablest, though one of the most
venal, of the Mogul officers employed in the Deccan.
He had besieged Raja Ram for seven years in the fort
of Grinjee, and when obliged to take the place, gave the
Raja due notice to escape. On other occasions Zool-
fikar acted with sufficient energy : within one period of
six months he is said to have marched, in pursuit of the
Mahrattas, 5000 miles, and, in this space of time, to
have engaged them nineteen times. In the year 1700,
oite month after Raja Ram's death, Satara was captured
by Aurungzebe. Raja Ram left two sons, Sivajee and
Sambajee, the former being the elder was, though an
an imbecile, placed on the gtiddec. He was only ten
years old ; but his mother, Tara Bye, was a woman of
energy and the virtual ruler. She moved from fort to
fort, encouraging her son's adherents, while, in five dif-
ferent directions, his troops kept the field under able
officers.
Aurungzebe was now at the head of his own army ;
and successively captured the principal strongholds of
the Mahrattas. Torna was carried by escalade, sword
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MAHRATTA HISTORY AND EMPIRE.
in hand, during the night : all the others were won by
gold. Several were retaken within the year, and the
Emperor's hold on any of them lasted only while a
strong force remained in the neighbourhood. The
climate, the difficulty of bringing up convoys, the feel*
ing of the people, all were against the Moguls. But
while the Mahratta fortresses were thus temporarily
yielding, and their country falling a prey to the Mogul,
their own predatory bands were daily extending the
influence of the Mahratta name. For a third time they
levied contributions on the city of Surat, and plundered
Burhanpoor, while their squadrons simultaneously ra-
vaged Malwa, Candeish, Berar, and Guzerat.
The Mogul system, with all its pageantry, was rotten
at the core. The royal presence, or the occasional
effort of an able and honest officer, might gain a brief
success; but what could one old man, bowed down
with the weight of ninety years, with centuries of care
and crime on his brow, perform ? One who, though he
had long exceeded the usual span of life, now felt he
was approaching the hour of his own long account.
Nor could the empire be upheld by chiefs and generals,
who had never been cordially trusted, and whose success
on behalf of their master would, in his eyes, be little
less than treason, entailing on the victors disgrace, if
not death. Most of them, therefore, were in the pay of
the Mahrattas. They allowed convoys to pass into the
fortresses they besieged, and occasionally even fed the
garrisons themselves. So far from protecting the royal
districts from plunder, the Mogul army connived at, if
they did not aid in, their devastation ; and the more-
far-seeing chiefs collected and husbanded their resources,
and quietly awaited the struggle they perceived must
follow the Emperors death. Worn out with disease,
and vexed by the ill success of his measures, Aurung-
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THE DESCENDANTS OF SIVAJEE.
183
zebe now allowed himself to be almost persuaded by his
favourite son Kaum Buksh, to recognize Mahratta inde-
pendence and to pay the surdeshmukhee (ten per cent.)
on the revenues of the six Soobahs of the Deccan. Their
insolence and daily-increasing demands alone prevented
the fulfilment of the compact. Feeling his end ap-
proach, Aurungzebe moved on Ahmednuggur ; his army
was attacked and defeated on the way, and the aged and
dying Emperor narrowly escaped falling into the hands
of his enemies.
Aurungzebe's last march was made. He died at
Ahmednuggur, on the 21st February, 1707, and left the
heritage of his manifold crimes to his three sons. To
the measure of their respective ability, they followed
his example. Two soon fell in civil conflict, and the
eldest, Sultan Mauzum, succeeded to the distracted and
already dismembered sovereignty, under the name of
Shah Alum.
The release of Shao, the son of Sambajee, had been
more than once proposed as a counterpoise to the party
of Eaja Ham's family ; but although, as a preparatory
measure, Aurungzebe had caused the youth to be
united in marriage to two influential families, he had
always hesitated to carry out the scheme. On the
death of the Emperor, Shao fell into the hands of
Prince Azim Shah, who released him, when he was
immediately joined by many influential persons, and
early next year (1708) seized Satara. Daood Khan, the
Mogul deputy in the Deccan, also supported him. Thus
countenanced, Shao's cause was on the ascendant ; but
young Sivajee, or rather his mother, Tara Bye, had still
a strong party. During the monsoon of 1709, their
partizans cantoned at Kolapoor, and the next year
Sivajee determined to make that town and the neigh-
bouring fort of Panalla, the residence of his court. In
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MAHRATTA HISTORY AND EMPIRE.
the year 1712, the young Prince died of small-pox,
when Ramchundur Punt, the ablest supporter of the
Kolapoor party, removed Tara Bye from the adminis-
tration, placed her and her son's widow in confinement,
and seated Sambajee, the son of Rajis Bye, the younger
widow of Raja Ram, on the guddee. Next year, Shirzee
Rao Ghatgay of Kagul, a name infamously notorious in
modern Mahratta history, joined the party of Sambajee,
and henceforward acted as a partizan of Kolapoor, or
under the banner of Cheyn Kulik Khan, better known
as the great Nizam-ul-Mulk, who was now Mogul
viceroy of the Deccan, and who, wishing to weaken the
Mahrattas by internal dissension, favoured the Kolapoor
party.
In the year 1714, Balajee Wishwanath, the ancestor
of the rulers of Poona, was appointed Peishwa, and
received a grant of the pergunnah of Poona, and the
fort of Poorundhur. Raja Shao was already a cypher,
and his minister the real ruler of the Mahrattas. The
latter now took the first step towards the dismember-
ment of the empire, by encouraging every chief at the
head of an army to administer the country he occupied
or commanded. The Peishwa thus gained temporary
partizans; but the Satara Raja soon lost dependants.
Unlike his father and grandfather, Raja Shao acknow-
ledged himself a vassal of Delhi; and, while in the
actual receipt of tribute from the Mogul officers, he
affected, in his transactions with them, to consider him-
self merely as a head zemindar or deshmukh of the
empire.
During all this time, the distractions at Delhi were
clearing the way for Mahratta aggrandizement. Ten
thousand of them, under Ballajee, accompanied Syud
Hoossein Ally, the viceroy of the Deccan, to take part
in a struggle against the Emperor. Ferokhsere lost
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AMBITION OF THE PEISHWA.
185
his life in the contest, and the Malirattas remained at
Delhi till they had obtained from his successor, Ma-
hommed Shah, grants of* revenue and privilege, which
not only confirmed them in their own possessions, but
authorized their inquisitorial interference in every pro-
vince of the Deccan. The minute intermixture of ter-
ritory, and the coparcenery system that divided districts
and even villages between rival authorities, was a suffi-
cient curse to the people as well as loss to the Mogul ;
but this legalization of the Mahratta demands on the re-
served territory was a virtual cession of the whole. It
subjected the country to the double tyranny of two sets
of tax-gatherers — " that which the locust left, the can-
kerworm devoured."
Bajee Eao succeeded his father Balajee Wishwanath
as Peishwa. As able an administrator as his father,
he was a better soldier. Against the opinion and
advice of more timid counsellors, he advocated the ex-
tension of Mahratta conquest into Hindoostan. Under
his banner, in Malwa, in the year 1724, we first hear of
Eanoojee Sindhia, Mulhar Rao Holkar, and Oodajee
Powar : the two first, the founders of their families ;
and the last, the regenerator of his, and the founder of
the Dhar principality. Already did the ambitious
Peishwa look to a universal Mahratta empire. He
promised the Raja that his flag should wave from the
Kistna to the Attock; and alluding to the Moguls,
" Let us strike," said he, " at the trunk of the withering
tree ; the branches must fall of themselves." All the
* The year of Mafrommed Shah's and Candeish ; second, to tlio sur-
accession, in 1720, forms an impor- dcsh-rnukhee, or tenth in excess of
tant era in Mahratta history. The the chouth ; and thirdly, to the su-
imperial grants they then obtained raj, or sovereignty of the sixteen
acknowledged their claim, first to districts possessed by Sivajee at the
the chouth, or fourth of the revenue time of his death. Thus was the
of the six Soobahs — Aurungabad, Mahratta aim of years gratified.-—
Berar, Beder, Hyderabad, Beejapoor, H. M. L.
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186 M AH B ATT A HISTORY AND EMPIRE.
ability and experience, however, of old Nizam-ul-mulk,
now again the Mogul viceroy in the south, were em-
ployed to baffle the Mahrattas and evade their claims.
This he perceived was to be best effected by fanning the
flame between the rival cousins of Kolapoor and Satara,
and throwing his weight into the scale of the weaker —
Sambajee. In the year 1727 he stopped all payments,
pending, as he said, a settlement of the Mahratta
sovereignty. The usually pacific Shao was roused to
action. The Nizam endeavoured to excuse himself by
declaring that he only meant to relieve the Kaja of his
overbearing minister, the Peishwa. Shao would listen
to no terms ; hostilities ensued, and the Kolapoor troops
were subsidized by Nizam-ul-mulk. The Satara party,
whose cause was managed by the Peishwa, gained the
day, which will appear the less surprising when it is
known that Sambajee and his ministers each sought to
obtain the handling of the Nizam's subsidies, not to
enable them to meet the enemy, but to employ the cash
for their own private debaucheries.
Nizam-ul-mulk was not the person to continue a
losing game ; he, therefore, patched up an arrangement
and abandoned the cause of Kolapoor. Sambajee, left
to his own resources, was, in the year 1729, so utterly
defeated as to be obliged to yield his claim to the
Mahratta sovereignty to Shao, and to accept a princi-
pality, comprehending, with certain reservations, the
tract of country between the Wurna and Kistna rivers
on the north, and the Toongbuddra on the south. The
treaty now made was offensive and defensive, and provided
for the division between the parties of such conquests as
might conjointly be made to the south of the Toong-
buddra. But there never has since been any cordiality
between the Kolapoor and Satara chiefs, or rather
between the former and the usurpers of the authority
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RISE OF THE PEISHWA.
187
of the latter ; for, within two years of the above-men-
tioned compact, the Peishwa Bajee Eao completely
defeated the Grhaekwar, and his other rivals, in a decisive
battle near Baroda, which left him the virtual head of
the Mahratta sovereignty.
From this year (1729) we date the separation of the
Kolapoor principality from that of the elder and Satara
branch. The lieutenants of the latter, or rather of the
Peishwa, proceeded in a bright but brief career, while
the Kolapoor chiefs, holding aloof from the upstart
servants of their family, proceeded in a course of
piracies and petty warfare with the Dessaees of Waree
and the jaghirdars around them. The last time the
armies of the Mahratta empire acted together was in
the year 1795, at Kurdla, where Nana Furnuvees, the
clever but timid minister of the Peishwa, induced Sind-
hia and Holkar, the Ghaekwar, the Nagpoor Eaja, and
almost all the jaghirdars to combine against the Nizam.
On this occasion the Mahrattas brought into the field
140,000 men, horse and foot.
The Peishwa had long been the mayors of the Satara
palace. They received their khillats (dresses) of in-
vestiture from the imprisoned descendants of Sivajee;
but they were virtually monarchs of the Mahratta con-
federacy. The submission obtained from the founders
of the several rival principalities was certainly loose
enough from the beginning; but they did allow, in
theory, the same superiority to the Peishwa as he con-
ceded to his puppet of Satara. A double government,
an imperium in imperio, has long been the fashion of
India ; prejudices and old associations are thus sought
to be soothed, and the fact is overlooked, or forgotten,
that a rallying point is thereby left to their enemies by
those in power. The good sense of more than one of
the Peishwas led them to think of ending the farce ;
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188
MAHRATTA HISTORY AND EMPIRK.
but a timid policy prevailed. The ruler of Poona
continued to call himself the servant of the Raja of
Satara, whom he kept a prisoner ; and the chiefs of
Gwalior and Indore, retaliating on the former, plun-
dered and insulted him at will, while styling themselves
his lieutenants. A decree could have been obtained
from the effete King of Delhi in favour either of Sind-
hia or the Peishwa, and would have carried as much
weight in India as did Pope Zachary's in Christendom,
when the second Pepin obtained his sanction to place
Childeric in a monastery, and add the title of King to
his mayorial designation.
Henceforward we follow the fortunes of Kolapoor and
Sawunt-waree. In December, 1760, Sambajee, the last
lineal descendant of Sivajee, died without issue, when
his widow adopted a boy called Sivajee, and conducted
the government in his name. The Kolapoorians were,
at this time, not content with plundering and levying
chouth on shore, but they engaged in piratical expe-
ditions along the western coast. In the year 1765, the
British Government sent an expedition against them,
and reduced the ports of Malwan and Rairee — the
former place belonging to Kolapoor, the latter to Waree.
The connection of Kolapoor with the Nizam was gene-
rally maintained, and, in the time of the Peishwa
Mudhoo Rao Bullal, caused the loss of several districts,
which were, however, recovered by the Raja taking part
with Rugonath Rao during the period of his authority.
In the year 1766, Malwan and Rairee were restored,
on condition that the Kolapoor Raja should indemnify
the British Government for all losses and expenses, and
that the Dessaee of Waree should enter into a new
treaty. The piracies of these petty States were then for
a few years suspended, only to break out more violently
than ever. In the year 1789, fresh operations were
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PIRACIES OF KOLAPOOR.
189
contemplated against them, and only suspended out of
consideration to the Court of Poona, whose dependant
the Raja of Kolapoor was erroneously supposed to be.
The Mysore war then occupied all the attention of the
British, and the pirates worked their will until the
year 1792, when an armament was fitted out against
them. A humble apology was, however, accepted, and a
treaty concluded, by wThich permission was obtained for
the establishment of factories at Malwan and Kolapoor.
None of these measures, however, were of any avail to
check the system of piracy, which continued until the
year 1812.
The petty States at Kolapoor and Waree were at war,
during nearly twenty-three years, on a foolish quarrel
regarding some royal privileges obtained for her hus-
band, Kem Sawunt, by Luximee Bye, a niece of Mahda-
jee JSindhia. Lord Minto, then Governor-General, was
solicited to aid Kolapoor, but he declined interfering.
The Peishwa was less scrupulous, and sought to take
advantage of the contest to subjugate both States.
Acting under his orders, one of his officers, Appa
Dessaee, obtained possession of Chickooree and Menow-
lee, and endeavoured to establish his own authority
over Sawunt- waree. The infant Sawunt was strangled ;
but Phoond Sawunt, the next heir, taking advantage of
the temporary weakness of the Poona commander,
expelled him from the country, and seized the govern-
ment.
During the first Mahratta war with the English, the
Kolapoor troops were not found in the ranks of their
countrymen; but their system of piracy and petty
plunder continued. In the year 1812, therefore, when
the British Government was settling the affairs of the
Mahratta country, it was determined at length to put
down the long-permitted piracies of Kolapoor and
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190 MAHRATTA HISTORY AND EMPIRE.
Sawunt-waree. Stringent measures were adopted,
the Eaja at once yielded, consented to a new treaty,
and was, in return, guaranteed against the aggressions
of all foreign Powers. Plioond Sawunt was, at the same
time, obliged to cede Vingorla, and engaged to suppress
piracy, under the penalty of being also deprived of the
forts of Eairee and Newtee. Some mercantile engage-
ments were at the same time concluded.
Soon after the ratification of these arrangements,
Phoond Sawunt died, and Doorga Bye became regent.
Regardless of the British guarantee, she immediately
attacked Kolapoor, and seized the fort of Burratgurh,
which had formerly belonged to Waree. The old lady
would listen to no remonstrances, and withdrew only on
the advance of a detachment of the Madras army.
She still, however, continued refractory, and though no
retaliation was permitted on the part of the Kolapoor
troops, the British were at length obliged to enter the
Waree territory; and in the year 1819 completely
reduced it. Certain cessions were then exacted as se-
curity against future misconduct, when the British
troops were withdrawn, and Sawunt-waree, in its reduced
limits, left independent.
During the last Mahratta war, the Kolapoor Raja
heartily espoused the British cause, and was rewarded by
the restoration of the two districts of Chickooree and
Menowlee, already referred to, yielding an annual
revenue of three lakhs of rupees. In July, 1821, the
Raja was murdered in his palace by a chief, whose
jaghir he had resumed. During the disturbances at
Kittoor in 1824, the conduct of the Kolapoor autho-
rities was very suspicious, and in a matter of dispute
with Sawunt-waree, the young Raja infringed the treaty,
and refused to abide by British arbitration. In this
affair he was decidedly wrong, and he ought to have
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OUR DUTY TO THE NATIVE 8TATES.
19]
been punished. In our dealings with native States, it
is as unfair to overlook palpable breaches of engage-
ment as it is cruel to stretch or twist dubious questions.
The homely adage " get an inch and take an ell" no-
where better applies than among Indian rulers. The
first encroachment is the precedent for succeeding ones.
The smallest infraction of a treaty should be promptly
noticed ; timely reproof may stop a career of ruin. We
are quite aware that it is from no ungenerous motive
that such admonition is often withheld ; but we are not
the less satisfied that a little trouble at the outset,
where differences arise, might often avert broils, and
eventual absorption. Most native chiefs are mere
children in mind, and in the ways of the world ; and as
children they should be treated, with affectionate sym-
pathy, but with systematic firmness. Grant them the
most liberal construction of their respective treaties;
but whatever that construction be, explain it clearly,
and enforce it strictly. Slips should not pass unnoticed ;
but severity ought to be reserved for cases of obstinate
contumacy. Such policy would convince all concerned,
that their amendment and not their destruction, was
the desire of the lord paramount. After a certain
career of vice or contumacy, the offender should be set
aside, and replaced by the nearest of kin who gives
better promise. One man should not be permitted to
ruin a State; nor in any case should the paramount
benefit by the error of the dependant. Were some such
principles as these steadily acted on, less would be heard
of the bankruptcies and distractions of tributary and
subject States.
In the year 1825, the Raja was, more questionably,
interfered with, when desiring to resume Kaghal, the
jaghir of Hindoo Rao, the son of the notorious Shirzee
Rao Ghatgay. Both the father and son had long aban*
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192
MAHRATTA HISTORY AND EMPIRE.
doned the Kolapoor service for that of Gwalior. Our
right of interference referred only to externals, and we
had no right to meddle, even by remonstrance, in do-
mestic matters. Such slippery handling of engage-
ments on our part, irritates native princes and affords
them pretext for bad faith. In December, 1825, the
Raja's misconduct obliged Government to march a
force into his country, when a new arrangement was
negotiated, stipulating for the reduction of the Kolapoor
army, attention to the advice of the British Government,
and the non-molestation of Hindoo Rao and certain
other jaghirdars. Such a treaty could hardly have
been expected to stand, nor did it. Princes do not
relish unsought advice, any more than any other indi-
viduals, especially if it be such as they are pledged to
take. It was, we believe, Colonel Sutherland who
rightly called the obligation to take counsel " a wither-
ing clause its very nature, indeed, is to provoke
irritation and opposition, and to entail eventual coercion.
At any rate, it is useless to provide that advice should
be taken, without specifically entering on the face of the
engagement the penalty for neglect. The matter then
becomes plain, and all parties can calculate their game.
The treaty under notice was scarcely signed before the
Raja broke through all its provisions. Instead of
reducing his troops, he increased them, and seized the
possessions of the guaranteed jaghirdars. Twice during
the year 1827, a British force was assembled for the
purpose of bringing the Raja to reason. In the
month of October the troops moved on Kolapoor, when
that fortified town, though occupied by between 2000
and 8000 Arabs and Sindhians, immediately surren-
dered. New terms were then dictated, restricting the
Kolapoor army to 400 horse and 800 foot, exclusive of
garrisons. Chickooree and Menowlee were resumed, and
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KOLAPOOR.
193
certain jaghirdars, whom the Eaja had molested, re-
ceived perpetual instead of life guarantees. The forts
of Kolapoor and Panalla were occupied by British
garrisons at the Raja's expense. He was also mulcted
1,47,948 rupees for damage done to his neighbours;
and territory yielding 50,000 rupees was retained until
the amount should be liquidated. A minister was also
nominated by the British Government, which retained
to itself the power of removing him and appointing
another. This last measure was as inefficacious at
Kolapoor as it has been everywhere else.
In the year 1829, the Governor of Bombay visited
Kolapoor, and then proposed to withdraw the garrisons
from that town and Panalla; but the measure was
deferred, because the management of affairs had at that
time fallen into the hands of an inimical Dewan. This
person was removed, and his sovereign was warned, that
if it should again be found necessary to send troops to
Kolapoor, they would be permanently saddled on him.
The Eaja was a man of considerable, though misdirected,
energy and ability. He quickly threw off the shackles
of the British Government, and systematically disre-
garded every provision of the treaty. His army was
increased to nearly ten thousand men ; and, having no
funds to pay them, having lost his best districts, having
no field of plunder or piracy open to him, his finances
fell into the most deplorable disorder. The troops were
seldom mustered more than once a year ; the men lived
where they liked, and, being always a twelvemonth or
more in arrears, were permitted great license, and
became, as might have been expected, a mere mass of
marauders, dangerous only to their own Government.
In the Civil department there was the same reckless
improvidence as in the Military. All the ancient titles
and offices were kept up, and the same state affected as
o
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194 M AH R ATT A HI8T0RT AND EMPIRE.
when the Kolapoor family had arrogated Mahratta
sovereignty. Centralization was the order of the day.
Every chief, every official of any rank resided in the
city of Kolapoor. There were not less than twenty-
one mamlutdars to manage the revenue of a tract of
country not exceeding 2500 square miles, and scarcely
yielding a clear income of five lakhs of rupees. All
these mamlutdars constantly remained at Kolapoor,
and acted by deputy. tThe durbar was, therefore, a
scene of perpetual intrigue and chicanery, varied only
by the lowest debauchery. Every Indian city is more
or less a sink of iniquity ; among them Kolapoor became
a bye-word for foulness, for corruption and ill faith.
Forgery and fawning were the steps to favour. Almost
every chief and officer was, like the sovereign, loaded
with debt : their estates and villages were mortgaged to
money-lenders, and the Eaja himself subsisted from day
to day only by squeezing his officials and by antici-
pating the revenues of the State. We have said that
the Eaja had ability; we may add that his mind seems
to have been tinged with insanity. In his saner
moments, he was intelligent and energetic ; occasionally,
even just. He daily held open durbar, where all had
admittance. Petitions were received, summarily dis-
cussed, and disposed of without appeal. The mamlut-
dars and courtiers were thus checked, and their illicit
gains generally reverted to his own coffers. The
highest officers were to be seen in chains one day, and
the next raised to greater honours : allowed their full
swing for a time, and then imprisoned, tortured, and
fined. Strange as it may appear, such practices do not
prevent scrambles for place now in India, any more
than they did in olden times in Europe. Mahrattas,
indeed, seem to enjoy such a troubled sea of politics.
It offers a fair field for their peculiar abilities. They
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CORRUPTIONS OF A MAHRATTA COURT. 195
prefer, even more than other Indians, a mere nominal
salary with the dim prospect of perquisites, to a fair
and limited remuneration. It is astonishing how men
become accustomed to live with their heads in their
hands. It is now in India, as it was centuries ago
in Greece and Kome. The Kolapoor system, however,
had peculiarities of its own. So desperate had become
the fortunes of the Chief, and of the court myrmidons,
that the great majority were reduced to depend for their
daily bread on the palace bounty ; nearly a thousand of
these minions fed daily at the durbar, and were reduced
to the condition of mere personal retainers. Stranger
still is the fact, that with such a head and such instru-
ments, the condition of the country was not wretched.
The secret lay in the Kaja's vigorous despotism. An
open court, with summary cruel punishments, kept
down crime. While the city and the palace were filled
with iniquities, the villages flourished ; few, if any, fell
into disorder, and, when the Kaja's career ended, little
waste land was to be found within his principality.
His offences thus lay in prodigality, in personal de-
bauchery, and in expending double or treble his income,
rather than in unduly squeezing his cultivators. His
last act was that of a desperate gamester. Shortly
before his death, in the year 1839, he affected to proceed
on a pilgrimage to Pundepoor; but the whole was a
mere scheme to plunder certain wealthy parties on the
Kistna. For this purpose, his ragged army was nearly
doubled; every effort was made to raise immediate funds,
and even the family jewels were pledged with this
unholy object. Death cut short the project ; and then
cannon and other munitions of war were found concealed
in the carts that were to accompany his train. On the
Kaja's death, his eldest son, the present chief, then a
minor, was placed on the yuddee, and a regency was
o 2
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196 MAHRATTA HISTORY AND EMPIRE.
formed by order of the British Government, consisting
of his mother, his maternal aunt, and four Karbarees.
The two ladies, of course, quarrelled. The British poli-
tical agent, on paying a hasty visit to Kolapoor from
Belgaum, finding them in warm contention, judged
it politic to leave them so, considering that he should
most effectually hold the durbar in check by counte-
nancing both. Within six months of the agent's
departure, the aunt, who went by the title of Dewan
Sahib, being the most energetic and most unscrupulous
of the two, got the better of her kinswoman and
assumed the whole powers of government. Her supre-
macy, thus acquired, was acknowledged by the British
authorities, though the step excluded the mother of the
minor sovereign from all authority.
We return to our sketch of Sawunt-waree affairs.
The measures taken in 1819 were soon found ineffectual
to protect the British frontier from plunder. The Waree
Government was unable to subdue or restrain its own
turbulent chiefs ; and the British authorities were con-
stantly annoyed by the distractions of this petty chief-
ship. In the year 1822, the Dessaee, then in his twen-
tieth year, was ousted from all authority by his Ranees,
supported by an influential minister. So great, at length,
became the disorganization of the country that, in the
year 1836-37, the British Government was obliged to
interfere, and to send a force to occupy the forts of
Mahdogurh and Naraingurh, and the town of Waree.
The Dessaee, thus relieved from his domestic persecutors,
was delivered over to a guaranteed minister. He, of
course, soon quarrelled with his monitor ; but his com-
plaints being attributed to the influence of disreputable
favourites, he vainly appealed to the British agent (the
collector of Rutnagirry). A formidable rebellion en-
sued, which it required a British detachment to quell.
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SAWUNT-WAREE.
197
In 1838, troops were again called out, being the fourth
time that armed interference had been employed in
Sawunt-waree within nine years. Phoond Sawunt, who
has within the last twelve months* again given so much
trouble, was then in arms, plundering the Waree villages
and threatening the British frontier. The Dessaee
thwarted all the efforts of this rough-riding minister to
put down the rebellion, and accused him of being in
league with the rebels. The British Government, tired
at length of fighting the Dessaee's battles, assumed the
direct management of the country, until such time as
there should be a probability of his governing it well.
Mr. Spooner, a Bombay civil servant, was placed in
charge of the territory; but had a very up-hill game
to play. The country, one of the very strongest in all
India, and in many parts believed to be inaccessible to
regular troops, teemed with malcontents. While many
had real grievances, some feared the indispensable re-
ductions incidental on the new arrangements; and
others dreaded the substitution of a strong Government
for their old system of misrule. All could plot, and
even fight confidently, having their friendly jungles to
fly to — a sure refuge in the sympathizing neutrality of
the border State of Goa. On one occasion, the rebels
acquired temporary possession of Waree ; another time,
they captured the fort of Humuntghar, blockaded the
passes, plundered travellers, and attempted to levy the
Government revenue. They were not only recruited
from the Goa territory, but one of the leaders at the
capture of Aumuntghar was a Goa Dessaee. A Sawunt-
waree local corps was, at length, raised; and a new
governor having arrived at Goa, who was less friendly
to the malcontents, they were finally put down. Nine
of the leaders were condemned to death ; but their sen-
* That is, about 1844-45.
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198 MAHRATTA HISTORY AND EMPIRE.
tences were commuted to banishment for life. The
execution of a number of prisoners also took place,
under the orders of Lieutenant Gibbard, the adjutant
of the local corps. He pleaded the orders of the po-
litical agent; but was made to answer for the deed
before a military tribunal. Sawunt-waree was thus,
as the phrase runs, settled ; but the flame was only
smothered; and no sooner did disturbances break out
in Kolapoor, than the Waree people were again up, and
the son of the Dessaee was himself in arms.
We have now brought our sketch down to the period
of the late disturbances in Kolapoor and Sawunt-waree.
The united area of these two States does not exceed
four thousand square miles, and their joint nett revenue,
after deducting jaghirs and rent-free lands, scarcely
amounts to seven lakhs of rupees. But, as already ob-
served, the whole tract, especially Sawunt-waree, is a
remarkably strong country, combining within a small
area all the strong points of mountain and jungle fast-
nesses. The inhabitants, moreover, though poor, are
hardy and lawless, and still bear in mind the exploits of
Sivajee's favourite Mawulees and Hetkurees.
Predatory habits, formed during centuries of anarchy,
are not to be changed in a day. British supremacy,
has, throughout India, restricted the field of plunder
and of warfare ; but sufficient time has not yet elapsed
materially to alter the feelings and associations of the
marauding times. We have taken from the lawless
their hunting grounds ; we have prohibited their spoil-
ing their neighbours ; but we have neither given them
an equivalent, nor allowed them an outlet for their
energies. We have not even rendered their own homes
secure. The guaranteed princes, who can no longer
array their followers for foreign raids, must turn their
hungry energies against those very followers. Money
EVILS OP NATIVE RULE.
199
they must have to feed their own luxurious lusts. If
they cannot plunder strangers, they must harry their
own people. The rule holds good throughout India.
The instances among native States, where the cultivator
is certain of reaping what he has sown, and of being
called on to pay only what has been previously agreed,
are most rare. Indeed, they are to be found only in
some few States of very limited extent, where the reign-
ing chief, being a man of probity as well as of ability,
sees with his own eyes, hears with his own ears, and,
setting aside ministers and agents, looks after his own
affairs.
The southern Mahratta States afford a good illustra-
tion of our argument. They have experienced all the
inconveniences of a strong supremacy, without partici-
pating in its advantages. The British aegis has been
thrown over the rulers and ministers of Kolapoor and
Sawunt-waree, while no effectual measures have been
taken to enforce their doing their duty to the governed.
It cannot, indeed, be denied that these territories have
been most egregiously mismanaged. Countries that
have been repeatedly in arms within a short term of
years must have grievances. Half-armed, hungry men
do not give their throats to the sword for mere amuse-
ment. Men do not, for ever, love to struggle in a
hopeless cause. We may then fairly infer that there has
been abuse; and as both Kolapoor and Sawunt-waree
have, during several years, been in a manner directly
governed by British agents, we are obliged to attribute
the maladministration which has entailed so much ex-
pense of blood and treasure, to our own ill-digested
schemes ; to the affectation of holding aloof, while we
were daily and hourly interfering in the most essential
manner, through native agents, by placing in the hands
of native underlings, powers that no native of the
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200 MAHRATTA HISTORY .AND EMPIRE.
present generation has head or heart to bear. With a
British superintendent in Sawunt-waree, and a native
agent in Kolapoor, acting as minister, as regent, as fac-
totum, under the political agent at Belgaum, neither of
the disaffected States can be considered as having been
under a domestic administration ; but our Government
is as distinctly responsible for their bad, as it would
have been entitled to the credit of their good manage-
ment.
Sawunt-waree offers a notable proof, that the sword
alone cannot sustain an Anglo-Indian administration.
Martial law had long prevailed ; the country had been
harried ; some malcontents had been justly condemned,
other unfortunate men had been butchered. The native
Government was wholly suspended; the management
was entirely in our own hands ; and yet, no sooner had
troubles arisen in Kolapoor than it became certain that
Sawunt-waree would rise. The worst expectations were
realized. With scarcely an exception, every chief in
the country took up arms, and forty of them, with
their personal followers, driven from their fastnesses,
are now in the dungeons of Goa, rather than surrender
to British clemency. There is something very lament-
able in all this, and it calls for no ordinary inquiry.
The circumstances of the Kolapoor outbreak are
different. We have already noticed the dissensions
among the members of the regency. The supremacy
of the Baja's aunt was not of long continuance, and
more than one change preceded the late outbreak. At
length, a few months before the insurrection commenced,
Dajee Krishen Pundit, a Brahman, who had risen from
a subordinate position in one of our civil offices, was
placed at the head of the regency. Within a month of
his accession to power, his two coadjutors were dis-
missed by the political agent for peculation ; and the
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THE KOLAPOOR REGENCY.
201
Pundit monopolized the combined powers of minister
and regent. Dajee could not have been a notoriously
bad man ; the probability is, he was both able and
moderate. But unlimited power has turned wiser heads
than are to be found among the underlings of an
Anglo-Indian cutchery. We accordingly find that Dajee
neither bore himself meekly, nor was content to follow
those two golden maxims, to let well alone, and to
endeavour to make the best of local, even though bad,
materials. He seems to have forgotten that he was a
foreigner among a wild and a proud people, who could
only be managed peaceably by and through their own
countrymen; that if he did not employ the natives,
they must and would oppose him ; and that they could
not remain neutral, and indubitably would be either
his coadjutors or his enemies. Nevertheless, Dajee did
make many changes, and did provide for his Brahman
kinsmen.* He, moreover, not only checked the abuses
and illicit gains of the Mankurees and other chiefs, but
by touching, their dignity made himself personally of-
fensive : there can, therefore, be little doubt that, though
few of them openly engaged in the insurrection, the
majority instigated and encouraged the acts of the rebel
Gurhkurees and refractory Sebundees. The former, we
have already explained, were the hereditary holders of
* We have no desire to run down a native agent are immeasurably
Dajee ; on the contrary, we look on greater than what would face a Euro-
him as a favourable specimen of an pean officer. An ordinary English-
Anglo-Native agent. Had he been man may do a hundred tnings that
better or worse, matters would have the best and purest native dare not
turned out differently. Had he attempt. The latter, too, has his
leagued with local oppressors, had peculiar advantages. Each has his
he gone hand in hand with the fitting place ; and the grand point of
plunderers and tyrants he found skilful Anglo-Indian administration
around him, his reign would at least turns on the judicious blending of
have been longer. Had he been a the double agency. Europeans and
" faultless monster " he might have natives may, conjointly, build up
saved the State. But in all such what either, acting singly, would
cases, the difficulties in the way of mar. — H. M. L.
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202 MAHRATTA HISTORY AND EMPIRE.
the Kill forts that dot the Kolapoor country. From
father to son, they had lived and died at their posts,
and were supported by certain lands dependant on their
respective charges. To interfere with arrangements
which had existed since the days of Sivajee, if not
before his time, was anything but prudent ; nor can we
perceive the policy, any more than the justice, of irri-
tating the hereditary soldiery of this wild country.
The immediate cause of offence was the appointment
of mamlutdars (revenue officers) to manage the Gurh-
kuree lands. Perhaps it would be more correct to say
that the Gurhkurees resented the removal of their own
immediate agents, and the doubling up of appointments
by which the charge of their affairs was made over to
mamlutdars who managed the adjoining districts. This
measure, as they supposed, affected their honour, and
placed them at the mercy of strangers. We are far
from believing that the Bombay authorities had any
design to mulct the Hill garrisons ; there was, therefore,
the less excuse for trifling with their feelings, it may
be their prejudices, by appointing people to do for
them what they preferred doing themselves. We need
hardly add that no stranger mamlutdar could have been
appointed, to whose fingers a portion of the proceeds of
the Gurhkuree lands would not have adhered.
In July, 1844, the flame broke out; the garrisons of
the strong forts of Bhoordurgurh and Samungurh re-,
fused to admit the mamlutdar appointed to manage
their lands. Dajee Pundit for a long time endeavoured
to cajole the recusants, and eventually sent two of the
principal officers of the State to cajole them into sub-
mission. The Gurhkurees were firm, and refused not
only to admit any mamlutdar except of their own
selection, but required the guarantee of the naiks
(chiefs) of the five regiments of Sebundees at Kolapoor
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HOW TO DEAL WITH MALCONTENTS.
203
as security for their future good treatment. The very
positiveness of the poor creatures seems to bear testi-
mony to their having experienced wrong, and their fear
of further injury. Dajee Pundit was desirous of grant-
ing their demands ; but the political agent forbad any
concession to men with arms in their hands ; and hear-
ing, in September, that the malcontents had levied con-
tributions in their neighbourhood, recommended that a
force should be sent against them.
It is to be regretted that, before the British func-
tionary counselled recourse to arms, he had not done
something more than communicate with the malcon-
tents through native agents ; that, in short, he had not
himself visited the scene of disorder. We have little
doubt that he might have entered either Samungurh or
Bhoordurgurh with perfect safety, the former being only
a long morning's ride from Belgaum. Or, supposing
that he could not have proceeded thither in person, why
not have called in a deputation from the recusants to
state their grievances? This question may rouse the
yells of fire-and-faggot politicians. "Visit or receive
men with arms in their hands?" they will say. We
reply, yes, decidedly so, as long as no overt act of
hostility has been committed, and while there is reason
to believe that the disaffected are moved by real, or
even supposed, wrongs. It is not the fashion, we know,
to argue thus, — the more the pity, — and the greater the
necessity that our voice, feeble though it be, should
be raised in the cause of humanity and of truth.
Unfortunately, British Indian history abounds with in-
stances where the neglect of so simple an act of justice
has cost us dear, both in blood and credit. Whether,
we ask, is it more creditable to grant terms to men in
arms before or after they have used those arms ? The
historical reader will be familiar with cases of civil and
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M AH R ATT A HISTORY AND EMPIRE.
military revolt ; and will have observed, that in the great
majority of instances, all that was at first humbly
craved, and forcibly demanded only when redress had
been refused, was finally conceded after blood had been
shed. Are we always to slay in order to prove our
strength? Far better to relinquish so sanguinary a
dominion ! This is one view of the case, — that justice
should first be fully done, and that we should enter on
no quarrel with dirty hands. We may, however, meet
the coercives on their own ground, and entirely deny
the necessity, at the present day, of brute force to
vindicate our honour. Whatever may have been the
case fifty years ago, a preliminary fusilade is not now
requisite to prove that our measures of mercy are
voluntary. Who, in his senses, ever doubted that the
British Government could coerce the Gurhkurees and
capture their forts ? Who ever denied that the Barrack-
poor division could annihilate the unhappy 47th Ben-
gal N. I.? There have been instances where prompt
and rigid austerity was perfectly justifiable ; but, for
one such emergency, a dozen have occurred where early
moderation, combined with firmness, would have been
the true course of policy.
Acting on the agent's recommendation, the Bombay
Government issued instructions that a detachment,
amply sufficient to effect the pacification of the dis-
turbed districts, should move from Belgaum, the head-
quarters of the southern division of the Bombay army.
With whom the selection and strength of the field force
rested, we are not exactly aware. It consisted of 1200
men, including two companies of European Infantry,
one company of Native Bifles, a few Irregular Horse ;
and sixty artillery-men with four mortars, two howitzers,
and two nine-pounders. One hundred labourers also
accompanied the engineer officer as pioneers. The
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COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN. 205
whole were placed under command of Lieut. -Colonel
Wallace, 20th Madras N. I. This small detachment,
though in division orders on the 12th September, did
did not march till the 16th, and arrived opposite the
fort of Samungurh, thirty miles distant, on the 19th
of the same month. The strength of the fort lay-
chiefly in its position on the summit of a scarped rock ;
its walls were found to be from twenty to sixty feet
high, and between one and two miles in circuit. The
hill on which the fort stands is, however, commanded
by an adjoining rock; the place was wretchedly equipped,
and garrisoned by only three hundred men, and might,
probably, have been seized by coup-de-main, the first
day. Tt is obvious, however, that if the fort was not
thus to be captured by a sudden attack, there was not
much hope of the success of a detachment scarcely
exceeding 1000 bayonets, and unaccompanied by bat-
tering guns. Fifty mortars might have settled the
matter in a few hours : the fire of four could only have
afforded amusement to the garrison of so extensive a
position. On the 20th, Colonel Wallace took posses-
sion of the hill, commanding the fort, and the next day
commenced shelling, but with little or no effect. On
the 24th, the pettah was carried by storm, and no effort
was wanting, on the part of the British commander to
reduce the fort ; but he soon found himself helpless,
and applied for reinforcements and battering guns.
The distance from Belgaum does not exceed thirty
miles, and yet the guns, being impeded by heavy rain,
did not arrive for more than three weeks, by which time
much of the moral effect of the military movement had
been lost, and the Gurhkurees had received confidence
and recruited their numbers.
On the 22nd September the garrison of Bhoordurgurh
sallied out upon the Kolapoor troops sent against their
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206 MAHRATTA HISTORY AND EMPIRE.
fort, and drove them off with loss. Alarm now spread,
and fears were expressed for Butnagiry, Vingorla, and
even for Belganm itself; at which last place sudden and
novel precautions were taken, sufficient to indicate alarm
and to provoke attack. When shall we gain experience
and learn to be always on the alert ? — In the words of
Washington, " to organize all our resources, and to put
them in a state of preparation for prompt action"
# # * "to endeavour by unanimity, vigilance, and
exertion, under the blessing of Providence, to hold the
scales of our destiny in our own hands." Reinforce-
ments were now ordered from various quarters towards
the disturbed districts ; and on the 8th October, General
Delamotte, by order of the Bombay Government, as-
sumed command of the troops in the field. On the
11th, four battering guns reached Samungurh, and were
placed in position, and by the evening of the next day a
practicable breach was effected. When the guns arrived,
Mr. Beeves, the commissioner, allowed the garrison the
opportunity of a parley to state their grievances ; but
he soon found that the Gurhkurees only desired to gain
time, in expectation of support from Kolapoor, where,
in the interim, the Sebundees, encouraged by our su-
pineness, had risen in open revolt, and seized and
confined the minister Dajee Pundit ; and where, in fact,
their leader, Babajee Thirakar, had assumed the govern-
ment. Affairs were, therefore, allowed to take their
course, and shortly before daylight on the morning of
the 13th, the place was stormed and carried with little
opposition. During the day, Mr. Beeves and Colonel
Outram accompanied a wing of the 5th Madras Cavalry
under command of Captain Graham, and cut up a large
body of malcontents who had collected in the neigh-
bourhood with a view of supporting the garrison.
Colonel Outram had joined General Delamotte's camp
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DIVIDED COUNSELS.
207
the day before the storm, in a political capacity, and
henceforward, wherever employed, threw into all pro-
ceedings that moderation, energy, and ability, which
have everywhere so strongly marked his career.
To save further bloodshed, the joint-commissioners,
Mr. Eeeves and Colonel Outram, now offered, with cer-
tain exceptions, an amnesty to all who would imme-
diately return to their allegiance. Few, if any, ac-
cepted the terms ; a strong presumptive proof that the
unfortunate men had real grievances. The day after
the capture of Samungurh, Colonel Outram, with
Colonel Wallace and 500 men of his brigade, proceeded
to Kaghal, one march from Kolapoor, with the view of
procuring the release of the minister who was im-
prisoned in the fort of Panalla, as well as of supporting
the Kaja and well-affected chiefs against the disorderly
troops and their disloyal leaders. The movements of
the head-quarters under General Delamotte were more
dilatory and less decided. He did not leave Samungurh
until the 12th October, and then hesitated a long time
whether to move on Kolapoor or Bhoordurgurh, the
garrison of which last place had, on the 10th October,
plundered the British pergunnah of Chickooree, and
robbed the local treasury. Whatever was to be done
should have been done quickly ; expedition was every-
thing ; and had a second blow, such as that at Samun-
gurh, been speedily struck, in any direction, the pro-
bability is, that the insurrection would have been sub-
dued.
There seems at this time to have been disunion in the
counsels of the authorities ; but their exact nature has
not transpired. Government, evidently, was very ill-
informed as to the nature of the outbreak, or the means
most likely to quell it. Like most other insurrections,
it had in the first instance been mismanaged and trifled
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MAHRATTA HISTORY AND EMPIRE.
with ; its dangers were then exaggerated ; troops were
poured into the country under hap-hazard commanders,
and it was only at the last stage of proceedings that
efficient means of tranquillization were adopted. On
the 24th October, after much negotiation, and not until
Colonel Wallace's detachment had been strengthened,
Dajee Pundit was released, and the young Raja of Kola-
poor, with his aunt and mother and the majority of his
chiefs, left the city and joined the British camp. The
movement had been strongly opposed by the Kolapoor
troops, about 500 of whom under Babajee Thirakar,
finding their wishes defeated, absconded and joined the
Bhoordurgurh malcontents. Babajee may be regarded
as the leader of the rebellion. He had imprisoned the
minister, usurped the government, and instigated the
raid on Chickooree. He and certain other principals
were, therefore, excepted in an offer of amnesty, which
was held out to such as should return to their alle-
giance ; but, strange to say, when General Delamotte
did at least appear before Bhoordurgurh, with every
means of speedily capturing the place, he admitted the
garrison to a surrender ; and actually allowed himself,
on the evening of the 10th, to be detained for several
hours at one gate, while Babajee Thirakar with his
party escaped from another. Thus was the flame
spread, rather than extinguished; for Babajee imme-
diately moved to the still stronger fortress of Panalla,
where the Kolapoorians imagined that, as in olden time,
a long, if not permanent, stand could be made against
all comers.
On the 25th November, General Delamotte appeared
before Panalla, where Colonel Ovans, the Resident at
Satara, was now imprisoned. This officer, who had
lately been appointed special commissioner in the
Southern Mahratta country, to the supercession of both
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CAPTURE OF COLONEL OVANS.
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Mr. Reeves and Colonel Outram, had been waylaid on
the 17th November, while incautiously travelling dak
with a very slight escort from Satara to Kolapoor, and
carried prisoner to Panalla. We pretend not to know
the reason of Colonel Ovans* appointment, but after
carefully comparing all we have heard on the subject, it
is our belief that the Bombay Government, already in
no good humour at the long continuance of hostilities,
were at this time irritated by Colonel Outranks refusing
to accept the permanent charge of the Kolapoor country,
and, therefore, at once accepted the resignation, which
he volunteered only on the expiration of hostilities.
This must have been the real motive that actuated, per-
haps unwittingly, the authorities, though they may
have likewise disapproved of some particular measures
he had pursued. We see at least no other mode of ac-
counting for the act. The rumours and assertions cir-
culated by a portion of the Press at the time must have
been erroneous regarding the man who was selected to
go to Kolapoor when affairs looked black, was offered the
permanent civil management when they looked blacker ;
was then employed as a military commander in putting
an end to the war ; and has since the termination of
hostilities been nominated to the charge of the political
and military relations at Satara.
Whatever may have been the cause of Colonel Ovans*
deputation, his career was, thus summarily, cut short,
and the political management in the field remained
in the hands of Mr. Reeves and Colonel Outram.
Strenuous endeavours were made by the commissioners
to effect the release of Colonel Ovans, whom the mal-
contents vainly tried to make the means of ensuring
their own safety. All their overtures were, however,
disregarded ; they were desired to release their prisoner
and surrender at discretion, or stand the consequences.
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MAHRATTA HISTORY AND EMPIRE.
They did release him, hoping thereby to obtain terms
of surrender, but they soon discovered their error.
On the* 27th the Pettah was captured; and on the
morning of the 1st December the batteries opened.
The same afternoon the breach, being reported practi-
cable, was stormed and carried in gallant style. Some
of the garrison endeavoured to escape into the adjoining
fort of Pawungurh, but were so closely followed by the
British troops, that this second fortress fell into our
hands the same day. Babajee Thirakar and some other
ringleaders fell in the storm, and many prisoners were
captured by the parties of troops judiciously placed in
the plain around.
On the 5th December, Colonel Wallace with a light
force proceeded against Bangna, seventy miles distant.
He reached it on the 9th, the same day carried the
Pettah, and the following night placed two guns and
two mortars in position: their play, during the next
day, caused the enemy after dark to evacuate the fort,
and fly into the Sawunt-waree jungles. The principal
fortresses of Kolapoor having thus fallen, their Ghirh-
kurees being slain, imprisoned, or dispersed, and the
country being full of British troops, there was now a
temporary lull ; but it soon appeared that the theatre,
only, of hostilities had changed, and that the war itself
was as far as ever from a conclusion. Two thousand of
the Waree people, under Phoond Sawunt, and Anna
Sahib, the, son of the Dessaee, who were at this time
devastating the Concan and stopping the roads, were
joined by the fugitive Kolapoorians. From the nature
of the country the military operations now became more
difficult. Wherever an enemy can be approached, there
is little cause for alarm. The strongest fortress or best-
intrenched position, if relied on, renders the occupiers
the more certain prey. It is but a question of time ;
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JUNGLE FIGHTING.
211
the result is certain. In a rocky, jungle country, how*
ever, abounding in deep, damp ravines, and in forest-
covered hills and dells, and occupied by an acclimated
people, the case is very different. In all such miasmatic
localities, as long as malcontents are satisfied to fly to-
day, to starve to-morrow, and altogether to live or die
as the beasts around them, they may long baffle the
operations of regular troops under ordinary comman-
ders. And thus it was that the Sawunt-waree people
acted; and thereby created, even beyond their own
immediate limits, more alarm than their wretched
means should have been permitted to do ; but the fact
is, that our regulars are as little adapted for jungle
fighting as were Aurungzebe's heavy Northmen to cope
on their own ground, with Sivajee's light Mawulees and
Hetkurees.
Troops employed in mountain and jungle warfare
require something more than mere bull-dog bravery.
Coolness, tact, activity, and a general acquaintance, at
least, with similar localities are as necessary in the leader,
as is some adaptation of his men to the enterprise.
Soldiers that will fearlessly mount a breach, silently
stand in array to be mown down by artillery, or un-
flinchingly hold their ranks to repel repeated charges
of cavalry, will falter under a dropping fire from unseen
foes. Men must be familiar with rock, ravine, and
jungle, to fight well among them. It is curious how ill
we generally make our selections from our ample and
varied resources — employing grenadiers as bush-rangers,
and keeping riflemen for garrison duty — pushing into
the front of battle, men who are fit only for the in-
valids, and keeping the young and active soldiers of
every rank comparatively in the background. We ge*
neraily get so well out of our scrapes that the waste
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MAHRATTA HISTORY AND EMPIRE.
of blood and treasure is too little considered ; and few
lessons are gained from past experience.
Fortunately for Government, the man they wanted
was at hand. Colonel Outram, who was now, about the
end of December, at Bombay, with the intention of pro-
ceeding to Europe, at once forgot past neglect and past
injuries, and came forward to rescue the Government
from their difficulties. He volunteered to return to the
seat of war, and there organize and lead a light corps.
Nobly did he fulfil the large expectations that were now
centred in him. Within a fortnight he was again in
the field, the soul of all active measures ; his very ad-
vanced guard driving before them the half-armed rabble
that had kept three brigades at bay.
Never was the magic power of one man's presence
more striking, than on Outranks return to the seat of
war. It might seem invidious were we to dwell on
the panic that then prevailed at Vingorla and Waree,
but the slightest glance at the proceedings in those
quarters will show that the insurgents had inspired a
ridiculously-formidable idea of their own importance.
All communications had long been cut off; the posts
were brought by long sea, from Malwan to Vingorla, and
many of the inhabitants of this latter place nightly
took refuge in boats in the harbour. The troops were
harassed with patrolling duty, yet the neighbourhood
was rife with murders and robberies, the perpetrators of
which sent insulting messages to the authorities. On
one occasion a religious meeting was dispersed by a wag
suddenly calling out that the enemy were upon them.
Vingorla, be it remembered, stands in an open country.
At Waree, matters were, if possible, still worse ; there
the troops remained as in blockade, not a soul venturing
beyond the lines. All outposts were called in and the
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ARRIVAL OF OUTRAM.
213
malcontents permitted to consider themselves masters of
the field. When the garrison was reinforced by the
arrival of the 10th and a part of the Bombay Native
Infantry, the authorities determined to occupy the gorge
of the valley of Seevapoor, in which lay the villages of
the insurgent Phoond Sawunt, and thus cut off this
focus of rebellion from the less- disturbed districts. The
scheme was a good one, but failed from the manner in
which its execution was attempted. A detachment of
two hundred sepoys set out ; they were sniped at from
the jungle and one man was wounded, when, instead of
closing with the enemy, they took post in a sort of en-
closure, and were soon beset by increased numbers. A
reinforcement of two hundred men joined them, but the
combined force, after losing twenty killed and wounded,
retreated to Waree. This success, of course, increased
the confidence of the insurgents, whose insolence was
not restrained even by the arrival soon after of Her
Majesty's 2nd Regiment. They gave out that the}r were
tired of thrashing sepoys and wished to try the metal of
the " Zamds." They soon obtained an opportunity of
proving their metal, but the sight of that fine corps was
too much for their nerves. The Europeans were then
kept idle, first at Waree, then at Dukhun-waree, and
full scope was given to the activity of the enemy.
At this juncture, Outram landed at Vingorla, where,
picking up two or three excellent officers, he pushed on
to Waree, and thence towards Seevapoor. From this
date, the 14th January, matters took a turn; hitherto
the three brigades had been playing bo-peep with the
enemy, and from the tops of the Ghats, examining
through telescopes the stockades below, which the com-
manders did not think it prudent to attack. But now,
at length, a decided movement was announced for
hemming in the rebels in the valley of Seevapoor.
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214 M AH R ATT A HI8T0RY AND EMPIRE.
Twelve hundred men were placed under Outram, with
orders to beat up the low ground from Waree towards
the forts of Munohur and Munsuntosh ; Colonel Car-
ruthers, with a brigade, was to occupy the Seevapoor
valley on the other side of the ridge on which those
forts are situated ; while Colonel Wallace was, on a given
day, to descend the Ghats, and it was reckoned that his
troops, dove-tailing with those under the immediate
command of General Delamotte, would complete the en-
circlement of the rebels. This is not the time or place
for commenting on Colonel Wallace's descent of the
Elephant Bock, and premature attack on the open
village of Seevapoor. . That officer probably thought
that he acted for the best, but we doubt whether dis-
obedience to orders can ever be so viewed. Without
any disparagement of his personal courage, we cannot
help thinking that Colonel Wallace manifested a very
contradictory estimate of the enemy's strength. If
they had been as formidable as he considered them,
then his descent of the rock, exposed to such a foe, was
absolute infatuation. Nothing but their weakness and
cowardice could justify the risk. But if the foe was so
contemptible, he could have easily taken the route he
was desired, driven them from stockade to stockade, at
the time ordered, and thus, completing the chain of
operation, have probably ensured the apprehension of
every individual rebel chief. Much have the merits of
Colonel Wallace's case been debated, but we cannot
perceive how he could have expected to escape a court-
martial, though he may have reckoned on ensuring an
honourable acquittal, from the nature of his offence.
There seems, however, to us, no more resemblance be-
tween his disobedience at the Elephant Rock and Nel-
son's at Copenhagen, than there is between the fame of
the two offenders. Judgment having been already
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PROGRE88 OP THE CAMPAIGN.
215
pronounced on Colonel Wallace by a military tribunal,
we should have avoided referring to his case, could our
narrative have been otherwise rendered intelligible.
To return to Colonel Outram. No communication
was practicable between the troops above and below the
Ghats, and he was left with his small band to his own
resources, without definite orders, and with very scanty
supplies, to carry out the most difficult operation of the
campaign. Merrily and confidently he advanced through
the wild sylvan scenes never before trod by European
foot. The ears of his people were now daily saluted by
the echo of the artillery on the overhanging Ghats •
sounds which could only be supposed to indicate " the
tug of war" above, and loss of ribbons and laurels to
those below. But such fears were soon relieved by
finding that the firing was only Colonel Wallace's long
practice with extra charges from the summit of the
Elephant Eock at the village Seevapoor, some three
miles distant in the Concan below.
Each day Outram found points of his route stockaded
by the enemy, but they never made a stand, the ad-
vanced guard and skirmishers being generally sufficient
to disperse the wretched rabble. At length, on the 20th
of January a combined movement was ordered upon
the high peak to the west of Munsuntosh. The main
attack was to be made by Colonel Carruthers, who,
supported by a portion of Colonel Wallace's brigade,
was to carry some stockades in his front, and then move
up the Dukhun-waree or Sevapoor side of the ridge,
while Colonel Outram was to make a diversion from
the Shirsarjee or Gotia valley. This last detachment
performed their part ; but, on reaching the summit of
the peak, from which an extensive view was commanded,
no sign appeared of either brigade. They saw the
stockades which Colonel Carruthers was to have attacked
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216 MAHRATTA HISTORY AND EMPIRE,
but which being now taken in flank were abandoned,
the enemy flying to Munsuntosh, within eight hundred
yards of which fort Outram established a post. Colonel
Carruthers, brigade had been prevented by the nature
of the country from taking their full share in the ope-
rations of the day. The next morning another com-
bined movement was made on the village of Grotia,
immediately below the forts ; again the nature of the
country favoured Outram, the advanced guard of whose
detachment captured the village with all its stockades,
though very strongly situated.
From these brief details we may infer how easily the
war might have been terminated, months sooner, by
more decided measures. The enemy had only to be
reached, to be routed. The troops, both Bombay and
Madras, were ready for their work, but a spirit of undue
caution and delay prevailed at head-quarters.
We cannot understand how it happened, but Colonel
Outram was now left, unsupported, to carry on opera-
tions against Munsuntosh. One of those accidents
which no human foresight can obviate, frustrated his
attempt to gain that fortress by a coup de main. He
carried three stockades, below the fort, attempted to
blow open a gate, failed, and was driven back with con-
siderable loss. He held his ground, however, high upon
the ridge, retained possession of the stockades, and was
on the eve of again storming the fortress when the
enemy evacuated not only Munsuntosh, but the adjoin-
ing fort of Munohur. Outram had skilfully thrown
out parties, to command the debouches from the south
and south-west faces of the forts, leaving the remaining
portions of the cordon to be filled up by the brigades.
Colonel Wallace, however, failed on his part, and thus
suffered the rebel chiefs, who had all been engaged, to
escape over the Sisadrug ridge, close to one of his posts,
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outkam's operations.
217
into the Goa territory. Outram followed hard upon
their track, had several skirmishes, took many prisoners,
and on one occasion, nearly captured the chiefs. Again
he scoured the wild country beneath the Ghats, encou-
raging the loyal, and beating up the disaffected villages.
The nature and value of his services during the opera-
tions we have glanced at, are not to be measured by
the actual opposition experienced or loss sustained, but
by the estimate formed by other commanders of the
obstacles and enemy to be encountered, and by the fact
that the rapid and skilful movements of his small
detachment, terminated, in a few days, an organized
opposition which had for six weeks kept at bay three
brigades, differently handled. The total silence of
Government, and the non-publication of any opinion
regarding the Sawunt-waree operations, might, at first
sight, lead to the inference that Outranks management
gave as little satisfaction as did that of his fellow com-
manders. But, the promotion since bestowed on him,
amply proves that Government took the same view of
his conduct throughout the campaign as did General
Delamotte, Colonels Brough and Wallace, and indeed
all his comrades. Outram's is an almost isolated
instance of a man receiving not only civil promotion
but brevet rank, without his good fortune exciting
jealousy ; a remarkable exception, only to be explained
by his rare qualities as a soldier, and his conciliatory
demeanour as a man.
The tone of our remarks upon Colonel Outram may
savour of partial panegyric, to those of our readers who
have not followed out his career as we have done. No
personal feelings however, can mingle in our praise of a
man whom we have never seen, and whom we know
only by his public acts. Those who have watched his
course, will probably concur in our eulogiuras ; indeed,
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MAHRATTA HISTORY AND EMPIRE.
any unprejudiced man, reading the despatches published
during the war, the proceedings of Colonel Wallace's
court-martial, and the discussions which they elicited
at the three Presidencies, must acknowledge that every
affair in which Outram had a voice, was carried out
with an energy and promptitude, very unlike the pro-
crastinating indecision perceptible elsewhere. He ar-
rived at Samungurh — the fortress was carried forthwith ;
and (what so rarely happens in Indian operations) the
success was immediately followed up, by despatching
Captain Graham to disperse the enemy's covering force ;
a work which that officer ably accomplished. Again, in
the despatch published by the Bombay Government, we
see Outram mentioned as " the man who volunteered
his services, and was among the foremost who entered
the fort of Panalla." The reader has only to contrast
the whole conduct of his detachment, from the 16th of
January to the conclusion of hostilities, with any other
operations of the campaign, and he will bear us out in
the opinion that ha was the soul of every decided
measure.
If our narrative has kept to Colonel Outranks de-
tachment it is for the simple reason that they appear
to have had all the fighting to themselves. No dis-
credit thereby attaches to the troops under the other
commanders, who were always ready for action, and
who, when opportunity offered, as at Samungurh and
Panalla, behaved with the accustomed gallantry of the
Madras and Bombay armies.
We must wind up this hasty, though perhaps prolix
sketch of Sawunt-waree affairs. By the capture of
Munohur and Munsuntosh the strength of the insur-
rection was broken. The strongholds of the rebels
were taken, their boldest leaders slain or captured, and
all others, to the number, as already stated, of forty, fled
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outram's diplomacy.
219
for shelter to Goa. Outram was then again called on
to act the diplomatist. His parties still followed up
the remaining small marauding bands, while he, himself,
proceeded to Goa, and by the union of firmness and
conciliation induced the Portuguese authorities to
remove their sympathizers from the frontier, and to sub-
stitute a cordon of such troops as would prevent the
Goa territory being made the place of ambush from
which the insurgents should at discretion devastate
Sawunt-waree. And now we may be permitted to con-
gratulate Government on their selection of such a man
as Colonel Outram to the important duties of the
Satara Eesidency. Our satisfaction would be increased
could we persuade the authorities to give him such
assistants as he can trust at Satara and Waree, and
place *him in authority at the central post of Kolapoor,
with combined powers as Besident, Commissioner, and
Military Commander.
Improved arrangements, we are aware, have already
been made. The Anglo-native agent at Kolapoor has
been replaced by an able British officer, and in Sawunt-
waree there could not be a better local superintendent
than the officer lately appointed. Captain Jacob is,
like Colonel Outram, a good soldier as well as an able
and conciliating civil officer. Such are the men re-
quired; men who, personally despising danger, are
forward in the hour of action, and, reckless of their own
blood, are chary of that of others. In no quarter of
India are such men more appreciated than in the
Southern Mahratta country, where their names alone
are worth regiments. They will preserve peace if it is
to be preserved, and if the sword must be drawn, will
carry on war, so that it shall speedily end in permanent
and prosperous tranquillity.
