Minx: a simple and efficient anonymous packet format

@inproceedings{Danezis2004MinxAS,
  title={Minx: a simple and efficient anonymous packet format},
  author={George Danezis and Ben Laurie},
  booktitle={Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society},
  year={2004},
  url={https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:2361282}
}
Minx resists active attackers that are prepared to modify messages in order to embed tags which they will try to detect elsewhere in the network.
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30 Citations
Highly Influential Citations
3
Background Citations
19
Methods Citations
8

30 Citations

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Breaking and Provably Fixing Minx

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cMix: Anonymization byHigh-Performance Scalable Mixing

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Toward an Information Theoretic Secure Anonymous Communication Service The Pynchon Gate Pseudonymous Mail System

We describe the Pynchon Gate, a practical pseudonymous message retrieval system. Our design uses a simple distributed-trust private information retrieval protocol to prevent adversaries from linking…

Breaking four mix-related schemes based on Universal Re-encryption

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Using Sphinx to Improve Onion Routing Circuit Construction

This paper significantly compress the circuit construction messages for three onion routing protocols that have emerged as enhancements to the Tor anonymizing network; namely, Tor with predistributed Diffie-Hellman values, pairing-based onion routing, and certificateless onion routing.

The Chances of Successful Attacks against Continuous-time Mixes

It will be shown via analytical means that considering a locally back-tracing observer and the source-hiding property as anonymity measure, the PROB Channel outperforms the SG Mix for MIN/MAX senders in practically relevant scenarios.

Low Latency Anonymity with Mix Rings

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26 References

Mixminion: design of a type III anonymous remailer protocol

Mixminion works in a real-world Internet environment, requires little synchronization or coordination between nodes, and protects against known anonymity-breaking attacks as well as or better than other systems with similar design parameters.

Breaking Efficient Anonymous Channel

This work shows several successful attacks on two new anonymous channels and thus on the secrecy of the votes in the election scheme, and presents some countermeasures against all the attacks.

From a Trickle to a Flood: Active Attacks on Several Mix Types

It is shown that if certain mixes are used, such attacks cannot destroy the anonymity of a particular message completely, and it is worked out the cost of these attacks in terms of the number of messages the attacker must insert into the network and the time he must spend.

Provably Secure Public-Key Encryptionfor Length-Preserving Chaumian Mixes

The generalized Kerckhoffs' assumption is generalized to allow an attacker to have access to intermediate results during the computational process of cryptographic operations and it is shown that the generalized assumption models quite well such real world attacks as the "memory reconstruction attacks" and the " memory core-dump attack".

Hiding Routing Information

This paper describes an architecture, Onion Routing, that limits a network's vulnerability to traffic analysis and provides real-time, bi-directional, anonymous communication for any protocol that can be adapted to use a proxy service.

Efficient Anonymous Channel and All/Nothing Election Scheme

An efficient computationally secure anonymous channel which has no problem of ciphertext length expansion is presented which improves the efficiency of Chaum's election scheme based on the MIX net automatically.

Non-malleable cryptography

Non-malleable schemes for each of the contexts of string commitment and zero-knowledge proofs of possession of knowledge, where a user need not know anything about the number or identity of other system users are presented.

A verifiable secret shuffle and its application to e-voting

A mathematical construct which provides a cryptographic protocol to verifiably shuffle a sequence of k modular integers is presented, and its application to secure, universally verifiable, multi-authority election schemes is discussed and shown to be honest-verifier zeroknowledge in a special case and in general.

Dummy Traffic against Long Term Intersection Attacks

The proposed solution is to send pregenerated dummy messages to the communication partner (e.g. the web server), during the user's off-line periods, to prevent so called "intersection attacks" on anonymity services.

A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems

An encryption method is presented with the novel property that publicly revealing an encryption key does not thereby reveal the corresponding decryption key, soriers or other secure means are not needed to transmit keys.

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