After more than six months of military operations,
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220
MAHRATTA HISTORY AND EMPIRE.
and the employment of nearly ten thousand troops,
in so insignificant a corner of India, peace has been
secured, or, more correctly, war has ceased. Let
us now, by honestly and carefully looking into pa^t
abuses and errors, and by not too rigorously judging
those who have been driven or reduced to misconduct,
secure the future tranquillity of the country. This can
be effected only by a permanent system of good manage-
ment consonant to the spirit of the people. We should
remember that rude tribes are not ripe for refined in-
stitutions, and that it is better to work on quietly, slowly,
and surely, than to risk new convulsions by sudden,
even though beneficial changes. The people of Kola-
poor and Sawunt-waree have, we believe, been partially
disarmed and many of their fortresses have been dis-
mantled. Both these measures should be completed.
Broad military roads should also be constructed to
intersect these territories in all directions, and the
jungle cleared at least a hundred feet on either side.
Such operations will involve present expense, but they
will prevent future sacrifices. No country, such as that
under notice, can be reckoned secure until those respon-
sible for its peace have facilities for quickly reaching
its most remote corners at all seasons of the year.
Half a dozen good officers under such a man as
Colonel Outram might, in a few years, wipe away the
reproach that is now attached to our name in the South
Mahratta country. Under their supervision, all real
rights and immunities would be clearly defined, and
speedily established; and all imaginary claims dis-
missed. A revenue system would be organized cal-
culated to protect cultivators from undue exaction, and
a scheme of police might be enforced that would make
the rock and the bush too hot for marauders. The
Mankurees, Chiefs, and Jaghirdars, would settle down
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OUR FUTURE POLICY.
221
into their places. The Eaja of Kolapoor and the Sin
Dessaee of Sawunt-waree would each, also, find his
level; they would respectively be the pageants that
mild, meek sovereigns in the East, who have the good
fortune to possess wise and virtuous Viziers, usually are.
They would be treated with respect, and they would
profit by the amelioration of their territories. The
labour, the responsibility, and let us not forget, the
honour of all improvements, would belong to the British
officials, who, eschewing the fiction of a double govern-
ment, putting aside all screens of dewans, ministers, or
karbarees, would openly stand forward as the avowed
managers of the country, on behalf of the ruling power.
The readers of these Essays will observe that we
distinguish between the cases of these Mahratta States
and that of Oude, where every measure short of super-
seding the King has been fruitlessly tried. Our rela-
tions with Kolapoor and Sawunt-waree stand in a dif-
ferent position. We have ourselves been for years the
managers of these countries ; the present disorganization
has been matured before our own eyes, and in our own
hands ; we should therefore nurture our change until its
health is thoroughly recruited, and restore full sove-
reignty to the legitimate princes, if we can then find
among them any whose characters will justify that
measure; otherwise we must continue to be the direct
managers, and persevere in a course so manifestly
advantageous to the hereditary chiefs themselves. No
pains should be spared to explain to them the eventual
intentions of Government in their favour, and they
should be as clearly informed that intrigue or treachery
will, at once and for ever, forfeit their thrones. Free
personal communication on the part of the European
superintendents with these princes, and constant,
though not intrusive, endeavours to enlighten their
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222 MAHRATTA HISTORY AND EMPIRE.
minds may gradually effect much. But whatever be
the result, the British Government will have done its
duty, and the good administration of the country will
have been secured, either in our own hands or in those
of the hereditary rulers.
We are quite aware of the difficulties in the way of
our scheme, and of the tact that will be required to
carry it out, but we are not the less confident of the
result, if the superintendence of affairs is entrusted to
the hands we have suggested. Intrigue, nay rebellion,
may at first arise ; but it will not be repeated, if
summarily and decidedly dealt with. As our scheme
admits of no just cause being given for insurrection,
and provides that determined malignancy shall receive
no quarter, we can perceive no likelihood of the arrange-
ment meeting with prolonged opposition. It is the
spasmodic tyranny of weak rulers that invites continual
attack. The Government that is one day oppressive,
the next cowardly, and the third day frantically venge-
ful, may fairly calculate on insurrections on every
emergency. The British administration of the present
day happily acts in another spirit, and the East India
Company has only, where legitimate openings offer, to
carry among the ryots of its protected princes some
portion of the benevolence that now influences its
dealings towards its own subjects, and protected India
will soon assume a new aspect. Blessings will, then, be
poured out, in many a rich plain and fruitful valley,
where curses are now plentifully showered on those who
have, unwittingly, given over the husbandman, the
strength and marrow of the land, bound hand and foot,
to the tender mercies of his irresponsible tyrants.
Note. — The deliberate opinion we perusal of that florid romance, en-
have formed of Colonel Outram, has titled, " The Conquest of Scinde,"
in no respect been altered by the concocted by the Governor of Guern-
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OUTRAM AND NAPIER.
223
sey from facts and fictions furnished
by the Governor of Scinde. The
foregoing remarks were written be-
fore* the appearance of Colonel Out-
ram's letter to General Napier ; a
letter that was not needed to set
" the Bayard of the Indian army "
(as Sir Charles Napier in an inspired
moment happily designated him)
right in the eyes of the Indian pub-
lic. Still less do they require a
further vindication of his conduct,
though they will welcome every item
of information that he may feel jus-
tified in giving. We fearlessly assert
that every right-minded man ac-
quainted with the progress of events
auring the year 1842, not only acquits
Colonel Outram of the absurd and
contradictory charges alleged against
him by the Napiers, but recognises
in his conduct throughout Scinde
transactions, both civil and military,
the spirit of a soldier, a gentleman,
and a Christian. We may hereafter
have the gratification of sketching
the career of this much-abused man,
who, with a singularly conciliatory
and kindly disposition, had the for-
tune to incur tne hatred of two first-
rate haters (Lord Keane and Sir
Charles Napier), men too, who fully
appreciated his good qualities, till
his manliness and honesty thwarted
their own views. In the year 1838,
Outram carried to Afghanistan a
character such as could not be paral-
lelled by any officer of his standing
in India. His services during the
first Affghan campaign were second
to those of no officer then and there
employed. Had he remained in the
Ghilzee country or at Khelat, many
of our disasters might have been
averted.
But it is by his civil management,
first, of lower Scinde, and then of
both the Upper and Lower Provinces
and of all Belochistan, that Outram
has won our highest admiration.
When the European inhabitants of
Calcutta trembled for our Indian
empire ; when, in the highest places,
men grew pale at the evil tidings
from Afghanistan, Outram held his
frontier post with a firm hand, a
brave heart, and cheerful tone, that
ought to have been contagious. Vigi-
lant, conciliatory, and courageous, he
managed, with his handful of troops,
not only to prevent the Ameers from
taking advantage of our disasters,
but to induce them to aid in fur-
nishing supplies and carriage for the
relieving, then considered the re-
treating, army. The merits of his
exertions on that occasion are little
understood. He obeyed, as was his
duty ; but he did not the less clearly
perceive the ruinous tendency of the
Government orders. He had the
moral courage to sacrifice his own
immediate interests by stemming
the then prevalent tide of cowardly
counsel. James Outram in one quar-
ter, and George Clerk — a kindred
spirit — in another, were the two who
then stood in the breach ; who forced
the authorities to listen to the fact
against which they tried to close
their ears, that the proposed aban-
donment of the British prisoners in
Afghanistan would be as dangerous
to the State as it was base towards
the captives. These counsels were
successfully followed : the British
nation thanked our Indian rulers,
while, of the two men, without whose
persevering remonstrances and exer-
tions Nott and Pollock might have
led back their armies, without being
permitted to make an effort to re-
trieve our credit — Clerk was slighted,
and Outram superseded. As cheer-
fully as he had stepped forward did
Outram now retire, and again when
his services were required was he
ready to act in the field, in willing
subordination to the officer who had
benefited by his supercession.
The Napiers accuse Outram of
jeopardizing the British army in
Scinde : this is mere nonsense. His
negotiations, followed up by Sir
Charles Napier's acts, were suffi-
cient to endanger his own life. They
did so, and nothing but his own
brilliant gallantry and that of his
small escort rescued them from the
toils. The British army was able to
take care of itself. Had Outram,
however, when deputed to Hydra-
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MAHRATTA HISTORY AND EMPIRE.
bad, been permitted the fair discre- Outranks chivalrous defence of his
Hon that his position demanded, assistant Lieutenant Hammersly is
had he been authorized definitely to one of the many instances in which
promise any reasonable terms ; his he advocated the right at the peril
abilities and his character would of his own interests. Hammersly
have secured an honourable peace ; was as brave, as honest-hearted a
but it was not in human nature that young soldier as ever fell a victim to
the Ameers should long continue to his duty. We knew him well, and
listen to an envoy sent to demand no one who did so need be ashamed
everything, and to offer nothing, to shed a tear over his fate. He was
This was not negotiating, it was literally sacrificed for telling tlte truth
dragooning. A British officer es- — a truth too that was of vital im-
corted by a single company was not portance to the beleaguered Canda-
the proper delegate for such a mis- har army — nay, to the interests of
sion. Sir Charles Napier at the British India. — Peace be to the
head of his army was the fitting memory of this noble fellow !
ambassador.
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LORD HARDINGE'S INDIAN ADMINISTRA-
TION.
[written in 1847.]
The general diffusion among our countrymen in India
of a spirit of fair and candid inquiry is a marked and
gratifying sign of the progress of improvement. A
course of enlightened and consistent policy in a ruler is
now certain of being met with calm and dispassionate
consideration, and, when shown to be characterized by
integrity and honesty of purpose, of being received with
cordial approval.
We may, therefore, safely predict that the admini-
stration of Lord Hardinge which has become, by his
departure from India, matter of history, will be unani-
mously praised by all who make Indian affairs their
study; and that the Eastern career of this soldier-
statesman will commend itself to their judgment and
approval as strongly as it evidently has done to that of
the Court of Directors and both sides of both Houses of
Parliament.
We proceed to detail those acts ; prefacing them with
a few words regarding the early and Peninsular career
of Lord Hardinge, chiefly compiled from the Memoir of
Lieutenant-General Sir Benjamin D'Urban.
Lord Hardinge is descended from an old Royalist
family of King's Newton, county Derby ; through which
he traces his ancestry up to the Conquest. His inime-
Q
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226 LORD HARDINGE's INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
diate ancestor raised troops for Charles I., hazarded
his life and lost his estates in the service of the Stuarts.
Lord Hardinge's uncle, Richard Hardinge, of Bellisle,
county Fermanagh, was created a Baronet in the year
1801, and was succeeded by his Lordship's elder brother,
the Reverend Charles Hardinge, of Bounds Park, Kent,
and Rector of Tunbridge. Lord Hardinge had three
other brothers : of whom one died young ; Col. Richard
Hardinge of the Royal Artillery, still alive ; and Captain
Nicholas Hardinge, who, in his 27th year, when in com-
mand of the "San Fiorenzo" fell in the moment of
victory at the close of a three days' action with " La
Piedmontaise" an enemy's ship of far superior force. A
monument in St. Paul's Cathedral records his achieve-
ments.
Before Henry Hardinge had attained his fifteenth year,
he joined his regiment in Canada. At the peace of
Amiens he returned to England, and, having studied at
the Royal Military College, was selected for a situation
on the Quartermaster-General's Staff with the expe-
dition, in 1807, under Sir B. Spencer, to the coast of
Spain. He was actively employed under Sir A. Wel-
lesley in the campaign of 1808, was present at the
battle of Roleia, and severely wounded at Vimiera. At
the close of the war he conveyed despatches to Sir John
Moore, with singular rapidity through many dangers.
With the rear-guard at the side of his heroic chief, he
shared in the many severe affairs of the retreat on Co-
runna, and was one of the officers near him when he
fell. In March of the same year (1809) he was ap-
pointed Lieutenant-Colonel and Deputy Quartermaster-
General of the Portuguese Army, under Sir B. D'Urban.
He served at the passage of the Upper Douro, on the
borders of Gailicia ; afterwards in Castile ; and at the
battle of Busaco.
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HIS EARLY CAREER.
227
Highly distinguished in the campaign of 1 811 under
Lord Beresford in the Alemtijo and Spanish Estre-
madura, it was at Albuera that his brightest wreath
was won. The fight had gone against the handful of
British soldiers. Half of those under fire had fallen,
when Colonel Hardinge, on his own responsibility
pointed out to Major-Greneral Sir Lowry Cole, that on
his moving up his division depended the fortune of the
day. These fresh troops were, on the instant, hurled
against the enemy's left flank; while Colonel Har-
dinge caused the right to be simultaneously assailed by
the re-inspirited brigade of Abercrombie. The heavy-
columns of the superb French Infantry were thus
checked, rolled back and broken : the British guns,
already limbered up and ready for retreat, were again
brought into action, and the enemy driven from that
fierce field.
This glorious turn in the tide of that fight, which
itself turned the tide of the Peninsular War, was the
achievement of Lieutenant-Colonel Hardinge, then only
25 years old ; immortalized by Alison in his record of
Albuera, as "the young soldier with the eye of a
general and the soul of a hero/'
Lieutenant-Colonel Hardinge served at the siege and
capture of both Ciudad-Eodrigo and Badajoz; and
especially distinguished himself at the storm of the
strong outwork " La Picurina." During the operations
which led to the battle of Salamanca, he officiated as
Quartermaster-General of the Portuguese Army, and
for his conduct received the Military Order of the
Tower and Sword.
At Vittoria, Colonel Hardinge was severely wounded
in the body, and while still suffering from a painful sur-
gical operation, resumed his duties in the Pyrenees.
He afterwards served at St. Sebastian, at the passage of
Q 2
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228 LORD HARDJNGK's INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
the Bidassoa, and in the battles of the Nivelle and
Nive.
In February, 1815, when in command of a Portuguese
brigade of infantry, he, in conjunction with General
Byng's brigade, gallantly carried with the bayonet
some strongly-occupied heights near Pallas. He was
then engaged at Orthes, and in the operations ending
with the battle of Toulouse. For the battle of Orthes
Colonel Hardinge received his ninth medal.
During the whole of the Peninsular War, Col.
Hardinge was never absent from his duty except for
very short periods after his wounds at Vimiera and Vit-
toria. At the peace, his signal services were rewarded
by his Sovereign with a Company in the Guards, and
by the distinction of Knight Commander of the Bath,
an honour usually reserved for general officers.
Sir H. Hardinge accompanied Sir C. Stewart to the
Congress of Vienna, and on the renewal of the war was
attached by the Duke of Wellington in a political ca-
pacity, with the rank of Brigadier-General to the head-
quarters of the Prussian army under Blucher. At the
sanguinary battle of Ligny on the 16th June, Sir H.
Hardinge again distinguished himself. About 4 p.m. his
left hand was shattered by a common shot, but, refusing
to dismount or leave the field, he placed a tourniquet on
his arm and sat out the battle, retiring sifter night-fall
with the Prussian army. At midnight, in a hut by
rushlight, attended by a single servant, he had his hand
amputated. Sir Henry had previously despatched his
brother, who was his aide-de-camp, to report to the
Duke the fate of the day, and to bring an English
surgeon. At daylight the French beat up the bivouac,
when Sir Henry, determined not to fall into the enemy's
hand, though faint from loss of blood, accompanied the
retreating Prussians. At Wavre he rejoined the gal-
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HIS EARLY CAREER.
229
lant Biucher, who, though still suffering from a fall,
and from having been ridden over by a whole brigade of
cavalry, got up and kissing his friend affectionately,
begged he would excuse the garlic (with which he was
perfumed), and condoled with him on Ligny, but cha-
racteristically added, "Never mind, my friend, if we
outlive to-morrow, Wellington and I will lick the
French/'
After the battle of Waterloo, the Duke of Wellington
devoted a separate gazette to the merits of Sir Henry
Hardinge and to a notification of his own regret for his
severe wound. From bad management in the first
instance Sir Henry's arm had to be several times re-
dressed, causing him extreme torture ; yet within the
fortnight he rejoined the army at Paris, where he was
received with military honours by Biucher, in the
palace of St. Cloud, and there placed in possession of
the apartments of Marie Louise.
At the expiration of the occupation of Paris, the
King of Prussia, in testimony of his high opinion of
his political and military services, decorated him, at a
grand review, with the Order of Merit, and of the Red
Eagle; and the Duke of Wellington, personally, pre-
sented him with the sword from his own side.
During these eventful seven years Sir H. Hardinge
had received four wounds, and had four horses killed
under him ; nor was he singular. Men long unaccus-
tomed to warfare are frightened at such losses as those
of Ferozeshah, Mudki, and Sobraon ; and forget, in these
recent events, the casualties of Albuera, Talavera, and
Waterloo. If, after a hard day's fight in India, all
the " means and appliances " of a cantonment hospital
are not found upon the field; if doolie-bearers, (who
get no pensions !) run away and leave their wounded
charge to be cut up by a straggling enemy ; and every
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230 LORD HARDINGE's INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
wound is not dressed and soothed with cerate on the
instant ; loud is the cry against the " culpable negli-
gence of the authorities :" but let them talk over Wel-
lington's campaigns with any of his veterans, and learn
how men of the best families of the land, lay stiff and
cold where they fell, unattended for hours and hours, or
even for the whole night, as Ponsonby on the field of
Waterloo ; or (to take a still nearer example) as our own
gallant old chief, Lord Gough, whose wound at Tala-
vera remained undressed for two whole days, though a
Lieutenant-Colonel commanding a regiment; and as
Sir Henry Hardinge, who though attached to the Prus-
sian army, in a high and honourable position, had to
wait eight hours for a surgeon to amputate his hand.
Peace came at last, and with it peaceful duties. Sir
Henry Hardinge now served for some years as a Captain
in the Guards; he then entered Parliament, and for
twenty years sat as Member for Durham and Launces-
ton. During this period he was employed for a short
time as Clerk of the Ordnance; on two occasions as
Secretary-at-War, and twice for short periods as Secre-
tary for Ireland. Sir Henry was early distinguished
for his clear business-like statements, his matter-of-fact
manner of transacting his official duties, and for the
vigour which he threw into all his actions. It is as
much the fashion to decry " Military Civilians/' as to
undervalue " Heaven-born " warriors. Such men as the
Duke of Wellington, Sir H. Hardinge, and a host of
others of all ages, should ere this have taught the folly
of the first error, as Cromwell, Washington, Clive, and
Blake, that of the other. When will the world perceive
that wisdom, foresight, and courage, are the gifts of God,
and not the mere results of social position ?
The quickness of perception, the physical and mental
energy and business habits which had been so often
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HIS CHARACTER.
231
tried in the field, were now to be tested in the Cabinet,
and in the Parliament of England — the noblest arena
in the world. Here Sir Henry's temper is described by
a candid political opponent as warm, but generous,
kindling at the least imputation, but never " allowing
the sun to go down upon his wrath." His adversaries
described him as " really a kindly and generous man,
warm in friendship, placable and scrupulous in hostility.
Plain, sincere, straightforward, just, and considerate."
They allowed him not only these personal qualities, but
all the ordinary ones of a safe practical executor of the
suggestions of others. They gave him credit for " un-
derstanding what he undertakes, and undertaking no-
thing but what he understands." Still, in reference to
his nomination to the post of Governor-General of
India, the same party observed that, " to consolidate
our Indian empire by ameliorating its institutions;
improve justice ; remove remaining restrictions on in-
dustry ; lighten taxes ; to execute great public works ;
to extend education ; and above all to raise the natives
and give them a higher social position, a more elevated
tone of feeling, and a greater share of political power,
require a great and zealous man. But to achieve such
results, or even to propose them, requires higher quali-
fications than we can give credit to Sir Henry for pos-
sessing."
That the writer erred in this estimate will, we doubt
not, be acknowledged when the extent of what Lord
Hardinge has done for education, for public works, for
the reduction of taxes, and for the general ameliora-
tion of the people of India, is known to him. It is
strange that the charge should ever have been made,
for in the only departments in which Lord Hardinge
had been tried, he had uniformly endeavoured to better
the condition of those under him. The British soldier
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232 LORD HARDINGE's INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
is indebted to him for many boons and liberal regula-
tions, which add to his comfort during service, and
improve his condition in old age ; and thus he has justly
earned the title of " the soldier s friend!' To him also
we believe it is, that England owes the humane prohi-
bition to the military and police against firing volleys on
mobs. The instructions are now precise 'and positive
as to when the soldier is to supersede the magistrate,
and then instesid of wholesale measures being at once
resorted to, only one file, in the first instance, is allowed
to fire; the remaining soldiers standing prepared to
resist attack.
But the time was come when Sir H. Hardinge was to
be called into a new and wider field of action. In May,
1844, his kinsman and friend, Lord Ellenborough, was
removed from the Government of India by the indig-
nant Court of Directors, whose authority he had defied ;
and the Ministry of the day, though disposed to defend
their colleague, wisely acquiesced in a measure which
they could not prevent. With equal wisdom, their
selection for the vacant office fell on Sir H. Hardinge.
The Court heartily and unanimously acquiesced, and the
lovers of official scandal were disappointed at the sudden
termination of what at one time bade fair to be a bitter
controversy, nay a struggle for superiority between the
Directors and the Ministry.
The new Governor-General was selected not as a
brilliant orator or Parliamentary partizan, but as a tried
soldier and straightforward practical statesman. With-
out, however, impugning the candour of either the
Cabinet or the Court, we may believe that each had a
motive for the choice they made. The former, perhaps,
desired as much as possible to soothe the feelings of
Lord Ellenborough ; and the Court, in accepting his
kinsman, doubtless considered that they gave the best
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THE GOVERNOR-GENERALSHIP.
233
possible proof that they had recalled his Lordship on
public grounds alone, and with no factious motive.
The appointment, in which the Ministers and the East
India Company thus happily concurred, was equally
popular with the public both in England and India.
In the latter, the friends of Lord Ellenborough (and
they were riot a few, especially among the juniors of
the army) looked with hope and confidence to a simi-
larity of military feelings in the mind of his successor
— at once his relative and a soldier; while all trusted
to Sir H. Hardinge's acknowledged character for fair-
ness, decision, and plain dealing.
Not long before, when the tidings of the Cabul
disaster reached England, Sir Henry Hardinge had
been offered the command of the army in India ; which
he declined. And now, for two whole days, he is under-
stood to have resisted the temptation of £25,000 a year,
with authority greater than that of the Autocrat of
Russia, over a population inferior in number only to
that of China. At the age of 60, to give up his family,
his seat in the Cabinet, and the society of the greatest
men of the times, for the sake of responding to the call
of his country and proceeding to the far East, at the
behest, and, in a measure, at the mercy of the Board of
Officials, who had so summarily dismissed his relative
and friend, required no little forgetfulness of self — no
ordinary sense of public duty. A common mind would
not have so confided. In this, as in many other pas-
sages of Lord Hardinge's Indian career, we recognise
the prompt courage of the hero of Albuera.
The usual pledges were now given and taken; the
usual dinners eaten, and the accustomed speeches enun-
ciated, but with more than their accustomed interest
derived from the past, and more, we believe, of sincerity
with reference to the future. On this occasion at least
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234 LORD HARDINGE's INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
the promises of peaceful policy were not forgotten,
though doomed to be disappointed; and after-dinner
visions of great works, and plans for the internal im-
provement of the Anglo-Indian empire, for once did
not melt into air.
In his speech on the victories of Mudki and Feroze-
shah, delivered on the 2nd of March, 1846, Sir Eobert
Peel thus well described the circumstances under which
Sir Henry Hardinge accepted his high office : — " I well
know what was the object of my friend, Sir Henry
Hardinge, in undertaking the Government of India.
He made great sacrifices from a sense of public duty;
my gallant friend held a prominent place in the
Councils of Her Majesty : he was, I believe, without
any reference to party divisions, held in general esteem
in this House, as well by his political opponents as by
his political friends. He was regarded by the army of
this country as its friend, because he was the friend of
justice to all ranks of that army. It was proposed to
him at a time of life, when, perhaps, ambition is a less
powerful stimulus than it might have been at an earlier
period — it was proposed to him to relinquish his place
in the Councils of his Sovereign — to forego the satis-
faction he must have felt at what he could not fail to
see, that he was an object of general respect and esteem.
He separated himself from that family which consti-
tuted the chief happiness of his life, for the purpose of
performing a public duty he owed to his Sovereign and
his country, by taking the arduous and responsible
situation of Chief Governor of our Indian possessions.
He went out with a high military reputation, solicitous
to establish his fame in connection with our Indian
empire, not by means of conquest, or the exhibition of
military skill and valour, but by obtaining for himself
a name in the annals of India, as the friend of peace,
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FAREWELL ADDRESSES.
235
and through the promotion of the social interests and
welfare of the inhabitants."
Such we are told by the Premier of England, by him
who best knew them, were the motives of Sir Henry
Hardinge in accepting the vice-royalty of India: and
when we glance over the parting address of the Chair-
man of the Court of Directors, to the new Governor-
General, and apply it as a touchstone to that Governor's
administration, we cannot fail to perceive how honestly
and ably Lord Hardinge has acted up to both the
Court's instructions and to his own pledges.
After assuring Sir Henry that he had the Court's
" entire confidence — a confidence founded on the reputa-
tion he had established for himself not only as a soldier
but as a statesman;" the Chairman slightly but dis-
tinctly alluded to the fact that the general admini-
stration of British India is the direct charge of the
Court of Directors, " subject to the control of the Board
of Commissioners for the affairs of India;" and, draw-
ing thence the corollary that " the maintenance of re-
spect for the authority of the Court is demanded by the
existing sytem of the Indian Government," significantly
added, "we are persuaded that you will impress this
feeling upon our servants abroad, not merely by precept,
but by your example'9
The Civil and Military services, and (with some em-
phasis) the Governor-General's " constitutional advisers,
the members of the Council of India," were then recom-
mended to Sir Henry's attention; the Native soldier's
good qualities were lauded; and lastly the Chairman
thus urged upon Sir Henry's notice the questions of
peace, conciliatory policy, and their results — consolida-
tion and internal improvement: — "By our latest in-
telligence, we are induced to hope that peace prevails
throughout India. I need not say it is our anxious desire
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236 LORD HARDINGE'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
that it should be preserved. You, sir, well know how
great are the evils of war, and we feel confident that,
whilst ever ready to maintain unimpaired the honour of
our country, and the supremacy of our arms, your
policy will be essentially pacific.
"To the Native States which still retain indepen-
dence, you will extend the shield of British protection.
It has hitherto been considered a wise and just policy to
uphold and support those which are in alliance with
us ; and in dealing with those which are more imme-
diately dependent upon our Government, we have, with
a view to soothe the feelings, and conciliate the attach-
ment, of both chiefs and people, permitted the former to
retain the recognised emblems of authority, their titles,
and other insignia of rank and station. Peace, apart
from its other advantages, is desirable with a view to
the prosperity of our finances and the development of
the resources of the country.
" The strictest economy consistent with the efficiency
of the service " was then enjoined.
The Chairman next touched on education ; observing,
it " has long been the desire of the Court to encourage
education among the people of India, with a view of
cultivating and enlarging their minds, of raising them
in their own and our estimation, and of qualifying them
for the more responsible offices under our Government.
It is, however, necessary, with reference to the subject
of education, to exercise great prudence and caution, in
order to avoid even the appearance of any interference
with their religious feelings and prejudices, and to
maintain on such points the strictest neutrality.
"Finally, Sir Henry, I would earnestly recommend
the whole body of the people of British India, and its
dependencies, to your paternal care and protection. It
has always been the earnest desire of the Court of
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ARRIVAL IN INDIA.
237
Directors that the government 01 the East India Com-
pany should be eminently just, moderate, and concilia-
tory. The supremacy of our power must be maintained,
when necessary, by the irresistible force of our arms;
but the empire of India cannot be upheld by the sword
alone. The attachment of the people, their confidence
in our sense of justice and in our desire to maintain the
obligations of good faith, must ever be essential elements
of our strength. I beseech you, therefore, to keep these
sacred principles habitually and permanently in view.
The Court has selected you for the high office of Go-
vernor-General with reference not less to the confi-
dence which they entertain in your character for justice,
moderation, and benevolence, than to your undoubted
possession of a sound practical judgment, and a firm
and indomitable spirit. You are already in possession
of the highest renown as a soldier, and we feel assured
that you will now rest your happiness and your fame on
the furtherance of measures tending to promote the
welfare and best interests of the Government, and of
the people committed to your care, and it is our earnest
prayer that after an extended career of useful and valu-
able service, you, may return to your native country,
bearing with you as the best and most gratifying re-
ward of your labours, the thanks and blessings of the
people of India."
In a modest rejoinder Sir Henry promised less than he
has performed.
Sir H. Hardinge reached Calcutta on 23rd July. The
tremendous heat of the Red Sea at that season did not
prevent him from minutely inspecting the works of
Aden, and drawing up a memorandum in correction of
the errors of the Bombay Engineers, and proving how
unnecessary was the extravagant expenditure then going
on upon the rock. Afterwards in India full information
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238 LORD HARDINGE's INDIAN- ADMINISTRATION.
was called for, and the Governor-General recorded in
another very able paper, that works to an extent suf-
ficient for 1200 men in peace, and 1500 in war and pro-
portionate artillery, would make good the post against
all probable comers; since a European enemy must
either drag his guns by land, 1500 miles, or be master
of the sea.
It is in similar adaptations of ways and means that
the officers in every department of the Government of
India have found Lord Hardinge's strength to lie ; his
practical intellect sees and seizes at once upon the
strong and weak points of a question; and above all
a military fallacy stands no chance with him. Thus
in the instance before us he justly ridiculed the incon-
sistency of making Aden a Gibraltar, while Singapore,
Hong Kong, &c, are left comparatively defenceless.
The Aden papers have generally transpired; and are
justly considered as among the very ablest that have
emanated from Lord Hardinge's pen.
One of the first acts of the new Governor-General in
India was to appoint the late private secretary of Lord
Ellenborough to the important commissionership of
Tennasserim and Moulmein. Captain Durand has
since been removed ; but, when appointed, no man in
India, of his standing, bore a higher character for talent,
application, and business habits; and even those who
have since condemned him, find him guilty mainly of
errors of judgment. A more honourable man than Cap-
tain Durand of the Bengal Engineers does not exist.
By his appointment to Tennasserim, the Governor-Ge-
neral was enabled to call up Major Broadfoot, who had
for two years held that commissionership to the north-
west frontier, where Lord Ellenborough had contem-
plated employing him. These two selections, and a
general adherence to his predecessor's policy, satisfied
HIS DOMESTIC POLICY.
239
men's minds, that, however, in personal demeanour to
the Court of Directors, and in some domestic questions,
Sir Henry Hardinge might act on his own special views,
yet there would be no systematic repeal of Lord Ellen-
borough's acts — no running down of his opinions be-
cause they were those of his predecessor; — a practice
too often prevalent in India in places both high and
low ; so much so, indeed, as often to lead natives to
suppose that there is no stability in our institutions ;
and that one official comes after another only to reverse
his orders. Sir Henry Hardinge came to India " fore-
warned, fore-armed" against this restless error. He
had visited Mount-Stuart Elphinstone in England and
asked his advice. The veteran statesman warned him
against meddling vrith civil details. The advice was wise ;
and, what is rare, has been as wisely acted on. The ad-
vantage of letting things alone where there is no cer-
tainty of mending them, is here too little understood,
especially by the half-informed. William Fraser, who
was murdered at Delhi, was once consulted by one of
his subordinates, who in despair declared that he had
tried every means he could devise to bring the people of
a certain district into order, but without avail. " Did
you ever try what could be done by letting them alone?"
was the reply. We recommend the anecdote to every
magistrate in India, who has got a little leisure, and is
thinking what to do with it !
We would not be understood to imply that Lord
Hardinge neglected civil affairs ; but when it can be
truly said that the most industrious magistrate in India
may let " well alone," and yet find ample occupation for
all his time, how much truer is it in regard to a Go-
vernor-General ! As he cannot possibly have leisure for
fiscal and judicial details, there is real wisdom in his
leaving them to such men as are usually found in the
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240 LORD HARDINGE's INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
position of Lieutenant-Governor of Agra, or Deputy-
Governor of Bengal.
We shall be delighted to hear that Lord Hardinge has
recommended the permanent appointment of a Deputy-
Governor at Calcutta. The system works admirably
at Agra. The Governor-General cannot, and, in our
opinion, ought not to, enter into all the minutiaB of
civil details ; but it is most important that the man who
has to do so should not only be up to his work, but be a
fixture for at least a moderate term. By some such ar-
rangement alone can he be enabled to turn his experience
to proper account, or encouraged to sow with any reason-
able prospect of seeing some portion of the fruit of his
labours. The improvement of the North- West Pro-
vinces under Mr. Thomason's four years' administration
has been most marked \ but what possible amelioration
can be expected under a system that, in ten years, has
given us nine Deputy-Governors over a province con-
taining thirty millions of inhabitants, and paying a
revenue of nine millions? Fortunately for Bengal, it
has had an able secretary in Mr. Halliday. But, how-
ever excellent the ministerial officers, and however
worthy and efficient the Deputy-Governor, if the latter
is to be annually relieved, he can at best only keep
matters straight for the day. It is morally impossible
he can do more. He would indeed be unwise to hazard
his own reputation in the projection of schemes which
his successor might mow down in the bud.
The Punjab has been called the difficulty of recent
administrations ; but the Government of Oude has been
the difficulty of all. A fortnight had scarcely passed
over the head of the new Governor-General before his
attention was drawn to Lucknow affairs. The King, a
poor vacillating creature, who had only a twelvemonth
before rejected from his counsel the upstart Ameen-oo-
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HIS FOREIGN POLICY.
241
dowlah, now again desired to place him at the head of
the Ministry to the exclusion of the Vizier Munowur-
oo-dowlah, who was giving satisfaction to the Envoy.
Strong measures were advised : no less than enforcing
the article of the treaty, which authorizes the assump-
tion by the British Government of the direct control of
all districts whose mismanagement endangers the public
tranquillity. The Governor-General did not consider
the case to require such an extreme measure ; but, ad-
dressing the King, as a friend and well-wisher, solemnly
warned him of the consequences of a systematic dis-
regard of the Envoy's representations and advice.
In the same manner, mixing firmness with friendli-
ness, and respect for individual treaties with determina-
tion to maintain the general peace, Sir Henry Hardinge
endeavoured to persuade the foolish Nepal Rajah, the
equally foolish Tfizam, and the whole host of petty
princes, to look to their own concerns ; to conduct
themselves with moderation and good faith ; and not to
fear British encroachment.
As little communication as possible was kept up with
Lahore; and the British Administration of the day,
after years of war and its baneful consequences, sat
down in earnest hope of peace, improvement, and re-
trenchment.
Sir Henry Hardinge lost no time in redeeming one
of the most important of his pledges to the Court of
Directors. On the 10th of October, 1844, was passed
that memorable education resolution, by which employ-
ment under Government was secured to native youths,
whether educated in private* or Government schools,
* It is to be regretted that, from which had been adopted See 5th
the benefits of this truly liberal Miscellaneous Notice of No. IX. of
measure, private Institutions were the Calcutta Review for a full ex-
wholly shut out, owing to the'narrow planation of this important subject,
and exclusive test of examination
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242 LORD HARDINGE'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
on proof shown of qualification, ability, studious habits,
and integrity. The effect of this noble resolution was
immense ; and the Calcutta Baboos, especially, lost no
time in responding to the call of Government. Early
in December they called a meeting, and voted an address
of thanks, which was signed by more than 500 native
gentlemen, presented to the Governor-General, and by
him most graciously received and answered. He told
the deputation that he advocated education as mutually
beneficial to the governors and the governed : that he
felt the advantages to Government of the services of
natives of superior intelligence and integrity ; but
added that he patronized learning on the far higher
principle that it increased the happiness and prosperity
of society. His speech concluded with these words:
" Rely upon it, gentlemen, you cannot perform a more
patriotic service to your countrymen than by encou-
raging and promoting education among the native po-
pulation."
The Governor-General on another occasion distributed
the prize medals at the Hindoo College, and in reference
to the speech he then made, a respectable Baboo de-
clared, " Never did words more convince me of the
ardent sincerity of the speaker than did the unaffected
but stirring language of Sir Henry Hardinge."
Having thus patronized the Hindus, the Governor-
General, early in March, 1845, attended the distribution
of prizes and scholarships at the Mahommedan College
in Calcutta, where an address was delivered by the
students, and received with the same encouraging kind-
ness which had been shown to the disciples of the rival
creed. In his reply, Sir Henry Hardinge called the
attention of his youthful audience to the exciting and
wondrous facts of steam and railroads, and the magic
power conferred on man by the discovery of electro-
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EDUCATIONAL MEASURES.
243
magnetic telegraphs ; showing how deeply even at that
early day the mind of the Governor-General was im-
pressed with the value of such means of communication
in an empire so vast as that over which he ruled. Sir
Henry concluded by holding out the encouraging ex-
ample of a distinguished pupil of the college named
Syud Hossein, who had recently been made a deputy-
magistrate, and among whose qualifications was a know-
ledge of English as well as of several Oriental lan-
guages.
The education minute affected the middle and reading
classes of the Natives ; and much about the same time
(30th October, 1844), was issued a notification scarcely
less interesting to the lowest and poorest. It involved
a considerable reduction in the price of foreign salt.
This measure, which had been contemplated during Mr.
Bird's Deputy-Governorship, seemed to be called for
not less by motives of humanity than by the soundest
maxims of policy. Nevertheless, the measure was re-
garded by many as a bold one ; since it was expected to
affect the revenue to the extent of not less than 12
lakhs of rupees ; and that at a time of great pecuniary
pressure, at the close of a five years' war, and the open-
ing of a new administration. There is, however, at
least as much of wisdom as of mercy in all such re-
ductions of duties ; for by them smuggling is starved,
and revenue ultimately augmented.
We come next to a question which has been much
canvassed both in England and India; — corporal
punishment in the army. A large majority of ex-
perienced Indian officers were agreed that Lord Wm.
Bentinck's well-meant abolition of flogging in the
Native army had entirely failed as an experiment of
discipline. Insubordination had increased. Evil doers
were under no restraint ; and a sepoy had actually on
r 2
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244 LORD HARDINGE's INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
one occasion stepped out of the ranks and dared his
commanding officer ; telling him that the worst punish-
ment he could inflict was dismissal. It was proved,
that, while on the old system the average instances of
corporal punishment had not exceeded one in 700 per
annum, the number sentenced, under the new system,
to labour in irons on the roads had been not less than
one in a hundred and fifty — amounting to as many as
ten thousand in ten years, — a frightful catalogue, and
one, that the benevolent heart of Lord Wm. Bentinck
could never have dreamt of. Abstractedly considered,
corporal punishment is odious; but it is nevertheless
true that many men in the Native, as well as in the
European ranks, have gained and honoured commissions,
whose backs have been scored at the halberds ; we much
doubt, however, whether any have recovered the moral
searing of labouring with robbers and pickpockets on
the public roads. The number alone of men punished
by the new code, was sufficient proof of its inefficiency.
The punishment brought misery and dishonour into
hundreds of innocent families ; while, at the same time,
from its being generally inflicted far from the scene of
the offence, it was no example to the comrades of the
offender, of the consequences of insubordination and
neglect of duty.
But a cry had been raised in England against " the
lash." With some right feeling, much sickly sentimen-
talism had been expended on it in Parliament, and by
the Press. In India also there was opposition to the
idea of restoring flogging to the list of military pe-
nalties ; and Sir James Lumley, the respected Adjutant-
general of the Bengal army, declared it not only un-
necessary, but highly dangerous.
Sir Henry Hardinge calmly heard all that was to be
said on both sides ; and, having given the opposing ar-
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THE PUNISHMENT OF THE LASH.
245
guments the consideration of an experienced soldier,
decided upon repealing Lord Wm. Bentinck's abolition.
In a masterly record of his own views, he exposed the
error of the prevailing system, miscalled humane, by ex-
hibiting the statistics of its convictions and punish-
ments ; and then, separating^oyyway from dismissal, and
showing that one was not a necessary consequence of
the other, he stripped the bugbear of half its ignominy,
and all its worldly ruin.
Let us not be mistaken. We are no more advocates
for flagellation than the softest-hearted of our readers,
but we know that the purposes of discipline, especially
in camp and on service, often require instant and sum-
mary punishment for offences not in themselves involv-
ing moral degradation ; and that, therefore, as one great
object of all punishment is, or should be, the prevention
of crime, it was not only justifiable, but absolutely ne-
cessary that the law should be altered and discipline
restored, by a return to a modified and closely-checked
system of corporal punishment. God forbid that any
right-minded man should advocate flogging, except as
the effectual substitute for the ineffectual punishments of
imprisonment and death ! Moreover, we would fence in
the penalty with every possible restriction, and never
inflict a lash more than the particular case required..
The purposes of discipline are as likely to be effected by
50 lashes as by 500, and in no case would we have them
inflicted except under the orders of the chief military
authority on the spot. Prompt punishment is required
for mutiny and insubordination — crimes, which, unless
on the instant put down, soon convert obedient armies
into ruffianly mobs. Neglectful compliance with orders
soon engenders jeers and abuse, then blows, and lastly
bayonet thrusts or bullets. Twenty lashes within a few
hours of the offence may suppress the spirit, which, un-
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246 LORD HARDINGE'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
checked, requires the infliction of death.* On the other
hand there is much detriment to the service, and no
possible good to any party, in marching men as prisoners,
as has been the case, from Affghanistan to the British
provinces, or from Saugor to Arcot and Madras.
Some such thoughts as these must have been passing
through the Governor-General's mind, when he sum-
moned Lieut.-Col. Birch the able Judge Advocate
General of the Bengal army, down from Simla to
Calcutta ; caused the whole of the Articles of War to be
revised; and, in the face of a still strong opposition,
and at a time when he was told that a dangerous feeling
of discontent was prevalent in the Native army, had the
new code quietly introduced. We can recollect that it
was not without some misgivings that the first case of
corporal punishment was enforced in our own neighbour-
hood; but neither then, nor since, have any murmurs
been heard against the law. The quiet and well-disposed
Native soldiers know that the punishment will never be
their fate ; and the dissolute and unruly have no voice
or discretion in the matter; indeed, it is merciful to
themselves to have a punishment which they dread.
We have said that the late Adjutant-General was
strongly opposed to the re-introduction of flogging in
.the Native army ; but we are happy to add that he lived
to correct his error, and acknowledge it. We have still
* Within the year 1847 there have for an eye" is the law of retributive
been fully fifty convictions of Euro- justice, and surely flogging is a more
►lcuers foi
pean soldiers for gross insubordina- suitable punishment lor the soldier
tion. Almost all the offenders have who strikes his officer than transpor-
becn either imprisoned or trans- tation which he desires. We are satis-
ported : three were shot, but only fied, that, if the first ten of the cul-
three or four men were flogged, prits above noticed had, each within
They received fifty lashes eachTbut twenty-four hours of his offence, re-
we are inclined to believe that their ceived fifty lashes, and then been un-
convict ions were not generally known prisoned, on the silent system, with
when the crimes were committed hard labour for a year or so, the three
that entailed corporal punishment. executions as well as tho expense
The law, or rather its practice, and loss of all the transportations
still requires amendment. "An eye would have been avoided. — H. M. L.
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THE KOLAPOOR CAMPAIGN.
247
greater satisfaction in recording that the returns of the
army in the three Presidencies show that the punish-
ment is so rarely enforced, as to be almost a dead letter.
We have enlarged on this topic, because we consider
the restoration of corporal punishment as the boldest
act of Lord Hardinge's Indian career. He found more
than one regiment in mutiny, and a feeling prevalent
that a spark was all that was wanted to light a flame.
A large proportion of the Native army was on, or near
the frontier, subject to the temptations and seductions
of the rioting Sikh troops, whose emissaries were leav-
ing no means untried to spread defection in our ranks.
The Governor-General had before his eyes the fate of
Sir John Craddock and Lord Wm. Bentinck, at Madras ;
and, little as was said when the event turned out hap-
pily and all went well, he must have foreseen as it were
already in type, and only waiting for the printer's ink,
the columns of invective and reprobation which would
have assailed him had a single file demurred upon a
punishment parade, much more if the new order had
caused general disaffection among the sepoys. An
Aliwal is trumpeted even to nausea; but the bold
spirit of legislation, the moral victory, whose loss would
have been revolution, passes by unnoticed in the calm
of its own success.
It was during the autumn of this year (1844) that the
little war of Kolapoor and Sawunt-waree took place.
We have already (in a previous essay), pretty fully
detailed its rise, progress, and termination, and have
little to add to that account. The Governor-General is
understood to have urged on the Bombay Government
prompt and energetic measures, nor did he disguise his
disapprobation of the dilatory proceedings of General
Delamotte and his colleagues ; and though a member of
the Cabinet which had approved, or at least shielded, the
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248 LORD HARDINGE's INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
appropriation of Sindh, might well have been expected
to be prejudiced against the sturdy advocate of the
unfortunate Amirs, Sir Henry at once approved of the
nomination of Lieut. -Colonel Outram to the command
of a light field force ; and that able and gallant officer,
as we have already shown, justified the confidence re-
posed in him by bringing hostilities to a speedy close.*
The war concluded, able officers were nominated to
conduct the civil management of the lately-disturbed
tract, where — much in the manner recommended in the
preceding essay — the whole authority was left in the
hands of the British agents; in Kolapoor during the
minority of the Prince ; in Sawunt-waree apparently for
ever. All has since remained perfectly tranquil in that
quarter, mainly owing to the same means that have
more recently tranquillized the Punjab. The forts were
dismantled, or occupied for the Government : the here-
ditary militia honestly disposed of, paid up and dis-
charged; or such as had claims retained and usefully
employed in police and other duties. There is a favour-
ite and true saying in the East that without " siyasut "
there can be no " riyasut ;" or, to be intelligible at home
— that severity is inseparable from good government.
And on this principle the Governor-General acted in
the case before us. He insisted on the punishment of
the leaders of the insurrection ; but forgave all others.
Immersed in these high duties of a civil ruler;
patronizing literature, encouraging education, cheapen-
ing the poor mans food, drawing tight the bands of
military discipline, maintaining peace, and repudiating
aggression, — the charge has been brought against Lord
Hardinge that he descried not the cloud which was
* Iu reference to Colonel Outranks that he was just the sort of fellow he
services on this occasion, we under- would wish to have in the field at the
stand Lord Hardinge to have said, head of a Light Brigade.— H. M. L.
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STATEMENTS OF THE " QUARTERLY REVIEW." 249
rising over the North- West frontier ; that he permitted
the Sikh invasion to take him by surprise and thus
jeopardized the empire, and sacrificed many valuable
lives. Strange to say, the most forward of these ac-
cusers has been the Quarterly Review* the political
organ of his Lordship's party. We are prepared to
prove that the assertions which it contains are as
groundless as they are injurious to Lord Hardinge's
reputation; and because the explanation afterwards
offered by the Quarterly* was tantamount to no expla-
nation at all.
The mail which first bore to England the news of
the Sikh invasion, carried, we believe, only a hasty and
exaggerated account of the battle of Mudki ; and in a
time of profound peace the country was aroused with
the intelligence that nearly 100,000 Sikhs f were en-
camped upon British territory and threatening a British
outpost. Public confidence and common sense fled at
the announcement ; and without reflecting that the be-
leagured post was held by the best general officer in the
Bengal army, at the head of 10,472 men; that this
force which had the advantage of holding a walled town
and a partly-intrenched cantonment was more than
double that which won the battle of Assaye, and four
times that which stemmed the whole torrent of Holkar's
army at Delhi ; \ and above all that those most qualified
to judge (Sir Hugh Gough, Sir John Littler, and
Brigadier Wheeler), were perfectly satisfied not only of
the safety of Ferozepore but also of Loodiana ; — without
giving a moment's consideration to any of these things,
* No. 165, June, 1846 ; and No. deemed certain victory, swelled the
157, December, 1846. invading force to at least 100,000. —
f We do not estimate the Sikh H. M. L.
A mxy which crossed the Sutlej at t Burn and Ochtcrlony had 2£
more than 60,000 ; but the crowds regiments and some trustworthy ir-
of armed plunderers, who flocked in regulars. Holkar mustered 70,000
the train of the camp to what they men ! — H. M. L.
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250 LORD HARDINGE's INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
the Press assumed defeat, in the interval between the
two mails, and a portion of it yelled for the recall of an
" imbecile " Governor, and an " incapable " Commander-
in-Chief. Other mails arrived; and with them the
tidings of the glorious victories of Ferozeshah, Aliwal,
and Sobraon. And when Sir Robert Peel, in Parlia-
ment, in that clear and convincing manner for which
his statements are remarkable, detailed the policy which
had been observed by the Governor-General towards the
Lahore durbar — although the Eight Honourable Ba-
ronet, in avoiding exaggeration, very largely understated
the strength of the frontier posts at the time of the
Sikh irruption, — yet the House and the country gene-
rally, went with him when in concluding that part of
his speech he declared, — "It is quite clear that my gallant
friend the Governor- General did take every precaution to
ensure the safety of the British dominions in India, in case
of sudden and unprovoked attack'9
The Quarterly Review undertook for "the incapable
Commander-in-Chief," the same friendly office which the
Premier had performed for "the imbecile Governor-
General and zealously did it execute the task. But
it was not content with eloquently advocating the claims
which that undaunted leader had upon his country's
admiration. In the warmth of biography it forgot
history ; and taking for its model those warlike medals
in which the erect figure of the victor is made to appear
gigantic by the corses prostrate at his feet, it elevated
the subject of its memoir by denying all merit, all saga-
city, all military forethought, to his friend and superior,
the Governor-General, beyond the bold-heartedness that
is common to every British soldier.
The words of the reviewer are as follows : — " If there
had been urgent arguments addressed to Lord Ellen-
borough in favour of a peaceful reign, the wish both of
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STATEMENTS OF THE "QUARTERLY REVIEW." 251
the Directors and of the Cabinet on that head, was ex-
pressed with increased earnestness to Sir Henry Har-
dinge. It is necessary to state all this clearly, in order
that the true causes of our seeming unpreparedness to
encounter the danger of a Sikh invasion, when it came,
may be understood. Sir Henry entered upon the duties
of his office more anxious than perhaps any other
Governor-General had ever been before him to signalize
the entire term of his residence in India by the useful
labours of peace. At the same time he did not consider
himself bound either to censure or to retrace the steps which
his predecessor might have taken in an opposite direction.
He found that the attention of Lord EUenborough had
been turned seriously towards the North- Western fron-
tier ; THAT ALL THE TOWNS FROM DELHI TO KlJRNAUL WERE
filled with troops ; that the Commander-in- Chief had
already surveyed the whole extent of the protected
States with a view to make choice of military positions ;
and that the advanced posts of Loodiana and Ferozepore
were garrisoned. Sir Henry Hardinge neither undid any-
thing of all this, nor found fault with it; but he carefully
abstained from the discussion in Council or elsewhere of
topics which might turn mens thoughts to war ; and, with-
out neglecting any necessary preparations, bent himself
to the arrangement of plans for the better education of the
people of India," &c— Pp. 187, 188, No. 155 Quarterly
Review, June, 1846.
" Sir Henry Hardinge, continued during the winter
of 1844 and the early spring of 1845, to prosecute his
plans for the general improvement of India. That he
kept his eye upon the Punjab, and was neither regard-
less of the confusion into which its affairs were falling,
nor of the consequences to which this might probably
lead, is most certain. He had already directed that
the works both at Loodiana and Ferozepore should be
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252 LORD HARDINGE's INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
strengthened ; and raised the garrison of the latter place
from four thousand to seven thousand men. The former
was held by about six thousand ; and at Umballa, where
Gough's head-quarters were established, and among the
cantonments in its rear, lay about seven thousand five
hundred, of all arms. But as Sir Henry certainly did
not anticipate that the whole power of thq Punjab would be
thrown across the Sutlej, he naturally concluded that there
was force enough at hand to meet and repel whatever inva-
sion might be hazarded'9 — Page 189, No. 155 Quarterly
Review, June, 1846.
Such entire ignorance of localities, and of what, in
reality, had been done on the frontier is displayed
throughout the article on which we are commenting,
that if we were writing for India alone, the reviewer
might safely be left to his own meditations ; but, as an
air of authority pervades his essay, it may be necessary
to remark, for the benefit of readers in Europe, that
not only " all the towns from Delhi to Kurnaul were "
not " filled with troops," but that not a single soldier
was stationed in any one of them at the period referred
to ; moreover, that Kurnaul itself had been abolished as
a military station, a twelvemonth before Lord Hardinge
arrived in India.
If the English language conveys any meaning at all,
the extracts we have quoted imply that Lord Ellen-
borough had prepared everything on the frontier for
war; that Lord Hardinge refrained out of delicacy
from countermanding those preparations, which he,
however, considered unnecessary ; but that he as care-
fully refrained from adding to them a single man or
a gun, except at the post of Ferozepore ; satisfied that
the force which his predecessor had collected between
Meerut and the Sutlej was " enough to meet and repel
whatever invasion might be hazarded."
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STRENGTHENING OP THE FRONTIER.
253
The table below will show how the case really
stands :*
Post.
Strength as
left by Lord
Ellenborough.
Do. at first
breaking out
of war.
Increased
preparation
made by Lord
Hardinge.
4,596 men.
12 guns.
10,472 men.
24 guns.
5,876 men.
12 guns.
3,030 men.
12 guns.
7,235 men.
12 guns.
4,205 men.
UmbaUa |
4,113 men.
24 guns.
12,972 men.
32 guns.
8,859 men.
8 guns.
6,783 men.
18 guns.
9,844 men.
26 guns.
3,971 men.
8 guns.
Whole frontier, exclusive of)
hill stations which re- >
mained the same . . . )
17,612 men.
66 guns.
40,523 men.
94 guns.
22,911 men.
28 guns.
Yes; as the Quarterly Review in self-correction says
in its " note," two numbers later, " The state of prepara-
* We have taken these figures
chiefly from a " Note" which we can
scarcely say appeared, but which is
to be found in the 157th number of
the Quarterly Review, of December,
1846. The materials of this « Note"
the editor says he received "from
India ;" and that he advances them
" on authority which it is impossible
to controvert ;" yet it will scarcely
be credited that after having, six
months previously, in a widely-cir-
culated article on the War, dissemi-
nated the belief that the military
Governor-General of India had been
so absorbed in peaceful occupations
as to forget his frontier and endanger
the empire ; when in process of time
he received " from India " and u on
authority" the completest refutation
in figures and facts; the only amende
which he makes as an historian and
instructor of the public mind, is to
smuggle the contradiction into his
157tn number, at the bottom of a
page and the tail end of an article
on " the state of Ireland" ! ! ! This,
too, without any announcement in
the Table of Contents, either on the
cover or fly-leaf, that such a a Note"
was to be found by any one anxious
to know the truth about the war in
India. We wish not to be unchari-
table, but it is apparent that if there
had been as much desire to make
known the corrections, as to blazon
the errors, some more conspicuous
place would have been found for the
" Note," and the usual means have
been adopted of attracting the atten-
tion of the reader by including it in
the Table of Contents. That we are
not imagining a grievance is proved
by the fact that the Indian papers
which copied the entire original ar-
ticle of nearly forty pages, took no
notice, so far as we know, of the
Note of scarcely more than three.
This can only be attributed to their
being unaware of its existence. Cer-
tainly they could not have found it
devoid of interest. — H. M. L.
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254 LORD HARDINGE's INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
tion with reference to the Sikhs, at the time of his
arrival in India (July, 1844), did not satisfy him (Lord
Hardinge) at all. On the contrary, within three weeks
of his arrival in Calcutta, — as soon, that is, as he had
received from the Commander-in-Chief a correct state of
the distribution of the force in advance, he came to the
conclusion that it would by no means suffice, even for defen-
sive purposes ; and that it was wholly inadequate to carry
on an offensive war, should such be forced upon him. In
like manner the answers to his inquiries relative to the
state of the magazines and means of transport, declared
that to assemble 36,000 men — the total amount of
troops stationed within a circuit of some hundreds of
miles — would require two months after the order to
concentrate should have reached Benares. Sir H. Har-
dinge saw that this state of things would never do;
and he began forthwith to reinforce every post in advance
— yet did it so quietly, that even in our own provinces
the operation passed unnoticed." — Note in No. 157.
The result was that before he had been three months
in India, Sir Henry Hardinge had several corps march-
ing from the farthest confines of the Bengal Presidency
towards the North- Western frontier ; apparently in the
usual course of relief ; but " giving orders that not a
man should withdraw from his position till the relief
arrived ; upon one pretext or another he kept the whole
together; thus doubling without the smallest appear-
ance of care on that head, his disposable force." — Note
in Quarterly Review, No. 157.
With a similar prescience of their coming necessity,
the Governor-General in September, 1844, only two
months after his arrival in India, gave orders for Euro-
pean barracks to be built at Ferozepore, and they were
completed in April, 1845. In January, 1845, Sir Henry
wrote privately to the Governors of Madras and Bombay
PREPARATIONS FOR THE SIKH WAR.
255
for remount horses ; and borrowed 600 from the former
and 500 from the latter, for his artillery ; 968 of which
reached Muttra in November, 1845, before the war broke
out.
From Bombay also the Governor-General summoned
H. M/s 14th Light Dragoons, foreseeing that if there
was a war the British cavalry on the frontier would
have warm work of it.
Equal preparation was made in the Ordnance depart-
ment. In January, 1845, the horses of light field
batteries were increased from 98 to 130; four bullock
batteries got horses ; and two batteries of iron 12-pounder
batteries were prepared with elephants.
" It was not, however, by providing men and guns
alone that the Governor-General put matters in a train
against every emergency. Fifty-six large boats prepared
by Lord EUenborough were brought up from the Indus,
and reached Ferozepore in September, 1845. The floor-
ing, grappling, cables, &c, arrived likewise complete ;
and a pontoon train was borrowed from Sindh, and
rendered available. It was this forethought which
enabled the engineers to lay down the bridge below
Ferozepore in the course of one night and one day;
and to do their work so securely, that the whole of the
invading force — 24,000 strong, with 40 pieces of siege-
cannon, 100,000 camp followers, and 68,000 animals —
passed without the occurrence of a single accident/ 9 —
Quarterly Review, note in No. 157.
To quote still further from the ungracious recantation
of the Quarterly ; " it appears in a word, that the new
Governor-General judged it necessary to re-arrange with
the concurrence of the C. C. the whole plan of distribu-
tion; and the result of his arrangements was that no
less than 14,000 British soldiers fought at Mudki five
days after the declaration of war ; and after leaving a
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256 LORD HARDINGE's INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
strong detachment with the baggage, 17,727 men, in-
cluding seven English regiments and 69 guns at Feroz-
shah three days later." These figured statements are a
sufficient answer to the charge against the Governor-
General of being unprepared ; for no one who has seen
a single regiment, much less a brigade or division move,
can be ignorant that the rapidity with which this force
was concentrated was unprecedented in Indian warfare,
— that not a tithe of the amount was ever before assem-
bled in an equally brief period — and that, without long-
continued previous preparation, not one-half of it could
possibly have been brought to bear within any reason-
able time.
To assist, however, a just estimate of what Lord
Hardinge did in the way of preparation, let us reduce
our speculation to one simple question ; viz. If, out of
32,479 men including the European regiments in the
Hills at and above Umballa in December, 1845, only
17,727 men could be brought into action after junction
with the Loodiana and Ferozepore forces ; and if that
number but just sufficed to beat back the most formid-
able enemy and win one of the most bloody battles
which British India has ever witnessed; what sort of
an army could the Commander-in-Chief have assembled
and brought into the field, and what would have been
the position of the empire, had the strength of the
frontier at and above Umballa remained as Lord Ellen-
borough left it in July, 1844, at 13,538 ?
Thus far we have only compared Lord Hardinge's
military preparations on the North-Western frontier,
with those of his immediate predecessor, who contem-
plated not merely defensive, but offensive operations,
because the narrow limits of a review forbid us to ex-
tend the retrospect. But should the historian, in his
search after materials, ever glance his eye over these
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HISTORICAL PARALLELS.
257
pages, we call upon him to go farther back and bring
the light of former times and former administrations
to bear upon the one before us. Let him tell the mole-
eyed critics of one war, how other wars came upon
British India ; how the Indian army was prepared when
the Government had virtually broken the treaty with
Mysore; when Hyder Ali's invasion burst upon our
defenceless frontier ; when his hordes swept the country
around Madras ; and, having destroyed one army, and
paralyzed the only other in the field, his nightly watch-
fires illumined the senators of the "benighted Presi-
dency !" How prepared, when the Bur mans broke
through treaties, invaded our territories and for six
months sat down in front of our hastily-assembled
army ; and how prepared, when the Nepalese murdered
our police officers, occupied our lands, and one after the
other destroyed our detachments ! or, as more akin to
what might have been expected from the Sikhs, what
was the extent of our preparation when, on two occa-
sions, the Mahrattas confederated against us, or even
when the Pindarri bands burst upon our borders and
devastated our districts? When all shall have been
fairly told, it will be, we think, unnecessary to add that
in no one of these instances were we in a tenth degree
as well prepared for war as in 1845, though in all we
had at least as much reason to expect it.
The retrospect may be further pursued. Was there
less cause, antecedently, to dread the Mysore troops, the
Burmans, the Mahrattas, and the Nepalese, than the
Sikhs ? Which of all these enemies had the best mi-
litary reputation ; and which was considered in India
most formidable to the British Empire? Was it the
warlike banded force of Mysore, led by French officers
under their able, unscrupulous, and powerful chief, in
the first flush and tide of his conquests, and in the hour
s
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258 LORD HARDINGE's INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
of our greatest weakness; the disciplined and veteran
battalions of Perron and De Boigne, backed by a formid-
able artillery and by bands of hardy cavalry ; the un-
daunted and energetic Gurkhas, proud of a hundred
victories ; the lusty Burmans, scarce rested from a long
career of unchecked success; — or, was it the supposed
rabble of dissolute and mutinous Sikhs, with weapons
scarce cleansed from the murder of their sovereign, and
the massacre of their best and bravest leaders ? Anarchy
doubtless has its strength. Its wild impulsive throes
may overthrow whatever is immediately within its reach,
and by a mad assault may even surprise and conquer
kingdoms ; but it was left for the Sikh soldiery to prove
that the centurion and the sentinel may be training
themselves for offensive war, while apparently busied in
murdering their consuls and their tribunes; — France
herself cannot show such an example. The French
were invaded ; the Sikhs were invaders.
And let not the historian, who begins the parallel we
have suggested, stop here. Let him, after showing how
former wars came upon British India, set forth how they
were carried on by the administrations of the day ; let
him recount the dangers and destitution of Rangoon,
the six months' delay at Chittagong, the constant
famine-stricken state of the Arracan division, and the
little better condition, and still worse results of General
Shouldham's column, during the Bur man war; the
disasters of the two Woods, the defeat and death of the
gallant Gillespie, the fruitlessness of the whole first
Nepal campaign, and the all but failure of the second,
saved only by Ochterlony's happy rashness ; the starv-
ing state of the army at Kandahar and Ghuzni, and
lastly the battles of Meant and Dubba, fought just after
a British regiment had been sent by one route out of
Sindh, and the Bengal column by another ; — and then,
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PRUDENCE OF PREPARATION.
259
let him compare these blunderings into victory with
the noiseless combinations of Lord Hardinge, who, in
nine days after the invasion, brought no less than
17,500 men (among whom were no less than seven*
British regiments) into action at Ferozeshah, and six
weeks later finished the campaign with an addition to
his European force of two regiments of infantry and two
of cavalry at Sobraon ; so that the most terrible war
which has ever threatened our empire was gloriously
concluded in sixty days, at which period Sir Charles
Napier, with a reinforcement of 16,500 fresh men and
50 guns, was close at hand ! We have thrown out these
last suggestions to those who read, or may one day add
to, the history of India. We must leave the campaign
to stand upon its own merits, unrelieved by the contrast
of others less successful ; and feel sure that after a calm
perusal of the facts we have adduced, and the figures we
have given — those obstinate and indelible proofs — it will
seem astonishing to our readers that the cry of want of
preparation should ever have been raised against Lord
Hardinge; and that 22,911 men and 28 guns should
steal up so softly to the frontier as to be unnoticed even
by the newspapers. In the end, however, according to
the old motto, " truth will prevail " even in the teeth
of a " Quarterly Review ; " and whenever the time shall *
come (may it be distant !) for history calmly to review
the closed list of Lord Hardinge's military deeds in
India, we believe that this very quality of foresight,
which, from ignorance of facts concealed by himself, he is
now so strangely denied, will be accounted foremost
among his claims to the title of an able general. It is
true that his fire and vigour in action at sixty does no
shame to the glories of his early fields ; but his main
excellence consists in prudence of preparation, and that
* There being at the time only eleven in the Bengal Presidency.
S 2
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260 LORD HARDINGE's INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
accurate calculation of time, place, necessity, and result,
which in strategy is called combination. Seldom indeed
in any country has been found a soldier, who so minutely
entered into the economical details of his army, who so
thoroughly understood those details, and as far as in him
lay brought them to bear upon the work in hand. We
wish too that he could have left behind him in India a
little of that " mens sequa rebus in arduis," which is so
happily perpetuated on his medal. Our countrymen in
the prostrate East become enervated by long prosperity;
and little fitted to meet even temporary trouble. Like
the Romans of old, we have vitality enough to survive
a Thrasymenus or a Cannae, but we not only cannot
forgive a Varro, but find it difficult to understand a
Fabius. We are too loud in consternation at occasional
disaster and unaccustomed loss; and in scanning the
conduct of our leaders are too ready on half information,
or no information at all, to register as dastards and im-
beciles, men who— perhaps before we were born — had
proved themselves in the field, and in the Cabinet,
equally brave and wise.
Among the injurious insinuations of the " Quarterly
Review " in chronicling events previous to the war, it
was pretty broadly implied that not only did not the
Governor-General make military preparation himself,
but that he would not allow the Commander-in-Chief to
do so for him. As an instance, the supposed marching
and counter-marching of the Meerut division was
quoted; and we now extract the same Reviewer's re-
cantation " upon authority which it is impossible to contro-
vert."
For example, at page 190, Sir Henry Hardinge is
described as arresting, in November, 1845, the advance
of a force which Sir Hugh Gough had ordered up from
Meerut, and declining to reinforce the garrison of Fe-
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REPORTED WARNINGS.
261
rozepore with an additional European regiment. This
turns out not to have been the case. No regiments
were ordered to remove from Meerut, so early as the
month of November, with the exception of H. M.'s 9th
Lancers ; and even that corps was subsequently halted
at the Commander-in-Chief's suggestion. Other regi-
ments were directed to hold themselves in readiness — and
that they were in a condition to move so early as the
11th of December was owing entirely to the vigorous
measures adopted by the Governor-General in his deal-
ings with the Commissariat.
Not only, indeed, was the Governor-General no stop
upon the Commander-in-Chief's proceedings, but the
two veterans were united in opinion both as to the
measure of danger, and the means of meeting it. Both
believed that the frontier might be insulted, perhaps
invaded, by desultory hordes of marauding horse, and
loose bands of Akalis ; but neither imagined that the
threat which, since the death of Eunjit Singh, had so
often been idly made in our times of trouble and even
of peril, would now be carried out at a period of perfect
peace, when the undivided resources of the British
Indian Empire were available to repel attack. And it
should be remembered that they held this opinion in
common with Major Broadfoot, Captain P. Nicolson,*
* A very erroneous idea was pre- sagacity of the former at the expense
valent after the Sikh war with regard of the latter. Captain Nicolson
to its having been foreseen by some was an able and zealous officer, and
of the political officers on the fron- did his best at a difficult time:
tier, and not by others. It has been certainly his manly aud upright
said— chiefly, we believe, on the au- character wants not the support of
thorityof private letters, some brief an untruth! We have seen copies
and hurried expressions of which of more than one of Captain Nicol-
might very easily be misconstrued son's letters written just before the
by inexperienced readers at a dis- Sikhs crossed. In one to Captain
tance— that Captain Nicolson was Mills, so late as the 2nd of December
always of opinion that the Invasion 1845, he wrote, " I do not think the
would occur, but that Major Broad- Sikh army will come on, but it is
foot scouted the idea ; and this has feverish." " The whole army with
been made a handle for exalting the guns and commissariat to some ex-
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262 LORD HARDINGK's INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
Mr. Currie, Sir John Littler, Brigadier Wheeler, Captain
C. Mills, and indeed all the ablest and best-informed
officers on the frontier. Time has shown the error of
the belief ; and recorded it in the blood of the two first
of the wise and gallant men we have enumerated ; but
even after this lapse of time, and familiar as we are with
the actual result, their judgment seems to us sound and
consistent with human reason and probability. For it
was not credible that the Lahore Government would
calmly sit down in the midst of its difficulties, and make
the horrible calculations which it did of its inability to
stand another month against the army — that the next
revolution would be directed against the lives and pro-
perties of the few surviving Sirdars ; and that the ven-
geance of a foreign army would be a lesser evil than the
tent is ready for a start, but I cannot could have had no other sources of
help thinking it is taking up its po- information than those open to his
sition rather with a view to defence official superior. By his position at
in case of our advance* than with Ferozepore he only saw and heard
the idea of crossing the Sutlej en what was reported a few hours later
potence. Small bands of them we to Broadfoot, and what the latter
must look for," &c. &c., — and again could corroborate or correct by Cap-
the very next day to Major Broadfoot tain Mills' and his own immediate
— " If the Sikhs do cross the river emissaries. We have quoted the
it will be for plunder ; but I do not opinions of all on the frontier that
think they will cross. Small inde- the enemy would not cross, as an
the war we saw some original letters add that of Major Lawrence in Nepal
of the same officer to Major Broad- and Captain Cunningham at Bana-
foot, and though we cannot recall the wulpur, both of whom, it is under-
exact words, we can positively state stood, discredited the fact of the
that up to the last moment they ex- invasion after it had occurred. But
pressed a firm belief that the Sikh we needlessly accumulate evidence
army, as an army, would never be on the subject. We very much doubt
mad enough to cross the Sutlej. We whether the Sikhs themselves knew
mention these facts, not to depreciate their own intentions twenty -four
Captain Nicolson's real merits, but hours before they carried them out.
simply to vindicate the memory of They had prepared the means of a
Major Broadfoot, who had no equal great military movement — Chance —
on the frontier, and few perhaps in accident — caprice determined the
India. Captain Nicolson having quarter against which it should be
been Major Broadfoot's assistant, directed. — H. M. L.
Shortly after
army. To their testimony we may
* The italic* are the Essayist's.
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ADVANTAGES OF A STRONG SIKH GOVERNMENT. 263
fury of its own, — that, therefore^ it was expedient to fling
the soldiery upon British India, supplying them with
every possible means of success, taking, if unsuccessful,
the chance of clemency and forgiveness, and if victorious
the merit and profit of repelling the English from Hin-
doostan. We repeat that this calculation was too
monstrous to be altogether credible, though not too
monstrous to be true. We have shown that Lord
Hardinge did not credit its probability, but was prepared
for its possibility.
A few words will not be misplaced here as to the by-
gone policy of our Government on the frontier in ques-
tion.
It has ever been the wish of the British Government
to assist in the maintenance of a strong Sikh Govern-
ment in the Punjab. It is understood that those who
had the best means of forming a judgment on the ques-
tion, Colonel Richmond, Major Broadfoot, Colonel
Lawrence, and Mr. Clerk — in whatever other points
they may have differed, were all agreed in this, that no
advantage that might be gained by annexation could
equal that of having an independent and warlike but
friendly people between us and the loose, wild Mahom-
medan hordes of Central Asia. Not that the latter are
in themselves formidable, even in their own country ;
but that their unsettled government, or too often ab-
sence of all government, must ever render them unsatis-
factory neighbours. Much, however, as the main-
tenance of a Sikh Government in the Punjab was
desired, it was early perceived that the chances were
against it. One after another the ablest men in that
unhappy country were cut off; falling by each other's
hands or plots ; often the assassin with his victim.*
* Dr. MacGregor, in his History of of the MunsM who now holds Raja
the Sikhs, naively mentions the name Dhyan Singh's written order for the
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264 LORD HARDINGE's INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
The violent death of Jowar Singh, though for an
instant it promised to prevent hostilities, in the end
rather accelerated than postponed them. No man dared
to seize the helm. Raja Lai Singh was not wanting in
courage ; and Maharaja Golab Singh has abundance ;
but neither coveted the viziership of the " Burcha Raj,"*
which involved responsibility to a thousand exacting
masters. Intoxicated with success at home, where no
man's honour was safe from their violence, where they
had emptied the coffers of the State and plundered
those of Jummu, the unsated soldiery now sought to
help themselves from the bazaars and treasuries of
Delhi. This madness of the Sikh army was the true
cause of invasion, and not the acts of either the British
Government or its agents.
Next to Runjit Singh, Maharaja Sher Singh was the
truest friend in the Punjab to the British alliance. He
was not a wise man, but in this at least he showed
wisdom. Few, indeed, are the native chiefs, or natives
of any rank, whose wisdom is consistent and complete.
Many are clever in the extreme — acute, persevering,
energetic, able to compete with the best of Europeans
in ordinary matters, to surpass them in some ; but the
most accomplished character among them has its flaw.
We never yet met one that was not an infant at some
hour of the day, or on some question of life. Maharaja
Sher Singh is an instance. Brave, frank, and shrewd,
he might have been a strong, if not a great ruler, had
murder of Maharaja Sher Singh ; of their rivals or masters ; Rajah
and also the one written by Ajit Dhyan Singh was the last man in the
Singh for that of the false vizier ; but world to have put on record such a
his believing in the existence of such document ! — H. M. L.
documents only proves how little * " Burcha," somewhat equivalent
qualified the doctor is for the office to our Butcher, was the designation
of the historian. Asiatic ministers in applied to the Lahore Pretorians
general are much too prudent to give during their reign of terror. — H. M. L.
written orders for the assassination
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EVILS OF INTERFERENCE.
265
he not been the slave of sensuality, and shrunk from the
exertion of opposing the Jummu brothers. He felt him-
self in their toils, but lacked the energy to snap the
cords. He saw that they ruled, though he was king.
He wanted the resolution to act as one.
It is as difficult for an administration to shape its
conduct so as to please all parties as it is for an indi-
vidual to do so. Great was the outcry against Lord
Auckland for anticipating, what he believed, invasion ;
and as loud against Lord Hardinge, because he acted
contrarily. It is now much the fashion, in some quar-
ters little cognizant of facts, to declare that among the
duties of the paramount Power is the obligation to
interfere in the concerns of every State of India at all
internally disturbed. The loudest setters-forth of such
doctrines, however, shut their eyes to the fact that inter-
ference may possibly rather increase than prevent mis-
chief ; and that British troops once marching into any
native State, the independence of that State then virtu-
ally ceases. In short, that unless we subdue and occupy
for ourselves, which, under the circumstances here referred
to, we have no right to do, the chances are that we in-
flict injury rather than confer benefit. Interference
therefore must be made on pure motives, for the good of
the people, and not for the improvement of the finances
of India. The day has gone by for annexing princi-
palities because they are rich and productive. The spirit
of the age is against such benevolence. With so much
of preliminary remark, we may observe that it is now
no secret that in the spring of 1841 Maharaja Sher
Singh did make overtures to the British Government,
and was offered an armed interference in his favour. A
force of 10,000 or 11,000 men was, moreover, actually
told off, and under preparation at Kurnaul, to move into
the Punjab under Major-General Sir James Lumley, and
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266 LORD HARDINGK's INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
the vituperators of Lord Hardinge's preparations for
the defence of the frontier will — or ought to be — " at a
loss for words to express their indignation," when they
hear that only four years previous to the Sikh invasion
of British India it was calmly contemplated to march a
force not exceeding that of Sir John Littler' s at Feroze-
pore to Lahore, to put down the whole mutinous Sikh
army.
In referring to this circumstance, however, we are far
from desiring to make it the handle of an imputation
against Lord Auckland's administration : we only give
it its weight in judging of Lord Hardinge's military
prudence. The intentions of Lord Auckland and of his
advisers were most pure: his lordship was perfectly
aware of the dangers of interference, but he believed
that the benefits to all parties would outweigh the evils.
He acted on the light of his day. He calculated on
divisions in the Sikh camp, separation of interests in
the Sikh durbar, and immediate junction of the Maha-
raja and his partizans with the British auxiliary force.
And the event might certainly have justified the mea-
sure ; but we doubt whether the military movement,
much less the political scheme, would have succeeded.
For if the Sikh soldiers could drag their chiefs and
officers over the border which Runjit Singh had never
crossed but to repent, and there induce them to lay down
their lives for the Khalsa, how much greater must have
been their influence, how infinitely more determined
would have been their opposition, had we been the in-
vaders of Umritsur and Lahore. Our own opinion is
that a massacre of Sher Singh and his adherents would
have closely followed the British passage of the Sutlej,
and that the whole Khalsa army and the flower of the
Jat population would have united to oppose us in one
decisive action which would have destroyed our army,
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THE CABUL CAMPAIGN.
267
or have given us the keys of the Capital. Our British
Indian readers — many, we trust, heroes of the Sutlej —
are now in a position to judge as accurately as we can
of what might have been the result ; but let them in
fairness remember, that their own knowledge is recent
and dear-bought experience, and not prescience : perhaps
at the opening of the war of 1845 they themselves
(as the custom was in the British camp) both thought
and talked contemptuously of the Sikh army. How
then shall any man " throw a stone " at Lord Auckland,
who only trod in the steps of those who went before
him, and whose opinions were — in this respect at least
— enthusiastically embraced by his successor.
Within a twelvemonth the Cabul catastrophe de-
pressed our military reputation in India more than any
disaster since the retreat of Monson. The necessity
was recognised of making extraordinary efforts to re-
cover our pre-eminence and our prestige. Yet General
Pollock's avenging army never exceeded 10,000 men,
until united with Sale, when, with Irregulars " of all
sorts," it might have mustered 15,000 of all arms. It
may be said, " Lord Ellenborough relied upon Sikh
friendship and co-operation, or he would never have per-
mitted so small a British force to carry on operations at
the further extremity of the Punjab/' On the contrary,
Lord Ellenborough recorded on the 15th March, 1842,
his -opinion that no reliance was to be placed on the Sikh
sirdars or soldiers co-operating with the General ; and
ordered accordingly that the army should not advance,
unless General Pollock could " by his own strength
overawe and overcome all who dispute the pass, and
keep up at all times his communication with Peshawur
and the Indus/' Thus wrote the Governor-General,
who was at heart a soldier ; and, as the advance took
place, we must presume the General, who was chosen
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268 LORD HARDINGE's INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
from all India to the high office of avenging his country,
felt himself equal to the task, and that the political
officers (Mackeson, Lawrence, MacGregor, and Shake-
speare) employed under his orders, saw no peculiar
danger in the move. In short Lords Auckland and
Ellenborough, backed by public opinion, based a mighty
military operation on the belief that a British army no
larger than Littler's at Ferozepore,* though watched by
30,000 disaffected Sikhs, could " by their own strength"
force the formidable Khyber ; and when reinforced by Sale,
could " keep up their communications with the Indus."
When we remember Plassey, Buxar, and numberless
other victories of early days ; when we call to mind
that the great Duke, in the face of Holkar, the most
dangerous enemy we had encountered since the days of
Hyder Ali, divided his scarce 10,000 men, and with less
than half that number fought and won the glorious
battle of Assaye ; when, indeed, we review all our great-
est battles in Burmah, Nepal, India, Affghanistan, and
China, and see what handfuls were enough for victory ;
and, lastly, when we acknowledge the estimation in
which, with very few exceptions, our officers held Sikh
soldiers till they tried them in 1845 ; surely we need not
too closely scrutinize either the intentions of Lord
Auckland or the overt acts of Lord Ellenborough.
But if we can — nay, if we must — exculpate those noble-
men, how unjust to arraign Lord Hardinge! The
armed interference contemplated by Lord Auckland
was postponed by the vacillation of Sher Singh and the
lateness of the season, until at last it was prevented
altogether by the Cabul catastrophe. On the return of
* We refer the curious reader to much food for reflection in the mode
the Affghan Blue Book, No. 89, for Colonel Wild was first sent up to
Sir Jasper Nicholl's own expression Peshawur, and General Pollock, and
of his "extreme unwillingness" to then Colonel Bolton, successively fol-
part with his brigades. There is lowed. — II. M. L.
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GENERAL DEFENCE OF INDIA.
269
Generals Pollock and Nott from Affghanistan, Lord
Ellenborough, at the head of 40,000 men and 101 guns,
met them at Ferozepore. Early in 1843 the assembled
thousands dispersed, and the frontier station was left
with only 2500 men, and so remained until after the
battles of Maharajpur and Punniar, when it was strength-
ened by two regiments. Lord Ellenborough contem-
plated the erection of a strong fortress at Ferozepore,
but the foundations were never laid ; and the intrench-
ment that was substituted scarcely, if at all, strength-
* ened the position.
We may take this opportunity of stating the opinion
to which mature consideration, and the gradual disclo-
sure of facts, has led us ; that, — whereas the War Estab-
lishment of the Indian army, including 33,000 British
soldiers, as also irregulars and contingents, did not ex-
ceed 300,000 men, and had to defend a frontier of 12,000
miles, and protect as well as coerce a population of not
less than 100,000,000* souls, a large proportion being of
warlike habits, and ill habituated to our yoke, — so far
from Lord Hardinge having failed to bring up to the
frontier in 1845 every soldier that was available, his error
lay, if anywhere, in having denuded the provinces by
bringing up too many. But the result justified the mea-
sure, and showed that the statesman had not been forgot-
ten in the soldier. At Gwalior, by Lord Ellenborough's
arrangements, a hostile army of 30,000 men had merged
into a friendly contingent of 6000. Nepal was quiet,
or at least engrossed in its own petty domestic broils ;
Burmah was somewhat similarly situated; Oude, the
Deccan and Mysore preserved an obedient subordina-
tion ; and from Bajputana Colonel Sutherland is said to
have written that 100,000 gallant Kajputs were ready
* With a population of 34,000,000 than four to one of the Indian, in
the French army is 450,000, or more reference to population. — H. M. L.
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270 LORD HARDINUe's INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
to march to the support of Government. There re-
mained then only the chances of domestic insurrection,
and of disaffection in our own army. How well the
native soldiery resisted all appeals from the Lahore in-
cendiaries ; how true they were to their salt, when
double pay with unlimited licence was offered them ;
is best shown by the fact that not above thirty men
deserted from the Ferozepore garrison of 10,472 ; and
that after hostilities commenced not an individual among
them abandoned his colours; nor are we aware that
twenty did so from the whole army during the war.
Domestic insurrection was a more probable contin-
gency. There is no denying that much alarm was felt
in Bengal, and in those parts of the Agra presidency
which were farthest from the seat of war ; but a crude
conspiracy at Patna, which injured only the few desperate
men concerned in it, was the only treason of which we
ever heard.
If, however, partial commotions had been the conse-
quence of the withdrawal of troops from the lower pro-
vinces ; it was perhaps wise to hazard them for the great
purpose of bringing the war to a rapid and glorious
close. The rising of a mob, or even the tumultuous
gathering of armed men without discipline, or means, is
a small matter when compared with the approaching
tide of a regular army of 60,000 men, well supplied
with artillery, and daily swelled by numberless recruits
of its own creed from the very country it invaded.
To combine the defence of the frontier with the
defence of the provinces, one other alternative presented
itself to Lord Hardinge. He might have increased the
army. But he rejected the idea for reasons sufficiently
obvious and cogent. Already the expenses of the State
were more than a million above the income ; already the
Government was threatened with bankruptcy.
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WAS THERE A CASUS BELLI?
271
Let us do justice therefore to the all but overwhelm-
ing difficulty of the Governor-General's position; and
honour to the firmness with which he met and overcame
it. It was, we may rfely upon it, no easy task — no
light responsibility — to defend a wide frontier with a
scanty army, await a war with an empty treasury, and
so cautiously prepare for hostilities as not to give cause
for offence. The latter was hardest of all. The
threatening rupture with the Khalsa might not come in
a day, or a year, or might even be staved off for the du-
ration of Lord Hardinge's administration ; but in all
human probability it was nigh at hand, could not be
avoided, and yet in good faith could not be anticipated.
Yes, it is our opinion that up to the date of the actual
invasion we had no " casus belli and had we invaded
the Punjab, because the mad Sikh soldiery, as they had
often done before, threatened' to invade us, the princes
of India would have supposed that our long and patient
forbearance had been merely an untiring ambush, — a
lying in wait till dissension had thinned the ranks of
the Sikhs, in order that when they were exhausted with
intestine strife, we might come forth and spring upon
the prey. The press of Europe too would have found
in such a questionable policy another theme for ca-
lumniating " perfidious Albion," and in all probability
that very portion of the Indian Press, which has syste-
matically assailed Lord Hardinge's " want of prepara-
tion " might have then been loudest in vituperating his
aggression.
Native States have, at any rate, appreciated the
chivalrous good faith which marked his conduct. Cha-
racter, we can assure our friends, is as useful, and " ho-
nesty" as " good policy" in Asia as in Europe. The Duke
of Wellington, with reference to Gwalior, well said that
he would prefer giving up any advantage to bringing by
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272 LORD HARDINGe's INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
implication a stain upon our name. We would desire
that our forbearance and good faith should ever prove
to the millions who so closely w^atch our actions that we
have come among them as messengers of peace, protec-
tion, and good-will; that we are slow to take offence,
and abhor the subterfuges of the aggressor, — though
when injured, we have the power and the spirit to
avenge ourselves. This train of thought pervades Lord
Hardinge's policy, and we honour him for it.
Having now fully discussed the Governor-General's
preparations for defensive war upon the North- Western
frontier, let us pass to the war itself, — first pausing a
little to see what reason there was to expect invasion in
1845 more than in any other year since the death of
Shere Singh, and next to add a few words as to how
we had been prepared in former times to resist agres-
sion.
Mr. Metcalfe's veto, rather than Ochterlony's batta-
lions, stopped Bunjrt Singh's southward career in 1808 ;
and when the station of Loodiana was established and
left, with three or four regiments, 150 miles in advance
of all support, the British authorities must have either
estimated the Sikhs very lightly or confided in them
very implicitly. Thus Loodiana remained for thirty
years, until strengthened by Lord EUenborough. But
more extraordinary still, Ferozepore, though the base of
the grand movement of Affghanistan, was, after the
first few months, left with a garrison of three, four, and
sometimes of even two regiments.
How jealously Eunjit Singh watched British move-
ments in Affghanistan is well known ; how he forbade
the passage of the Punjab, obliging the army of the
Indus to proceed by the wide circuit of Sindh and the
Bolan Pass ; how, after the Lion's death, Sir J. Keane's
return to the provinces, during the cold weather of
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SIKH JEALOUSY.
273
1839-40, was only not opposed through the extraordi-
nary personal influence of Mr. Clerk and the estimation
in which he was held by the Sikhs, — is also no secret.
Those who were with Sir John may remember, that
when he arrived at Shahdurra with the mere skeleton of
a brigade, and saluted the fort of Lahore, his compli-
ment was not returned; and barely the commonest
personal civilities paid to himself. Some at least of his
companions may also remember that an official notice
then reached him from Captain Nuthall, an intelligent
commissariat officer, who had been for months employed
in collecting supplies in the Punjab, that a treacherous
attack on his camp was intended, and that simultane-
ously with it the Sikhs purposed to cross the river, burn
Ferozepore, and march on Delhi. Whether there was
any truth in the information is perhaps not now ascer-
tainable ; but one thing is certain, that, about the same
time the British kafila for Affghanistan, on which our
very existence in that country depended, was refused a
passage ; and not till after a month's delay, and again
through Mr. Clerk's personal influence, was it permitted
to pass.
The reader of the Delhi Gazette will also remember
how, during the next year, 1840-41, Major Broadfoot's
progress with Shah Sujah's family to Cabul was im-
peded as much by his own Sikh escort as by the muti-
nous soldiers on his way; and how, but for his own
indomitable courage, he probably never would have
reached his destination. It is also well known how
cordially, in 1841-42, that ill-fated and ill-used officer
Brigadier Wilde, was supported by his Sikh allies, and
how, on General Pollock's arrival at Peshawur and
during his two months' stay there, they were considered
more as enemies than as friends ; and yet, by entrusting
them with the escort of our treasure and our supplies,
T
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274 LORD HARDINGE's INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
the safety of the army was virtually placed in their
hands.
But still more to the point are the little-remembered
facts, that, in the year 1848, and again in 1844, the Sikh
army actually left Lahore with the declared purpose of
invading the British provinces : the frontier authorities
considered it possible they would come, and General
Vincent, commanding at Ferozepore a force scarcely
half the strength of that of Sir John Littler, received
his orders how to act in case they should. And yet,
after all these threats, all these symptoms for years
disregarded by two successive administrations, that of
Lord Hardinge, which alone took all the steps that could
with propriety be taken, has been recklessly accused of ne-
glect and supineness.
We offer Sir Robert Peel's opinion in regard to the
course pursued by Lord Hardinge as expressed in the
admirable speech already referred to : —
" It is quite clear that my gallant friend the Governor-General did take
every precaution to ensure the safety of the British dominions in India, in
case of sudden and unprovoked attack. In the early part of the year, at
the time when he was occupied with his functions as Governor-General, and
when it was most material that he should perform them in conjunction with
his Council at Calcutta ; in a minute, dated on the 16th June, he submitted
to the Council his opinion that our relations with the Court of Lahore
became so doubtful, that, great as was the inconvenience of separating the
Governor-General and his Council, it was desirable, with reference ex-
clusively to Indian interests, that he should proceed to the left bank of the
Sutlej, in order that on the spot he might be enabled to give such directions
as appeared necessary, and which, if given at the distance of a thousand
miles, might be inappropriate. The unanimous opinion of the members of
the Council was, tnat it was for the public interest that the Governor-
General should proceed to ioin the army ; and, in conformity with this ad-
vice, in the month of October he took his departure for the left bank of
the Sutlej. Up to an early period in December, the opinion of my gallant
friend (Sir Henry Hardinge]) was, that there would be no irruption from
the right bank of the Sutlej into the British territory. He felt confident
that the Sikhs must be convinced that such an attempt could only end in
signal defeat, and, therefore, that it would not be made. So far as he could
reason from experience, he had a right to arrive at this conclusion. In
1843, the army of Lahore left the capital and advanced to the Sutlej ; but
after remonstrance on our part it retired again and abandoned the enter-
prize. In 1844, exactly the same conduct was observed ; the Punjab army,
eager for pay, or for booty if pay could not be obtained, and, instigated by
the Government and the chiefs, appeared to contemplate an irruption ; but,
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OPINIONS OP SIR ROBERT PEEL.
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in 1844, as in 1843, the army withdrew to the interior. Accounts, however,
reached my gallant friend towards the end of November last, which led him
to believe that an invasion of the British territory was seriously menaced.
The House will find by the Papers recently presented by command of Her
Majesty, that on the 20th November, Major Broadfoot addressed a letter
to the Commander-in-Chief, and another to the Governor-General to this
effect : —
" ' Governor-General's Agency, Nov. 20, 1845.
" ' Sir, — Since I had the honour of waiting on your Excellency to-day, I
have received Lahore letters of the 18th instant (morning). During the
night of the 17th, the chiefs had agreed on, and the durbar had ordered in
writing, the following plan of operations. The army was to be divided
into seven divisions, one to remain at Lahore, and the rest to proceed
against Roopur and our hills, Loodiana, Hureekee, Ferozepore, and Sindh,
while one was to proceed to Peshawur ; and a force under Rajah Golab
Singh was to be sent to Attock.'
u The decision then taken by the Lahore durbar was, that four divisions
were to be employed in an attack upon the British territory, but they were
not to make a concentrated or simultaneous movement ; and the policy of
the course adopted by the Governor-General was thus demonstrated. The
Lahore army, m four divisions, was to make four separate attacks on dif-
ferent points along the river — the first division was to force the eastern
extremity of the line ; another to attack Loodiana ; a third pass the river at
Hureekee ; and the fourth attack Ferozepore. Those divisions were to
consist of about 8000 men each. The House will see by reference to the
Papers laid before them how difficult it was for any person, even the most
experienced, to speculate on the decision to which the governing powers at
Lahore might arrive. They will see, too, that the Ministers, or those who
held the reins of government, spent their days in such continuous drunken-
ness and debauchery, that no resolution of theirs could be depended on.
An account written by the Agent at Lahore, to the Secretary to Govern-
ment, dated Umballan, November 21st, founded on information received
direct from Lahore, presents this picture of the councils of the Punjab : —
' The Ranee (that is, the regent, the mother of the infant Maharajah) com-
Elained that whilst the troops were urging the march, they were still going
ome to their villages as fast as they got their pay; and Sirdar Sham
Singh AttareewalLah declared his belief that unless something was done to
stop this, he would find himself on his way to Ferozepore with empty tents.
The bait of money to be paid, and to accompany them was also offered,
and at length the durbar broke up at 2, p.m. Great consultations took
place in the afternoon ; but I know only one result, that the Ranee had to
give her lover his formal dismissal, and that he (Raiah Lai Singh} actually
went into the camp of the Sawars he is to command, and pitchea his tent.
What the Ranee says is quite true of the sepoys dispersing to their houses ;
the whole aflair has so suddenly reached its present height, that many of
the men themselves think it will come to nothing, and still more who had
taken their departure do not believe it serious enough to go back. On the
day after this scene took place, t. e. the 19th, the usual stream of sepoys,
natives of the protected states, who had got their pay, poured across the
Sutlej, at Hureekee, on the way to their home.'
"There appears also an account of another conversation, in those papers,
which took place between the Rajah Lai Singh, and Bhaee Ram Singh, one
of the principal officers and advisers of the Lahore Government, and who
seems to have been the only one of them in whom, from his character and
wisdom, the slightest confidence could be placed. In a letter from Lahore,
T 2
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276 LORD HARDINGE's INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
dated the 24th day of November, the following conversation was detailed :
Bhaee Ram Singh, addressing Lai Singh, said —
" ' The English have interfered in no affairs of the Khalsa ; what is the
wisdom of your making religious war at the bidding of the soldiery 1 None
of the nobles have discovered the real intentions of the English. The
Governor-General's agent, who is a steady friend, has written in the
plainest terms, that the English Government desires only friendship like
that of the late Maharajah Kunjeet Singh ; but that if anything wrong is
done by the Sikh army, the rulers of the kingdom will be held responsible,
for rulers must account for the acts of their troops and subjects. Be
cautious how you march to Hureekee with the troops.' The Rajah said,
' Bhaee Sahib, what can I do ? if I remain, the soldiery seize me by the
throat.'
"In a word, the councils of the durbar seem to have shifted from day to day,
and no one could speculate with any degree of confidence on the probable
result*
u On the 9th of December, the Governor-General, thinking our relations
with the Punjab very critical, and that it was desirable to take every pre-
caution against any sudden irniption, gave orders that the division of troops
at Umbafiah, consisting of 7500 men, should move towards the Sutlej. On
December 11th, the very day on which the Lahore army crossed the Sutlej,
the British and native troops of that division were on their march from
Umballah to the frontier. The whole proceedings of the Governor-General
and the Commander- in-Chief, subsequently to that day, as well as before
it, were characterized by the greatest prudence, skill, and foresight. From
Umballah the troops marched to a place called Busean, where, owing to the
prudent precautions of the Governor-General, they found an ample supply
of food and stores. It was resolved that a junction should be effected with
the Loodiana division, and that it would be better to incur some risk at
Loodiana, rather than forego the advantage of a junction with the Loodiana
division of the army. Those troops advanced accordingly towards Feroze-
pore, and learned by the way that the army of Lahore, amounting to not
less than 60,000 men, had crossed the river, and were prepared to attack
the British army. The expectations of the Governor-General were entire-
ly justified by tne result."
Our extract is long, but to the purpose. Sir Robert
Peel under-estimating the force at Ferozepore at only
7500, but over-estimating the number of heavy guns in
position, correctly states that "the army of Lahore
shrunk from the attack of so formidable a post," and
moved down to give battle to the army advancing from
Umballah. There is much in the extract quoted by Sir
Robert Peel from Major Broadfoot's despatch to induce
belief that, whatever were the insane intentions of
some wild spirits among the Sikh army, there was still,
even late in November, no general intention of invasion.
" On the \§th {of November) the usual stream of sepoys,
* The Italics are ours.
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INDECISION OF THE SIKHS.
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natives of the protected States, who had got their pay,
poured across the Sutlej, at Hureekee, on the way to their
horned This in itself was justly considered a pacific
symptom. These men were not emissaries sent to
mislead our sepoys. Such did not come in streams, but
stole over one by one, and were, without exception,
Hindustanis, who had relatives in our ranks.
So late as during the month of October, 1845, the
tenor of the Governor-General's conversation and cor-
respondence was sanguine as to peace for another year
at least ; to the Commander-in-Chief alone did he urge
preparation for a defensive war, and it was at this time
that confidential orders were issued for two-thirds of
the force at and above Meerut to be prepared by the
12th of November, with the means of moving on the
shortest notice.
On the 22nd of November, the first authentic intelli-
gence reached Major Broadfoot, and through him the
Governor-General, that invasion was intended ; and the
very same day the report was contradicted. The
greatest indecision prevailed at Lahore, in the Camp as
well as in the Court. Both felt that they were on the
brink of greater events than in their worst revolutions
they had ever shared in — greater too than they felt able
to direct and guide to their own profit. Astrology was
now called in ; as if the perpetual stars would shed down
firmness upon such miserable mortals and be accomplices
in their plots ! But the soothsayers themselves declared
that a fortunate day would not arrive before the 28th
of November ; and the soldiery who would have hailed
"To-morrow" as an oracular response from Heaven, now
called the interpreters of fate, impostors. The majority
of voices was for an immediate march. The Ranee and
her advisers, who felt that all authority was lost, urged
them to be gone at once; but this very impatience
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278 LORD HABDINGE's INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
roused the suspicions of the soldiers. Hesitation again
fell upon them ; and Lahore became like a sea without
a tide, agitated by opposing winds. Thus doubtful did
matters remain for more than twenty days : the whole
Sikh army, it is true, at last left Lahore ; but, as on
former occasions, they still hesitated to " cross the Ru-
bicon," and finally commit themselves. The great delay,
however, was in persuading the sirdars. They had
property to lose. The rabble had only property to gain.
Sirdar Tej Sing, who ultimately was Commander-in-
Chief of the invading force, consented only when openly
and loudly taxed with cowardice, and even threatened
with death.
In the " Calcutta Review," No. XI., September, 1846,
appeared as truthful an account as could be given of
the military events which followed ; of the rapid
march of the British army from Umballah and Loo-
diana ; of the hard-contested and glorious battles of the
Sutlej. We shall only now add what seems deficient
in that account ; or correct what we may have since
discovered to be inaccurate ; keeping in view more par-
ticularly, as we are bound in this memoir, those personal
exertions of the Governor-General, which would have
been out of place in a history of the war and its many
heroes.
Her Majesty's 80th Foot marched from Umballah on
the 11th December, for Ferozepore, or a day before the
invasion took place ; and so little did the military autho-
rities expect that it was running into danger, that the
families of the men actually moved with them. On the
2nd December, the Governor-General had dismissed
the Lahore Vakeel because he had given no satisfactory
answer to the Political Agent's demand for an explana-
tion of the reason of the advance on the Sutlej. A
week was allowed him to satisfy the Governor-General
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PASSAGE OF THE SUTLEJ.
279
that hostility was not intended. That week was re-
quired to complete the commissariat arrangements.
The Deputy Commissary-General had required six weeks
for preparation, and received for answer that it must be
done in as many days. The energetic Broadfoot volun-
teered to undertake the task, and was ready within the
time. The army of the Sutlej is indebted to him for
food.
On the 12th of December the Commander-in-Chief
moved with his head-quarters from Umballah. On the
evening of the same day the Sikhs commenced crossing
the Sutlej. On the 13th the Governor-General pro-
claimed the Cis-Sutlej States at once invaded and incor-
porated with British India. Sir Henry, being some
days' march in advance of the Commander-in-Chief,
rode over to Loodiana, inspected the fort, and, deeming
it secure, withdrew the Loodiana troops to Bussean, the
great grain depot on which the British army depended,
and which was only sixty miles from the Nuggur Ghat,
at which the Sikh army crossed.* The Sikhs might
have easily made a forced march on that important
place, reached, and burnt it on the evening of the 14th
of December, had not the Governor-General, by that
time, thus thrown in front of it the Loodiana force of
5000 men. The main column of the British army,
under the Commander-in-Chief, from Umballah, did not
reach Bussean till the 16th, and the importance of the
Governor-General's combination will be better under-
stood when we explain that if Bussean had been fired
by the enemy, the advance of the whole British army
* Among other instances of igno- have shown his error, and consider-
rance of localities, the Quarterly Re- ing that the whole army and all its
viewer increases the distance from supplies moved by way of Bussean,
Loodiana to Ferozepore by one- he might have taken thus much
fourth, and places Bussean between trouble. — H. M. L.
them. The commonest map would
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280 LORD HARDINGE's INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
would have been delayed ten days at least, until food
could have been brought from the rear ; and Ferozepore
would have been all that time without relief ! On the
15th and 16th, as the Governor-General's camp passed
Rai ke Kote, it was disencumbered of its heavy baggage,
spare tents, &c, and the elephants and camels thus
rendered available were forthwith employed in bringing
up stores for the army. The elephants, in particular,
were most useful on the 19th December, in bringing
up the wearied men of the 1st European Regiment and
Her Majesty's 29th Foot, who had made an extraordi-
nary march from the Hills to join the army, but, after
all, were too late for Mudki. This provision and appli-
cation of carriage was one of many instances which the
war afforded of the Governor-General's happy manage-
ment and attention to details.
On the 15th, the Sikhs crossed their heavy artillery.
On the 16th they encamped at Lungiana, about three
miles north of Ferozepore ; and Sir John Littler gal-
lantly marched out with two brigades, and offered them
battle, which the boasting enemy declined.. On the
17th the Sikhs advanced a division, and occupied the
celebrated position of Ferozeshah, which they immedi-
ately entrenched. On the morning of the 18th, another
strong division of upwards of 30,000 men, horse and
foot, with 22 guns, was pushed on to within a few
miles of Mudki, where, concealed in the jungle, it
awaited the arrival of the British Generals, whose de-
struction they looked forward to with confidence, from
a belief that they were attended only by a small escort.
On that morning the British army had made a
fatiguing march of twenty-one miles from Churruk to
Mudki, where a Sikh picquet was on the watch, and re-
tired to inform Rajah Lai Singh and the troops in am-
buscade that now was the time to make their spring.
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MUDKI.
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The British picquets had hardly been planted ; scarcely-
one of the soldiers had breakfasted ; and officers were at
their ablutions or snatching a little sleep upon the
ground, when Major Broadfoot, who was sitting at
luncheon with the Governor-General, received a scrap of
paper. Looking at it, he rose with the exclamation,
" The enemy is on us." He rode to the front, and
passed the word along. Some mistrusted his informa-
tion, and even when he showed the clouds of dust raised
by the advancing enemy, his warning was not implicitly
believed, and the dust attributed to skirmishers. " That
dust," he energetically exclaimed, " covers thousands ;
it covers the Sikh army." The story is differently told
in different quarters ; but though, like Plutarch's bio-
graphies, the anecdotes of Broadfoot may not be all
strictly true, yet they are all illustrative of his bold,
energetic, and able character. While the British troops
were yet forming, he returned from his reconnaissance,
gallopped up to the Commander-in-Chief, and gracefully
saluting him, pointed to the rising cloud of dust ahead,
and said, " There, your Excellency, is the Sikh army ! "
It was the political agent making over the frontier to
the soldier. The cannon shots that almost immediately
began to lob in from the still unseen guns soon told
their own tale.
The Commander-in-Chief at this time despatched an
aide-de-camp to the rear to hasten on H. M/s 29th
and the 1st Europeans, still a march behind ; and the
Governor-General had previously sent back his active
commissariat officer, Captain G. Johnston, with elephants,
as before mentioned, carrying food and water to assist
the movement.
The victory of Miidki has been well chronicled by
eye-witnesses; and its details need not here be re-
peated. Suffice it that, the battle won, every exertion
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282 LORD HARDINGE's INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
was made to improve it. Expresses were sent ip every
direction with information ; Sir J. Littler was, in the
first instance, warned to be ready to move by his right
to join head-quarters, and afterwards directed to com-
bine with it by mid-day of the 21st near Ferozeshah.
On the night of the 19th, H. M.'s 29th and the 1st
Europeans, accompanied by the 11th and 41st N. I.,
arrived in camp, and at daylight of the 21st, after
two full days of rest to the army, the whole force
moved, without baggage, in light marching order, on
Ferozeshah.
During this halt of two days, the wounded and sick
were cared for, and secured in the fort of Mudki, a regi-
ment and a half being told off to protect them and the
baggage of the army. Regarding the latter arrange-
ment, we understand there was much difference of
opinion, but the Governor-General insisted that none
should be taken to the field. The decision was a wise
and a humane one. It was better in every sense to
place a strong detachment at Mudki, than, leaving
the wounded with a small one, to embarrass the column
with the care of the baggage train ; while the fort, de-
fended by a regiment and a half, was safe for a time
against the enemy's cavalry and loose plunderers, which
alone could penetrate to the rear of our army. Much
needless alarm, however, was caused by idle reports in
the camp at Mudki, which would have been more rea-
sonable had it been left less protected.
Leaving 5000 men to hold his position, and watch
Tej Singh, Sir John Littler prepared, early on the 21st,
to join head-quarters, with 5500 men and 21 guns.
Permitting his division to snatch a hasty meal, at 8 a.m.
of the 21st he quietly moved off, by his right, leaving
his camp and picquets standing, and at mid-day had
effected his junction, without Tej Singh's being aware of
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FEROZESHAH.
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his departure from Ferozepore — so ably was the move-
ment conducted.* Sir John sent word of his approach
to the Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief, who
had arrived within a mile of, and opposite to, the in-
trenchment of Ferozeshah, when the ever-active Broad-
foot, riding forward with a few horsemen, conducted the
General to the Commander-in-Chief. Arrangements
were now made for the struggle. A question has arisen
— the combination having been completed by mid-day —
why the attack was delayed till half-past three ? Time
was of the utmost importance : all the force expected
having arrived, it was vitally important to strike the
blow before Tej Singh could join : why, then, was there
a delay of nearly four hours? We have never heard
the question satisfactorily answered, and shall therefore
leave it, with other points of this battle, and of the war
generally, to be hereafter explained.
A few minutes before 4 p.m. the attack commenced,
Sir Hugh Gough leading the right, Sir Henry Hardinge
the centre, and Sir John Littler the left. The advance
was made partly in line, partly in echellon, the Go-
vernor-General preferring the first formation, as less
likely to create confusion, especially in difficult ground.
The right and centre were successful ; the left wing was
repulsed. Daylight failed and prevented complete
success. The loss on our side was severe : ten aides-de-
camp fell by Lord Hardinge's side, five killed and as
* The intelligence department of of what was passing around him and
the Sikhs, during the war, has been to incapacity as a General in chief ;
as unduly trumpeted as that of the perhaps, also, in part to the conflict-
British has been depreciated. Their mg orders of his many masters in
information is proved on this as on his own ranks. Doubtless he, like
many other occasions to have been many others, had little inclination
very much worse than ours. Tei for the war ; but, once involved, he
Singh's conduct on the 21st and could not help himself : his life, then
again on the 22nd, though usually depended on his fidelity to the
attributed to treachery, may much Khalsa. — H. M. L.
more safely be imputed to ignorance
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284 LORD HARDINGE's INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
many wounded ; among the latter was his nephew,
Kobert Wood. His two sons, though closely attend-
ing their father, escaped unscathed.
At the side of his chief, whom he refused to leave
when wounded by a shot from the Sikh tents, fell the
gallant and accomplished Broadfoot ; here the chivalrous
Somerset sank mortally wounded ; the young and pro-
mising Munro was lost to his country ; here the brave
Saunders Abbott received his wounds, and lay uncom-
plaining by the side of the Governor-General, during the
remainder of the night. The staff of the Commander-
in-Chief almost equally suffered ; his Adjutant-General,
his Quartermaster-General, and most of his aides-de-
camp being wounded, either here or at Mudki. Pro-
videntially the two noble chiefs remained unharmed.
In his speech already referred to, Sir Kobert Peel
happily notices the night's events. We cannot do
better than quote his words : —
a The night of the 21st December was one of the most memorable in the
military annals of the British empire. The enemy were well defended
within strongly-fortified entrenchments — their guns were served with the
greatest precision, and told on our advancing columns with great effect.
The right of the British army was led by the Commander-in-Chief, whilst
the left centre was headed by Sir H. Hardinge. Our forces made an attack
on the enemy's camp during the three hours which as yet remained of day-
light ; but they had not sufficient time to complete that victory, which
was gloriously achieved on the following day. The British army, however,
made good their attack, and occupied a part of the enemy's camp. In the
middle of the night the camp took fire, and further conflict was for a time
suspended in consequence ; but as soon as it had ceased the army of Lahore
brought forward their heavy artillery, and poured a most destructive fire
upon our troops. The details of those occurrences have been given with
admirable clearness in the despatches of both commanders; but there have
been private letters received which speak of them with less of formality,
and perhaps give truer and more faithful accounts of these actions than
the official documents. Perhaps the House will excuse me if I read an
extract from a private letter from the Governor-General to a member of
his own family. '
The right hon. Baronet then read as follows : —
" ( The night of the 21st was the most extraordinary of my life. I bi-
vouacked with the men, without food or covering, and our nights are bitter
cold. A burning camp in our front, our brave fellows lying down under ;i
heavy cannonade, which continued during the whole night, mixed with the
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FEROZESHAH.
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wild cries of the Sikhs, our English hurrah, the tramp of men, and the
groans of the dying. In this state, with a handful of men, who had car-
ried the batteries the night before, I remained till morning, taking very
short intervals of rest by lying down with various regiments in succession,
to ascertain their temper, and revive their spirits.'
" My gallant friend, as you see, spent that eventful night passing from
regiment to regiment, cheering the men by his own example of constancy
and courage — doing all that human means could do to ensure victory to
our arms. ' I found,' my gallant friend goes on to say — * I found myself
again with my old friends of the 29th, 31st, 50th, and 9th, all in good heart'
— regiments with which he had served in the Peninsula, and with them
that regiment which has earned immortal fame in the annals of the British
army-— Her Majesty's 80th Regiment. — * My answer to all and every man
was, that we must fight it out, attack the enemy vigorously at daybreak,
beat him, or die honourably in the field. The gallant old general, kind-
hearted and heroically brave, entirely coincided with me.'
" Let the House observe how anxious my gallant friend is to do justice
to his companions in arms : —
" * During the night I occasionally called on our brave English soldiers to
punish the Sikhs when they came too close and were impudent ; and when
morning broke we went at it in true English style. Gough was on the
right. I placed myself, and dear little Arthur (his son) by my side, in the
centre, about thirty yards in front of the men, to prevent their firing, and
we drove the enemy without a halt from one extremity of the camp to the
other, capturing thirty or forty guns as we went along, which fired at
twenty paces from us, and were served obstinately. The brave men drew
up in an excellent line, and cheered Qough and myself as we rode up the
line, the regimental colours lowering to me as on parade. The mournful
part is the heavy loss I have sustained in my officers. I have had ten
aides-de-camp hors de combat, five killed and five wounded. The fire of
grape was very heavy from 100 pieces of cannon ; the Sikh army drilled
by French officers, and the men the most warlike in India.'
" From my affectionate regard for this gallant man, I am proud to be
enabled to exhibit him on such a night as that of the 21st of December —
going through the camp— passing from regiment to regiment — keeping up
the spirits of the men — encouraging them — animating their ardour — and
having lost ten aides-de-camp out of twelve — placing his young son, a boy
of seventeen or eighteen years of age, in the front of the lme, in order that
the British troons might be induced not to fire on the enemy, but drive
them back by the force of the British bayonet. It was characteristic of
the man to read these details. He had two sons present, one of whom
was a civilian, and the other in the army. On the afternoon of the 21 st,
he sent the civilian to the rear of the army, saying that his presence dis-
turbed him, and that, if he refused to retire, he would send him away in
arrest as a prisoner ; but the presence, he said, of his younger son, an
officer, whose duty called him to the field, ouly made the father more des-
perately resolute in the discharge of his duty. On the 22nd, after the
tattle was over, he took his eldest son, when visiting the sepoys and the
wounded, and he showed them a Governor-General of India who had lost
his hand, and the son of a Governor-General who had lost his foot, and
endeavoured to console them in their sufferings by proving to them that
men in the highest rank were exposed to the same casualties as them-
selves."
The event of the night — that long, long night — was
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286 LORD HARDINGE's INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
doubtless the capture and spiking of the great gun,
which, within 300 yards., had been pouring death on
our harassed and recumbent ranks. But Her Majesty's
80th, supported by the 1st Europeans, at the Governor-
General's word were in a moment up, and spiked it ;
and for the rest of the night the enemy was silent. In
this attack; Sir Henry Hardinge's nephew and aide-de-
camp, Colonel Wood, advancing with his own regiment,
H. M/s 80th, was severely wounded. It is pleasing,
even still, to listen to the stories current regarding those
eventful hours. " And sure he talked to us as to ladies
in a drawing-room, so quiet and polite," is a frequent
remark of the soldiers of the artillery, of H. M.'s 29th,
31st, 50th, 9th, and of the 1st Europeans, who, lying
around the Governor-General, witnessed his composure
during the night. It must be remembered that Lord
Hardinge, during these perilous hours, not only person-
ated the Soldier and the General, but the Father and
the Viceroy. His thoughts then were not simply for
the army, but for the mighty empire in his keeping —
for his brave boys by his side ; and yet the rude men
around him could perceive no symptom of anxiety on
his brow — nay more, their own stout hearts were
encouraged and inspirited by his calm and cheerful
bearing.
The " Quarterly Keview" has disseminated much error
regarding the events of this momentous period. No
officer carried messages of retreat between the Governor-
General and the Commander-in-Chief, though some few
did take upon themselves to advise that course, and one
officer, by his inquiries for the road to Ferozepore,
showed what was passing in his own mind. The state-
ment bears absurdity on its face : the two chiefs lay
within a hundred yards of each other, and once or
twice, during the night, consulted together. There is not,
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RENEWAL OF THE BATTLE.
287
indeed, a doubt that neither for one moment hesitated
what should be done — " to die at their posts rather than
yield an inch to the enemy/' It is not, however, to be
denied that this was a night of danger — of great danger.
Darkness had covered our ranks, while the scarcely-
thinned foe, driven from his foremost entrenchments,
and with his formidable artillery still almost intact, fell
behind his second line, and strengthened it for the
morning's fight. And where were our battalions ?
Nearly two whole divisions were absent. Sir John
Littler had been repulsed, and Sir Harry Smith, in the
darkness and confusion, after having actually occupied a
portion of the village of Ferozeshah, in the heart of the
Sikh intrenchment, retired two miles from the field ; so
that of 17,500 men, not more than 7000 can have lain
that night before a foe still numbering 40,000 men and
60 guns — a situation such as might have daunted a
Roman heart. Sir Henry Hardinge calmly prepared
for the worst ; he sent orders to his secretary, Mr.
Currie, at Mudki, to destroy his papers, in case of acci-
dent to himself; he positively ordered his wounded
nephew into Ferozepore, as well as the gallant Prince
Waldemar and his suite, who, with equal reluctance, left
the field.
By daylight of the 22nd all arrangements for renew-
ing the attack were made. Colonel Benson, accompa-
nied by Captain A. Hardinge, the Governor-General's
youngest son, had been despatched before dawn, to bring
up Sir John Littler ; but before they could reach, the
Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief had advanced
at the head of their line. On hearing the first shot,
Captain Hardinge spurred on to his father, saying that
as his aide-de-camp he must be in his place. Indeed
this young soldier was the only member of the Governor-
General's staff that remained unharmed. Colonel Birch,
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2S8 LORD HARDINGE's INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
Colonel Parsons, and the Hon. Captain West now offici-
ated as aides ; and taking them with him, Lord H.
advanced at the head of the left, as Lord Gough did of
the right, of the line, keeping thirty yards in front to
prevent the troops from firing, and desiring the staff to
tell them that if they fired, they fired on him. The
opposition was slight, most of the guns were taken in
reverse, and now wheeling to the right, past the village
of Ferozeshah, the Commander-in-Chief and Governor-
General swept down the whole left and rear of the
enemy's position, halting when they had cleared the
works at the opposite extremity.
Not till now did Smith's and Littler's division re-
join ; but there still remained work to do. Sirdar Tej
Singh had at length been roused to action, perhaps by
some of the early fugitives from the combat of the
night ; and scarcely had the tired troops united, before
his fresh battalions and squadrons, amounting to scarcely
less than 30,000 men and 60 guns, came in view —
showing how needful had been the dawn's attack, and
how dangerous would have been a single hour's delay.
Whether daunted by the defeat of the night, or suspi-
cious of a stratagem, in the flank movement of the
cavalry and part of the artillery, on Ferozepore, Tej
Singh, after little more than several demonstrations and
a distant though destructive cannonade, withdrew.
Thus was the Sikh invasion repelled. The Burchas
had found themselves overmatched ; accompanied even
as they were by thousands of their brothers, and of
wild Akalis, eager for war, and to wet their swords in
Feringi blood — for the savage soldiery and their kins-
men ruled not only the durbar of Lahore and the vil-
lages whence they came, but sought to have a share in
the supposed certain plunder of Delhi. Few of these
amateurs, however, were seen after Ferozeshah ; nor
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EFFORTS OF LORD HARDINGE.
289
were they much heard of again until after the terrific
rout of Sobraon, when they lay in wait for their dis-
comfited comrades, ready to cut down and rob all strag-
glers who might escape to the right bank of the Sutlej.
Thousands of the Sikh soldiers are understood to have
fallen by their hands.
But now that the first roll of the tide of invasion
had been resisted, how did Sir Henry Hardinge occupy
himself? His exertions seem to have redoubled. Night
and day his active mind was at work. Collecting infor-
mation, getting up supplies, urging on the indolent,
encouraging and cheering the active and willing, now
suggesting plans to the Commander-in-Chief and his
lieutenants; now writing to Calcutta, to England, to
Delhi, Umballah, and Kurnaul, and now riding out to
army head-quarters to consult with the Commander-in-
Chief in person.
On the death of Major Broadfoot, Major Lawrence
was sent for from Nepal, although there were aspirants
to the vacant office on the spot ; and he proved his zeal
by joining within a fortnight. In the interim Mr.
Currie carried on the duties of the frontier ; while
Major Mackeson was entrusted with the charge of the
Cis-Sutlej States.
A brief return to disputed points may be here excused.
It is not easy within the limits of a single essay even
to refer to all that has been said and written regarding
Lord Hardinge's acts. Their bare enumeration would
nearly occupy its entire space. Lord Hardinge is blamed
for the " defenceless state" of the frontier ; but we have
shown by figures that he doubled and trebled the
strength of posts. We may now add, that shortly after
his arrival in India, he seriously contemplated altogether
withdrawing the posts of Loodiana and Ferozepore, and
was only prevented from doing so by the knowledge
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290 LORD HARDINGE's INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
that the act would be misinterpreted. Eetrogression
is at all times difficult ; never more so than in the face
of a powerful and insolent enemy. No one at all
acquainted with Lord Hardinge can doubt that he is
the last man in the world who would have taken up
those positions. No one knows better than himself
that he who tries to defend everything defends nothing,
and that, in Major Broadfoot's admirable words, " the
defence of the frontier against aggression is the power of
Government to punish the aggressive nation ; and to-
wards the exercise of that power the frontier force will
contribute best by securing against all comers those
important stations/' viz., Loodiana and Ferozepore.
If it had originally devolved upon Lord Hardinge to
have made provision for the defence of the frontier, he
would doubtless have simply watched the fords, and kept
in hand, in the neighbourhood of Sirhind, a strong field
force ready to meet any enemy that might cross. It
was idle to expect that two isolated posts could defend
a hundred and fifty miles of river, fordable at twenty
different points, and crowded with boats. Our readers
may rely upon it that Major Broadfoot only expressed
Lord Hardinge's conviction when he said that the
Ferozepore force was meant for the protection of Feroze-
pore and the frontier in peace, and not for general war
purposes.
On another point much discussion has arisen. On
one side it is asked why Lord Hardinge fought the
battle of Ferozeshah so late on the 21st December, and
on the other why he fought at all on that day. But
a fact which has been stated in previous accounts of
the war must not be forgotten, viz., that on the 19th,
Lord Hardinge had asked for and accepted the office
of second in command of the army. We have never
hesitated to approve of the arrangement under all the
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MILITARY CRITICISMS.
291
circumstances of the case, and we hold to our opinion.
There are seasons when all secondary considerations
must be waived — when the post must be abandoned,
the detachment sacrificed, for the safety of the army.
Once in the field in this capacity, though the Governor-
General could suggest his wishes, he could not, with-
out going to extremities, issue or enforce orders. It
belongs not then necessarily to the province of Lord
Hardinge's biographer to enter into the details of the
different actions of the war, but we must remind those
who would have counselled a halt at Ferozeshah that
it could not have been made — neither supplies nor
water being procurable. Strategy is good : excellent in
its way ; but water more than ground directs military
movements in India, where no general can succeed
who does not look minutely to this important point.
The wells near Ferozeshah were at intervals of miles ;
and by them were the movements of the British army
influenced.
The writer in the "Quarterly Keview," however,
reversing the real state of affairs, gives Lord Hardinge
no credit for what he really did do in cases where he
acted with energy, and leaves him, at least by implica-
tion, to bear the blame of defects in operations over
which he had virtually little or no control. That
writer's remarks, and the strictures of others, on the
order of battle on the three different occasions, and on
the want of information of the enemy's movements, are
examples of the latter ; while, with regard to the former,
the reviewer, apparently ignorant that in Tndia not a man
or a gun can move without the sanction of the Governor-
General, emphatically claims for the Commander-in-
Chief alone all credit for the bringing up of troops and
stores for the combinations which preceded Aliwal ; and
yet it was at Lord Hardinge's suggestion, and by his
u 2
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292 LORD HARDINGE's INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
orders, that the troops engaged there were assembled
from the four quarters and combined at Loodiana.
Brigade after brigade was pushed on from army head-
quarters: Wheeler went after Smith, Taylor after
Wheeler; Lawrence, at the last moment, to help on
Taylor ; all at the Governor-General's suggestion ;
while the Shekawatti brigade westward and H. M/s
53rd from the southward were brought up by his direct
orders. All this was known, or should have been
known, by the historiographer of the war.
During the war, precise information was seldom pro-
curable. Many able and good men were employed in
procuring intelligence, but the Indian army, possessing
no establishment trained in time of peace to procure
the information required in war, can never be more than
partially successful in this respect. The thing is not to
be done in a day. A quartermaster-general or a political
officer may in himself be all energy and ability, but,
unaided, must inevitably fail to secure accurate and
precise information. All this requires known and tried
native agency — men who have a stake in the State.
Serving against Asiatics we can never have our Col-
quhoun Grants, who will enter the enemy's lines and
ascertain their state and preparation ; but there is no
possible reason why we should not have imitators of
him in our Native army. To pay men, teach them,
trust them in peace, and thus to have them ready for
war, is the true policy. We shall then have men whom
we can rely on, instead of chance-comers, who may be
honest, but if energetic and able are too often rather
serving the enemy than us. Thus has it ever been since
Hyder Ali sent his shoals of Hurkaras to deceive and
mislead our generals, down to the late war, when, as in
all previous campaigns, the intelligence arrangements
had to be made after hostilities had commenced. Lord
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ADVANTAGES OP INTELLIGENCE CORPS. 293
Hardinge, in a measure, has provided the nucleus of a
remedy, and in the small guide corps raised on the
north-west frontier under Colonel Lawrence's supervi-
sion, has given the means of acquiring information, and
has prepared a body of men to meet future contingen-
cies. We would have had him act on a larger scale, and
even in peace time attach several officers to the corps to
learn their duty and acquire information of roads and
rivers, wells and tanks, supplies, means of carriage, and
other milito-statistical details — so much required, so
little attended to in India. The very formation, how-
ever, of this corps is a sufficient answer to those who
charge Lord Hardinge with neglecting, during the war,
so important a point as that of procuring intelligence of
the enemy : while it proves equally that his lordship
felt during the campaign the necessity of some such
permanent establishment.
We entirely deny that during the Sikh campaign
there was anything like general ignorance of the enemy's
movements; or that the authorities were not kept at
least as well informed of what went on around them as
during any other war that was ever conducted in India.
' But supposing the fact to be otherwise, is it not too much
to blame the head of a Government whose whole tenure
of office has been three and a half years, and who was
called into the field within less than half that time after
his arrival, for evils which arise only from the defective
institutions of an Asiatic system that has prevailed over
our European notions — a system that has existed from
the days of Clive and Hastings, and through every
Administration down to the present day? If the
Governor-General denied either the quartermaster-
general or the political agent the means of supplying
information, then, indeed, is he to blame ; but because,
with a thousand pressing matters before him, he did
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294 LORD HARDINGE'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
not, even before he could look around, reform and re-
model an important branch of the public service, he is,
forsooth, to be made the scape-goat for many imaginary
and some* real defects in the system bequeathed to him
by his predecessors !
But we digress, and should here rather detail how,
personally, the Governor-General at this time exerted
himself in all departments ; how he urged the reinforc-
ing of Sir Harry Smith, how he sent Lieut. Lake of the
engineers, Lieut. Clifford of the artillery, and finally
Major Lawrence, one after another to see to the
munitions and reinforcements in support of the Loo-
diana movement. Nothing escaped his attention ; not
even the minutest commissariat or ordnance details.
He thought of the brandy and beef for the European
soldiers, as much as of the grape shot for the artillery,
and the small arm ammunition for the infantry. All
this time the heavy train was winding its weary way
by the Bussean road from Delhi. The Governor-Ge-
neral was therefore intensely anxious that the seat of
war should not be moved from the Ferozepore side east-
ward, and consequently strained every nerve to crush
Runjore Singh, and prevent even his light troops mov-
ing southward. To effect this object, the force before
Sobraon was greatly weakened, but the Commander-in-
Chief as well as the Governor-General saw the advisa-
* Our approval of the scheme of never heard that a sepoy was expect-
training a guide corps, such as is ed to know his way anywhere: if
here indicated and strongly recom- then Col. Lawrence can obtain faith-
mended, may appear to be at vari- ful guides of ordinary courage he
ance with the opinions elsewhere will do good service. One or two
expressed in this essay against na- hundred would have been invaluable
tives of India proving useful in a to have carried despatches between
double capacity. In a measure it is the different posts of the army dur-
so : but the low castes of the north- ing the war. Col. (General Sir
west frontier are a bolder, and alto- George) Schovell's guides, though
gether a different race from those of many of them French deserters,
Hindoostan. In India, sowars are were often thus employed during
notoriously blind guides, and we the Peninsular war. — H. M. L.
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SOB R AON.
295
bility of the measure. An excellent brigade under
Colonel Taylor of H. M.'s 29th, which was detached to
reinforce Sir Harry Smith, had reached Dhurmkote
within 20 miles, and would have been up next day,
when on the repeated and urgent suggestions of the
Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief to attack,
Sir H. Smith on the 28th January fought the battle of
Aliwal. This action secured the communications, and
the authorities could now await without anxiety the
arrival of the siege train. Lord Hardinge had visited
the army head-quarter camp on the 28th January, and,
riding back, his horse fell under him and so severely
bruised his leg that he was a cripple during the rest of
the campaign. Suffering great pain, and for a month
scarcely able to sit on horseback, he yet did not forego
his labours, nor did he fail to sit out the whole action of
Sobraon, though he went to the field in his carriage,
and only mounted his horse when the batteries opened
on both sides.
On the 8th February Sir H. Smith's division rejoined
head-quarters ; on the 9th the train reached camp ; on
the 10th the Sikhs were driven across the Sutlej. As
far back as the middle of January, the Governor-General
had in his home despatch contemplated the probability
of coming to action by that day. We do not purpose
again to fight the battle of Sobraon in these pages, but
will offer a few briefs words on some hitherto unex-
plained points. The question has been often asked why
were not the entrenchments at Sobraon and Ferozeshah
turned ; why attacked in the face of the formidable Sikh
artillery? The same question might be asked of almost
every Indian battle. The Duke of Wellington wisely
counselled taking an Asiatic army in motion, but he him-
self with half his numbers attacked them at Assaye, in
position and by a forward movement. At Mehidpur,
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296 LORD HARDINGE'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
where perhaps the next most formidable display of
cannon was encountered by an Anglo-Indian army,
Hyslop and Malcolm, — the latter at least accustomed to
Indian warfare, and trained in the school of Wellington,
— not only attacked the long array in front, but crossed
a deep river under fire. But the fact is that Ferozeshah
was not to be outflanked ; its oblong figure was nearly
equally formidable in every direction, and had Sir Hugh
Gough attacked on the northward face, he might have
subjected himself to the double fire of Tej Singh in his
rear and the works in his front ; besides having aban-
doned the line of communication with his wounded and
baggage at Mudki.
As matters turned out at Sobraon, perhaps the cavalry
and Grey's division, with some horse artillery, might
have crossed the Sutlej simultaneously with the attack,
and completed the destruction of the panic-striken
Sikhs. We say perhaps, for even now we are not
satisfied that the move would have been a safe one.
The Nugger and Uttari fords are deep and uncertain ;
our troops on the other side must have been for at least
two days without any certain supplies ; and above all,
with the experience of Ferozeshah before us, we did not
know that every man's services might not be required
on our own bank of the river. No man in camp, not
even the Commander-in-Chief and Governor-General
(and there were no two more sanguine of victory),
expected such complete success as crowned our efforts
on the 10th February.*
* Major General Sir Robert Dick's loss incurred than otherwise would
column, as one powerful wedge, was have been the case. This is to be
alone intended to attack ; but by lamented. Too much, however, has
some mistake it was left weaker been said of the casualties during
by a full brigade than was contem- these battles, and we have only to
plated. Smith's and Gilbert's feints look to the returns of the Peninsular
were converted into real attacks on war or to those of Assaye, Argaum,
Dick's repulse, and thus it was that Laswari, Delhi, Mehidpur, and Ma-
a larger frcnt was exposed and more harajpore, to find that the loss in
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SOBRAON.
297
Here again the Governor-General was attended by
both his sons, and his nephew ; and the same calm col-
lected demeanour was on this occasion observable by
those around him, as under more trying circumstances
at Ferozeshah. The artillery fire did much execution,
and cleared the whole area except the immediate breast-
works in their front ; but as the Sikh gunners stood
manfully to their guns, and rather than otherwise in-
creased their fire, there was some hesitation whether the
column of attack should be brought forward. About
9 o'clock the Commander-in-Chief and Governor-General
held a few words of converse. Councils of war do not
usually fight; but theirs was not of such sort. The
gallant Gough was all fire, and confidence ; and the
equally gallant Hardinge bade him by all means proceed
to the assault, if he felt satisfied of success. He told
him that loss must be expected, but should not prevent
attack if it was likely to prove successful. It is well
known how both chiefs simultaneously ordered up
Smith's and Gilbert's divisions, how those generals as
well as Dick, reeling before the shock of the Sikh bat-
teries, retired; but only to re-form and again on all
sides to renew the attack ; — the best proof of discipline
that soldiers could give ; and one which the Portuguese,
to whom Sir Henry Hardinge was often accustomed to
liken the sepoys, seldom evinced. It has been narrated
former campaigns averaged at least hand, promptly confronted and well
as much as that of the Sikh battles, beaten in a hand-to-hand fight,
and generally — indeed, in India seldom renews the conflict. We are
always — from the same cause, the far from advocating bull-dog mea-
enemy's artillery. It must ever be sures or the neglect of science, but
so. Assaults are not to be made on we would impress on our readers,
positions, bristline with heavy guns, that we hold India at least as much
without loss ; and if more cautious by the conviction of our prowess
measures, involvirg delay, might in and our pluck as by our civil insti-
the first instance save some lives, it tutions, and, therefore, that deeds
must also be borne in mind that which at first sight may appear
such delays tend to give confidence brutal and sanguinary, in the end
to the enemy, who, on the other may actually save life. — H. M.L.
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298 LORD HARDINGK's INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
elsewhere how the Governor-General, at the very com-
mencement of the attack, had three troops of horse
artillery brought up by their drivers and kept in reserve
at Bodawala, until their gunners, employed with the
heavy guns, had fired away all their ammunition and
could retire to bring these field-pieces up to complete
the destruction of the Sikh army. This may seem a
small matter, but is in keeping with all Lord Har-
dinge's military conduct. Though an infantry officer
himself he saw at once what no artilleryman appears to
have perceived, and evinced his sense of its importance
by despatching three several officers to bring them up.
In this manner, with a view of ensuring the execution
of his orders, he detached the officers of his staff so
rapidly one after the other that he was repeatedly left
almost alone during the heat of the action.
Our tale is of the Governor-General and our narrative
must keep him constantly in sight ; but we would not
for a moment imply that the Commander-in-Chief did
not throughout the day do all that a soldier could do.
Never indeed, on India's fertile field of glory, fought a
braver spirit than Lord Gough; and we believe that
no British general in the East has ever won so many
battles.
By 1 p.m. the battle and the campaign were over, and
not a Sikh in arms remained south of the Sutlej. The
moment was a proud one for both the Commander-in-
Chief and Governor-General, but we doubt whether, in
the mind of either, there was elation, and whether the
first and saddest thought was not the heavy cost of
victory: recollections of the noble soldiers who had
fallen, the brave who had suffered, the widows and the
orphans who survived. Such men as Lords Hardinge
and Gough can appreciate peace, can separate the tinsel
from the gold, and in the parade and panopoly of war
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THE PUNJAB ENTERED.
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picture also to their minds its horrors, with a force and
vividness which can hardly be appreciated by an amateur
soldier.
By half-past 1, Colonel Wood, the ever-active aide-
de-camp, now military secretary, of the Governor-Ge-
neral, scarcely recovered from his wound received at
Ferozeshah, was off with the tidings of victory to Feroze-
pore, which though twenty-five miles distant he reached
in an hour and a half, and returned half way to meet
the Governor-General at 5p.m. That night the passage
across the river commenced, and by the incredible ex-
ertions of Colonel Abbott and the engineers, the whole
army was at Kussur, one march in the enemy's territory,
and thirty-five miles from the scene of action, on the
13th, the third day after the battle !
We now know that the Sikh power was completely
broken by the repeated heavy blows of Mudki, Feroze-
shah, Aliwal and Sobraon ; but such was not then the ge-
neral opinion ; and there were not wanting many, even
in high places, to solemnly warn the Governor-General
against crossing the Sutlej, as some of them said, " only
to be driven back with disgrace." Better men declared,
that we had not the means to lay siege to both Gobind-
gurh and Lahore, and that without such means it would
be injudicious to cross. While thus pressed on the spot,
there had been for some time as impressive suggestions
from irresponsible persons elsewhere to advance and to
hazard all in the Punjab before the enemy were broken
and before our train and ammunition had come up. The
Governor-General's practical common sense steered him
safely between these extremes. He waited not an hour
beyond the arrival of the siege train : he felt that all
now depended on time, on closing the war before the
hot season could set in on our European troops, entail-
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800 LORD HARDINGE'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
ing death in a hundred shapes on all ranks, and the
expenses of another campaign on the Government.
Some have blamed Lord Hardinge for the partition
of the Punjab, and above all for raising Rajah Golab
Singh to a throne and independent principality. We
will here add a few " last words," briefly commenting on
the other courses which were open to the Governor-
General.
It was out of the question to annex the Punjab.
The lateness of the season, the weakness of our army,
especially in what constitutes its pith and essence, the
Europeans, — who, after four pitched battles and the
skirmish at Buddawal, were reduced to barely 3000
men, forbade it. In this view the Governor-General
was supported by the opinion of the best soldiers in
India, among whom was Sir C. Napier. Our occupa-
tion of the country, even if successful, would have been
expensive and dangerous. It would, for years and
years, have interfered with useful projects in India;
perhaps, like Scinde, have entailed another debt. Under
any circumstances, it would have brought us into re-
newed contact with Affghanistan and its difficulties —
our sepoys into collision with the fierce and hardy
mountaineers of the north, with whom a struggle
which can bring neither glory nor gain could not fail
to be unpopular. This is the matter-of-fact view of the
case.
The exaltation of Golab Singh is a part of the same
question. Those most hostile to this act of the Go-
vernor-General have founded their chief objections on
the badness of his character. He is represented as a
monster, as an unholy ruffian who delights only in
mischief. We admit that he is a bad man: we fear,
however, that there are few princes in India who are
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GOLAB SINGH.
301
much better, — few, who, with his provocation, have not
committed equal atrocities. And let it not be forgotten
by those who justly execrate his worst act, that the
victims of his barbarity were also the victims of their
own. They had not merely rebelled against his autho-
rity, but had cut in pieces his police officers and thrown
their fragments to the dogs. We go as far as any
of our readers in execrating Golab Singh's conduct
even on such provocation: we but ask that it be re-
membered.
From this chief let us turn not only to almost any
leading member of the Lahore durbar, but to any
independent chief at present alive in India, or to any
that have passed away during the last hundred years ;
and then let us decide if Golab Singh is a worse man
than they were. Is he worse than his rival Sheikh
Imam-ud-din, who with no personal animosity, but
simply out of zeal for the powers of the day, cut up, and
removed in pots, the late Treasurer of Lahore and his
brother? Is he more vile than Rajah Lai Singh, an-
other rival, who was one of the chief parties to the
murder of Hirah Singh, of Kashmera Singh, and of
many others ? Compare him with the Rajah or ex-rajah
of Nepal and the present minister of that country,
with their hands dyed deep with blood ! If we go back
to the Nawabs of Oude and to the Nizams of Hydera-
bad, to Tippoo or his father Hyder Ali, or to the deeds
of our protege, Amir Khan, is there a man among
them all at whose hands not only blood, but innocent
blood, could not be required, or who, taking him all
in all, is morally preferable to Golab Singh ? It is not
so much what he formerly was, as what he has been
during the last eighteen months, that ought, in fairness, to
be considered. Has his new career been cruel and
tyrannical, or otherwise ? He certainly has not gained
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302 LORD HARDINGfi's INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
the ear of the press, and especially of the Lahore
scribes. Watched as he is, by a hundred Argus-eyed
enemies, what single atrocity has been brought home to
him ? The general tenor of the reports of the score of
English travellers who have visited his country during
the years 1846 and 1847, is, that though grasping and
mercenary, he is mild, conciliatory, and even merciful ;
that he indulges in no sort of sensuality, and that he
has permitted himself to be guided by the advice of the
British political officers employed with him.
Golab Singh, then, is morally no whit inferior to other
Native princes, and in intellect vastly the superior of
all. We may, therefore, conclude that if a Sovereign
was to be set up, it would not have been possible to have
found a better; certainly not among the princes and
ex-rajahs of the Hills, than whom a more dissolute and
despicable race it would be difficult to lay hands on.
Besides the re-enthroning them would have been re-
turning to the system which took us to Affghanistan,
and it must be always borne in mind that we gave, or
rather confirmed, to Golab Singh little that he did not
either possess at the time, or over which he had not some
authority. The Blue Book proves that even Sheikh
Imam-ud-din and his father had been creatures of Golab
Singh, and had held Cashmere by his influence. The
Bajah's power and means, it is true, were overrated, but
that again was not the fault of Lord Hardinge ; who
could but judge from the information before him. It
was not then sufficiently understood how much Rajah
Dhyan Singh's death, the exactions of the Sikhs during
the past two years, and perhaps his own penuriousness,
had weakened his military power. Had terms been
refused to Golab Singh, and he had proved an Abdul
Kadir, where would have been the end of the vitupera-
tions levelled against Lord Hardinge? Insurrection,
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GOLAB SINGH.
303
however incurred, would have excited instant attention,
while measures which ensure tranquillity are received
with silence or treated with indifference and contempt.
One very inconsistent portion of the clamour against
Lord Hardinge has been, that he has given up a Native
population to a ruler alien to their own faith. The
charge is an unreasonable one. As a tolerant Eajput,
Grolab Singh must be more acceptable to his subjects
than can be intolerant Sikhs. A large proportion of
them are Rajputs; there are few or no Sikhs in the
Hills, and even of the majority who are Mahommedans,
most are of Hindoo lineage, men whose ancestors in the
proselytising days of Mahommedan power were forced
to change their religion. Such races of Mahommedans
are very different from those of pure descent.* They
retain many of the feelings, prejudices, habits, and even
superstitions of their Hindoo forefathers, and to them a
Hindu, a Eajput, and a mountaineer could not be ob-
jectionable simply on the score of faith. One of the
first acts of Grolab Singh was to proclaim freedom of
worship through his dominions ; while even to this day
in the face of Colonel Lawrence and the British officers,
the Mahommedan cry to prayer has been suffered rather
than sanctioned at Lahore. But those who are loudest
* At one time there was some-
thing like an accusation of treachery
put forth in reference to the pro-
motion of Golab Singh ; but the
fact is, that Lord Hardinge's deal-
ings with him may with advantage
be contrasted with those of all and
any Indian officials towards hostile
princes and their dependents from
the days of Clive and Jaffier Alii
down to those of Marquis Hastings
and Ummir Singh Thappa, or even
with the more recent cases of Haji
Khan Kakur in Afghanistan, and
Morad Ali, in Scinde. Golab Singh,
of his own accord, held aloof ana
was virtually an enemy to the Sikhs
during the war : — he obtained them
a favourable peace, the terms of
which, if there nad been any honesty
or patriotism among the Chiefs,
they could have fulfilled in a week,
and thus have deprived him of Cash-
mere. His redemption of their bond
corrected the only mistake that was
made in the whole transaction ; for
after all that had passed it would
have been cruel to nave left him to
be vizier of Lahore, to avenge the
E hinder of Jummu — the murder of
is sons and brothers.
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304 LORD HARDINGE's INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
on this question appear to forget that this is not the
first or the tenth time that a chief of one creed has
been placed over a people of another. They forget the
transfer of Khyragurh and the Nepal Terai to Oude, of
Tonk to Ameer Khan ; they are oblivious or unmindful
of the partition treaty of Mysore, or of the offer, so
late as the year 1842, of the Affghan province of Julal-
labad to the Sikhs. These are some of the instances in
proof that Lord Hardinge acted in this matter, in con-
formity with the practice of some of his ablest prede-
cessors. We are far from presuming that the errors of
one administration palliate those of another, but it will
be acknowledged by all practical men that, provided
honesty and good faith are preserved intact, a wider
latitude must of necessity be admitted in political
measures than would be admissible in domestic matters.
Public men have something more to do than simply to
gratify their feelings. Lord Hardinge needed not to
seek for the best or the most amiable man in private or
in public life ; what he wanted was the best ruler, — the
man who could best secure tranquillity in a hitherto
troubled tract. The chief who would have the ability
and the courage to manage tribes which, in the memory
of man, had never been managed. The task was not
an easy one. Lord Minto and other Governor-Generals
gave away many petty principalities, but as in the
instances of Hansi, Kurnaul, &c, they were soon sur-
rendered as uncontrollable.* When all these points are
considered, it will, we doubt not, be conceded that, in
this branch of the arrangement, Lord Hardinge acted
wisely and well.
If then the Punjab could not become English, what
* Few chiefs of India would have among them, except Golab Singh,
refused the sovereignty of the Hill who, circumstanced as it then was,
country, but we know no individual could have managed it. — H. M. L.
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HIS PUNJAB POLICY.
305
should have become of it ? Some — not many — would
have given it back to Dhulip Singh, or rather to the
Burchas, and thus allowed them another opportunity
to try their arms against us. Strange as it may seem,
we have heard respectable and intelligent men advocate
such a course. Others would have had a Punjab, as
well as a Cis-Sutlej protectorate, — perhaps the wildest
of all schemes. Surely we have by this time had
enough of such a system, to forbid again voluntarily
shackling ourselves with such arrangements. A native
principality is always more or less a source of care, the
more so, indeed, the more that it is interfered with, un-
less managed altogether by our officers. But when we
come to a hundred petty chiefships, each with its owner
possessing full internal authority, we have all the vices,
the absurdities and inconveniences of the Native system
of Government on a large scale, without its advantages
— incapable of resisting foreign aggression or of preserv-
ing domestic peace, and at feud with their surrounding
neighbours, regarding every village boundary. The
paramount Power has all the odium of being the pro-
tector of such petty rulers, and therefore the aider and
abettor of their misrule. It has been our fortune for
the last forty years to have borne with this system on
the western frontier, and it would have been insanity
had we enlarged it. We should have had all the
expenses of defending these chieflings from foreign
powers, from internal commotion, from mutual violence,
and when the day of danger and trial arrived, many
would have acted as the Ludwa Kajah did during the
late campaign.
In a word, Lord Hardinge had not the means for an-
nexation, had he desired it. It was necessary to punish
and weaken the invader without, if possible, destroying
his political vitality. To lessen his power for mischief
x
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306 LORD HARDINGE'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
by dividing his territory was the only alternative ; nor,
in doing so, would it have been practicable to have an-
nexed the Hill provinces, adding the upper half of it to
the British dominions. A position so isolated and diffi-
cult of access could only have been held by means of a
chain of strong military posts. The ruinous expense of
such a measure is the most conclusive argument against
it. Would those, again, who clamour against handing
over the Hill territory to Grolab Singh have approved of
annexing the Lower Provinces to the British dominions,
thus fastening the more cruel and distasteful rule of the
Sikhs upon the Mountain tribes ? or would those who
urge the danger of the neighbourhood of the Sikhs,
even now that their army is dispersed, have listened
with complacency to a proposition which would have
given them so advantageous a position of annoyance as
the possession of the Mountain ranges which bound the
plains of the Punjab ? It was necessary to provide for
the management of the Hill portion of the Sikh terri-
tory, and now, nearly two years after the event, we deny
that, politically or morally, a better practical arrange-
ment could have been made.
We have perhaps said enough to prove that those on
the spot and best qualified to judge were not of opinion
that we were at the time in a condition to seize and
annex the Punjab, had the Governor-General been
so disposed. It is very easy to decide what should
have been done twenty months before. The Sikhs have
come to terms, and have settled down, because they have
been well treated by ns, and protected from their own
army and chiefs by us ; because scarcely a single jaghir in
the country has been resumed, and because the rights
and even prejudices of all classes have been respected.
It is, however, by no means so certain that, had the
country been occupied, all jaghirs summarily resumed as
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ARGUMENTS AGAINST ANNEXATION. 807
has been done elsewhere in India, and held until it
might be the pleasure or convenience of Government to
examine into the tenures — and had our system, even in
its most moderate form, but with its necessary vexations
to a loose wild people, been introduced, it is by no
means so certain that the Sikh population would have
sat down quietly under the yoke. They have lost little
that they held under Kunjit Singh ; they are therefore
patient and submissive, if not contented and happy;
but had they been reduced to the level of our revenue-
paying population, there cannot be a doubt that ere now
there would have been a strike for freedom.* The Sikhs
perhaps care as little for their Government aa do other
natives of India ; but, like others, they care for them-
selves, their jaghirs, their patrimonial wells, gardens and
fields— ^their immunities and their honour. And in all
these respects, the Sikh and Jat population had much
to lose. The Sikh position must not be mistaken.
They are a privileged race; a large proportion have
jaghirs and rent-free lands ; all hold their fields on more
favourable terms than the Mussulmans around them.
A guerilla war, the Sikh horsemen plundering the
plain, Golab Singh acting the part of Abdul Kader in
the Hills, would have given us at least one long years
warm work. Its expense may be calculated. Then let
any one conversant with such matters estimate the ex-
pense of holding any equal extent of territory in India
— of the North- West Provinces, of Bombay, or Madras.
Let him calculate the cost of the military and civil esta-
blishments, and then consider how much of the single
crore of rupees that comes into the Punjab treasury
would reach the general exchequer of British India.
We fear that for some years at least the deficit would
be considerable. Besides the British garrison of Lahore
* Written before the annexation of the Punjab.
x 2
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308 LORD HARDINGE'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
costing 30 lakhs per annum, 25 Infantry regiments,
12,000 Cavalry, and 18 or 20 batteries, are now kept up,
irrespective of numerous Irregulars. For a long period
not a man less could we maintain ; with more than the
usual proportion of Europeans, with batta to the sepoys,
with a hundred et ceteras that always start up after an
arrangement has been closed.*
These are substantial reasons for the Governor-Gene-
ral's moderation, and many others even as cogent might
be found ; but he acted on higher and nobler grounds
than mere expediency. He desired to punish a gross
violation of treaties — he did not desire to destroy an
old and long-faithful ally. No one more than the Go-
vernor-General saw the chances of a break-down in the
arrangement of March, 1846 ; but it is as idle as it is
malicious therefore to blame him for its consequences.
The question rested entirely on the honesty and patriot-
ism of the Sikh cabinet. Were they or were they not
disposed to sacrifice their own selfish desires to the hope
of rescuing their country from internal anarchy and
foreign domination ? Because one good, one able man
was not to be found in a whole people, was that a just
reason for condemning the Governor-General's acts?
He at least did his duty, nobly, wisely, and honestly.
Carefully abstaining from such interference as would
weaken the executive, he authorized remonstrance of the
most decided kind to the durbar in behalf of the dis-
banded soldiery: as decidedly he supported the con-
stituted authorities against the assumptions of Dewan
Mulraj of Mooltan ; he forbore on the strong provoca-
* When it is considered that the some idea may be formed of the
Say of the officers of a regiment of expense that would be incurred by
ative Infantry of 800 men exceeds the substitution of British battalions
that of the Native officers and and batteries for the Sikh troops
soldiers, while the Sikh rates of pay now employed in the Punjab. —
are lower than those of our ranks, H. M. L.
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SYMPTOMS OF SUCCESS.
309
tion given at Kangra, and forgave the offence of Cash-
mere— punishing, in the latter case, one individual,
where a very slight stretch of privilege would have
authorised a disseverance of the whole treaty.
We need not here repeat our arguments, but may
satisfy ourselves with congratulating Lord Hardinge
and the British public on the great success of his lord-
ship's Punjab policy. The candid reader will remember
how some of the bravest of the land, how Sir Charles
Napier himself, expressed alarm at the first occupation
of Lahore ; how the cry of Caubul was in every man's
mouth ; and disaster was loudly predicated. W e have
heard that Sir Charles Napier so fully considered there
was danger in the arrangement, that he volunteered
to take command of the Lahore garrison. To hold the
post of honour, as brave a man was found in Sir John
Littler ; and near two years have now passed over with
less of outrage, less of crime in the hitherto blood-
stained Punjab than in our most favoured provinces.
Daily the newspapers have told of improvements or of
contemplated ones, of favours and kindnesses showered
on chiefs, people, or soldiers, so as to give all well-dis-
posed among them reason to approve our ride.
The idle attempt, or rather thought, of a half-crazed
Brahmin, supported by a score of as wretched and
worthless creatures as himself, last February, has been,
for their own purposes, trumpeted into something by
designing Europeans, but silence and contempt is a suf-
ficient answer for their malice. They would desire to
mar, they would rejoice to break, the peace — the calm
that they hate — which they prophesied would never be.
The effects of this honest policy of Lord Hardinge
have extended far beyond the limits of the Five Waters.
The princes of Central Asia have looked with wonder
upon such acts of moderation — upon the twice-emanci-
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310 LORD HARDINOE'8 INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
pated Punjab — on the twice-surrendered Cashmere. Dost
Mahommed Khan has been quieted, the chiefs beyond
his limits cease to look for the coming English squa-
drons. The princes of India, too, have evidence that
we do not seize all that is fairly within our reach.
Oude, Hyderabad, and Gwalior may still hope for pro-
longed existence.
It would be no unpleasant theme to dilate on the
Cashmere campaign, on the extraordinary fact, never
before witnessed, of half a dozen foreigners taking up
a lately-subdued mutinous army through as difficult a
country as there is in the world, to put the chief, formerly
their commander, now in their minds a rebel, in posses-
sion of the brightest gem of their land. Roman history
tells no such tales — shows no such instantaneous fellow-
ship of the vanquished with the victors.
A still pleasanter tale would be that of the voice of a
suppliant people, a unanimous nation, calling on their
conquerors to remain for their protection — calling, as
the Britons of old, to their masters not to abandon
them ; to remain and protect their infant sovereign and
to save them, one and all, from themselves — from
their mutual animosities. The best part of the conti-
nental Press, while giving Lord Hardinge credit for his
moderation, could not credit that Mr. Currie and Colonel
Lawrence had not brought about this happy event —
this combination, in their opinion, so fortunate for both
parties.
How it was brought about cannot be better explained
than in Lord Hardinge's own despatches ; and though
our essay has already exceeded the usual limits, we
give nearly in full Nos. 2 and 9 of the Blue Book papers ;
the first of which clearly lays down the principles of the
Governor-General's policy ; and the second tells how his
agents carried out the preliminary arrangements after
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THE PUNJAB UNDER THE REGENCY. 311
the deposition of Lai Singh. Little comment is required
on either. They speak for themselves ; and are as
honourable to the head as to the heart of the writer.
In Despatch No. 2, dated "Simla, September 10,
1846/' the Governor-General commences by informing
the secret committee that the political agent had re-
ported that, in conformity with his instructions, he had
repeatedly declared to the durbar that the British gar-
rison of Lahore would, in fulfilment of the agreement
of 11th March, be withdrawn during the month of
December. As directed, the agent separately informed
each member of the durbar of this determination, in
order that there might be no misunderstanding. With
the exception of Dewan Dina Nath, they unanimously
declared that the Administration could not stand if the
British troops were withdrawn. Six months' respite
was asked, but the agent, instructed of the Governor-
General's strong objections to the subsidiary system,
distinctly refused. We must, however, give his lord-
ship's own words : —
u The avowal of the Vizier and his colleagues, on the 10th of September,
has not been elicited by any suggestions offered to him by the officiating
agent. That officer has treated tne Vizier uniformly with respect, and his
declarations have not originated in any attempt to excite his fears ; but
thev appear to be the voluntary impressions of his own judgment, as shown
in former conversations shortly after the officiating agent's arrival, when
he expressed the danger, to which he was daily exposed, of being assas-
sinated.
u I have no doubt the Vizier and the durbar are convinced of the sincerity
of the British Government's purpose to promote the establishment of a
permanent Hindoo Government in the Punjab, and that the British Go-
vernment has no desire to interfere in their internal affairs.
" The durbar has profited by our advice and mediation in settling their
differences with the Dewan of Mooltan. They know that the political
agent has abstaining from enforcing the article of the treaty for the pay-
ment of the arrears to the disbanded soldiery, in order that the Bntish
authorities might not appear to court popularity at the expense of the
Vizier's Government ; that the greatest pains have been taken, and most
successfully, to maintain a strict discipline amongst our troops ; that the
inhabitants of their great city can, for the first time during many years,
sleep in safety ; that the insolence and rapine of the Khalsa soldier have
been repressed ; and that, upon the whole, a most favourable change has
been effected in the feelings of the Sikh people, and even soldiery, towards
the British authorities, since the occupation of the capital in March last.
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312 LORD HARDINGE's INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
" There can be no doubt of the great improvement of our relations with
the people of the Punjab, in this short space of time, which is corroborated
by the satisfaction which has followed the assessment of lands made in
the Julundcr and the ceded territories.
M I notice this state of popular feeling, as far as it can be correctly ascer-
tained, not only because its existence is a satisfactory proof that the occu-
pation has been followed by desirable results, but because this disposition,
on the part of the people, to confide in our justice and lenity, wul be an
essential means of carrying on a Government through a British minister,
if such an expedient should be adopted. At any rate you will be enabled
to form a correct judgment of the present state of our relations with the
Punjab.
" In my despatch of the 3rd instant, I stated my impression that no per-
manent advantage to the Maharajah's interests, or to our own, would be
derived by the continued presence, under existing circumstances, of our
troops at Lahore. That opinion remains unaltered.
"I do not think that the British Government would be justified in support-
ing a native Government in the Punjab, merely because it may conduce to the
safety of a regent, and a minister obnoxious to the chiefs and people, and to
whom the British Government owes no obligations. These are the very indi-
viduals who, for personal interests of their own, excited the Sikh soldiery to
invade the British frontier ; and considerations of humanity to individuals
would be no plea for employing British bayonets in perpetuating the misrule
of a native State, by enabling such a Government to oppress the people.
" Our interference, if it should ever be called in, must be founded on the
broad principle of preserving the people from anarchy ana ruin, and our
own frontier from the inconvenience and insecurity of such a state of things
as that which, it is assumed, will follow when the British troops retire.*
" To continue to hold Lahore, without reforming the evils so clearly exist-
ing under the Vizier's Government, would not only, if that Government is
to remain as it is now constituted, be an infraction of the agreement
entered into on the 11th of March, but would, in all probability, be an un-
successful attempt. If the various classes who now justly complain of tho
misrule of the Regent and the Vizier find that a British force, in opposition
to the terms of the treaty, continues to occupy Lahore in support of a bad
Government, the confidence which we have inspired up to the present
time will be changed into mistrust of our intentions ; the Sikh troops re-
maining unpaid would refuse to serve at the distant stations ; and, with a
British garrison at Lahore, the whole of the country beyond the Ravee
would not fail to be a scene of disorder and bloodshed. I, therefore, adhere
to the opinions expressed in my last despatch, that the British garrison
ought not to remain beyond the stipulated period, if a Native Government
continues to administer the affairs of the Punjab.
"I have, since my arrival in India, constantly felt and expressed my
aversion to what is termed the subsidiary system, and, [although it was
probably most useful and politic in tho earlier period of British conquest
m India, I have no doubt of its impolicy at the present time, but more
especially on this, the most vulnerable, frontier of our empire.
M The period of the occupation of Lahore was expressly limited to the end
of this year, for the purposes specified in the agreement of the 11th of
March, namely, that the Sikh army having been disbanded by the Vlth
article of the treaty, a British force should be left to protect the person of
the Maharajah and the inhabitants of the city, during the re-organization of
the Sikh army. By the XVth article of the treaty it was stipulated that
* The Italics are the Essayist's.
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THE PUNJAB UNDER THE REGENCY.
313
the British Government would not exercise any interference in the internal
affairs of the Lahore State.
" At that time, the entreaties of the Regent for our assistance appeared to
me not only reasonable, but as imposing upon me a moral duty, exacting,
as I was as that very time, from the Lahore Government, the disbandment
of their mutinous army. It is true this assistance, and the whole measure
of occupation, was no part of the original policy in framing the treaty, for
you are aware that the application for our troops was made after the treaty
nad been signed. But it was evident I had no alternative, if I felt con-
fident, as I then did, that the British garrison would be able to effect its
declared objects without compromising the safety of the troops. I, there-
fore, did not hesitate to afford the aid solicited, although I did so with
reluctance.
"On every occasion, the Lahore Government has been assured that the
British Government deprecates interference in their affairs : they have
been informed that our troops were ready to retire at any moment, if the
re-organization of the Sikh army, and the improved state of the country,
would admit of their being withdrawn.
"It may be further observed, that the occupation of Lahore could not bo
considered in the light of a subsidiary arrangement, because the instruc-
tions given to the General officer and to the Political Agent were, that the
garrison was placed there to preserve the peace of the town, but was not
to be employed in any expedition, even between the Ravee and the Sutlej.
" The force was expressly given as a loan of troops for a peculiar emer-
gency, and to aid the Lahore Government in carrying out an essential article
of the treaty, which required the disbandment of their army. No payment
was demanded, except for certain extra allowances granted to the native
troops, whilst serving beyond the Sutlej.
"If therefore, the proposals of the Regent a)id the durbar are merely confined
to a further loan of British troops for six months, on the plea that a Hindoo
Government cannot be carried on u?iless supported by British bayonets, I am
of opinion that the application must be refused.
" There has been ample time for the re-organization of the Sikh army, and
by proper management the durbar could have fulfilled the limited objects
for which the British force was left at Lahore. The means of effecting
these objects have been invariably neglected, in opposition to the friendly
admonitions of the British Government. I have not failed to exhort the
Vizier to pay the troops with regularity, as the only mode by which the
Government and the army can be on good terms, and without which no
efficient service, or correct discipline, can be expected. Two regiments
have been recently driven into mutiny for want of pay— such a course
being their only means of obtaining their just dues, — whilst estates of
large value have been given to the brother of the Maharanee, at well as to
the relations of the Vizier. It is surprising that, after the experience of
the last five years, of a mutinous army controlling its own Government at
Lahore, the durbar cannot understand, or will not practise, so simple a
system to ensure obedience.
" It is not necessary that I should recapitulate the acts of impolicy and
injustice which have marked tho conduct of the durbar during the last
fivo months. Having a right to interfere, by the terms of the treaty,
in matters relating to the payment of the disbanded soldiery, I have fre-
quently urged the durbar to do their duty ; and this advice, given with
moderation, had led the Sikh Government to make the confession of its
own weakness, and to implore the Governor-General to prolong the period
of occupation.
"It is impossible to place any confidence in the professions of the Maha-
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814 LORD HARDINGK's INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
ranee or the Vizier, that the advice of a British agent would be followed, if
the garrison were to be permitted to remain : the British Government
would, in such case, be a party to the oppression of all classes of the
people. Again, if the troops are withdrawn, we are warned that the
country wiU be plunged into a state of anarchy, and the destruction of all
government will ensue. Neither of these results would be consistent with
the humanity, or the sincerity, of our policy, and they would be equally
opposed to our best interests.
" The other course — which it may be open to the British Government to
take, and which has constantly occupied my attention since the 3rd of
September — would be, to carry on the government at Lahore in the name
of the Maharajah during his minority (a period of about eight years), or
for a more limited time, placing a British minister at the head of the Go-
vernment, assisted by a Native Council, composed of the ablest and most
influential chiefs.
" This course, however, could not be adopted, even if the offer to sur-
render the Regency were to be made by the Maharanee, unless Her High-
ness' solicitations were cordially and publicly assented to by the great
majority of the chiefs.
u If, therefore, the chiefs should not join the Regent and the durbar in
calling upon the British Government to act as the guardian of the young
prince during his minority, and to conduct the Administration, no attempt
would be made to carry such a measure into execution. I should, in that
case, scrupulously adhere to the terms of the agreement. Those terms
could not oe suspended, even temporarily, without some such public act as
that of assembling all the chiefs who have an interest in the State, through
the lands they hold from the Maharajah ; and in any such proceeding,
the proposal must originate with the Lahore, and not with the British
authorities.
"The marked difference between the system of having a British minister
residing at Lahore, and conducting the government through native agency,
and that which now prevails of a Native Government administering the
affairs of the State, without any interference, foreign or domestic, excepting
from the Regent, would amount to this — that, in the one case, our troops
are made the instrument for supporting misrule, and giving countenance
and strength to oppression ; in the other, by British interposition, justice
and moderation are secured by an Administration conducted by native
executive agency, in accordance with the customs and feelings, and even
prejudices, of the people. An efficient Administration, working satis-
factorily, being fairly established, the British interposition might be with-
drawn ; or, if necessary, it might continue till the coming of age of the
Maharajah, when, as may be hoped, his country would be made over to
him in a much-improved and prosperous condition.
" The principal means of ensuring a successful government would consist
in the strict administration of justice between the Government and the
people, in the regular payment of the troops, and the guarantee to the
chiefs, of the unmolested enjoyment of their estates, which should only be
liable to forfeiture on a strong case of misconduct clearly proved.
" The native officers of the army would remain, as at present, generals
and colonels at the head of their troops ; and innovations, unless required
for important purposes of government, would not be introduced.
" Such a system of British rule might not answer as a permanent one,
but it might be adopted, if the durbar and chiefs are convinced that the
Government, without such an alternative, would fall to pieces on the
retirement of the British garrison.
" If, therefore, the proposal of the Regent and durbar should lead to an
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THE PUNJAB UNDER THE REGENCY.
315
offer to carry on the Lahore government by a British Minister, during the
minority of the Maharajah, and the proposal should be confirmed by the
influenzal chiefs, publicly convoked for the deliberation of such a mea-
sure, I should be disposed to give to the experiment a favourable con-
sideration.
❖ * * * * *
u If no such proposal leading to modifications of the treaty should be
made, it is my intention to withdraw the British force' from Lahore the
latter end of December, in accordance with the agreement. I shall, in this
case, have afforded the Lahore durbar every facility in my power to avert
the misfortune which the Vizier and his colleagues anticipate on the re-
tirement of the troops ; and you may be assured that, in the transactions
now pending, the conduct of the British Government shall be strictly re-
gulated by principles of justice and good faith.
" With regard to the apprehended failure of the Vizier to establish a Sikh
Government, I am satisfied it will not have been caused by any difficulties
which might not have been obviated by a firmer minister. At the same time,
it must be admitted, that he has been placed in a position of great dif-
ficulty, which might have baffled the skill of an abler and better man. It
is due, however, to the Rajah, and must be admitted, that he has on all
occasions cheerfully assented to every proposal for the comfort and accom-
modation of the British troops.
" If the hope, which I have expressed since last March, that a permanent
Sikh Government might be formed, should be disappointed, the result will
not prove that the measure could have been dispensed with at the time it
was adopted.
" The force was left expressly for the purpose of protecting the inhabitants
of a large city from spoliation by a disbanded army. The occupation has
fulfilled that object, and has given to the Sikh Government the time to
re-organize their army ; it has given to the Lahore Government the oppor-
tunity of performing its duty to the State : and if, from causes beyond the
control of the Governor-General, the attempt to establish a Sikh Govern-
ment should fail, that result can in no respect reflect unfavourably on the
policy of the attempt. It has not impaired the British character ; on the
contrary, it has caused it to be respected, not only by force of arms, but by
the removal of national prejudices. At the time I consented to the occu-
pation, the question then raised by the opponents of the measure was, not
whether a Sikh Government would succeed or fail, but whether the British
garrison could maintain its position in Lahore ]
" The risk of occupying the capital, in my judgment, was not commen-
surate with the moral obligations imposed upon me, and the political ad-
vantages which have followed that act ; and, at this moment, it will not be
forgotten by reflecting men, that a great military object has been obtained,
of giving to this admirable Indian army a salutary lesson, that, under the
firm management of an able commander, there are no difficulties in occu-
pying a large town, the capital of a foreign nation, which cannot by good
discipline be overcome.
" I, therefore, never can regret a measure which, up to this hour, has
secured the capital of a neighbouring State from ruin, and has maintained
unimpaired the reputation of the British power throughout our Eastern
Empire."
The above masterly document tells how honestly the
Governor-General endeavoured to prop up the State
that had been struck down by the hands of its own
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316 LORD HARDINGK'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
children : it does more — it emphatically lays down the
somewhat novel, though happily-growing, doctrine that
British protection ,when accorded, is not merely a shield
for the native sovereign and his myrmidons, but that
it covers the people also — that the country of an ally
may be defended, but may not be harried, by British
bayonets.
The other despatch with which we enrich our pages
states that the culprit Vizier of Lahore was tried in open
court in the presence of sixty-five of his Peers ; not by
them, because they were his enemies ; but by five British
officers, every individual of whom was more or less his
friend and well-wisher. It then tells of the terms on
which Lord Hardinge consented to carry on the Admi-
nistration of Lahore for eight years. Even Lai Singh,
though anxious for a Resident and a Contingent on
the old system, preferred this scheme to being left to
the mercies of the Sikhs and the fate of his prede-
cessors. But without further preface we offer the ex-
tract nearly in full as published in the Blue Book : —
No. 9.
u The Governor-General to the Secret Committee.
" Camp, Bhyrowal Ghat,
(Extract.) "December 21, 1846. (No. 59.)
" In my last despatch, of the 5th instant, I informed you of the arrange-
ments which had been made at Lahore, for conducting the inquiry iuto
the allegations of Sheik Imamoddeen, relative to his proceedings in Cash-
mere.
" The collection of papers which accompanies this despatch will bring
before you all the circumstances that have since occurred, and will show,
that the course contemplated by me, in my communication to you of the
19th of September, in the event of the Lahore Government desiring the
continuance of the British troops, has been acted upon.
" I have to request your attention to Mr. Currie's letter of the 5th of
December, forwarding the minutes of evidence and abstract of the pro-
ceedings taken in the investigation of the Cashmere insurrection.
" You will observe that the inquiry was conducted in the most open and
public manner. All the leading chiefs of the most influential families,
sixty-five in number^ attended to witness the proceedings."
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THE PUNJAB UNDER THE REGENCY.
317
The Governor-General then enters into some details
of the trial of Eajah Lai Singh ; acknowledges the ser-
vices of Mr. Currie and his colleagues, and thus pro-
ceeds : —
" In the subsequent transactions to which I am now about to draw your
attention, and which refer to the terms on which alone I could consent to
the continued occupation of Lahore by a British garrison, you will find
that all the anticipations of my confidence in this valuable officer's ability
have been realized.
" In the same letter (of the 7th of December) in which I confirmed Mr.
dime's proceedings, I instructed him to address the Maharajah, express-
ing the deep interest I took in His Highnesses welfare, and stating that, as
the time had nearly arrived when the British troops would, in observance
of the agreement of the 11th of March, withdraw from Lahore, I was
anxious, after the Vizier's deposition, that the Government should be so
reconstructed as to afford the nest prospect of preserving the Raj ; that I
was anxious the British Government should remain on terms of peace and
amity with the Government of Lahore ; but that I was determined, after
the experience of the last nine months, and the recent misconduct of the
Vizier, not to leave a British force in the city, beyond the stipulated period,
for the sake of supporting a Native Government which can give no assur-
ance of its power to govern justly, as regards its people, and no guarantee
for the performance of its obligations to its neighbours.
" I stated, that it was the duty of His Highness's Government and the
Chiefs, to decide upon the course which they might deem to be most
expedient ; but that in these arrangements I could exercise no interference,
further than in giving to His Highness's Government the aid of my advice
and good offices in promoting the interests of the State.
" These sentiments were conveyed to His Highness in Mr. Currie's letter
of the 9th of December, and the answer is contained in a recapitulation of
each paragraph by the durbar, concluding with the request that I would
leave two regiments of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, and a field-bat-
tery, at Lahore, with Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence as the Resident, for
some months longer.
"Mr. Currie, in his reply to this letter of the Maharajah's, informed His
Highness, that the application for the continuance of a British force at
Lahore involved a departure from the conditions of the articles of agree-
ment concluded on the 11th of March, and stated that it would, therefore,
be advisable that the members of the durbar and the principal sirdars
should assemble, in order that Mr. Currie might declare, in their presence,
the only terms on which the Governor-General would consent to a modifi-
cation of the arrangements, and to the continuance of a British force at
Lahore, after the expiration of the stipulated period.
"The paper containing these conditions was carefully translated into
Persian ana Hindoostanee, and delivered by Mr. Currie to the chiefs, when
they met on the 15th of December. For the purpose of avoiding all mis-
understanding, the different articles were explained — the sirdars retired for
consultation, and, after some discussion relating to the amount of the con-
tribution for the expense of the British garrison, the terms were agreed to.
In order to afford full time for further deliberation, it was resolved that
the sirdars and chiefs should reassemble on the following day, when certain
individuals should be selected by themselves to draw up articles of agree-
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318 LORD HARDINGE's INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
merit, in conjunction with Mr. Currie and Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence.
The chiefs accordingly reassembled at Mr. Currie's durbar tent, at 3 o'clock
of the 16th instant. Each article was discussed separately : the contribu-
tion was fixed at twenty-two lakhs ; and every siroar present signed and
scaled the paper. All the chiefs, in number fifty-two, on the conclusion of
the meeting expressed their satisfaction that the Maharajah would be under
the protection of the British Government during his minority, which will
continue until the 4th of September, 1854.
" At these meetings the chiefs unanimously concurred that a State ne-
cessity existed for excluding the Maharanee from exercising any authority
in the administration of affairs, and the durbar and the chiefs have come
to the decision that Her Highness shall receive an annuity of one lakh and
a half.
" You will observe, that a British officer appointed by the Governor-
General in Council, with an efficient establishment of subordinates, will
remain at Lahore, to direct and control every department of the State.
"The feelings of the people, and the just rights of all classes, will be
respected.
" A Council of Regency, composed of leading chiefs will act under the
control and guidance of the British Resident.
" The Council will consist of eight sirdars, and the members will not be
changed without the consent of the British Resident, acting under the orders
of the Governor-General.
" The power of the Resident extends over every department, and to any
extent.
" A military force may be placed in such forts and posts, and of such
strength, within the Lahore territories, as the Governor-General may de-
termine.
" These terms give the British Resident unlimited authority in all matters
of internal administration, and external relations, during the Maharajah's
minority.
"The concession of these powers will enable the British Government to
secure the peace and good order of the country — the authority will be exer-
cised for the most beneficial purposes : these terms are more extensive than
have been heretofore required, when Native States have received the protection
of a British contingent force. My motive in requiring such large powers has
arisen from the experience of its necessity during the last nine months; and
my reluctance on general principles to revert to the subsidiary system of
using British troops to support a Native Government, while we have no
means of correcting the abuses of the civil administration of a country
ostensibly under British protection. A British force, acting as the instrument
of a corrupt Native agency, is a system leading to mischievous consequence*,
and which ought, when it u possible, to be avoided.
r* " The occupation of Lahore will afford the means of counteracting much
of the disorder and anarchy which have disturbed the Punjab for the last
five years, chiefly owing to a numerous Sikh army, kept up in the vicinity
of the capital, in numbers greatly disproportioned to the revenues of the
country, and by whose republican system of discipline, the soldiery had
usurped all the functions of the State.
" The control which a British garrison can exercise in enforcing order
amongst the disbanded soldiery, will, in conjunction with a British system
of administration, protect all classes of the community. The immediate
effect of depriving a numerous body of military adventurers of employment
(there being still many to be disbanded to reduce the numbers to the limits
of the Treaty of Lahore), may be troublesome, and a source of some
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THE PUNJAB UNDER THE REGENCY.
319
uneasiness.* No policy can at once get rid of an evil which has been the
growth of years. But the operation of a system of order introduced into
the Punjab, will subdue the habits of this class, as has been the case in
our own provinces since the Pindarree war, and, by gradually mitigating the
turbulent spirit of the Sikh population, encourage the people to cultivate
the arts of industry and peace.
" A strict adherence to the letter of the treaty, by the withdrawal of the
British garrison at this moment from the Punjab, after the avowals made
by the durbar, that the Government could not stand, would probably have
led to measures of aggrandizement, and the extension of our territory,
after scenes of confusion and anarchy. This danger was felt by the most
able of the sirdars, and it reconciled them to the sacrifices which the
terms inevitably required for the interest of the Lahore State. By the
course which has been adopted, the modification of the terms of the
agreement of last March, has been made with the free consent of the
sirdars, publicly assembled, who were made fully aware of the extent of
the power which, by the new articles, was to be transferred to the British
Government.
" The confidence which the Sikh chiefs have reposed in British good faith
must tend, by the unanimity of their decision, which partakes, as far as it
is possible in an eastern country, of a national sanction, to promote the
success of this measure.
" I have deemed it expedient, that the ratification of the new terms of
agreement entered into for protecting the Maharajah during his minority
should be made as public as possible. It has, therefore, been determined,
in communication with the sirdars, that His Highness shall come to my
camp on this side of the Beas on the 26th instant ; and I propose after-
waras, when the agreement will be formally ratified, to pay His Highness
a friendly return visit at Lahore."
* In some quarters we understand
that Lord Hardinge is reproached
with allowing the arrears of a thou-
sand or two of Sikh sowars to re-
main unpaid. The following facts
therefore will be instructive : — The
Sikh army has during the last twelve
months been reduced not less than
20,000 men ; and the finances thereby
relieved by 30 lakhs. Not only have
all these men been paid their arrears,
but the army still kept up, which
was found in arrears of from nine to
sixteen months, is now paid nearly as
regularly as our own. The infantry
are two months in arrears, and the
majority of the cavalry only five ;
and their not being pajd up as well
as the infantry is for the excellent
reason that there is no money. When
these facts have been digested, we
would beg attention to the contrast
afforded by the following. The
Gwalior cavalry, remodelled and
taken under our protection in
January, 1844, was still owed in
June, 1847 (3^ years after the treaty)
the monstrous sum of 25 lakhs of
rupees. If 10 lakhs of the marriage
gin; of the Bazee Bhaie have been
appropriated to the payment of those
arrears, as was suggested, we under-
stand, by the localagents, there will
still remain, four years after the
treaty, a larger arrear to the Gwalior
cavalry, than is owed to the whole
Sikh army nine months after the
treaty that transferred it with the
rest of the Lahore State to British
care. We attribute no sort of blame
in this matter to Col. Sleeman, or
Sir R. Shakspeare. The treaty of
Gwalior did not give them the au-
thority to act ; that of Lahore did
give Col. Lawrence. We only add
one more example to the many on
record of the evils of the old subsi-
diary system, and the advantages of
the new. — H. M. L.
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320 LORD HARDINGe's INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
Compliments to Mr. Currie and Colonel Lawrence
here follow, and the despatch thus concludes : —
" In every part of India the most perfect tranquillity prevails.
" No efforts on my part will be omitted to preserve this desirable state
of things. My views and measures have been uniformly directed to main-
tain a system of peace, by consolidating the British power in India, and
not by objects of aggrandizement, and 1 trust that the arrangements now
about to be ratificdwill tend to this effect, and that the course which I
have adopted will be found by you to be consistent with true policy, and
conducive to the interests of British India."
The treaty of March, 1846, was no sooner signed
than arrangements were made for the management of
the valuable acquisitions obtained. Mr. John Lawrence,
one of the most experienced officers in the civil service,
was sent for from Delhi, in which neighbourhood he
had served for many years with great credit. To his
care, as Commissioner, was entrusted the Jullunder,
with half a dozen assistants, while Major Mackeson,
with a similar staff, superintended the Cis-Sutlej States,
both acting under the agent of the Governor-General.
The arrangement answered so well, that within the
year almost all the complicated questions caused by the
war were decided, and the Sikh chiefs put on a new and
improved footing. Major Broadfoot had truly observed
that these chiefs had long ceased to be the protected,
and might latterly rather be called the restrained. They
had ceased to fear the Punjab ruler: they now only
feared our preventions from plunder. The police powers
of many of these were withdrawn : the customs of all
commuted or abolished. The disorderly and untrust-
worthy contingents on both sides the river were com-
muted for a money payment sufficient to pay several
good regiments ; the jaghirs of all examined, and pos-
session allowed until so done ; and, above all, a very
light summary assessment was completed, within three
months, in the Jullunder, and, during the year, else-
where. The Governor-General's only instructions to the
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REDUCTION OF THE ARMY.
321
Commissioners being to be moderate in their demands,
and not to distress the people. Thus has order been
brought out of anarchy, and a most fruitful and lovely
district, already yielding fifty lakhs, been added to
British India.
Simultaneously with these arrangements, retrench-
ments in a small way were commenced, but it was not
until the treaty of December, 1846, was signed, that
the Governor-General felt justified in reducing the mili-
tary force. Now, however, that affairs were put on a
more promising footing, the strength of every infantry
corps in the service was reduced, as also of all the irre-
gulars ; the police battalions were one by one disbanded ;
and, without any apparent effort, more than 30,000 men
were reduced from the Bengal army alone. There is no
denying that while this bold measure saved much to
the State, it curtailed establishments with less injury to
public credit than ever was before accomplished.
There is one feature of this question which the future
historian will dwell on with special satisfaction. Scarcely
was the Punjab war over, when the party in the British
Senate with which the Governor-General had always
acted were ejected from power. They had honoured
and rewarded him, and he might now have retired, or,
when remaining at the request of his political adver-
saries— who seem to have treated him with as much
consideration as if one of themselves — he might not
unreasonably be expected to forward no financial arrange-
ments that would affect his popularity during the brief
remainder of his stay in India. An ordinary man
would certainly thus have acted ; but far otherwise was
Lord Hardinge's practice. In the face of the clamour
of a portion of the Press he as honestly and unflinch-
ingly used the shears as Lord William Bentinck could
have done — as effectively as if he himself were to have
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322 LORD HARDINGE'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
been the gainer. He had submitted his resignation to
the home authorities. He had expressed his desire to
be relieved in the winter of 1847 ; so that, without
any apparent dereliction of duty, he might have left
every invidious measure to be carried out — every re-
duction to be enforced by his successor.
We shall enter somewhat fully — we trust not tedi-
ously— into these reductions, premising that, since the
year 1837, the Indian army had been increased by no
less, in round numbers, than 120,000 men. More than
half of these levies were discharged, and yet all vulner-
able points were left as well guarded as they ever were;
and the North-west frontier was placed on a footing of
strength sufficient to satisfy the most clamorous
alarmist.
With the exception of the cavalry, every branch of
the Indian army had been increased since 1837 ; the
officers by no less than 834 ; in the proportion of 656
to the infantry, 146 to the artillery, and 32 to the
engineers. Above 50,000 men were reduced after the
war, leaving the army still stronger by more than that
number than it was in 1837. None of the officers,
Native or European, were touched. Certain local corps
were disbanded; while other " irregulars," more ur-
gently required, were subsequenty raised. Among these
are the Scinde and Sikh levies. The chief reduction was
caused by bringing down the strength of corps from
1100 to 800 men.* This was effected by giving a bonus
of from three to twelve months' pay to every man will-
ing to take his discharge ; and by permitting men to
invalid in 1847 who, in the usual course, would not
have been passed till 1848. No soldier, however, of
the regulars was discharged against his will ; and none
of the irregular horse who had served seven years ;
* They were permitted gradually to fall to 750.
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REDUCTION OF THE ARMY.
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while every individual of the latter, however short his
service, discharged on the reduction, received a gratuity
of twelve months' pay, being no less than £24 for a
private horseman — a noble sum, a fortune to many.
Eight regiments of cavalry were raised during the
war ; and all of them for very good reasons were irre-
gulars. First because a corps can be formed in a month
or two, and costs only £19,000 per annum; while one
of regulars costs £39,000 ; secondly, because they are
more easily moved and provided for ; requiring (includ-
ing officers) only thirty-seven doolie bearers and twenty-
two camels, while a corps of regular cavalry requires
sixty and 200 respectively; lastly and above all, because,
during the Sikh campaign, after every exertion, we
never had 4500 sabres in the field opposed to not less
than 30,000. We were deficient in numbers, not material.
When Punjab affairs were settled, the strength of corps
of irregular horse was reduced to 500, and it was sub-
sequently designed to bring them down to 420, the
strength of the regular cavalry ; but, as in the infantry,
the full number of corps as also their constitution was
kept up, so as to enable officers on the shortest notice to
fill up their ranks. The gratuity of a twelvemonths
pay to the discharged men was a humane measure, be-
cause many had incurred debt to enable them to enter
the service, and it then became clearly a man's own
fault if he was unable to make a fresh start in life with
a trifle in his pocket : it was a politic act, because it
induced volunteers, when required, to crowd to our
ranks.
Thus the reduction in the Native army was effected,
with the least possible detriment to efficiency. The
cavalry, the arm in which we were most deficient, was
increased by eight regiments ; and the number of sabres,
even after reductions, by some hundreds. For the police
y 2
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324 LORD HARDINGK's INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
battalions the more efficient Scinde and Sikh levies were
substituted. The police corps did not give satisfaction.
No man who has much worked with natives could have
expected otherwise. The theory of a military police is
excellent; but as a general rule natives of India will
not take to a double trade. They will not both fight
and write; they will not do menial work and head
work. There are of course exceptions to this as to
every other rule ; but with some personal experience in
these matters, we are decidedly of opinion, that the
native of India who has been in the habit of doing one
work well, will fail inx a double duty. There are a dozen
reasons for what we aver. Listlessness, cowardice, vanity,
and the prejudices of the caste to which they belong,
all interfere with such combination of duties. He who
reckons on orientals by European rules will assuredly
reap repentance. The Sikh and Scinde levies are more
decidedly military bodies than the police battalions, and
bring into our ranks men who have fought against us ;
and might, if not employed, do so again. This, indeed,
is another reason for encouraging irregular cavalry, as
it is chiefly formed of the most military portion of the
Mahommedan population.
Though several European regiments were sent home
after the war, it is quite a mistake to suppose that the
European force in India was then decreased below the
usual average. On the contrary, it very far exceeded
what was considered sufficient to defend India during
any period of the China, Gwalior, Scinde, and AfFghan-
istan campaigns, — the fact being that though between
the years 1837 and 1842, the force in Bengal was in-
creased by no less than one dragoon and seven infantry
regiments, an equal number were generally absent be-
yond the limits of India. During the years 1848-44,
and '45, this branch of the army counted three regi-
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REDUCTION OF THE ARMY.
325
ments of dragoons and fourteen of infantry, being one
of the former, and five of the latter, in excess of the
establishment of 1837. In the year 1838, while the
whole European force in the Bengal presidency was
only two regiments of cavalry and nine of infantry, one
of the first and two of the last were in Affghanistan ;
and in 1840, when the infantry establishment was in-
creased to twelve regiments, not less than six were
absent, viz. three in China, and three in Affghanistan.
In the year 1846 the infantry regiments were again in-
creased to sixteen by orders from home, but before the
reinforcements could arrive peace was declared.*
It was, we understand, intended after the war to keep
three regiments of dragoons and eleven of infantry on
the Bengal establishment, being one of cavalry, and two
of infantry in excess of the establishment of 1837, before
Gwalior or the Punjab was subdued !
At Madras, in the year 1841, there were eight Euro-
pean regiments, but of these three were absent; viz.
one in China, one at Aden, and one at Moulmein ; leav-
ing five. The establishment was reduced to eight !
At Bombay, the European force was
In 1837 4^ regiments (a wing being at Aden).
„ 1838 2*
„ 1839 3
„ 1840 4
„ 1841 4 „
One regiment went home, leaving seven ; but a wing
* This was a very natural and cessary. No : his reinforcements
E roper caution on tne part of the were much nearer ; Sir Charles Na-
ome authorities, but it was un- pier was in Scinde with 23,000 men.
advisedly made a handle for the re- When the war ended in February,
port that Lord Hardinge wrote to 1846, Napier was at hand with 16,000
England, after Ferozeshah, for 12,000 men and fifty guns ; while supports
troops. The fact, however, is, he did from England could hardly have
not write for a man. Lord Hardinge reached before the spring of 1847,
was not the person to wait till the unless by Egypt, and there in April
middle of a war before he indented and May the soldiers would have
on England for all he considered ne- suffered from heat. — H. M. L.
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826 LORD HARDINGE's INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
being at Aden, and two regiments in Scinde, the same
number as in 1837 remained for the duties of the pre-
sidency.
Thus we have shown that the European force actually
within the limits of India was left considerably stronger
than at any former period — though for the first time
since our sovereignty commenced there was no organ-
ized army (Nepal excepted, which has no cavalry) in
India but our own. To make the matter still plainer
to unprofessional readers, we may remark that, during
profound peace, the European force in India, though
5000 men less than the war establishment of 1846,
was 10,000 in excess of that of the year 1835, and 9000
stronger than that of 1837, when the hostile army of
Gwalior was on our flank, the Sikhs in our front, and
the expedition to Affghanistan was already on the tapis!
The increase to the army since 1837, in Bengal alone,
exceeded 50,000 men ; the reductions, including Queen's
regiments sent home, exceeded 30,000 men, at a saving
of £700,000. In Bombay, including a European regi-
ment, 7000 men, at a saving of £300,000, and in Madras
10,000, at a saving of £160,000.
Thus the total reductions made by Lord Hardinge
were £1,160,000, while with the Lahore subsidy of
£220,000, and the Jullunder and Cis-Sutlej proceeds
(after deducting expenses) of £500,000 more, we have
a total improvement of the revenue during the year
1847 of £1,880,000 sterling;— so that, with reductions
at Bombay and Madras, the relief to the finances of
India could not have fallen short of two millions of
money ; giving, for the first time since 1838, a prospect
of escape from bankruptcy.
The advocates of annexation, those who think the
Indus or the Solemane range should be our border,
may with advantage reflect on the above facts. An-
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ARGUMENTS AGAINST ANNEXATION. 327
nexation that tends to insolvency can never be bene-
ficial. Hitherto our debt has increased with our
frontier; and we are satisfied that the Punjab would be
no exception to the rule. Its revenues are not four
millions, as influential journals in England consider;
they are scarcely one-third of that sum; and of it
nearly half is expended in jaghirs and the British sub-
sidy. Could we with our present establishments safely
hold the four Western Doabs, or the other half? We
think not ; and had we tried to do it, where would have
been the reductions above displayed? Would those
who feared to occupy Lahore, with 10,000 men, at the
earnest prayer of the Sikh nation, have had no misgiv-
ings, when again in front of the formidable Khybur —
when again confronted with the Murris, the Bogtis, and
the Vizeris, while the irritated Sikh population was in
their rear? Each river of the Punjab would have been
as dangerous, or at least as dreaded, as a Klurd Cabul
or a Khybur, and we must literally have kept up an
army in each Doab, or India and Europe would have
rung with forebodings of disaster — instead of a reduction
of the army, then, there must have been an increase, and
especially in the most expensive branches; the Euro-
peans;— the artillery and the cavalry. Above all,
instead of sending home Queen's regiments, we must
have indented for six or eight more, and for years at
least the country would have been a loss to us. The
balance-sheet is the best answer against annexation !
In proof that the reductions we have noticed did not
unduly affect our military strength, we proceed briefly
to contrast our posture, in the most vulnerable quarters,
before and after the war.
A European regiment was withdrawn from Moul-
mein — wisely, we think. The force there was not strong
enough to make, though it might tempt, war. Our
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328
LORD HARDTNC.e's INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
steamers enabled us to reinforce the Tenasserim coast,
and to destroy Kangoon, at a few hours' notice.
The small fortified posts of Petoragurh and Lohu
Ghat on the western Nepal frontier, inviting attack,
were dismantled, and their garrisons withdrawn. The
regiment of native infantry was recalled from Almorah,
where it should never have been stationed, and the fort
at that station was strengthened, and made tenable
against all comers until it could be relieved.
An irregular cavalry corps was stationed at Gorukpur,
in communication with that at Segowlie ; the best pos-
sible arm to employ in watching the Gurkhas. By
Lord Ellenborough's arrangements, Gwalior had become
an armed friend, occupied by a British force more than
double that which won " Meani."
There remains only the North- Western frontier. We
have already shown, but may repeat, that in July, 1844,
when the Sikh army was in force at Lahore, the British
troops at and above Meerut, amounted to 24,000 men
and 66 guns, but were increased by Lord Hardinge by
1st of December, 1845, to 45,000 men and 98 guns.
After the war, though there were not 3000 Sikh soldiers
in the whole country around Lahore and Umritsur, and
those under our orders, Lord Hardinge had 54,000 men
and 120 field guns as well as a battering train of equal
strength at and above Meerut ! *
A comparison of these numbers should satisfy the
most apprehensive mind, that, in making his well-con-
sidered reductions, Lord Hardinge never hazarded the
safety of the empire. Not only during the whole of
the year 1846 were moveable brigades, complete in
carriage and equipment, kept up at Lahore, Ferozepore,
* We are indebted for much of letters signed Zeta and Omega, which
the information contained in this appeared in the Bombay Times. —
portion of our article to some instruc- rf. AL L.
tive, and apparently authoritative,
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ARTILLERY ARRANGEMENTS.
329
and Jullunder, but in the midst of profound peace they
were retained. Each consists of one European regiment
and three of Native infantry, one of cavalry, and twelve
guns. The former had also two companies of sappers
and a second regiment of cavalry. These brigades
were under two distinguished brigadiers, Campbell and
Wheeler, both aides-de-camp to the Queen, and the whole
commanded by Sir John Littler. These three brigades
could be reinforced in ten days by four regiments of
British infantry ; while there were three of cavalry, with
seventy guns and 20,000 Native infantry, in reserve.
Lord Hardinge's Ordnance arrangements ought alone
to satisfy men's minds that, in all that concerned mili-
tary matters, he was thoroughly at home. Not a man
or a gun from the war establishment was reduced ; 60
nine-pounder guns before drawn by bullocks were soon
horsed, and there were siege and field artillery on and
near the frontier sufficient to meet any contingency, and
it cannot be his Lordship's fault if our Horse artillery
ammunition ever again runs short in action, or if our
siege trains are ill-supplied.*
We have entered at such length into the origin, con-
duct, and results of the war with the Sikhs, the great
episode of Lord Hardinge's Administration, that we
have space only to glance at some of the civil measures
* The old system did not allow patiate on the excellences of the men
sufficient ammunition to the field and of the captains, and we believe
artillery. Lord Hardinge rectified it to have been his opinion that the
the error. We would, however, chief wani of the artillery, as of the
correct an impression that prevails Bengal army, in all its branches, was
in some quarters, that, because the a senior list. We may here mention,
Governor-General expressed himself what is little known — we are not
warmly regarding the deficiency of sure that it is so to Lord Hardinge—
ammunition at the beginning of the that the chief reason for the ammu-
campaign, he, therefore, thought ill of nition having run out at Ferozeshah
the bengal Artillery. Far otherwise, was the extraordinary number of
He thought them, as all who have waggons that blew up. Of eighteen
seen their practice must do, as good that went into action under Lt. Col.
artillery as any in the world. Indeed, Geddes, no fewer than seven ex-
his Lordship was often heard to ex- ploded.— H. M. L.
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330 LORD HARDINGB's INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
to which the restoration of peace enabled him to turn
his attention.
The question of the great Ganges canal had met
with cool advocacy and warm opposition. Mr. Thoma-
son's views were opposed ; Major Cautley, the able pro-
jector, was in England, and the war called away his
excellent successor, Captain Baker, and his assistants.
Doubts were raised as to the advisability of opening a
new canal, when those, on a much smaller scale, now
running past Delhi and Kurnaul, had rendered these
towns and cantonments unhealthy. A sanatory com-
mittee was appointed and ordered to proceed to the
canals; there to investigate the amount of sickness
usually caused by them, and to draw up a full report
embodying their own suggestions. The committee pre-
pared a very curious table, demonstrating most clearly
that the size of the spleens of children, in the tract
irrigated by the Delhi canals, increased in proportion to
their vicinity to the inundation. The fact was not
ascertained from examination of bed-ridden patients,
but from scores of boys and girls who were running
about the villages. It was, however, also ascertained
that these symptoms of disease were little thought of
by the people themselves, and that sufferers from inter-
mittent fever preferred to be subject to such trials
rather, than to lose the fertilizing waters of the canals.
It was also shown that the course of the Jumna canals
being through a low line of country, difficult of drain-
age, caused swamps and stagnant pools, at the most
unhealthy season of the year, as around Kurnaul. Much
if not all of this might be remedied, and it was believed
that Delhi and Kurnaul might be restored to compara-
tive salubrity.
By a judicious system of drainage, it was expected
that malaria might be prevented, and with this view it
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THE GREAT GANGES CANAL.
331
was designed that the Ganges canal should follow the
highest ridge of the Doab, at a prescribed safe distance
from towns and cantonments. Thus, irrigation would
be prevented in the vicinity of masses of people, and it
might be hoped that care and attention would mitigate
the existing canal evils to the rural population. Indeed
we do not see why irrigation might not be prohibited
within prescribed distances of village sites; but, as
already remarked, the cultivators prefer good crops with
miasma and visceral disease, to dearth, hunger, and
starvation. Malaria doubtless does shorten life, but it
is unquestionable that for hundreds whom it has de-
stroyed in India famine has carried off its tens of thou-
sands. Who can estimate the misery and mortality of
the famine of 1837? the loss and expense of which
alone, in a single year, cost the Government a million
of money — much what the Ganges canal is estimated
at! Only four years previously, in 1833, that of Gun-
toor cost sixty lakhs and the lives of a quarter of a
million of people !
Another danger was prognosticated. It was feared
that to divert from the Ganges seven-eighths of the
main stream would endanger its navigation. As the
proposed canal is to be navigable for boats, and as the
river is now scarcely so, throughout the year,* this
objection seems to us unimportant.
After a rigid calculation of the advantages to be
gained and the risks to be encountered, the Governor-
General, in March, 1846, visited the head of the canal
and its most important feature the Solani aqueduct, and
then authorized the vigorous prosecution of the work.
We understand that the annual expenditure of a quarter
* We have ourselves, in an English Furrukabad and Allahabad. — H.
wherry, been a dozen times aground, M. L.
in the month of March, between
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832 LORD HARDINGK's INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
of a million sterling has since been sanctioned from home.
Six years will probably open a canal of not less than
600 miles in length, to spread its fertilizing waters over
1,200,000 acres, to secure from famine several millions
of people, and to remain a lasting monument of British
architecture and of British benevolence in India.*
That Mr. Stephenson and his staff made their way
to Calcutta, prepared to commence the grand Northern
Eailway, is mainly attributable to Lord Hardinge's
sound advice and practical good sense. It must
ever redound to his credit that when his colleagues,
men supposed to be more cognizant of India's wants,
doled out such a small modicum of Government assist-
ance as would have smothered the project for ever,
the Governor-General, taking an enlarged and states-
man-like view of the question, declared, "I am of
opinion that the assistance to be given ought not to be
limited merely to the land and further on, " the value
of the land is not commensurate with the advantages
which the State would derive from rapid and daily
communications between Calcutta and Delhi;" and
again, " the calculation of the contribution to be given
should be based on the political, military, and commer-
cial advantages which would be derived from the com-
pletion and full operation of such a line." His Lord-
ship's task was a peculiarly hard one. He had, at a
time of great financial pressure, in the face of the com-
bined opinion of his civil counsellors, to advocate a
large outlay. He had his reward in seeing the founda-
tion of that noble work laid, which it was Lord Dal-
housie's privilege to see fairly in operation. In his
Lordship's character and previous career, there was an
earnest that he would not be found wanting in works of
improvement : indeed in his speech at the dinner given
* It will be borne in mind that this was written in 1847.
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RAILROADS.
333
to him by the Court of Directors, on the 4th of No-
vember, his Lordship declared that he would do all that
prudence permitted in opening out communications be-
tween different parts of the land. The guarantee of
five per cent, for twenty-five years made the invest-
ment an excellent one as a private speculation, while
to Government the advantages of railroads are incal-
culable. With the means of rapidly transporting our
munitions, our batteries, and our battalions from one
end of the empire to the other, we may confidently
defy all danger, and the strength of British India will
be more than doubled. Famine can no more stalk in
one quarter, while plenty smiles in others. The trains
that convey provisions for our English soldiers to the
fort of the Himalayas will return with the products
of those mountains, whose dyes, herbs, and minerals
will now find a market.
Lord Hardinge has added another to the number of
sanataria, and has, we hope, prepared the way for all
Europeans, henceforward invalided for India, to be sent
to the mountains. We are satisfied that it is only
misapprehension of the advantages to be gained that
prevents the veterans of Chunar now, to a man, vo-
lunteering for the Hills. And who can deny, when
masses of men can be transported from the sea to the
frontier and back again within the week, that evety
European regiment in the service should have its chief
hospital in the Hills, where at least half the period of
service of every English soldier should be spent?*
While anxious to further the introduction of rail-
roads, Lord Hardinge very far from neglected those
communications to which we must still, for so many
* A few months ago ice was sane- night, in the barracks in the plains,
tioned for European hospitals, and This is indeed doing as we would be
we hear that it is now determined done by: the measure will save many
to allow punkahs, both day and lives. — H. M. L.
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834 LORD HARDINGE'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
years, be indebted. On his arrival, finding the works
on the Great Trunk road languishing, and the roads
scarcely passable for want of bridges, &c, he gave
every encouragement to the Executive officers, and
placed the means of completing the whole line of road
in three seasons in their hands. The war impeded this
as well as many other measures, but more than fifty
bridges were built on this road during two years and a
half, no less than fifteen of them being in one march of
fourteen miles. Many drain bridges were then also
prepared, and much metalling work completed. In
short, except the bridges over seven rivers, it was ex-
pected that ere June, 1848, the whole line of road from
Calcutta to Meerut would be quite ready. As it is,
travellers in carriages now (1847) go up and down for
eight months of the year, easily reaching Delhi and
Meerut from Calcutta in a fortnight.
During Lord Hardinge's Administration there was
very much discussion, especially in the south of India,
regarding interference with the religion of the natives.
At an early date the Governor-General made his stand.
By his own example encouraging the observance of the
Christian religion, he not only discountenanced inter-
ference with the rites of the Natives, but prohibited
Government officials from involving themselves directly
in schemes of conversion. By all legitimate means,
without interfering with the labour of the missionary,
he encouraged general education and the enlightenment
of the Native mind ; the rest he appears to have left to
God and to His appointed time.
The notification of October, 1846, prohibiting Sun-
day labour, is evidence of Lord Hardinge's sincerity,
and will be long remembered to his honour. Viewed
merely as a secular measure the good will be great. It
will be a check to many who, having little to do during
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HUMANIZING EFFORTS.
335
the week, from mere listlessness and carelessness, were
wont to desecrate the sabbath, or permit it to be dese-
crated by their subordinates. The Moslem and the
Hindoo, who worship after their own fashion, have now
some proof that the Christian respects the faith he pro-
On several occasions we have discussed the subjects
of infanticide and human sacrifice, and have now great
pleasure in recording Lord Hardinge's efforts to put
down these crimes as well as suttee and man-stealing.
During the year 1846-47 scarcely a month failed to
record some act of prohibition of one or other of these
crimes in the territories of protected chiefs, in Central
or Northern India. Several princes having come for-
ward and reported their desire to put an end to these
atrocities, it now rests with the paramount power to see
that these edicts be not infringed by present rulers
themselves or by their heirs. Where a prince reports
an edict of his own to the British Government, he
virtually calls on it to witness the act, and where he
swerves from such attested deed the least punishment
that is his due is an expression of the severe displeasure
of the Governor-General, which in most cases will have
the desired effect. The great gain to humanity of
recent measures will be better understood, when it is
considered that at the death of a petty chief, such as
the Eaja of Mundi near Simla, who holds a country
yielding scarcely £40,000 a-year, as many as a dozen
women had been incremated;* and that throughout
the Hindu States, up to the period of the recent pro-
hibitions, the point of honour had been for every widow
to immolate herself. The murder of Kqja Hira Singh,
* We have heard an officer assert, Rajas, that the average number of
who counted the figures on the se- victims was 45 ! — H. M. L.
pulchres at Mundi of the last ten
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336 LORD HARDINGE'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
at Lahore, involved the suttee of no less than twenty-
four helpless women, of whom two were his own wives,
and eight his slaves.*
The suppression of infanticide will be much more
difficult than that of suttee. In different quarters of
protected India, whole villages and tribes confess that
they have no daughters — declaring that such is the will
of God ; but, even in our own oldest provinces, it is by
no means certain that child-murder does not largely
prevail. The right course seems now being pursued to
eradicate this horrid system : — not by sweeping penal-
ties (carelessly or not at all carried out), but by watching
events, by instructing the people, and by discountenanc-
ing all who, having local influence, do not lend it in
support of humanity. In the Jullunder Doab, the
Bedis, descendants from Guru Nanuk, permitted no
female child to live, and throughout the Punjab they
shed blood almost with impunity. One of them, how-
ever, we observe, by the Delhi Gazette, has recently
been hanged at Lahore, for murdering his mother and
brothers, and from the day of the introduction of our
rule into the Jullunder, the Bedis have been given to
understand that they are subject to the law like other
people. When the Bedi of Oona, the head of their
" tribe of Levi," was told by the Commissioner that he
must forbid the crime within his extensive jaghir ; he
replied he could not, but that he would himself, by a
life of celibacy, support British views. Mr. Lawrence
told him that he must take his choice of obeying or
* In Major Broadfoot's despatch, phetic, their blessing eagerly sought
dated 26th September, 1845, pub- for, and their curses dreaded. De-
lished in the Punjab Blue Book, wan Dinanath, the Rani, the Maha-
reporting the death of Sirdar Jowa- raja, and others, prostrated them-
hir Singn and the burning of his selves before them, and obtained
four widows, it is stated, " Suttees their blessing. . . . The Suttees
are sacred, and receive worship ; blessed them, but cursed the Sikh
their last words are considered pro- Punt." — H. M. L.
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HUMANIZING EFFORTS. 887
of surrendering his lands ; he appears to have preferred
the latter alternative.
Child-stealing, and the selling of men, women, and
children, for purposes of slavery or prostitution, are
crimes — though still practised in British India, and most
common throughout Native States, — not sufficiently
considered in their frightful consequences. By recent
notifications we observe that child-stealing has been
made penal in the Punjab, and that the very name of
slave has been prohibited in the Gwalior territory.
These are wholesome effects of interference ; most hqjy
fruits of protection.
Attention thus excited towards suttee, infanticide,
and child-stealing, very slight efforts on the part of
Government and its officials will surely tend to eradi-
cate the crimes throughout the limits of Hindoostan.
Some few Hindus may pervert, or disregard their own
shasters ; but the more sacred and authoritative of
these writings in no way sanction suttee. We never
heard a Hindu pretend to prove that they did, and not
many months since a good Brahman emphatically told
the writer of these remarks, that in prohibiting infanti-
cide, we had compensated for permitting the crime of
cow-killing. Be it remembered that the majority of
Hindus consider a cow's life more sacred than that of
a man !
During the administrations of Lords Hardinge, Ellen-
borough, and Auckland, much anxiety was displayed to
put an end to the human sacrifices of the Khonds and
other wild tribes south-west of Calcutta. It has been
shown by the Calcutta Review that, among other recorded
atrocities, as many as twenty-five full grown persons
have been sacrificed at a single festival by the Khonds ;
that a caterer for such impious rites had pledged and
actually delivered up his own two daughters, for want
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338 LORD HARDINGE'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
of purchased offerings ; and that in some of the Khond
districts, those who could not procure other victims
gave up their old and helpless fathers and mothers to
he sacrificed."
The measures lately undertaken have been carried
out under the orders of the Deputy-Governor of Bengal,
under the general supervision of the Governor-General.
In all his communications on the subject, Lord Har-
dinge advocated the combination of energy with for-
bearance. It has been clearly demonstrated that mere
advice, or earnest remonstrances, or partial tokens of
favour, would not alone effect the humane purposes of
Government ; but it does not therefore follow that hang-
ing and destroying are to be advocated, or that we should
carry our measures at the point of the sword. This
would, in our opinion, rather retard civilization, would
drive the wild tribes into their wildest fastnesses, and
sooner extirpate the offenders than eradicate the offence.
Of the nature and extent of Captain Macpherson, the
Khond agent's, success, chiefly through his administra-
tion of justice, ample accounts have been furnished ; but
of Lord Hardinge's designs comparatively little is known.
Perceiving the utter impossibility of a single agent, how-
ever zealous and able, effecting much over 60,000 square
miles of wild mountain country, he suggested giving him
six European officers as coadjutors, each armed with full
powers to act, and each supported by three efficient
native assistants. Thus at a stroke was the machinery
to be increased eighteen - fold ! These European and
Native agents were to go among the Khonds as friends
and benefactors. They were to be authorized to make
them small presents, to advise and to consult with them,
to administer justice, and to explain that a merciful
God does not smile on murder, and that the blood of
human victims does not fertilize their fields, but that
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POST-OFFICE REFORM.
339
valleys, happier and richer than their own, as free from
famine and disease, are witnesses of no such detestable
rites. Failing by such means, we understand it to have
been Lord Hardinge's intention to have sanctioned all
possible measures short of devastation and spoliation ;
and we have little doubt that when mild measures, such
as those which have already been shown to have proved
so far successful, are thus energetically enforced, there
will be little need of recourse to the sword. But the
evils of centuries cannot be eradicated in a day, espe-
cially in a country whose climate is so deadly, that for
half the year few Indians, much less Europeans, can live.
If we have not yet (1847) obtained Post-Office reform,
it is assuredly not Lord Hardinge's fault. All his acts
prove him to be quite alive to the advantages of rapid
and cheap communication and exchange of opinion. We
understand that during the spring of 1847, he sent
home the Post-Office papers with a strong recommen-
dation that the suggestions of Mr. Eiddell, the Agra
Postmaster-General, should be sanctioned.
On the present system, there are two rates of postage
for newspapers ; two annas and three annas, according
to distance. Letters all pay according to distance and
weight ; a quarter tola, or one-fourth of a rupee, being
considered a single letter. These rules largely affect
the prices of the presidency newspapers in the Mofussil,
and enable all who wish to send small letters to club
together, and thus transmit a dozen advices or letters
by a single postage. It was soon ascertained that Na-
tives did so, and that merchants employed collectors
of these scraps of letters in different quarters, who on
salaries of five or six pounds a year collected and trans-
mitted letters at decimal rates, and in the same way re-
ceived packets containing bundles, the contents of which
they delivered according to their directions.
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340 LOUD HARDINGE's INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
The new rules were proposed to meet these difficul-
ties. A one-anna stamp was to pass newspapers from
one end of India to the other, and, though lightly taxing
Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras readers, would largely
benefit all Mofussil ones. Proprietors must benefit, as
the reduction would now induce many Mofussilites to
take daily papers. In regard to letters, one rate of half
an anna, or three farthings, was suggested for all dis-
tances, one-eighth of a tola (rupee) being, however, the
weight of a single letter, so that there could be little, if
any advantage, in an agency between the Government
and letter-writers and receivers. At present the north-
western provinces alone pay any postal revenue to Go-
vernment. The present income, we believe, is about
£10,000, but double that amount is swamped in the ex-
penses of the other presidencies, leaving a deficit of a
lakh of rupees on all India, which was expected to in-
crease to five, as the first effects of the new scheme. The
Post-Office revenue had, however, lately increased ten
per cent, per annum, and under such an impulse as was
proposed, letters and newspapers wrould vastly increase,
so that it was not too much to expect that eventually a
gain would be obtained instead of a loss incurred, by the
new arrangement, independent of Government packets
being carried free. Should, however, this hope be dis-
appointed, it would still be the interest as well as the
duty of Government to remodel the Post-Office establish-
ment. The whole system, especially in Bengal, is dis-
creditable to an enlightened Government. There is now
little or no check on the delivery of letters, and while the
post runs at the rate of ten miles an hour westward of
Benares, the letter-bags are still carried around Calcutta
on men's shoulders.
The inhabitants of Calcutta have reason long to re-
member Lord Hardinge's warm approval, in August,
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ABOLITION OP TRANSIT DUTIES.
341
1846, of the measures for the improvement of the Cal-
cutta conservancy. All such reforms have everywhere
obtained his support. But to a commercial people
perhaps his removal of all restrictions on trade is his
best recommendation. Throughout British India, trade
is now free, and even in almost every Native state the
worst restrictions have been removed. The town duties
not only of such places as Loodiana and Umballah have
been abolished, but those of Surat, yielding eleven lakhs
of rupees, have been released.*
No sooner was the J ullunder Doab annexed than all
transit and town duties were annulled, and those of the
Cis-Sutlej States soon followed. In Central India the
example has been followed, so that with exceptions, so
few as to be scarce worth mentioning, trade in India is
now taxed at single points on the great Customs line or
on the seaboard. In the north-western provinces the
said Customs line has been reduced from a double to a
single one ; would that the state of the exchequer per-
mitted its being altogether removed ! The Sutlej and
the Indus are now, in reality, free of imposts, to the sea;
and, under British influence, considerable reformation in
Customs' arrangements has been effected in the Punjab.
Cotton cultivation has not been neglected, and we un-
derstand that a full report on this important staple is
now before Government.
Lord Hardinge took great interest in the endeavours
for the cultivation of tea, and authorized its enthusiastic
promoter, Dr. Jameson, to commence plantations in dif-
ferent quarters of the lower Himalayas. The present
price that Indian tea fetches is an earnest that England
will be independent of China for this essential of English
* It is only fair to Sciy that the new arrangement was estimated at
Salt Tax was simultaneously in- four lakhs ; the duty levied on salt
creased at Surat, but the loss to Go- being seven, while the town duties
vernnient in that town alone by the removed were eleven. — H. M. L.
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342
LORD HARDINGE* S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
life, at least as soon as the Chinese can grow their own
opium.
Thus much has been done or laid in train during
Lord Hardinge's Administration of forty-two months.
His benefits to the Services have not been less real,
though not so apparent as those to the State.
In the first place, by reducing the expenditure within
the income, no retrenchment of salaries was made.
And no rational man can, for a moment, suppose that
England could continue to hold India at an annual loss
of a million and a half. As, then, it ifc not likely to
part with its brightest gem, sooner or later all servants
of the State must pay the penalty of undue expendi-
ture, be it on visionary schemes of war or of peace.
In this, then, Lord Hardinge deserved gratitude, that he
never wilfully allowed a rupee of public cash to be un-
necessarily expended : he closely scanned and jealously
scrutinized all attempts, however plausible, on the public
pocket ; and when he rewarded liberally, and freely
abandoned present profits, it was because he had sense
and far-sightedness enough to perceive that there is no
reaping without sowing, and that, in the end, it is
cheaper and better to pay well and to act liberally,
than by stinted measures to cramp zeal and retard
improvement.
But far more than in mere pecuniary matters are we
indebted to his lordship. The spirit of consideration
and kindliness that prevailed throughout his Admi-
nistration, not only to those around him and enjoying
his personal society, but to all officers of the State
with whom he had occasion to communicate, was of a
marked kind. Under Lord Hardinge there was no black-
balling of classes nor undue encouragement of others.
Men were judged by their own merits — due considera-
tion being paid to just recommendations, especially in
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CARE OF THE SOLDIERY.
343
favour of sons of meritorious officers. Himself a thorough
soldier, the Governor-Genera! always upheld the civil
authority as necessarily supreme, but he discouraged all
jealousies between civilians and soldiers, and taught that
each is most honoured in best fulfilling his duties.
All branches of the army, European and Native, were
indebted to him for distinct acts of favour.
To his advocacy, when Sccretary-at-War, several Com-
pany's officers are indebted for being aides-de-camp to
the Queen. And it is believed that he strove earnestly
to obtain for the army a senior list. The Company's
regiments in the three Presidencies are indebted to his
voice for their extra captains. Additional pensions
have, at his recommendation, been allowed to widows of
officers killed in action, and also to the heirs of native
officers.*
Free quarters have been allowed to all ranks at
Lahore; the families of European soldiers have been
allowed to join them, both in Scinde and the Punjab, a
measure that, considering Lord Hardinge's precise no-
tions on military questions, can only have been caused
by his strong desire to make the soldier as comfortable
as possible, since none more than himself saw the ob-
jections to crowding Kurrachee and Lahore with Euro-
pean women and children.
On the close of the war of sixty days, while the
treasury was still empty, a gratuity of twelve months'
batta was granted, not only to those who had been
actually under fire, but to all who had arrived at and
above Bussean by a certain day. For months of expo-
sure in Affghanistan and Burmah half this amount of
batta was granted !
* We presume that the gallant served, " The noble lord (Hardinge)
Lord Gough referred to this boon, had done much for the army ; both
when, in a parting speech at his own for the living and the dead — he had
hospitable table the night before made both more comfortable ! " —
Lord Hardinge left Simla, he ob- H. M. L.
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311 LORD HARDINGE'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
The European soldier's kit, by a general order of
February, 1 840, is now carried at the public expense :
the sanatarium of Dugshae and the barracks for Euro-
pean artillery at Subathu are the work of Lord Har-
dinge, in continuation of the best act of Lord Ellen-
borough's Administration.
The boons peculiarly affecting the Native soldier are
not fewer. The pension of sepoys disabled by wounds
in action has been largely increased ; in some cases from
one rupee eleven annas to four rupees, in others from
four to seven rupees per mensem. By an order of 12th
February, 1846, the benefit of these pensions was ex-
tended to sepoys of local corps.*
By Government orders of 15th August, 1845, the
long-vexed and dangerous question of Scinde pay was
decided, and troops in that province were put on a foot-
ing with those in Arracan. In February, 1846, the
same rates were granted in the Punjab.
Hutting money was allowed to the whole Native
army by Government orders of August 15, 1845, and
on the same date an order was issued authorizing sepoys
to put in plaints in all the civil courts on unstamped
paper, f
Sepoys wounded in the battles of the Sutlej received
rations gratis while in hospital, and when scurvy broke
* Pity it is that these corps which, proper footing. We have heard that
as in the cases of the Nusseri and on an occasion of reviewing one of
Sirmur Battalion, were present at the Gurkha Corps, Lord Hardinge
Bhurtpur and during the Sikh cam- asked a zealous Hibernian officer
paign, are not called " Irregulars,11 in- how it was the men were so small,
stead of being misnamed " Locals,11 " They get such small pay," was the
and accordingly underpaid. They answer. We presume he meant to
would to a man volunteer for general say that higher rates would obtain
service, and having little fellow-feel- finer men.— -H. M. L.
ing with our sepoys, and few preju- t We should have preferred to
dices, would bo invaluable light have seen the sepoys hutted, or ra-
troops. We feel satisfied that their ther barracked, by Government. The
case could never have been lightly present system of hutting is inju-
brought before Lord Hardinge, or rious to discipline, and might, with-
that he would have put them on a out difficulty, be improved. — H.M.L.
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HIS CARE OP THE ARMY.
345
out among the wounded Europeans, the Governor-
General's own state tents were instantly pitched for the
accommodation of a portion, and he constantly visited
both Europeans and natives, talking to the former, and
expressing his commiseration of the sufferings of all.
These are some among the many benefits conferred
by Lord Hardinge on the army of India. As already
observed, Sir Kobert Peel gave testimony in Parliament
that he was regarded by .the army of England as its
friend, " because he was the friend of justice to all ranks
of that army!' He has, at least, equal claims on the army
of India, where he was equally the friend of the sentinel,
the subaltern, and the veteran. He equally sought the
welfare, the happiness of all. Before he had put foot in
the East, he had advocated the interests of its exiles ;
and when he had shared in their dangers, and partaken
of their honours, — when his name was for ever connected
with the glories of Mudki, Ferozeshah, and Sobraon,
history delighted to designate him, like his illustrious
Captain, a " Sepoy General/' His interests and theirs
became one ; his honours had been won by the Indian
army, and on a hundred occasions he bore testimony to
the merits of that army, and he will doubtless always be
esteemed among its warmest friends.*
Though thoroughly a utilitarian, Lord Hardinge
was possessed of a fine taste, and was fully alive to the
beauties of art. When in Paris he refused to touch a
picture from among the master-pieces in St. Cloud, as
he would not set an example of spoliation; but he
carried to England purchased specimens of art and
* The essayist here added : — " We vernnient that, much as it is the
may venture to remind him that interest of their servants to be per-
much is expected at his hands ; and mitted to visit England, it is im-
first and foremost it is confidently measurably more that of their mas-
hoped that his voice will advocate ters to induce them periodically to
the furlough memorial, if indeed he go there."
has not yet satisfied the home Go-
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346 LORD HARDINGE's INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
nature from every corner of India. During his resi-
dence, he encouraged the preservation and repair of the
Eastern architecture around him. On the occasion of
his visit to Agra in October, 1845, he frequently visited
the Taj Mahal, the fort, and the palace. Finding that
some of the large slabs of stone from the palace had
been removed, and that the marble railing was lying
ruined and unfixed, and the whole place much out of
repair, he reprehended such desecration, ordered the
pavement to be restored, and the injuries to be repaired.
After causing every enquiry to be made to ascertain the
original design of the Kutub Minar at Delhi, and finding
that neither descriptions nor old drawings gave any au-
thority for the grotesque ornament placed on its summit
by Colonel Smith, Lord Hardinge directed its removal.
To the Archaeological Society of Delhi, instituted
mainly for the purpose of exploring the various ruins of
India, Lord Hardinge afforded his encouragement and
assistance, and placed at their disposal the services of
any officer distinguished for his skill as a draughtsman.
The revenue survey of the Jullunder and Cis-Sutlej
States was nearly completed in Lord Hardinge s time ;
others in Kajputana and Central India being set on
foot ; and no sooner did Mr. Thomason, the able Lieu-
tenant-Governor of Agra, project a college of instruction
for civil engineers at Kurki, near the head of the Ganges
canal, than the scheme was sanctioned, and an excellent
officer of the engineer corps, Lieutenant MacLagan,
placed at his disposal as its principal. As sanctioned
by the Grovernor-Creneral, the grand trigonometrical
survey will also soon be extending its operations into
Cashmere and to the banks of the Indus.
Thus in no department are we aware that Lord
Hardinge was found wanting to the extent of his oppor-
tunities and the means at his disposal. He carried on
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HIS OUDE POLICY.
347
wax in all its details, like a thorough soldier, and in all
points encouraged the arts of peace, like a practised and
far-sighted statesman.
His last public movement was a vice-regal visit to
Lucknow. The public had been for months on tiptoe
at the prospect of annexation, though the whole tenor
of Lord Hardinge's career might have satisfied people,
not only that he would not at the last stage of his
career open a new and wide field of diplomacy, but that
under my circumstances, and at any time, he would not
annex Oude to India in the manner many desired to do.
Our opinions regarding the great Indian "difficulty"
are unchanged since, in a previous essay, we propounded
what might honestly and with advantage to all parties
be done for Oude.
Indian officials cannot be too careful to read treaties
in their spirit as well as in their letter; lest it be
thought that, like the Romans of old, we diplomatize
only to deceive, — that our pacifications are only truces.
We should not only disdain such practices, but prove
to the world that we do so.
Premising thus much, we would ask those honest and
able men who advocate the annexation of Oude if, in
their opinion, the treaties with either Oude or Hyder-
abad contemplated our ever obtaining another rupee
from those countries? If such be the case, on what
possible plea can we take to ourselves territories, be-
cause they are mismanaged, more especially when there
is no concealing from ourselves that much, if not all, of
this mismanagement, has been caused by our own mea-
sures. No ; if mistakes have been made, let them be
honestly amended, as they would be with Burdwan or
with Betteah, or with any other private estate. Appro-
priation is no more the remedy for the mischiefs of a
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313
LORD HARDIKUe's INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
principality than of a zemindary. We must abide by our
treaties, public as well as private, whatever be the incon-
venience. If Oude and Hyderabad affairs are really as
disordered as they are declared to be, let us by all
means temporarily, or, if need be, permanently assume
the management of part or all, but justice and the faith
of treaties forbid the appropriation of a rupee of their
revenue to the general purposes of the Indian Govern-
ment. It will be a reward, ample and sufficient, to re-
cover large tracts from anarchy, and to bring under our
influence a numerous population with whom our only
connection can be that of paternal protection. Twenty
or fifty lakhs of revenue will not increase our strength
so much as may the love and gratitude of people thus
rescued from oppression. Above all, we shall have pre-
served our reputation for justice and good faith — we
shall still be recognized as the reverers of treaties.
As the time for delivering over his charge drew near,
Lord Hardinge became restless and impatient. We
have heard him likened to a schoolboy on the approach
of holidays. He now counted the days till his release.
And can it be wondered that, at his age, after an ab-
sence from his family approaching to four years, and
borne down with such labour as at any period of life is
scarcely endurable, his heart should have bounded at the
prospect of release — of return to domestic happiness.
The bare perusal of our faint description of Lord Har-
dinge's Indian career may enable the reader to judge of
a Governor-General's labours. Petitions and appeals;
every measure military, political, or civil ; every arrange-
ment, medical, scientific, police, or revenue, with the
hundred miscellaneous matters of the three Presidencies,
are all liable to be referred for his decision. The re-
sponsibility and anxious thought, the amount of bu-
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HIS CHARACTER.
349
siness and of office work which it entails, is almost
beyond belief, and is to be surmounted only by ability,
method, punctuality, and great industry.
In these attributes and in sound good sense, in quick
perception, in judgment, in resource, and in calm prompt
courage, we believe Lord Hardinge to have been excelled
by few men. His memory was good, though not exact,
vividly remembering facts and general circumstances
though not particular words. He seldom forgot faces,
even though names escaped his recollection.
Among other qualities, eminently useful in his high
station, by which the Governor-General was distin-
guished, one of the most marked was his tact and ma-
nagement of men's minds, in soothing animosities, re-
conciling adverse spirits; and when differences proved
irreconcilable, in conciliating to himself the good will
of both the contending parties. Contrary to a practice
too common in India, Lord Hardinge may be said to
have been on excellent terms with almost every indivi-
dual with whom he had to transact business. He ex-
pected every man to do his duty conscientiously, yet in
marking his disapprobation of neglect or slackness, his
manner was so kindly, gentlemanlike, and consistent
as seldom to give offence. Many difficult questions
were offered for his solution ; and his arbitration was
demanded even in personal quarrels.
Nor was Lord Hardinge's career less marked by mo-
deration, we might almost say, by modesty, in his public
as well as in his private capacity. The unassuming
general order directing the proud march of the captured
Sikh ordnance to Calcutta, when contrasted with the
" Song of Triumph/' which heralded the return of the
gates of Somnath to Hindoostan, might be adduced in
illustration of the former ; and the latter was most con-
spicuous in the quiet and unpretending style in which
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350 LORD HARDINGE's INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
he travelled, and which marked his daily rides. Lord
W. Bentinck himself was not more unostentatious ; and
often, even when in the neighbourhood of the enemy,
Lord Hardinge might have been observed riding about
with a single attendant.
His habits were abstemious and regular. He was
liberal in his hospitality; no day passed in which
visitors did not sit at his excellent board ; and twice or
thrice a week large parties were given, to which all
strangers were invited. He was at first surprised at the
independence of the Indian service, but freedom of
opinion when allied to due subordination was too eon-
genial to his nature to win disapproval. We have said
that Lord Hardinge was considerate and kind, and we
repeat that he was so to all, whether distant or around
him. His letters and orders were always courteous and
gentlemanlike; never betraying anger, or forgetfulness
that those addressed were gentlemen, and that even if
wrong in particular cases their motives may have been
right, or that their previous services may have deserved
well of the head of the Government. All this is unde-
niable, but we fear it is equally true, that many who
partook of Lord Hardinge's hospitality left his house
annoyed rather than pleased. They considered them-
selves intentionally slighted, because the Grovernor-
General had not separately addressed his conversation
to them. Wounded vanity is hard to deal with, and
we believe that had Lord Hardinge been able more
frequently to divert his mind from cares of State to
the frivolities around him, he would have been what is
called a more popular man. On our own experience we
can testify to his desire to be affable and attentive to
his visitors. He was always indignant if his staff ap-
peared to fail in their duty to guests ; but it was not
always easy for an elderly man, worn down with labour
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HIS CHARACTER.
351
from early dawn, to remember the especial case of every
pompous field officer or self-complacent civilian. To
take wine and say a civil nothing was seldom omitted,
but the special remembrance of each individual's peculiar
case was often wanting. This we know gave offence,
especially to those who, having applied for private au-
diences, were refused them, but invited to dinner.
This refusal of audiences also offended many. Lord
Auckland gave them, but regretted it, and recommended
Lord EUenborough not to do so; but his Lordship
was more ready of speech and more at home at a levee
or an evening party than was Lord Hardinge. We
are, however, of opinion that both were quite right.
Audiences waste much time : they give advantages only
to the forward and presuming and to parasites of the
Presidency and Simla. Every man can tell his story by
letter or viva voce to the Private Secretary. If there is
much in him, it will not require an audience to elicit it ;
his name, character, and particular merits are better
known at Army and Government head-quarters than in
any other service in the world, and Lord Hardinge was
the last man in the world to intentionally neglect an
individual, high or low, who had in any manner, by
courage or by ability, distinguished himself ; indeed, by
his hearty and cordial converse, he soon won his way to
such mens hearts.*
In Europe, Lord Hardinge s duties required the
smallest modicum of official correspondence, and up to
his sixtieth year he had little or no practice in writing ;
but restricting himself in his minutes, memoranda, and
letters, as in his speeches, to facts, and attempting no
* What we have stated relates who have worthy objects to promote,
more especially to all cases of appli- unconnected with any of the regular
cation for private interview, with services, a relaxation of the rule,
reference to the obtainment of per- under proper restrictions, might be
sonal favours, connected with any of at once politic and beneficial. —
the services. As regards individuals, H. M. L.
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852 LORD HARDINGK's INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
sort of display, the products of his pen may be placed
without disparagement by the side of those of any
statesman of his day. Clear and distinct in his percep-
tions, he has always desired to master every subject
before him, and would never be satisfied with slurring
over questions imposing even the necessity of perusing
voluminous papers on matters often affecting only the
particular interests of an humble individual, but which
he perceived did involve a principle.
This was a notable and a valuable feature in his
character. He took large views of all questions. He
saw them as Governor-General ; looked on them from
the arena of Europe, as affecting England as well as
India, and not as referring to a particular class. Such
men are needed for this country, and it is on this
account we consider that, as a general question, India
can be best supplied with Governors-General from the
British -senate. Large and enlightened views, influ-
enced but not warped by local experience, with ability,
is what is wanted in India. The due admixture of
European and Native talent is one great secret of good
Government; a no less one is the introduction in all
places of fresh minds and fresh talent from the mother
country.
Because Lord Hardinge was always cordial and kind
to his secretaries, some have jumped at the conclusion
that he was unduly influenced by them. Far otherwise.
He was ready to hear the opinion of every man who
had a right to give one. But no Governor-General ever
more decidedly took his own line, and chalked out his
own course, than did Lord Hardinge. He is under-
stood to have usually drafted most of his own official
letters of importance, as indeed seems to have been the
practice with Lord Ellenborough, and many of his
predecessors. Lord Hardinge' s quick perception at
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HIS HABITS OF BUSINESS.
353
sixty enabled him readily to master matters to which
his previous habits had been alien, and to which he had
before paid little attention ; moreover, his experience
on the stage of Europe enabled him often to throw new
lights on the most abstruse Indian subjects.
Accustomed, as a constant attendant, for twenty
years, of Parliament, to turn night into day, he found
no difficulty in reconciling himself to Indian habits,
and not only to be stirring with the dawn, but as an
almost general rule to be at work one, two, and three
hours before daylight. It was this practice that enabled
him to get through so much business and to appear
more or less at leisure during the day. On an average,
however, he could not have worked less than ten hours
a day.
He was regular in his rides and walks, and took much
exercise ; pacing his room or verandah he would discuss
questions of interest with his advisers and secretaries,
and often with chance visitors, or those he met on the
road. Many of the younger as well as older members
of the service, in no way connected with his own staff,
have thus been honoured with his cordial and even
familiar conversation on the most interesting European
as well as Asiatic questions, and it was thus he elicited
opinions on Indian subjects, and obtained an insight
into the characters and merits of individuals. On such
occasions, it was no uncommon speech for him to make.
— " So-and-so must be a fine fellow, every one speaks
well of him;" or "It must be true, or some one would
say a word in his flavour."
Much has been said and even written of Lord Har-
dinge's dispensation of patronage. We are among
those who believe that the last four Governors-General
all dispensed theirs with scrupulous honesty ; none more
so than Lord Hardinge. Like other mortals he has
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854 LORD HARDINGE's INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
erred, but his nominations have been made carefully and
with perfect good faith. As in duty bound he has con-
sidered recommendations from the Court of Directors,
where they were in behalf of deserving individuals, in
the same way that he has recognized the superior claims
of the sons of distinguished officers ; but in the whole
circuit of his appointments we know scarcely an instance
of his putting a man into a wrong place, and not one of
his wilfully doing so.
We happen to be able to narrate the real circum-
stances of four of his most important nominations;
two of which were at one time unreasonably arraigned.
Lord Hardinge may have originally thought that
there was one other officer in the army who would have
made a better Adjutant-General than Colonel Grant,
but he considered his strong claims, his long depart-
mental experience, his excellent business habits, his
recent gallant services in the field, his severe wound,
and last, perhaps not least, — but by no means the ground
of the appointment as some would say — his connection
with the brave Lord Gough, and confirmed him in the
appointment in which he had officiated throughout the
war. We know that he is now perfectly satisfied with
the choice he made, and we are not sure that if he had
to choose again he would not give the first, instead of
the second place to Grant.
Mr. John Lawrence was known throughout the Ben*
gal Presidency as a practical, clear-headed, and energetic
officer, who had for years, as magistrate of the turbulent
city of Delhi, enjoyed the confidence of all ranks.
When passing through Pelhi, the Governor-General
admired his bold, frank manner, and was pleased with
his activity in forwarding supplies, carriage and stores
to the army, as well as with the cheerftd, manly tone
of his conversation and correspondence. Before Colonel
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HIS PATRONAGE.
355
Lawrence's arrival on the frontier, Mr. John Lawrence
was acordingly sent for to be employed in a judicial
capacity in the Cis-Sutlej States ; but the Lieutenant-
Governor, remarking that he could not be spared at
such a time from Delhi, sent up another civilian, who
was considered a good judicial officer. Some disappoint-
ment and even disapprobation was expressed at what
Mr. Thomason had done ; and when, at the expiration
of the war, a commissioner was required for the Jul-
lunder Doab, Lord Hardinge again selected him, and
has assuredly had no reason to regret his choice ; nor
has a single voice ever pretended to assert that he has
failed in his duties, while those who know him say there
are few better civil administrators in India, No man is
more satisfied of this than Mr. Thomason.
Colonel Gouldie is our third instance. We doubt if
the Governor-General had seen him twice when he
made him Auditor-General of the Bengal army.
Colonel Gouldie had been for many years a pension
paymaster, and had acquired a high character as a
man of business. He joined the army, and was found
to be a good soldier, a shrewd, sensible man, however
employed. This Lord Hardinge ascertained from va-
rious sources. We have it from an honourable man
that he was casually asked by Lord Hardinge what was
Colonel Gouldie's character, and that when he answered
favourably, his lordship replied, "that is much what
Colonel and Major said," mentioning per-
sons equally unconnected as our informant with Colonel
Gouldie. At the time we refer to, Lord Hardinge had
recommended Gouldie to the Court of Directors for the
appointment ; though some months later, when he was
sent for to be told of his selection, he had not the
slightest idea of the purpose for which his presence was
required.
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350 LORD HARDINGE's INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
In the same manner Mr. H. M. Elliot was selected
as Secretary to Government in the foreign department.
For a whole year preceding the vacancy, Lord Har-
dinge would ask, in conversation, all sorts and degrees
of persons as to Mr. Elliot's character and ability.
Thus, without — as far as we are aware — ever having
seen him, he selected the man whom the voice of the
services voted the best qualified for this important
ministerial office.
We might adduce a dozen other instances equally
to the point. Every man cannot have his wishes, nor
perhaps all his deserts; but it may be fairly asked,
where was the high influence, or what is called the
interest, of Littler, Currie, Elliot, the three Lawrences,
Thoresby, Wheeler, Campbell, Mackeson, MacGregor,
Birch, Colvin, Sage,* Benson, Gouldie, Edwardes, the
four Abbotts, the Bechers, Lumsden, Holmes, Napier,
MacLagan, Taylor, Beadon, and a host of others whose
names Lord Hardinge probably never heard of before
he reached India ; before they approached him officially,
or were presented to his notice as suited to certain
offices ?
Although we have already exceeded the limits usually
allowed to a single paper in a Review, we must not
altogether omit mention of the cordial reception given
to Lord Hardinge by all ranks of the community of
Calcutta on his Lordship's return from the North-
West Provinces. Commendatory and congratulatory
addresses poured in on him, and the warm expressions
of the commercial, civil, clerical, and military commu-
nity of the metropolis of - India, will be found not only
* We readily bear our testimony likely to be remedied by the Military
to Colonel Sage's zeal and ability, we Board, working tcith and through
wish we could add to his urbanity Executive Engineers, than by irri-
and considerateness. There are tating a body of zealous and ho-
many abuses in the Department of nourable officers. — H. M. L.
Public Works, but they are more
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CONGRATULATORY ADDRESSES.
357
to bear out the anticipations with which we opened this
essay, but our own statements may 'possibly appear
cold and heartless when contrasted with the glowing
and affectionate terms in which they recorded their
sentiments.
At the meeting of the inhabitants of Calcutta at the
Town Hall on the 24th of December, a letter from the
Bishop was read by the Chairman, regretting that in-
disposition prevented him from attending the meeting,
and in warm and energetic terms proposing that a statue
be voted to the retiring Governor-General, towards the
expense of which the writer expressed himself ready
to subscribe £200. We can only find space for the
following portion of the letter : —
" To no one of our greatest Governor-Generals was such a task assigned
by Providence, as was allotted to Lord Hardinge. His victories at the
moment of conflict were only equalled by his discretion in avoiding all
previous causes of irritation, and by his moderation and wisdom in the use
of his success.
" None of our bravest Governors had the happiness of conveying, and
at once, to a fierce and tumultuous population, such wide-spread blessings,
social and moral, as the Punjab has already received.
" Nor can I forget the other services of my Lord Hardinge, the honour
he has shown to the Christian religion on all occasions, his prohibition of
the continuance of public works on the Lord's Day, his encouragement of
Col. Lawrence's Benevolent Asylum at Kussowli, and the impulse he has
given to public education by instituting periodical examinations into the
learning and good morals of the candidates for employment. In fact, Lord
Hardinge has crowded into one short administration all the services of the
highest order, both military and civil, which have commonly been divided
amongst several much longer ones."
Several Natives took the opportunity at this meet-
ing, in enthusiastic terms, to express their gratitude
to Lord Hardinge for the benefits he had conferred
on India, and, entirely approving of the address, as
far as it went, proposed to add to it the following
paragraph : —
" We cannot, on the occasion of your Lordship's departure, refrain from
expressing our grateful admiration of the lustre which your beneficent
policy in the encouragement of education, your resolute adherence to
peace until war became inevitable, and your paternal solicitude for the
welfare of the people entrusted to your charge, have shed on your admi-
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358 LORD HARDINGE'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
nistration. Brief as your sojourn has been, you have represented the high-
minded benignity of the British sceptre no less than its maiestic splendour,
the peaceful virtues of the Christian statesman no less than the indomi-
table courage of the British warrior, the humanizing influences of British
ascendancy no less than the invincible force of British arms."
Some discussion ensued, the only difference of opinion
being as to whether the sense of the proposed addi-
tional paragraph was not expressed in the address
already prepared. With the consent of all parties, it
was finally determined to insert a few words, exhibit-
ing the purport of the amendment in the original
address. We give the document in full as presented
on the 28th, placing the additional paragraph between
brackets : —
" To the Right Honourable Lord Viscount Hardinge, G. C. B.,
&c, &c., &c.
"My Lord,
" The inhabitants of Calcutta addressed your Lordship on the occasion
of your return to the Presidency, and declared their sense of the dis-
tinguished services rendered by you to this country. In acknowledging
that address your Lordship expressed your conviction, that a pacific course
was the one best calculated to promote the honour and interests of Great
Britain and the welfare of the people of India. We feel that in this belief
your Lordship commenced your administration, and that it influenced you
until war became the necessity of self-defence. We can desire no happier
future for India and England than that this sentiment should prevail with
our rulers, and no more glorious achievements, when forced into the field,
than those which, under Divine Providence, have won imperishable honour
for our arms on the banks of the Sutlei.
" We cannot permit your Lordship to lay down the high office of Governor-
General of India, and quit these shores, without repeating our admiration
of your distinguished career. History perpetuates the memory of great
public benefactors, and its pages, which have already recorded your Lord-
ship's early services to your country, on the most desperate field of modern
times, will glow with the brilliant addition made to tnem after an interval
of thirty-six years, the greater portion of which has been subject to the
ordeal of public life.
" [In the same pages, and in the traditions of a grateful people, will live
the recollection of the wise measures by which you have encouraged educa-
tion, and contributed to the permanent improvement and happiness of
those committed to your charge.]
" We desire, my Lord, to have and preserve in Calcutta some personal
memorial of one who has received the highest honours from his Sovereign,
and the thanks of his countrymen, while ruling this great empire : we
desire it, my Lord, as a testimony of our respect for your private and ad-
miration of your public character, and as a legacy of deep interest to those
who will come after us.
"We have, therefore, to ask that your Lordship will permit a committee
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CONGRATULATORY ADDRESSES.
359
to place itself in communication with you for the purpose of carrying out
the object we have in view, and it remains for us only to bid your Lord-
ship farewell, and to convey to you our earnest hope that it may please the
Almighty to bless you with years of health and strength, to enjoy the
honours you have nobly won, and to deserve yet further the gratitude of
your country, by enforcing in the Senate that principle of enlightened rule
which recognizes peace as the surest guarantee for the prosperity and hap-
piness of mankind."
In an appropriate and feeling reply, Lord Hardin ge
expressed his gratification at the handsome testimony
of the approbation and personal regard of the inhabi-
tants of Calcutta, and in the course of his speech thus
gracefully recommended cordiality and unanimity be-
tween the two great classes of the community : —
" It is also very flattering to me to observe that this address has been
agreed to by the united voice of the European and Native inhabitants of
this great city, the capital of Her Majesty's Eastern Empire ; and I may
allude to this fact, because I am impressed with the belief that the happi-
ness of the Native population depends upon the existence of a thorough
identity of interests among all classes of the community. By the en-
couragement of such a feeling, our power will be more firmly consolidated,
our national character more pre-eminently exalted, and our influence more
beneficially exercised in promoting the prosperity of British India."
The Friend of India, of the 30th of December, in
echoing the sentiments of the community at large, thus
concludes an elaborate notice of Lord Hardinge's ad-
ministration : —
"But we must draw this lengthened sketch of Lord Hardinge's career
to a close. His brief administration has been crowded with events of the
deepest interest and importance. To it appertains the distinguished honour
of having extinguished: the last enemy left to us between the Himalaya
and Cape Comorin, and removed the apprehension of future hostilities.
Though his Lordship has been engaged in large military enterprises which
have terminated in making the will of the British Government as para-
mount in Peshawur, as it is in Jessore, no one has dreamt of threatening
him with a Parliamentary inquiry. His measures have been characterised
by so much justice and moderation as well as vigour, that although they
have resulted! in an extension of territory and influence which Lord
Ellenborough himself might have envied, he has not roused the outcry of
party hostility. He has reduced the numerical strength of the army
without weakening our means of defence ; and he delivers the empire to
his successor with an excess of income over expenditure, and in a state of
such tranquillity as to inspire the hope of large resources for the future
triumphs of peace."
Before his departure, Lord Hardinge must also
have received the reports of the speeches made at the
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LORD HARDINGK's INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
parting dinner given by the Court of Directors to Lord
Dalhousie, and in them had an earnest of the greeting
that awaited him in England. On the occasion referred
to, the Premier of England, addressing ttie Governor-
General elect, expressed his conviction " that he would
show, as his immediate predecessor, Lord Hardinge,
had shown, that resolution in administering justice, for-
bearance towards all neighbours and foreign powers,
attention to the arts of peace, and sedulous care for
the improvement of the internal condition of India,
which are compatible with the utmost spirit, the utmost
courage in repelling any aggression that may be made
— meeting and conquering those who choose to con-
stitute themselves the foes of the British empire in
India."
The Chairman of the Court of Directors, himself a
distinguished member of the Bengal Civil Service,* at
the same dinner, when proposing the health of Lord
Hardinge, eulogized him no less than Lord John Rus-
sell had done.
Thus, amid the plaudits of the people whom he had
ruled, and already stamped by the approbation of the
home authorities, closed the administration of Lord
Hardinge.
We bid adieu to his Lordship with every hearty
good wish. He found India held by a discontented
army, threatened by invasion, and almost bankrupt.
He, in all senses, righted the vessel, restored confidence
to our ranks, to our allies, and our dependants ; reple-
nished the public purse, tranquillized the frontier, and
brought peace and security to the long distracted Pun-
jab. He had his reward ; but the title and the pension
which he earned were but a small portion of his recom-
pense. His best reward was in the conviction of his
* Mr. Henry St. George Tucker.
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HIS DEPARTURE FROM INDIA.
361
own noble heart that he had honestly and bravely done
his duty ; that he left behind him more than a hundred
millions whom he had largely blessed by enlightened
and just measures ; and that, returning to his native
land, he was regretted by those he left behind, and
warmly welcomed by men of every shade of opinion,
as the pacific warrior, the happy statesman; the man
who, in reality, "brought peace to Asia!"
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THE INDIAN ARMY.
[written in 1855-56.]
Recent discussions and events have proved, to the
dullest understanding, the necessity of military reform
throughout the British army. The evidence before the
East India Committee, the Report of the Promotion
Commissioners, and, finally, Roebuck's Crimea Report,
have laid bare deficiencies, and shown that, with the
best physical and moral materials in the world, with the
bravest and the strongest men, the most chivalrous
officers, and the largest resources of any nation, ancient
or modern, Great Britain is wanting in almost all the
requisites of an efficient army. Our meaning is well
expressed by a friendly critic, Baron Bazancourt, in his
" Five Months in the Camp before Sebastopol :" —
" The English, those soldiers whom it is impossible to disturb in the
midst of the battle, those human walls which may be pierced by the
heavy fire of the enemy, but never beaten down, experienced a great mis-
fortune at the commencement of the expedition. A defective internal
administration decimated their forces more effectually than war. There
was amongst them an amount of demoralization of which I cannot give
the terrible account. The soldiers lay down before their huts looking sad,
sullen, and exhausted. The horses died by hundreds. Inkerman had
decapitated the head of the army. The vice of an improvident organiza-
tion devoured the rest. It is the war in Africa which has preserved us.
We owe our safety to our habits of encamping, and to our expeditions
into the interior of countries. The necessity thus incurred of making
provision for the smallest details, has been of the greatest utility to us in
the Crimea."
India is England's Africa, if she knew how to avail
herself of its opportunities. But such is not the case.
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DEFICIENT MILITARY ORGANIZATION. 363
Here we have our camp life, and our expeditions ; how
many benefit thereby ? Hundreds of officers, especially
of the royal army in India, with every opportunity, go
through their career, live and die, in the most child-like
helplessness. They have no object, or at least the very
smallest, to a worldly mind, for exertion. They are ac-
customed to have everything done for them. To be fed,
clothed, barracked, encamped, all without a thought on
their part ; when, therefore, a necessity for using their
senses arises, they are like babes. All goes wrong.
European soldiers are exposed in long useless marches,
in the hottest months, are paraded and sometimes even
made to march during those months in full dress cloth
clothes. Sepoys, in their lines, are equally ill dealt with.
Much hardship, and even many deaths, are the result.
A good, deal has been done to remedy the most glaring
evils. Reform is afoot : but after a hundred years' ex-
perience of Indian warfare we are still nearer the ABC
than the Z of a sound, practical, military administration.
We neither clothe nor arm our troops according to com-
mon sense. They are not even rationally fed. The
sepoy is perhaps the best paid soldier in the world, and,
the large majority of them, the worst fed. The Euro-
pean is at times too highly fed. Eating and drinking,
rather than heat or cold, send him to his grave. In the
matter of finance, thousands are spent uselessly to-day ;
lives are sacrificed to-morrow to save a few rupees. We
might interminably run on and offer scores of examples ;
mortality-bills and bills of expenditure. At present we
can only glance at the bare facts. There notorieties
need no examples for Indian readers.
The startling disclosures of the Times' correspondent,
and of the Crimea Commission, for a time turned attention
to India ; and the Press, usually little prone to do justice
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364
THE INDIAN ARMY.
to the Indian army, all at once found a panacea for all
Crimean and home shortcomings in Indian officers and
Indian arrangements. East India Company's servants
at once rose to as undue a premium as they had shortly
before been, and are already again, at an unfair discount.
A Bengal civilian was offered the post of Commissioner
in the Crimea Commissariat inquiry, and the same able
and energetic gentleman might have been the superin-
tendent of the Smyrna Hospital. Indian contingents
were called for. Certain leaders of public opinion would
have sent elderly subadars and sepoys to the Caucasus,
or the Crimea ; and some would have done still worse,
and have transferred bodily many of our European
battalions from India to the seat of war. Even our
hitherto very worst department, the commissariat, was
suddenly, and for the nonce, trumpeted into fame, and
it required Sir Charles Trevelyan's personal knowledge
and matter-of-fact evidence to convince the British
public that they would not gain by superseding Mr.
Filder by one of Jotee Pershad's proteges. The names
of some excellent soldiers were introduced into the dis-
cussions. Cheape, Steel, Stalker, Edwardes, Mayne, and
Chamberlain obtained due praise; some others more
than due. But the hot fit passed. India is again for-
gotten. Another Cabul, or another Sebastopol, is re-
quired to remind England of India's existence. In the
interim, out of the 6215 officers of the Indian army,
two or three dozen, some good and many bad, have been
permitted to take part in the great European struggle,
although there are scores, nay hundreds, of the best
who would gladly join, and who might, under proper
arrangements, be temporarily spared. We fear that the
chief permanent result will be a considerable increase to
our present stock of self-conceit. We forget that, on a
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INDIAN
SHORTCOMINGS.
3G5
small scale, we have had our own Balaklava and our own
Scutari a dozen times over ; and that from the days of
Hyder Ali down to those of Akbar Khan, Providence
only has saved our armies from destruction by hunger
and thirst as well as by the sword. The exposures by
the Press of incompetency, neglect, and cruelty in the
Crimea, have done good. The eyes of England being
on the hospitals, the harbours, the tents, and the
bivouacs of the army, it will hardly again be exposed
to the scenes of 1854 and 1855, that struck so much
horror into every British heart. To have got rid of the
fine gentlemen who do not like real soldiering, is itself a
gain. To have obtained a commander possessed of phy-
sical strength, is a greater.
We are by no means so certain of the good effect of
English discussions on Indian affairs. The gross igno-
rance with which everything Indian is discussed in
England is well exemplified in the mention, during
these discussions, of Brigadier Mayne. Few Indian
officers have been more before the public, during the
last fifteen years, than Mayne. Yet the Press, while
lauding his military qualities, must needs dilate on his
experience with wild tribes, and in raising irregular
levies; the fact being, that he never raised a single
troop or company, and that $11 his experience has been
with as civilized soldiers as any in India.
But to our subject — the Indian army. Both the
writers, whose historical works are professedly reviewed
in this article, go over the same ground — the British
conquest of India, from the earliest days down to the
settlement of the Punjab. Mr. St. John chiefly sketches
political, while Captain Eafter restricts himself to mili-
tary events. Both praise the army and, in the main,
the Government of India; but while Captain Eafter
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866
THE INDIAN ARMY.
(a nom de guerre, we presume *) would knock away the
" twenty-four stools " that have worked out tlie present
glorious consummation, Mr. St. John, more logically,
advocates the maintenance of a system which, in his
opinion, has worked so well.
Captain Kafter professes to have been in India, but it
would be difficult to elicit the fact from his book. Both
writers have evidently crammed, with the purpose of
cramming their readers. Country gentlemen and mem-
bers of Parliament will accordingly be as often misled
as instructed when they seek for information on contro-
verted subjects from their pages. The old jog-trot is
followed. There is no original information, and little
of any sort in either book but what is superficial.
Captain Bafters book, though dedicated to Lord Gough,
omits the battles of Eamnugger and Sadoolapore, and
makes Agnew and Anderson retire to " a small fort out-
side the town " after the treacherous attack on them at
Mooltan. Neither writer has gone much further for his
facts than Mill, Wilson, Thornton, Malcolm, and Orme.
Captain Baffcer seems never to have heard of Williams,
Broome, Buckle, or Begbie ; nor is Mr. St. John ac-
quainted with Prinsep, White, or other well-known
writers on politico-military events.
The Synopsis of Evidence taken before the Select
Committee of the House of Commons in 1834, is a
mine of information, and the man who understandingly
studies it, and the first and second Beports of 1852,
will rise from them with more knowledge of Indian
affairs than he could obtain from all the published ab-
stract histories, Gleig and Macfarlane included. We
say understandingly ; for the subject of India, in any de-
partment, is not to be taken up as mere holiday amuse-
* Apparently an erroneous supposition.
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SMATTERERS.
867
ment. The figures in the Blue Books would frighten
Babbage. They have given us a dozen headaches. But
the less abstruse matters discussed require previous
knowledge to enable the reader to separate the chaff
from the grain — to appreciate the sound sense of a
Colonel Alexander or Grant, and the nonsense of a Sir
W. Cotton or a Sir E. Perry.
For instance ; Sir E. Perry is an able English Judge
and an enlightened reformer ; but he made holiday trips
into the interior, and therefore presents himself as per-
sonaUy acquainted with the wants of India. Himself
unversed in any Indian language, he would introduce
English into Courts where the judge alone understands
it, where the mass never can do so, where the smattering
that may be attained by a few attorneys or others would
give them an unfair influence were such a proposal car-
ried into effect. Sir Erskine's proposed re-distribution
of the army and transfer of it to the Crown was, how-
ever, $n interference of a different sort, involving a
more immediate danger. He would have better evinced
his wisdom by showing more modesty in the discussion
of a question so foreign from all his previous pursuits.
With respect to Sir W. Cotton, one anecdote will express
our views regarding his Parliamentary evidence. Being
asked on Committee by Lord Gough whether men of
the Concan " are not so peculiar with regard to their
castes?" he replied, "No, they are not; but now we
get Bengal men of a caste that we prefer very much,
called the ' Purdesee ' caste ; if they had ajiy caste be*
fore they came to us, we never heard of its interfering
in discipline." We much doubt whether either the
gallant interrogator or respondent knows what is the
caste of the Concan men, or even whether they are
Hindus or Mahojnmedans. They certainly do not
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3f>S
THE INDIAN ARMY.
know that " Purdesee " means foreigner, and that the
Bombay " Purdesee " is simply the Brahmin and Raj-
poot of the Bengal army. Indeed they are entered as
such, to the number of 6928 in Mr. P. Melvill's Table,
at page 11, of his second examination.
In a previous essay we have afforded some informa-
tion relating to all branches of the Indian army. We
profess here to offer few new facts ; but, with the aid of
the mass of evidence before us, to correct some errors, and
to sketch the present and past condition of the army,
and also to point out many points in which its efficiency
may be improved without increasing its expense. Cost-
ing now eleven millions a year, or little short of half
the revenue of the country, the army cannot be increased
without risk of bankruptcy. Reform and adaptation,
not numerical increase, then, are required. Reform in
the French rather than in the English fashion ; not in
pipe-clay details, but in arms, accoutrements, and drill ;
above all, in tone and morale. In putting not only the
right sort of soldier of all ranks and creeds in the right
place, and giving him an object and a motive for simple
duty, but offering him inducements to zeal and exertion.
In short, to substitute to a certain extent, rewards for
merit, in lieu of for old age. Our remarks must neces-
sarily be desultory, and will touch the prejudices and
even the interests of many. They will, therefore, not
be popular ; but we trust they may be useful.
We have vainly sought for exact detailed states, at
different periods, of the Indian army, in Blue Books, in
histories, in army lists, as also from private sources.
Captain Rafter quite misleads his reader. He gives two
European regiments, instead of three, to each Presidency,
though a third was raised a twelvemonth before his book
was published. He calls all the Engineers " Royal Corps."
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INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION.
369
What he means by " twelve regiments of irregular in-
fantry" and " sixteen of local militia" in Bengal, we are
at a loss to imagine. The expression, " militia," smacks
of his book being a " get up " in Paternoster Row.
Unfortunately we have no militia in India. All are
mercenaries — the most faithful in the world, but still
mercenaries. The men who fought against us under
Mahratta and Sikh banners are now our trusty soldiers.
They are ours to the death, so long as we keep covenant
with them. Their salt is their country and their banner.
We cannot expect and do not deserve more : we have
done little to induce personal attachment in sepoys or in
any other class. The time, we hope, is coming, when
both will have greater reason than at present to fight
for love of our supremacy.
The evidence before Parliament has scarcely assisted
us more than Captain Rafter has done ; we have puzzled
ourselves for very many hours over the Blue Book
figures and tables, but have not succeeded in reconciling
the statements of the different authorities or even the
evidence of the same individual at different times. We
have, therefore, concocted a table for ourselves, which
will be found on the other side of the page.
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370
THE INDIAN ARMY.
Tubular Statement of the Army of India in January 1856, induding all
and Irregular Corps officered from the Line ; also
Presidency.
Bengal .
Madras
Bombay
Total
Corps,
&c., &c. .
At an aver
age of .
Total
strength
a
o
O
r/3
a
a
H
cj o
^ C
II
2,907
2,019
1,289
700
6,215 1400
m
14
4
4
22
1,100
24,200
t
o
X
&
o
o
19
140
110
2000
440
wft
12
337
4,04 I
a
o
i
CJ
5zi
3
2
2
640
5
o
4.4NI l,.-;30 7,490
1,200
1,369
Grand Total
Of the 6215 officers, 782 aro medical. Invalid officers are not included,
but simply those on the strength of regiments. Police Battalions and
Police Horse are not included, but only corps included in Army Lists. The
one weak corps of Cutch Horse is counted with the two strong regiments
of Scinde Horse as a total of three average corps. In the same way two
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APPROXIMATE STRENGTI1.
371
Her Majesty's and the Honourable Company's Troops ; all the Contingent,
the Field Regular and Irregular Guns attached.
4
ii
it
1,000
74
52
29
155
1,100
9,0001 170,000
I
0
fl
a
'Sb
I
fa
3
1
J
41
6
8
55
930
51,150
O
S3
bo
10
8
3
21
450
9,450
8
o
a
1
s
31
4
6
41
580
23,780
Veterans.
ctf
8.
O
w
368
304
700
T O
1 O
11
TJ 49 £3
ill
bi5 2
i«8a
2,941
483
3,124
Subordi-
nate
Medical.
G
O
E
I
Guns.
320
17
235
300 : 339
652
198
138
78
I
I
78
24
0
510
and three corns or detachments are occasionally clubbed. The grand total
323,823 includes 48,519 European officers and soldiers ; and 275,304 natives,
516 field guns, as also a small mountain train, arc attached. Three hun-
dred battery guns and as many mortars might be brought into the field
within a month.
B B 2
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372
THE INDIAN ARMY.
We submit this account to our readers with much
confidence, as containing a nearer approximation to the
total strength of the Army, and even of its details, than
any other published document.
In preparing the above table we have derived assist-
ance from Mr. Philip MelvilTs evidence, but have not
always been able to ascertain his meaning, nor are we
satisfied that his figures are always correct. Most of
ours are taken from the Army Lists. Mr. Melvill gives
no details of the contingents, but clubs them at 32,000
men, which is above their strength.* We have entered
them in our table, with other Irregulars, under their
several heads, Artillery, Cavalry, and Infantry. It will
be observed that we estimate the Army at 323,823,
which though differing in detail, closely agrees with
Mr. P. Melville total of 289,529, added to 32,000
contingents. Our total strength includes 1400 Dra-
goons, 24,200 Eoyal Infantry, 2660 Horse Artillery,
4044 Foot Artillery, 6215 officers of the Company's
Army, 9000 Company's Infantry, 700 veterans and
300 Ordnance, Warrant, and N. C. Staff, making a total
of 48,519 European officers and soldiers. The 275,304
natives include 2569 Sappers, 4480 Foot and 440 Horse
Artillery, 9450 Regular and 23,780 Irregular Cavalry ;
also 170,000 Regular, and 51,150 quasi local or Irregu-
lar Infantry,! and 516 guns, are attached, 138 being
Horse Artillery.
This vast army occupies about 1,350,000 square miles
* Since writing the above wo have especially the Guicowars, are neither
observed that Mr. Melvill reckons officered nor disciplined. — H. M.L.
the Guicowar and Mysore contin- f They are more regular than the
gents as part of his 32,000, and as regular battalions of Clive's time,
being on the same footing with the and indeed differ little from the
(Jwalior and Hyderabad contingents ; regulars except in having only three
but such is not the case. The two officers instead of twenty-four. Few
latter are disciplined bodies, officered of them can correctly be called
by Knglish gentlemen ; the others, local. — H. M. L.
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POLICE BATTALIONS.
373
of country, and protects and overawes about 150 mil-
lions of people. There is, therefore, about one soldier
to 465 of the population, but so unequally divided, that
in the Punjab the proportion is one to 200, whereas in
Bengal it is one to 3000. Intermediately and in the
south, it varies according to the circumstances of the
country, a single regiment being here and there sta-
tioned at long intervals, but more frequently a brigade
with cavalry and guns being located together.
The army as above detailed, does not include the
Punjab Police battalions, the Scinde, and other orga-
nized Police, altogether numbering at least 16,000
drilled, and well armed, soldiers ; most of them quite
equal to average Irregulars.* To these may be added
about one hundred thousand ordinary Police and Ee-
venue peons, the " Idlers " of Sir Charles Napier. He
estimated the number in the Bengal and Agra Presi-
dencies at 158,000; but the correct number is 59,000,
and in the Punjab 11,000. In somewhat similar pro-
portion 30,000 will be the number for Bombay and
Madras. If to this hundred thousand, we add the vil-
lage police throughout the country, an array of numbers
equal to the whole strength of the army might be
made. And if we count, as our predecessors the
Moguls would have done, or as any European Govern-
ment but our own would do, the armies of Native States
situated within our limits, we may nearly complete the
full million, and rival Xerxes of old, or the Czar of to-
day. That we allow the village police of Bengal to be
breakers, instead of conservators of the peace, is surely
our own fault. If they commit dacoitees and overawe
landholders and planters, and act energetically against
the law, for a motive, they can also, for a motive, fight
* We have taken no account of Bengal Police battalion. — H. M. L.
the projected Oude contingent and
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THE INDIAN ARMY.
daeoits to maintain the law. Whole districts in the
North- Western Provinces filled with the brethren of
the fighting classes of Oude have never, during the
last seventy years, seen a British sepoy. Sir George
Clerk, no mean conservator of the peace, in his evi-
dence before Parliament, considered it quite feasible to
make use of the 30,000 to 40,000 hereditary village
police of Bombay, now set aside, though still enjoying
service lands.
In regard to native armies, when we were Compara-
tively weak, they fought on our side. The Nizam
helped cordially at Seringapatam. Less cordially dif-
ferent Mahratta chiefs have at times done so. The
Bajpoots were more true to us than we were to our-
selves during Monson's retreat. Sikh contingents
served at Bhurtpore, and in the Nepal hills. The Sikh
army, in its worst days, helped us to force the Khyber,
and a portion even accompanied us to Cabul. The
Goorkhas periodically offer their services, and Golab
Singh's regiments have, on two occasions, fought
valiantly by our side in Hazara. Above all, the Bhau-
walpore Nawab fought our battle when the weather was
thought too hot for us to fight it ourselves. Bearing
these facts in mind, we would steer a mean course be-
tween those who would have made over Delhi and Agra
to the Eajpoots during the Sikh war, and Sir Charles
Napier's alarm of the Goorkhas, of Hyderabad, Golab
Singh, and the Burmese. Indeed, we are of opinion,
that all but the last might without difficulty be induced
to aid in the conservation of the public peace.
The expense of the army, including the dead-weight,
is eleven millions a year, or nearly one-half the revenue
of India. To increase it, as many suggest, would be to
risk bankruptcy. It already exceeds, by 158,000, the
strength when Lahore and Gwalior had large hostile
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ITS EXCESSIVE BULK.
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armies at our very doors ; and is 30,000 in excess of
the highest numbers during the Burmah and Sikh wars.
Allowing, then, the police in all its branches to do ordi-
nary police work, as in good hands it is amply able to
do, we have the army to support it and to watch a sea-
girt frontier, whence nothing can touch us, the Nepal
and north-west borders where we are scarcely less safe,
and to owerawe the rabble portions of the Hyderabad
army, and deal with Sonthal and other half-armed sa-
vages, and even less-formidable discontented chiefs.
For these purposes our means are most ample, if we
are true to ourselves. In the words of the first Punjab
Eeport : —
" It is not open war that is to be guarded against (at Lahore), but secret
intrigue, and outbursts of small bands of desperate men : against the first,
the best remedy is a mixture of the different arms, with a large sprinkling
of Europeans ; for the other, irregular horse, and such infantry as, unen-
cumbered with baggage, can be under arms and in movement at an hour's
notice."
" One thousand (1000) men (half cavalry, half infantry), and two guns,
put in motion within two hours of the news of a disturbance reaching any
of our stations, and able to traverse the country at the rate of twenty or
thirty miles a day, will do more to secure the peace of the Punjab than
the tardy assemblage of armies. Indeed, we do not hesitate to state that
our anxiety is rather on account of the number of troops, and the system
on which we understand they are to be located, than of any deficiency of
force."
The above passages entirely express our opinion.
There is nothing in the length or breadth of the plains
of India that could for an hour stand against such a
force. Had such an one been put in motion at the out-
set of the Sonthal insurrection, the whole affair would
not have lasted as many weeks as it has months. Had
the ten thousand men that had been told off on the north-
west frontier to meet disturbance promptly marched
on Mooltan, in 1848, there would probably have been
no siege, or, at least, the affair would have been as in-
significant as it proved momentous. Decisive and ener-
getic measures have never yet failed, though contrary
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THE INDIAN ARMY.
courses have often brought us very near destruction,,
Arcot, Piassey, Buxar, Assaye, and Laswaree, tell their
own tales, as do Baillie, Monson, and Elphinstone theirs.
With less means than Monson, Goddard successfully
performed twice his task. By a bold front Goddard
marched across the continent of India, and carried
everything before him. Monson, by distrusting his
troops, by retreating when he ought to have advanced,
drew Holkar after him, and lost his army. A few
hours' stand, or a single march in the right direction,
would have saved Baillie. A three-mile movement
would have preserved Elphinstone, even after months
of insane delusion. The very first day he taught the
Affghans their game. Instead of attacking the rabble,
who had murdered Burnes in the city, he called in his
detachments and kept close within his intrenchments,
letting nothing but hunger move him. A single regi-
ment would have dispersed the mob on the first day.
For three days the very men who afterwards destroyed
our army supported Mackenzie and Trevor in the city,
and eventually aided their retreat. Thus it will always
be. Providence helps those who help themselves.
Those who don't, need not look for friends anywhere,
especially in the East. Lords Hardinge and Gough
won Ferozeshah by holding their ground during the
night. Lord Gough lost the fruits of Chilianwalla by
not following the same course.
Borne conquered the world by never yielding a foot,
by never confessing herself beaten, by rising with re-
newed courage from every defeat. We require such
fortitude more than Home did. As yet our tents are
only pitched in the land. We have a numerous and a
noble army, but six-sevenths of it are of the soil. We
have one fortress in all India. We offer no inducement
to extraordinary fidelity, even while we place our maga-
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PERIODICAL PANICS.
377
zines, our treasuries, and our very throats at the mercy
of any desperado. While we English are thus reckless,
we, both at home and in India, are more easily panic-
stricken than, perhaps, any brave people in the world.
Not only does a Cabul, or a Chilianwalla, strike terror
from one end of the country to the other, but a simple
murder, a Sonthal or a Moplah outbreak, has scarcely
less effect. With few exceptions there is no preparation
to meet sudden danger. There is the most helpless alarm
when it does occur.
Russia did not wait until she was attacked, to fortify
Sebastopol, Bomarsund, and a hundred other points.
She mil now lose character if, at the present juncture,
she fortify St. Petersburgh and Moscow. Let us profit
by experience. Let us put our house in order. We
know not how soon a coalition may press Britain as
Russia is now pressed. While the war lasts there will
be no undue economy; but should peace occur to-
morrow we run the risk of reverting to the old apathy,
that left the whole coast of England undefended, and
only thirty guns in the isles available for field service
at the very time we were expecting war with France.
Let us not be misunderstood; we are no alarmists.
We only testify to what we have witnessed during the
last twenty years. Our disgust was often great at what
we did so witness. History testifies to the preceding
eight years. We have vividly before our eyes the
terror of Madras when Hyder Ali's horsemen swept
its suburbs. The alarms caused by the failures of the
first Nepal campaign ; also those by supposed Mahratta
combinations, and by Pindaree incursions, by Murray's
and by Monsons retreats, by the occupation of Fur-
ruckabad, and the beleaguerment of Delhi, and, lastly,
by our four failures at Bhurtpore. Even greater,
though utterly without reason, was the panic at Cal-
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. THIS INDIAN ARMY.
cutta at the outset of the first Burmah war. Chitta-
gong was reported in flames. Bankers asked to be
allowed to send their cash to Fort William, and Bur-
mah war-boats were reported on the salt-water lake ;
and all this because the Calcutta militia ran away at
Bamoo. These are historical facts. Nor were the
whisperings of alarm less loud on the occasions of the
murders in 1848, or when, in the ensuing year, six
Malay-like Sikhs sold their lives in an onslaught on a
whole European regiment at Lahore. Or, on each
Moplah affair, though the number of fanatics con-
cerned was scarcely more numerous than in that of
Lahore. Finally, our readers will remember how the
murders of Mackeson and Connolly, and the attack on
Mackenzie, were received. The first was supposed to
be connected with a simultaneous rise at Peshawur and
invasion from the Khyber ; the others, as the forerun-
ners of the assassination of all Europeans.
It must be pleasant to our enemies, and amusing to
others who watch our arrogance and insolence in ordi-
nary times, to observe the dastard fear with which many
of our numbers receive such events. The loud talk,
even in mess-rooms, of general insurrection, the loading
of pistols, and the doubling of sentinels. Such acts are
all wrong. They tend to produce the very danger that
is feared. It is right always to bear in mind that we
are but encamped in the land. We are dwelling " in
the tents of Shem." We have yet to prove the perma-
nence of the encampment, whether it is to be rudely
broken up in blood, whether to be a Mogul, " Oordoo,"
a Mahratta, or a Sikh "Lushkur," or "Chaonee;" or
whether, after a fertilizing and blessed rule of centuries,
we are voluntarily to hand over regenerated India to
her own educated and enlightened sons. But whatever
bo our and India's destinies, our obvious duty is to
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GROUNDLESS ALARMS.
379
avoid all unnecessary occasion of danger, at the same
time always calmly and unostentatiously to stand to our
arms. The spirit of Wellington's and Cromwell's words
should be our motto, and always in our hearts, " Trust
in God," " Keep your treaties," and " Keep your powder
dry."
To such of our readers as are disposed to tax us with
exaggeration in the above rough sketch, we recommend
a glance at recent newspaper statements regarding
Connolly, Mackenzie, and the Sonthal disturbances.
Above all, let them read Sir William Napier's pamphlet
of 1854 on the Dalhousie and Napier controversy.
They may then blush for British officers. It is difficult
to know whether William Napier believed those incen-
diary and dastardly reports. If he did he was as cre-
dulous as his gallant brother when the latter perceived
danger from Hyderabad, Burmahi and Cashmere. Such
records of our shame, however, abound in the newspaper
correspondence of the Affghan, Scinde, and Sikh wars.
Wellington and Raglan were equally molested by scare-
crows; and according to the accounts from our own
ranks, Spain should have been lost, and the army before
Sebastopol destroyed. The public enunciation of such
opinions is by few ; the taJkings and murmurings are by
many. Even brave men — men ready to lead the storm-
ing party, or to die at their posts — consider themselves
privileged to talk in strains they would never permit in
the ranks under them ; strains that must weaken their
own influence, and might even endanger their own
lives.
We freely admit that, with the march of civil im-
provement, much has been done, during the last few
years, to improve our military position. But, in the
words of Napoleon, moral is to physical force as three
to one, and moral strength is not altogether at the bid-
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THE INDIAN ARMY.
ding of Governor-Generals, Commanders-in-Chief, or
subordinate leaders. But, to a great extent it is.
The army at Candahar never lost heart, because Nott
kept his. MacLaren s brigade, intended for Ghuznee,
failed even to reach Khelat-i-Ghilzie, because MacLaren
never expected to carry out his orders. It did not
require a Xenophon to do so. Havelock, Monteith,
Eichmond, Mayne, MacGregor, Broadfoot, Pottinger,
MacKenzie or Backhouse, with many others engaged in
Afghanistan, would have saved not only Ghuznee but
Cabul. The futile attempt of MacLaren did mischief.
It added to the previous discouragement of our own
people ; it gave courage to the Affghans. The fact is
notorious. Mahomed Akbar had failed in an attack on
the citadel of Cabul held by Shah Soojah ; but the same
night, hearing of MacLaren's retreat, he renewed the
assault, and succeeded. With Cabul also fell Ghuznee,
and Khilat-i-Ghilzie was left to its fate, for Craigie to
make a defence not often surpassed. The counsel of a
few brave hearts saved Jellalabad after their own Go-
vernment had abandoned them.
It was the moral depression of Wilde's brigade, added
to the shameful manner in which it, a body of four
sepoy battalions with a hap-hazard brigadier and bri-
gade-major, taken from their own ranks, without a
single other staff officer, without carriage, commissariat,
guns, or cavalry, was sent to Peshawar, that not only
prevented its reaching Jellalabad, but nearly caused its
own destruction in the Khyber. The Blue Book records
Sir Jasper NicholTs opinion — " I have yet to learn the
use of guns in a pass/' On this wondrous conclusion,
a general who, four-and-twenty years earlier, had him-
self done good service in a mountain country, or rather,
we suspect, on the preconceived opinion that Jellalabad
must be lost, acted. It would have been more honesty
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SEPOY LEADERS.
381
sensible, and humane, to have boldly refused to permit
a man to cross the Sutlej. That chapter of Indian
military history has yet to be written. Kaye's work,
admirable as it generally is, has not done justice to
those concerned, but has done very much more than
justice to the Commander-in-Chief. Few officers have
been worse treated than the gallant and unfortunate
Wilde. As brave a soul as ever breathed, he was driven,
broken-hearted, to his grave.
We might adduce scores of such examples, bad and
good, from past Indian history, of the effect of prestige
and of leading ; of good and of bad conduct, by the
very same men, all induced by individual example, or
by the moral effect of circumstances. No soldier is
more open to the influence of all the above causes than
the sepoy. He has a wonderful opinion of the " Ikbal "
of the Company. He has also a keen perception of the
merits or demerits of his officers. He loves the memory
of the commander who has led him successfully ; and,
in extreme old age, will talk of the subaltern who was
kind to him and shared his dangers.*
In the track of Monsons retreat, we have repeatedly
heard an old subadar recount the doings of his own
corps, going over not only the names of his own officers,
but of others with whom he was not immediately con-
nected. Telling how nobly Lucan died in covering the
* Malcolm's anecdote of the old accompany him, and every man
native officers, always taking their stepped out. Such an officer must
sons to salaam to the pictures of everywhere be loved, but probably
Coote and Medowes in the Town he could not talk to natives, and
Hall of Madras, but of their making therefore lost one important engine
a distinction in favour of the former, of influence. Sir Eyre Coote was
is an example of the advantage of perhaps as badly off in regard to
long intimacy with sepoys. Sir Wil- the languages, but he had more
liam Medowes was an admirable knowledge of the habits of sepoys,
soldier. On the breaking out of the Let us not be told that Hastings
American war, being transferred and Clive could not converse with
from a corps he had long com- natives. They were giants: rules
manded, he called for volunteers to are not for such. — H. M. L.
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THE INDIAN ARMY.
retreat through the Mokundra Pass ; how the 12thN. I.
was destroyed in covering the passage of the Bunnas
Biver. History corroborates the old man's tale, and
tells how the sepoys bade their officers keep heart ; " we
will take you safe to Agra." Captain Rafter records
that "out of 12,000 men, scarcely 1000 entered Agra,
without cannon, baggage, or ammunition." The guns
dragged by bullocks were, of course, lost in a country
which in the rains is a quagmire ; but our author has,
unintentionally no doubt, exaggerated the tale of misery
and disaster. Never was more devotion shown by a
mercenary army. With Holkar at their heels, slaying
them like sheep, or sending them in noseless, or other-
wise maimed, to terrify their comrades, and on the other
hand, offering them service with the prospect of high
command in his own ranks ; there were scarcely more
desertions from the sepoys' battalions than there have
been from the British ranks at Sebastopol.
Monson's affair was one, entirely, of trust and of pres-
tige. Affairs were ill-managed, but the sepoys stood by
him as by Matthews and Baillie, because they looked
to the Company's Star; because in all points they
trusted and respected the Government. In those days
it was not unusual for the pay of the troops to be six,
twelve, and even twenty months in arrears. The army
was then numerically not half its present strength ; but
our character as soldiers was superior to what it is at
present. Strange, that after we have conquered all
around, we should have lost weight with our own
people. Monson was a brave man and somewhat re-
trieved his own personal character at Bhurtpore; but
the effect of his retreat nearly negatived all Lord Lake's
victories.
Hector Munroe, Coote, Ochterlony, Adams, Malcolm,
and Munro were men of a different stamp. With them
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SYMPTOMS OY REFORM.
883
there was confidence on both sides. In full reliance on
his troops, Ochterlony, with sepoys alone, succeeded
where royal officers and royal troops had failed. Gil-
lespie's prompt gallantry rescued Vellore, though the
same general, by impetuosity at Kalunga, sacrificed his
own life and virtually lost the campaign. It would be
a pleasant task to tell of Arcott, Onore, Masulipatam,
Korigaum, and Setabuldee. We point to them simply as
illustrations of the happy effects of mutual trustfulness.
We might also with advantage glance at other and
more recent affairs of opposite complexions. We shall,
however, not, on this occasion, do so.
The moral of our dissertation is to take advantage of
the present crisis in Europe, and, while we have no
present cause of alarm in India, to take warning from
the past. Much we repeat has been done. Much rot-
tenness has been swept away. Many departments have
been reformed. Some portions of the empire have
been put in good state of defence. Less expensive but
equally efficient bodies of troops have been raised, thus
combining economy with efficiency. Above all, some
steps have been taken to give us Commanders-in-Chief,
having the use of their limbs and with their senses
about them. We are not henceforward to have the
dregs of the lives of gallant veterans who, during
health and strength, were never entrusted with im-
portant command; nor are we to have as generals of
division and brigade, men whose only guarantee of
efficiency is old age, whose very existence is often a
token of their never having earned command, who have
kept themselves in clover, during the legitimate years
of working life, and thus, while generous souls have
sunk in the struggle, survive to win the prizes.
Another and more urgent step is wanted. There
must be a bar against the command of regiments being
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THE INDIAN ARMY.
the reward of thirty and forty years of incompetence.
We can even do better with bad generals, than with bad
regimental officers. Inkermann was won by the indi-
vidual action of regiments, not by the strategy or tactics
of generals. Most of our Indian battles have been so
won. The appointments of Generals Anson and Grant
are auguries of good. There may be abler and more
experienced commanders, but both have common sense,
the use of their limbs and of all their faculties. Let
them see that their subordinates enjoy similar advan-
tages. Neither Wellingtons nor Washingtons are ex-
pected, but it is not therefore necessary we should wait
till the quantity of sense and strength that officers have
been endowed with, has evaporated, before they are
employed in command. No such absurdity is per-
petuated in ordinary life. No brewer or baker waits
till his workman is superannuated before he promotes
him to the post of foreman ; a pension is the fitting
reward for old age. Some officers now in command, to
the injury of the service, were good men and true
twenty years ago, — others were never fit for a corporal's
charge; and only in a seniority service could have
escaped from the subaltern ranks. Chief Judges, Resi-
dents, and Commissioners, are not the oldest men in
the service. Metcalfe, Jenkins, Elphinstone, Clerk, and
Munro performed good service when under thirty years
of age. On the bench, if anywhere, age is wanted, or
at least is not an incumbrance. We reverse the order
— we have young judges and old divisional and even
regimental commanders. We have boys on magisterial
benches, hoary age commanding Light Horse.
We implore the attention of all the authorities at
home and in India, to these glaring inconsistencies.
Lord Hardinge, Sir Charles Napier, Lord Gough, all
testify to the necessity of a change. No one denies it.
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INEFFICIENT COMMANDERS.
385
Honour will be to him who, notwithstanding the outcry-
that will follow, will change the system that has
brought irregular troops into fashion, to the disparage-
ment of Kegulars, thus averring that three selected and
comparatively young officers are preferable to a dozen
or sixteen haphazard ones, commanded by such men
as are generally found at the head of regiments of
the line. Some system must be devised, by having
the whole army in one general list; or by having
regiments of two, three or four battalions, or by strik-
ing off inefficients, and by admitting the transfer of
officers from one corps to another, to secure the com-
mand of regiments to those, between the ages of
thirty and fifty, who have at least not given proofs
of incompetency. There are men now commanding
regiments known to have greatly injured, if not ruined,
more than one corps, and who are working hard to
destroy the credit of their present charges. We have
heard the new Commander-in-Chief of the Madras
army regret the necessity of putting such men in com-
mand. We confess never to have been able to perceive
the necessity. It has been a custom rather than an
obligation, and the sooner it is abrogated, the better for
the Indian army.
Let officers rise to rank much as at present by se-
niority; but drive inefficients to resignation by posi-
tively refusing them command. Let there be tests for
every grade of authority. Let no officer obtain the
command even of a company until he has proved his
qualification. The present tests are altogether insuffi-
cient. The examination should be systematic, and not
dependent on the whims of commanding officers or
examiners. Graduated for each rank, it should oblige
each officer to evince moderate ability and moderate
application. All men are not intended by nature for
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THE INDIAN ARMY.
soldiers. The sooner incapables find out the mistake
of their parents in having put them into the wrong
line, the better for themselves and for the service. In
no army are higher qualifications required. Is it good
that one single individual officer should be a laughing-
stock to his men ? They are nearly fifty to one of us.
Our staff should be good — the best procurable, or it
must be more than useless — mischievous, nay dan-
gerous.
On this the most important question concerning the
army, we desire to suggest no specific rules, but simply,
though most earnestly, to recommend those of common
sense. Let a mixed committee of officers from the
three Presidencies be appointed to consult and report
on this, and other matters, and let their report be
published, and, after discussion, be acted on, as far as
possible ; but unhappily there is less lack of informa-
tion than of desire or ability to act on it. Some twenty
years ago such a committee did report on artillery
matters, and made many excellent suggestions, few of
which have to this day been carried out.* General
Patrick Grant tells us, in his evidence before Parlia-
ment, that cavalry matters were also, though less
formally, reported on many years ago, but still the
strife goes on between Eegulars and Irregulars, as to
straight swords, sabres, spears, carbines, pistols, bits,
and saddles. All this is bad. There is a good and
a bad way for everything, and what is good for one
Presidency is good for another. Shafts and poles,
Bengal system and Royal system, are not all best. The
best ought to be insisted on for all. And so with
cavalry. If an Irregular is, as Sir Charles Napier and
* The present Emperor of the called attention to the labours of
French, then the exile Louis Napo- that committee. — H. M. L.
leoD, in his treatise on Artillery,
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ADVANTAGES OP A STAFF-CORPS.
387
others insist, the most efficient soldier, it is foolery to
pay double the money for an inferior article.
But, whether by a committee or any other authority,
let the vital questions be settled. Eespect as far as
possible present incumbents, by giving them time to
meet examinations, &c. ; but, at any cost, rid the service
of notorious incompetents, and prevent incapables from
obtaining command. If the cry be, " vested interests,"
and " men will not enter the service on insecure terms/'
we answer that able and energetic men are most likely
to enter a service that encourages ability and energy.
We dont want the mass that join the army simply
as an easy provision. For England's glory and India's
safety, we are better without such. We would not
deprive Directors of patronage, but the tests at home
should be much higher, and, as already suggested,
should be continued up to the rank of Field Officer, as
the rule now obtains in H. M.'s Service.
There must be a Staff Corps : whatever may be its
inconveniences, they will be less than those that now
obtain. The French " Etat-Major " might, to a certain
extent, be our model. The rewards of the staff should
not be on such a scale as to prevent good officers desir-
ing to stay with their corps. When commands are
open to them after fifteen or twenty years, instead of
after thirty and thirty-five, there would be more con-
tent in the regimental ranks; without contentment
there can hardly be efficiency. In proof of the present
prevailing spirit we annex, verbatim, an extract from a
recently-received letter, from an officer of ability who
has done good service to the State, and who obtained
command of his regiment after about twenty-five years'
service.
" As to the service, I have long since ceased to take any interest in it ;
for however hard I may work, or however much I may know or do, I find
C C 2
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THE INDIAN ARMY.
myself not one bit better off than the fool who knows and does nothing ;
therefore, beyond doing exactly as I am told, I do nothing.
" You will, I dare say, laugh when I tell you I never mount one (a horse)
but to go to parade, and this I consider a great bore, and never go out of
a walk."
The above, if not a favourable specimen of the spirit
of the writer, is at least the honest opinion of an able
officer who has been more than usually fortunate. We
could match with it a similar letter, received from a
captain of a different Presidency, of nearly equal stand-
ing, who is yet several years from a command. Ten or
fifteen years ago, both these officers were fall of zeal
and energy. They were of the Chamberlain and Jacob
school rather than of the race of incapables. Chamber-
lain and Jacob would be as they are, after thirty years
of subordinate regimental duty.
The Native officer question is only second to that
of the European. With efficient commanders there
would soon be efficient subordinates, but to expedite
matters and to prevent tyranny, perhaps convulsions,
extraneous help and Government authority are required.
In this, as in other matters, perfectly different systems
obtain, not only at different Presidencies, but in different
regiments of the same Presidency. In Bombay and
Madras, the merit-fostering rule is followed ; in Bengal
all sorts of rules and systems obtain. There is autho-
rity, though not very explicit, for promotion by merit,
and provision is made, by increase of pay after terms of
seven years, for the superseded, but recent orders have
directed differently. The consequence is, that command-
ing officers do much as they like. One finds reason for
promoting all the old, another all the young. One
pesters and persecutes the veterans, another objects to
the smart fellows who " can drill the regiment as veil
as any officer, and who wear trousers as neat as the
adjutants." These are the extremes. Discipline suffers,
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NATIVE OFFICERS.
389
and deserving Native soldiers of all ranks suffer, and are
often driven with disgust from the service.
We confess to a decided preference, notwithstanding
all the objections of Lord Hardinge, Sir Charles Napier,
and other high authorities, for the Madras and Bombay
systems. We allow it to be dangerous to bring forward
young energetic native soldiers, to the rank of subadar
and there to stop, and that it would be, on the present
system, safer to have subadars of sixty rather than of
thirty years of age. But it is the danger of the power-
loom over the fire-side wheel ; the danger of the steam
carriage over the poney chair. Where is to be the end
of our fears if we shirk efficiency in dread of our own
tools turning on us ? It is our obvious duty to put the
right man in the right place, and to keep him there by
self-interest. We desire no such radical change as to
put armies, or even very important posts, or detach-
ments, under Native officers. We desire not the Cartha-
ginian, or the Mogul, or the latter Boman systems, but
to a certain extent, that which influences the autocratic
Governments of Bussia, France and Austria. Surely we
can afford as much license as they can. If Asiatics and
Africans can obtain honourable position in the armies
of Bussia and France, surely Indians, after tried service
of a century under England's banner, are entitled to the
same boon — nay, justice. We desire no extremes. We
would not, as Austria did in the Hungarian war, place
our magazines in the enemy's hands. We would avoid
risking them in questionable ones. We would not, as
in our own early times, by undue temptation, turn
honest soldiers into traitors,* but we would not drive
* Mahommed Issoof 's is a case in ducted sieges, defended posts, and
point. He was mdre useful than earned supplies and reinforcements,
most of the European officers in the at critical tunes, through the enemy's
early wars of the Carnatic. Faithful, country. But he was tempted be-
gallant, and enterprizing, he con- yond his strength. He was put in
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THE INDIAN ARMY.
them from our service or, worse still, permit them to
remain in it in sullen discontent. If among the 6000
European officers such feelings prevail as we have shown
in the preceding extract, have we any right to expect
that among the 275,000 natives of the army, they do
not exist to a much greater extent ?
This subject is too much pooh-poohed or altogether
blinked. If the correspondence of Native soldiers was
as patent to us as that of our European comrades, we
should better understand their feelings. Those who do
associate with them can testify to the disgust of the
very best at their present position. The Bengal Baboos
of Calcutta, and the Parsees of Bombay are among our
best-treated and most-contented subjects. The latter
highly-enlightened class is a loyal and useful section of
the community; and some of its legal members have
recently been appointed to high office; as have also
some of the Bengal Baboos. These latter however are
not contented. They complain that the highest salary
allowed to their class is 1200 rupees a month, and that
very few positions of 1000 rupees, 800 rupees, and 600
rupees, though many of 250 rupees a month, are open
to them. Native civil officers of the higher grades are
remunerated throughout the provinces at somewhat the
above rates. In every district are to be found half a
dozen, whose salaries average 250 rupees, with two or
three on 400 or 500 rupees a month. Exceptional cases
run up to 800 and 1000. The latter are still too few to
command honest devotion. More prizes, and some of
them of greater value than any yet conceded, are wanted.
Such, however, as they are, they greatly exceed those
of the Native army. The largest pay obtainable in an
possession of a fort, and made a have stood such a test? Some
renter of the surrounding district. Europeans could not. — H. M. L.
In such times, what Natire could
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ABSENCE OF REWARD.
391
army of 275,000 soldiers of the soil is 300 rupees a
month, and we do not know more than three men
enjoying such pay. The Hyderabad pay of a ressaldar,
which is the title, in that province, of a Native cavalry
commandant, used to be 413 rupees, but it has recently
been reduced to 300. Jemadars of troops (virtual res-
saldars) have also been lowered from 165 to 150, the
rate of ressaldars throughout the Bengal Irregular Ca-
valry. The pay of a subadar in the regular army is 67
rupees a month, with 25 rupees additional, making 92
rupees, to one subadar in every regiment, as subadar
Major. This is the highest bond fide pay enjoyable by an
infantry soldier. When marching, he receives fifteen
rupees batta, which seldom covers his extra expenses.
The "Moniteur" constantly recounts the rewards of
bravery, in all ranks, of the French army. To one
private soldier, " for keeping his place in the ranks when
badly wounded." To another, " for being the first in
the breach ; " to a third, " for saving his captain's at the
loss of his own legs, by throwing aside a live shell.,,
To a fourth, "for helping to extinguish the flames
around the magazine." Such matters, if not wholly
overlooked in the British army, are not so noticed as to
excite emulation or create any hearty desire to do like-
wise. What rewards have been given to the subaltern's
party which for half an hour, last November, stood on
the top of the magazine of the Light Division, covering
it with saturated tarpaulins, while all around was on
fire, and while shells and rockets were falling thick on
every side ? But, nearer to ourselves, what reward has
been given to the sergeant of the Pegu magazine who,
last year, heroically performed a similar feat? Such
men are the real heroes of an army. Any fellow can
charge with a crowd, or can stand between his comrades,
to be mowed down or ridden over. He seldom can help
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THE INDIAN ARMY.
himself. Many, in such positions, would run away if
they could : they cannot, and they come out of the fray,
heroes. But the soldier who, with no excitement before
him, courts death, in the path of duty, deserves more
especial honour — indeed all the honour, and all the
reward, that can be bestowed. It is true that in the
British army after every battle, strings of names are
submitted for brevet rank and honours. There is
seldom a response in any mans heart to the accuracy of
those lists. Lord Gough got brevet rank for one officer
for carrying, " orders through the hottest of the fight,"
though he was not in the battle at all : for another for
" leading a brigade/' though he was in bed. Some of
our readers will also remember his Lordship's favourable
mention of the gallant brigadier, who, he said, "ma-
nceuvered skilfully in the rear." Sir Charles Napier
was the first of our generals who mentioned a private
soldier in his despatches. How rarely has the good
example been followed, even in the Crimea ! Napier's
and a very few other cases excepted, we do not re-
member ever seeing a native soldier, in orders, though
we could narrate scores of instances of individual valour.
Of a naick and six swimming the Buri Gunga in the
face of the enemy; of a single trooper carrying a
despatch through the enemy's lines, at Setabuldee ; of
two troopers in open day, fathoming the ditch at Bhurt-
pore; of a ressaldar leading his single troop through
Shere Singh's cavalry at Mooltan ; of another, on the
frontier, carrying his into the midst of twenty times
their number, though covered by a bank. None of
those men were held up to the admiration of their com-
rades. Descending to the ridiculous, we recollect a lady
telling us that she had parted with her husband, going
to Affghanistan, with some comfort, " as Earn Singh,
the pay havildar, has promised to cover him in action,
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THE " ORDER OP MERIT."
393
and Earn Singh is a big man." The captain came
back safe, whether by Earn Singh's " ikbal" we cannot
say.
The nearest approach to the French system, in the
Indian army, is " the Order of Merit." It is open to
all ranks of the Native army for " individual gallantry "
in the field, or in the attack or defence of a fortress.
But, though its numbers are not positively limited, there
are so many restrictions to its obtainment, that " the
decorated " are so few as to be hardly discoverable. The
order is divided into three grades. The first is only ob-
tainable by tl^ose who have already won by individual
gallantry and, step by step, the second and third grades.
The badge of the first grade is a gold star with in-
scription— " The reward of valour." The decoration of
the others is of silver, with a similar motto. All are
pendant from a dark blue ribbon with red edges. With
a very large acquaintance, with the Native army, we do
not recollect having seen a dozen silver stars. We can-
not recollect seeing a single golden one. Double pay is
attached to the first grade, two-thirds increase to the
second, and one-third to the third. These are sub-
stantial advantages to the clod of a sabreur, to the
sentinel whose sinews would never have earned him a
front place in the Akhara (gymnasium) ; but what
reward are they to the adventurer whose sword, under a
different regime, would have carved out for himself a
principality? None. They are a mockery, ending as
they do, at utmost, in extreme cases, in double pay;
that is, to a ressaldar, in three hundred rupees a month,
— or if he have also obtained the first class " Order of
India " on sixty rupees additional, at fifty or sixty years
of age. But how the first class, " Order of Merit," and
double pay are to be obtained, we are at a loss to imagine.
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THE INDIAN ARMY.
He is a lucky fellow who has one chance " of individual
valour" that is accepted, by his surviving comrades,
that then satisfies the reporting Committee ; that after-
wards passes the ordeal of the Military- Auditor General,
whose duty is, not to reward valour, but to watch the
public purse, at all hazards; and, finally, that is
sanctioned by Government. Three times has this full
prooess of proof to be gone through, before the subadar
major can obtain 02 rupees a month, added to his
original ninety-two, or the ressaldar 150 + 150 = 800.
The Order of Merit, moreover, gives no handle to a
man's name. The brave man is still the simple havildar,
ressaldar, or subadar. In a country where words and
looks are even more valued than rupees, though a hero,
he is not a bahadoor. On the other hand the title,
though a military one, is freely conferred on Native
civilians and traders, of no better blood, and is arrogated
by black and white of all ranks.
But there is an order that does confer rank and title—
" The Order of British India." It is divided into two
classes, each of a hundred members, the first restricted
to subadars and ressaldars, and giving the title sirdar
bahadoor, with two rupees a day increase of pay; the
second to native officers, generally, with the title of
bahadoor and one rupee a day. The decoration is a
gold star, pendant from a blue ribbon. Though
awarded only for good service, it is virtually the reward
of old age; indeed, the wearers are mostly invalids at
their homes.
The pay, including batta, of a jemadar of regular in-
fantry (lieutenant), is 24£ rupees a month, havildar
(sergeant), fourteen; naick (corporal), twelve; sepoy,
seven. The pay of the sappers and native artillery is
the same as infantry; both should be higher; that of
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WANT OP STIMULUS.
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the regular cavalry is considerably so.* Sepoys after
sixteen years' service, with good conduct, get one rupee
extra, and after twenty years two rupees j or, in all, nine
rupees a month,
Such are the temptations we offer the military popu-
lations of India, and to the northern adventurers who
still occasionally find their way, through the passes, and
who would do so, in numbers, were there moderate in-
ducement. The mistake is in treating all alike; in
attempting to have one dead level, and still expecting
active zeal and fidelity. The astonishment is that,
under the present system, we should have so much of
both. Present rules cannot last. They are against
nature. Ninety in a hundred sepoys have every reason
to be delighted with the service. Several of the remain-
ing ten are satisfied. One, two, or three are thoroughly,
and dangerously, discontented. The reason is plain. They
feel they have that in them which elsewhere would raise
them to distinction. Our system presses them down.
The throne of Hyderabad is held by the descendant of
one such adventurer. That of Oude is, or rather was, by
another Hyder Ali, Ameer Khan. The first Holkar
and the first Scindiah were such fellows as are now in
our ranks, if indeed the Koorme slipper-bearer, and the
goat-herd would have been received into our high-caste
ranks ! Golab Singh, and Eunjeet Singh's grandfather,
were military adventurers. Several of the generals in
the Sikh service, as also some of the most powerful
amils in Oude, were, originally, sepoys in our ranks.
IRREGULAR CAVALRY.
* Subadar Major . . Rs. 150 Ressaidar Rs. 105
Subadar . . . . „ 80 Ressaidar „ 80
Jemadar . . . , „ 32 Naibs „ 50
Havildar . . . . „ 20 Jemadars „ 45
Naick „ 16 Kote Duffadars . . . „ 83
Trooper . . . . „ 9 Puffadar » 28
Sowar » 20
Troops have a ressaidar and a ressaidar, alternately.
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THE INDIAN ARMY.
Those outlets for restlessness and ability are gone ;
others are closing. It behoves us, therefore, now
more than ever, to give legitimate rewards, and as far
as practicable, employment to the energetic few, to that
leaven that is in every lump — the leaven that may secure
our empire or may disturb, — nay, even destroy it.
In early days, when Europeans fancied themselves
more dependent on Natives than at present, they were
not only more courteous, kindly, and considerate to
them than they are now ; but posts were then open
to them that, of late years, have been closed. Ma-
homed Issoof 's case, already mentioned, was an extreme
one. In those times, Native civilians were over-paid.
English civilians were denied honest wages. With few
exceptions, all were accordingly dishonest. There was
no check, no restraint. The tables were suddenly
turned. Europeans were made honest by honest treat-
ment; natives were driven to worse roguery than before,
for bread. During the last twenty years, our eyes have
been gradually opening in regard to Native civil esta-
blishments. If all have not been made honest, the
right measures have been taken to make them so. The
service is already greatly reformed. It is because the
authorities seem still in the dark, regarding the necessity
of improving the condition of the higher soldiery, that
these remarks are offered. Let the sepoy soldier be
treated as the civilian is ; that is, let there be openings
for the gentleman — for the hero. The ordinary sepoy
is amply paid. He has even been pampered and petted.
The extra battas and the donatives that he has received,
have done him harm, and induced greed. We have
been running fast on the shoal of the Sikh army,— of
the Legionaries, the Janissaries and the Mamelukes.
The many are usefully provided for, but honours and
rewards, present and future, are still wanted for the few.
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REWARDS FOR MERIT.
397
In what has been done to raise the condition of Native
civilians, Government has been influenced by the best
motive, the good of the country, the purity of the judg-
ment seat. In what we advocate there is even a nearer
interest, one that swallows up all others.
It is not easy to suggest the details of our proposed
scheme ; but there are points of it, open to every under-
standing. In the Punjab are six battalions of police ;
commanded by native officers. Excellent soldiers all.
Some of these corps were in the Sikh service, served
with. Pollock's army and again under Edwardes. Two
or three of them are doing frontier work ; all are fully
equal to average irregular battalions. Their comman-
dants, with most of the responsibilities of command, re-
ceive only 200 rupees a month, or one-fourth the pay of
a European officer in a similar position. The latter too
rises to be a general, may find himself successor to
Morrison, Casement, Pollock, Littler, Gilbert and Low
in the Council Board. The old Native officer lives and
dies a commandant on 200 rupees,* or retires on half
the amount. "Lives and rots without hope" is the
expression we once heard a comparatively young ressal-
dar use regarding himself. The sons of the comman-
dant have no opening. They would have entered the
Sikh service, as subadars, or even in their fathers' rank ;
if they enter ours, it must be as privates. We say, give
such commandants about half the pay that Europeans
get, and let their sons, if qualified, enter the service as
jemadars, and let those of other Native officers have some
advantages above the ordinary recruit.
Let also the officers of a certain number, say one, of
the irregular corps be entirely Natives. A European
brigadier commanding every two or three such, looking
* Present incumbents, some of receive their old rates of pay— 400
them colonels in the Sikh service, or 500 rupees a month. — H. M. L.
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THE INDIAN ARMY.
to the pay, discipline, tone, &c, doing, in short, much
the duty, and having the same military authority, as
captains of police in the Punjab have, though interfer-
ing with details less than they do. Give in all irregular
corps half the Company's allowances to the subadars
commanding companies, who should do all the duty of
captains except paying the men. This important duty
should always be performed by a European officer in the
presence of the commanding officer, or second in com-
mand. No room should be left for scandal or discon-
tent. Raise also the pay of subadars from 67 rupees
a month to 140, or about one-third that of captains
doing the same work. Raise proportionally the pay of
jemadars. In all corps of the line let there be no
Native officers. Their position is anomalous and absurd.
In the Bombay army there are seldom sergeant-majors
or quartermaster-sergeants, because they clash with the
Native officers. The Bombay authorities are quite
right. It is absurd, and might prove worse than
absurd, giving twenty men, " all good drills " and all
"wearing tight pantaloons," commissions, arid then
allowing them to ' be bullied by vulgar uneducated
Europeans, vnthout commissions. The anomaly, and the
heart-burnings, will be removed by having the Euro-
pean officers and sergeants with the stricter discipline,
or rather with the more English practices, in one set of
regiments ; the Native officers with the looser, the French
system, in others. By removing Native officers from
corps professedly commanded, and officered by Euro-
peans, though too often really managed by havildar
majors, opportunity would be given to the European
officer to look into the interior economy of his regiment
or company. Seldom is anything of the kind done at
present. So long as all is smooth and quiet on the
surface, few inquiries are made. All may be rotten
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PROPOSED REFORMS.
399
below; the jog-trot is followed— a mine may be ready to
be sprung, for all that nine-tenths of the officers would
know. Many do not know the very names of the men of
their own company.
No great expense need be incurred in carrying out
the proposed arrangement. There are plenty of regi-
ments, an excess of men, scarcely a deficiency of officers.
We repeat that organization and adaptation, mainly, are
wanted. Let the one hundred and five infantry corps
of the line be gradually converted into a hundred and
twenty five service, and thirty veteran corps. Let 18
of the present 24 officers be removed from each of the
30 veteran regiments, and be divided among the 125
service ones, leaving the three field officers with one
selected captain and two selected subalterns, in all six
European officers. Omitting two field officers as gene-
rally absent, four officers will thus remain, all being
selections. This would leave 640 officers available for
service corps, which number, increased by eighty-five,
would provide five additional officers for each, and thus
increase their strength to twenty-nine. Allowing then
nine for field officers, and for absentees, on private and
medical leave, twenty officers, or two for each company,
would be present with each service regiment.
The scheme involves the disposal of all staff officers
in a staff corps, also eighty-five additional officers, and
one hundred promotions to rank of captain. The pro-
portions of the relative ranks we would thus suggest
for the 125 regiments, would be three field officers, as
at present, eight captains, twelve lieutenants, and six
ensigns, instead of six, ten, and five, as now. And
attached to each of the thirty veteran corps, three field
officers (only one to be present), one selected captain and
five selected subalterns.
To make this or any other scheme work, the service,
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THE INDIAN ARMY.
not individuals, must be considered. Incompetent field
and other senior officers must be rigorously set aside.
None incapable should be at the head of any corps,
regular or irregular, service or veteran. There is no
knowing where exigencies may arise. The Calcutta
militia and the Ramgurh battalion should have as good
officers and as good arms as the frontier regiments.
There is at least no excuse for their being badly armed.
It is very bad economy to send a soldier into action
with any but the very best muskets in his hand. Inca-
pables may be shelved as seconds in command, but they
had better be sent home, even with a brevet step. The
title of major or lieutenant-colonel will do no harm as
long as it be not accompanied by authority. Old men,
with their senses about them, and with the use of their
legs, may command veterans, but there should b$ a
limit to the age, even of such incumbents. The now
pending orders as to vacation of staff commands are
anomalous, and, if they be decided against brevet
officers, will be absurd. To replace a man of fifty by
one of sixty is indeed a novel mode of regenerating an
army, wanting, above all wants, new blood, life and
energy. Commands of all corps should be given to the
very best officers available. Their staff should be strictly
selections. These should be posts of high honour, and of
considerable emolument. The veterans should have all
the advantages of other corps of the line, the men being
older and the Company's officers being Natives. Such
corps will be available for all home service, that is,
service within the Provinces, and will be specially va-
luable, if treated with honour and consideration, for
guards on forts, magazines, and treasuries. Majors
and captains should obtain brevet rank for three
years' command of regiments. Subalterns of ten
years' service and captains of twenty should receive
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VARIOUS SUGGESTIONS.
401
one-fourth increased pay. Half batta should be
abolished. It is an injustice and an inconvenience,
and costs on the one hand, as much as it saves on the
other.
A large proportion of the expense thus suggested
may be covered by a reduction in the strength of com-
panies, throughout the service, and by departmental
clippings ; but supposing the balance of expense to be
half a million a-year, which would be its utmost limit,
we hold that such a sum would be well expended in
making a more contented and a more efficient army.
It is not a very numerous army, but a really efficient and a
contented one, that is wanted. Much of the duty still
performed at Bombay, and some that is done elsewhere,
by the army, might with advantage be made over to
the police so as greatly to relieve the ranks. Indeed,
the military might be entirely relieved of escorts, jail
guards, &c.
Officers should serve five years in the line before
being eligible for the staff, the examinations for which,
in every department, should be strict. Those for civil and
political employ should involve the tests in the lan-
guages required of interpreters. At Madras, Tamul
should be a requisite.* Exchanges should be permitted
between regiments, even of different Presidencies, also
between cavalry and infantry up to the rank of captain.
It is ridiculous to keep a man, who cannot ride in a
mounted corps. Good may be derived from exchanges,
harm cannot. The armies of the Presidencies should,
as at present, be kept separate with separate com-
manders of the forces, but with one Commander-in-
Chief, relieved from the Bengal command, for all.
Proper emulation, and some check, is caused by these
* Mr. P. Melvill shows that 2500 wants in Hindustani. — H. M. L.
Madras Sepoys cannot express their
D D
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THE INDIAN ARMY.
separations. Eates of pay have already been almost
entirely assimilated. For future incumbents there
should be no differences. The great question of sim-
plifying and making plain to all ranks, what is their
pay under all circumstances, has yet to be resolved.
Whoever effects the measure will save much discontent,
if not some mutinies.
The arrangement for the supply of Native officers
will be the most difficult part of our proposed arrange-
ments. From the hundred and twenty-five service
corps of the line, let old havildars be transferred for pro-
motion to veteran battalions for home duties, and the
younger to service corps for frontier and SonlAal-like
work. The veterans, we repeat, should be corps of
honour, manned by sepoys of good character above
forty years of age, or of weak and worn constitutions,
from all other corps, and officered by subadars and
jemadars of similar stamp, from the same quarters.
The Native officers of irregular corps should be partly
from their own ranks, partly young picked men from
the line. Unless they are so selected, and unless they
are unmistakably good men, commanding officers of
irregulars will often pester their lives out. Their
berths will not be worth holding. The utmost honest
care will be required in making selections for transfer.
We repeat, that to all these corps, veteran and irregular,
first-rate European officers must be attached; four to
the first, five to the others. Their names to be borne
on the strength of the staff corps.
As a general rule we would require every sepoy to
serve a certain period in the ranks. Consideration
should also be paid to seniority, to cleanliness, smart-
ness, and soldierly bearing, rather than to literary ac-
quirements. Too much stress is now laid on reading
and writing ; we otight to remember that the military
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REWARDS TO NATIVE SOLDIERS.
403
class, as a body, despises study. Time, at least, should
be given them to get over their prejudices. Eecent
orders on this subject are very unpalatable to many of
our best soldiers. Indeed, very few of our worthiest
old warriors would be now ressaldars and subadars if
they had had to pass present tests. They should not
be educated above their positions. To add literary
attainment to Pathan and Brahmin pride of birth, and
still to keep Brahmins and Pathans under serjeant-
majors, is a grievous mistake. There are sepoys in the
Bombay army who translate treatises on drill and
tactics. This is hardly safe. Havildars, unqualified
for promotion to either of the above classes of corps
should, on retirement, after certain terms of good ser-
vice, receive a step of rank. The present system of
invaliding is defective. The Madras and Bombay
armies invalid eight and ten years earlier than is the
practice in Bengal. With them almost any man is
passed after fifty years of age, and so it generally
should be. Few Native soldiers are fit for field service
after that age, though many are up to all garrison
duties at sixty. In Bengal the term for invaliding
should be shortened ; but at the same time there should
be more check on malingering for pension after fifteen
years. Veteran battalions would be a check. They
exist already in Madras and Bombay; but Bengal,
which most wants them, has none.
The higher prizes for the very select have now to be
considered. They should as of old, be commands of
Hill forts, and jaghirs. Also, as at present, titles of
honour and pensions, &c, but on increased scales, com-
mensurate with the present British position, where we
gave hundreds when subordinate to the nabobs of
Arcot and Bengal, we should, now as successors of the
Mogul, give thousands. The practice, however, has
d 2
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THE INDIAN ARMY.
been rather reversed. Jaghirs, that were once perhaps
too freely dispensed, are now entirely withheld. An able
and deserving public servant, ambitions to possess what,
above all else, a Native desires, viz. : a bit of land of
his own, has now hardly a road to its obtainment but
by plotting to subvert our rule. At least, so it may
easily seem to him. Why oblige such conduct ? The
labourer is worthy of his hire, — the faithful servant of
his reward. Why make him, at least in heart, a rebel,
because he thinks Government an ingrate? We, in-
tentionally, personify Government. Every Native does
' so. The general, colonel, commissioner, or collector is,
to him the Government. He perceives the great powers
for mischief in the hands of such an official ; he cannot
credit that he has no power to reward. He, accordingly,
thinks him ungrateful. Much good service is thus lost ;
much bad feeling engendered. It matters little in the
calm ; it might matter much in the storm. Are calms
so lasting, storms so rare? The objections to giving
estates appear to us of no weight. Under the present
settlement of estates there is protection to the culti-
vator. At worst the old soldier would not be harder
on the ryot, than are the Jotee Pershads who are fast
buying up villages throughout the Provinces. Or, if
jaghirs be denied, let some of the zemindaries be pur-
chased by Governmeiit and reserved, either in fee-simple,
or as zemindaries, as the great rewards to the faithful
soldiers of the higher ranks. Such grants need not, as
a rule, be in perpetuity. Two or three lives will be a
long vista to the old trooper or sepoy. Five hundred
rupees in such form will go further than a thousand in
any other. We beg attention to the fact ; we write of
what we know.
In the same spirit we could name a hundred forts, or
other posts, which could, with perfect safety, be en-
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HONORARY DISTINCTIONS.
405
trusted to Native officers, and would be prized by them
as honourable retiring berths. Titles and honours are
cheap; they cost nothing and are greatly valued.
Medals to the mass should be abolished. Decorations
are brought into contempt, when worn by individuals,
or by whole regiments known to have run away, or even
when largely distributed to those who were not under
fire. The "Order of Merit " and that of "British
India " should be largely extended, and should be open
to Europeans and Natives of all ranks. There should
be two branches of each, one civil and the other mili-
tary. Titles should be attached to the higher grades ;
pecuniary grants to, at least, all the lower. There
would be difficulties in the way. In what scheme are
there not difficulties ? The first Napoleon found no in-
superable difficulties in his selections for the Legion of
Honour. We doubt if either Napoleon ever decorated
a notorious coward; that is, one who had given proof
of cowardice. So it might be with us. The army
itself can sufficiently judge such questions. After
each action, let a hundred or thousand decorations be
adjudged. No difficulty will be found in ascertaining
who are best entitled to them. There may be heart-
burnings and dissatisfaction ; there cannot be more than
at present. Half the value of a decoration is lost to
A. B. and C, when it is also worn by D. E. and F.
We have much to say on many other points, but
must reserve most of our remarks for another occasion.
The great, the vital question is the officering of the
army. We have roughly sketched our scheme — roughly,
but we hope sufficiently to explain our meaning. Sir
Charles Napier, a general of decided ability and of
large experience, who had led both Bengal and Bombay
troops into action, has declared that the present system
is canvassed in every guard-room. To a certain extent
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THE INDIAN ARMY.
this assertion is correct, and the fact bodes no good.
Sir Charles advocated the introduction of Natives into
the covenanted ranks of the army, but he would have
found it difficult to carry out his scheme ; caste, food,
a hundred causes, will, for a half a century at least,
present such amalgamation. The difficulties far exceed
those of entrance into the civil and medical services,
and in them they are not small. But, if all that ought
to be done cannot be done, there is no reason why we
we should sit still and wait until obvious rights are
clamoured for ; until, in a voice somewhat louder than
that of the European officers, in the days of Clive, the
" excellent drills " and the " tight pantalooned " combine
to assert their claims. What the European officers have
repeatedly done, may surely be expected from Natives.
We shall be unwise to wait for such occasion. Come
it will, unless anticipated. A Clive may not be then at
hand.
Those who have watched events, or have studied
Indian Military History, can distinctly trace almost all
past murmurs and mutinies, we might indeed say every
one, to some error or omission, trivial or great, of
our own. Pay has been the great stumbling-block.
Whether in Bombay, Madras, or Bengal, doubts as
to the intentions of Government in regard to pay
have been at the bottom of most mutinies. In Bengal
such affairs have generally been exaggerated, while in
Madras and Bombay they are kept quiet, if not hushed
up. We confess to preferring the quiet system — wash-
ing dirty linen at home: the linen should, however,
always be washed, somewhere and somehow; quietly,
but fully.
This motive to mischief should be disposed of at
once. It should not be in the power of any stupid
commander or paymaster to refuse what Government
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WANT OP A GOOD CODE.
407
had conceded. The Bombay rule of auditing all bills
before payment is good ; and preventing retrenchments,
shuts one door of dissatisfaction. But even at Bombay,
a plain unmistakable code is wanted in addition even
to " Jameson's." One has repeatedly been attempted,
but has always failed of accomplishment. Amusement
might be derived from the narrative of the failures, if
the results were less grave. We look anxiously for the
very long promised Bengal Code, but fear disappoint-
ment. An officer who had scarcely done any regi-
mental duty, with a regular corps for twenty years, aided
by two young artillery officers, however clever, was
not the fitting president, and they were not the fitting
members, of a committee to prepare a code for all
branches of the Bengal army. We strongly recom-
mend that the new code, with all others extant, of
the three Presidencies, be made over to a committee
of mixed artillery, cavalry, and infantry officers, and
that a code for India be prepared, in which every
question, involving the rights of individuals, of all
branches of the three armies, should be distinctly and
unmistakably laid down in the briefest way consistent
with clearness. Such a code would be more valuable
than three more European regiments, or than five
hundred miles of rail.
The other chief cause of mutiny is religion — fanati-
cism. Hitherto it has been restricted to Mahommedans.
Hindus are content to be let alone. The faithful not
only desire to proselytize, but go out of their way to
annoy their neighbours with their ceremonies. On two
or three occasions we have witnessed Mohurrum proces-
sions ostentatiously drawn up opposite a Christian
church during Divine service, and there drumming
lustily. The late Bolarum affair, like most Indian
questions, has been taken up with party spirit, Briga*
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THE INDIAN ARMY.
dier Mackenzie possesses much of the Covenanter spirit,
and Mrs. Mackenzie's book is unpopular (we hope not
Mrs. Mackenzie, objectionable as are many parts of her
work) ; therefore we fear the attack upon him was ac-
cepted, in some quarters, in a controversial spirit. But
having read much on the subject, we cannot discover
what legitimate offence wras given, and fully approve
the order which sentences all directly connected with
the murderous attack on Mackenzie to condign punish-
ment, and all responsible to be dismissed the service.
The Hyderabad contingent, of all classes, is a distin-
guished body, but the Deccan Mahommedans, pretty
generally, are fanatical and insubordinately disposed,
beyond anything to be found elsewhere in India, except,
perhaps, at Patna and on the Peshawur border. Wit-
ness Colonel Davies's murder in 1827, and the more
recent mutiny of the 4th Madras Cavalry. Davies, like
Mackenzie, was a fearless chivalrous fellow. Their
cases were even more alike than their characters. On
the impulse of the moment, the comrades of the mur-
derers avenged Colonel Davies's death, but the murder
was approved of by the Mahommedans of that day and
neighbourhood, and the ringleader's grave shortly be-
came a place of pilgrimage and a resort for Mussulman
devotees The attack on Mackenzie was also by fanatics,
and was, perhaps, more premeditated. Mackenzie is-
sued a perfectly legitimate order; it was disobeyed.
His mistake was in personally interfering. The error
nearly cost his life, and may yet do so. His wounds
were frightful, few men could have survived them. His
dauntless spirit sustained him. However, this and
other matters of the kind should make us more than
ever cautious against real offence. A cap, a beard, a
moustache, a strap, all in their time have given offence.
All on pretence of religion. But by a little management,
TREATMENT OF EUROPEANS.
409
by leading instead of drawing, almost anything may be
done. The man who would not touch leather a few
years ago, is now, in the words of a fine old subadar,
" up to the chin in it!' But the same old fellow begged
that the leather might stop there, and that leather caps
might not be tried. In the corps of which that old
gentleman was a worthy member, leather cap-straps had
been accepted gratis, in preference to paying an anna or
two for cloth ones. We mention the fact as showing
what may be done with men who have all but mutinied
because the Grenadiers were told to occupy the Light
Company huts : and at another time because they thought
they had been prohibited taking their bedding to the
guard-room. Tact and management, not Brahminwm, in
officers, are wanted. Hindus and Mahommedans can
respect real Christianity. They certainly do not respect
Anglo-Hindooism.
Sir William Gomm's farewell order tells how much
has recently been done for the European portion of the
army. Barracks are improved; gardens, libraries, and
other sources of amusement will soon be as plentiful as
they used to be scarce. Little more is wanted than to
prevent individual commanding officers nullifying the
good intentions of Government, by keeping sickly men
in the plains, and sending bad characters in their places
to the Hills ; bullying the men, torturing them with
stocks, cloth coats, and hot weather drills — in short,
making what are called smart regiments at the expense
of the men's very lives. Bailroads, waggon trains, and
steamers should now prevent Europeans being moved
between April and November. Too much is heard of
the sun {not from them) when they are wanted for field
service, but when there is no such necessity they are too
frequently exposed, even in April and May. Brigadiers
and generals of divisions, as well as regimental officers,
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THE INDIAN ARMY.
should be held responsible for such cruel follies. The
European soldier is, after all, our stand-by. We are
delighted at every unattached commission that we ob-
serve given to a Company's European soldier. Like his
officer he has more average emolument than his comrade
in the Royal ranks, but like him is debarred great re-
ward. Until lately, commissions were not open to the
soldiers ; yearly, we hope, they will become more com-
mon. With such rewards, and with rational pursuits
open to the men, the tone of the barracks will rise.
Drunkenness, we trust, will yet be the exception rather
than the rule. Chunar should be abolished ; it is a dis-
credit to us.
We will no further enter on the vexed question of
cavalry than to remark that we generally support
Captain Nolan's views. We mis-arm and mis-dress the
trooper, bit and saddle his horse as if the object were
not to hold and ride him, and then we wonder that the
same trooper is no match for a comparatively feeble and
ill-mounted Asiatic horseman. The complaint made in
India is equally rife in Africa and in the Caucasus. A
recent French writer observes that one Arab is good for
three French dragoons. We ourselves have witnessed
one Indian horseman dealing with three English dra-
goons. The annexed extract from Spencer's " Crimea "
shows that to repulse Circassian cavalry the Russians
are obliged to bring guns to bear on them : —
" In other situations, on the banks of rivers or open places, they are
equally dangerous, provided their inimitable cavalry can act ; for, should
they unexpectedly surprise a Russian army, a charge from these terrible
horsemen is a most disastrous affair. They then sweep down upon them
like a living avalanche, and invariably throw the front and rear into con-
fusion, cut them in pieces, and disappear before the artillery can be
brought to play upon them." — Page 327.
There can be little doubt that the Kegulars have been
over abused afid Irregulars unduly bespattered with
praise. The comrades of the men who rode at Laswaree,
REGULAR AND IRREGULAR CAVALRY.
411
Delhi, Setabuldee, and Meanee, only want good leading
and good management to ride through any Indian
cavalry. The disappearance of "the small speck of
Trench grey " at Setabuldee, amid the host of Arabs,
rivals Unitt and the 3rd Dragoons at Chilianwalla,
Ouvrey at Sobraon, and the Light Brigade at Balaclava.
Why is it that one British regiment, the 3rd Dragoons,
for instance, always covers itself with glory, while
others go through campaigns unheard of? The men,
materials, all but the leading, is the same ! To talk of
all the Irregular Cavalry as heroes is as absurd as to
call all the Regulars cowards. We personally know
many brave men who ran at Purwandurrah. That
story also has yet to be told. The leaders were brave
men, but they were not good Native cavalry officers.
No man can manage well or lead successfully men whom he
dislikes.
We would not convert a man of Regular Cavalry
into Irregulars, but we would have three regiments of
Company's dragoons in lieu of six of Regular Cavalry.
All others should stand, but they should be dealt with
much as we have proposed for the infantry. The Native
officers should be collected in three or four out of the
twenty-one regiments, with bond fide power and pay, as
troop officers ; but to those corps four selected officers
should be attached. Every trooper should be permitted
to fit his own saddle, and adapt his bit to his own horse.
Lancers should be abolished, and the tulwar, the weapon
of the Indian horseman, should be allowed, as also a
carbine and one pistol, to each trooper. It must be
borne in mind that they are light horsemen, not heavy
dragoons.
Most of the Irregulars are good of their kind. Some
very good, some bad. Some of the officers cannot ride ;
some cannot talk to their men, others do so only to
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THE INDIAN ARMY.
abuse them. Some of the regiments are overwhelmed with
debt ; and yet burdened with bankers, and with all sorts
of tomfoolery in dress. In short, there is little system,
and no uniformity in the service. One regiment wear
kettles on their heads, others wear cocked hats. Few
wear their own sensible turbans that will stop a sword-
cut and keep their faces cool. An inspector is wanted ;
not an old Eoyal dragoon officer, but a first-rate Irregular
officer — a Jacob, a Chamberlain, an Anderson, a Daly,
or a Malcolm. A man, in short, who will go on com-
mon sense principles, keep the men out of debt, insist
on rational uniform and rational treatment. Such as
the Irregulars are, there are very few instances of their
misconduct, and then only when greatly over-matched ;
indeed, unfairly tried. They are a most valuable arm
and deserve every consideration. With such an arrange-
ment as above proposed, and five rupees added to the
pay of the men, a noble body of horsemen might be
secured to the Government, and fitting employment
offered to the numerous broken-down families, now mut-
tering curses against us, in the streets of every large
city in Upper India. Lord Gough, Sir Charles Napier,
and almost all Irregular Cavalry officers, recommend the
increase, even on the terms of reduction of strength of
regiments. If thirty rupees is necessary for the Scinde
Horse and for the Hyderabad (in the Deccan*) Cavalry,
twenty-five is surely so for the whole body. In scarce
times the Irregulars have not bread. In war time they
must plunder for subsistence. Sir Charles Napier
thought they must do so in peace. What more need
be said ? If more be required, let us add that each of
these horsemen is a soldier gained from the enemy's
ranks.
* Until lately the Hyderabad Ca- pany's rupees a month. — H. M. I.
valry received thirty-three Corn-
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AEMY EEPOEM.
[written in 1856.]
Our last essay abruptly closed with some meagre
mention of the cavalry. We propose now to con-
tinue our rough notes on the most urgent wants of
the army, especially on those which most easily admit
of remedy: to tell of all its wants would require a
goodly volume. It is, however, consolatory to think
that the most glaring defects are not only on the sur-
face, but can be removed without difficulty. Their
remedy only requires the exercise of ordinary common
sense, in the appliance of materials ready at hand, and a
very slight pull at the purse-strings ; indeed proportion-
ately a less pull than would be required to insure the
life of a healthy soldier. An expenditure of three or
four per cent, on the present eleven millions, and plac-
ing the right man in the right place, would do all that
is required — would convert a discontented into a con-
tented army ; an immoveable into a moveable one ;
would put it beyond the power of any section of the
military community to beard the Government ; perhaps
to destroy it.
We pretend to no panacea for all military evils, to
chalk out no military Utopia, but simply to bring before
the public, in very brief form, the experience of all ages
in all departments ; to show that men of like creeds,
influenced by like motives, and moving under like con-
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ARMY REFORM.
diticms, will combine ; that they have always done so in
every clime. Further, that creed and colour are to be
greatly nullified by slightly-varied conditions. Above
all, that every man, whatever be his country, creed, or
colour, has his particular ambition, and that such am-
bition varies, not only with general creed, colour, and
country, but with individual temperament, constitu-
tion, and circumstances. That the ambition of very few
European soldiers is limited, in their old age, to abund-
ance of cheap grog at Chunar, Cuddalore, or Dapoulee.
That, though many sepoys would delight to retire and
smoke their hubble-bubbles under the shade of their
village trees, yet that their ranks contain many fit for
higher destinies, panting for them, and sullen at their
non-obtainment. Such are the objects of our past and
present essays. To help the Government by helping
its servants ; to induce the former to effect the usual
insurance on its property, and prepare the fire-engines
before the house is on fire ; to urge on each individual
his own particular duty. Some of our readers will
doubtless remark, that we are propounding mere truisms
which everybody knows. Everybody does know; but
what authority does act on the knowledge of the forego-
ing facts ? Are the right men everywhere in the right
places ? Is the army as efficient as it might be ? Is it
in any rank contented ? A dozen more such questions
might be answered by all honest men, in the negative.
If such be the case, we request attention to what we have
said in the preceding essay, as also to the following
remarks. We are quite aware that they are loosely,
perhaps illogically arranged. Our facts, however, are
beyond question; and we feel that our inferences are
not strained. We accordingly propose to hammer both
facts and inferences into the public, in our own rough
way, until they have at least a trial.
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DISADVANTAGES OP THE SENIORITY SYSTEM. 415
In military matters the Government of India starts
on wrong principles. Strict seniority never secured
efficiency in any department, in any country. It has
only been by superseding the seniors, after the first
bungling campaign of each war, that the British army
has escaped great disaster. To a less extent the
example has been followed in India, whero the remedy
was much more wanted. Why not prevent war by
preparations ? Si via pacem para helium. Muskets and
accoutrements, cannon and munitions are all prepared
during peace. It would be considered a crying shame
for arms to be kept unpolished, belts uncleaned, lines,
barracks, and magazines to be slovenly and dirty ; but
what is all this to having at the heads of armies, divi-
sions, brigades, and regiments, men less efficient than
nine-tenths of those under them ? To have age and com-
parative inefficiency in all posts of authority. To drive
the Cromwells and Washingtons from our ranks, and in
lieu of them, to place the Whitelockes, Englands, and
Elphinstones in command!
That this parallel is not exaggerated, every man with
an eye to see and an ear to hear can ascertain for him-
self. He may discover, as we have done, a corps of
Light horse in which nearly every trooper is close on
fifty years of age. The old gentlemen paint and dye to
such an extent, and are so well set up, that casual ob-
servers might easily mistake a " boodha" for a "puckha
jutcan" He may talk to subadars and jemadars, sixty
and even seventy years old. He may perhaps, have
served under a commander-in-chief who could not
mount or sit upon a horse ; perhaps his own command-
ing officer can do neither. When he has thus cast his
eye around, he may contemplate the Jacobs, Chamber-
laines, Maynes, Malcolms, Taylors, Edwardeses, Lums-
dens, Cokes, Nicholsons, and others, who, however,
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ARMY REFORM.
favoured above those of their own standing, still chafe at
their positions, still feel that they have not their fitting
places, and that a seniority service is not the service for
them. With regard to the many Singhs and Khans,
Syuds, Begs and Tewaries, who, with even more reason,
— because their attainable position* is much more sub-
ordinate— pine in the ranks of the army, such men, one
after another, leave its service. A lieutenant-colonelcy
would have retained Washington in the British service.
An accident detained Cromwell in England. Men of
kindred spirit are not so easily obtained that, when
found, they should be scorned, or lightly set aside.
Clive conquered and saved India. Individuals have,
probably several times since preserved the country.*
An individual may also, any day, bring it to the verge
of ruin; nevertheless scores of individuals, not one of
whom would have been intrusted in his youth, health,
and strength with the charge of a mill, by a sensible
cotton-spinner, during a disturbance, are now placed in
commands, where their incompetence may any day blow
a spark into a flame that may cost hundreds of lives and
millions of money. We might go even further, and
show that some of these men have, at every stage of
their career, proved their incompetence. That as- young
or middle-aged men, they have been set aside or super-
seded, to have, in their old age, commands thrust upon
them, and to be pushed into authority, even on the
frontier, to the hinderance of distinguished officers.
Such men also are frequently supported by comman-
dants of regiments of kindred spirit and physique. The
latter, of course, recommend, for promotion to commis-
sions, the oldest Native soldiers, the grounds of election
* Forty years ago Metcalfe wrote, again may the fate of a great part
" Often has the fate of India de- of India depend on a single army."
pended on a single army ; often He lived to verily his words.
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THE CAVALRY.
417
being that old men are the most inoffensive, the least
dangerous. What would the cotton-spinner, or the
mill-master, say to such a system? Why, that the
Indian Government deserve to have an inefficient army.
But to return to details. The closing remarks of our
last essay referred to the Cavalry. We have since made
minute calculations, and find that the cost of Irregulars
and Regulars is about three to seven against the latter.
We have not the means of estimating the proportion of
pensions, but are satisfied that the differences would
make the ratio fully equal to three to one. That is,
fifteen hundred more efficient horsemen, for light horse
duty, could be obtained for what now maintains five
hundred. What possible reason then is there for de-
laying a day, to commence modifying the cavalry to
the extent recommended in our last essay? No in-
dividual, black or white, need be injured; whilst the
Government and the army, and many individuals, would
greatly benefit. A few words of warning, however.
Let not half our scheme be taken. Let not a mongrel
system be introduced, or rather continued. Every man,
high or low, cognizant of the whole system, allows that
the pay of the majority of Irregulars is now too low.
Lord Dalhousie allowed it. Sir Charles Napier not
only recorded the fact, but fixed thirty, instead of
twenty, rupees a month for the troopers he himself
raised. He paid Native officers proportionally. Let
then twenty-five, or at the least twenty-four, rupees be
the horseman's pay ; and, what is equally important, let
pensions be raised to the footing of the line. With
such increases, the expenses of reformed Irregulars will
hardly exceed half that of the present Regulars.
We beg those who object to our proposition, to con-
sider what it costs themselves, throughout the year, to
keep a horse with gear, accoutrements, &c. Let them
£ £
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ARMY REFORM.
then bear in mind, that the sowar has to provide for bad
as well as for good seasons, and for dear as well as for
cheap localities ; for Candahar, with grain at a seer the
rupee ; as well as for grain countries where thirty and
forty seers may be obtained. Government allow mounted
officers thirty rupees a month for each horse ; few gain
materially by such contract; and yet twenty is given
to the trooper, who ought not to be materially worse
.mounted! Of this twenty, after deductions for the
remount-fund, clothing, gear, washing, watermen, bar-
ber, &c, there is not, we firmly believe, a sowar in the
service who receives more than seventeen, to feed him-
self, his family, and his horse, and to provide arms, a
tent, and a hut ! Fix, then, twenty as the sum to be
actually paid to each man, every month. Let the balance,
whether four or five rupees, be retained in the com-
mandant's hands for remounts, clothing, &c, and be
accounted for every six months. If commanding
officers are fit for their berths, they should be able to
arm, mount, and equip their regiments better than
individuals can. One hundred and fifty rupees is now
the usual price of a remount. Where such sum is
insufficient — which in some parts of the country is
occasionally the case — the unfortunate sowar, already
perhaps burdened with debt, has to give the difference,
possibly thirty or fifty rupees, from his seventeen rupees
monthly pay. He is thus swamped for life. The pro-
posed scheme would prevent the necessity of debt, and
would enable every sowar to ride a three-hundred-rupee
horse.
"Bargeers," as now constituted, should be entirely
abolished. No respectable man will take service as a
bargeer, who, when away from head-quarters, is little
better than a servant to the owner of the horse. Nine
bargeers out of ten, of this class, are disreputable
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THE CAVALRY.
419
fellows. Let the head of a respectable family have
as " bargeers " whatever number, within moderation, of
his relations he may wish to bring with him. There
is no danger of their being made servants of, or
of their chief making money out of them. He will
neither be willing nor able to do so. Each man will
receive his full Government pay ; the chief being con-
tented that they, being his assamees, are dependent on
and look up to him as their head. He is thus able
to control his young relations, to keep them from being
extravagant and to restrain their debaucheries, &c. If
it be objected that we advocate the old system of
brotherhoods, and throw undue power into the hands of
Native officers, we deny the imputation. Limit the
number of " bargeers " as at present, but encourage good
men to introduce their kinsmen into the ranks. Go-
vernment is thus strengthened ; the enemy weakened.
No Native banker should on any account be allowed.
Many regiments do without them ; there is no reason
why all should not : they only encourage extravagance
and debt.
Our scheme, then, for the mounted branch of the
army, is, for Bengal, two regiments of European dra-
goons, and six of regular cavalry, all fully officered ; with
similar proportions for the other Presidencies. The rest
of the cavalry, under whatever names, irregular, con-
tingents, legionaries, &c, to be designated " Hindustani
Horse," on not less than twenty-four rupees a month ;
three-fourths of the regiments to have each three or
four European officers ; the others to be commanded by
natives, and to have a brigadier* over every two or three
regiments. An inspector is part, and not the least im-
portant part, of this scheme. He should be an officer
of experience, temper, and discretion, answering, as far
* The brigadier to be paymaster : that is, buhshee and deputy inspector.
E K 2
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ARMY REFORM.
as possible, the description given by Lieutenant Jervis,
of an efficient cavalry commander. Indeed, such men
only should command cavalry regiments, and from the
best of them brigadiers (bukshees) should be selected.
A Wellington makes an army ; one man can make or
mar a regiment or a brigade.
If there have been repetitions in the above remarks,
the importance of the subject demands them all. The
question involved is, whether by reforms, consonant not
only to the spirit of the age but to the genius of the
Hindustani horseman, increased contentment and in-
creased efficiency are to be given to the whole mounted
branch of the Indian army ; the expense demanded to
meet the required change being only about twelve lakhs,
or £120,000 a-year.
We are quite aware of the financial necessities of the
State, and therefore would not throw away a rupee.
But bad cavalry are worse than none. If, then, there
be not means to meet reforms, let the strength of regi-
ments be reduced sufficiently to provide the necessary
funds. Four hundred efficient and contented troopers
would, in war or in peace, be very preferable to five
hundred discontented, badly-equipped, and badly-horsed
sowars.
Regiments, though weak in numbers, would be
efficient and safe. Hundreds of expectants, all pre-
pared for Jacob's ordeal of "a stiff leap on a bare-
backed horse," would always be ready for the ranks of
a popular service. In a month, under the proposed sys-
tem, the Hindustani horse might be increased by a
sixth, and in three months be doubled. Such a service
would give bread in comfort to the poor soldier of for-
tune, and would afford a chance of honour and compe-
tence to the Native gentleman. The system would, at
least, not drive them from our ranks to Cabul, er to any
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421
native service ; there to introduce our discipline, and, as
has often'been the case, to turn our own weapons against
ourselves.
Let it not be said that the writer of these remarks
has a personal interest in Regulars or Irregulars. He
has just the interest, and no more, in the cavalry ques-
tion, and in army reform generally, that has every loyal
British subject in India. It is his interest that the
army, in all its branches, should be both safe and effi-
cient. Every man is not born a soldier, much less a
trooper, nor are horses to be had for the asking. Care,
selection, and timely arrangement are scarcely less re-
quisite for organizing cavalry than artillery. We lift
our voice loudly in the calm ; that it may not be needed in
the storm.
One word more on this point. The Calcutta Review
has furnished during the last thirteen years, ample
facts and ample theories. Let Government make se-
lections and lay them before three of their best and
least-prejudiced cavalry officers, with orders to carry out
details. To fix the arms and accoutrements, for both
regular and irregular cavalry, and once for all, to set
at rest all controverted questions. We are quite con-
vinced that this scheme carried out, in its full spirit,
would give the Indian Government the best light horse
in the world for Indian purposes ; we might indeed add
for Asiatic purposes.
Regarding both cavalry and infantry, we have an-
other suggestion to offer, viz., that the recruiting-field
should be extended. Oude should no longer supply the
mass of our infantry and regular cavalry; indeed,
twenty years hence, it will be unable to do so. The
Punjab, Nepaul, and the Delhi territory should be more
largely indented on ; as should the whole North- West
Provinces, and the military classes of Bombay and
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ARMY REFORM.
Madras. Hardy men, of fair average height, not
giants, are wanted for light horsemen. The Zouaves
and Goorkhas prove that the biggest light infantry are
not the bravest. We have too long tilled the same
fields.
If proof were wanted that abundance of Sikhs are
ready to enter the ranks, Captain Eattray has settled
the point. When Sikhs volunteer for Bengal on police-
pay, they will assuredly accept better service in better
climes. Already have they fought on the Irrawaddy,
and volunteered for the Crimea. But assuredly the
right plan has not yet been followed, for getting the
best Sikhs. As usual, extremes have been tried. On
annexation, of the 40,000 or 50,000 Sikhs thrown out
of employ, scarcely a tenth were taken into British pay.
The Punjab Irregular Corps were even restricted to ten
Sikhs a company. All of a sudden, within two years
of the issue of the above restriction, the enlistment of
two hundred Sikhs in every regiment of the line was
authorized. This was, indeed, going to the other ex-
treme. Fortunately, the measure failed, or the Sikh
punchayut system would probably have been introduced
into the British ranks. Some few Native infantry regi-
ments, stationed in the Punjab, did boast of having
enlisted " a hundred or more " fine Sikhs, " who had
fought against us in every battle of both campaigns."
This was just what might have been expected, but what
ought to have been avoided. The older Sikh soldiers
should have been sent to their homes, and encouraged
to expend their energies at the plough. Their young
kinsmen should have been enrolled in irregular regi-
ments throughout India, and should thus have been
gradually introduced to British discipline. There was
too much of the leaven of insubordination in the Sikh
army, to make the sepoy ranks fitting places for the old
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THE SIKH SOLDIERY.
423
khalsa, or even for their sons. Time, new scenes, and
strict discipline, under officers acquainted with their
virtues and their vices, were wanted. The ship has,
however, righted itself. The Hindoo prejudices of
commanding officers have kept the Sikhs aloof from
many regular corps, and driven them out of others.
Some gentlemen wished to cut their hair, forgetting that
the very essence of Sikhism lies in its locks. Other
officers found Sikhs dirty and troublesome ; others, pro-
bably, unable to get young recruits, hesitated to enlist
the veterans of Sher Singh's army. The result is, that
the Bombay army has ceased to enlist Sikhs, and that
in the seventy-four Bengal infantry regiments, there
are scarcely three thousand of that faith. We believe
we should be nearer the mark, were we to say half that
number, for some Sikhs have abjured Sikhism, others
have been driven out of it, and not a shadow of
encouragement has been given to counteract the quiet,
but persistent opposition of the Oude and Behar men.
That such opposition is no small obstacle to the in-
troduction of new classes into the army, all experienced
officers know full well. Even the determination of the
present Commander-in-Chief at Madras, when com-
manding the Hurriana Light Infantry, eighteen years
ago, did not enable him to carry such a measure. He
tried to introduce into its ranks the hardy " Aheers "
and " Eanghurs " of the Province, but failed ; we have
it from his own lips; the Rajpoots and Brahmins
bullied the new levies out of the corps.
We are tempted to give another anecdote. A corps
of the line, within our observation, that has about four-
score Sikhs in its ranks, possesses only one Sikh non-
commissioned officer, and him of the lowest rank. We
asked the reason why the Sikhs had not their propor-
tion of officers. The reply was, " Why, the naick is the
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ARMY REFORM.
luckiest soldier in the Bengal army." Be it remembered,
that this luckiest fellow in the Bengal army has served
the period which entitles a civilian to a seat in council.
This is luck indeed ; to be a corporal on about a pound
sterling a month, after ten years' service. He is a
remarkable man, has attracted the special attention of
his officers ; otherwise he would to this day have been a
sentinel. Had he similarly outstripped all his compeers
in the Punjab service, or in any Native service, he
would now have been, at least, a commandant, perhaps
a colonel, possibly a sirdar, or even a rajah. In the
Russian, Austrian, or French service, he would most
likely be a decorated captain or field officer. In the
sepoy army, he is a corporal ! To complete the story,
the officer commanding the company, in which was one
of the batch of Sikhs to which we refer, begged that
this one too might be made a naick. The reply was,
"What has he done that he should be put over the
heads of the whole Bengal army?" If that man be
lucky, he will be a corporal ten years hence ! Such is
the inducement, to the finest infantry soldier in India,
to enter the British ranks.
The whole system is wrong. In a few years the
survivors of those Sikhs will be simply low-caste
Hindus ; they will have learnt to object to mess
together, and in all points will be as helpless and as
subservient as Brahmins or Rajpoots. The plan to be
followed, to get and to keep the best soldiers throughout
India, and to quietly oppose class against class, and tribe
against tribe, is to have separate regiments of each
creed or class, filling up half, three-fourths, or even
more of the commissioned and non-commissioned ranks
from their own numbers. Thus there might be Brah-
min, Rajpoot, Aheer, Groojur, Meena, Ranghur, Patan,
Mogul, Malay, Goorkha, and Sikh regiments, as also
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FUSION 01? CLASSES.
425
Chumar and Sweeper ones. Each to have a sprinkling
of other castes or tribes, stout fellows, with more than
their proportion of promotion, and therefore able to
hold their own. Say, in a corps of Brahmins, a
hundred Eajpoots, and as many Mahommedans. In
one of Sweepers, a couplfe of hundred Mahommedans.
Similarly with Sikhs and Goorkhas, a sprinkling of
Hill Eajpoots and Moslems. Such dilutions will be
sufficient to prevent, or at least to bring to light, in-
ternal disaffection ; while it not only cuts off sectarian
influence, but unostentatiously opposes class to class
and party to party. We have not a doubt that, thus
organized, the low-caste man, who, under present in-
fluences, is the mere creature of the Brahmin, would as
readily meet him with the bayonet, as he would a Ma-
hommedan. There might still be many regiments com-
posed much as at present, only keeping the very high,
and very low castes more apart.
Some people will say that Brahmins will not act with
low-caste men. We happen to know better. In the
Bombay army Sweeper subadars command Brahmin
sepoys. We ourselves have seen Bheels and Meenas,
Grassias and Patans, Aheers and Eajpoots, all shoulder
to shoulder, all working well and amicably together,
notwithstanding that the first two tribes eat carrion,
and are classed little, if at all, above Mehturs. We are
aware that such arrangements are only to be carried out
by tact and determination. In a certain Bheel corps
the Grassias and others combined to refuse to salute the
first Bheel who was promoted to the rank of a subadar.
The commanding officer, having seated the Bheel on a
chair by his side, called in the whole company, asked
each individual his intentions, ordered him to salute the
Bheel and pass op. The Hindustanis did so; three
Grassias refused. On the instant they were discharged.
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ARMY REFORM.
There was no more hesitation ; the Bheel subadar ever
afterwards was duly obeyed.
Tt is, however, well known that low-caste men give
most trouble about caste ; that the Sweepers of the
Bombay and Madras armies are more fanciful than the
Brahmins and Kajpoots. Religionists, too, whether
Hindoo or Mahommedan, whether Syuds, or Brahmins,
or Swamees, influence only the mob ; they do not touch
each other. They should therefore have their energies,
as far as possible, confined to their own classes.
Under somewhat such arrangements as above sug-
gested, there would be no scarcity of Sikhs or Goorkhas
in the ranks, nor, indeed, if desirable, of Malays,
Moplas, and Arabs. At present few original Goorkhas
enter the British service, simply because it is not worth
their while. It was recently shown, in the Calcutta
Beview* how a thousand Goorkhas had been enlisted in
a week. The same means are open any day to Govern-
ment. Let a popular officer be sent to raise a corps of
Goorkhas in communication with the Resident at Khat-
mandoo. Let three-fourths of the native commissions,
&c, be given to Goorkhas, and there will be no scarcity
of recruits. There must, of course, be good manage-
ment ; but the ice once broken, there will always be a
fair proportion of Goorkhas in the British ranks.
In Oude the Punjab mistake has been reversed.
Oude has long been the Alsatia of India. In that pro-
vince were to be met, even more than at Hyderabad or
at Lahore, the Afreedee and Euzufzye of the Khyber,
the Belooch of Khelat, and the Wazeree of the Suli-
mani range. There also congregated the idle, the dissi-
pated, and the disaffected of every native State in India.
Added to these were many deserters from the British
ranks. Tet the contingent of twelve thousand men
* Article, " Sir Charles Napier's Posthumous Work."
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DANGERS IN OUDE.
427
has been almost wholly filled from the old Oude army.
The reason assigned for the different line of conduct is,
that the Punjab was conquered, but that Oude fell in
peace. In this there is a fallacy, little understood, but
not the less a fallacy. Proportionally few of the insti-
gators of opposition at Lahore, and in the Sikh army,
were Sikhs. They were British subjects, many of them
British deserters. The general feeling of the Sikhs
was hardly hostile ; many of the Sikhs were friendly —
decidedly so, compared with the Hindustanis in the
Punjab service.
The king of Oude employed 59,000 soldiers; his
chiefs and officials at least as many more. Of these vast
numbers, one-fifth at the utmost have found employment
in the police and irregular corps. Yet these levies, with
half-a-dozen regular corps, form the whole army of oc-
cupation. This seems a grave mistake. Why not at least
make a change ? Why not move some of the Punjab
regiments that have been keeping watch and ward on the
Indus for seven years to Oude, and send some of the king's
people to the north-west ? The king had some 8000 artil-
lery. Of these about 500 may have obtained employ-
ment ; the rest, old and young, are on the world. Surely
if there was danger in employing Sikhs in 1849, it would
be well to remove some portion of the levies from Oude,
where such materials for mischief still remain. In the
province are 246 forts, besides innumerable smaller
strongholds, many of them sheltered within thick jun-
gles. In these forts are 476 guns. Forts and guns
should all be in the hands of Government, or the forts
should be razed. " Many a foolish fellow has been urged
on to his own ruin by the possession of a paltry fort ;
and many'a paltry mud fort has repulsed British troops.
Forts and intrenched posts, moreover, notwithstanding
all Sir Charles Napier and other great authorities have
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ARMY REFORM.
said, are the bridles and the main safeguards of all,
especially of conquered, countries. Spain confirms,
indeed all Europe and all history confirm, this opinion.
Gibbon imputes the downfall of the Koman empire,
among other causes, to the facts that —
" In the vast extent of the Roman empire there were few fortified cities
capable of protecting a routed army, nor was there anv person, or family,
or order of men, whose natural interest, unsupported: by the powers of
Government, was capable of restoring-the cause of a sinking party."
The latter portion of the passage hits the British
Government. Hitherto it has made no interest with
the people ; it therefore the more needs an efficient and
contented army.
The eighty or ninety thousand disbanded Oude sol-
diers are the brethren of the British sepoys. In one
sense this makes them more dangerous, in another more
safe. All will expect much from Government, most too
much. Future tranquillity will greatly depend on the
manner in which justice, firmness, and kindly considera-
tion are combined in Oude arrangements. We simply
recommend forethought, moderation, and common sense
for Oude, for all new countries, indeed for India gene-
rally.
No troops, regular or irregular, should remain for
ever in one province. They should move every three
or four years ; not at one step from Peshawur to Cal-
cutta, as is sometimes the order ; but step by step, from
one end of the country to the other. All these are
very obvious truths ; they are, however, not the less dis-
regarded. While on this topic we commend to the
attention of Oude, Punjab, and Nagpore administrators
Gibbon's 43rd chapter, on the rebellions of Africa, when
among other events—
" Two-thirds of the army were involved in the guilt of treason ; and
eight thousand insurgents, assembling on the field of Bulla, elected Stoza
for their chief, a private soldier (the italics aro ours), who possessed, in a
superior degreo, the virtues of a rebel."
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THE ARTILLERY.
429
Volumes nine and twelve of the Calcutta Review
have largely dwelt on the history, the services, and the
necessities of the Bengal artillery. Intending shortly
again to enter in detail on the artillery question, we
need here only cursorily refer to that arm. Except at
Guzerat, the Indian army has always heen greatly over-
matched in guns; and as British commanders have
ordinarily delighted to attack in front, the loss of life
has been proportionally great. By reversing the rule at
Guzerat, the enemy was smashed at little cost. With
very few exceptions our proceedings have been similar
in the conduct of sieges. In 1825-26, at Bhurtpoor,
close to the Agra magazine, and with the result of the
first siege before our eyes, the army nearly ran out of
ammunition, and was not over-supplied with guns. The
tardy and insufficient supplies on the Sutlej will be in
the memory of many, even though Lahore and Umrit-
sur were expected to resist. Indeed Hatras is the only
fortress against which the army went altogether pre-
pared. The result was success after a few hours' shelling.
Those were the days when Lord Metcalfe lifted his voice
to urge the authorities to expend shot and shells rather
than human lives. European lives, at least, are more
expensive than ordnance ammunition.
We recently showed that 506 field guns are attached
to the Indian army of 323,823 men, being one gun to
630 fighting men, instead of to 500 as, at the lowest
calculation, should be the equipment. Jomini and other
eminent writers give three guns to a thousand men as
the needful proportion. It is true, as Jomini remarks,
that Napoleon conquered Italy with 50 guns, while he
failed in Russia with 1200. It is not the less true
that his batteries of 50 and 100 guns won him several
battles. There is really no excuse for insufficient or
inefficient artillery in India, and yet the proportions
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ARMY REFORM.
here are below the standards of all armies. Moreover,
of the 506 existing field guns, 102 are what is called
irregular ; that is, have, at the utmost, one officer to six
guns. To some few no officer is attached. Such guns
can never be as efficient as other batteries. Two officers,
at least, are absolutely required to each battery. We
are glad to perceive that a second officer has recently
been appointed to each Punjab one. In other quarters
seconds are equally required. An irregular battery is
an absurdity. It is truly childish hazarding the effici-
ency of six guns on the life and energy of a single officer.
Horses should be given to all remaining bullock batteries.
What are called " post guns " are as liable to move as
any others within the provinces ; their being unable to
do so might, on occasion, be disastrous.
We quite agree with the late Sir Charles Napier that
the foot artillery is sacrificed to the horse : we do not
agree as to his remedy. Horse artillery are as requisite
to act with cavalry, as foot artillery with infantry. The
whole of the artillery should always be kept up on the
amplest scale, and on the most efficient footing. Not-
withstanding all the idle .talk of Sikh guns and Sikh
practice during the Punjab war, the Indian artillery is
unmistakably superior to all that can be brought against
it. All the field batteries should be nine-pounders, as
all but one, and " the mountain train," are in Bengal.
Indeed we would have half the horse artillery of that
calibre, and keep a nine-pounder equipment for every
troop ready at the nearest magazine. The change from
sixes to nines of the Royal artillery, just previous to
Waterloo, may have saved that glorious day. The nine-
pounders did at least greatly help to win it. Two or
three elephant field batteries should be kept up at points
on the trunk or railroad, whence they could be made
most generally available.
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THE GOLUNDAUZE.
431
In a former essay we remarked that 300 battering
guns, with as many mortars, might be turned out of
the Indian magazines in a month; we should like to
think that every magazine could move a second-class
train in a fortnight. We are aware that the present
Inspector-General is quite alive to the subject. We
desire to strengthen his hands. Why are there not
Inspectors of Ordnance at Madras and Bombay ? And
why is not the School of Instruction at Meerut put on
a really efficient footing ? Half the object in moving
the Bengal Artillery head-quarters to Meerut has been
lost by petty savings. The artillery is one of the last
legitimate fields for retrenchment.
The next increase in artillerymen may, with advantage,
be partly Grolundauze. They are admirable soldiers, die
at their guns, never join in disaffection, scarcely ever in
discontent. Eegarding Grolundauze, there has been at
all the Presidencies more than the usual see-saw of the
Indian army.* In Calcutta, a hundred years ago,
Foreigners, Papists, and natives, were prohibited entering
the arsenal. Half a century later, the Bengal artillery
were stronger in natives than in Europeans. A few
years afterwards, as the tide of suspicion again rose,
whole battalions of these fine fellows were discharged,
and driven for bread into the enemy's ranks. Again
the Grolundauze were increased, and again reduced.
Sometimes mixed up with Europeans, at other times
placed on their old formation. Then, again, Lascars
were largely employed, good fellows in their way, but
not to be put on a par with, still less in the place of,
Golundauze. These unnecessary changes, and, above
all, the reduction of pay to the level of infantry, have
affected the confidence and the efficiency of the Golun-
dauze. The same style of men are not now enlisted in
# * See Broome's, Buckle's, and Begbie's volumes.
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ARMY REFORM.
any Presidency as formerly ; and should Golundauze be
again required in a hurry, they will not be as easily
recruited as of old. In all Native armies the artillery
are the best and trustiest men. They are always true
to their guns; they worship them. But artillerymen
are not made in a day, nor is it either prudent or econo-
mical to teach sepoys to work guns in substitution for
short numbers of Golundauze. The latter can better
and more safely do infantry duty than infantry theirs.
Serving the vent, sponging and ramming are only the
A. B. C/s of an artilleryman's work. But under any
circumstances, when Golundauze and sepoys are paid at
exactly the same rates, why put extra temptation in the
way of the larger body ? A thousand Golundauze cost
no more than as many sepoys. The more is the pity.
They should be taught to consider themselves a separate
and selected body. No sepoy should touch a gun. The
Golundauze should be in numbers amply sufficient for
all post guns, with large reserves to take their share in
siege operations * Their number should not exceed the
European artillery, but, whatever the number and pro-
portions, let the Golundauze receive the one extra rupee.
It would be good economy. We repeat that our arrange-
ments are for the storm as well as the sunshine — for the
possibility of a Russian army at Herat, simultaneously
with an American fleet off Bombay. But, whether in
peace or in war, the more the several arms are kept
apart, the better. Perpetual ordinary caution in this
matter, as on other points, prevents occasional spas-
modic alarms, which alarms again put mischief into
men's minds.
* The reserve artillerymen are successive nights. At Sobraon, the
altogether insufficient. At every men of three troop worked the
siege from Seringapatam to Mooltan heavy ordnance until their ammuni-
artillerymen were in battery two tion was expended, and then joined
nights out of three, often many their own six -pounders. — M. L.
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THE ENGINEER CORPS.
433
The fame of the Indian artillery is world-wide ; there
is no finer. The Bombay men are not behind their Ben-
gal and Madras comrades in esprit de corps or soldierly
qualities. Why does not some Bombay artilleryman
follow the example set by Captain Buckle and Major
Begbie, and record the services of his regiment ? Such
compilations are valuable. Indeed every corps should
have its history. What better stimulus to the young
soldier than to read the record of his brethren's services?
Such memorials, too, would tend to draw together officers
and sepoys. In the regimental "Tuwareekh " they would
have something in common; the honour of the corps
would then be more palpably in the keeping of each
individual. No deed of personal bravery of the youngest
sepoy or drummer boy would pass unrecorded. Each
might hope to live in history.
The Bengal army is largely indebted to Major Broome
for his excellent history. Its tone is admirable and its
painstaking research most praiseworthy. We sincerely
hope the Major is at work on its continuation, and that
the three armies will at least take as many copies as
will cover his expenses. It is not creditable to any
regiment to be without his first volume ; nor could any
person desiring to acquaint himself with early British-
Indian history have a better or more impartial guide.
Engineers and sappers, even more than artillery, ought
to be kept in full strength. Sappers are not used in
public works to the extent they might be. The men
should not have the disbursement of public money, but
should be liberally rewarded according to their zeal and
abilities, as sappers are, when employed in England on
the trigonometrical survey, &c. By such peace duties
engineer officers, sergeants, and native sappers are kept
in training, and, while largely aiding the works of peace,
are preparing themselves for war.
F F
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ARMY REFORM.
A few words on the calling of military engineers at
the three Presidencies. In war their duties are impor-
tant, and in sieges they are the virtual commanders.
It was the joke of the camp how Cheape kept the
nominal commander at Mooltan informed, from day to
day, of the work he intended should be performed.
Irvine's, Abbott's, Waddington's, Smith's, Napier's,
Baker s, Tremenhere's, Scott's, Durand's, and Thomson's
services, during recent campaigns, are in the memory of
our readers. Still more valuable are the services of such
men during peace. A Cotton, a Boileau, a Napier, or a
Cautley, is worth a brigade. This is the only portion
of the army that pays at all seasons. So few civil
engineers of ability consider it worth their while to
come to India, that all civil engineering is virtually in
the hands of the military. We are not quite clear that
this is the best arrangement, but under improved manage-
ment it may be made very much more effective than at
present.
Promotion has recently been good in the Engineers.
In the higher ranks they are nearly ten years a-head of
their sister corps — the Artillery ; but they are still nume-
rically weak for the work required at their hands. The
consequence is, that there is more poaching on their
domain than on any other. The artillery, with reason,
scream when people even talk of posting infantry officers
to field batteries ; but the engineers obtain little sym-
pathy when some of their best berths are monopolized
by outsider. Nor, indeed, should we pity them were
better men put over their heads — were Cautleys, Max-
wells, Prices, Balfours, and Longdens to be had for the
asking ; but such is not the case. By all means let the
best man be selected for every berth in every depart-
ment ; but be sure he is the best, before trained and
able men are superseded. Far be it from us to join the
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THE ENGINEER CORPS.
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cuckoo-cry in favour of individuals. There are plenty,
without our aid, to advocate the cause of the incompetent;
our voice is for " the right man in the right place."
Engineer officers are the elite of the service. They
are the selections, and generally veiy fair selections, from
the mass of Addiscombe. The energies of many are,
however, damped by the treatment they meet in India.
They win the race, but obtain not the prizes. The latter
are too often reserved for the sluggard and the incompe-
tent. Few engineer officers would select the engineer
corps for their own sons.
Great pains are taken at home to qualify the young
engineer officers for the important and arduous duties
which they are called upon to perform in India. The
great error, however, is in so calling on them at too
early a period after arrival. This may, in a measure,
account for cracked and broken bridges, for unfinished
and ill-made roads, and for high rates. While yet
apprentices, and while ignorant of the rudiments of the
language and of civil routine, they have heavy respon-
sibilities thrown on them, and are put to deal with the
veriest rogues in India.
Every young engineer officer, on arrival in India,
should be sent to the head-quarters of the Sappers and
Miners, now also the head-quarters of the corps ; and
he should not be withdrawn on any grounds or pretence
until he had passed at least one year of probation with
the corps ; had attended the schools regularly, and been
well instructed in the technical language and practice
of sapper-engineering duties as conducted in India.
Most young officers could, during this year of probation,
pass the P. H. examination, and this should be made a
sine qua non for their employment in any independent
substantive charge. The rule is enforced with regard
to officers of other branches of the services appointed
f f 2
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ARMY REFORM.
to the Staff, and it is only fair and proper that the same
rule should be extended to the alumni of the engineer
department. Few young officers, when they have once
quitted the sappers, after their few months' sojourn
with the corps, ever rejoin it, unless, perhaps, on
active service in the field. Thus, unless grounded in
the vernacular phraseology of their craft, and instructed,
on their first arrival, in the various processes of their
duties, as conducted in India, it is perfectly certain that
they will not acquire these very important and necessary
qualifications in after-life ; while as builders and civil
engineers, their talents will remain hidden, or lose half
their value, until a competent knowledge of the verna-
cular language shall enable them to communicate their
knowledge in language intelligible to the people of the
country. Our advice is, thus to instruct them well, then
to trust them largely, and pay them liberally.
The abolition of the Bengal and Bombay Military
Boards was a grand measure. But the rubbish has not
yet been all cleared away. Commissary-generals, in-
spector-generals of ordnance, and chief engineers must
have more authority; must each respectively be put
into a position assimilating more to that of the old
Boards than each now fills, before the new system can
be expected to work smoothly. Chief engineers must
not be made mere postmen and clerks to local governors.
They are the most scientific and among the ablest and
most zealous officers in the service. Their positions
should be of high honour, considerable authority, and
great comfort. At present this is far from the case.
The sooner the matter is righted the better. We com-
mend the subject, as also the following anecdote, to the
attention of the Secretary in the Public Works Depart-
ment. We might tell many such tales.
Some three years back, a sanatory measure urgently
THE MILITARY BOARDS.
437
recommended by a medical officer, involving an ex-
pense of six hundred rupees, was reported. The im-
mediate superior, a person of high rank, authorized
the measure, and the local officer carried it out. Sanc-
tion was quickly obtained from the Supreme Govern-
ment ; but a greater than Lord Dalhousie, the auditor-
general, had not been consulted. A few words in red
ink, negatived his lordship's order, and the bill was
made over to the Military Board. After many njonths
the Board passed and sent it to the military accountant
for adjustment. In due course, the cash was paid.
After a considerable interval, however, the military
auditor-general again interfered, and retrenched the
full amount. Again was the matter referred to the
Supreme Government, which passed it on to the Local
Government, and after six months more it was finally
sanctioned, and the retrenchment recovered through the
local chief engineer. Thus, during more than two
years, some forty official letters had been written, and
innumerable copies been made for one authority or an-
other ; and during all this time, the zealous officer who
had expended his private means, in the cause of hu-
manity, was out of pocket £60. Such delay could not
now occur, but six months or more of the delay in this
very case, did take place during the present order of
things, and we believe that with a less energetic
officer than the local chief engineer, twelve months
more might have passed before the cash had been re-
covered.
Much reform is still required in the Commissariat.
As yet, in some quarters at least, confusion and expense
seem rather to have been increased than diminished, by
recent changes. In the cattle department, for instance,
the new arrangements were inaugurated by the sale of
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ARMY REFORM.
the greater part of the public stock. Under such cir-
cumstances, only nominal prices were, of course, obtain-
able; but scarcely were the elephants, camels, and
bullocks sold, than out came an order to re-purchase.
The fortunes of some rising " Jotee Pursads " were
accordingly made at Government expense. We know
not whose was this see-saw move, but such was the
fact. We refer specially to sales at a certain large
station, and we have reason to believe that, throughout
the Bengal Presidency, sales, re-purchases, discharges,
and re-enlistments followed each other, quickly. Such
has always been the East India Government's fate in
war time. This was a peace measure.
Half the commissariat expenses during war is attri-
butable to such doings ; to alternate haste and delay ;
above all, to untrustworthy agency. War is expected,
or a movement is to be made in any quarter, whether
within or without our limits. At once the market is
up, not for the contractors, but for the Government.
The former, practically, have the benefit of the earliest
intelligence. They buy at twenty seers for the rupee,
sell at ten ; and again, after a few weeks or months,
re-purchase the accumulated stores at fifty. Jotee
Pursad's trial proved how cattle contracts were ma-
naged. But reform has now commenced. The great
contractor has himself arranged for a small retaining
fee, to hold some thousand cattle available for the
public service. This is a good move. On this principle,
contracts for all commissariat necessaries should be
made. In our opinion, they can be most cheaply ef-
fected by civil officers ; the commissariat officers looking
only to quantity and quality. Let Local Governments,
through their most efficient civil officers, contract with
monied men, to supply at fixed points, within given
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THE COMMISSARIAT.
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periods, certain quantities of grain, cattle, &c, and
let a given proportion be always kept available, under
special restrictions, for the contractors own purposes.
We propose that these arrangements be made by-
civil officers, because they ought to have most influence
in the country ; ought to know the soundest traders ;
and to be able to make the cheapest bargains. The
commissariat should look to the terms of contracts
being kept, and should manage all details ; a few well-
paid inspecting officers, men not above their work, and
accustomed to such matters, with well-paid Natives
under them, will suffice for all the suggested duties. A
single active officer could ordinarily supervise a Pro-
vince. No sergeants, and very little inferior European
agency, should be employed in the department. The
temptation is too great. If the officer does his duty,
little subordinate supervision is required. The legiti-
mate work of sergeants can be better done by Natives.
The legitimate work of gentlemen should be done by
gentlemen, trained to the work. Some of them, at
least, might be mercantile men from England. Indeed,
we are disposed to think, that the commissariat might
advantageously be altogether a civil establishment, as is
now the case in the Royal army ; but our Indian " Mr.
Filder," should be, at least, a K.C.B., and so be hoisted
well above the vulgar depreciation of the commissariat
service, so general through the Peninsular and Crimean
wars.
The commissariat must be a well-paid and respectable
body; every responsible official having the status and
pay of a military officer. But there should be no irre-
sponsible agency; contractors should be strictly kept
to contract work, and not permitted, by their money-
influence, to overshadow and bully, even the chief com-
missariat officers.
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ARMY REFORM.
By our scheme, very small annual payments will give
Government the command of markets at all times;
instead of, as at present, leaving it in every difficulty,
at the mercy of its own nominal servants. Eetaining
fees may, in many cases, be almost nominal. Monied
firms gain so much in credit by Government contracts,
that they can afford to deal for small profits. Their
stores will be laid in at harvest-time, and by sale of
half or three-fourths at sowing time, they will at least
cover their own expenses, having their full retaining
fee as profit. Similarly, by being permitted, within
limits, to work the cattle they keep up, they can afford
to charge the merest trifle. Such a scheme would in-
volve clashing, some must necessarily occur at first ; but
lieutenant-governors and the commissary-general could
easily stop all that. A few severe examples would
suffice. And as long as inspectors and receivers, Euro-
pean and Native, are paid sufficiently well, to make it
worth their while to be independent of contractors, but
at the same time to do their duty to them, as well as to
Government, all else will work well. Officers enough
are now in the department, to do the needful. Num-
bers might even be reduced; but pay and position
should be raised. Zeal and ability should be the sole
passports to promotion in all ranks. Let also venality
be promptly and severely punished, and all will soon be
smooth. We repeat that much has been done in this
department. To simplify accounts and insist on their
being promptly rendered, would be immense points.
A transport train should be established; one com-
bining the virtues of Sir Charles Napier's baggage-
corps, and of those recently employed by the Allied
armies in the Crimea. Hints may also be taken from
the Russians; from their wonderful organization and
application of resources. Organization and military
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BAG6A0E.
441
discipline in this department, are as requisite as in any-
other branch of the army. Economy and efficiency
will both be thus best secured. An Indian army can
never move like a European one ; but still there is very
much that can be effected, if officers will set the example.
There was no more necessity, as was the case, for a
lieutenant-colonel to take three elephants and double-
poled tents, and glass doors, to Candahar, than for him
to have taken the Crystal Palace. Neither was it
necessary for subalterns to take dressing-boys, and
deputy dressing-boys, and butlers, with their assistants,
&c, throughout those campaigns.
Mr. Kaye has recorded that Sir John Keane's army
was accompanied by five non-combatants for every
soldier. In such a country every man should have been
armed, and the camp-followers should not have exceeded
the fighting men. It is all nonsense to say that the
present system is necessary. It is not. General Pol-
lock had not half General Nott's number of followers ;
nor were such proportions found necessary during either
the first or second Burmah war. Three or four servants
will suffice, for a time, for each officer. They, and
indeed all ranks, should have as good cover, over their
heads, as circumstances admit of; but it is nonsense to
expect to carry all peace-luxuries into war. Indeed, the
attempt to do so, too often leads to the abandonment
or failure of necessaries. There should be a director-
general of baggage, with deputies, and assistants for
divisions and brigades, as in continental armies. They
should be stern men, of somewhat Napierean views,
with authority to burn all extra baggage, and all bur-
thens of overloaded cattle. Those who remember Bur-
mah, or who bear in mind the passes of Affghanistan,
crammed with cattle and human beings, even as poppy
heads ; who remember grain at a rupee a seer, and water
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ARMY REFORM.
nearly as scarce as beer, will feel with us, that the very
existence of armies should not be risked to give Cleo-
patra sofas and fresh bread to gentlemen whose services,
at best, are ill worth such price.
With a staff corps would, of course, come more effi-
cient staff establishments in all departments. Good
regimental officers who had studied their profession, in
all its arms, would then, as in the continental armies,
be attached to the Etat Major, and according to their
more special qualifications be distributed into the ad-
jutant and quartermaster-general's and other depart-
ments. No one will pretend that the best man is now
selected for either of those important branches. We
cannot indeed be said to have a quartermaster-general's
department at all. We never had. The present heads
are striving to make up for departmental deficiencies,
but the whole department requires regeneration and
extension ; in short, radical reform. Assistant quarter-
master-generals should be the eyes of divisional com-
manders, not merely their aide-de-camps; still less
should they be gentlemen at large, occasionally, in fine
weather, marching with large perambulators along high
roads.
We have suggested the formation of a staff corps.
A word as to details. The French Etat Major is a
distinct corps, admission to which is only obtained, as
in the engineers and artillery, by a special education,
and when this has been completed and the requisite
examination passed, by a fixed period of regimental
duty, with each of the three arms of the service, in the
grade of subaltern. Adverting to local peculiarities,
we would require an officer to serve from two to four
years with his original corps : when armed with a cer-
tificate that he thoroughly understood his regimental
duty, was physically active, zealous, and intelligent, he
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THE 8TAFF.
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should, after passing the interpreter's examination in
the languages, be admitted into the staff corps. No
man is thoroughly fit for staff duties without such
qualifications. He should, in addition, pass for a par-
ticular department.
First. Adjutant-General's, Military Secretariat, and
Judge Advocate-General's Department.
Second. Quartermaster-General's and Survey.
Third. Civil and political employment.
Fourth. Army Finance Departments, as pay, audit,
commissariat.
Fifth. Miscellaneous, as military police, baggage, &c,
&c. Government to fix tests for each department.
High proficiency in other branches might permit the
P. H. to be substituted for the interpreter's test in in-
dividual cases ; but we look on a thorough colloquial
knowledge of the languages, next to good judgment,
the very first qualification for a staff officer. Half the
contre-temps and violences that occur between Europeans
and Natives, are occasioned by mutual ignorance of
language. Book learning is less required ; but ability
to read accounts and sepoys' letters is important. Many
civilians never acquire the power, and are accordingly
much at the mercy of their own moonshees. Good col-
loquial knowledge, acquired by free association with all
ranks, will render other lingual attainments compara-
tively easy. By such processes the staff corps would
possess soldierly officers, qualified by study for every
branch of duty, whether civil or military. After pass-
ing the interpreter's examination, and being furnished
with a certificate of proficiency in his regimental duties,
the staff candidate should then be sent to do duty for
one year with each of the other branches of the service,
his name being struck off his original regiment, and
enrolled in the staff corps. A staff man would thus
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ARMY REFORM.
have done from five to seven years' regimental duty,
and be about twenty-four years of age, before being
eligible for staff duty. He would have fairly won
his spurs, and would then be available, according to
qualification and the test he had passed, for any depart-
ment.
It will be observed that we have thrown the whole
civil as well as military staff into the staff corps. We
have done so deliberately, and after much consideration,
as agreeing with Lord Hardinge,* that it is useful to
have officers qualified for both civil and military duties
on the strength of the army.
Such is the Oriental system, which is too much over-
looked, or even despised. Orientals put a man of
energy and ability to the front, whatever be his antece-
dents ; whether he were a slipper-bearer or a pipe-
bearer, a slave or a son of a slave, a pasha or a son of a
pasha. In troubled times and places, at least, they put
such a man in authority with full power. On the other
hand, Englishmen, judging by English rules, split up
and separate offices, thereby puzzling Natives where to
look for justice, and often obliging officials to waste
half their time in forms and squabbles. England has
no need of Rome's fears. The most popular Governor-
General would not be followed in rebellion by a single
regiment. Yet Rome won and held the world under
consuls and pro-consuls. Even the jealous Augustus
armed his governors " with the full powers of the sove-
reign himself. It was reserved for Constantine, by
divided administration, to relax the vigours of the
State/'f
We do not altogether advocate Roman powers for
British officials, although there cannot be a doubt that
half Sir Charles Napier's success in Scinde is attribu-
* Evidence before the Lords. t Gibbon, Book xvii
THE STAFF.
445
table to his despotic powers. A fool so armed will get
into & mess ; but a man of ordinary judgment will con-
sult others where he is himself deficient, and by prompt
action will cover a multitude of defects. For the next
fifty, or hundred, years there must be non-regulation
provinces and military civilians. Indeed, we would
always have them, and uncovenanted officers also, were
it only for a stimulus to civilians, and a fillip to routine
practices.
Thus, according to qualification, men would be posted
to civil and political berths, to the adjutant-general's,
quartermaster-general's, finance, supply, baggage, law,
and other departments.
They might rise regimentally, as vacancies occur, in
the staff corps, or being originally appointed in that
corps, according to army standing, they might be pro-
moted at fixed periods, so as to reach lieutenant-colonel-
cies in twenty-five years. Or present incumbents might
be promoted on the day on which each would have
obtained each step had he remained with his original
regiment. The regimental rank being secured, each
departmental step would only be won by efficiency, by
hard work, and by keeping pace with the times. The
regimental pay might be as that of the engineers;
separate staff allowances being allotted as at present for
each office, and a fresh test required on each departmental
step up to certain periods. If men became lazy or
apathetic, they might be restricted to small inoffensive
berths ; or if physically or mentally qualified, be sent
as juniors of their rank to do duty with a corps of the
line. After two reports, at intervals of six months, of
continued apathy they should be discharged, pensioned,
or invalided, according to the circumstances of each
case. There would be no more difficulty in disposing
of each case than of that of the late Colonel Davidson,
of the engineers. To place incompetence on the shelf,
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ARMY REFORM.
and to employ men in positions according to their
talents, is following common sense rules. Thus, a cap-
tain might be commissary-general, a field officer his
deputy. Other posts would be similarly filled.
It strikes us that some such arrangements provide, as
fairly as is practicable, for all circumstances, and would
not be difficult to work. They would effectually check,
if not altogether prevent, jobbery ; would give all young
working officers an object to work for, and still would
not altogether shut the staff doors to regiments. The
scheme would, at least, put down the present cry of
favouritism, and thus induce comparative contentment.
If it did no more than allay present restlessness, much
good would be effected.
The corps would be large or small, according to the
necessities of the service, and would, like other regi-
ments, annually receive drafts to fill up vacancies. Our
scheme will be called incomplete, because it does not
shut the staff door entirely to regimental officers. This
is intentional. All men do not ripen early. A very
efficient regimental officer may be idle during the first
three or four years of his service, or his education may
have been neglected. Such a man, if of commanding
talent or energy, should not be lost to the Etat Major.
Ochterlony, Barry Close, and other eminent staff officers,
would have been excluded from high employment by
such a rule. The arrangement would, however, lessen
the necessity of drafts from the line. After its forma-
tion, one captain and two subalterns from each regiment
should be the utmost allowed on the staff. Most of
these would probably go to irregular corps. They
should, however, be available for all staff posts, remain-
ing on the strength of their original corps. In fixing
the strength of regiments and battalions, allowance
should be made for these three absentees, and for one in
four absent on furlough, &c.
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WHO SHOULD COMMAND?
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Calculating, then, the staff to eventually require six
officers for each of the 219 regiments and battalions in
the service, and 657, or half the number, to be attached
to the staff corps, the expense will be in round numbers
a quarter of a million sterling. At least half of this
would, however, be civil charges, as pay of men ready on
emergency for military duty,
A delicate point reftnains. Are the staff to be eligible
for command ? The recent order, making the command
of a regiment and certain posts the only roads to a full
colonelcy, implies that such is the present intention.
The rule does not work well, and has already put bad
juniors over good seniors. Its tendency is to exclude
from eventual command many of the very best officers
in the service — men who have risen by their military
merits. We feel that we can argue this point without
prejudice. In discussing it we have no purpose to
answer but the good of the State. The question is not
what is best, or even fairest, for this or for that indi-
vidual, but what is best and fairest for the service:
whether in a great calamity — and Government should
always be ready for one — the public, and, above all,
those immediately concerned, would place most confi-
dence in soldiers like Broadfoot, Jacob, and Edwards, or
in hap-hazard seniority commanders. Whoever would
have preferred Xenophon to Menon, or Pottinger to
Elphinstone, must vote with us. It is doubtful whether
Xenophon was a soldier* at all when he was raised to
command on the shields of the soldiery. Herat proved
Pottinger to have been a thorough soldier, though he
was far from being what is called a clever man. Wash-
ington was a militia man and a surveyor ; Cromwell a
country gentleman. They were all born soldiers.
* Rollin calls him a young Athenian : Plutarch says Cyrus gave him a
commission. — H. AL L.
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ARMY REFORM.
The staff corps must then correspond with the Mai
Major. Its colonels must come on the general grada-
tion list, it being always optional with Government to
keep men to their gram bags, law books, &c, or to put
them in command of brigades. General Huyshe, one
of the most efficient officers in the Bengal army, rose to
his majority in the commissariat ; and General Lumley,
one of its best adjutant-generals, was transferred from
the head of the commissariat to be adjutant-general.
The command of European regiments is given to the
smartest officers. Huyshe commanded one, and Colonel
Swatman, who also rose in the commissariat, now com-
mands another : we mention these names and dwell on
the question because we daily hear it said, " So-and-so
can know nothing of his duty, he was all his life in the
commissariat, &c." We particularize the commissariat
as being a department perhaps less soldierly in its cha-
racter than others. The quartermaster-general's and
survey departments are among the best schools for war,
as are many of the duties of the military collector and
magistrate. They are akin to Wellington's hunting
parties ; they improve the coup d'ceil, sharpen the per-
ceptions, and give opportunities of display of courage,
hardihood, and resource. Five to seven years of mixed
military duties, in early life, would instil into soldierly
civilians all requisite details. It is not by three times
a day seeing soldiers eat their rations, or horses twice a
day eat their gram, nor is it even by, year after year,
driving fuzes and portfires, or by marching round barrack
squares, that officers learn to be soldiers, much less to be
generals. Such avocations are rather the necessary drud-
geries of the profession ; with hasty spirits, they cramp
rather than foster eminent attainments. The soldier
in heart will keep up his military knowledge, wherever
or however he may be placed. He will also avail him-
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TRAINING FOR COMMAND.
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self of opportunities to take part in battery practice,
and in field exercise ; nor will his steps be ^infrequently
turned towards the regimental parades, hospitals, and
target practice. He will enjoy such avocations, while
many regimental men expend their energies in execrating
them.
In short, we altogether deny that the officer who has
passed his life in small regimental details, and in per-
forming Dundas' eighteen manoeuvres, or any one else's
twenty-eight, is likely to prove a better commander in
field or in garrison, than the one who, with from five to
seven years' practical military education, has early dis-
tinguished himself above his fellows as a soldier ; and,
in later years, has been knocking about the country as
a quartermaster-general, a surveyor, a magistrate, or a
collector. We even question, whether the individual of
like antecedents, whose wits have been sharpened by the
duties of a military lawyer or commissariat officer, will
not, as a rule, be as efficient as the man of regimental
details. We argue on the rule, not the exception. There
are undoubtedly excellent regimental officers and very
bad staff men. Facts however bear out our argument.
Among the highest names in European warfare, are
those of men who performed little regimental duty. In
the Indian ranks, also, the Pollocks, the Notts, the
Gilberts and the Cheapes of the present day, did as little
battalion drill, as did the Malcolms, the Munros, and the
Clives of old.
We are very far from decrying the school that pro-
duced Colin Campbell, Henry Havelock, Markham,
Franks, and hosts of good soldiers in the Company's
ranks. We simply aver with all confidence, that there is
nothing erudite, nothing difficult in Dundas, nor in more
modern books of manoeuvres ; on the contrary, that any
dolt may learn his battalion drill, and even the Light
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ARMY REFORM.
Infantry manoeuvres in a few weeks ; that many do so,
and are little the wiser; that they are practically as
great dolts as ever, and that not one out of a dozen of
them could get a brigade out of Hyde Park, much less
mana3uvre it before an enemy. No ; it is not elemen-
tary knowledge, such as barrack life, or regimental
parades can give, that is most essential to a commander.
It is good sense, energy, thoughtfulness, and familiarity
with independent action. Above all, it is that coolness
under all circumstances, that enables a man to apply
the full resources of his mind, and without fear of re-
sponsibility, to act upon his own judgment. Few will
deny these obvious truths. Then, in all common sense,
let not at least working men be excluded from command,
and those hoisted over their shoulders, who have neither
studied their profession as these have done, nor had
their opportunities. Such practice would deprive Go-
vernment, perhaps in its necessity, of the military
services of its best, or at least of its most accomplished
soldiers.
In all we have propounded, we are borne out, not
only by Asiatic practice, but by the practice and theory
of the Continental masters of war. We have already
more than once referred to Jomini ; we do so again, as
his words are very apposite to our argument. He tells
us that a chief commander of artillery should be a good
strategist and tactician, a man who could consult with
the commander-in-chief, and bring into play, at the
most effective moment, not only the reserve artillery,
but half the guns attached to divisions. This is com-
mon sense, but is not what is learned at Dum-dum,
Meerut, the Mount, or Ahmednugger. Those head-
quarters turn out excellent practical artillerists, but few
strategists or tacticians. We quote in more detail
Jomini's views as to the requisite qualifications of a
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QUALIFICATIONS FOR COMMAND.
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commander-in-chief, also his opinion as the arm whence
he may be best drawn. The translation or rather para-
phrase is our own.*
" A general must be a man of great mind, of a moral courage which
leads to great resolutions, of sang froid or physical courage which over-
comes dangers. Knowledge is only a third-rank requisite, but is a powerful
auxiliary. Vast erudition is not here meant. It is necessary to know
little, but to know that little well, and to be well grounded in principles."
*♦#*##
" The question has often been agitated, whether command should bo
given to the general long habituated to the management of troops, or to
generals who have risen in the Etat Major, and, though learned in war,
have been little habituated to handle troops. It is indisputable that a
general may be able to combine operations, and carry on war on a largo
scale, who never led a regiment against the enemy. The great Cond6,
Frederic, and Napoleon, are examples."
Jomini proceeds :
" It cannot be denied that a man from the Etat Major, as well as any
other, may become a great Captain, but it will not be from having grown old
in the functions of quartermaster,t but because he possesses the natural
genius for war. A general of like character from the cavalry or infantry
will be equally fit for supreme command. Individual qualities will be
everything."
" In coming to a decision, all points must be considered, and a medium
taken. A general from the Mat Major, from the Artillery, or from the
Engineers, who has held the command of a division or corps d'armee, will
have, other points being equal, a superiority over the general who under-
stands the conduct of only one arm, or of a special corps."
" In brief, a general who has thouglU much on war, that is, has studied
war, will be qualified for command. A great and comprehensive mind is,
above every other quality, necessary for a commander-in-chief. Lastly, the
union of a wise theory with a great mind will constitute the great cap-
tain."!
Such are the dicta of one of the ablest, and most
practical, military writers of the present age. Of one
who was the chief of Ney's staff, and who is supposed
to have inspired his genius. Of one who, even as a
traitor to the side on which he had so long fought, was
so much respected as a soldier, by the Emperor Alexan-
der, that he made him an aide-de-camp, and put him at
the head of an army. Jomini advocates all we urge.
* Precis do Tart de la guerre, par department combines the general
le Baron de Jomini. Paris, 1837, staff.
pages 604 and 605. % Jomini, part i., pages 110, 111,
T In the Russian army, for which and 112.
Jomiui wrote, the quartermaster's
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ARMY REFORM.
Genius is heaven-born. Strategy, tactics, and all else
must give way on occasion. A general must understand
rules and principles, but not be the slave of them.
Neither rules nor principles require the term of a life to
learn. He must have moral and physical courage, and
ready aptitude to apply his resources. These qualifica-
tions are somewhat akin to genius. They are to be
cultivated, though not to the best advantage under dry
routine. The India Government has seldom the power
of selection from generals who have commanded di-
visions. It is limited to select between commanders of
regiments, and men who, like Generals Patrick Grant
and Cheape, and Colonels Tucker and Birch, though of
known ability, not only never led a regiment into
action, but never commanded one for a day.* Or the
selection may be extended to a third class, to men dis-
tinguished in youth as soldiers, but afterwards em-
ployed as civilians ; to the Broadfoots, Edwardes', Lakes,
Bechers, and Nicholsons of India; to the Hardinges,
Baglans, and Cathcarts of the Eoyal Army. The im-
portance of the subject tempts us again to quote
Jomini : —
" A general instructed in theory, but destitute of coup cTceU, of sang
froid, and of skill, may make a fine strategic plan, but fail in every law of
tactics when he finds himself in presence of an enemy. His projects will
then vanish, his defeat become probable. If he has force of character, he
may diminish the bad results of his check : if he loses his head, he will
lose his army"
Few soldiers in India have witnessed much strategy ;
but many have witnessed the failure of tactics in the
presence of the enemy, aye, and every day witness it on
their own parade grounds, when " adjutants' regiments"
in the hands of routine lieutenant-colonels and majors,
even though they may " have never been on leave for a
day for thirty years," are clubbed up and tortured in
every conceivable way. [The men who never go on
* General Grant is the exception, but the corps was irregular.
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QUALIFICATIONS FOR COMMAND. 453
leave are not the best officers. All work and no play-
makes Jack a dull boy.] The card system fails. The
man who never reflected in his life cannot be expected to
reflect on an emergency. An inequality or contraction
of ground puts him out ; the unexpected appearance of a
crabbed brigadier flusters him ; the whirlwind rush of a
Sir Charles Napier down the line, frightens him out of
his senses; cards, manuals, catechisms, and all other
helps are forgotten, and the unhappy field officer is like
' a babe in a wood/ He loses his senses, and is alike
the laughing-stock of his sable soldiers, and of his
younger countrymen. Is such a man, — and there are
scores of them, — the fitting leader of a brigade through
the Bolan or the Khybur ; up the Persian Gulf, or to
China or Burmah? Yet they are the men so sent,
daily so selected. Can such men be expected to preserve
their senses in the presence of the enemy ? That such
men have not lost armies is no fault of the present
system, but is attributable to the courage and skill of
subordinates, and to the Ikbaloi the company. But let
not Providence be too long tempted. Borne lost her
Legions when commanded by generals who were soldiers
only in name. Napoleon's words to his brother Louis
at Toulon apply to our argument. Standing in midst
of the corpses of 200 grenadiers slain through the ignor-
ance of their commander, at the assault of an impreg-
nable side of Fort Phuron, he observed, " If I had com-
manded here, all these brave men would be still alive.
Learn Louis, from this example, how absolutely ne-
cessary instruction is to those who aspire to command
others."
We have dwelt so much on the mischiefs of routine
and strict seniority, and on the evils of having decrepit
or incapable officers at the head of troops, that it
behoves us to offer some remedy for present evils. We
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ARMY REFORM.
know that the seniority system cannot be uprooted
altogether, nor indeed do we desire to uproot it. Senio-
rity must be the basis of Indian promotion, but seniority
may be, and must be, helped over the stile.
In the first place, then, let us earnestly deprecate the
threatened closing of the invalid establishment. As
Sir George Pollock deposed before the Lords, it has
often been grossly abused, but so have other establish-
ments. Army head-quarters, and the doctors between
them, ought to be able to prevent gross abuses. In-
valid officers ought to be employed, as they usually have
been at Madras and Bombay, in duties commensurate
with their powers. It is by leaving them as gentlemen
at large that malingering is encouraged. Our objection
to the abrogation of the establishment is, on the double
ground that present incumbents have a sort of right to
its advantages, and that it is a safe outlet for incapables.
This latter is surely a substantial reason for its main-
tenance. What matter, whether a man be unwilling or
unable, so that he do not perform his duty ? His disease
may be real, though not apparent. It is, indeed, a
grievous disease, to prefer idleness and inaction to
moderate work. It is surely then better to shelve such
diseased gentlemen in small civil posts, requiring only
an hour or two's daily work,* than to have them at the
head of companies or regiments. In garrison duty,
with veterans, commanded by good officers, they may
also earn their bread. We pray then the authorities to
let the invalids stand, but to employ them as above
suggested. The alternative is to allow invalid officers
to cumber the regular ranks. Commanding officers are
men with bowels, and such men will not drive respect-
* Few such sinecures exist in different soldiers may creditably fill.
India; but our argument is, that Pay and pension and post offices arc
there are quasi-civil |>osts which in- among thcni.*
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RETIRING FUNDS.
455
able incompetents, with families, out of their corps, to
starvation. The pension establishment, in lieu of the
invalids, would be starvation to many.
But we have a more substantive proposal to make.
A scheme for an unattached list for the armies of India,
prepared with a view to relieve the service from the
weight of seniority, now lies before us, and as far as
it goes, it seems well suited to effect the object. We
therefore notice it at length.
First, let us glance at the measures which have been
adopted by the Court of Directors during the last
twenty-five years, to improve the condition of their
officers. — In 1832, the Court expressed themselves de-
sirous of remedying the then stagnant state of promo-
tion, and of providing for the comfort of their officers
on retirement. They intimated their willingness cor-
dially to encourage the institution of retiring funds, and
informed Government that they were prepared to bear
the increased charge of retired pay that would be con-
sequent upon the establishment of funds at the three
Presidencies. They sanctioned the remittance of the
retired officers' annuities through their treasury, at the
rate of two shillings the Sicca rupee, and the grant of
six per cent, per annum, on the balances of the several
funds. The number of retirements, however, were
limited to 24 per annum, for the three Presidencies, and
the amount of the annuities to be given in each year
was fixed at £7750.
Schemes for retiring funds were prepared, but none
were approved of. After waiting a reasonable period,
the Court resolved themselves to provide for the object
contemplated, by enlarging the retiring regulations.
This was effected in 1836. Officers were then for the
first time permitted to retire after certain fixed periods
of service instead of, as formerly, according to their
rank. In 1837 these new regulations were still further
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ARMY REFORM.
enlarged, and a colonel's pension was sanctioned for all
officers, whatever might be their rank, after 32 years
of actual service in India ; lieutenant-colonel's pension,
after 28 years; major's pension, after 24 years; and
captain's pension after 20 years. This enlargement of
the retiring regulations was not productive of any real
advantage to the service. Mr. Philip Melvill, in his
evidence before the Lords in 1852, says —
" The first and great effect (of the new system of retirement) has been
to soothe the feelings of the officers with regard to the rate of their retiring
pension ; they know that, however unfortunate they may be as compared
with others in regimental rise, a fixed rate of pension is secured to tnem ;
the healing effect of this change has been most beneficial."
He further says,
" The number of retirements is increasing, as a necessary consequence
of the additions made from time to time to the number of European
officers, but the percentage is much the same ; it is less than two per
cent, from all causes, whether retiring on full or half pay, or resigning
without any pay, and it has been much the same for the last thirty years.
He gives the number of officers who are entitled to
retire on full pay at 1098, of whom 557 are entitled to
retire on the pay of a rank superior to that which they
had actually attained. The aggregate establishment
of European officers in 1834, he states to have been
4084, and 5142 in 1852.
We give below an abstract* return, showing the
* Abstract return of retirements in the Bengal army from 1834 to
1853, showing the branch of the service to which the retired officers
belonged.
s
4
e
o
i
g«
i
I
o
Artillery ......
0
10
12
21
Engineers ......
0
4
3
1
Cavalry ......
0
3
6
27
Infantry ......
0
33
60
169
Invalids ......
0
4
21
32
Irregular Cavalry unattached ....
0
0
0
1
Ordnance Commissariat department .
0
0
0
1
0
64
102
252
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PROMOTION SCHEMES.
457
number of officers who have retired from the Bengal
army for the twenty years commencing with 1884 and
ending with 1853. The retirements in the artillery,
and engineers, and in the medical service are more
numerous, in proportion, than those in the cavalry and
infantry. This is caused, no doubt, by the existence of
retiring funds in those branches of the service. In
1849 a fund called " the Majors' Bonus Fund," was
established in the infantry of the Bengal army, and
existed until the end of 1851. It offered no fixed
bonus on retirement to lieutenant-colonels, nor was
there any certainty that a bonus would be available at
all to a lieutenant-colonel wishing to retire. It there-
fore fell to the ground.
The "Unattached Senior List" scheme now before
us, is more of the nature of a superannuation fund,
than of one of mere purchase. Unlike the superan-
nuation funds of the civil and medical services, it does
not propose to remove the annuitants from the service
altogether, but simply raises them as it were a step, to
make way for others : leaving their services available to
the Government, if they have any physique remaining.
But we must let the proposal speak for itself.
It sets out by showing the average length of service
on promotion of the infantry officers of the armies of
Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, in October, 1853, which
are as follows : —
#
Colonels. Lieut.-Cols. Majors. Captains. Lieutenants.
Bengal, 43.76 32 28.03 13.42 4.74
Madras, 39.39 31.32 26.53 12.80 4.33
Bombay,139.29 31.23 27.78 12.24 4.60
The average ages, therefore, of officers, assuming that
they entered the army at 17, must be, colonels on pro-
motion to that grade, 58 years ; lieutenant-colonels,
48 years : majors, 44 years ; captains, 29 years ; and
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ARMY REFORM.
lieutenants, 21 years. The length of service of the
junior officers on promotion varies very considerably.
In the Bengal army, there were, in 1853, majors who,
on promotion, had served but 18 years, and majors of
35 years' service. In Madras, the most fortunate major
of infantry was promoted in 14 years, and in Bombay
in 13 years. The most unfortunate officers of that
grade, in those Presidencies, were of 34, and 33 years'
service respectively. Amongst the captains of the
three armies, last promoted, the most fortunate were
of 7, 8, and 9 years' standing, those who were most
unfortunate, had been subalterns 26, 20, and 17 years.
In Bengal, the average rate of promotion from grade to
grade, is given as follows : —
Ensign to Lieutenant .
Lieutenant to Captain .
Captain to Major . . .
Major to Lieut. -Colonel
Lieut. -Colonel to Colonel
Years.
Months.
4
10
9
10
11
9
5
10
10
2
42
5
Total years 42
which corresponds very nearly with the average length
of service of the colonels of the Bengal army as given
before.
In order to better this wretched state of promotion,
it is proposed "that a certain number of the senior
colonels of each branch be ' placed yearly on an un-
attached list, and promotions made in their room, as in
the case of death vacancies."
To carry out this proposal it is suggested that a fund
be formed somewhat similar to the Annuity Fund of
the civil service, or to the Medical Retiring Fund. The
chief difference is, that the army retirements would be
by strict seniority, and not by voluntary withdrawal, as
in the services above named. To exhibit the working of
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PROPOSED SENIOR LIST.
459
the fund it is explained with special reference to the
Bengal infantry.
It is proposed, First, — That the number of colonels
to be placed yearly on the unattached senior list shall
not exceed nine, or such number as the Court of
Directors may sanction.*
Secondly. That the pay proper or British pay, and
the colonel's allowance of the unattached officers shall
be paid as at present by Government, and the promo-
tion to the ranks of major-general, &c, and to the
honours of the Bath, shall be open to all officers on the
senior list, as in the case of unattached officers in the
Eoyal army.
Thirdly. That the cost of the senior unattached list
be borne partly by the Government, and partly by the
army. The former to defray the amount of British
pay of the unattached officers, and the latter to provide
annuities for them, equal to their colonel's allowances.
Fourthly. That the terms of payment of the annuities,
payable at the India House to be solicited from Govern-
ment, be similar to those now granted to the civil and
medical services, namely, an exchange of two shillings
for the Company's rupee, and interest at the rate of 6
per cent, per annum on all appropriated capital.
* For the whole Indian army, the number of officers to bo placed
yearly on the unattached list would be
Bengal
Madras
Bombay
Infantry
9
Cavalry
1.153
Engineers
0.461
Artillery
1.384
11.998
Infantry
4 6.333
Cavalry
0.923
Engineers
0.230
Artillery
0.807
7.293
Infantry
3.807
Cavalry
0.346
Engineers
0.230
Artillery
0.576
4.959
Total per annum
24.250
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ARMY REFORM.
The value of an annuity of £650 (colonel's allow-
ance) at 6 per cent, is calculated for the various ages
from 60 to 76. For the former age, the cost would be
Es. 53,293, and for the latter Rs. 30,914. To provide
these annuities it is proposed to levy contributions from
the several grades of the service, the chief payments
being made by the senior ranks as they gain most by
promotion. In the grades of lieutenant-colonel and
major, a fixed sum is required for each step. The
maximum subscription of a lieutenant-colonel is limited
to two months' difference of pay between that grade,
and the grade of colonel, that is, to Rs. 500, and the
minimum is fixed at ^©th of the above sum, or Co.'s
Rs. 6-4. All other subscriptions in the grade of lieu-
tenant-colonel, are in arithmetical proportion to the
above sums, and according to the standing of the
subscriber. The maximum subscription of a major is
limited to one and a half month's difference of pay,
namely, to Rs. 300, and the minimum to Rs. 3-12. All
junior grades to pay a donation on promotion. Captains
on promotion to major, 8 months' difference of pay, or
Rs. 2500. Lieutenants on promotion to captain, 4
months' difference of pay, or Rs. 500 ; and ensigns on
promotion to lieutenant, 2 months' difference of pay,
or Rs. 100. These contributions are expected to yield
as follows : —
Rs. as.
Lieut.-Colonels . . 500 + 6 — 4 x 40 = 20,250
Majors 300 + 3-12 x 40 = 12,150
For each step, Rs. 82,400
9
For nine steps, Rs. 291,600
25 Captains promoted at 2500 is . . 62,500
40 Lieutenants promoted at 500 is . . 20,000
50 Ensigns promoted at 100 is . . 5,000
Yearly Income, Co.'s Rs. . 3,79,100
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PROPOSED SENIOR LIST.
461
This sum will insure nine annuities yearly, to Colonels
above the age of 69 years, or seven annuities, should
the ages of the annuitants be below 69, but not under
60. The total payments that would be required from
any one officer, in passing from Ensign to Colonel,
would be
Re.
As Lieutenant on promotion ... 100
As Captain on promotion . . . . 500
As Major on promotion 2,500
While passing through the grade of Major . 4,404
While passing through the grade of Lieut.-
Colonel 10,125
Total Co.'s Es. . 17,629
Under the present system, the average period of ser-
vice in the grade of Lieutenant-Colonel, is 1 0 years and
2 months, which gives 7 J steps a year as the rate of
promotion : by adding 8 steps to the above, a Lieu-
tenant-Colonel would pass through that grade in 5 years.
Majors are at present 5 years and 10 months in passing
from Major to Lieutenant-Colonel: eight additional
steps per annum, would push them through the grade
of Major in 3 years and 7 months. Ensigns are, on an
average, 25 years 5 months in attaining the rank of
Major regimentally. Eight additional line steps per
annum, would be equal to one regimental step in ten
years. The regimental officer would therefore gain two
regimental steps by the line promotion in his run to
Major more than he does at present, and for his greatly-
accelerated promotion would pay but Ks. 3100.
Such is the scheme before us. Its promised advan-
tages are so great that we cannot imagine any officer
refusing it his support. It appears to be free from the
objections which have been urged against purchase in
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ARMY REFORM.
Her Majesty's service. No unnecessary supercession of
old officers by young and inexperienced boys, whose
only recommendation for promotion is their ability to
pay for it, would occur. The cost to individuals would
not be out of proportion to the increased income that
would follow the several payments. The rise would be
equally felt by all, and Government would derive even
greater benefit than the officers themselves, by having
at their disposal in the higher grades men physically fit
for service, The average age of colonels would not in
the course of time exceed forty-seven years. Lieute-
nant-colonels would be placed in command of corps at
forty -two, and the lower grades would feel the benefit of
a senior list in equal proportion.
During the first years of its existence the cost of a
senior list to Government would be trifling. The finan-
cial result ought not, however, to prevent its adoption,
if it offer, as we believe it does, the means of making
the armies of India, as regards their European commis-
sioned officers, really efficient. Supposing the mean
duration of the lives of the officers removed to the senior
list to be nine years. This will give 9x24 = 216 an-
nuitants as the maximum of the senior unattached list
for the three Presidencies. The ultimate cost, therefore,
to Government would be
45G|x216= £98,550
To which add the difference between
4 and 6 per cent, as the donation
interest on £908,712, the value of
216 annuities 18,174
Making a total of . . . .£116,724
or eleven lakhs of rupees a year for the whole Indian
army; that is, one-hundredth part of the cost of the
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THE MEDICAL SERVICE.
463
military establishment of India, as at present consti-
tuted.
We are given to understand that the scheme is before
Government. We beg their support. It received the
cordial concurrence of the late commander-in-chief, and
has met with the concurrence of many experienced
officers, the letters of several of whom lie before us.
We trust that it will receive that consideration from
General Anson which the subject deserves.
Let a mixed commission be appointed to inquire into
the state of promotion. That now sitting in England
will not benefit the Indian army. The system of pro-
motion in India being by seniority alone, requires a
separate investigation ; and without some such special
inquiry we despair of effectual improvement. We fear
we have been tedious, perhaps unintelligible. The great
importance of the subject demands the time and atten-
tion of our readers.
From general, let us return to special necessities.
Among the burdens of the army — indeed, of the Indian
services — are paper forms and returns. They weigh
down men's souls. Thet medical department, which has
always been a step-child, peculiarly suffers. The doctor
must often neglect his patients to enable him to send in
his papers, and prove why he gave No. 1 three eggs and
a chop, and No. 2 a pint of ale and two ounces of
brandy. Such things, at least, are managed better in
the Eoyal army. There a surgeon enjoys the reason-
able confidence due to his position and profession. The
East India Company's doctor is treated as a quasi-pecu-
lator. All this must, in a great measure, be imputed to
the fact of the service having few influential friends.
The boards have no proper influence ; they can retard
or prevent ameliorations, but can seldom further good
measures. How can a board of the oldest of the old
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ARMY REFORM.
surgeons be otherwise? Age is the practical, though
not the ostensible, qualification. A change in names,
and nothing more, has been recently effected. Senior
and junior members of an effete board were converted
into a physician-general, a surgeon-general, and an
inspector-general of the same board, with identically
the same duties. The inspector-general inspects no
one! In the Eoyal army the titles and duties are
more appropriate ; one director-general supervises all :
and a right good supervisor Dr. Andrew Smith seems
to have been, notwithstanding the abuse heaped on him
last year. If others had evinced half his forethought,
and had done their duty as he did his, many of the
dreadful tales of 1854-55 would have been spared. In-
spectors-general are as Indian superintending surgeons.
Deputy-inspectors are superintending surgeons of divi-
sions— a rank and office much wanted in India in the
field, if not in quarters. All these appointments go by
age; indeed, almost by incompetency. The form of
selection has, in two cases only, been gone through.
Men like Kennedy, Dempster, and James McRae are
selected for war service. They evince indomitable
energy, cool courage, and great skill. Their operations
are carried on under fire. They stand fast when crowds
of fighting men break through their doolies and over
their amputating tables. They endeavour to make up
for the misconduct of others. What is their reward ?
A bare mention in the Gazette with the crowd who
have, as above hinted, roughly interfered with their
duties ; no honours, no rewards, await them on return
of peace ; they sink to regimental charges. We are
wrong. Jemmy Thompson was, in his old age,
knighted, and three or four surgeons, for past services,
were made Companions of the Bath. These inaugura-
tions were somewhat akin to the recent creation of field-
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THE MEDICAL SERVICE.
465
marshals in honour of Sebastopol. All this is very bad.
The man who works, who hazards his own life to pre-
serve others, whatever be his position or department,
should be honoured, and otherwise rewarded, and that
promptly. There ought to be special professional re-
wards. Men like McEae and Dempster ought to be
Knights of the Bath, and be placed in positions putting
them above pecuniary care. The former good man and
good surgeon has several sons, and cannot get one of
them into the service in which he has behaved so well
and ably I True, he was specially thanked after the
second Punjab campaign, and told that no man in the
whole army of twenty-five thousand men had done the
State better or more useful service ; but for years he
remained unrewarded. The fact is, that, as in the
Eoyal service, there is little, if any, professional stimu-
lus or reward for the practical surgeon. Lord Dal-
housie, just previous to departure, as far as lay in his
power, did McRae tardy justice in placing him at the
head of the Calcutta Medical College.
We might name many surgeons, far down in the list,
who merit special reward, and yet are unrewarded. Dr.
John Murray, of Agra, can hardly be said to be un-
rewarded ; but his reward and position are the private
fruits of his public and private ability and energy.
The late cholera crisis at Agra bears witness to all.
His case at Aliwal so peculiarly exemplifies our argu-
ment that we must narrate the circumstances. Murray
was then assistant-surgeon attached to the troop of
horse artillery. Heaps of wounded lay around, but
there was no field surgeon ; neither were there sufficient
amputating instruments. Several large boxes, however,
full of all requisites, were lying at the post-office, ad-
dressed to the superintending surgeon at Ferozepore,
eighty miles distant. No one dared to open them. The
H H
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ARMY REFORM.
postmaster probably objected to such felony. Murray,
unable to inspirit his seniors, went at the boxes like a
man ; no, like a woman, like Miss Nightingale at the
Balaklava store-room. Hatchet ^in hand, he got out
saws, knives, plasters, lint, and tourniquets ; told his
brethren to help themselves, each giving a receipt for
what he took (the canny Scot here peeps out). He
then went to Sir Harry Smith, and got him to name a
field surgeon ; but the nominee refused the responsi-
bility. Murray then accepted it himself, worked hard,
got the wounded under cover, and doubtless saved many
lives. What was his reward ? Why, that the Auditor-
General deducted his horse artillery pay, and refused to
pass his field surgeoncy allowance on account of some
informality — perhaps, because he was an assistant-sur-
geon. The essential part of the story we know to be
correct. He did the work, and was thereby out of
pocket.
We have also a story of a different sort to tell.
About that same period an old surgeon arrived within
a few miles of where lay nearly a thousand sick and
wounded soldiers, belonging to a brigade to which only
a single surgeon, or assistant, was present for each regi-
ment. He came to be superintending surgeon, but
could not take up his new office, pending some arrange-
ment. How did he pass the interval ? Why, in entire
idleness, a march or more from the sufferers, although
he was urged to lend a hand ! We can vouch for this
fact. It occurred under our own eyes. Yet Murray
lost his pay by his exertions, and is now simply a civil
surgeon ; while his senior who thus acted never suffered
in pocket, more than in feeling, by his cruel apathy, and
is now comfortably out of the service.
The medical staff of the army is altogether insuf-
ficient, and hitherto it has not been well supported by
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ASSISTANT-SURGEONS.
467
the recently-appointed class of sub-assistant-surgeons.
The move in their favour was a good one, but has not
yet ripened to good fruit. We are well pleased that
assistant-surgeoncies are now open to natives of India ;
but for some years it will be moral, not mental, capa-
bility that will be found most deficient. In no profes-
sion are conscientiousness and high moral worth more
required than in the physician and surgeon. More
Native doctors are greatly wanted, and those in the
service have insufficient motives for exertion. Some of
them are most deserving men. A few can operate for
cataract, extract calculi, &c. We strongly recommend
grades being established, rising on strict examination,
from present rates, 25 and 30 rupees, to 50, 70, and 80
rupees a month. Also, that schools for the professional
education of such persons be established at Bangalore,
Poonah, and Lahore, as already exist at Agra and
Hyderabad.
Pay should also be proportioned to work and respon-
sibility with the higher classes. Every assistant-surgeon
has, on arrival, to do duty on subaltern's pay with an
European regiment, or at the Presidency General Hos-
pital. His aim is accordingly to move as soon as pos-
sible. Some stay hardly a month, and are then com-
fortably settled in civil stations, or in the hills. Others
are knocked about from regiment to regiment. We
have known an instance of a young assistant-surgeon
being eighteen times moved within as many months,
ending with having to take a wing of an European
regiment two hundred miles in the month of May and
June, after having just brought a similar detachment a
similar march in April. We recollect another young
medico dying of heat and exposure when similarly
employed. The assistant-surgeon with an European
regiment has exactly the same duty to perform as the
h h 2
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ARMY REFORM.
surgeon — the same responsility for his portion of the
corps. He is not, like a subaltern, under minute orders.
He acts every hour, in matters of life and death, on his
own responsibility. He should receive, at least, the
same staff pay as if in charge of a Native corps, and
thus have a motive for remaining at his more respon-
sible post. At an apparent first expense money would
thus be saved, inasmuch as valuable lives, now sacrificed
by changes and by inexperience, would be preserved.
Constant changes do no one good ; they damp all zeal,
and vitally hinder all efficiency.
Medical officers in charge of corps should have full
authority, however, to draw for all necessaries for the
sick. Thus trusted and sufficiently supplied with Eu-
ropean medicines, which is not always the case at
present, they would endeavour to keep down expense by
using indigenous drugs, many of which are valuable,
and all of which are cheap, and procurable in every
bazaar. Surgeons should be assisted by efficient well-
paid stewards, as is the case in the Bombay army.
They should not be teased with mere business details
about bread, sago, saucepans, and flannel gowns. It
should be quite sufficient in such matters for them to
satisfy the superintending surgeon, that they have not
wasted the public money. Dooly-bearers and other
hospital servants should all be enrolled, well-paid, and
eligible for pensions ; their not being so has cost many
a wounded man his life. The scum of the earth will
go under fire when there is a pension for heirs. Non-
combatants can hardly be expected to expose themselves
without such provision. Mule-litters, horse ambulances
are much required on service. Every corps should have
two educated medical officers ; European corps four. We
remember an officer proposing to prosecute Government
for putting his precious limbs into the charge of a veiy
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OPPORTUNITIES OP THE MEDICAL OFFICER. 469
worthy and deserving man, who, however, was only an
apothecary. On the other hand, we knew another who
preferred the apothecary to the doctor.
Our remarks on this division of our subject have been
somewhat full, because we deeply feel its importance
both to humanity and to the Government's good name.
Every European, and Anglicized native, in India is a
missionary. Each individual has the opportunity,
within his sphere, of doing great good or great evil ; of
setting a good or a bad example. He is a light on a
hill. Surgeons are specially so. The subaltern deals
with a hundred men, the doctor with a thousand, and if
he have a spark of philanthropy, will minister extra-
officially to hundred of others. Some do to thousands.
Such men are ministers of mercy to the most wretched ;
give light to the blind ; relieve the leper, heal the sick,
and greatly smooth the path of the aged to the grave.
They should be cordially assisted by Government.
Every medical man should have a carte-blanche to open
dispensaries for the poor, under check, as to medicines,
only of their immediate professional superiors.
The truth of our sentiments as to the prospects of
Indian army doctors is demonstrated by the fact that
the candidates for employ, at all the recent examinations
in London, have been hardly as numerous as the
vacancies awaiting them. The well-educated young
doctors of England have discovered the East India
Company's service not to be the best field for talent
and energy.
Did space permit, we should have much to say on the
morality of the Indian army. The Native portion gives
no trouble. No soldier ever existed more patient, more
sober, more obedient than the Hindoo sepoy.
The Hindustani Mahommedan has more energy, but
is scarcely less tractable under a firm but considerate
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ARMY REFORM.
commandant ; both classes offer examples for any army.
A petty theft, an occasional religious brawl, and a less-
frequent murder, originating in revenge, form the foil
catalogue of serious crime. In some regiments years
glide by without a necessity for severe punishment.
The European soldier is a different creature, and re-
quires a stricter discipline. The day of great severity
has happily passed away ; the day when the remedy for
every error was the lash. The law of kindness has
however yet to be tried. Let British soldiers be dealt
with as reasonable beings. Believe them from espionage,
keep them strictly to their duty, but let them have
all reasonable indulgence when off duty. Let Jacob's
scheme be tried with European soldiers, as with Native
horsemen, with rifles, and with cannon. We are glad
again to quote Jacob's words : —
u The attempt to govern English soldiers by fear of bodily pain is as
wise as is the cramping of our men's bodies by absurd clothing and
accoutrements. * * * * Appeal to the highest and noblest
faculties of man."
Jacob thinks that fifty thousand elite English peasantry
and yeomen in the ranks, treated, and trained, and armed
on rational principles, " would be a match for a world in
arms." Again we go very far with Colonel Jacob, and
heartily wish he were "the Lord Panmure" of India.*
* Since the first part of this article on Monday morning last one of each
was in type, we have fallen upon the of these was taken to the target
following extract from the Times, practice ground. To the tumbril
relative to the efficiency of the En- were attached six horses with riders
field rifle and its advantages over made of framework, covered with
artillery. This experiment goes far canvas, and stuffed with straw ; the
to support Colonel Jacob's views on whole the size of life. About the
this subject, more especially when gun-carriage were stuffed figures re-
it is considered that Jacob's rifle is presenting men unlimbenng and
a more deadly and lavger-ranging bringing the gun into action. At a
piece than the Enfield rifle: — distance somewhat beyond 600 yards
u An interesting experiment took from them, about sixty of the men
place lately at the School of Mus- under instruction at the School of
ketrv at Hythe. Some condemned Musketry were drawn up in two
tumbrils and gun limbers having divisions, the one extending in skir-
been lately procured from Woolwich, mishing order, the other supporting.
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MARRIED LIFE IN BARRACKS.
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Barrack married life is one of the greatest military
difficulties. The expense of keeping and moving large
numbers of women must always be a bar to the positive
encouragement of matrimony. On the other hand, the
improved health and steadiness of married men, should
be considered in all calculations of expense, and should
at least modify its discouragement. We agree cordially
with a recent Bombay reviewer,* that " the percentage
system of indecency, and the rejection of all beyond
the percentage (six, on embarkation), should at once be
knocked on the head."
With him we urge that, whatever be the number of
women allowed, they should be cared for and dealt with
as Christian females. At present, they are hardly allowed
to be respectable ; they are not treated as if they were.
A shawl, a bit of cloth, separates families. Obscene
language ever rings in their ears, obscene sights are
constantly before their eyes. The result is too often
what might be expected, and then the cry is, " the nasty
creatures, the hypocrites, the liars." That some respect-
able women do live and die in the barracks is a standing
miracle. Great should be their reward !
On board ship and at depots, where most attention is
required, least is often given. We have known women
One round was first fired by the at the supposed artillery, first by
front rank only of the skirmishing sections, tnen by sub-divisions, and
party, which may have consisted of finally by divisions, the whole with
about twenty men, and the result an accuracy perfectly wonderful,
was that a bullet had passed through The experiment clearly proved that,
almost every horse, as also through in the hands of well-skilled soldiers
many of the riders and men em- — men who, having been taught the
ployed at the gun. The support principles of rifle-shooting theoreti-
was then ordered up to reinforce cally and practically, have obtained
skirmishers, and the whole fired a perfect confidence in their weapon
three or four rounds in skirmishing — the Enfield rifle must prove more
order, which completely riddled than a match for any field guns of
horses, riders, and footmen. The the present day." — Times.
party was then closed on its centre, * Bombay Quarterly, No. VI. ; ar-
and retired to a distance of above tide, "Military men and their dress/'
800 yards, when volleys were fired
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ARMY REFORM.
sent in open pattemars, from Scinde to Bombay, in
company with bachelor soldiers, without the slightest
arrangements for privacy. The hourly scenes at most
depots are too disgusting for description.
The principle of the PatcAerry, or cottage system, for
married soldiers, obtaining in the Bombay Presidency, is
good, but is badly carried out. Many of the buildings
are altogether unfit to be occupied by Europeans, when
the thermometer is 100° and even 110°, as is often the
case during several months of the year. But the prin-
ciple is good. Indeed we see not why the Patcherry
system should not be extended to bachelors of good
characters. Let two, four, ten, or more friends, under
joint responsibility for good conduct, mess and live to-
gether, whether in detached cottages, or in partitioned-
off apartments of present barracks. The sober and
the pious man might then, at least, live unmolested by
the jeers and ribaldry of his dissipated comrades. We
throw out the hint to the authorities. A distinguished
officer, who advocates the measure, has told us that in
Scinde he has often, in his rides in the jungle, come
upon threes and fours of the 78th Highlanders at
prayers, or reading their bibles.
Considering their circumstances and temptations, the
early age at which they leave home, and the little check
on irregularities by regimental authorities, the morality
of the officers of the Indian army is good. It is at least
on a par with that of corresponding classes in England.
It is superior to that of the Colonies. In mainy quarters
there is much earnestness of purpose, much that is
thoroughly good. Gross and open immorality is now
most rare : as rare, as forty years ago it was common.
While, however, in many corps there is an excellent
tone, while in such the commandant considers and treats
the subalterns as his wards, and while the elder officers
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MORALITY OP THE ARMY.
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set an example of sobriety and gentlemanly conduct to
the younger ; in others, the whole atmosphere of the re-
giment is clouded by opposite influences. The proceed-
, ings of courts-martial, as occasionally published, let the
public behind the scenes in such matters. And what
more uncertain and even whimsical, than the fiats of
such courts? A Lieutenant Barnes at Bombay is
acquitted of blame for virtually declining to do duty.
A Major O'Grady at Madras, is " severely reprimanded "
for denouncing his commanding officer before the young
officers of the mess, as " an old fool " and " a d — d jack-
ass." Within a few weeks of these two awards, Lieu-
tenant Patterson, a young officer of previously-unstained
reputation, is dismissed the service for an act of gross
violence certainly, but perpetrated on the impulse of the
moment, under gross provocation. We are of opinion
that two of these sentences might, with advantage, have
been reversed, and that the award on Lieutenant Barnes
was erroneous. He was undoubtedly guilty of the crime
of which he was charged, however he may have been
provoked to it, and doubtless he was grievously pro-
voked.
Although then the army is not so bad as Sir Charles
Napier and some recent writers depict it, there is, in
many quarters, much that needs reform. H. M/s
46th Begiment prove that full messes are neither the
most moral, nor the most gentlemanly; but in India,
as a rule, the largest messes are the most respectable.
Major O'Grady set a bad example to his younger
brethren, but it is where a number of idle young fellows
get together, without the restraining voice of their
seniors, that vulgar quarrels and immoralities mostly
occur.
The remedy, again, is efficient commanders to regi-
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ARMY REFORM .
ments. At whatever cost to the State, and at whatever
pain to individuals, let there be a soldierly man, of good
sense, at the head of every corps, and let his authority be
supported. Better that his authority be in excess, than
that he should lack power. For the rest, and from the
higher authorities, a medium course between that of Sir
William Gomm and Sir Charles Napier is needed. The
violent tirades, the hollow and insincere compliments,
the biting and damning invectives of Sir Charles are not
wanted. Neither Europeans nor Natives require severity;
they do require firmness. The soft showers, the kindly
and well-meant platitudes of Sir William are therefore
as little to the purpose as were the thunder torrents of
Sir Charles.*
Judicious, without afflictive, discipline is required.
Such as, while reminding officers that they must always
be gentlemen, will equally impress on gentlemen, that
they are and must be soldiers. In Bengal the latter
reminder is most necessary. We will not assume the
invidious task of deciding where the other is most
wanted; in what quarter Mr. Arnold's and Mrs.
Mackenzie's caps best fit.
Such discipline and such surveillance as we advocate,
will be approved by most good officers. Throughout
the services the materials are excellent. Some of the
best working blood of England is in India. The sons
of the middle classes, that have won and raised England's
Oriental empire, will maintain it against all comers and
all odds. The task may be easy or hard, according as
each individual performs his part.
As one example is at all times more effective than
many homilies, we commend to our readers the " Me-
* Each general, in his parting ministration. Each evidently rote
address, well epitomized his own ad- his own farewell greeting. — H. M. L.
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HEDLEY VICARS.
475
morials of Captain Hedley Vicars, H. M. 97th Kegi-
ment,,, * who, after a short but brilliant career, died a
hero's death in the trenches before Sebastopol. Stern
soldiers wept at his death : many recorded their lamen-
tations. One sentinel wrote, " as our adjutant, he was
loved by every one in the regiment, and as captain of
No. 4 Company, he was more so by his company."
Officers of all grades and arms, from Lords Panmure
and Kaglan downwards, lamented his fall. One, a
kindred soul,f who at the age of twenty was adjutant
of the 97th Eegiment, and twice fought his way into
the Eedan, on the fatal 8 th of September, and was there
found, "far advanced on that red ground lying by a
cannon, in the sleep of death," thus wrote of Vicars
the day after the death of the latter in a private letter
to his own mother : —
u Such a death became such a life, — and such a soldier. The most gal-
lant, the most cheerful, the happiest, the most universally respected officer,
and the most consistent Christian soldier, has been taken from us by that
bullet. * * * I had fondly hoped that we should live to go home, and that
I might bring my dear departed friend to vou, and proudly show him as a
specimen of what a model soldier should be. * * * Noble fellow !
he rushed in front of his men, and his powerful arm made more than one
Russian fall * * * How he fearlessly visited and spoke to the men
in the worst times of the cholera ! but, as he told me, he got his reward ;
for the soldiers' dving lips besought blessings on his head. * * * Our
men got great praise for the fight last night, but who would not go anywhere
with such a leader ? "
Yes, we can vouch to all who will " go and do like-
wise," that such a man, the soldiers friend, the brave
in battle, the gentle in peace, will be followed to the
death by every British soldier and by every sepoy.
Sympathy, kindness, and gallantry are nowhere more
appreciated than in the Indian army.
We are happy to perceive that, for once, peace has
not thrown the home authorities off their guard. There
* James Nisbett and Co., Berner's 97th Regiment, nephew of General
Street, London, 1 856. Paul MacGregor, and cousin of Lieut.-
t Lieut. Douglas Macgregor, IL M. Col. George MacGregor, Bengal army.
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ARMY REFORM.
can be no lasting peace. The time has not come. The
war of principles has yet to be fought. Russia must
have her revenge, and America must try her strength,
her gigantic frigates, and her ten-inch guns: we are
accordingly delighted to observe that the peace estab-
lishment is to be 140,000 men, on a footing admitting
of speedy increase : above all, that twenty thousand ar-
tillery-men are to be maintained.
We regret, however, that nothing was done, on the
treaty of peace, to control Russia in Asia. We are
aware that there were difficulties; but the right of
having a Consul at Meshed and trading vessels on the
Caspian might have been obtained. Information on
Central Asian matters is greatly wanted. Insensibly
and almost by a coup-de-?nain, the Russian empire has
been extended for thirteen thousand miles across the whole
Continent of Europe and Asia, and for twenty degrees
over America. Curbed to the south and west, Russia
has not waited an hour to push forward her soldiers,
her sailors, her savants, her engineers, and her labourers
to the Caspian, to the Aral, and even to the mighty
Amoor. Her old policy will now, more vigorously
than ever, be pursued, and though the dream of a
century will never be realized, her position in Persia
will speedily be strengthened, and posts will be esta-
blished in Central Asia and even in China. Bomar-
sunds, if not Sebastopols, will arise at Orenburgh,
Astrakan, and Astrabad, perhaps even at Balkh and
Herat. The wave has receded, to return with re-
doubled force, though at a different angle.
Such has ever been and will be Russia's policy. There
will be no Russian invasion of India, nor probably will
the tribes be impelled on us. The latter now under-
stand our strength ; Russia has long understood both
our strength and our weakness. There will be no
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RUSSIAN POLICY.
477
foolish raid as long as India is united, in tranquillity and
contentment, under British rule. Russia well knows
that such an attempt would only end in the entire de-
struction of the invaders. India has been invaded some
forty times, but always by small armies, acting in com-
munication with domestic parties. A small Russian
army could not make good its way through Affghanistan ;
a large army would be starved there in a week. The
largest army that could come with Affghanistan and
Persia in its train, would be met at the outlets of the
only two practicable passes, and while attempting to
debouche would be knocked to pieces. A hundred
thousand Anglo-Indian troops might, with the help of
railroads, be collected at each pass in as few days as it
would take an unopposed Russian army weeks to traverse
them. Hundreds of eight-inch guns would there be
opposed to their field-pieces. The danger, then, is ima-
ginary. Herat is no more the key to India than is
Tabreez, or Khiva, or Kokan, or Meshed. The chain
of almost impenetrable mountains is the real key to
India. England's own experience in the western passes,
and in the Crimea, have proved the absurdity of the tale
of Russian invasion. No, the dream is idle : England's
dangers are in India, not without ; and we trust that it
will be in India they will be met, and that there will be
no third Affghan campaign. Such a move would be
playing Russia's game. We are safe while we hold our
ground and do our duty. Russia may teaze, annoy, and
frighten us by her money and by emissaries. She may
even do us mischief, but she will never put foot in Hin-
dostan.
What America may venture, sixty years hence, when
her population numbers a hundred millions, and when
vessels of ten thousand tons ply the ocean, is another,
and may possibly be considered a wilder question. But
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ARMY REFORM.
that America will strive for Oriental sovereignty is
certain. She is welcome ; there will be room for cen-
turies, for the whole Saxon race. Let England work
out her destiny, let her govern India for the people, and,
as far as possible, by the people, and neither England
nor India need fear Eussia or America, or both com-
bined.
To recapitulate. Our object is, to direct attention to
Wellington's dying legacy, and to our greatest living
warrior's equally solemn enunciation,
" Woe to the nation that forgets the military art ! Woe to that nation
—woe to that nation which heaps up riches, but which does not take the
precaution to defend them."
Such were the impressive and truthful words of the
hero of Kars, on the day he landed in England ; such
the warning addressed by him to the thousands who
hailed his return. And the lesson his words inculcate,
based as it is on a mournful experience, cannot be too
often or too earnestly urged upon the minds of those who
truly and unselfishly love their country. Let us not for
ever learn only from disaster. Let us use our opportunities.
To conclude : Our recommendations are, to have one
strong fortress in every province, and a redoubt in
every cantonment. All may be of mud, at very moderate
expense. No man, black or white, to be permitted merely
to cfumber a muster roll, a cantonment, or a battle field.
Only the young and middle-aged to be in the service
ranks. Elderly men to be in garrison, and in veteran
corps, commanded by hale and efficient soldiers. Old men
to retire to their homes. Similar rules for European
officers and soldiers, as for Natives, without favour or
affection. It is sheer madness, on the plea of economy,
mercy, or aught else, to keep inefficients, from whatever
cause, in the service ranks. It is worse, it is a crime, to
keep such men in authority, high or low. Their fitting
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places are the invalids, the pension list, the clubs, their
English hearths.
Legitimate outlets for military energy and ability in
all ranks, and among all classes, must be given. The
minds of subadars and resseldars, sepoys and sowars,
can no more with safety be for ever cramped, tramelled,
and restricted as at present, than can a twenty-foot
embankment restrain the Atlantic. It is simply a
question of time. The question is only whether justice
is to be gracefully conceded or violently seized. Ten or
twenty years must settle the point.
Our view is also, that regiments professedly officered
by Europeans should be really so, that officers should
really do the duty they profess to do. That the work
should not be left to havildar majors and pay orderlies.
We accordingly propose that at least two European
officers per company be posted to each of such regi-
ments ; that there be no Native officers, unless indeed
one Anglicized jemadar (as ensign) be attached to each
company, to learn his duty as a captain (subadar), when
he may be transferred as such to a regiment officered
by Natives.
We further propose that certain cavalry and infantry
regiments be wholly, and others partially, officered by
Natives.
That the veteran service be made one of honour and
comparative ease.
That honorary rewards be increased, and that pen-
sions be given earlier, and, in particular cases, on a more
liberal scale. Whether pensions be by deferred annui-
ties, or as at present, there can be no better safety
valve to the service than the pension establishment.
Comparatively few attain it ; all look to it. The vista
is long, and the cottage in the distance, very small ; it
is nevertheless the day and the night dream of thou-
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ARMY REFORM.
sands. To the Native soldiers, home is not, as with
Europeans, a simple resting-place after life's task is
done ; it is the return to, and union with, the relatives
and friends of earlier years. The whole domestic ex-
istence of the sepoy is limited to the few years of
pensioned and furlough life. His peculiar customs
deprive him of such happiness while in the ranks.
The scientific branches of the service to be kept
complete on the n\ost liberal scale. This is the best
economy. Sappers and artillerymen will, on an emer-
gency, make fair infantry, but sepoys cannot reciprocate
the obligation, nor is it perhaps expedient that they
should be taught.
The numerical strength of the European troops
should never be less than one-fourth of the regular
Native army. One-third would be a better proportion.
Year by year, the proportions have decreased, though
the contrary would have been the wiser policy. Fami-
liarity nowhere engenders reverence. A hundred years
ago a company was looked on by the enemy as a regi-
ment is now, and yet at Seringapatam, the proportion
of Europeans was very much greater than it has been
during more recent wars.
The arms and accoutrements of all, but especially of
the Europeans, should be of the very best description.
Our infantry arms at Sebastopol were better than those
of the Eussians. The Minie rifle probably saved Inker-
mann, as the change from six to nine-pounders may
have saved Waterloo.
A staff corps to be formed of officers who have served
from two to four years with their own arm, and for at
least one with every other. The staff not to be ex-
clusively drawn from this corps. Examinations to be
required for every post, and for every grade, up to given
points. Staff corps men, as others, to undergo such
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RECAPITULATION.
481
examinations. Literary attainments to be slightly con-
sidered ; military science, rather than mathematics, to be
the desideratum. In short, strictly practical and pro-
fessional knowledge with soldierly bearing, and good
characters, to be the main points. We are quite sensible
of the difficulty : the public service, not the welfare of
individuals, is the point at issue.
Another of our suggestions is, quietly and unostenta-
tiously to oppose class to class, creed to creed, and
interest to interest. We have also argued, that this
can be best done in the army, not as at present, by a
mixture of sects in each regiment, but by separate
regiments, each consisting chiefly, though not entirely,
of a single sect.
Annual " Chobhams," and " Aldershotts " to be esta-
blished at each Presidency, where officers, soldiers, and
sepoys should be taught to work, as before an enemy ;
to make gabions and fascines : to dig and delve ; to
throw up works ; to attack and defend them. In short,
for two or three months of every year, soldiers should
have the opportunity, as far as practicable, of learning
what war is, and should also learn to take care of them-
selves in the field in all weather.
On somewhat the principles above enunciated, and
with one unmistakable Pay Code for all India, the
army* might be made doubly efficient for war or for
peace, at an expense hardly exceeding half a million in
excess of present expenditure. Officers would no longer
* We have purposely left un- necessity of a large field for selec-
touched the question of one army tions for Indian army staff apply
or three armies, or of a general amal- equally to the Royal troops. Free
gamation with the Itoyal army. But employment for all, and liberty of
in whatever hands the Indian army cxcnange between the Queen's and
remains, its officers should be avail- Company's troops should be the
able for service throughout the world, rule. — H. M. L.
All the arguments that apply to the
I I
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ARMY REFORM.
doubt their own men,* the men would have less reason
to complain of their officers. The latter would do what
they hardly now profess to do — they would look into the
details of their regiments and companies, not leave them
to Native officers whom they despise, or to non-com-
missioned Natives, who have no legitimate authority.
Each man, high or low,- in each class of regiments,
would have his place and his duty. Each man would
accordingly have more contentment. The staff ap-
pointments from corps being few, and regimental
commands being earlier obtainable, and given by merit
as much as by seniority, there would be fewer and less
loud aspirations for staff employ. The contentment of
the officers would alone go far to content the sepoys.
Pleasure and pain are catching. The murmurs of
messes quickly reach the quarter guard, as do contrary
feelings. We conclude with our oft-repeated remark,
that it is not a numerically strong army, but a contented
one with efficient officers, that is wanted. Our duty is
now done ; let others do theirs, and a reproach, possibly
a danger, will have been removed.
A paragraph in the Delhi Gazette, announcing that
the Oude authorities are disposed to dispense with the
service of the regular regiments for Lucknow, tempts a
few further words of caution — though we do not alto-
gether credit the newspaper report. The earliest days
of annexation are not the safest. Be liberal, considerate,
and merciful, but be prompt, watchful, and even quietly
suspicious. Let not the loose characters floating on the
surface of society, especially such society as Lucknow,
be too far tempted, or trusted. Wellington's maxim of
" keeping the troops out of sight," answered for Eng-
* We refer especially to such times as those of the Madras Mutiny.
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CAUTION.
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land; it will not answer for India. There must be
trusfy bayonets, within sight of the understandings, if
not of the eyes, of Indian subjects, before they -frill pay
willing obedience, or any revenue. Of late years, the
wheels of Government have been moving very fast.
Many Native prejudices have been shocked. Natives
are now threatened with the abolition of polygamy. It
would not be difficult to twist this into an attack on
Hindooism. At -any rate, the faster the vessel glides,
the more need of caution, of watching the weather, the
rocks, and the shoals.
Felix quern faciunt aliena pericula cautum.
WooUfrll and Kinder, Pi inter*. Aiitfel Court, Skiuner Street, London.
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